

Introduction

A rough guide to Cognitive Linguistics

Dirk Geeraerts

So this is the first time you visit the field of Cognitive Linguistics, no? You may need a guide then. Sure, when you move through the following chapters of this volume, you get to see a top twelve of sights that you should not miss: a delightful dozen of articles written by authorities in the field that each introduce one of the conceptual cornerstones of the theoretical framework of Cognitive Linguistics. Still, to give you a firm reference point for your tour, you may need some initiation to what Cognitive Linguistics is about. That's what the present chapter is for: it provides you with a roadmap and a travel book to Cognitive Linguistics. It's only a rough guide, to be sure: it gives you the minimal amount of background that you need to figure out the steps to be taken and to make sure that you are not recognized as a total foreigner or a naïve apprentice, but it does not pretend to supply more than that.

To understand what you may expect to find in this brief travel guide, we need to introduce one of the characteristic ideas of Cognitive Linguistics first – the idea, that is, that we should not just describe concepts and categories by means of an abstract definition, but that we should also take into account the things that the definition is about, if we are to achieve an adequate level of knowledge. Take birds: you can define birds as a certain type of animal with certain characteristics (like having wings, being able to fly, and being born from eggs), but if you want to get a good cognitive grip on what birds are, you will want to have a look at some typical birds like robins and sparrows and doves, and then maybe also at some less typical ones, like chickens and ostriches.

It's no different when you are dealing with linguistic theories. You have to know about the scientific content of the theory, that is to say, the abstract definition of the approach: the topics it deals with, the specific perspective it takes, and the observations it makes. But you also have to know about the sociology of the theory: the people it involves, the conferences where they meet, the channels in which they publish. Introductions to linguistics tend to focus on the first perspective only, but the present guide will take the second into account just as much as the first.

1. What is so special about this place?

Theories in linguistics tend to be fairly insular affairs: each theoretical framework tends to constitute a conceptual and sociological entity in its own right, with only a limited number of bridges, market places or even battlegrounds shared with other approaches. Cognitive Linguistics, when considered in the light of this metaphor, takes the form of an archipelago rather than an island. It is not one clearly delimited large territory, but rather a conglomerate of more or less extensive, more or less active centers of linguistic research that are closely knit together by a shared perspective, but that are not (yet) brought together under the common rule of a well-defined theory. The present volume contains an introduction to twelve fundamental parts of that theoretical conglomerate – a tour of twelve central islands, if you wish: Cognitive Grammar, grammatical construal, radial network, prototype theory, schematic network, conceptual metaphor, image schema, metonymy, mental spaces, frame semantics, construction grammar, and usage-based linguistics.

We will define in a moment what links hold these concepts together and why each of them separately is important, but at this point, the chief thing is to realize that there is no single, uniform theoretical doctrine according to which these research topics belong together: Cognitive Linguistics is a flexible framework rather than a single theory of language. From the point of view of category structure (one of the standard topics for analysis in Cognitive Linguistics), this recognition is again one way in which Cognitive Linguistics illustrates its own concepts. As we mentioned a moment ago, Cognitive Linguistics emphasizes the fact that defining a category may involve describing some of its principal members rather than just giving an abstract definition. But it also stresses that the abstract definition need not consist of a single set of defining characteristics that belong uniquely and distinctively to that category. Think of birds again: when we describe the features of birds, we soon notice that the features we would like to think of as definitional for birds are not shared by all members of the species: we may even find birds like the penguin or the kiwi, that have no wings to speak of, cannot fly, and don't have feathers but that are rather covered with some kind of fluff. In such cases, we say that a category has a family resemblance structure: different types of birds resemble each other like the members of a family would, but there is no single set of attributes that necessarily shows up in all the members of the family. Again, it is no different with a linguistic framework like Cognitive Linguistics: it constitutes a cluster of many partially overlapping approaches rather than a single well-defined theory that identifies in an all-or-none fashion whether something belongs to Cognitive Linguistics or not.

Then again, the recognition that Cognitive Linguistics has not yet stabilized into a single uniform theory should not prevent us from looking for fundamental

common features and shared perspectives among the many forms of research that come together under the label of Cognitive Linguistics. An obvious question to start from relates to the ‘cognitive’ aspect of Cognitive Linguistics: in what sense exactly is Cognitive Linguistics a cognitive approach to the study of language?

Terminologically speaking, we now need to make a distinction between Cognitive Linguistics (the approach represented in this reader), and uncapitalized cognitive linguistics – referring to all approaches in which natural language is studied as a mental phenomenon. Cognitive Linguistics is but one form of cognitive linguistics, to be distinguished from, for instance, generative grammar and many other forms of linguistic research within the field of cognitive science. What, then, determines the specificity of Cognitive Linguistics within cognitive linguistics?

There are a number of characteristics that need to be mentioned: one basic principle that is really, really foundational, and four tenets that spell out this fundamental notion. The foundational point is simply that language is all about meaning. As it says in the Editorial Statement of the very first issue of the journal *Cognitive Linguistics*, published in 1990, this approach sees language ‘as an instrument for organizing, processing, and conveying information’ – as something primarily semantic, in other words. Now, it may seem self-evident to you that a ‘cognitive’ approach to language focuses on meaning, but if you are familiar with generative grammar (i.e. Chomskyan linguistics), you will know that this is a theory that thinks of language primarily in formal terms: as a collection of formal, syntactic structures and rules (or constraints on such structures and rules). And generative grammar is definitely also a ‘cognitive’ conception of language, one that attributes a mental status to the language. So we have to be careful with the term *cognitive* in *Cognitive Linguistics*. It does not only signal that language is a psychologically real phenomenon (and that linguistics is part of the cognitive sciences), but also that the processing and storage of information is a crucial design feature of language. Linguistics is not just about knowledge of the language (that’s the focus of generative grammar), but language itself is a form of knowledge – and has to be analyzed accordingly, with a focus on meaning.

Conversely, Cognitive Linguistics is not the only linguistic approach focusing on meaning: there are diverse forms of functional approaches to language that go in the same direction. And further, formal semantics is clearly a semantically oriented approach as well. It lies beyond the scope of this introduction to provide a systematic comparison with these other semantic approaches, but you will certainly be interested in what is particular about the way in which Cognitive Linguistics deals with meaning. So that brings us to the four specific characteristics that we announced earlier: each of them says something specific about the way Cognitive Linguistics thinks about meaning. (By the way, the captions we use to introduce the features may sound formidable, but don’t worry: an explanation follows.)

LINGUISTIC MEANING IS PERSPECTIVAL

Meaning is not just an objective reflection of the outside world, it is a way of shaping that world. You might say that it construes the world in a particular way, that it embodies a perspective onto the world. The easiest way to understand the point is to think of spatial perspectives showing up in linguistic expressions, and the way in which the same objective situation can be construed linguistically in different ways. Think of a situation in which you are standing in your back garden and you want to express where you left your bicycle. You could then both say *It's behind the house* and *It's in front of the house*. These would seem to be contradictory statements, except that they embody different perspectives.

In the first expression, the perspective is determined by the way you look: the object that is situated in the direction of your gaze is in front of you, but if there is an obstacle along that direction, the thing is behind that obstacle. In this case, you're looking in the direction of your bicycle from the back garden, but the house blocks the view, and so the bike is behind the house.

In the second expression, however, the point of view is that of the house: a house has a canonical direction, with a front that is similar to the face of a person. The way a house is facing, then, is determined by its front, and the second expression takes the point of view of the house rather than the speaker, as if the house were a person looking in a certain direction. Such multiple perspectivizations (and not just spatial ones!) are everywhere in the language, and Cognitive Linguistics attempts to analyze them.

LINGUISTIC MEANING IS DYNAMIC AND FLEXIBLE

Meanings change, and there is a good reason for that: meaning has to do with shaping our world, but we have to deal with a changing world. New experiences and changes in our environment require that we adapt our semantic categories to transformations of the circumstances, and that we leave room for nuances and slightly deviant cases. For a theory of language, this means that we cannot just think of language as a more or less rigid and stable structure – a tendency that is quite outspoken in twentieth century linguistics. If meaning is the hallmark of linguistic structure, then we should think of those structures as flexible. Again, we don't have to look far for an example. Think back to what we said about birds: there is no single, rigid set of defining features that applies to all and only birds, but we have a flexible family resemblance structure that is able to deal with marginal cases.

LINGUISTIC MEANING IS ENCYCLOPEDIC AND NON-AUTONOMOUS

If meaning has to do with the way in which we interact with the world, it is natural to assume that our whole person is involved. The meaning we construct in

and through the language is not a separate and independent module of the mind, but it reflects our overall experience as human beings. Linguistic meaning is not separate from other forms of knowledge of the world that we have, and in that sense it is encyclopedic and non-autonomous: it involves knowledge of the world that is integrated with our other cognitive capacities. There are at least two main aspects to this broader experiential grounding of linguistic meaning.

First, we are embodied beings, not pure minds. Our organic nature influences our experience of the world, and this experience is reflected in the language we use. The *behind/in front of* example again provides a clear and simple illustration: the perspectives we use to conceptualize the scene derive from the fact that our bodies and our gaze have a natural orientation, an orientation that defines what is in front of us and that we can project onto other entities, like houses.

Second, however, we are not just biological entities: we also have a cultural and social identity, and our language may reveal that identity, i.e. languages may embody the historical and cultural experience of groups of speakers (and individuals). Again, think of birds. The encyclopedic nature of language implies that we have to take into account the actual familiarity that people have with birds: it is not just the general definition of *bird* that counts, but also what we know about sparrows and penguins and ostriches etc. But these experiences will differ from culture to culture: the typical, most familiar birds in one culture will be different from those in another, and that will affect the knowledge people associate with a category like ‘bird’.

LINGUISTIC MEANING IS BASED ON USAGE AND EXPERIENCE

The idea that linguistic meaning is non-autonomously integrated with the rest of experience is sometimes formulated by saying that meaning is experientially grounded – rooted in experience. The experiential nature of linguistic knowledge can be specified in yet another way, by pointing to the importance of language use for our knowledge of a language.

Note that there is a lot of abstract structure in a language: think for instance of the pattern Subject – Verb – Direct Object – Indirect Object that you find in a sentence like *Mary sent Peter a message*. In many languages, such structures are not directly observable: what we do observe, i.e. what constitutes the experiential basis for our knowledge of the language, is merely a succession of words (and even that is not entirely without problems, but let’s pass over those). So the question arises: how does this more concrete level of words relate to the abstract level where you find functional categories like Subject and Direct Object? In more traditional terms, the question reads: how does the lexicon relate to the syntax?

But if we think of grammatical patterns as having an experiential basis in concrete, observable strings of words, there is yet another step we have to take: the ‘observable strings of words’ do not exist in the abstract; they are always part

of actual utterances and actual conversations. The experience of language is an experience of actual language use, not of words like you would find them in a dictionary or sentence patterns like you would find them in a grammar. That is why we say that Cognitive Linguistics is a usage-based model of grammar: if we take the experiential nature of grammar seriously, we will have to take the actual experience of language seriously, and that is experience of actual language use. Again, from the point of view of mainstream twentieth century linguistics, that is a fairly revolutionary approach. An existing tradition tended to impose a distinction between the level of language structure and the level of language use – in the terms of Ferdinand de Saussure (generally known as the founder of modern linguistics), between *langue* and *parole*. Generally (and specifically in the tradition of generative grammar), *parole* would be relatively unimportant: the structural level would be essential, the usage level epiphenomenal. In a usage-based model that considers the knowledge of language to be experientially based in actual speech, that hierarchy of values is obviously rejected.

2. What does the tour include?

You are right, of course: the first exploration of Cognitive Linguistics in the previous section remains somewhat superficial and abstract. You now have a general idea of what type of scenery to expect in the Cognitive Linguistics archipelago, but you would like to get acquainted with the specific islands, i.e. you now know what the overall perspective of Cognitive Linguistics entails, but you hardly know how it is put into practice. In this section, we will have a look at the twelve basic concepts that are introduced by the dozen articles in this collection, and we will show how these concepts relate to the overall picture that was drawn in the previous pages.

As a preliminary step, let us observe that each of the characteristics that we discussed earlier defines a number of specific questions for Cognitive Linguistics. The *perspectival* nature of meaning raises questions about the specific mechanisms of construal present in a language: what kinds of semantic construal, imagery, conceptual perspectivization do languages implement? The *dynamic* nature of meaning raises questions about the process of meaning extension: what are the mechanisms of semantic flexibility, and how do the various readings of a linguistic expression relate to each other? The *encyclopedic* nature of meaning raises questions about the interdisciplinary links of language to the other cognitive capacities: to what extent are the cognitive mechanisms at work in natural language shared by other cognitive systems? And the *usage-based* nature of meaning raises questions about the relationship between syntax and lexicon, and the acquisition of language: what kind of experience do children need to learn a language?

These questions are illustrated in various ways by the articles in the collection, but before we can make that explicit, we need to introduce the articles separately, and say something about the way in which they are grouped together. Roughly, there are four groups of concepts and articles, corresponding to the four features that we identified before. The following pages pay specific attention to the logic behind the basic concepts that we introduce: why is it that these concepts are so important to Cognitive Linguistics? What you should see, in particular, is how they turn the fundamental features that we discussed in the previous section, into a concrete practice of linguistic description. Reading through the following pages will give you an initial idea of what you can expect in the volume, but of course, until you get there yourself, you will never really know what it is about.

2.1. The perspectival nature of grammar

The first two concepts, COGNITIVE GRAMMAR and GRAMMATICAL CONSTRUCTION, illustrate the overall organization of a grammar that focuses on meaning. If conceptual perspectivization is the central function of a grammar, the typical formal categories of grammatical description (like word classes or inflection) will have to be reinterpreted from a semantic point of view. In the context of Cognitive Linguistics, two authorities in particular are systematically exploring these phenomena: Ronald W. Langacker, and Len Talmy. The two initial papers in the volume will introduce you to the thought of these two major thinkers – towering figures in the context of Cognitive Linguistics, who have both provided the approach with some of its basic vocabulary.

COGNITIVE GRAMMAR

Cognitive Grammar is the specific name that Langacker uses for his theory of language. The paper included in the present volume originates from 1986, but is here reprinted in the form in which it was published in 1990. It specifies a number of basic features of Cognitive Grammar that are still valid, and that form an interesting backdrop for the rest of the articles in the present collection. Langacker starts off with the very idea of a perspectival grammar – although he uses a slightly different terminology: he talks about grammar as conceptualization and imagery. He introduces a number of high level general features of grammatical ‘imagery’ (profiling, specificity, scope, salience) and then tackles the key question how to build a descriptive framework for a grammar that starts from the assumption, simplistically, that language is meaning and that meaning is conceptualization.

Central to his answer is the idea that a grammar is not built up out of grammatical rules on the one hand and a lexicon on the other (the idea that you traditionally find in generative grammar). Rather, a grammar consists of ‘symbolic

units', where a symbolical unit is a conventional pairing of a form and a meaning. You can obviously think of lexical items here, but symbolic units can be more abstract than that, like when nouns are claimed to instantiate the abstract notion 'thing', and verbs the abstract notion 'process'. Given that you take the notion of symbolic unit as the basis for a grammar, there are two questions that immediately crop up, and Langacker does not fail to address them.

First, what could be the notional, conceptual characterization of abstract entities like word classes? What do we mean when we say that the meaning of nouns is 'thing' and that of verb is 'process'? On conceptual grounds, Langacker distinguishes between a number of basic classes of predications: entities and things versus relations, and within the relational predicates, stative relations, complex atemporal relations, and processes. The formal word classes of a language will typically express a basic type of predication. For instance, while nouns express the notion of 'thing' (a bounded entity in some domain), adjectives will typically be stative relational predicates.

Second, if you have a grammar with no rules but only symbolic units, how do you achieve compositionality, i.e. how do you ensure that different symbolic units may be combined to build larger units, like phrases or sentences? Here, the trick is to recognize that many predicates have open slots. If, for instance, the meaning of *above* is defined in terms of a stative relationship between what Langacker calls a 'trajector' and a 'landmark', the trajector and the landmark are only included schematically, as an open slot, in the meaning of *above*. Filling out the slots with other predicates then compositionally yields phrases like *the lamp above the table*.

In the course of Langacker's paper, you will come across a number of concepts that will play a central role in some of the other chapters included in the present collection: the schematic network idea (which will come to the fore in Chapter 5), the notion of domain matrix (which will play an essential role in Chapter 8), and the concept of a construction and a continuum between lexicon and grammar (which will constitute the focus of Chapter 11 and Chapter 12).

GRAMMATICAL CONSTRUAL

Talmy never suggested a specific label for his approach to grammatical description, but the label *grammatical construal* captures very well what he is doing: what are the forms and patterns of construal (in the sense of conceptual perspectivization through language) that are realized by the grammatical structure of a language? This adjective *grammatical* is quite important here: Talmy focuses on the specific types of conceptual construal that are expressed by those aspects of natural language that have to do with syntax and morphology, rather than the lexicon. In Langacker's article, we noticed a specific interest in the relationship between the

lexical dimension of the language, and the structural dimension – the syntax and the morphology. Talmy notes that there are some forms of conceptual construal that are hardly ever expressed by the grammatical structure (like color), whereas others (like the distinction between singular and plural) are typically expressed by syntax and morphology. The bulk of Talmy's paper, then, provides an overview of different types of conceptual construal systems that are typical for the structural, grammatical rather than the lexical subsystem of natural languages.

2.2. The dynamic nature of grammar

If natural language signs are flexible, we will need a model to describe how the different readings of the expressions relate to each other. Several such models for the polysemic architecture of expressions have been proposed by Cognitive Linguistics, and the three concepts in this group describe the most important of them.

RADIAL NETWORK

The radial network model describes a category structure in which a central case of the category radiates towards novel instances: less central category uses are extended from the center. The paper featured in this collection, 'Cognitive topology and lexical networks' by Claudia Brugman and George Lakoff is based on Brugman's seminal analysis of the preposition *over*. The study was seminal not just in the sense that it popularized the radial network model, but also because it spawned a whole literature on the analysis of prepositions (more on this in the *Further reading* chapter). Brugman suggests the 'above and across' reading of *over* (as in *the plane flew over*) as central, and then shows how less central readings extend from the central case. These can be concrete extensions, as in a 'coverage' reading (*the board is over the hole*), but also metaphorical ones, as in temporal uses (*over a period of time*).

PROTOTYPE THEORY

Radial categories constitute but one type of a broader set of models that fall under the heading of *prototype theory*. For instance, the importance of specific birds in the category structure of *bird* (this is a point we drew the attention to before) belongs in the same set of phenomena as the radial set idea. The paper 'Prospects and problems of prototype theory' by Dirk Geeraerts presents a systematic overview of the different prototype-theoretical phenomena that are mentioned in the literature. Specific attention is paid to the mutual relations that exist among these phenomena: it is argued that *prototype* is itself a prototypically structured

concept, i.e. that there is no single definition that captures all and only the diverse forms of ‘prototypicality’ that linguists have been talking about.

SCHEMATIC NETWORK

Prototype theory as described in the previous article is a generalization over the radial network model. But there is another generalization to introduce: the schematic network model. What this adds to the radial network and prototype models is the idea that the dynamism of meaning may also involve a shift along a taxonomical dimension. This may need some explanation. Note that we can think of birds at different levels of conceptual abstraction (or schematicity, as it is also called). At one level, we have a prototypical idea of birds as living beings that have feathers and wings and that can fly. If we stay on this level, we can move from the central prototype cases (the ones that correspond to the central concept) to peripheral cases, like birds without feathers and wings (we mentioned penguins and kiwis before). But there are other levels at which you can think of birds: more specific ones (as when you think about individual birds, like your great-uncle’s parrot) and more general ones (like when you group bird species into categories like ‘fowl’, ‘birds of prey’, ‘water birds’ etc.).

Moving from a more specific to a more general level is called ‘schematization’, and the resulting model of readings for an expression is called a schematic network. The idea of schematic networks is implicit in prototype theory, but it has been made most explicit by Ronald W. Langacker. The concept plays an important role in construction grammar (see below), but here, in David Tuggy’s paper ‘Ambiguity, polysemy and vagueness’, it is applied to a crucial question about meaning: the relationship between vagueness and polysemy: in a schematic network, you accept that what is polysemy (different meanings) at one level is vagueness (a less specified meaning potential) at an other, more schematic level. In a very clear and graphical way, Tuggy shows how this shift between levels is a contextual effect: in one situation we may use an expression rather more vaguely, in another we use it at a more specific, polysemous level.

The consequences for our conception of semantic dynamism are tremendous. The dynamism of meaning does not just imply that it is easy to add new meanings to the semantic inventory of an expression, but also that we should not think of this overall structure of meanings as stable. The semantics of lexical and constructional units is not a bag of meanings, but is a (prototypically and schematically) structured meaning potential that is sensitive to contextual effects.

2.3. The non-autonomy of grammar

If meaning is non-autonomous and encyclopedic, it is important to investigate the way in which different types of experience interact with each other. How for instance does our bodily experience of a sensory or motor kind relate to our more abstract thought, and are there any conceptual mechanisms that cut across the sensorimotor and the abstract mode of human knowledge? The four papers brought together in this group show how Cognitive Linguistics deals with the encyclopedic entrenchment of linguistic meaning, from both perspectives: what is the role of general cognitive mechanisms, and how do specific domains of experience interact?

Two of the four concepts that will be introduced are not specific for Cognitive Linguistics: metaphor and metonymy are traditional concepts in natural language semantics. Cognitive Linguistics has however brought new perspectives to the study of both metaphor and metonymy, and we will see in what sense. The other two concepts were newly introduced by Cognitive Linguistics. Incidentally, the fact that metaphor and metonymy are traditionally known as mechanisms of semantic change, makes clear that there is a certain degree of overlap between the present group of concepts and the previous one: some of the concepts mentioned here may also be seen as illustrations of the dynamic nature of meaning.

CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR

Conceptual metaphor is probably the best known aspect of Cognitive Linguistics: if you've heard only vaguely about Cognitive Linguistics, conceptual metaphor is likely to be the notion that you've come across. You will have learnt by now that there is much more to Cognitive Linguistics, but still, Conceptual Metaphor Theory occupies a major place in the cognitive linguistic research program. Conceptual Metaphor Theory rests on the recognition that a given metaphor need not be restricted to a single lexical item, but may generalize over different expressions. Such general patterns may then be summarized in an overall statement like LOVE IS WAR, a pattern that ranges over expressions like the following:

He is known for his many rapid *conquests*. She *fought for* him, but his mistress *won out*. He *fled from* her advances. She *pursued* him *relentlessly*. He is slowly *gaining ground* with her. He *won* her hand in marriage. He *overpowered* her. She is *besieged* by suitors. He has to *fend them off*. He *enlisted the aid* of her friends. He *made an ally* of her mother. Theirs is a *misalliance* if I've ever seen one.

This way of thinking about metaphor was introduced in George Lakoff's and Mark Johnson's book *Metaphors we live by* of 1980, a book that has achieved something of a bestseller status. The article included here, Lakoff's 'The contem-

porary theory of metaphors' gives a systematic overview of the theoretical and practical features of Conceptual Metaphor Theory.

You will notice how the two aspects of non-autonomy that were mentioned earlier show up in conceptual metaphor theory. First, metaphor is treated as a general cognitive mechanism, not as a specifically linguistic one that works on the level of individual expressions. Second, metaphor involves the interaction between different domains of experience: a source domain (in the example, war) and a target domain (love). This notion of domain will turn out to be crucially important for the other concepts in this group as well.

IMAGE SCHEMA

An image schema is a regular pattern that recurs as a source domain (or a structuring part of a source domain) for different target domains. Typical image schemas include containment, path, scales, verticality, and center-periphery. The recurrence of image schemas may be illustrated by a closer look at the containment schema. It occurs in conceptual metaphors in which containment is the source domain for widely diverse target domains like the visual field (*in sight, out of sight, go out of view, inside* someone's field of vision), time (*in two hours, he's into* the first year of his retirement, do something *in* a short period), difficulties (get yourself *into* difficulties, we're *in* this together, how do we get *out of* this, to be *in* a mess), obligations (what are you getting *into*, no way *out*, can he get *out of* it), and the self as contained in the body (withdraw *into* oneself, a young man *in* an old man's body, there's an insecure person *inside*).

Characteristically, image schemas involve some form of sensory or motor experience, like a spatial configuration in the case of containment. In that sense, the appearance of image schemas in metaphors is typical for the encyclopedic, non-autonomous nature of meaning: prelinguistic domains, like the sensorimotor or spatial ones are mapped onto more abstract domains, providing them with structure. The notion of image schema, like the notion of conceptual metaphor, was introduced into Cognitive Linguistics by George Lakoff in his collaboration with the philosopher Mark Johnson. The paper included here, 'The cognitive psychological reality of image schemas and their transformations' by Ray Gibbs and Herb Colston, examines the psychological reality of image schemas: how can you prove, by means of experimental methods, that image schemas do indeed have a psychological reality?

In this sense, the paper is not just important as an illustration of the notion of image schema, but also for methodological reasons. The particular theoretical perspective of Cognitive Linguistics has a number of far-reaching methodological consequences. For one thing, treating meaning as a mental phenomenon and focusing on language as a cognitive tool implies that a rapprochement with the methodology of psychological research is obvious: experimental methods should

bear fruit in Cognitive Linguistics just like they do in psychology. For another, the idea that grammar is usage-based implies that the analysis of actual usage data (as in corpora, specifically) should play an important role in Cognitive Linguistics. The paper by Gibbs and Colston is an example of such an experimental approach. An example of a corpus-based methodology is presented in Tomasello's paper in this volume.

However, neither the use of an experimental method nor the use of corpus data is as yet a dominant methodology in Cognitive Linguistics. They constitute emerging tendencies that are likely to gain in importance in the course of the following years, but a lot of the work done in Cognitive Linguistics is still based on a more traditional analytic methodology.

METONYMY

There is yet another way in which thinking in terms of domains plays a role in Cognitive Linguistics, viz. in the analysis of metonymy. In the tradition of lexical semantics, metaphor and metonymy are distinguished on the basis of the type of semantic association they involve. Metaphor is supposed to be based on similarity (if love is war, it is *like* war in a number of respects), whereas metonymy is said to be based on contiguity – a somewhat vague notion that could be clarified in terms of 'actual proximity or association'. For instance, when you fill up your car, you don't fill the entire vehicle with fuel, but only the gas tank. The name of the whole comes to stand for the part, and part and whole are associated in reality.

Now, metonymy research in Cognitive Linguistics received an important impetus from the recognition that metonymy could receive a definition that is nicely complementary to that of metaphor. If metaphor is seen as a mapping from one domain to the other, metonymy can be seen as a mapping *within* a single domain. The shift from whole to part in *car* is a shift within the physical, spatial domain. This view on the relationship between metaphor and metonymy was already made in Lakoff and Johnson's *Metaphors we live by*, but the article 'The role of domains in the interpretation of metaphors and metonymies' by William Croft adds an innovative perspective. The relevant shift, Croft argues, is not necessarily one within a single domain, but it may be a shift within a domain matrix.

The domain matrix is a notion introduced by Ronald W. Langacker: it captures the idea that a concept may be simultaneously defined in various domains. For instance, Shakespeare is not only defined as a physical person, but also in the literary domain, as an author. So, when you say that you have read the whole of Shakespeare, you metonymically mean the entirety of his literary production, rather than the person. What Croft suggests, then, is to define metonymy overall in terms of such a domain matrix.

MENTAL SPACES

If metaphor is analyzed as a mapping from one domain to another, the question arises how such mappings take place: how does the structure of the source domain get mapped onto the target domain? The notion of conceptual integration developed by Gilles Fauconnier, and represented here by the paper ‘Conceptual integration networks’ by Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, provides a descriptive framework to answer that question. It distinguishes between four spaces: a source input space, a target input space, a blend between both, and a so-called generic space. For instance (to use an example first described by Seana Coulson), you can think of ‘trashcan basketball’ as a game in which you throw crumpled pieces of paper into a trashcan, as you might do in an office environment or in a student dorm. The game of basketball is one input space, and the office or the dorm situation the other. The mapping between the two spaces associates the ball with the piece of paper, the basket with the trashcan, the players with the students or the office people, and further elaborations are possible. This mapping creates a blended space, and the relevant features of the blend are not just directly derived from the original input spaces. On the contrary, you may find emergent structure that is specific to the blended space: the fact that the trashcan would normally be placed on the ground, in contrast with a basketball ring, would certainly influence the way the game is played. The fourth type of space, the generic space, contains the common structure of the input spaces; in this case, it would be the space of someone throwing an object into a container.

The description of the four spaces may also explain some of the alternative names that the conceptual integration approach is known by: the *blending* or the *mental spaces* approach. As mentioned, the conceptual integration approach clearly links up with the analysis of metaphor as mapping across domains: one might say that the trashcan example elaborates the metaphor ‘a trashcan is a basketball ring’. However, the blending analysis is more general than the study of metaphor. Conceptual integration has proved to be useful in a wide variety of phenomena, many of which are not even remotely associated with metaphorical processes. Counterfactuals are a case in point. *If Beethoven were alive, he would use a synthesizer* creates a blended space between the present-day musical situation and the historical space of Beethoven as an innovative composer, but you cannot really say that the conceptual process is a metaphorical one.

2.4. The experiential grounding of grammar

You will remember that the experiential nature of language raised the question of the relationship between lexicon and syntax. Cognitive Linguistics provides a specific answer to that question that links up with what we said about prototype

theory and schematic networks: we can think of a grammar as a schematic network with abstract patterns at the schematic level, and the lexicalized instantiations of those patterns (the words and strings of words that fill the patterns) at a more specific level. From the point of view of mainstream twentieth century linguistics, this is a bit of a strange idea. If you assume (as generative grammar so vehemently stressed) that grammar is a set of rules, the lexical items instantiating those roles are not all that important: you basically need an inventory of items, but the real work is done by the rules.

However, Ronald W. Langacker has pointed out that there is a fallacy here: the so-called rule/list fallacy, i.e. the idea that what can be handled by rules should not be listed. If you start from that assumption, you get a strict separation between lexicon and syntax. But if you think in terms of schematic networks, such a separation is not necessary at all: you can both describe abstract patterns and their concrete lexicalizations. In fact, you *have* to, because there are prototypicality effects that you may need to describe. An indirect object construction of the type Subject – Verb – Direct Object – Indirect Object is typically filled by verbs like *give* or *tell*, and less typically so by verbs like *envy*. It is part of our grammatical knowledge that we recognize those typicalities (just like we recognize blackbirds as more typical birds than ostriches).

The specific form in which this idea is realized in Cognitive Linguistics, is in the form of construction grammars. The plural is deliberate here: since there are various forms of construction grammar, Construction Grammar is a family of theories rather than a single well-defined approach. The three papers in this group all involve Construction Grammar, but it is the paper by Goldberg (Chapter 11, the second one in the group) that introduces the approach most directly. The first paper in the group presents frame semantics, which is one of the important sources for Construction Grammar. The final paper show how the principles of Construction Grammar can be applied in language acquisition research.

FRAME SEMANTICS

Frame semantics is the specific approach to natural language semantics developed by Charles Fillmore. The article included here, 'Frame semantics', sets out the basics of the theory. One essential starting-point is the idea that one cannot understand the meaning of a word (or a linguistic expression in general) without access to all the encyclopedic knowledge that relates to that word. This obviously ties in with the non-autonomous nature of natural language semantics: that meaning in natural language is not separated from other forms of knowledge implies that it is not very useful to maintain a strict separation between world knowledge and knowledge of linguistic meaning. While this recognition would be shared by all forms of semantics in Cognitive Linguistics, the individual identity of

frame semantics involves the specific structures of encyclopedic knowledge that it invokes. Basically, these ‘frames’ are things happening and occurring together in reality. For example, in order to understand the word *sell*, you need to have world knowledge about the situation of commercial transfer. This comprises, apart from the act of selling, a person who sells, a person who buys, goods to be sold, money or another form of payment, and so on.

A semantic frame of this type is a coherent structure of related concepts where the relations have to do with the way the concepts co-occur in real world situations. Knowledge of the frame is necessary for an adequate knowledge of the words referring to the concepts in the frame: a word activates the frame, highlights individual concepts within the frame, and often determines a certain perspective in which the frame is viewed. In the standard commercial transaction example, for instance, *sell* construes the situation from the perspective of the seller and *buy* from the perspective of the buyer.

Although frame semantics was originally applied predominantly to the semantic description of words, there is a close relationship with Construction Grammar. Words like *sell* come with their own set of constructions (like *sell something to someone* or *sell something for a certain price*), and the different constructions reflect different ways in which the frame can be highlighted. In this way, frame semantics can be integrated with Construction Grammar as one way of specifying the semantics of constructions. Overall, we can now see that frame semantics occupies a transitional position in our grouping of concepts. On the one hand, if we focus on the way in which it uses structured encyclopedic knowledge as the background for the description of meanings in natural language, it belongs with the previous group of papers: it describes one of the ways in which conceptual knowledge of an encyclopedic (i.e. not specifically linguistic) nature is structured. On the other hand, if we concentrate on the input that frame semantics provides for the description of construction types, it links up with the present group of articles.

CONSTRUCTION GRAMMAR

Simplistically, a grammatical construction is any string of words or morphemes exhibiting a coherent pattern, whether it be an entire sentence or a clause or a phrase (like a noun phrase or a verb phrase) or a complex lexeme (like a phrasal verb). And of course, the abstract pattern itself may also be called a ‘construction’. In classical contemporary grammars, an indirect object pattern of the type Subject – Predicate – Indirect Object – Direct Object would be considered a derived structure, built up from the functional classes Subject, Predicate etc. That is to say, the rules of the grammar would be defined in such a way that a grammatical pattern of the form Subject – Predicate – Indirect Object – Direct Object could

be assembled on the basis of the relevant functional building blocks. In Cognitive Linguistics, a pattern of this type is considered to be non-derived, i.e. is taken to be a sign of the language, or, if you wish, an (abstract) expression in its own right.

As you can read in Adele Goldberg's paper 'The inherent semantics of argument structure: The case of the English ditransitive construction', there are a number of advantages to such an approach, two of which may be mentioned here, to give you a first idea of why thinking in terms of constructions may be interesting. First, if a construction is treated as an entity in its own right, it is possible that the whole has characteristics that cannot be straightforwardly derived from the constituent components. This is a property known as non-compositionality: the meaning of the whole is not necessarily a compositional function of the meaning of the parts. Second, if any construction is a distinct element of the inventory of linguistic signs for a given language, you can treat constructions like any other category – according to the usual practice of Cognitive Linguistics. That is to say, it will then be quite normal to describe not just the meaning and the form of the category, but also its salient members. In the case of constructions, we may then think primarily of the lexical elements that can fill the slots of the construction (like the verbs that occupy the predicate role in the indirect object construction). Or in other words: describing grammar as a schematic network with lexical elements at the bottom and more abstract patterns higher up in the network is completely congenial to a construction grammar approach.

USAGE-BASED LINGUISTICS

Defining Cognitive Linguistics as a usage-based model of language has a number of consequences, like the straightforward methodological conclusion that cognitive linguists will have to invest in the analysis of real language use if they are to live up to their self-declared status. You would expect a lot of corpus research in Cognitive Linguistics, then, but to be honest, this is a trend that is clearly emerging, but that has not yet gained as prominent a status as one would expect.

Using corpora of observed speech is natural in language acquisition research, though: if you wish to study how children acquire their language, you will obviously want to observe and analyze their developing language. Also, language acquisition is a domain par excellence to test a usage-based model of language that believes that our experience of actual speech determines how we come by more abstract patterns. In fact, if our more schematic knowledge is based on our more concrete knowledge of lexical instantiations of such patterns, you should be able to observe 'lexical bootstrapping' effects: the specific words in which we begin to learn certain constructions, determine how we learn the construction. That is exactly what Michael Tomasello investigates in his paper 'First Steps toward a Usage-based Theory of Language Acquisition', which is part of a long-

term research effort to develop a theory of language acquisition that ties in with Cognitive Linguistics and Construction Grammar.

If you are familiar with the history of contemporary linguistics, you will appreciate how important such an attempt is. The generative grammar idea that language is a separate module of the mind is very much based on an argument from language acquisition: if we do not assume that language is genetically wired in, the argument goes, we couldn't explain at all how the acquisition of language proceeds so quickly as it actually does. This is particularly the case, the argument continues, because the input children get (the language they are exposed to) is not sufficient to explain how they could learn all the intricacies of natural language syntax. This is the 'poverty of stimulus' argument. Obviously, if Tomasello succeeds in his attempt to explain how children can learn language through abstraction from the actual input they get, a central tenet of generative grammar will be overturned.

2.5. A conceptual map

Let us summarize. What we have shown in this (somewhat detailed) introduction to the tour of twelve papers is how they introduce, discuss, illustrate concepts that follow logically from the central characteristics of Cognitive Linguistics that we learned about in the previous section. It will not come as a surprise to you that these twelve concepts are far from being the only relevant or interesting ones that have been developed in the context of Cognitive Linguistics – but they are certainly among the most basic ones. When you read the individual papers, it may be wise to refer back once in a while to the characterizations that you find in the foregoing pages: they will help you not to lose track and to interpret the conspicuous features of the papers.

In Figure 1, the relations between the various papers are graphically represented. The fundamental features of Cognitive Linguistics (the perspectival, dynamic, non-autonomous, experiential nature of natural language) are mentioned in the corners of the figure. Intermediate between these cornerstones and the twelve central concepts, you will find six fields of research that emerged in the foregoing discussion as the logical link between the fundamental features and the central concepts: the conceptual characterization of the grammar, the search for models of polysemy, the analysis of mechanisms of polysemy, the importance of thinking in terms of domains of experience, the relationship between grammar and lexicon, and the relationship between structure and usage. The arrows in the figure indicate how each more specific concept is motivated by a more general one for instance: looking at mechanisms of categorial polysemy is one way of getting a grip on the dynamic nature of linguistic meaning, and in a next step, conceptual metaphor is one of the specific mechanisms of categorial polysemy.




Figure 1. A conceptual map of Cognitive Linguistics

Adding the intermediate level with the six fields of research brings in extra subtlety in the overview. We can now make clear, for instance, that Langacker's paper with which the collection opens, not only illustrates the perspectival nature of grammar, but also deals with the relationship between lexical structure and morpho-syntax. In the same way, the figure illustrates how the experiential nature of the grammar does not only involve questions about the acquisition and the architecture of the grammar, but also links up with thinking in terms of domains and their mutual relations.

3. Where do you go next?

Let us assume that, after roaming the present introductory volume, you really like the look and feel of *Cognitive Linguistics*. It's a safe assumption, in fact: you are bound to be drawn in by an intellectual climate that is both hospitable and inspiring, open-minded and exciting, wide-ranging and innovative. But where do you go after the initial tour d'horizon that has won your heart? Let's go over a few trajectories that might cater to your personal interests.

A first thing to do would be to complete your initiation by reading the companion volume to the present collection. In several ways, *Cognitive Linguistics: Current Applications and Future Perspectives* (edited by Gitte Kristiansen, Michel Achard, René Dirven and Francisco J. Ruiz de Mendoza) is deliberately complementary to the book that you are holding in your hands: it does not focus on Cognitive Linguistics basics, but rather describes the contemporary state of affairs in the main fields of application of Cognitive Linguistics. Also, it does not consist of existing papers, but only contains newly written articles that have the explicit purpose of presenting current discussions and domains. Taken together, the two volumes will thoroughly familiarize you with Cognitive Linguistics, way beyond the fragmented and uncertain knowledge that an incidental visit would impart.

From that point on, you may want to go beyond the level of introductions, and you may, with the acquired confidence of the experienced traveler, do some journeying on your own. However, in case your self-assurance has not reached an optimal level and you would want to boost it with an additional round of introductory reading, there are some good book-length introductions to Cognitive Linguistics that may help you. Here's a list of commendable texts.

- Friedrich Ungerer and Hans-Jörg Schmid. 1996. *An Introduction to Cognitive Linguistics*. London/New York: Longman.
- Violi, Patrizia. 2001. *Meaning and Experience*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- John R. Taylor. 2003. *Linguistic Categorization*. Third Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- René Dirven and Marjolijn Verspoor. 2004. *Cognitive Exploration of Language and Linguistics*. Second Revised Edition. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- William Croft and D. Alan Cruse. 2004. *Cognitive Linguistics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Vyvian Evans and Melanie Green. 2006. *Cognitive Linguistics. An Introduction*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Once you are ready to leave the introductory level, there are basically two things to do: deepen your understanding of the existing body of work in Cognitive Linguistics, and keep aware of current developments. With regard to the former, a first set of routes to explore is provided by the present volume itself: accompanying each of the chapters included in the collection, you find a broadly conceived set of suggestions for further reading in the *Epilogue*. They will direct you to elaborations and discussions of the basic concepts that are presented here – and to some of the less basic (but no less important) concepts developed in the field of Cognitive Linguistics. Alternatively (or in parallel), you could have a look at the forthcoming *Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics*, edited by Dirk Geeraerts and Hubert Cuyckens and published by Oxford University Press. It's a collection of some fifty commissioned articles that each offer an in-depth treatment of one of the manifold aspects of Cognitive Linguistics.

To keep in touch with new work, you would certainly want to be aware of new publications. So, what are the journals and the book series that you need to keep an eye on? Note that a lot of studies in Cognitive Linguistics are now being published in general publication channels and by a wide variety of international publishers. Here, only journals and book series that are specifically dedicated to Cognitive Linguistics are mentioned.

Two journals need to be cited: *Cognitive Linguistics*, and the *Annual Review of Cognitive Linguistics*. The former, published by Mouton De Gruyter, is the official journal of the International Cognitive Linguistics Association (more about which in the next section). The journal was founded by Dirk Geeraerts in 1990. Consecutive editors-in-chief so far were Arie Verhagen and Adele Goldberg. The latter journal, published by the John Benjamins Publishing Company under the auspices of the Spanish Cognitive Linguistics Association, first appeared in 2003. It is led by Francisco Ruiz de Mendoza. The journal *Cognitive Linguistics* is not only the most reputable journal in the field, it also comes with a considerable bonus. A subscription to *Cognitive Linguistics* includes a copy of the digital *Bibliography of Cognitive Linguistics* – and indispensable bibliographical tool compiled through the relentless efforts René Dirven (undoubtedly the major organizational force behind the entire Cognitive Linguistics enterprise). The bibliography now covers 7000 publications (no, you won't have to read them all

to be recognized as an accomplished cognitive linguist), and it will be regularly updated in the following years.

Five book series specifically dedicated to work in Cognitive Linguistics need to be mentioned. *Cognitive Linguistic Research* or CLR is the oldest and most complete series. Published by Mouton de Gruyter of Berlin, it was launched at the same time as the journal *Cognitive Linguistics*, and now numbers over thirty volumes. Recently, *Cognitive Linguistic Research* (with Dirk Geeraerts as managing editor) has received a companion series in the form of *Applications of Cognitive Linguistics* or ACL (managed by Gitte Kristiansen) – a series that will focus on the descriptive applications of Cognitive Linguistics, while *Cognitive Linguistic Research* harbors the more theoretically relevant studies. The other main publisher for Cognitive Linguistics, the John Benjamins Publishing Company of Amsterdam, features three specifically relevant (but as yet less extensive) series. While *Human Cognitive Processing* (edited by Marcelo Dascal, Raymond W. Gibbs and Jan Nuyts) has a broad cognitive orientation, the two other series are more specific: *Cognitive Linguistics in Practice* (edited by Günter Radden) covers the field from a textbook oriented perspective, and *Constructional Approaches to Language* (edited by Mirjam Fried and Jan-Ola Östman) specifically deals with Construction Grammar.

If you are interested in following what is going on in Cognitive Linguistics, note that the book series are not just monograph series. A lot of what is being published in the series consists of collective volumes with thematically interconnected articles. In many cases, these constitute selections of papers presented at Cognitive Linguistics conferences. Because quite a lot of relevant work is being published in such collective volumes, you will profit from keeping an eye on them once you've become a Cognitive Linguistics aficionado.

When you've reached this stage, you will be ready to take a step into the world and take part in some real life Cognitive Linguistics activities. Where would you go? All self-respecting cities and countries have their own festivals and fiesta, and becoming part of the crowd involves participating in the celebrations. In Cognitive Linguistics, the main community event is without any doubt the bi-annual ICLC or Cognitive Linguistics Conference. The first ICLC took place in 1989 in Duisburg, Germany. It was one of the so-called LAUD symposia (where LAUD stands for Linguistic Agency of the University of Duisburg) that had been organized by René Dirven since 1977 and where some of the world's most distinguished linguists were invited to present their work. The Duisburg conference was of crucial importance for the institutionalization and the international expansion of Cognitive Linguistics: it was there and then that the International Cognitive Linguistics Association or ICLA was founded (the conference was accordingly rebaptized as the First International Cognitive Linguistics Conference), that plans were made to launch the journal *Cognitive Linguistics*, and that the monograph

series *Cognitive Linguistics Research* was announced. Cognitive Linguistics as an intellectual movement is too self-critical to recognize any historical sites or places of pilgrimage, but if ever a commemorative plate were to be considered, Duisburg would be a likely candidate.

The following ICLC conferences were consecutively held in Santa Cruz, US (1991, organized by Gene Casad), Leuven, Belgium (1993, organized by Dirk Geeraerts), Albuquerque, US (1995, organized by Sherman Wilcox), Amsterdam, The Netherlands (1997, organized by Theo Jansen and Gisela Redeker), Stockholm, Sweden (1999, organized by Erling Wande), Santa Barbara, US (2001, organized by Ronald W. Langacker), Logroño, Spain (2003, organized by Francisco J. Ruiz De Mendoza), and Seoul, South Korea (2005, organized by Hyon-Sook Shin). The tenth ICLC in 2007, organized by Elzbieta Tabakowska, has its venue at the Jagiellonian University of Krakow in Poland.

Next to the ICLC's, there are a number of local events that you may consider attending. The LAUD conferences are now being organized bi-annually in Landau, Germany, in the year between the ICLC conferences. That holds for a number of other regular meetings, like the US-based Cognitive Structure, Discourse and Language conference, which reached its eighth edition in 2006; or the International Conference on Construction Grammar, which had its fourth edition in 2006.

An important part in the organization of workshops and symposia in Cognitive Linguistics is currently played by the ICLA affiliates. These are ICLA branches defined by region or country (and occasionally by language). The first one to be founded was the Spanish Cognitive Linguistics Association, whose affiliation was formally approved at the 1999 ICLC. The year 2001 saw the affiliation of the Finnish, the Polish, and the Slavic Cognitive Linguistics Associations. Further affiliates include the Russian Association of Cognitive Linguists (2004), the German Cognitive Linguistics Association (2005), the Discourse and Cognitive Linguistics Association of Korea (2005), the Association Française de Linguistique Cognitive (2005), the Japanese Cognitive Linguistics Association (2005), the Conceptual Structure, Discourse and Language Association (2005), and the UK Cognitive Linguistics Association (2006). Further local branches are likely to emerge, and all of them are likely to organize regular meetings. If you are interested in following what is on the agenda, you may want to consult the ICLA website: it contains a calendar of Cognitive Linguistics events, and supplies links to the individual websites of the ICLA affiliates. This is the ICLA address: <http://www.cognitivelinguistics.org/>

Meetings, lectures, workshops, symposia, and conferences are also announced on Cogling, a mailing list for disseminating ICLA news, queries, and discussions of interest to cognitive linguists. Again, details about subscribing may be found on the ICLA website. Incidentally, the website also offers an overview of

the courses or programs in Cognitive Linguistics that are offered at many places around the globe.

Once you get to one of the conferences, who would you be likely and/or eager to meet? Thinking in terms of people, the key figures of Cognitive Linguistics are George Lakoff, Ronald W. Langacker, and Leonard Talmy. Round this core of founding fathers, who originated Cognitive Linguistics in the late 1970s and the early 1980s, two chronologically widening circles of cognitive linguists may be discerned. (The lists that follow are obviously indicative only: they are not meant to exclude anyone, but only to give you an idea of the different ‘generations’ of cognitive linguists.)

A first wave, coming to the fore in the second half of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, consists of the early collaborators and colleagues of the key figures, together with a first generation of students. Names that come to mind include those of Gilles Fauconnier, Eve Sweetser, Mark Johnson, Mark Turner, Raymond W. Gibbs, William Croft, Adele Goldberg, Dave Tuggy, Gene Casad, Laura Janda, Suzanne Kemmer, Sally Rice, Ricardo Maldonado, Karen Van Hoek, Geoff Nathan, Margaret Winters, Sherman and Phyllis Wilcox, Margaret Freeman.

Simultaneously, a number of people in mostly Western and Central Europe took up the ideas of Cognitive Linguistics and contributed to their international dissemination. Names include those of René Dirven (to repeat: his instrumental role in the expansion of Cognitive Linguistics can hardly be overestimated), Brygida Rudzka-Ostyn, John Taylor, Zoltan Kövecses, Chris Sinha, Brigitte Nerlich, Arie Verhagen, Barbara Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, Elzbieta Tabakowska, Peter Harder, Günter Radden, Susanne Niemeier, Martin Pütz, Hans-Jörg Schmid, Hubert Cuyckens and the author of the present introduction.

The mid 1990s and later witnessed a second wave of expansion, with second generation students and a further geographical spread directed largely towards Asia and the rest of Europe. Names include those of Alan Cienki, Michel Achard, Joe Grady, Tim Rohrer, Seana Coulson, Todd Oakley, Gary Palmer, Jose M. Garcia-Miguel, Antonio Barcelona, Francisco Ruiz de Mendoza, Carlos Inchaurralde, Andrej Kibrik, Ekaterina Rakhilina, Michael Tomasello, Ted Sanders, Wilbert Spooren, Gerard Steen, Stefan Grondelaers, Stefan Gries, Anatol Stefanowitsch, Yo Matsumoto.

In addition, you might profit from the occasion to rub elbows with people who would perhaps not describe themselves unreservedly as cognitive linguists (coming as they do from other theoretical families or other disciplines, or simply because they like their independence), but who would show up at the Cognitive Linguistics conferences because they have relevant things to say: linguists like Charles Fillmore, Joan Bybee, Elizabeth Traugott, Östen Dahl, Jan Nuyts, or psychologists like Melissa Bowerman, Dedre Gentner, and Dan Slobin.

4. Why would you want to come back?

So now you know your way around in Cognitive Linguistics. You can walk the walk and talk the talk, and there's no way that you'd be exposed as a novice. But why would you be coming back? What would be a good reason to become a permanent resident? An obvious but relatively superficial motivation would be the diversity of the panorama: there's a lot to be found in the Cognitive Linguistics archipelago, and the framework is not so strict as to stifle creativity. It's a lively, colorful, varied environment, and you're likely to find some corner of special significance to you, where you can do your thing and meet people with similar interests. But beyond that? What would be the long-term importance of Cognitive Linguistics?

Let us try to take a bird's eye view of the history of linguistics, and see exactly where Cognitive Linguistics fits in, and why it could be important for the future of linguistics. Agreed, you can only achieve this sort of extreme synthesis if you allow for massive simplification: let us try to keep that in mind as a proviso when we do the exercise.

The development of linguistics in the twentieth century, then, is characterized by a succession of two dominant approaches: the structuralist one, and the generativist one. Currently, in the first decade of the 21st century, the generativist paradigm is no longer the principal framework, but there clearly is no new central approach yet. If one looks at Cognitive Linguistics from this perspective, there are indications that Cognitive Linguistics combines a number of tendencies that may also be found in other contemporary developments in theoretical linguistics – viz. in the broad range of functionalist approaches to linguistics. By combining these tendencies, Cognitive Linguistics taps directly into the undercurrent of contemporary developments. Specifically, if we recognize that *decontextualization* is a fundamental underlying characteristic of the development of grammatical theory in twentieth century linguistics, Cognitive Linguistics strongly embodies the *recontextualizing* tendency that is shared by most functionalist approaches.

The logic behind the decontextualization of twentieth century grammar may be grasped if we take our starting-point in De Saussure, the founding father of the structuralist approach. The Saussurean distinction between *langue* (the language system) and *parole* (the use of the language system in actual usage) creates an internally divided grammar, a conception of language with, so to speak, a hole in the middle. On the one hand, *langue* is defined by De Saussure as a social system, a set of collective conventions, a common code shared by a community. On the other hand, *parole* is an individual, psychological activity that consists of producing specific combinations from the elements that are present in the code. When *langue* and *parole* are defined in this way, there is a gap between both: what is the factor that bridges the distance between the social and the psychological,

between the community and the individual, between the system and the application of the system, between the code and the actual use of the code?

The father of generative grammar, Noam Chomsky, provided an answer by introducing a distinction between competence and performance: the missing link between social code and individual usage is the individual's knowledge of the code. Performance, in the Chomskyan sense, is basically equivalent with Saussurean *parole*, but competence interiorizes the notion of the linguistic system. Competence is the internal grammar of the language user, the knowledge that the language user has of the linguistic system and that he or she puts to use in actual performance.

Remarkably, however, Chomsky introduces a new gap into the system. Rather than the threefold classification that one might expect, he restricts his conception of language to a new dichotomy: the social aspects of language are largely ignored. In comparison with a ternary distinction distinguishing between *langue*, competence, and *parole*/performance (between social system, individual knowledge of the system, and individual use of the system), the binary distinction between competence and performance creates a new empty slot, leaving the social aspects of language largely out of sight.

This apparent lack of interest for language as a social sign system links up logically with the Chomskyan emphasis on the genetic nature of natural language. Where, in fact, does the individual knowledge of the language come from? If the source of linguistic knowledge is not social, what else can it be than an innate and universal endowment? If the language is not learned through acculturation in a linguistic community, what other source could there be for linguistic knowledge except genetics?

Further restrictions follow. Meanings constitute the variable, contextual, cultural aspects of language par excellence. Because social interaction, the exchange of ideas, changing conceptions of the world are primarily reflected in the meaning of linguistic expressions, meanings are less interesting from a genetic point of view. Also, if the lexicon is the main repository of linguistically encoded meaning, studying the lexicon is of secondary importance: the focus will fall on the abstract syntactic patterns. And finally, if linguistics focuses on formal rule systems, the application of the rule systems in actual usage is relatively uninteresting. If the rules define the grammar, it is hard to see what added value could be derived from studying the way in which the rules are actually put to use. The study of performance, in other words, is just as secondary as research into the lexicon.

In short, generative grammar led to a severe decontextualization of the grammar, separating the autonomous grammatical module from different forms of context: through the basic Chomskyan shift from *langue* to competence, linguistics is separated from the social context of language as a social code; through the focus on the genetic aspects of the language, linguistics is separated from the cognitive

context of lived individual experience; through the focus on formal rule systems, linguistics is separated from the situational context of actual language use.

Compared to this, Cognitive Linguistics is very much a recontextualizing approach. First, it is an outspoken attempt to give meaning a central position in the architecture of the grammar. Second, in contrast with formal semantics, the conception of meaning that lies at the basis of this approach is not restricted to a referential, truth-functional type of meaning – the type of meaning that you could express in logical terms. Linguistic structures are thought to express conceptualizations, and conceptualization goes further than mere reference. As we have seen, it involves imagery in the broadest sense of the word: ways of making sense, of imposing meaning. Also, the conceptualizations that are expressed in natural language have an experiential basis, i.e., they link up with the way in which human beings experience reality, both culturally and physiologically. In this sense, Cognitive Linguistics embodies a fully contextualized conception of meaning. Third, the link between linguistic performance and grammar is re-established by the view that language is usage-based, i.e. that there is a dialectic relationship between *langue* and *parole*.

We can observe, then, that the various characteristics of Cognitive Linguistics that you learned about in the first section of this introductory chapter and that were further spelled out in twelve crucial concepts, can be summarized under one general denominator: the *recontextualization* of grammar. If we assume, next, that this recontextualizing tendency is an underlying trend in contemporary cognitive-functional linguistics, Cognitive Linguistics is probably one of the most outspoken representatives of this tendency. Surely, it is not the only one, and there are whole disciplines in linguistics that are devoted to the exploration of specific forms of context, like sociolinguistics dealing with the social context, or pragmatics and text linguistics dealing with the level of *parole*. But Cognitive Linguistics is specific in the extent to which it tries to integrate these different tendencies into an overall model of language.

All of this does not mean, however, that Cognitive Linguistics has reached its goal yet. To begin with, because it is far from being alone in pursuing a recontextualized line of linguistic research, one of the major tasks for its future development will be to systematically confront similar approaches within the broad cognitive-functional domain and see to what extent theoretical and empirical convergences are possible. That is not going to be self-evident, given that Cognitive Linguistics is not even a theoretically uniform framework on its own account.

Further, we cannot say that Cognitive Linguistics has already realized all the consequences of the decontextualizing stance. For one thing, seeing language in the context of the mind at large would seem to imply a lively interdisciplinary interaction with the other sciences of the mind, but that is a trend that is only gradually emerging in mainstream cognitive linguistic circles. For an other, recontextual-

izing language in its social context implies an awareness of the variation that is inherent in the social life of language. Here again, sociolinguistically oriented studies inspired by Cognitive Linguistics are only beginning to come into view.

In short, there is still a quite a lot to be done. Ultimately, that may well be the best reason for coming back: not what has already been achieved, but what still has to be done – all the exciting, inviting paths for further exploration. So we will meet there, right?