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Modern China
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DOI: 10.1177/0097700407308138
2008 34: 36Modern China
Kang Xiaoguang and Han Heng
Contemporary China
Graduated Controls : The State-Society Relationship in
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36
Authors’ Note: Research for this article was sponsored by the Ford Foundation.
Graduated Controls
The State-Society Relationship in
Contemporary China
Kang Xiaoguang
Renmin University of China
Han Heng
Zhengzhou University
On the basis of a large number of empirical observations, this article explores
the state-society relationship in contemporary China. Through an examination
of the actual state controls over a great many organizations, this article
proposes the concept of a “system of graduated controls.” In this system, the
state, in its own interests, exerts various control strategies over different types
of social organizations according to the capacities of the social organizations
to challenge the state and the value of the public goods they provide. After
comparing this system with other types of state-society relationships, this
article concludes that the system of graduated controls is an ideal type that
best characterizes the state-society relationship of contemporary China.
Keywords: graduated controls; state-society relationship; social organization;
NGO
Since the late 1970s, Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform has brought
about a dramatic and extensive transformation in China and has
inspired more and more scholars to discuss China’s ongoing development
trajectory. In the 1980s, scholars most often resorted to modernization theories,
among which “neo-authoritarianism” and “democratism” were significant
and conflicting theoretical approaches, to explain China’s transition.1
The 1989 Tiananmen Student Movement changed this situation, and the
breakdown of post-communist regimes in the former Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe redirected China scholars’ attention to the study of the
state-society relationship. The advocates of a new theoretical paradigm
began to focus on the social arena outside the state apparatus and pinned
their hope for reform on the emergence of independent civil organizations.
Modern China
Volume 34 Number 1
January 2008 36-55
© 2008 Sage Publications
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Kang, Han / Graduated Controls 37
In studies of state-society relationships, civil society (shimin shehui) is the
most popular analytical framework. Clemens Stubbe Østergaard introduced
civil society theories into contemporary China studies when he proposed a
thesis of “civil society against the state” to analyze the 1989 Tiananmen
Student Movement (Gu, 1994).2
Based on an examination of social organizations
in Xiaoshan city, Gordon White suggested that a civil society was
emerging in contemporary China (White, 1993). Later, using the concept of
civil society in a sociological sense, White and others analyzed the changes
of social organizations brought by economic reform and pointed out that a
strong and growing sphere of social association in China exhibited the organizational
features of a civil society (White, Howell, and Shang, 1996: 208).
Considering that in China no social organization exists independently of the
state, some scholars qualified the concept of civil society as defined in the
West and proposed concepts like “semi-civil society” (He, 1997) and “stateled
civil society” (Frolic, 1997) to analyze contemporary China.
The concept of civil society emphasizes the existence of a social arena
independent of the state. This is, however, obviously not the case in contemporary
China. Thus some scholars completely abandoned the concept of
civil society and turned to the corporatist framework to analyze the statestate
relationship in contemporary China. Based on research on trade
unions and business associations, Anita Chan and Jonathan Unger argued
that the state-society relationship in contemporary China fits the corporatist
model (Chan, 1993; Unger and Chan, 1995; Unger, 1996). Tony Saich also
analyzed the state-society relationship during the reform period by using
the concept of corporatism (Saich, 2001: 207–10). In addition, Jean C. Oi
explained local economic growth and the role local government played by
using the concept of local corporatism (Oi, 1992).
Some scholars questioned the validity of applying the Western concepts of
civil society and corporatism to the Chinese case.3
At the same time, some
Chinese scholars proposed new analytical concepts on the basis of China’s
experience. For example, WangYing and others proposed a “social mesosphere
theory” (shehui zhongjianceng) through a survey of basic-level social organizations
in Xiaoshan, Zhejiang (Wang, Zhe, and Sun, 1993; Wang, 1994).
Why are there so many different theoretical models for explaining the
same social phenomenon in contemporary China? It is probably because
China is so huge and complex that any theoretical model can find empirical
support as long as one is willing to look hard enough and to ignore data
that contradict it. In general, studies of the state-society relationship in China
have up to now been limited in scope and far from comprehensive. Scholars
who pay more attention to the 1989 Tiananmen Student Movement regard
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China as a civil society against the state. Scholars who are concerned more
with newly formed social organizations (shehui tuanti) believe civil society
has emerged in contemporary China. Scholars who are concerned with
mass associations (renmin tuanti) consider China in terms of corporatism,
while scholars who focus on the semi-governmental nature of these associations
define this phenomenon as a “social mesosphere.” The proliferation
of new classification schemes and labels reminds Richard Baum and Alexei
Shevchenko of “the parable of the blind men and the elephant” (Baum and
Shevchenko, 1999: 333–34, 346). This article attempts to go beyond such
partial explanations. It summarizes previous research and proposes a new
analytical framework according to data drawn from field work.
Developing a Theoretical Model
How government supervises social organizations is a common starting
point in the literature on the state-society relationship. To a great extent, differences
between conclusions by different scholars can be attributed to differences
between types of social organizations that they have surveyed. As
far as their respective local surveys are concerned, their conclusions are correct.
However, the conclusions are flawed since they are one-sided generalizations,
that is, generalizations about the whole on the basis of the local.
This also hints that the government controls social organizations with not a
single method but plural methods. That is to say, the government uses different
strategies to regulate different social organizations. In this article we
call such plural methods “graduated controls.” A system of such controls is
a basic feature of the state-society relationship in contemporary China.
For an authoritarian government, social organizations have double
attributes. On the one hand, they are potentially challenging enemies, for
they are the strongest carriers of collective behavior. On the other hand,
they can perform an instrumental role by providing some public goods to
society, and thus can share some responsibilities with the government. At
the same time, the capacities of various social organizations to challenge
state power differ from organization to organization and the public goods
they provide differ as well. Therefore, any government that pursues maximization
of its own interests must supervise various social organizations
differently, according to their different capacities to challenge state power
and the nature of the public goods they provide.4
Obviously, this is what any
authoritarian government would wish to do. But the wish can become reality
only if the government has the necessary capacity. The Chinese government
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today has precisely the right capability. China’s reform path started from
totalitarianism. At the onset of the reform, the government absolutely
dominated the balance of power between state and society. The reform did
not really change this situation because it was a top-down, governmentinitiated
reform. The dominant position of the government in the statesociety
relationship gave the government the capability to carry out reform
as it wished. Moreover, the piecemeal character of the reform process gave
the government ample time to adjust its strategies of control over social
organizations. Therefore, the government was able to establish a system
of “graduated controls” for implementing different strategies tailored to
different social organizations.
Accordingly, one can make two inferences. If the vital interest of the
government is to monopolize political power and the biggest challenge
comes from the collective actions of the public, the government will choose
different control strategies according to the capabilities of social organizations
in organizing collective action. Therefore, the first inference is that the
government exerts different controls over social organizations according to
their different capabilities in challenging its power or organizing collective
action. Furthermore, the government undertakes the function of providing
public goods, and if the function is not accomplished, its stability will be
threatened. So the government must apply differentiated control strategies
over social organizations according to the attributes of the public goods
they provide. Therefore, the second inference is that the government
exerts different controls over social organizations according to the public
goods that the social organizations provide.
We use five variables to describe the way government regulates social
organizations: A, the attitude of the government toward the establishment of
social organizations: Does the government permit their existence or not? If it
does, is the government’s attitude toward their registration positive or negative?
During the registering, does the government arrange everything for
social organizations or does it not intervene? B, the attributes of the administrative
supervising agency (yewu zhuguan danwei): Is there an administrative
supervising agency to supervise social organizations? If so, is the administrative
supervising agency full-time or part-time? C, the government’s administrative
control of the governance of social organizations: Who make
important decisions (such as key personnel appointments)—the administrative
agencies or the social organizations, or both? D, government control of
resources needed by social organizations, such as financial and human
resources: In terms of financial resources, does the government exercise control
over social organizations via laws and regulations, or by administrative
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measures, or does it simply not intervene at all? On personnel matters, to
what degree are appointments, salaries, and the welfare of personnel controlled
by the government? E, government control over the routine daily
activities of social organizations: Does the administrative supervising agency
stipulate and/or interfere with the daily routine or is it decided autonomously
by the organization itself? If the organization is autonomous, does it need to
report its daily routine to the administrative supervising agency?
Case Analysis: Description of the System
of Graduated Controls
To demonstrate the usefulness of the above theoretical model, we examine
eight types of social organizations: politically antagonistic organizations,
trade unions, business and commercial associations, urban community
organizations, religious organizations, official non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), grassroots NGOs, and informal organizations (see Table 1).5
These organizations differ in their capacity for organizing collective action
and for providing public goods. For instance, what we call politically
antagonistic organizations have the greatest ability to challenge the government.
Both trade unions and business and commercial associations (that is,
interest groups of owners of enterprises) have a strong capability to organize
collective action. Religious organizations challenge the official ideology.
Urban community organizations provide important public goods as
well promote collective action. Generally speaking, nonprofit official
NGOs, grassroots NGOs, and informal organizations have no obvious challenging
power. Nevertheless, as far as the government is concerned, official
NGOs and grassroots NGOs are of more importance than informal organizations
in providing public goods.
Exploring the correspondence between types of social organizations and
the five control variables of the government, we identify five “grades” of control
strategies for the eight types of organizations, as presented in Table 2.
The Grade I control strategy targets politically antagonistic organizations.
Such organizations are strictly prohibited by the government, and any existing
ones that were secretly established will be banned if detected. The Public
Security Bureau is responsible for watching out for such organizations.
These organizations obviously have total autonomy when it comes to vital
decisions, appointment of key personnel, resource acquisition, and daily
routine. Compared to other social organizations, politically antagonistic
social organizations face particularly harsh governmental control measures.
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Kang, Han / Graduated Controls 41
The Grade II control strategy governs trade unions and community organizations
that are established by government directive. In the four trade
unions surveyed, two (SG General Trade Union and SG Steel Factory Trade
Union) were established by the government at the founding of the People’s
Republic, and the other two (SK Corporation Trade Union and SD
Corporation Trade Union) were established at the demand of the government
after the reform and opening up. By the same token, the community
organizations were established at the demand of the government. The predecessor
of community organizations is the residents’ committee (jumin
Table 1
The Survey Samples
Primary Secondary
Classification Classification Name Type Location
Functional Trade union SG General State-owned Beijing
organization enterprise
SG Steel State-owned Beijing
Factory enterprise
SK Corporation Joint venture Shenzhen
SD Corporation Foreign Shenzhen
enterprise
Business and YY Commercial Beijing
commercial ZB Business Shenzhen
association WS Investment Shenzhen
Community Urban residents’ SY Community Dayuan Beijing
organization committee XX Community Common Beijing
Religious Three Selfs YC Church Urban Henan
organization Church (sanzi BD Church Rural Henan
jiaohui)
NGO Official NGO FP Foundation Beijing
Grassroots NGO XY Research Domestic Beijing
Institute
FZ Journal Foreign Beijing
Informal Art, entertainment, RD Painting and Work unit Beijing
organization and other and Calligraphy
SY Music Work unit Beijing
QN Interest Public park Beijing
Antagonistic Politically Falungong
organization antagonistic
organization
Note: NGO = Non-governmental organization.
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Table 2
Relationship between Types of Social Organizations and Types of Government Control
Type of Government Control
Attribute Control Over Governance
of the
Type of Administrative Appointment Control Over Resources
Control Social Control Over Supervising Vital of Key Control Over
Strategies Organization Establishment Agency Decisions Principals Funding Personnel Routine Activities
I
II
III
Politically
antagonistic
social
organization
Trade union
and
community
organization
Religious
organization
Prohibited
Compulsory
establishment
from the top
Absorbed in
the system
set by the
government
Full-time
appointed
agency
Full-time
appointed
agency
Full-time
appointed
agency
Made by the
organization
independently
Made by the
supervising
agency
Proposed by the
organization
but examined
and approved
by the
supervising
agency
Decided by the
organization
independently
Appointed
by the
supervising
agency or by
the unit
nested under
Decided after
consultation
between the
organization
and the
supervising
agency
Funding
limited by
administrative
regulations
Funding
stipulated by
laws and
regulations
Funding
limited by
administrative
regulations
Decided by the
organization
independently
Decided by the
supervising
agency or by
the unit nested
under
Decided by the
organization
independently
but reported to
the supervising
agency
Carried out by
the organization
independently
Defined by the
supervising
agency or by
the unit nested
under
Decided by the
organization
but examined
and approved
by the supervising
agency
in advance
42
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IV
V
Business
association,
Commercial
association,
andOfficial
NGO
Grassroots
NGOand
Informal
interestgroup
Establishment
encouraged
Existenceas
enterpriseor
nointerfer-
ence
Pluralistic
agencythatis
fixedafter
consultation
Noadministra-
tivesupervis-
ingagency
Proposed
bythe
organization
butapproved
bythe
supervising
agency
Madebythe
organization
indepen-
dently
Appointed
bythe
supervising
agency,by
theunit,orby
consultation
Decidedbythe
organization
independently
Fundingby
administrative
measures
orno
interference
Decidedbythe
organization
indepen-
dently,sup-
portedbythe
unitnested
under,orno
interference
Decidedbythe
unitnested
under
Decidedbythe
organization
independently
Decidedbythe
organization
butreportedto
thesupervis-
ingagency
Carriedoutby
theorganization
independently
43
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weiyuanhui) established by municipal governments, which is under direct
control of the government. For example, XX Community Committee was
created by combining two committees, and SY Community Committee was
developed from one resident committee that had been created by combining
several residents’ committees.
Not only does the government monopolize the establishment of such
types of social organizations, but also it assigns them to full-time administrative
supervising agencies that make and carry out vital decisions top
down and appoint the key principals. Surveys show that the routine activities
of trade unions are mostly arranged by local trade union federations and
that trade union federations above the county level are absorbed into the
government system. The Trade Union Law clearly stipulates that retired
trade union functionaries at or above the county level shall enjoy the same
treatment as retired functionaries of government departments (Article 48).
Most routine activities of residents’ committees are arranged by the
people’s government of the subdistrict. The Organic Law of Urban
Residents’ Committees stipulates that the people’s government of a city not
divided into districts or of a municipal district or an agency of such a
people’s government shall provide guidance, support, and help for the residents’committees.
The residents’committees shall, for their part, assist the
superior people’s government or agency in its work (Article 2). That is to
say, the government appoints key leaders of trade union federations at various
levels, and the government of a city, or its subordinate branches, manages
the operations of trade unions and community organizations.
Our survey shows that the key principals of trade unions are all
appointed by the Party or administrative departments. For example, in SG
General the chairman of the trade union is the deputy secretary of the Party
Committee of the SG Corporation, and the principal of every department of
the trade union is nominated by the Party Committee, as is the case in
lower-level trade unions in SG. In SK Corporation, the chairman of the
trade union is the vice secretary of the SK Corporation Party Committee as
well as the chairman of the Supervisory Committee and the executive director
of the corporation. All the chairmen of subordinate trade unions are
nominated by the department managers. As for community organizations,
though a voting system has been implemented, selection of leaders is in
reality under government control. For example, before the election of XX
Community Committee, to ensure control officials of the subdistrict government
(jiedao banshichu) did much campaigning, including disseminating
propaganda and holding informal meetings to increase the visibility of their
own, favored candidates.6
There was also an election in SY Community
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Committee, but it was only nominal. In 2003 for example, before the election
SY leaders and subdistrict government officials made a number of
speeches to voice their support for the incumbent committee members and
to mobilize the residents to reelect them. The committee was reelected, just
as the officials had expected.
As for funding, the Trade Union Law and the Organic Law of Urban
Residents’ Committees have different stipulations. For example, the Urban
Residents’ Committee law stipulates that “the operational funding and the
source of funding of the committee and the stipend scheme and source [of
funding] for the staff” must be determined and allocated by the government,
and the “office space for these committees must be provided by the
local government in a unified fashion” (Article 17). The salaries, provision
of welfare, and personnel scheme of grassroots trade unions are determined
by the enterprises in which they operate.
Most routine activities of trade unions in state-owned enterprises involve
the upper-level trade union system. Comparing the activities in 2002 of the
SG Trade Union with those of the Beijing Municipal General Trade Union,
we found that the activities of the former involved either taking part in activities
organized by the municipal general trade union or were dictated by the
latter. The operation of trade unions in joint ventures and non-state-owned
enterprises is subject to the management of their enterprises.7
The routine
activities of community organizations is controlled by the relevant government
bureaucracies. For example, while investigating XX Community
Committee, committee members complained to us about too many assignments
and too many meetings with the subdistrict government offices
(jiedao banshichu). During an interview, the staff members of a community
committee were busy with jobs assigned by the superior government offices.
Under such tight governmental control, trade unions and community
organizations have become quasi-governmental organizations that carry out
specific policies of the government. In a word, they are integrated into the
government and have little independence.8
The Grade III control strategy is applied to religious organizations. The
government imposes certain limits on the establishment of religious organizations.
For example, a newly established Christian church must be examined
and approved by the government and absorbed into the Three Selfs
Church (sanzi jiaohui); otherwise, it will be banned. Actually, before the BD
Christian Church was reviewed and approved, several government agencies
such as the Public Security Bureau, the Civil Affairs Bureau, the United
Front Department, and the Bureau of Religious Affairs had cracked down on
it many times. Most of the key figures of the BD Church remember being
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arrested. In fact, while we were conducting our field work, some staff
members of a church in one township were detained by the Public Security
Bureau because the church had not yet been approved by the government.
To supervise the activities of religious organizations, the government has
set up a specialized Administrative Bureau of Religious Affairs. All important
activities of religious organizations must be approved by this agency;
otherwise, they will be banned. For example, in summer 2003, the YC
Christian Church held a sodality meeting for college students who were
either Christians themselves or had Christian parents. The YC District
Bureau of Religious Affairs approved this gathering beforehand but did not
notify the City Bureau of Religious Affairs. As a result, the gathering was
interrupted by the YC City Bureau of Religious Affairs when it was almost
over. The city bureau reprimanded the church leaders for “competing for
talent” with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Key principals of religious organizations are appointed through consultation
with the relevant administrative supervising agency and seek to maintain good
relations with the government. Some of them have even been absorbed into the
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). For example,
the leader of the YC Christian Church was appointed in 1994 and has
remained in the CPPCC since then. Though there were several elections after
1994, these elections were only nominal. In addition, he is also a member of
the YC District CPPCC and of the Henan Provincial CPPCC.
With respect to fundraising, the government imposes many restrictions,
especially on churches’ acceptance of overseas contributions. According to
a principal of the Henan Province Christian Three Selfs Patriotic Committee
(Jidujiao sanzi aiguo yundong weiyuanhui), the Bureau of Religious Affairs
strictly limits the church’s overseas contributions. Contributions below
300,000 yuan have to be approved by the Provincial Bureau of Religious
Affairs, and any contribution above that amount has to be approved by the
National Bureau of Religious Affairs. Generally speaking, when a religious
organization applies for permission to accept a contribution, information on
the contributor will be transferred to the Provincial Foreign Affairs Office
and then to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a process that always takes two
or three years.
With respect to personnel, the engagement of personnel, the level of
salaries, and the provision of welfare for full-time staff, all these are
decided independently by the church, but they must be recorded with the
relevant governmental departments. Routine matters such as the time,
place, and form of assembly are carried out independently by the church,
but they must be examined and approved by the government.
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In contrast to its control strategy with regard to trade unions and community
organizations, the government follows a stern control strategy with
respect to religious organizations.
The Grade IV control strategy is tailored for business and commercial
associations and official NGOs. The government encourages the founding of
such organizations. In 1989, to encourage foreign investment, the government
promulgated regulations entitled Interim Provisions for the Administration of
Foreign Chambers of Commerce in China (Waiguo shanghui guanli zanxing
guiding), and in 1999 it circulated a document entitled “Opinions on
Stepping Up the Development of Industrial and Commercial Associations
(For Trial Implementation)” (Guanyu jiakuai peiyu he fazhan gongshang
lingyu xiehui de ruogan yijian). The latter document states that “industrial
and commercial associations . . . are important components of the socialist
market economy. Their development is an important part of the reform of
government organization and the deepening of the reform of state-owned
enterprises.” Obviously, the government encourages the development of
such associations. In fact, our investigation testifies to this. For example,
the YY Commercial Association is a product of the separation of government
functions from enterprise management. The ZB Business Association
and the WS Investment Association were jointly initiated and founded by
the government and the relevant enterprises. Not only does the government
encourage the establishment of business and commercial associations, it
also encourages the establishment of official NGOs. For example, the FP
Foundation was directly sponsored by the government. It has since worked
hand in glove with the government. As an official stated, the CCP Central
Committee and the State Council have focused on and strongly supported
the development of the FP Foundation.
In terms of administrative supervision of Grade IV organizations, there
is no single, full-time agency assigned to this task. Instead there are multiple
administrative supervising agencies, created via consultation between
the social organization and relevant departments of the government. Such
social organizations enjoy different levels of autonomy when it comes to
vital decisions and appointment of principals. In the four organizations we
surveyed, the ZB Business Association and the WS Investment Association
have relatively great autonomy, while the YY Commercial Association is
more subject to influence from the work unit of its chairman (huizhang
danwei) on personnel matters and important decisions. The principals of
the FP Foundation are appointed by the government.
There are no restrictions on the acquisition of funding; indeed, the government
actively supports such organizations. For example, the FP has enjoyed
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many preferences over the years. From 1992 to 1993, with the government’s
backing it received discounted loans of twenty million yuan from the People’s
Bank of China, the Agricultural Bank of China, the China Construction Bank,
and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China. The FD is free to hire fulltime
staff and to decide on the salaries and welfare provision of its staff. In its
routine activities, it faces little interference from the government, but nonetheless
its routine must be reported to the administrative supervising agencies.
Obviously, since these organizations are different from religious organizations,
the government’s control strategy is not to severely restrict them
but to actively encourage and support them.
Finally, the Grade V control strategy is reserved for grassroots NGOs and
informal organizations, which do not encounter too much interference from
the government.9
Grassroots NGOs are always registered as enterprises,
which are supervised by the Administrative Bureau for Industry and
Commerce (Gongshang ju). According to the Regulations on the Registration
and Management of Social Organizations (Shehui tuanti dengji guanli
tiaoli), a social organization, with the agreement of its administrative supervising
agency, must register with the Bureau of Civil Affairs. That is to say,
if a social organization wants to be an associational legal person (shetuan
faren), it must find an administrative supervising agency. But in reality
administrative bureaucracies are not willing to take on the responsibilities this
involves, and thus many social organizations cannot find an administrative
supervising agency. As a result, these social organizations cannot register as
an association (shetuan faren). Therefore, to operate as a legal entity, they
have no choice but to register as a corporation (business enterprise). For
example, before the XX Research Institute registered as an enterprise, it had
approached the National Educational Commission, the All-China Women’s
Federation, the Soong Ching Ling Foundation, the Youth Development
Foundation, the Child Development Center, the China Disabled Persons’
Federation, the Beijing Disabled Persons’ Federation, and so on to find an
administrative supervising agency. None of these agencies was interested.
Thus, XX was forced to register as an enterprise. Compared with official
NGOs, grassroots NGOs are more independent because they do not have any
administrative supervising agency.10
As for informal organizations, the government neither demands them to
register with the Bureau of Civil Affairs nor exercises direct control. Instead,
the government’s control strategy is one of either indirect control, such as
managing organizations through the units and residents’ committees they
adhere to,11
or letting things go without control. Obviously, the control of
the government over such organizations is weak.
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In sum, the government implements different control strategies for different
social organizations according to their capability to challenge the
government. For example, the strategy for controlling politically antagonistic
organizations is to ban them, since they have publicly and explicitly
challenged the government. For trade unions and community organizations
that have a strong potential challenging capability, the strategy is to turn
them into quasi-governmental organs. The strategy for religious organizations
is to limit their growth, since they have a strong potential challenging
capability. The strategy for business and commercial associations and official
NGOs is to encourage and support them, since they have weak potential
challenging capability. The strategy for grassroots NGOs and informal
organizations is one of no interference. On the premise that social organizations
cannot challenge the government’s power, the government follows
different control strategies according to the public goods they provide. For
example, the strategy for business and commercial associations and official
NGOs is to encourage and support them, because the public goods they provide
are necessary for the government. If the public goods that social organizations
provide are not deemed necessary, the control strategy of the
government is to control and limit them or to let them operate without
restriction.12
In short, the government implements different control strategies
with respect to different social organizations according to their different
challenging capabilities and the character of public goods they provide.
Graduated Controls as an Ideal Type
of State-Society Relationship
Analysis of our data shows that during the reform period with political
liberalization and economic marketization there emerged a myriad of social
organizations representing diverse interests and needs. In the face of this
change, the old totalitarian mode of control, in which the state absolutely
controls society, gradually disintegrated. Civil autonomy has not, however,
emerged in its place. Rather, a new mode of state control has taken shape,
what we call a “graduated mode of control.” The key feature of this new
state-society relationship is that the state controls society purposefully,
flexibly, and selectively. Its controls are very intensive and strong when it
feels such are necessary, and lax or even absent when control is considered
unnecessary. In this new system the kind of strategies and the degree of the
control vary according to the interest of the government and the challenging
capability and social function of the controlled organizations. In fact,
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this is a new system through which the government implements overall control
of society by quasi-governmental means in a new economic environment.
The system of graduated controls not only describes essential features of the
state-society relationship of contemporary China but also establishes an ideal
type. We can understand the features of the new type by comparing it to other
types of state-society models such as the civil society model, the corporatist
model, the civil-society-against-the state model, and the totalitarianism model.
Though there is some controversy over the definition of civil society, in
general we can say that civil society is the realm of the social, economic, and
moral order that lies outside of state control (Miller, 1992: 126). Civil society
emphasizes freedom of association, competition among diverse social organizations,
and a social field independent of the state. It is a free democratic
regime that can assure these features of civil society in which society dominates
the distribution of power between the state and society, while in a system
of graduated controls, the right to organize is so limited that each different
realm has different rights. In the latter system, social organizations have been
established neither fully according to the free will of their members nor fully
independent of the state. Different social organizations have different relationships
with the government.13
This new system is an adaptation not to a free
democratic regime but an authoritarian or post-totalitarian regime, where the
state dominates in the distribution of power between state and society.
In the corporatist model, in contrast to the model of graduated controls,
citizens have ample rights of free association and social organizations are
relatively autonomous.14
However, unlike the civil society model, corporatism
emphasizes communication and cooperation between state and
society instead of a social field independent of the state. In addition, corporatism
emphasizes a monopoly of functional organizations instead of free
competition among social organizations. Such functional organizations can
negotiate with the state for their members’ sake on the one hand, and on the
other hand, they must make a commitment to enforce public policies among
their members (Miller, 1992: 173–76). In a system of graduated controls,
there is not always a monopoly social organization for every interest group.
Even when a monopoly social organization does exist in a system of graduated
controls, it probably does not have the support of its members because,
given the restriction on the freedom of association, most likely it is mandated
by the government rather than by the free will of its members.15
Therefore, those monopoly organizations may not serve the interests of their
members, but instead tend to serve the interests of the state. In addition, corporatism
is more flexible and adaptable than graduated controls and can
exist in harmony with democracy, authoritarianism, and even totalitarianism.
50 Modern China
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The civil-society-against-the-state model characterizes the state-society
relationship of Eastern European countries in transition, which corresponds to
totalitarianism in collapse. In this relationship, though people’s right to organize
is limited by law, in fact the limitation is ineffective. Social organizations
have a great deal of independence and publicly oppose the state, while state
controls over these organizations are weak. In a system of graduated controls,
not only are associational rights limited but also state controls over social organizations
are efficient. Generally, social organizations do not oppose the state,
for they have a clear sense of limits; that is, they dare not publicly challenge
the authority of the government.16
The civil-society-against-the-state model
corresponds to totalitarianism in collapse, while a system of graduated controls
corresponds to totalitarianism in self-adjustment.
The totalitarianism model describes the state-society relationship in
mainland China before the reform. In this model people are deprived of
associational rights and independent social organizations are banned. In the
distribution of power between the state and society, the state dominates
totally and intrudes into every corner of society, including both the public
sphere and private lives. To a certain extent China’s present system of graduated
controls has inherited some features of totalitarianism. For example,
the state dominates in the distribution of power between state and society
so that it controls all of the public sphere and monopolizes all resources for
collective action. But there is an obvious difference between the two
models. In a system of graduated controls, the state no longer interferes in
every aspect of society and permits limited freedom of association. Many
social organizations emerge, and moreover economic and private spheres
open up. With regard to providing public goods, the state changes from
arranging everything into using social organizations to meet social needs,
though these social organizations are supposed to play only a supplementary
“odds and ends” role.
A system of graduated controls is thus different from both the old model
of totalitarianism before reform, civil-society-against-the-state in Eastern
Europe, and corporatism and civil society in the West. It is a new model of
the state-society relationship.
After twenty years of reform in China, the market has replaced central
planning as the dominant mechanism of resource allocation and authoritarianism
has replaced totalitarianism. In the system of graduated controls that
appeared in China in the 1990s, the state does not totally control the economy
or interfere in personal lives any longer, but it firmly controls the political
and public spheres. The state permits citizens limited freedom to organize,
but social organizations are permitted neither to exist independently of the
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52 Modern China
state nor to challenge the power of the state. At the same time, the state fully
uses the capabilities of social organizations to provide public goods. As a
result, the freedom of the citizens of China has greatly expanded, while
authoritarianism ultimately remains unchallenged. In addition, the development
of social organizations has not led to democratization in the political
arena. Of course, twenty years is so short that we cannot forecast the longterm
effects of the system of graduated controls based on what has happened
over the past two decades, nor can we forecast what may result from
further organizing in Chinese society. By the same token, we cannot judge
whether the system of graduated controls is a short-lived phenomenon or
will endure. Perhaps only time can give us the answer.
Notes
1. On the controversy over “neo-authoritarianism” and “democratism,” see Liu and Li
(1989).
2. Tony Saich has pointed out that the early literature on contemporary China and civil
society focused on the areas of conflict between the state and society. In this literature, almost
all types of nonconformity or antiregime behavior were cited as evidence of an emerging civil
society (Saich, 2001: 206).
3. On the applicability of the civil society model, see Wakeman, 1993; Huang, 1993; Dean,
1997; Chamberlain, 1998; Saich, 2000: 139; and Howell, 2004: 163–4. On corporatism, see
White, Howell, and Shang, 1996: 211–15; Saich, 2001: 209; Foster, 2002: 62–63; and Howell,
2004: 162–63.
4. “Government” is not an abstract concept, for it is made up of real persons; in fact, persons
who are rational and pursue the maximization of their own interests. As a result, in all
cases government also acts to maximize its interests or those of its agents.
5. An example of a politically antagonistic organization is the Falungong. See Kang
Xiaoguang’s survey and research on the Falungong between 1998 and 2000 (Kang, 2000).
6. Jiedao banshichu is a subordinate agency of the people’s municipal district government.
7. We surveyed one enterprise established with foreign capital–the CL Group–which has
no trade union. Though it lacks a trade union, the CL Group offers all the recreational activities
that are offered by the SK Trade Union; moreover, some of these activities are better.
Judging from this, we can conclude that whether a trade union exists or not in a joint venture
has little effect on the workers. Even if an enterprise has no trade union, it nonetheless may
carry out such things as work competitions (laodong jingsai) and propaganda, and it may offer
recreational activities because its purpose is to stimulate enthusiasm, initiative and a sense of
loyalty among its workers. In short, the object is to promote the interests of the enterprise
rather than the interests of the workers.
8. Grassroots trade unions and compound (dayuan) residents’ committees are attached not
only to the government but also to the units under which they are nested. The appointment of
principals, funding, and personnel matters are highly dependent on these units. Thus, these
organizations can be doubly dependent.
9. This does not mean the government exercises no control over such organizations. In
fact, the Public Security Bureau controls every organization and every individual. Once these
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Kang, Han / Graduated Controls 53
organizations and people engage in nonconforming behavior, the Public Security Bureau
promptly intervenes. As Jude Howell (2004: 159) notes, such governmental control establishes
the limits of what is tolerated: no organization and no individual is permitted to challenge the
power of the government or threaten its stability.
10. At present, the government manages grassroots organizations as enterprises instead of
social organizations, although these organizations carry out activities and perform the functions
of social organizations. That is to say, there is a loophole in the government’s management
of such organizations.
11. This manifests itself in two ways. One is that informal organizations must register with
the units that they belong to, and the other is that the units actively support informal organizations.
This is also true of community residents’ committees. In XX Community, government
“Measures on Strengthening the Management of Community Social Organization” demand
that residents’ committees gather information about the interest group organizations in the
community, including the name, gender, age, address, place of employment, and telephone
number of their members. Thus, although there is no direct control over informal organizations,
the government implements indirect control over informal interest groups through community
organizations and units.
12. If a social organization has a strong potential challenging capability and the public
goods it provides are not necessary for the government, the control strategy of the government
is to limit its development. A religious organization would be an example of such an organization.
If, however, a social organization has a weak potential challenging capability and the
public goods it provides are not necessary for the government—which would be the case with,
for example, an informal interest group—the control strategy of the government is to let the
organization operate without restriction.
13. Because of this, some scholars who advocate civil society adjust the concept when analyzing
China and propose such concepts as “semi-civil society” and “state-led civil society”
and argue that civil society in China is in a nascent, embryonic, and emerging stage (Dickson,
2003: 18).
14. There are two primary types of corporatism: societal corporatism and state corporatism.
In the former, citizens have full rights of association. In the latter, the rights of association
are limited. But as a whole, in the corporatist model citizens have greater rights of
association than in the model of graduated controls.
15. As Foster (2002: 63) points out, associations are designed neither to represent nor to
stifle group interests; instead, they are created to assist government agencies. Although the
structural form of corporatism is found in contemporary China, these arrangements are essentially
not corporatist.
16. Not all the activities of the organizations we surveyed (politically antagonistic organizations
excluded) are seen by the government as challenges to its authority. All the organizations
we surveyed have a strong sense of boundary lines and carry out strict self-discipline in
their daily operations, which indicates that governmental control is so effective that these organizations
avoid challenging the authority of the government.
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Kang Xiaoguang is a professor in the School of Agricultural Economics and Rural
Development at Renmin University of China and the director of NPO Research Center in the
School of Public Administration at People’s University.
Han Heng (PhD in Environmental Economics and Management, Chinese Academy of Sciences,
2006) is an instructor in the School of Public Administration at Zhengzhou University.
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