



Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group

Relations between the Chinese Mainland and Taiwan: Overview and Chronology

Author(s): Winberg Chai

Source: *Asian Affairs*, Vol. 26, No. 2, Relations between the Chinese Mainland and Taiwan (Summer, 1999), pp. 59-76

Published by: [Taylor & Francis, Ltd.](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30172770>

Accessed: 08-01-2016 13:31 UTC

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



Taylor & Francis, Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Asian Affairs*.

<http://www.jstor.org>

Relations between the Chinese Mainland and Taiwan: Overview and Chronology

WINBERG CHAI, Editor

Relations between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan have become extremely tense since July this year. At that time Taiwan president Lee Teng-hui introduced a new element by insisting that negotiations must be based on a "special state-to-state relationship." As a result, China has cancelled Wang Daohan's planned trip to Taiwan, and tensions have escalated almost to the point of war.

The present issue of Asian Affairs is devoted to a brief history of Taiwan-China relations. Following this overview and chronological survey of events are nine essential policy papers from the past decade, seven reproduced in their entirety. It is hoped that they will serve as a useful source for students, scholars, and policymakers in China-Taiwan relations. The text of Lee Teng-hui's statement and Wang Daohan's reply will appear in the fall 1999 issue of Asian Affairs.

U ntil President Chiang Ching-kuo's death on 13 January 1988, Taiwan's political landscape was dominated by a single party, the Kuomintang (KMT), and its two leaders, Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975) and his son Chiang Ching-kuo (1910–1988). Chiang Kai-shek, who had become president of the republic in Nanking (Nanjing) in 1948, left the mainland for Taiwan in August 1949 after his total defeat by the Communists led by Mao Zedong. The Communists then established the People's Republic of China (PRC) in Peking (Beijing) on 1 October 1949.

At that time, the U.S. Department of State issued a secret memorandum to its diplomatic and consular posts in the Far East to prepare them for the possible fall

of Taiwan to the Chinese Communists. However, the unexpected outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950 provided a new impetus for the United States to intervene in Taiwan's fate. President Harry Truman reversed his stance of neutrality on the Chinese civil war and ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Taiwan. Without a modern navy and air force, Mao was in no position to challenge the United States.

During his twenty-five years of rule on Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek was an authoritarian leader in his attempts to prevent the spread of the Communists' power to Taiwan. He had only one policy toward the mainland: to fight communism relentlessly and to recover the mainland by any means at his disposal. He forbade all forms of contact with the mainland, including such seemingly trivial ones as reading mainland newspapers, listening to mainland radio broadcasts, or even receiving mail from friends or relatives still living on the mainland. At the same time, Chiang staged commando-style raids on the mainland, often with training and cooperation from U.S. intelligence agencies.

After the death of Chiang Kai-shek on 5 April 1975, the real power in Taiwan fell into the hands of his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, who had already served in a number of important positions: deputy minister of defense (1965–69), vice premier (1969–72), and premier (1972–78). In May 1978 he was finally elected by the National Assembly to the presidency of Taiwan, or the Republic of China (ROC). Chiang Kai-shek had brought with him from China the "Emergency Provisions" law, dating from the civil war years, which suspended civil liberties by declaring martial law throughout Taiwan without legislative approval. Chiang Ching-kuo repealed the law in 1987, permitting the organization of opposition parties and allowing their candidates to run for elections. However, like his father, he absolutely opposed any demand for Taiwan's independence. Both Chiangs believed that Taiwan was a base from which the KMT, and thus the ROC, could regain control of the mainland. To the two Chiangs, Taiwan was part of China, period.

However, Chiang Ching-kuo took significant steps to relax tensions with the mainland government. For example, he permitted indirect trade and contacts with the mainland by Taiwan residents. He was prepared to begin negotiations with the Communists shortly after lifting the travel ban in October 1987, but before direct negotiations could begin Chiang died of cardiac and pulmonary failure on 13 January 1988.

The death of Chiang Ching-kuo opened a new era in Taiwanese politics. A native-born Taiwanese, Lee Teng-hui, succeeded him in 1988. At first Lee continued his predecessor's open-door policy toward the mainland. He established the National Unification Council under the auspices of the president's office. In February 1991 the council adopted "Guidelines for National Unification" outlining three phases of unification: short-term, middle-term, and long-term (a process of consultation and unification). However, Lee refused to set a timetable for the implementation of the guidelines.

Meanwhile, Taiwan was becoming a more democratic and pluralistic society. The pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party became a major opposition voice with considerable support among the Taiwanese voters. It also enjoyed support abroad and was favored by many Americans.

During the past fifty years the United States has played a pivotal role in determining the future of Taiwan and its relations with China. However, U.S. policy has often been inconsistent and reflected the politics of the Cold War more than any coherent principle. President Truman did not wish to involve the United States in China's civil war, but after the start of the Korean War, the United States recognized the government on Taiwan as "the" government of China for more than thirty years. America's fear of "the Reds" and "the yellow peril" escalated to the point that President Dwight Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles threatened to use nuclear weapons against the mainland during the Korean War and the Formosa Strait crises in 1954.

The first opportunity for a new relationship between China and the United States arose from President Richard Nixon's diplomatic initiative. In his Shanghai Communiqué of February 1972, he acknowledged that for all Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait there was but one China, which included Taiwan. He could not abandon Taiwan, however, and sought to maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan in some form.

After President Jimmy Carter restored full diplomatic relations with mainland China in January 1979, he abrogated the 1954 U.S. defense agreement with Taiwan and ordered the removal of U.S. forces from the island. The joint communiqué that he signed with China established U.S. recognition of the PRC as the sole legal government of China. However, in March 1979 the U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act, which permitted the United States to provide Taiwan with arms for purposes of defense. The act was signed by President Carter in April 1979.

The promise of better U.S.–China relations during the Carter years did not come to fruition. President Ronald Reagan authorized massive arms sales to Taiwan, alienating the mainland government. However, in August 1982 a third communiqué was signed by the United States and China, in which the United States reaffirmed its acceptance of the principles of the 1979 normalization agreement and pledged that it "does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years." Nevertheless, disagreements between the Reagan administration and the PRC continued. The Reagan administration seemed to the Chinese to have instituted a major policy change, from support for "unification by peaceful means" under Nixon, Ford, and Carter to "noninvolvement" by the end of 1986. China's Vice Chairman Yang Shangkun raised this issue during his 1987 visit to the White House.

When George Bush succeeded Reagan as president in January 1989, there was a general feeling of optimism because of Bush's prior experience as U.S. ambas-

sador to Beijing. Bush visited China in February 1989, but U.S. goodwill toward China evaporated overnight after the military crackdown on demonstrators in Tiananmen Square on 4 June 1989. Televised reports showing People's Liberation Army troops firing on civilians in Beijing turned public opinion against the Chinese government. The United States declared sanctions against China, recalled its ambassador, and requested that all American businesses close their offices throughout China. All Western nations and Japan joined in the condemnation. Bush authorized the largest military sales ever to Taiwan, including 150 F-16 fighter jets, thereby tilting the air strategic balance on the Taiwan Strait in favor of Taiwan.

Bill Clinton, in his bid for the presidency, demanded an even tougher policy toward China, including blocking Beijing's bid to host the Olympic games in the year 2000. Once he was elected, however, he surprised his supporters by lifting most of the sanctions against the Chinese and granting China "most favored nation" status in trade. During his second term, Clinton initiated major improvements beginning in 1997, such as authorizing the sale of sophisticated supercomputers to China.

Clinton became the first U.S. president to visit China in nine years when he made a state visit in 1998. During the visit, acceding to a request by the Chinese, he announced a new "Three No's" policy in a panel discussion in Shanghai. He said, "We don't support independence for Taiwan, or two Chinas, or one Taiwan—one China, and we don't believe that Taiwan should be a member of any organization for which statehood is a requirement." However, he continued to support the selling of defensive weapons to the Taiwanese. A week later, the Senate passed a resolution reaffirming U.S. commitment to Taiwan.

China became extremely frustrated by the two faces of U.S. policy toward Taiwan. The U.S. executive branch followed the three signed communiqués, but Congress maintained that the United States must continue to protect Taiwan, whatever the cost.

The Chinese have always maintained that Taiwan is a Chinese province and must be reunited with the mainland. China was poised to conquer Taiwan militarily in 1950 but was deterred by the U.S. Seventh Fleet. In mid-October 1954, a full-fledged war between China and Taiwan was brewing over Tachens and Quemoy islands but was averted by the U.S.–Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty. The PRC shelled Quemoy in 1958 and again in 1962. Not until December 1978 did the shelling stop, when President Carter negotiated with Chinese leaders to resume normal diplomatic relations.

Although China's policy of reunification with Taiwan remained consistent, its plans to achieve that goal varied. Before 1978 the official policy was to use military force to "liberate" Taiwan. In 1978 the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party adopted a resolution calling for "peaceful reunification" with Taiwan. In September of the following year, Marshal Yeh

Jiaying, chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, issued a proposal for peaceful reunification known as the Nine Point Proposal. The new Chinese constitution of December 1982 included a provision for "special administrative regions" (Article 31) specifically designed for Hong Kong and Taiwan.

Beginning in 1983, the late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping made a number of concessions to Taiwan, and in early 1984 China offered a proposal that would take into account Taiwan's political and economic concerns: the "one country, two systems" proposal. "One country, two systems" continues to be the PRC's official policy under President Jiang Zemin and Vice Premier Qian Qichen, who is in charge of Taiwan policy.

Angered by Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui's visit to the United States in 1995, which China feared was a move toward independence and recognition of Taiwan as a state by the world community, China conducted military exercises across the strait from Taiwan involving four hundred thousand troops. By 1996, four

Table 1. Indirect Trade between the Mainland and Taiwan via Hong Kong, 1979–97 (in Millions of Dollars)

| Year | Total Indirect Trade | Taiwan Exports | Taiwan Imports | Taiwan Surplus or Deficit (-) |
|------|----------------------|----------------|----------------|-------------------------------|
| 1979 | 77.8 | 21.5 | 56.3 | -34.8 |
| 1980 | 311.2 | 235.0 | 76.2 | 158.8 |
| 1981 | 459.3 | 384.2 | 75.2 | 309.0 |
| 1982 | 278.5 | 194.5 | 84.0 | 110.4 |
| 1983 | 247.7 | 157.9 | 89.9 | 68.0 |
| 1984 | 553.2 | 425.5 | 127.8 | 297.7 |
| 1985 | 1,102.7 | 986.9 | 115.9 | 870.9 |
| 1986 | 955.6 | 811.3 | 144.2 | 667.1 |
| 1987 | 1,515.5 | 1,226.5 | 288.9 | 937.6 |
| 1988 | 2,720.9 | 2,242.2 | 478.7 | 1,763.5 |
| 1989 | 3,483.3 | 2,896.5 | 586.9 | 2,309.6 |
| 1990 | 4,043.6 | 3,278.3 | 765.4 | 2,512.9 |
| 1991 | 5,793.1 | 4,667.2 | 1,126.0 | 3,541.2 |
| 1992 | 7,406.9 | 6,287.9 | 1,119.0 | 5,169.0 |
| 1993 | 8,689.0 | 7,585.4 | 1,103.6 | 6,481.8 |
| 1994 | 9,809.5 | 8,517.2 | 1,292.3 | 7,224.9 |
| 1995 | 11,457.0 | 9,882.8 | 1,574.2 | 8,308.6 |
| 1996 | 11,300.0 | 9,717.6 | 1,582.4 | 8,135.2 |
| 1997 | 11,458.9 | 9,715.1 | 1,743.8 | 7,971.3 |

Source: *The Monthly Report of Two Straits' Economic Statistics*, vol. 69, May 1998 (Taipei: Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, Republic of China), 19.

Chinese missiles had been fired within thirty-two miles of the island state. During that tense period, the United States dispatched two nuclear-armed aircraft carriers into the area. Ultimately, war was averted.

The reunification issue will not be resolved in the foreseeable future. As the Taiwanese increasingly clamor for preservation of the status quo, having long ago relinquished any claim to the mainland, an increasingly nationalistic China insists on a timetable for reunification. Is war inevitable? Will the United States play peacemaker or be drawn into a bloody conflict?

If economics is the key to world politics, then the future of China-Taiwan relations appears bright, despite political upsets. Since the opening of trade relations between the two sides in 1979, indirect trade across the Taiwan Strait has become a significant portion of total trade for both China and Taiwan. Indirect trade via Hong Kong rose from \$1.5 billion in 1987 to more than \$11 billion in 1997. The Chinese mainland is now Taiwan's fourth-largest trading partner. Taiwan's investment on the mainland from 1979 to 1995 exceeded \$11 billion, making Taiwan the mainland's second-largest investor, next to Hong Kong. Furthermore, Taiwan has enjoyed a handsome trade surplus every year since 1980 (see table 1).

One of the longest civil wars of the twentieth century remains unresolved.

Chronological Survey

The following chronological survey provides background for the complex relationship between the PRC and the ROC. (In entries for 1950 and later, "China" refers to the PRC; "Taiwan" refers to the ROC.)

17 April 1895. China ceded to Japan the island of Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores Group under the Treaty of Shimoneseiki.

9 December 1941. China declared war on Japan and voided the 1895 Treaty of Shimoneseiki.

26 November 1943. U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt, Chinese generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and British prime minister Winston Churchill issued a press communiqué in Cairo declaring that Formosa and the Pescadores would be restored to China after the war.

26 July 1945. The United States, China, and Great Britain reaffirmed the terms of the Cairo Declaration of 1943 in the new Potsdam Declaration.

2 September 1945. Japanese emperor Hirohito issued the Instrument of Surrender and declared Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration of 26 July 1945.

25 October 1945. The Chinese administrator on Taiwan, Chen I, issued an order to the Japanese governor of Taiwan to surrender; a ceremony was held in Taipei for the transfer of power.

12 January 1946. The Chinese government in Nanking (Nanjing) decreed the resumption of Chinese nationality for the Taiwanese people.

1 October 1949. At the end of the three-year civil war on the Chinese mainland, the Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek fled to Taiwan; Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) established the PRC in Peking (Beijing).

27 June 1950. After the outbreak of the Korean War, President Harry Truman ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet to prevent any Chinese attack on Taiwan and requested that Taiwan cease air and sea operations against the mainland.

28 June 1950. PRC foreign minister Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) issued a statement criticizing Truman, declaring that the actions of the U.S. Navy “constituted armed aggression against the territory of China” and stating that Taiwan’s status as part of China would “remain unchanged forever.”

28 April 1952. Taiwan signed the Treaty of Peace with Japan, in which Japan renounced all rights, title, and claim to Taiwan and Penghu (the Pescadores) as well as the Sparty Islands and the Parcel Islands.

23 September 1954. PRC premier Zhou Enlai issued a report to the First National People’s Congress in China stating “that Taiwan is China’s sacred and inviolable territory and that no U.S. infringement or occupation will be tolerated.”

2 December 1954. The United States and Taiwan signed the Mutual Defense Treaty.

8 December 1954. Zhou Enlai called the U.S.–Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty an aggressive treaty of war.

29 January 1955. The U.S. Congress passed House Joint Resolution 159 authorizing the president to employ the armed forces to protect Taiwan, the Pescadores, and related positions and territories in the area.

18 January 1956. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement indicating that U.S.–China ambassadorial talks had been under way for more than four months at Geneva, adding that “the tension in the Taiwan area is the key issue between China and the United States,” and that “the root of the tension is U.S. armed occupation of China’s territory.”

28 June 1956. Speaking before the Third Session of the First National People’s Congress, Zhou Enlai reiterated China’s official position toward Taiwan-mainland reunification: “The Chinese government has repeatedly pointed out that there are two ways for the Chinese people to liberate Taiwan, that is, by war or by peaceful means, and that the Chinese people would seek to liberate Taiwan by peaceful means so far as it is possible.” In a policy change, Zhou also extended an official welcome to any Taiwanese who wished to be reunited with their families for short visits to China.

4 October 1957. Taiwanese president Chiang Kai-shek, in response to questions from a foreign journalist, remained firm in his opposition to the PRC, declaring that there was “absolutely no possibility of any compromise between Free China [Taiwan] and the Chinese Communists [in the mainland].”

10 February 1958. Zhou Enlai reported to the Fifth Session of the First National People’s Congress that “the Chinese government and people are firmly opposed to the scheme to create ‘two Chinas’ [China and Taiwan].”

4 September 1958. U.S. secretary of state John Foster Dulles issued a statement: “Neither Taiwan (Formosa) nor the islands of Quemoy and Matsu have ever been under the authority of the Chinese Communists.”

6 September 1958. Zhou Enlai issued a statement: “Taiwan and the Penghu Islands have been China’s territories from ancient times [and] all so-called treaties concluded . . . are null and void as far as the Chinese people are concerned.”

25 October 1958. Chinese defense minister Peng Dehuai issued a second message to the people of Taiwan in which he stated, “There is only one China, not two in the world. . . . All Chinese people . . . absolutely will not allow the American plot forcibly to create two Chinas to come true.”

22 October 1959. U.S. president Dwight Eisenhower took exception to the Chinese position that the Taiwan issue was an internal matter only, when in reply to a question at a news conference he said, “Forty-two or more nations—I forget how many but a great number of nations—recognize the independence of Formosa, so I think certainly the rest of the world would take [the PRC’s claim to Taiwan] as a threat to international peace.”

20 February 1960. Chiang Kai-shek addressed the opening of the Third Session of the First National Assembly in Taipei, saying that “the recovery of the mainland and the deliverance of our compatriots there from the Communist tyranny are the sacred mission from which we are morally bound never to fall back.”

11 June 1961. In an interview Chiang Kai-shek said, “Our friends in the U.S. and other free countries must realize that the existence of Free China [Taiwan] is based upon the conviction that free society must in the end triumph over the Communist system of slavery.”

27 June 1962. U.S. president John F. Kennedy made a policy statement on Taiwan in which he reaffirmed Eisenhower’s policy that “we would defend Quemoy and Matsu if there were an attack which was part of an attack on Formosa and the Pescadores.”

1 September 1963. A Chinese government spokesman criticized USSR secretary general Nikita Khrushchev’s support for the U.S. “two Chinas” policy. Khrushchev had said that there was “more than one way to solve every complicated question,”

citing Lenin's decision to recognize the Far Eastern Republic after the October Revolution.

25 February 1964. At a press conference in India, Zhou Enlai rejected a call for Taiwanese self-determination. In doing so, he gave notice of China's Taiwan policy to all Third World nonaligned nations.

29 September 1965. When a Japanese correspondent at a press conference asked Chinese foreign minister Chen Yi about the possibility of cooperation between the KMT (Kuomintang) and the CCP (Chinese Communist Party), Chen invited any individual or group in Taiwan "to come back to the embrace of the motherland and join in this cooperation." At that time, the ROC's former vice president, Li Tsung-jen, returned to China from self-imposed exile in the United States, where he had immigrated after the civil war. Li's return to China was considered a major propaganda coup for the CCP.

27 June 1966. China's official newspaper, the *People's Daily*, published an important editorial calling on the Chinese people to liberate Taiwan. It stated, "The Chinese people certainly will liberate Taiwan Province, certainly will plant the five-star Red flag on Taiwan Province and certainly will drive out the U.S. aggressors."

21 March 1968. China's Foreign Ministry delivered a note to the USSR embassy in Beijing complaining that "the Soviet revisionist ruling clique has long been actively collaborating with U.S. imperialism in its criminal plot to create two Chinas."

4 April 1969. China issued a communiqué with the Japanese representative in Beijing saying that "the Chinese side reiterates that to liberate Taiwan is China's internal affair. . . . The so-called peace treaty [with Taiwan] . . . is hostile to the Chinese people and is illegal." Japan and China have not established diplomatic relations, however.

23 May 1970. Chiang Kai-shek told the International Press Institute that the "ROC may serve as a blueprint for the construction of a new China after the recovery of the mainland."

12 November 1970. Taiwanese foreign minister Wei Tao-ming stated before the UN General Assembly that "the Government of the ROC is not an exile government. It is, as my delegation has time and again reminded the Assembly, a Chinese government on Chinese soil."

28 April 1971. Charles Bray, U.S. Department of State press officer, said, "The U.S. regards the status of the island [Taiwan] as unsettled." The United States clarified President Truman's military declaration of 27 June 1950 with Bray's statement that the determination of the future status of Taiwan "must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan or consideration of the United States."

30 April 1971. Taiwanese foreign minister Chow Shu-kai expressed his government's extreme concern about Bray's remarks, pointing out that both the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Declaration clearly provided that Taiwan and the Pescadores should be returned to the Republic of China.

4 May 1971. In an editorial, the *People's Daily* also criticized Bray's statements on the "unsettled" status of Taiwan. The editorial declared, "Taiwan is part of Chinese territory from time immemorial. . . . Our great leader Chairman Mao has pointed out: 'The Chinese people are determined to liberate Taiwan, to safeguard the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of China. The U.S. armed forces must pull out of Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits.'"

28 February 1972. U.S. president Richard Nixon visited China for the first time and issued the first of three famous communiqués governing U.S.–China relations, signaling a change in U.S. policy. The Shanghai Communiqué stated in part that "the United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The U.S. government does not challenge that position."

4 January 1973. Zhou Enlai met with seven Taiwan students who studied in the United States and were invited to visit China for the first time. He discussed the Taiwan issue and reiterated China's previously stated position that Taiwan was part of China.

1 January 1974. Chiang Kai-shek chose to attack the mainland in his New Year's Day message, saying, "Our National Revolution is a struggle against the traitorous Maoists in thought, culture and life. . . . If our seven hundred million Mainland compatriots are delivered from their dark and blood-stained hell, it will be a blessing for the free world. . . . In fulfilling our responsibility for national revolution, national recovery [of the mainland] and national reconstruction, we are fighting both the vanguard and the rearguard actions for the lasting and glorious victory of our course."

5 April 1975. Chiang Kai-shek died at the age of eighty-seven. His son, Chiang Ching-kuo, became chairman of the KMT's Central Committee on 28 April and assumed his father's position of power in Taiwan.

1–5 December 1975. U.S. president Gerald Ford visited China. China's emerging new leader, Deng Xiaoping, told him that the establishment of diplomatic ties between the two countries should be based on the following three principles: that the United States sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan, that it abrogate the U.S.–Taiwan Defense Treaty, and that it withdraw U.S. troops from Taiwan.

8 January 1976. Zhou Enlai died. China was in the midst of a power struggle.

9 September 1976. Chairman Mao Zedong died. Deng Xiaoping emerged as the undisputed successor despite Hua Guofeng's official title as chairman. The Gang of Four was arrested, effectively marking the end of the Cultural Revolution.

29 June 1977. U.S. secretary of state Cyrus Vance, in a major policy address before the Asia Society (the New York-based association devoted to exploring economic, cultural, and political aspects of U.S.–Asia relations), hinted at a “full normalization of relations” with China.

12 September 1978. In an effort to avert U.S. diplomatic recognition of mainland China, Taiwan lobbied in the U.S. Congress to pass an amendment to the International Security Assistance Act of 1978 concerning the Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROC. The amendment stated that “it is the sense of the Congress that there should be prior consultation between the Congress and the executive branch on any proposed policy changes affecting the continuation in force of the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954.”

16 December 1978. China and the United States signed a joint communiqué establishing mutual recognition as of 1 January 1979.

1 January 1979. The United States and China issued a second joint communiqué, which read: “The United States of America recognizes the government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan. . . . The United States of America and the People's Republic of China reaffirm the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communiqué [of 28 February 1972].”

China's National People's Congress Standing Committee issued a “Message to Compatriots on Taiwan” in which it called for an end to military confrontation and to limits on direct mail, trade, and travel.

28 January–5 February 1979. China's paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping, visited the United States and stated on 30 January 1979 that “China hopes to resolve the Taiwan issue by peaceful means.”

4 April 1979. Taiwan president Chiang Ching-kuo issued the “Three No's” policy regarding China: no direct contact, no direct trade, no direct negotiation.

10 April 1979. After intensive lobbying by Taiwan, the U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act, which became Public Law 96-8. The act states, “The Congress finds that the enactment of this Act is necessary to make clear that the U.S. decision to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means . . . [and] to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character.”

30 September 1981. Ye Jianying, chairman of China's National People's Congress, issued what became known as the Nine Points Proposal, "Elaborations on Policy Concerning the Return of Taiwan to the Motherland and Peaceful Unification." It proposed (1) talks between the KMT and the CCP; (2) exchanges of mail, trade, air and other travel, shipping, tourists, and academics, and permission for family reunions; (3) a high degree of autonomy for Taiwan; (4) noninterference in Taiwan's socioeconomic system; (5) Taiwanese participation in leadership positions in China; (6) Chinese subsidization of Taiwan's economy; (7) freedom of entry and exit for Taiwan's people; (8) Taiwanese investment in China; and (9) Taiwanese proposals for reunification.

2 April 1982. The KMT Congress adopted the "Proposition to Unify China under the Three Principles of the People" (socialism, nationalism, and democracy). It rejected all overtures from China.

17 August 1982. After U.S.–China relations deteriorated because of disputes about continuing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, a joint communiqué on the matter was signed. The United States agreed to most of the objections that China had raised (in 1981–82) and promised "to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan." But the United States refused to commit itself explicitly to a timetable for the termination of arms sales. The Chinese considered the agreement, known as the "August 17 Communiqué," to be the third most important of the U.S.–China communiqués.

10–16 January 1984. Chinese premier Zhao Ziyang visited the United States.

26–30 April 1984. President Ronald Reagan visited China. He expressed the U.S. commitment to abide by the three U.S.–China Communiqués: the Shanghai Communiqué, the Normalization Communiqué, and the August 17 Communiqué.

23 June 1984. Deng Xiaoping introduced the concept of "one country, two systems," under which Taiwan would be allowed to practice capitalism after reunification with China while the mainland retained a socialist system.

21–31 July 1985. Chinese president Li Xiannian visited the United States, accompanied by vice premier Li Peng. Li signed an agreement with the United States for peaceful nuclear cooperation. He also held talks with scholars from Taiwan.

5 February 1987. Chiang Ching-kuo spoke on the future of a new China, including the PRC, that would realize Sun Yat-sen's "Three People's Principles." He asserted that all Chinese from both sides wanted freedom, democracy, peace, and prosperity.

23 June 1987. Taiwan's Legislative Yuan passed a new National Security Law to replace the old "Emergency Decree" (martial law).

15 July 1987. Chiang Ching-kuo lifted the Emergency Decree, thereby permitting the formation of political parties in Taiwan.

16 September 1987. Chiang Ching-kuo proposed to the KMT that Taiwan residents be permitted to visit relatives on the mainland.

15 October 1987. Taiwan premier Yu Kuo-hwa announced permission for Taiwanese residents (except government and military personnel) to visit China through Hong Kong; applications were to be submitted to the Red Cross beginning on 2 November 1987.

13 January 1988. Taiwan's Chiang Ching-kuo died. He was immediately succeeded by Vice President Lee Teng-hui.

7 July 1988. China's State Council issued regulations for encouraging investment by the people of Taiwan. The KMT Thirteenth Party Congress also adopted a policy to ease trade and travel restrictions for Taiwanese.

1 October 1988. China's State Council established the Taiwan Affairs Office, which incorporated the CCP's Taiwan Affairs Office to form one coordinating agency to handle relations between the two sides.

25–26 February 1989. George Bush visited China. He declared that the United States would continue a One China policy.

20 May 1989. Lee Teng-hui became the eighth president of the ROC. He announced a willingness to establish communication with the mainland, provided that it renounced the use of force in the Taiwan Strait, among other conditions.

4 June 1989. The killing of students by the People's Liberation Army at Tiananmen Square in Beijing shocked the people of Taiwan. The Taiwan government immediately condemned the brutality of the Chinese action and offered political asylum to pro-democracy activists fleeing the mainland. China retaliated by accusing Taiwan of involvement in the student demonstrations preceding the crackdown, and all bilateral relations ceased.

21 November 1989. Indirect telephone calls and telegrams between China and Taiwan were permitted for the first time. Bilateral relations had gradually improved; after American businesses pulled out as a result of U.S. sanctions, Taiwanese businesses had begun to invest in China, with generous incentives from the mainland.

24 March 1990. The Taiwan-Invested Enterprises Association, the first trade association of Taiwanese business people on the mainland, was established.

11 June 1990. China's new leader, CCP general secretary Jiang Zemin, requested that the Taiwanese and mainland Chinese sit down to discuss any and all issues.

29 June 1990. Lee Teng-hui convened the National Affairs Conference in Taipei, in which participants proposed the establishment of a special government unit and an authorized intermediary agency to handle cross-strait relations.

12 September 1990. The Red Cross Societies representing the two sides of the Taiwan Strait signed the Kinmen Accord, with provisions for the repatriation of individuals, criminals, and suspected criminals who illegally crossed the strait.

7 October 1990. Lee Teng-hui established the National Unification Council and formulated the Guidelines for National Unification (of Taiwan and China) with a three-phase, no-time-frame approach to unification: short-term (the phase of unofficial exchanges), medium-term (the phase of official relations), and long-term (the phase of unification negotiations).

18 January 1991. Taiwan's Legislative Yuan approved the establishment of a Mainland Affairs Council under the Executive Yuan.

30 January 1991. The Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) was formally established as Taiwan's statutory administrative agency.

19 February 1991. In Taiwan a private foundation, the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), was approved by the MAC to engage in direct negotiations with China.

1 May 1991. Lee Teng-hui declared the termination of the old anti-mainland law entitled "The Period of General Mobilization for the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion."

16 December 1991. China established the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) to negotiate with Taiwan's SEF.

21 January 1993. Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a white paper in which it asserted the existence of one China, two entities, and equality between them in the period before reunification.

10 April 1993. The ARATS representative met with the SEF representative in Beijing for the first time. They signed drafts of two agreements: the "Agreement on the Use and Verification of Certificates of Authentication across the Taiwan Straits" and the "Agreement on Matters Concerning Inquiry and Compensation for Lost Registered Mail across the Taiwan Straits."

27 April 1993. The ARATS chairman, Wang Daohan, and the SEF chairman, Koo Cheng-fu, met for the first time in Singapore. They signed four agreements: (1) "Agreement on Document Authentication between Taiwan and the Mainland Area," (2) "Agreement on the Tracing of and Compensation for Lost Registered Mail," (3) "Agreement on the Establishment of Systematic Liaison and Communication Channels," and (4) "The Koo-Wang Talks Joint Agreement."

This was the most senior meeting between the two sides since 1949 and was considered a major breakthrough in cross-strait relations.

29 August 1993. The first functional meeting of the two sides to discuss procedure after the Wang-Koo talks was held in Beijing.

31 August 1993 (see document 1). China's Taiwan Affairs Office, together with the Information Office of the State Council, jointly issued a thirty-three-page white paper on Taiwan unification. The paper emphasized that "reunification of the country embodies the fundamental interest of the Chinese nation [and that the] Taiwan question has long been a destabilizing factor in the Asia-Pacific Region. Reunification of China will not only bolster the stability and development of the country itself, but also contribute to the further enhancement of the friendly relations and cooperation between China and other countries as well as to peace and development in the Asia-Pacific region and the world as a whole."

2 November 1993. The second procedural meeting after the Wang-Koo talks was held in Xiamen, China.

19 December 1993. The third procedural meeting after the Wang-Koo talks was held in Taipei.

7 January 1994. Taiwan's MAC announced the "Guiding Principle on Cross-Strait Cultural Exchanges at the Current Stage" to promote cultural exchanges for mutual benefit.

5 March 1994. The National People's Congress adopted the "Law to Protect Investments by Taiwan Compatriots."

25 March 1994. The fourth procedural meeting after the Wang-Koo talks was held in Beijing.

5 July 1994 (see document 2). The MAC published the white paper "Relations across the Taiwan Strait," stressing again a three-phase, no-time-frame approach to unification.

30 July 1994. The fifth procedural meeting after the Wang-Koo talks was held in Taipei but failed to produce any breakthrough.

22 December 1994. The sixth procedural meeting after the Wang-Koo talks was held in Nanjing. Again, no agreement was reached.

22 January 1995. The seventh procedural meeting after the Wang-Koo talks was held in Beijing. Again, the two sides failed to reach an agreement.

30 January 1995 (see document 3). China's president and CCP general secretary Jiang Zemin, anxious to reach an agreement with Taiwan, made public his eight-

point policy for developing cross-strait relations within a “One China” and “one country, two systems” framework.

8 March 1995. In response to Taiwanese lobbying, the U.S. Congress passed a concurrent resolution, by a vote of 97 to 1 in the Senate and 396 to 0 in the House, in support of granting a visa for an unprecedented visit by Lee Teng-hui to the United States. Taiwan also lobbied in the UN for membership.

China began missile tests near the waters north and south of Taiwan.

12 March 1995. China fired live ammunition in a sea-and-air maneuver off the coastal areas opposite Taiwan. The next day, it fired guided missiles into the waters off Taiwan’s Kaohsiung harbor.

8 April 1995 (see document 4). Lee Teng-hui introduced a six-point proposal for normalizing cross-strait relations.

27–28 May 1995. Another preparatory meeting was held in Beijing, and the two sides agreed to hold a second round of Wang-Koo talks.

7–12 June 1995. Lee Teng-hui visited the United States, hosted by leading U.S. senators and observed by an international press corps. At Cornell University he gave a public address in which he demanded a place for Taiwan in the international community.

16 June 1995. China postponed the agreed-upon Wang-Koo talks.

7 July 1995. China announced that it would conduct missile tests and fire surface-to-surface missiles from July 21 to 28 on the East China Sea.

21–26 July 1995. China fired six missiles at an area only eighty miles north of Taiwan.

23 July 1995. The *People’s Daily* published the first of several commentaries criticizing Lee Teng-hui personally.

15–25 August 1995. China proceeded with a second wave of missile tests near Taiwan.

24 October 1995. U.S. president Bill Clinton and Jiang Zemin met in Washington, D.C. They agreed that the Taiwan issue would be handled in accordance with the three U.S.–China communiqués.

5 March 1996. China announced that it would conduct military exercises from March 8 to 15, firing surface-to-surface guided missiles into waters 20–40 nautical miles east of Keelung, Taiwan, and 30–50 nautical miles west of Kaohsiung. The United States responded by dispatching two nuclear-armed aircraft carriers to the area. Although war was averted, tension persisted.

20 May 1996. Lee Teng-hui, beginning his second term as popularly elected president, offered in his inaugural address to make a historic visit to the Chinese mainland.

26 June 1996. Jiang Zemin said in a press conference that the two sides could begin negotiations for peaceful reunification and follow the One China principle to terminate the hostilities.

27 December 1996. Lee Teng-hui convened a National Development Conference, which passed thirty-six agreements on Taiwan's policies toward the mainland.

19 February 1997. China's paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping, died.

23 May 1997. Taiwan's Government Information Office issued a position paper asserting the ROC's rights as a sovereign state.

1 August 1997. China's defense minister declared at the seventieth anniversary of the founding of the People's Liberation Army that "the PRC would never renounce the use of force, specifically against the Taiwan independence movement, movements to split the motherland, and intervention by foreign forces."

26 October–3 November 1997. Jiang Zemin visited the United States and met with President Clinton in Washington, D.C. The Chinese again declared the Taiwan issue to be China's internal affair; the Americans reiterated that the United States would observe the three U.S.–China communiqués.

30 October 1997. Taiwan's MAC urged China to face the reality that the two sides belonged to separate jurisdictions and asked for immediate resumption of the postponed Wang-Koo talks.

19 December 1997. Lee Teng-hui announced that the ROC government was willing to resume the SEF-ARATS negotiations without any preconditions.

6 February 1998. Taipei's mayor Chen Shui-bian, a possible candidate to represent the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in the next presidential election, said in an interview published by the *Washington Post*, "The future of Taiwan can only be decided by the 21.5 million people on the island through a referendum."

24 February 1998. For the first time since China had suspended the cross-strait dialogue on 16 June 1995, ARATS sent a letter to the SEF expressing its willingness to resume consultation and welcoming the visit of SEF chairman Koo Cheng-fu to China.

11 March 1998. ARATS wrote to invite SEF to lead a delegation to visit China.

22–24 April 1998. SEF delegates visited China.

25 June–3 July 1998. Bill Clinton visited China. The Chinese asked him to publicly affirm U.S. support for China's "Three No's" policy on Taiwan, and he did so during a panel discussion in Shanghai on 30 June.

7 July 1998. U.S. senator Robert Torricelli (D-N.J.) and Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.) introduced S.R. 107 in the Senate, reaffirming U.S. commitment to Taiwan. The resolution was passed by a vote of 92 to 0 on 10 July. This was the Senate's rebuttal to Clinton's announcement of support for the "Three No's" policy.

22 July 1998 (*see document 5*). MAC chairman Chang King-yuh issued a policy paper to be presented at the National Unification Council meeting.

28 July 1998 (*see document 6*). China published a white paper on national defense, which included a 150-word statement reiterating China's established position on Taiwan.

11 August 1998 (*see document 7*). MAC vice chairman Lin Chong-pin released the results of a poll that it had commissioned in July 1998, in which 40.3 percent of the respondents said that the pace of change toward closer relations between the two sides was just right.

14–19 October 1998. Koo Cheng-fu visited China for the second historical Wang-Koo meeting in Shanghai. He also met Jiang Zemin. Koo and Wang agreed on four points: (1) Wang would visit Taiwan in 1999; (2) SEF and ARATS would resume contacts and negotiations; (3) the two bodies should reinforce mainland-Taiwan exchanges at various levels; and (4) the two bodies should provide more assistance in protecting the property and personal safety of visitors from both sides.

26 October 1998 (*see document 8*). MAC chairman Chang King-yuh presented a special report on Koo's trip before the Legislative Yuan.

5 December 1998. In a hotly contested election for the position of mayor of Taipei, the KMT's Ma Ying-jeou, a mainland-born Taiwanese, defeated incumbent Chen Shui-bian, a pro-independence DPP candidate. The election was viewed as a major defeat for the DPP's goal of an independent Taiwan, and it encouraged the KMT to reconsider negotiations with China.

19 December 1998. Lee Teng-hui explicitly stated that he would not seek re-election in March 2000. He made the remark during an interview with Shouichi Oikawa, editor in chief of Japan's *Yomiuri Shimbun*.

29 January 1999 (*see document 9*). China's vice premier Qian Qicheng provided a final clarification of the One China principle.