III. Jazyk a komunikace

Komunikace předpokládá <u>MLUVČÍHO</u> a <u>ADRESÁTA</u>.

Komunikace může být <u>vědomá</u> či <u>nevědomá</u>.

Komunikační systémy zvířat vs. lidská řeč

- Kvalitativní odlišnosti (?)
    - Symboličnost, arbitrárnost, přenos skrze tradici…

    - Dislokace, produktivita, „dvojí artikulace" (A. Martinet)

    - Rekurze

- Evoluční kontinuita (?)
    - Schopnost řeči/jazyk jako důsledek mutace vs. evoluce

*Další četba:* Hocket, Ch. 'The Origin of Speech'. In *Scientific American*, 203. 1960.

Anderson, S. R. *Doctor Dolittle's Delusion.* Yale Univ. Press. 2004.

Evans, V. *The Language Myth*. Cambridge University Press. 2014.

<u>Modely komunikace</u>

- Bühlerův model funkcí jazykového znaku *Organon* (Karl Bühler, 1879–1963)
- Matematický model komunikace (Shannon & Weaver)
- „Kódovací" model komunikace (Roman Jakobson, 1896–1982)
- „Relevanční" model komunikace (Sperber & Wilson, Randy LaPolla aj.)

<u>Organon</u>

Matematický model komunikace

Claude Shannon (1916–2001) a Warren Weaver (1894–1978)

Saussurovo pojetí přenosu ZNAKU

Jakobsonův „kódovací" model

KONTEXT

TÉMA

SDĚLENÍ

MLUVČÍ   -------------- *signál* -------------->   ADRESÁT

KANÁL

KÓD

Argument „čínského pokoje“: Searle, J. R. 'Mind, Brains, and Programs'. In *The Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, vol. 3.

„Potrubní" metafora (*conduit metaphor*)

Další četba: Reddy, M. J. 'The Conduit Metaphor – A Case of Frame Conflict in Our Language about Language'. In Ortony, A. (ed.) *Metaphor and Thought*. Cambridge University Press. 1979.

„Relevanční" model komunikace

Předpoklady komunikace:

- Sociální kooperace
- Racionálnost účastníků
- Komunikační záměr
- Ostensivní akt – ostenze předmětová a intenční
- Inferenční akt

Další četba: Sperber, D.; Wilson, D. *Relevance: Communication & Cognition.* Cambridge: Blackwell Publishing. 2nd edition. 1995.

De Busser, R.; LaPolla, R. (eds.) *Language Structure and Environment*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company. 2015.

Příloha 1

„Čínský pokoj" (převzato z Feldman, J. A. *From Molecule to Metaphor. A Neural Theory of Language.* Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 2006. p. 35)

Suppose that I'm locked in a room and given a large batch of Chinese writing. Suppose furthermore (as is indeed the case) that I know no Chinese, either written or spoken, and that I'm not even confident that I could recognize Chinese writing as distinct from, say, Japanese writing or meaningless squiggles. To me, Chinese writing is just so many meaningless squiggles. Now suppose further that after this first batch of Chinese writing I am given a second batch of Chinese script together with a set of rules for correlating the second batch with the first batch. The rules are in English, and I understand these rules as well as any other native speaker of English. They enable me to correlate one set of formal symbols with another set of formal symbols, and all that "formal" means here is that I can identify the symbols entirely by their shapes.

Now suppose that I am given a third batch of Chinese symbols together with some instructions, again in English, that enable me to correlate elements of this third batch with the first two batches, and these rules instruct me how to give back certain sorts of Chinese symbols with certain sorts of shapes in response to certain sorts of shapes given me in the third batch. Unknown to me, the people who are giving me all these symbols call the first batch "a script," they call the second batch "a story," and they call the third batch "questions." Furthermore, they call the symbols I give back "answers to the questions," and the set of rules in English that they gave me they call "the program."

Suppose also that after a while I get so good at following the instructions for manipulating the Chinese symbols and the programmers get so good at writing the programs that from the external point of view that is, from the point of view of somebody outside the room in which I am locked, my answers to the questions are absolutely indistinguishable from those of Chinese speakers. Nobody just looking at my answers can tell that I don't speak a word of Chinese.

I produce the answers by manipulating uninterpreted formal symbols. As far as the Chinese is concerned, I simply behave like a computer; I perform computational operations on formally specified elements. For the purposes of Chinese, I am simply an instantiation of the computer program.