





# Lexical Meaning in Cognitive Linguistics: From Classical Semantics to Conceptual Metaphor to Conceptual Blending

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
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#### The Semantic Problem

- Why is a chair a chair?
- 'The chairness' of a chair, inherent to the object?
- A necessary, direct link between the word and the object (Plato)?
- An intermediary?



#### The Semantic Triangle



 Ogden and Richards (1921) The Meaning of Meaning

#### Anglo-American semantics today

 Smith and Medin (1981)<sup>1</sup> Three approaches to categorization – hold today, too:

Atomistic

```
(tree = a WOODY PERENIAL PLANT...)
```

Probabilistic

```
(tree = +SOLID, +NATURAL, +ANIMATE, -MOVING,...)
```

Exemplar


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(the "prototypical" tree = ROOT, TRUNK, CROWN)
```

#### Atomistic attempts (ca. 1960-1975)

- Necessary and sufficient conditions
- "A chair is a four-legged object used for sitting"
- Further break down into elements
- "A leg is a..." "An object is a..." "Sitting is..."
- Further break down...
- Until you reach the level of ultimate categories

#### Categories

- Aristotle: "fundamental protoconcepts"
- Analysis:
- Kill = cause to become (neg) alive
- 'causation' and 'becoming' prior to 'killing'; 'alive' prior to 'dead'...
- In search of a 'deep structure' of meaning (not syntax!). A big clash with Chomsky 1968-1972.
- The generative semanticists
- The Linguistics Wars





#### How about these?





#### Or these?



#### Or these?





Are there actually 'primitives of meaning'?

If there are, then there must be an "ultimate causation", i.e. meanings must be reducible to atomic elements...

Are they..?

Not the mention the notorious problem of context





## Which brings us here...




# The collapse of generative semantics

Why Women are evil!

 Chomskian semanticists switch to studies of "sentence meaning" and – in most approaches – give up on lexical semantics altogether!


 Lakoff retires... for five or so years...




... GraphJam.com

#### The exemplar approach...

- Alternative approaches to categorization:
- Wittgenstein, ca. 1953 family resemblance
- Rosch,ca. 1975 prototypes
- Lakoff 1987 ICMs: relatively stable representations equivalent to theories about the world (Is the Pope a bachelor – ICMs 'marriage' and 'Catholicism')
- (new at the time? Not really... Kant, Blummenberg, Weinrich, Merlau Ponty, Mika Petrovic Alas)








#### Concepts are all but clearly defined!

• Eleonor Rosch (1975)

William Labov (1973)



Also: categories (and centrality effects) may expand BEYOND JUST ONE DOMAIN!
... Which gives rise to the phenomenon of CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR.



#### How did metaphor fit in?

- The classical view
- Literal and metaphorical meaning
- "Oh, Hamlet, thou has cleft my heart in twain"
- "Love is not love... [...] if it bends with a remover to remove..."
- Rhetoric. Master trope.
   Reduced comparison.






#### Literal and figurative language

- Problems with this view (compositionality, truth conditions, literal meaning comes first, everything else – if present at all – follows)
- Evans and Greene Ch 9.1 distinctions hardly hold (after Gibbs, 1994)
- Conventional literality vs. poetic usage (but: Things are going smoothly, He is in a state of shock)
- Non metaphorical vs. metaphorical use (Achilles is brave OK, but try talking about time or music without using a metaphor)
- Truth-conditionality (but many lg expressions are not propositions e.g. Could you help me, please?, I name this sheep Elizabeth)

#### CMT – The notorious intro example

- a. Look how far we've come.
- b. We're at a crossroads.
- c. We'll just have to go our separate ways.
- d. We can't turn back now.
- e. I don't think this relationship is *going anywh*
- f. Where are we?
- g. We're stuck.
- h. It's been a long, bumpy road.
- i. This relationship is a dead-end street.
- j. We're just spinning our wheels.



#### And the 'cross-domain mappings'

**Source: JOURNEY** → **Target: LOVE** 

TRAVELLERS → LOVERS

VEHICLE → LOVE RELATIONSHIP

JOURNEY → EVENTS IN THE RELATIONSHIP

DISTANCE COVERED → PROGRESS MADE


OBSTACLES ENCOUNTERED → DIFFICULTIES EXPERIENCED


DECISIONS ABOUT DIRECTION → CHOICES ABOUT WHAT TO DO

DESTINATION OF THE JOURNEY → GOALS OF THE RELATIONSHIP

#### Any other examples?

- SPACE is TIME ("a protoconceptual metaphor")
- How do we understand TIME?






**English prepositions!** 

#### Numbers...

- Why don't I have any problems understanding this:
- . 16
- But I do have problems with this:
- 1000101101 or this:
- 2AF3 = 10,995





### My favorite...

- The musical system is abstract
- The only way to approach it is to use a metaphor
- Are pitches really UP and DOWN
- Do they actually MOVE?
- What runs through the musical FLOW?
- Does music 'INVOKE' EMOTIONS?
- What indeed is LIGHT in the sound of the trumpet and DARK in that of the viola? etc.








### The simplest example


PITCHES are LOCATED IN THE VERTICAL SPACE



#### Common mappings

"PITCHES ARE HEIGHTS"  SOURCE DOMAIN  Series of dots along the line Low position  High position  Vertical axis, proportion of lines	= = = =	Low and high TARGET DOMAIN Music Low frequency High frequency Key
Change of position along the line	=	Change of frequency
"PITCHES ARE SIZES" SOURCE DOMAIN		Small and big TARGET DOMAIN
Spectrum of sizes	=	Music
Smaller object	=	Low frequency
Bigger object	=	High frequency
Sphere, geometrical proportion	=	Key
Expansion of the sphere	=	Change of frequency
"PITCHES ARE THICKNESSES"		Thick and thin
SOURCE DOMAIN		TARGET DOMAIN
Spectrum of thicknesses	=	Music
Thicker object	=	Lower frequency
Thinner object	=	Higher frequency
Horizontal axis, width proportion	=	Key
Expansion of the axis	=	Change of frequency

## Ultimately... in psychology








#### Ultimately... in cognitive science










## Any other interesting concepts that 'have to' be thought of in metaphorical terms?



#### CMT – Theoretical principles

"Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature" (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 3).

Thought vs. language

Source and target domains

Mapping

Selectivity



Unidirectionality

(even: PEOPLE are MACHINES vs. MACHINES are PEOPLE, Lakoff and Turner, 1989)

- Motivation source and target: Kovecses, 2002
- Source: body, health and illness, plants and animals, buildings and construction, machines and tools, games and sport, money and economic transactions, cooking and food
- Target: emotion, desire, morality, thought, society, nation, politics, time, life and death, religions, events and actions

#### Life is a Journey – Event Structure Metaphor

#### Table 9.2 The event structure metaphor

Metaphor: STATES ARE LOCATIONS (BOUNDED REGIONS IN SPACE)

Example: John is in love

Metaphor: CHANGE IS MOTION (FROM ONE LOCATION TO ANOTHER)

Example: Things went from bad to worse

Metaphor: CAUSES ARE FORCES

Example: Her argument forced me to change my mind

Metaphor: ACTIONS ARE SELF-PROPELLED MOVEMENTS

Example: We are moving forward with the new project

Metaphor: PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS

Example: We've finally reached the end of the project
Metaphor: MEANS ARE PATHS (TO DESTINATIONS)

Example: We completed the project via an unconventional route

Metaphor: DIFFICULTIES ARE IMPEDIMENTS TO MOTION

Example: It's been uphill all the way on this project

Metaphor: EVENTS ARE MOVING OBJECTS

Example: Things are going smoothly in the operating theatre


Metaphor: LONG-TERM PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITIES ARE JOURNEYS


Example: The government is without direction

- Metaphorical entailments: the potential of metaphorical expressions (in the language) to "break away" from the mappings
- Eg. Metaphor: THEORIES are BUILDINGS
- Linguistic realization: Your theory is well structured.
- Entailment: The hypothesis holds.
- Yet, also constraints: just any metaphorical entailment (or enrichment) is not possible. Eg. \*We are in the cellar of your theory.
- The invariance principle (Lakoff, 1993) only those portions of the source can be mapped which do not conflict with the *schematic* structure of the target.

#### Invariance

- She gave him a book. (source language)
- Based on the metaphor CAUSATION IS TRANSFER we get:
- (a) She gave him a kiss.
- (b) She gave him a headache.
- ... (a) \*and he still has it (?)
- ... (b) and he still has it.
- Only (b) is metaphorical...
- ... because the image-schematic structure remains.





#### • ☐ Image schemas

- ●□Elaborating on Kant: Mark Johnson (1987): *The Body in the Mind*
- •□A schema is a recurrent pattern, shape, and regularity in [conceptual activities]. [...] I conceive schemas as structures for organizing our experience and comprehension (p. 29)
- They originate from early bodily interactions.
- They are visually represented for theoretical purposes, but **are not** equal to rich images.
- ■□Rather, they are "preconceptual", i.e. their cognitive reality is postulated on a level between neuronal activity and mental representation.
- •□Likewise, they are "analogue", i.e. not reducible to a set of formally computable relations.
- ●□Finally, they are *systematic* and tend to be *universal*.

#### Some typical image schemas






Figure 1: Diagrams of Image Schemes

#### **VERTICALITY**

Image schema






#### **PATH**





Image schema







#### **CENTER-PERIPHERY**

Image schema







# Conflation theory (C. Johnson, 1997)

- From sensorimotor to subjective experience
- WARM is CLOSE

• (1) Conflation

• (2) Differentiation




• (3) Metaphorization

# Primary Metaphor Theory (Grady, 1997)

- Pretty much an eclectic approach!
- Primary and complex metaphors (atomism)
- Cross-domain mappings remain (CMT)
- Conflation gives rise to primary metaphors (C. Johnson)
- Complex metaphors are built by means of conceptual blending (Fauconnier and Turner)


#### Primary Metaphor Theory

- Rejects the 'concrete to abstract thesis'
- Instead: 'physical experience to subjective experience'
- SIZE is IMPORTANCE: "We've got a big week coming up next month."
- QUANTITY is ELEVATION: "The price has gone up."
- SEEING is UNDERSTANDING: "I see."
- Possible origins?
- Subjective experiences restored: there must be an experiential correlation between the source and target in primary metaphors



#### Complex metaphors


- THEORIES are BUILDINGS
- Can't be primary:
- not likely universal or cross-linguistic;
- poverty of mapping (\*
   "the windows of his
   theory"?);
- lack of clear experiential basis.




#### Conceptual Metonymy

- Or: "The ham sandwich wants some more coffee".
- Referential
- Contiguous (direct, experiential relation between the two entities)
- Contingent on the context (not pre-conceptual like metaphor)
- Both the metonimic expression and what it stands for are in THE SAME ICM (Lakoff and Turner, 1989), one is "highlighted





Conceptual metaphor (compound): crossdomain mapping between source and target



Conceptual metonymy: mapping within a single domain between a vehicle concept and a target concept

#### In sum

CMT: ANGER is a HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER (Lakoff and Kovecses, 1989)

- The physical container → the angry person's body
- The top of the container → the person's rational self
- The hot fluid inside of the container → the anger
- The degree of fluid heat → the intensity of the anger
- The cause of increase of fluid heat → the cause of anger

## That simple?





Jesse Lefkowitz

#### Alternatively...

