Lexical Meaning in Cognitive Linguistics: From Classical Semantics to Conceptual Metaphor to Conceptual Blending Mihailo Antović Faculty of Philosophy and Center for Cognitive Sciences University of Niš, Serbia www.cogsci.ni.ac.rs www.mihailoantovic.com http://prijemni.infostud.com/imagethumb.php?s=univerziteti/files/univerzitet_5/unini.jpg&w=150 Image result for university of brno logo The Semantic Problem lWhy is a chair a chair? l'The chairness' of a chair, inherent to the object? lA necessary, direct link between the word and the object (Plato)? lAn intermediary? The Semantic Triangle lOgden and Richards (1921) The Meaning of Meaning > Anglo-American semantics today •Smith and Medin (1981)1 Three approaches to categorization – hold today, too: • •Atomistic •(tree = a WOODY PERENIAL PLANT...) •Probabilistic •(tree = +SOLID, +NATURAL, +ANIMATE, -MOVING,...) •Exemplar •(the “prototypical” tree = ROOT, TRUNK, CROWN) • •1Smith, E. and Medin, D. (1981) Categories and Concepts, Harvard University Press Atomistic attempts (ca. 1960-1975) lNecessary and sufficient conditions l“A chair is a four-legged object used for sitting” lFurther break down into elements l“A leg is a...” “An object is a...” “Sitting is...” lFurther break down... lUntil you reach the level of ultimate categories • Categories lAristotle: “fundamental proto-concepts” lAnalysis: l Kill = cause to become (neg) alive l'causation' and 'becoming' prior to 'killing'; 'alive' prior to 'dead'... lIn search of a 'deep structure' of meaning (not syntax!). A big clash with Chomsky 1968-1972. lThe generative semanticists lThe Linguistics Wars How about these? • • > Or these? • • > Or these? Are there actually 'primitives of meaning‘? • •If there are, then there must be an “ultimate causation”, i.e. meanings must be reducible to atomic elements... • •Are they..? • •Not the mention •the notorious •problem of context Which brings us here... • • > The collapse of generative semantics • •Chomskian semanticists switch to studies of “sentence meaning” and – in most approaches – give up on lexical semantics altogether! •Lakoff retires... for five or so years... best of week equation evil math money time women - 5620724480 The exemplar approach... lAlternative approaches to categorization: lWittgenstein, ca. 1953 – family resemblance lRosch,ca. 1975 - prototypes lLakoff 1987 – ICMs : relatively stable representations equivalent to theories about the world (Is the Pope a bachelor – ICMs 'marriage' and 'Catholicism') l(new at the time? Not really... Kant, Blummenberg, Weinrich, Merlau Ponty, Mika Petrovic Alas) > Concepts are all but clearly defined! •Eleonor Rosch (1975) •William Labov (1973) Image result for rosch prototypical bird Image result for labov cup bowl glass Also: categories (and centrality effects) may expand BEYOND JUST ONE DOMAIN! ... Which gives rise to the phenomenon of CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR. How did metaphor fit in? lThe classical view lLiteral and metaphorical meaning l“Oh, Hamlet, thou has cleft my heart in twain” l“Love is not love... […] if it bends with a remover to remove...” l Rhetoric. Master trope. Reduced comparison. • Literal and figurative language lProblems with this view (compositionality, truth conditions, literal meaning comes first, everything else – if present at all – follows) lEvans and Greene Ch 9.1 – distinctions hardly hold (after Gibbs, 1994) lConventional literality vs. poetic usage (but: Things are going smoothly, He is in a state of shock) lNon metaphorical vs. metaphorical use (Achilles is brave – OK, but try talking about time or music without using a metaphor) lTruth-conditionality (but many lg expressions are not propositions – e.g. Could you help me, please?, I name this sheep Elizabeth) CMT – The notorious intro example •a. Look how far we’ve come. •b. We’re at a crossroads. •c. We’ll just have to go our separate ways. •d. We can’t turn back now. •e. I don’t think this relationship is going anywhere. •f. Where are we? •g. We’re stuck. •h. It’s been a long, bumpy road. •i. This relationship is a dead-end street. •j. We’re just spinning our wheels. • And the 'cross-domain mappings' •Source: JOURNEY → Target: LOVE •TRAVELLERS → LOVERS •VEHICLE → LOVE RELATIONSHIP •JOURNEY → EVENTS IN THE RELATIONSHIP •DISTANCE COVERED → PROGRESS MADE •OBSTACLES ENCOUNTERED → DIFFICULTIES EXPERIENCED •DECISIONS ABOUT DIRECTION → CHOICES ABOUT WHAT TO DO •DESTINATION OF THE JOURNEY → GOALS OF THE RELATIONSHIP Any other examples? lSPACE is TIME (“a protoconceptual metaphor”) lHow do we understand TIME? English prepositions! > Numbers... lWhy don't I have any problems understanding this: l16 lBut I do have problems with this: l1000101101 or this: l2AF3 = 10,995 • > My favorite... nThe musical system is abstract • nThe only way to approach it is to use a metaphor • nAre pitches really UP and DOWN nDo they actually MOVE? nWhat runs through the musical FLOW? nDoes music 'INVOKE' EMOTIONS? nWhat indeed is LIGHT in the sound of the trumpet and DARK in that of the viola? etc. > The simplest example nPITCHES are LOCATED IN THE VERTICAL SPACE • > Common mappings • > > Ultimately... in psychology • > Ultimately... in cognitive science > Any other interesting concepts that 'have to' be thought of in metaphorical terms? > CMT – Theoretical principles •“Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 3). •Thought vs. language •Source and target domains •Mapping •Selectivity > CMT - principles lUnidirectionality •(even: PEOPLE are MACHINES vs. MACHINES are PEOPLE, Lakoff and Turner, 1989) lMotivation – source and target: Kovecses, 2002 lSource: body, health and illness, plants and animals, buildings and construction, machines and tools, games and sport, money and economic transactions, cooking and food lTarget: emotion, desire, morality, thought, society, nation, politics, time, life and death, religions, events and actions > Life is a Journey – Event Structure Metaphor > CMT - principles lMetaphorical entailments: the potential of metaphorical expressions (in the language) to “break away” from the mappings lEg. Metaphor: THEORIES are BUILDINGS lLinguistic realization: Your theory is well structured. lEntailment: The hypothesis holds. lYet, also constraints: just any metaphorical entailment (or enrichment) is not possible. Eg. *We are in the cellar of your theory. lThe invariance principle (Lakoff, 1993) – only those portions of the source can be mapped which do not conflict with the schematic structure of the target. > CMT - principles lInvariance lShe gave him a book. (source language) lBased on the metaphor CAUSATION IS TRANSFER we get: l(a) She gave him a kiss. l(b) She gave him a headache. •… (a) *and he still has it (?) •… (b) and he still has it. lOnly (b) is metaphorical... l… because the image-schematic structure remains. > CMT - principles •Image schemas •Elaborating on Kant: Mark Johnson (1987): The Body in the Mind •A schema is a recurrent pattern, shape, and regularity in [conceptual activities]. […] I conceive schemas as structures for organizing our experience and comprehension (p. 29) •They originate from early bodily interactions. •They are visually represented for theoretical purposes, but are not equal to rich images. •Rather, they are “preconceptual”, i.e. their cognitive reality is postulated on a level between neuronal activity and mental representation. •Likewise, they are “analogue”, i.e. not reducible to a set of formally computable relations. •Finally, they are systematic and tend to be universal. > Some typical image schemas VERTICALITY •Image schema —Metaphor UP is GOOD —Embodiment PATH •Image schema —Metaphor LIFE is a JOURNEY —Embodiment verb_1i CENTER-PERIPHERY •Image schema —Metaphor CENTER IS IMPORTANT, PERIPHERY is IRRELEVANT —Embodiment Conflation theory (C. Johnson, 1997) lFrom sensorimotor to subjective experience lWARM is CLOSE • l(1) Conflation • l(2) Differentiation • l(3) Metaphorization > Primary Metaphor Theory (Grady, 1997) lPretty much an eclectic approach! lPrimary and complex metaphors (atomism) lCross-domain mappings remain (CMT) lConflation gives rise to primary metaphors (C. Johnson) lComplex metaphors are built by means of conceptual blending (Fauconnier and Turner) > Primary Metaphor Theory lRejects the 'concrete to abstract thesis' lInstead: 'physical experience to subjective experience' lSIZE is IMPORTANCE: “We've got a big week coming up next month.” lQUANTITY is ELEVATION: “The price has gone up.” lSEEING is UNDERSTANDING: “I see.” lPossible origins? lSubjective experiences restored: there must be an experiential correlation between the source and target in primary metaphors > Complex metaphors lTHEORIES are BUILDINGS lCan't be primary: lnot likely universal or cross-linguistic; l poverty of mapping (* “the windows of his theory”?); llack of clear experiential basis. • > Conceptual Metonymy lOr: “The ham sandwich wants some more coffee”. lReferential lContiguous (direct, experiential relation between the two entities) lContingent on the context (not pre-conceptual like metaphor) lBoth the metonimic expression and what it stands for are in THE SAME ICM (Lakoff and Turner, 1989), one is “highlighted > In sum •CMT: ANGER is a HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER (Lakoff and Kovecses, 1989) • lThe physical container → the angry person's body lThe top of the container → the person's rational self lThe hot fluid inside of the container → the anger lThe degree of fluid heat → the intensity of the anger lThe cause of increase of fluid heat → the cause of anger • That simple? • • Alternatively... • •