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III. Jazyk a komunikace
Komunikace předpokládá MLUVČÍHO a ADRESÁTA.
Komunikace může být vědomá či nevědomá.
Komunikační systémy zvířat vs. lidská řeč
• Kvalitativní odlišnosti (?)
o Symboličnost, arbitrárnost, přenos skrze tradici…
o Dislokace, produktivita, „dvojí artikulace“ (A. Martinet)
o Rekurze
• Evoluční kontinuita (?)
o Schopnost řeči/jazyk jako důsledek mutace vs. evoluce
Další četba: Hocket, Ch. ‘The Origin of Speech’. In Scientific American, 203. 1960.
Anderson, S. R. Doctor Dolittle’s Delusion. Yale Univ. Press. 2004.
Evans, V. The Language Myth. Cambridge University Press. 2014.
Modely komunikace
• Bühlerův model funkcí jazykového znaku Organon (Karl Bühler, 1879–1963)
• Matematický model komunikace (Shannon & Weaver)
• „Kódovací“ model komunikace (Roman Jakobson, 1896–1982)
• „Relevanční“ model komunikace (Sperber & Wilson, Randy LaPolla aj.)
Organon
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Matematický model komunikace
Claude Shannon (1916–2001) a Warren Weaver (1894–1978)
Saussurovo pojetí přenosu ZNAKU
Jakobsonův „kódovací“ model
KONTEXT
TÉMA
SDĚLENÍ
MLUVČÍ -------------- signál --------------> ADRESÁT
KANÁL
KÓD
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Argument „čínského pokoje“: Searle, J. R. ‘Mind, Brains, and Programs’. In The
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, vol. 3.
„Potrubní“ metafora (conduit metaphor)
Další četba: Reddy, M. J. ‘The Conduit Metaphor – A Case of Frame Conflict in
Our Language about Language’. In Ortony, A. (ed.) Metaphor and
Thought. Cambridge University Press. 1979.
„Relevanční“ model komunikace
Předpoklady komunikace:
• Sociální kooperace
• Racionálnost účastníků
• Komunikační záměr
• Ostensivní akt – ostenze předmětová a intenční
• Inferenční akt
Další četba: Sperber, D.; Wilson, D. Relevance: Communication & Cognition.
Cambridge: Blackwell Publishing. 2nd
edition. 1995.
De Busser, R.; LaPolla, R. (eds.) Language Structure and Environment.
Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company. 2015.
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Příloha 1
„Čínský pokoj“ (převzato z Feldman, J. A. From Molecule to Metaphor. A Neural Theory of
Language. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 2006. p. 35)
Suppose that I’m locked in a room and given a large batch of Chinese writing.
Suppose furthermore (as is indeed the case) that I know no Chinese, either written
or spoken, and that I’m not even confident that I could recognize Chinese
writing as distinct from, say, Japanese writing or meaningless squiggles. To me,
Chinese writing is just so many meaningless squiggles. Now suppose further that
after this first batch of Chinese writing I am given a second batch of Chinese script
together with a set of rules for correlating the second batch with the first batch. The
rules are in English, and I understand these rules as well as any other native speaker
of English. They enable me to correlate one set of formal symbols with another set
of formal symbols, and all that “formal” means here is that I can identify the
symbols entirely by their shapes.
Now suppose that I am given a third batch of Chinese symbols together with some
instructions, again in English, that enable me to correlate elements of this third
batch with the first two batches, and these rules instruct me how to give back certain
sorts of Chinese symbols with certain sorts of shapes in response to certain sorts of
shapes given me in the third batch. Unknown to me, the people who are giving me
all these symbols call the first batch “a script,” they call the second batch “a story,”
and they call the third batch “questions.” Furthermore, they call the symbols I give
back “answers to the questions,” and the set of rules in English that they gave me
they call “the program.”
Suppose also that after a while I get so good at following the instructions for
manipulating the Chinese symbols and the programmers get so good at writing the
programs that from the external point of view that is, from the point of view of
somebody outside the room in which I am locked, my answers to the questions are
absolutely indistinguishable from those of Chinese speakers. Nobody just looking
at my answers can tell that I don’t speak a word of Chinese.
I produce the answers by manipulating uninterpreted formal symbols. As far as
the Chinese is concerned, I simply behave like a computer; I perform computational
operations on formally specified elements. For the purposes of Chinese, I am simply
an instantiation of the computer program.