Overview
Cognitive linguistics
Vyvyan Evans∗
Cognitive linguistics is one of the fastest growing and influential perspectives on the
nature of language, the mind, and their relationship with sociophysical (embodied)
experience. It is a broad theoretical and methodological enterprise, rather than
a single, closely articulated theory. Its primary commitments are outlined. These
are the Cognitive Commitment—a commitment to providing a characterization of
language that accords with what is known about the mind and brain from other
disciplines—and the Generalization Commitment—which represents a dedication
to characterizing general principles that apply to all aspects of human language.
The article also outlines the assumptions and worldview which arises from these
commitments, as represented in the work of leading cognitive linguists.  2012 John
Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
How to cite this article:
WIREs Cogn Sci 2012. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1163
INTRODUCTION
Cognitive linguistics represents a contemporary
approach to language, language learning, and
conceptual structure. Hence, I will restrict myself
in this review to assumptions relating to these
specific areas of enquiry. Moreover, Cognitive
linguistics provides a perspective on language and
the mind which is diametrically opposed to both
Generative Grammar and Formal Semantics. While
it flies under the colors of cognitive psychology,
Cognitive linguistics has much in keeping with
functional approaches to language. It is also important
to emphasize that Cognitive linguistics is not a
single, closely articulated, theory. Rather, it is a
broad theoretical and methodological enterprise,
wherein lies its strength. What provides the
enterprise with coherence is its set of primary
commitments and central theses. Influential theories
within the enterprise have afforded practicing
cognitive linguists the analytical and methodological
tools with which to investigate the phenomena
they address. What makes Cognitive linguistics
distinctive in the contemporary language sciences
is its overarching concern with investigating the
relationship between human language, the mind,
and sociophysical experience. In doing so, Cognitive
linguistics takes a clearly defined and determinedly
∗
Correspondence to: v.evans@bangor.ac.uk
School of Linguistics & English Language, Bangor University,
Bangor, UK
embodied perspective on human cognition. And in this
respect, cognitive linguists have developed a number of
influential theories within the interdisciplinary project
of cognitive science which self-consciously strive for
(and measure themselves against) the requirement to
be psychologically plausible, given what is now known
about the mind/brain.
Cognitive linguistics has its origins in scholarship
which emerged in the 1970s, conducted by a
small number of researchers. These include Charles
Fillmore,1
George Lakoff,2,3
Ronald Langacker,4
and Leonard Talmy.5,6
This research arose out of
dissatisfaction with formal approaches, especially
Generative Grammar7,8
and Montague Grammar,9–11
then dominant in the disciplines of linguistics and
philosophy. While the origins of Cognitive linguistics
were, in part, philosophical in nature, as is evident
in the landmark 1980 publication, Metaphors we
Live By, by Lakoff and Johnson, Cognitive linguistics
has always been strongly influenced by theories and
findings from the other cognitive sciences, particularly
cognitive psychology, and more recently by the brain
sciences, especially the interdisciplinary perspective
known as cognitive neuroscience.
Cognitive linguists have typically adopted a
number of distinct (although complementary) areas
of focus. Some researchers within the enterprise
have been exercised by the study of language
structure and organization. This constitutes a subbranch
of Cognitive linguistics sometimes referred
to as cognitive approaches to grammar. Notable
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exemplars include Construction Grammar, which in
fact represents a family of (related) theories, including
Radical Construction Grammar12
and Cognitive
Construction Grammar developed by Goldberg13,14
and Lakoff,15
as well as Cognitive Grammar,
developed by Langacker16–20
and Talmy’s21
work on
the distinction between open and closed-class systems
of language. Others have employed language as a
means of studying aspects of conceptual organization
and structure. The study of aspects of the mind,
such as knowledge representation and meaning
construction, employing language as a lens for doing
so, is sometimes referred to as cognitive semantics.
Exemplars include Mental Spaces Theory,22,23
Conceptual Blending Theory,24
and Conceptual
Metaphor Theory25,26
A further sub-branch relates to
the study of word meanings, sometimes referred to as
cognitive lexical semantics. Notable exemplars include
the Principled Polysemy model,27,28
and the work of
Geeraerts on diachronic prototype semantics.29
Some
scholars have attempted to integrate the study of all
three areas. A recent example is the Theory of Lexical
Concepts and Cognitive Models (LCCM Theory).30
This article presents an overview of the
primary theoretical commitments, assumptions and
worldview of Cognitive linguistics. This will serve
to provide an introduction to the major concerns
and theoretical orientation of this rapidly expanding
perspective. Hence, I survey the central tenets of
Cognitive linguistics. I do so by firstly examining
the primary commitments that practicing cognitive
linguists subscribe to. I then examine the guiding
assumptions, the default hypotheses, that follow
from these commitments. And finally, I consider the
theoretical and methodological worldview that is built
upon these assumptions. The article concludes with
an overview of recent trends, and new directions, in
cognitive linguistic research.
THE COMMITMENTS OF COGNITIVE
LINGUISTICS
Cognitive linguistics is guided by two primary commitments.
Firstly, it takes seriously the cognitive
underpinnings of language, the so-called Cognitive
Commitment.31
Cognitive linguists attempt to
describe and model language in the light of convergent
evidence from other cognitive and brain sciences. Secondly,
cognitive linguists subscribe to a Generalization
Commitment: a commitment to describing the nature
and principles that constitute linguistic knowledge
as an outcome of general cognitive abilities31
–rather
than viewing language as constituting, for instance,
a wholly distinct encapsulated module of mind
(cf. Chomsky32
; Fodor33
). That is, rather than assuming
that language arises solely from an innate prespecification,
with a domain-specific learning mechanism,
Cognitive linguistics assumes a domain-general learning
mechanism that is highly sensitive to usage and
frequency.34
Clearly, there must be some prespecification
for language learning, given that humans
appear to the only species capable of language. However,
cognitive linguists emphasize the importance of
learning, in linguistic development, and in particular,
domain-general sociocognitive abilities.35,36
The Cognitive Commitment
One defining feature of Cognitive linguistics is the
Cognitive Commitment.31
This represents a commitment
to providing a characterization of language that
accords with what is known about the mind and
brain from other disciplines. It is this commitment
that makes Cognitive linguistics cognitive, and thus
an approach which is fundamentally interdisciplinary
in nature.
The Cognitive Commitment represents the view
that principles of linguistic structure should reflect
what is known about human cognition from the
other cognitive and brain sciences, particularly psychology,
artificial intelligence, cognitive neuroscience,
and philosophy. In other words, the Cognitive Commitment
asserts that the models of language proposed
should reflect what is known about the human mind,
rather than purely esthetic dictates such as the use
of particular kinds of formalisms or economy of
representation.37
The Cognitive Commitment has a number of
concrete ramifications. Firstly, linguistic theories cannot
include structures or processes that violate what
is known about human cognition. For example, if
sequential derivation of syntactic structures violates
time constraints provided by actual human language
processing, then it must be jettisoned. Secondly, models
that employ established cognitive properties to
explain language phenomena are more parsimonious
than those that are built from a priori simplicity metrics
(such as Chomskyan elegance—the view that a
theoretical model should eschew redundancy of representation
in favor of parsimony as a matter of
principle, regardless as to whether such is supported
by the empirical facts). For instance, given the amount
of progress cognitive scientists have made in the study
of categorization38
(see Lakoff15
and Taylor38
for
reviews), a theory that employs the same mechanisms
that are implicated in categorization in other
cognitive domains in order to model linguistic structure
is simpler than one that hypothesizes a separate
system. Finally, the cognitive linguistic researcher is
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WIREs Cognitive Science Cognitive linguistics
charged with establishing convergent evidence for the
cognitive reality of components of any model proposed—whether
or not this research is conducted by
the cognitive linguist.
The Generalization Commitment
The Generalization Commitment31
represents a
dedication to characterizing general principles that
apply to all aspects of human language. This goal
reflects the standard commitment in science to seek the
broadest generalizations possible. In contrast, some
approaches to the study of language often separate
what is sometimes termed the ‘language faculty’ into
distinct areas such as phonology (sound), semantics
(word and sentence meaning), pragmatics (meaning
in discourse context), morphology (word structure),
syntax (sentence structure), and so on (see Pinker39
for a case in point). As a consequence, there is often
little basis for generalization across these aspects of
language or for study of their interrelations.
While cognitive linguists acknowledge that it
may often be useful to treat areas such as syntax,
semantics, and phonology as being notionally distinct,
cognitive linguists do not start with the assumption
that the ‘subsystems’ of language are organized in
significantly divergent ways. Hence, the Generalization
Commitment represents a commitment to openly
investigating how the various aspects of linguistic
knowledge emerge from a common set of human cognitive
abilities upon which they draw, rather than
assuming that they are produced in an encapsulated
module of the mind, consisting of distinct knowledge
types or subsystems.
The Generalization Commitment has concrete
consequences for studies of language. Firstly, cognitive
linguistic studies focus on what is common
among aspects of language, seeking to reuse successful
methods and explanations across these aspects.
For instance, just as word meaning displays prototype
effects—there are better and worse examples of referents
of given words, related in particular ways15
—so
various studies have applied the same principles to
the organization of morphology,40
syntax,13,14
and
phonology.41
Generalizing successful accounts over
distinct domains of language isn’t just good scientific
practice, this is also the way biology works;
reusing existing structures for new purposes, both on
evolutionary and developmental timescales.42
THE GUIDING ASSUMPTIONS
OF COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS
In addition to the two primary commitments of
Cognitive linguistics, the enterprise also features a
number of guiding assumptions. These constitute
default hypotheses, and arise on the basis of the
primary commitments. These are:
1. the thesis of embodied cognition,
2. the thesis of encyclopedic semantics,
3. the symbolic thesis,
4. the thesis that meaning is conceptualization, and
5. the usage-based thesis.
These are elaborated below.
The Thesis of Embodied Cognition
This thesis is made up of two aspects. The first holds
that the nature of reality is not objectively given,
but is a function of our species-specific and individual
embodiment—the subthesis of embodied experi-
ence.15,25,26,28
Secondly, our mental representation of
reality is grounded in our embodied mental states:
mental states captured from our embodied experience—the
subthesis of grounded cognition.30,43,44
The subthesis of embodied experience maintains
that due to the nature of our bodies, including
our neuroanatomical architecture, we have a speciesspecific
view of the world. That is, our construal of
‘reality’ is mediated, in large measure, by the nature
of our embodiment. One example of the way in which
embodiment affects the nature of experience is in the
realm of color. While the human visual system has
three kinds of photoreceptors (i.e., color channels),
other organisms often have a different number.45
For
instance, the visual system of squirrels, rabbits, and
possibly cats, makes use of two color channels, while
other organisms, including goldfish and pigeons, have
four color channels. Having a different range of color
channels affects our experience of color in terms of
the range of colors accessible to us along the color
spectrum. Some organisms can see in the infrared
range, such as rattlesnakes, which hunt prey at night
and can visually detect the heat given off by other
organisms. Humans are unable to see in this range.
The nature of our visual apparatus—one aspect of our
embodiment—determines the nature and range of our
visual experience.
A further consequence of the subthesis of embodied
experience is that as individual embodiment within
a species varies, so too will embodied experience
across individual members of the same species. There
is now empirical support for the position that humans
have distinctive embodied experience due to individual
variables such as handedness. That is, whether one
is left- or right-handed influences the way in which
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one evaluates concepts such as good and bad, and
hence, important aspects of the way in which one
experiences reality.46
The fact that our experience is embodied—that
is, structured in part by the nature of the bodies we
have and by our neurological organization—has consequences
for cognition—the sub-thesis of grounded
cognition. Put another way, the concepts we have
access to, and the nature of the ‘reality’ we think and
talk about, are grounded in the multimodal representations
that emerge from our embodied experience.
More precisely, concepts constitute reactivations of
brain states that are recorded during embodied experience.
Such reactivations are technically referred to
as simulations—an idea I illustrate below. Simulations
are grounded in multimodal brain states, which arise
from our action and interaction with our sociophysical
environment.47
Such experiences include sensory–motor
and proprioceptive experience, as well as states
that arise from our subjective experience of our internal
(bodily) environment, including our visceral sense,
as well as experiences relating to mental evaluations
and states and other subjective experiences, including
emotions and affect more generally, and experiences
relating to temporal experience. From the grounded
cognition perspective, the human mind bears the
imprint of embodied experience. The embodied experience
and grounded cognition perspectives together
make up the thesis of embodied cognition.
The Thesis of Encyclopedic Semantics
The thesis of encyclopedic semantics is also made
up of two aspects. Firstly, it holds that semantic
representations in the linguistic system, what is
often referred to as semantic structure, interface
with representations in the conceptual system. The
precise details as to the nature of the relationship
can, and indeed do vary, however, across specific
cognitive linguistic theories. For instance, Langacker16
in his theory of Cognitive Grammar equates semantic
structure with conceptual structure, whereas Evans,30
in his LCCM Theory, maintains that semantic
structure and conceptual structure constitute two
distinct representational formats, with semantic
structure facilitating access to (some aspects of)
conceptual structure. It is worth noting that the
‘representational’ view associated with the thesis of
encyclopedic semantics is directly at odds with the
‘denotational’ perspective, what cognitive linguists
sometimes refer to as objectivist semantics, as
exemplified by some formal (i.e., truth-conditional)
approaches to semantics.48
The second part of the thesis relates to the view
that conceptual structure, to which semantic structure
relates, constitutes a vast network of structured
knowledge. This has been referred to as a semantic
potential,30
which is hence encyclopedia-like in nature
and in scope.
By way of illustration, consider the lexical item
red. The precise meaning arising from any given
instance of use of the lexical item red is a function
of the range of perceptual hues associated with our
encyclopedic set of mental representations for red,
as constrained by the utterance context in which red
is embedded. For instance, consider the following
examples (drawn from Evans)30
:
(1) The school teacher scrawled in red ink all over
the pupil’s exercise book.
(2) The red squirrel is almost extinct in the British
Isles.
In each of these examples, a distinct reactivation of
perceptual experience, a simulation, is prompted for.
In the example in (1) the perceptual simulation relates
to a vivid red, while in (2) the utterance prompts for a
brown/dun hue of red. In other words, the meaning of
the lexical item red arises from an interaction between
linguistic and conceptual representations, such that
the most relevant conceptual knowledge is activated
upon each instance of use. Examples such as those
in (1) and (2) suggest that word meaning does not
arise by unpacking a purely linguistic representation.
Rather, it involves access to a potentially vast body
of encyclopedic knowledge. A simulation, then, is a
reactivation of part of this nonlinguistic encyclopedic
knowledge.
A consequence of this is that each individual
instance of word use potentially leads to a distinct
interpretation. For instance, fast means something
quite different in fast car, fast food, a fast girl, and fast
lane of the motorway. This follows as any instance
of use constitutes a distinct usage-event that may
activate a different part of the encyclopedic knowledge
potential to which a lexical item facilitates access.
The Symbolic Thesis
The symbolic thesis holds that the fundamental
unit of grammar is a form-meaning pairing or
symbolic unit. The symbolic unit is variously
termed a symbolic assembly in Langacker’s Cognitive
Grammar,16,20
or a construction in construction
grammar approaches.12–15
Symbolic units run the full
gamut from the fully lexical to the wholly schematic.
For instance, examples of symbolic units include
morphemes (for example, dis- as in distaste), whole
words (for example, cat, run, tomorrow), idiomatic
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TABLE 1 Examples of Symbolic Units
Type of Symbolic Unit Traditional Name Example
Complex and (mostly) schematic Syntax Form: NP be-TENSE VERB- en by NP
Meaning: ACTION FROM PERSPECTIVE OF PATIENT
Complex and (mostly) specific Idiom Form: pull-TENSE NP’s leg
Meaning: TO TEASE AS A JOKE
Complex but bound Morphology Form: NOUN-s
Meaning: MORE THAN ONE OF SOMETHING,
Form: VERB-TENSE
Meaning: TIME REFERENCE WITH RESPECT TO CODING TIME
Atomic and schematic Word classes Form: NOUN
Meaning: THING,
Form: VERB
Meaning: TEMPORALLY-GROUNDED RELATION
Atomic and specific Lexical items Form: The
Meaning: specific entity,
Form: cat
Meaning: Felis domestica
Symbolic unit
Form
Syntactic properties
Morphological properties
Semantic properties
Pragmatic properties
Symbolic
correspondence
Semantic
representation
FIGURE 1 | A symbolic unit.
expressions such as He kicked the bucket, and
sentence-level constructions such as the ditransitive
(or double object) construction, as exemplified by the
expression: John baked Sally a cake (see Goldberg13
).
Some examples of symbolic units are given in Table 1.
More precisely, the symbolic thesis holds that the
mental grammar consists of a form, a semantic unit,
and a symbolic correspondence that relates the two.
This is captured in Figure 1. In other words, the symbolic
thesis holds that our mental grammar comprises
units, which consist of pairings of form and meaning.
One consequence of the symbolic thesis is that
units that do not consist of pairings of form and
meaning, such as the abstract rules posited in the
generative tradition,8,49
for instance, are excluded
from a language user’s mental grammar. Langacker16
posits a content requirement, a principle that asserts
that units of grammar must involve actual content:
units of semantic structure and phonological form
(even if phonologically schematic), that are linked by
a symbolic correspondence. Interestingly, the symbolic
thesis, as manifested for instance in Langacker’s
content requirement, represents a return to some
aspects of the core ideas of the American structuralist
tradition, but with a significant reworking of the
notion of meaning.
The adoption of the symbolic thesis has a
number of important consequences for a model of
grammar. Because the fundamental element is the
symbolic unit, meaning achieves central status in cognitive
linguistic approaches to grammar. This follows
as the basic grammatical unit is a symbolic unit: form
cannot be studied independently of meaning.
The second consequence is that as there is not a
principled distinction between the study of semantics
and syntax, the study of grammar is the study of the
full range of units that make up a language, from
the lexical to the grammatical. Cognitive linguists
posit a ‘lexicon-grammar continuum’12,16
to capture
this perspective. While the grammar of a language
is made up of symbolic units, symbolic units exhibit
qualitative differences in terms of their schematicity.
At one extreme are symbolic units that are highly
specified in terms of their lexical form and in terms of
the richness of their semantic content. Such symbolic
units—for example words—lie at the ‘lexical’ end of
the lexicon-grammar continuum. At the other end,
lie highly schematic symbolic units, schematic both
in terms of phonological and semantic content. An
example of a symbolic unit of this kind is the sentencelevel
ditransitive construction studied in detail by
Goldberg.13
Lexically unfilled sentence-level syntactic
templates such as the ditransitive construction are
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held to have a schematic form and schematic meaning
conventionally associated with them as exemplified
in (3):
(3a) Form: SUBJ VERB NP1 NP2
(3b) Meaning: X CAUSES Y TO RECEIVE Z
Symbolic units of this sort lie at the ‘grammatical’ endpoint
of the lexicon-grammar continuum. While fully
‘lexical’ and ‘grammatical’ symbolic units differ in
qualitative terms, they are the same in principle, being
symbolic in nature, in the sense described. Moreover,
examples such as these are extreme exemplars. A range
of symbolic units exist in all languages, which occupy
various points along the continuum, which are less
extreme.
A third consequence is that symbolic units can be
related to one another, both in terms of similarity of
form and semantic relatedness. One manifestation of
such relationships is in terms of relative schematicity
or specificity, such that one symbolic unit can be
a more (or less) specific instantiation of another.
Cognitive linguists model the relationships between
symbolic units in terms of a network, arranged
hierarchically relating to levels of schematicity. This
is an issue I return to below when I discuss the
usage-based thesis.
Finally, constituency structure—and hence the
combinatorial nature of language—is a function of
symbolic units becoming integrated or fused in order
to create larger grammatical units, with different
theorists proposing slightly different mechanisms for
how this arises. For instance, Langacker16
holds that
constituency structure emerges from what he terms
conceptually dependent (or relational) predications,
such as verbs, encoding a schematic slot, termed
an elaboration site. The elaboration site is filled by
conceptually autonomous (or nominal) predications,
such as nouns. In contrast, Goldberg,13
in her theory
of Cognitive Construction Grammar, argues that
integration is due to a fusion process that takes place
between verb-level slots, what she terms participant
roles, and sentence-level argument roles—see Evans30
for further discussion of these issues.
The Thesis that Meaning
is Conceptualization
Language understanding involves the interaction
between semantic structure and conceptual structure,
as mediated by various linguistic and conceptual
mechanisms and processes. In other words,
linguistically mediated meaning construction doesn’t
simply involve compositionality, in the Fregean sense,
whereby words encode meanings, which are integrated
in monotonic fashion such that the meaning of the
whole arises from the sum of the parts—see Evans30,50
for critical discussion of this notion of compositionality.
Cognitive linguists subscribe to the position
that linguistically mediated meaning involves conceptualization,
which is to say, higher order cognitive
processing, some (or much) of which is nonlinguistic in
nature. In other words, the thesis that meaning is conceptualization
holds that the way in which symbolic
units are combined during language understanding
gives rise to a unit of meaning which is nonlinguistic
in nature—the notion of a simulation introduced
above—and relies, in part, on nonlinguistic processes
of integration.
There are two notable approaches to meaning
construction that have been developed within
Cognitive linguistics. The first is concerned with the
sorts of nonlinguistic mechanisms central to meaning
construction that are fundamentally nonlinguistic in
nature. Meaning construction processes of this kind
have been referred to as backstage cognition.23
There
are two distinct, but closely related, theories of
backstage cognition: Mental Spaces Theory22,23
and
Conceptual Blending Theory.24
Mental Spaces Theory
is concerned with the nature and creation of mental
spaces, small packets of conceptual structure built
as we think and talk. Conceptual Blending Theory
is concerned with the integrative mechanisms and
networks that operate over collections of mental
spaces in order to produce emergent aspects of
meaning—meaning that is in some sense novel.
A more recent approach is the LCCM
Theory,30,50
named after the two central constructs
in the theory: the lexical concept and the cognitive
model. LCCM Theory is concerned with the role of
linguistic cues and linguistic processes in meaning
construction (lexical concepts) and the way in which
these lexical concepts facilitate access to nonlinguistic
knowledge (cognitive models) in the process of
language understanding. Accordingly, as the emphasis
is on the nature and the role of linguistic prompts in
meaning construction, LCCM Theory represents an
attempt to provide a front-stage approach to the
cognitive mechanisms, and specifically the role of
language, in meaning construction.
The Usage-Based Thesis
The final thesis to be discussed is the usage-based
thesis. This holds that the mental grammar of
the language user is formed by the abstraction of
symbolic units from situated instances of language use:
utterances—specific usage-events involving symbolic
units for purposes of signaling local and contextually
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relevant communicative intentions. An important
consequence of adopting the usage-based thesis is that
there is no principled distinction between knowledge
of language and use of language, because knowledge
emerges from use. From this perspective,
knowledge of language is knowledge of how language
is used.
This perspective stands in stark contrast to
the Chomskyan assumption that the (linguistic)
environment is impoverished—the so-called the
poverty of the stimulus.39
In point of fact, there are
a wide range of cues (social, linguistic, statistical)
that children use when learning language,35
and
infants and adults have been repeatedly shown to
be highly sensitive to these cues. In addition, there
is substantial evidence for domain-general learning
mechanisms35,36
—contra Chomsky’s domain-specific
device.7
Moreover, it is now apparent how
sophisticated humans are at statistical learning based
on linguistic input.51
It is not necessary to posit the
existence of innate linguistic knowledge (UG), nor do
we require a language acquisition device.
The symbolic units that come to be stored in the
mind of the language user emerge through processes
of abstraction and schematization,52
based on pattern
recognition and intention reading abilities.35,53–55
Symbolic units thus constitute what might be thought
of as mental routines,16
consisting, as we have seen,
of conventional pairings of form and meaning.13,14
One of the consequences of the usage-based
thesis is that symbolic units exhibit degrees of
entrenchment—the degree to which a symbolic unit is
established as a cognitive routine in the mind of the
language user.16,20
Moreover, entrenchment of usage
and its effects may be different for different users. If
the language system is a function of language use,
then it follows that the relative frequency with which
particular words or other kinds of symbolic units are
encountered by the speaker will affect the nature of
the grammar. That is, symbolic units that are more
frequently encountered become more entrenched.
Accordingly, the most entrenched symbolic units tend
to shape the language system in terms of patterns
of use, at the expense of less frequent and thus less
well entrenched words or constructions. Hence, the
mental grammar, while deriving from language use,
also influences language use.
A further consequence of the usage-based thesis
is that by virtue of the mental grammar reflecting
symbolic units that exist in language use, and
employing cognitive abilities such as abstraction to
extract them from usage, the language system exhibits
redundancy. That is, redundancy is to be expected in
the mental grammar.
[P NP]]
[in the shed][on the table][from me]
FIGURE 2 | Schema-instance relationships.
As noted earlier, symbolic units are modeled
in terms of a network. Redundancy between
symbolic units is captured in terms of a hierarchical
arrangement of schema-instance relations holding
between more schematic and more specific symbolic
units.52
By way of illustration, Figure 2 captures the
schema-instance relationships that hold between the
more abstract [P [NP]] symbolic unit and the more
specific instances of this abstract schema, such as [from
me]. The usage-based thesis predicts that as [P [NP]]
is a feature of many (more specific) instances of use, it
becomes entrenched in long-term memory along with
its more specific instantiations. Moreover, the schema
([P [NP]]) and its instances (e.g., [from me]) are stored
in related fashion, as illustrated in Figure 2.
THE WORLDVIEW OF COGNITIVE
LINGUISTICS
The primary commitments and theses of Cognitive
linguistics give rise to a specific and distinctive
worldview, which has a number of dimensions.
Collectively, these give rise to a distinctive cognitive
linguistic perspective on the nature of language
and its interaction with nonlinguistic aspects of
cognition. In this section, five dimensions of the
Cognitive linguistics worldview have been identified
and elaborated.
Language Reflects Conceptual Organization
Following the thesis of embodied cognition, cognitive
linguists view language as reflecting the embodied
nature of conceptual structure and organization.
Hence, cognitive linguists study language by taking
seriously the way language manifests embodied
conceptual structure.
An outstanding example of this is the study of
conceptual metaphor.25,26,56
For instance, it is claimed
by conceptual metaphor theorists that humans use
language relating to more abstract domains such as
Time in terms of Space, as exemplified by the example
in (4), or states in terms of locations exemplified
in (5), precisely because at the level of conceptual
structure Time is systematically structured in terms
of conceptual structure recruited from the domain of
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space, and states are structured in terms of locations
in space.
(4) Christmas is approaching.
(5) She is in love.
Language is a Lens on the Mind
Secondly, language serves as a lens for studying aspects
of the mind. It does so, cognitive linguists argue, precisely
because it reflects organizational principles of
embodied cognition—language does not run on principles
associated with an encapsulated module divorced
from the rest of cognition, as held by Chomsky.32
For instance, by studying metaphorical patterns in
language, the cognitive linguist is able to discern patterns
in the nature and organization of conceptual
structure. Conceptual metaphors, qua cross-domain
mappings—mappings that relate distinct conceptual
domains in asymmetric fashion—are evidenced by
virtue of examining distinctive and productive patterns
in language to uncover their existence.
Of course, in keeping with the Cognitive Commitment,
linguistic evidence for conceptual structure
must be supplemented with converging evidence from
the other cognitive sciences. Evidence supporting some
of the main claims made by Conceptual Metaphor
Theory, for instance with respect to Time-as-Space
metaphors, has emerged on the basis of gestural
studies,57
and behavioral experiments (Box 1).58–60
BOX 1
CONVERGING EVIDENCE
Given the interdisciplinary nature of Cognitive
linguistics, cognitive linguists often employ
converging evidence in support of their perspectives
and theories. In addition to drawing
upon the traditional methods of language
science—intuition and theoretical analysis—in
order to generate hypotheses, practicing cognitive
linguists increasingly draw upon findings
from a broad range of methods from a range
of behavioral and brain sciences in order to
substantiate their theoretical assertions. These
provide converging lines of evidence in support
of claims. Findings commonly drawn upon
include those deriving from linguistic corpora,
gesture studies, and sign language, discourse
analysis, experimental methods in the discipline
of psycholinguistics, behavioral experiments
from cognitive psychology, brain scanning,
and imaging methods from cognitive neuroscience,
as well as computational modeling.61
Language Provides a Mechanism
for Construal
A given language is constituted of a language-specific
inventory of symbolic units. Following the symbolic
thesis, any given language provides a means of
viewing the same state, situation, or event from
the range of perspectives that are conventionally
available to the language user—given the languagespecific
symbolic resources available. In other words,
a language provides the language user with resources
for viewing the same scene in multiple, and hence
alternative, ways. This constitutes a mechanism for
construal. Construal is a technical term, within
Cognitive linguistics, for the facility whereby the same
situation can be linguistically encoded in multiple
ways. For example, someone who is not easily parted
from his or her money could be either described
as stingy or as thrifty. In keeping with the thesis
of encyclopedic semantics, each of these words is
understood with respect to a different background
frame or cognitive model, which provides a distinct
set of evaluations. While stingy represents a negative
assessment against an evaluative frame of giving
and sharing, thrifty relates to a frame of Careful
Management of Resources (Husbandry), against
which it represents a positive assessment. Hence,
lexical choice provides a different way of framing
ostensibly the same situation, giving rise to a different
construal.1
Indeed, any given language, by virtue of containing
a language-specific set of symbolic units, thereby
provides a ready-made language-specific repertoire
for construing human experience, and the world
in, necessarily, different ways. One reason for this
is because different languages often encode culturespecific
ideas and hence perspectives. For instance,
the Korean word nunchi, which might be translated
as ‘eye-measure’ in English, provides a conventionalized
means of encoding the idea that a host evaluates
whether a guest requires further food or drink in order
to avoid the guest being embarrassed by having to
request it.
Of course, languages provide conventional
means of alternate construals even when two similar
ideas are both conveyed in two different languages.
For instance, both English and French—genetically
and areally related—have conventional means of
expressing the notion of containment: the preposition
in for English and dans for French. Yet, the scene
involving a boy walking in the rain is conventionally
construed, in English, as exhibiting a ‘containment’
relationship, as evidenced by (6) but in French as
exhibiting an ‘under’ relationship, as encoded by the
French preposition sous, evidenced in (7).
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WIREs Cognitive Science Cognitive linguistics
(6) The boy is walking in the rain.
(7) Le gamin marche sous la pluie.
The boy walks under the rain.
‘The boy is walking in the rain’
What is remarkable about these examples is
what they illustrate about the way in which two
relatively closely related languages conventionally
construe a similar, everyday experience in what
amounts to quite different ways.
Language Influences Nonlinguistic
Cognition
The discussion of the English and French utterances
in (6) and (7) also helps illustrate the fourth
dimension of the Cognitive linguistics worldview.
As language provides a means of construing reality
in alternate ways, and moreover, remains connected
to conceptual representation, it has a transformative
function: It can influence aspects of nonlinguistic
cognition. That is, language doesn’t merely reflect
conceptual representation; it can influence and affect
it. For instance, as French and English each have
conventionalized alternative ways of encoding a
particular spatial scene, this leads to what Slobin62
has labeled differences in thinking for speaking: Users
of any given language must pay attention to particular
aspects of their experienced reality, at the expense of
others, in order to package their thoughts for purposes
of linguistic communication.
Cognitive linguists hold that this languagespecific
‘packaging’ has profound consequences on
nonlinguistic cognition. That is, language influences
how we categorize aspects of our sociophysical environment,
and how we think about reality, independently
of language. For example, based on behavioral
findings, Lera Boroditsky63,64
has concluded that
cross-linguistic differences in construing both time
and gender influences performance of nonlinguistic
activities. This view is of course part of a resurgence
in work by linguists of various theoretical stripes who
are increasingly vocal in advocating a neo-Whorfian
perspective on the relationship between language and
nonlinguistic cognition. This resurgence can be traced
to the seminal work of John Lucy65,66
on categorization.
Since then, the Neo-Whorfian perspective has
been applied to a broad range of domains, perhaps
most notably space,67
and color perception.68
A classic illustration of the way in which
language can influence thought comes from an
experiment carried out by Gentner and Gentner.69
In their work, Gentner and Gentner trained different
TABLE 2 Hydraulic System Model
Hydraulic System Electric Circuit
Pipe Wire
Pump Battery
Narrow pipe Resistor
Water pressure Voltage
Narrowness of pipe Resistance
Flow rate of water Current
Source: Gentner and Gentner (1982, p. 110).
TABLE 3 Moving Crowd Model
Moving Crowd Electric Circuit
Course/passageway Wire
Crowd Battery
People Resistor
Pushing of people Voltage
Gates Resistance
Passage rate of people Current
Source: Gentner and Gentner (1982, p. 120).
English-speaking subjects in ‘analogical models’ of
electricity. An analogical model relies upon a relatively
well-known scenario or system for understanding a
less well-known system, where the parts and relations
of the well-known system stand in a similar relation to
those in the less well-known system, here electricity.
Through analogy, subjects can reason about electricity
using the well-known model.
In the experiment, one group was taught that
electricity can be represented as a teeming crowd of
people, while another group was taught that electricity
can be represented as water flowing through a pipe,
as in a hydraulic system. The mappings between these
two analogical models and an electrical circuit are
summarized in Tables 2 and 3.
Importantly, each analogical model correctly
predicted different aspects of the behavior of an
electrical circuit, but was no help with other aspects.
For example, a circuit with batteries connected serially
will produce more current than a circuit with batteries
in parallel. This is predicted by the analogy based
on the hydraulic system, where serial pumps one
after the other will produce a greater flow rate of
water. In the moving crowd model, where the battery
corresponds simply to the crowd, it is difficult to
think of a meaningful contrast between a serial and a
parallel connection.
Serial resistors in an electrical circuit reduce
current, while parallel resistors increase it. The moving
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Overview wires.wiley.com/cogsci
crowd model is better at predicting this aspect
of the behavior of electricity, where resistance is
modeled in terms of gates. Parallel gates allow more
people through, while serial gates allow fewer people
through.
Gentner and Gentner hypothesized that if
subjects used different analogical models to reason
about the circuit, then each group should produce
dramatically divergent results, which is exactly what
they found. Subjects who were trained in the hydraulic
system model were better at correctly predicting the
effect of serial versus parallel batteries on current,
while subjects who were familiar with the moving
crowd model were better at predicting the effect
of serial versus parallel resistors on current. This
study reveals that different ‘choices’ of language for
representing concepts can indeed affect nonlinguistic
thought, such as reasoning and problem solving.
A Common Human Conceptualizing
Capacity
Of course, one of the charges that is leveled at those
who subscribe to a (neo)-Whorfian perspective is that
this entails that language determines how the world
is viewed and categorized. If this view were correct,
language would effectively provide a straightjacket,
resulting in wholly distinct ways of conceptualization
across languages and language users, which would be
insurmountable.
However, the Cognitive linguistics worldview
treats language as but one of the mechanisms whereby
humans construct their perceptual, cognitive, and
sociocultural reality. Cognitively modern humans
have a common conceptualizing capacity: we share
with our conspecifics a similar range of cognitive
mechanisms and processes that provide us with multiple
ways of construing reality. Language is but one
modality, and hence, but one way in which we interact
with and learn about our environment, our sociocultural
reality, others around us and ourselves. Cognitive
linguists fully recognize that there are myriad ways in
which humans experience their environment, including
sense-perceptory experience, proprioception, and
subjective experiences including affect, the visceral
sense and diverse cognitive evaluations and states. All
of these experiences provide a rich basis for a multiplicity
of mental representations, providing often
complementary and even competing ‘views’ of reality.
From the perspective of Cognitive linguistics, semantic
structure encoded by language can influence our
conceptualizations, and other outputs of cognitive
function, such as categorization, for instance. However,
language does not determine them.
CONCLUSION
Cognitive linguistics is a contemporary approach to
meaning, linguistic organization, language learning
and change, and conceptual structure. It is also one
of the fastest growing and influential perspectives
on the nature of language, the mind, and their
relationship with sociophysical (embodied) experience
in the interdisciplinary project of cognitive science.
What provides the enterprise with coherence is its set
of primary commitments and central theses. Influential
theories within the enterprise have afforded practicing
cognitive linguists the analytical and methodological
tools with which to investigate the phenomena they
address. What makes Cognitive linguistics distinctive
in the contemporary study of language and mind
is its over-arching concern with investigating the
relationship between human language, the mind
and sociophysical experience. In doing so, Cognitive
linguistics takes a clearly defined and determinedly
embodied perspective on human cognition. And in
this, cognitive linguists have developed a number of
influential theories within the interdisciplinary project
of cognitive science which self-consciously strive for
(and measure themselves against) the requirement to
be psychological plausible, given what is now known
about the mind/brain.
As it has developed, Cognitive linguistics has
inevitably had to grapple with specific problems.
Some of the most notable of these remain unresolved.
One for instance, relates to the nature of concepts.
For instance, what is the difference, if any, between
linguistic versus conceptual meaning? Some highprofiled
cognitive linguists have, at times, appeared
to suggest that linguistic meaning is to be equated
with conceptual meaning.16
Yet, findings in Cognitive
linguistics—for instance, the distinction between the
closed-class and open-class systems in Cognitive
Representation, as persuasively argued for by
Talmy21
—would seem to suggest a more clear-cut
distinction. Evans30
has argued, more recently, for
a principled separation between linguistic versus
nonlinguistic concepts. Such a separation would
seem to be supported by linguistic, behavioral
and neuroscientific findings. Yet, some prominent
psychologists70
appear to have underestimated the
complexity of linguistic concepts, denying that
language has conceptual import independent of the
conceptual system. Others have gone the other way,71
arguing, along the lines of Evans, for a principled
separation between the two knowledge types—see also
Zwaan72
; and Taylor and Zwaan.73
The issue of the
relative semantic contribution of linguistic knowledge
versus conceptual knowledge to meaning construction
is a complex one, and at present is unresolved. Clearly,
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WIREs Cognitive Science Cognitive linguistics
communicative meaning relies on language as well as
nonlinguistic knowledge.74
As of yet, however, the
relative contribution, and the way the two systems
interface, is still not fully resolved.
Another outstanding issue relates to the domain
of time. A common assumption within Cognitive linguistics
holds that abstract patterns in thought and
language derive from the projection of structure across
domains—the notion of conceptual metaphor.25,26
However, it is not clear, in the domain of time, for
instance, that time is created by virtue of the projection
of spatial content, as is claimed by Lakoff and
Johnson.26
Some researchers27,75,76
have argued that
time is as basic a domain as space.27,75,76
Moreover,
recent interest in reference strategies in the domain
of time cast doubt on a straightforward projection of
space to time.77–79
In addition, there are two issues that have come
to the fore in recent work in Cognitive linguistics.
These are areas that have not been prominent in earlier
research within the enterprise. Both of these areas
bear special mention. The first is language evolution.
Recent cognitively oriented account have applied core
insights from Cognitive linguistics to the nature of
language change and its evolution.80–82
The second is
the so-called ‘social turn’, whereby a cognitive sociolinguistics
has begun to be developed.83
In terms of methodology, Cognitive linguistics
has now well-established criteria and analytic frameworks
for the analysis of linguistic and nonlinguistic
phenomena. There is an excellent collection detailing
empirical methods in Cognitive linguistics61
as
well as informed views on methodology, in general,
in the literature, for example, with respect to lexical
semantics.84,85
Since its inception in the mid to late
1970s, Cognitive linguistics has matured in terms of
theories, methodologies, and scope. It is now firmly
established as a fundamental and impressively broad
field of enquiry within linguistics and cognitive science.
It features a number of prominent journals,
including the journal of the International Cognitive
linguistics Association (ICLA), Cognitive linguistics,
and since 1990 a series of biennial international conferences
run under the aegis of the ICLA. Cognitive
linguistics is now, arguably, the fastest growing area of
language science and represents an endlessly exciting
field to work in for the aspiring researcher.
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FURTHER READING
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Evans V. A Glossary of Cognitive Linguistics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press; 2007.
Evans V, Bergen BK, Zinken J. The Cognitive Linguistics Reader. London: Equinox; 2007.
Evans V, Green M. Cognitive Linguistics: An Introduction. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press; 2006.
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Geeraets D, Cuyckens H. The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
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Ungerer F, Schmid HJ. An Introduction to Cognitive Linguistics. 2nd ed. London: Longman; 2006.
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