What is the explanatory value of a
conceptual metaphor?
Matthew S. McGlone *
Department of Communication Studies, The University of Texas at Austin, 1 University Station A1105,
Austin, TX 78712-0115, United States
Abstract
Lakoff [Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind. The University
of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1987.] and other ‘‘conceptual metaphor’’ theorists have argued
that our use and understanding of figurative language is mediated by unconscious metaphoric
correspondences that structure human concepts. Communication scholars have employed the conceptual
metaphor framework to infer attitudes and beliefs from the figurative expressions people
use to describe their personal experiences. However, these scholars rarely scrutinize the framework’s
assumptions, many of which have been vigorously challenged in other disciplines. In this article, I
critically assess the explanatory value of the ‘‘conceptual metaphor’’ construct and review the empirical
evidence for and against it. Based on this assessment, I conclude that despite its important atmospheric
influence, the conceptual metaphor framework has not fared well as an account of
conceptual structure or a model of figurative language understanding.
Ó 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Metaphor; Analogy; Figurative language; Concepts; Categorization
1. Introduction
A metaphor (from the Greek metapherein, meaning ‘‘transference’’) is a figure of speech
in which a word or phrase is used to describe something it does not literally denote, e.g.,
This journal is a gem. You may or may not agree with this characterization of the journal,
but you probably had no difficulty understanding it. Furthermore, your understanding did
0271-5309/$ - see front matter Ó 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.langcom.2006.02.016
*
Tel.: +1 512 471 1920; fax: +1 512 471 3504.
E-mail address: matthew_mcglone@mail.utexas.edu.
Language & Communication 27 (2007) 109–126
www.elsevier.com/locate/langcom
LANGUAGE
&
COMMUNICATION
not hinge on a literal reading of the sentence – e.g., at no point in your reading did you
wonder about the journal’s carat weight or how it might look in an engagement ring.
The meanings of metaphorical expressions do not coincide with the literal meanings of
words comprising them. How then do we go beyond the literal to understand them? There
are scholarly contemplations of this question dating back to Aristotle, but only in the
twentieth century has it been regarded as an important problem in the study of language
and thought.
Aristotle (1965) considered metaphor a sign of language mastery and genius, but he also
deemed it ornamental, appropriate for poetry but too enigmatic for philosophical or scientific
discourse. Few contemporary language scholars agree with his limited view of metaphor’s
utility, although many still endorse his account of metaphor understanding.
According to what has come to be known as the Aristotelian ‘‘comparison view,’’ metaphors
of the form X is a Y are understood by implicitly converting them into simile form,
X is like a Y (This journal is like a gem). This conversion serves the dual purpose of affording
the proposition literal truth (in that any two things, even a journal and a gem, are literally
alike in some respects) and making explicit the analogical comparison Aristotle
presumed to be the crux of metaphor. Once converted to a simile, the metaphor is then
interpreted by determining the commonalities of the two things compared. The comparison
view thus treats metaphor as a species of analogy and asserts that the perception of
similarity is the basis of metaphor use and comprehension (Miller, 1993; McGlone, 2003).
Aristotle’s relegation of metaphor to stylistics had the unfortunate effect of leading
many subsequent generations of language scholars to ignore the topic altogether. Up until
the late 19th century, the study of metaphor was primarily the province of literary scholars
who focused on the interpretation of particular tropes in poetry and fiction. Near the turn
of the twentieth century, French philologist Breal’s (1899) Essai de Semantique sparked
new interest in the topic among American linguists and philosophers. Breal persuasively
argued that metaphor was not mere ornament, but a ubiquitous feature of language
and a principal device of linguistic change. Richards (1936) later took up this cause and
introduced a terminology of metaphor that has become fairly standard: The term used
metaphorically is the ‘‘vehicle’’ (e.g., gem), the term to which it is applied is the ‘‘tenor’’
or ‘‘topic’’ (e.g., this journal), and the meaning of the metaphor is the ‘‘ground.’’ Building
on Richards’ work, philosopher Max Black (1962) articulated an influential alternative to
traditional views of metaphor understanding. Having rejected Aristotle’s comparison view
as too simplistic, Black argued that metaphor is a communicative phenomenon operating
not at the level of mere word meaning, but at the (ostensibly) deeper level of conceptual
structure. According to his ‘‘interaction view,’’ metaphors are understood by perceiving
the topic concept ‘‘in terms of’’ the vehicle concept to produce a ground that combines
their alignable conceptual attributes and thereby transcends their literal denotations. Contemporary
metaphor theorists have frequently (and justly) criticized Black’s vague account
of figurative transcendence, but most have nonetheless adopted his notion of ‘‘interaction’’
as a preferable alternative to ‘‘comparison’’ for describing the cognitive processes underlying
metaphor use and understanding (Ortony, 1979; McGlone and Manfredi, 2001).
In the years since Black’s (1962) treatise, a variety of theories and models have been
offered to specify how topic and vehicle concepts interact to yield metaphoric meanings.
Undoubtedly the most influential has been the ‘‘conceptual metaphor’’ framework
advanced by the linguist George Lakoff and his colleagues (Lakoff, 1987, 1990,
1993, 2002; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 1998; Lakoff and Turner, 1989). According to their
110 M.S. McGlone / Language & Communication 27 (2007) 109–126
proposal, the production and comprehension of metaphorical language are mediated by
metaphorical correspondences that structure our mental representations of complex concepts.
For example, consider the concept of love. Lakoff (1993) has argued that our
understanding of this concept is guided by ‘‘conceptual’’ metaphors1
that assimilate
the target concept ‘‘love’’ into concrete source concepts such as ‘‘containers’’ and ‘‘journeys.’’
The conceptual metaphor LOVE IS A CONTAINER2
entails a correspondence
between love relationships and containers, and between the lovers and entities inside a
container. These correspondences are inferred from expressions such as We are in love,
We fell out of love, and We are trapped in this relationship. The conceptual metaphor
LOVE IS A JOURNEY entails correspondences between lovers and travelers, the love
relationship and a traveling vehicle, problems in the relationship and obstacles in the
path of travel, and so forth. Expressions such as We are at a crossroads in our relationship,
Love is a two-way street, and We may have to go our separate ways are consistent
with these correspondences. Lakoff and Turner (1989) contend that conceptual metaphors
not only mediate our use and understanding of ‘‘frozen,’’ idiomatic expressions,
but also underlie our creation and interpretation of novel metaphors (e.g., Ten years
of marriage would give anyone saddle sores), which only rarely coin descriptive themes
de novo.
Conceptual metaphor theorists posit two distinct but related roles for LOVE IS A
JOURNEY (and other figurative schemata) in the human conceptual system. First, it is
presumed to play a representational role by structuring our understanding of love. This
claim derives from the rhetoric of ‘‘cognitive economy’’ (Miller and Johnson-Laird,
1976), according to which the mind borrows the semantic structure of simple concepts
to organize aspects of complex concepts that might be too computationally expensive to
represent in a stand-alone fashion. Second, LOVE IS A JOURNEY is hypothesized to
play a process role in that it mediates our use and understanding of certain metaphoric
expressions pertaining to love. For example, upon encountering the statement Our relationship
has hit a dead end in discourse, we can retrieve the conceptual correspondences
between love and journeys in semantic memory (lovers-travelers, relationship-vehicle,
problems-obstacles, etc.) to interpret the statement. Again, the metaphor’s hypothesized
process role appears to be economical from a cognitive standpoint, in that (a) metaphoric
meanings may be retrieved from memory rather than constructed, and (b) the meanings of
several metaphoric expressions (dead end, spinning our wheels, etc.) may be generated from
a single semantic structure (the LOVE IS A JOURNEY schema).
In recent years, Lakoff and his collaborators have formulated a vast taxonomy of conceptual
metaphors to describe the figurative expressions we use to talk about concepts
such as anger (ANGER IS HEATED FLUID UNDER PRESSURE, as in Matt blew
his stack), crime (CRIME IS A DISEASE, as in Midtown has been plagued by a series
of bank robberies), death (DEATH IS DEPARTURE, as in The old man finally passed
away), mentality (THE MIND IS A CONTAINER, as in What do you have in mind?),
and many others (Lakoff, 1987, 1993; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 1998; Kovecses, 1990,
1
The dual reference of the term metaphor in conceptual metaphor theorists’ writings is a potential source of
confusion. The term is used to refer both to the verbal trope (its conventional sense) and to the hypothesized
system of correspondences between domains. Rhetoricians have traditionally used the term analogy to convey the
latter sense. However, in fairness to conceptual metaphor theorists, I will follow their convention.
2
Following the notational convention of Lakoff and his collaborators, I will use uppercase titles to identify
conceptual metaphors.
M.S. McGlone / Language & Communication 27 (2007) 109–126 111
2000; Fauconnier and Turner, 2003). The influence of this organizational scheme extends
well beyond the domain of linguistics. Philosophers have used it to describe how our
understanding of abstract concepts is ‘‘embodied’’ in sensorial experience (Gibbs et al.,
2004; Johnson, 1987; Stern, 2000; Talmy, 1996). Cognitive scientists and artificial intelligence
researchers have developed process models of language comprehension in which
conceptual metaphors figure prominently (Albritton et al., 1995; Carbonell, 1982; Gibbs,
1994; Way, 1991). The theory has also had an impact on conceptions of the relationship
between language and thought in such diverse fields as cultural anthropology (Holland,
1982), law (Winter, 1989, 1992), literary studies (Fauconnier and Turner, 2003; Giora,
2003; Turner, 1987, 1991), political science (Lakoff, 2002; Paris, 2002), and religion
(Soskice, 1987).
Despite communication’s long tradition of scholarly inquiry into the form and function
of rhetorical figures (Osborn and Ehninger, 1962; Crocker, 1977), the discipline’s reception
of conceptual metaphor theory has been curiously uncritical. Scholars in the field have
used the framework to infer attitudes and ideologies underlying figurative language in
the discourse of economics (Eubanks, 1999, 2000; Kecskes, 2004), education (Goulden
and Griffin, 1995; Staton and Peeples, 2000), family interaction (Buzzanell and Burrell,
1997; Hayden, 2003), illness and disease (Bradac, 2001), journalism (Kitis and Milapides,
1997), organizational communication (Koch and Deetz, 1981; Deetz, 1984; May, 1994),
politics (Ausmus, 1998; Bosman, 1987; Bosman and Hagendoorn, 1991), social science
(Danaher, 1998), and war (Kuusisto, 2002; Lule, 2004; Medhurst et al., 1998). However,
the field has yet to scrutinize Lakoff’s claims about the thought processes underlying metaphor
use and understanding, many of which have been vigorously challenged in other
fields. If the notion of a ‘‘conceptual metaphor’’ is to be treated as a useful analytic construct
in communication research, then a critical assessment of its explanatory value is
overdue.
The evaluation of conceptual metaphor theory that follows is in three parts. In Section
2, I discuss how the theory’s representational claim fares as an account of human conceptual
structure. In Section 3, I describe the empirical evidence pertinent to the theory’s process
claim regarding metaphor use and understanding. Finally, in Section 4, I draw
conclusions about its promise as a comprehensive theory of figurative language and
thought.
2. The metaphoric representation of conceptual structure
In all of their writings on the subject, conceptual metaphor (CM hereafter) theorists
make it very clear that they do not view metaphor as being solely (or even primarily) a
linguistic phenomenon; rather, they consider it a mode of conceptual representation. Lakoff
and Johnson (1980) argued that metaphor constitutes the modal method by which the
mind represents concepts that are not sensorial or perceptual in nature:
‘‘Many aspects of our experience cannot be clearly delineated in terms of the naturally
emergent dimensions of our experience. This is typically the case for human
emotions, abstract concepts, mental activity. . . Though most of these can be experienced
directly, none of them can be fully comprehended on their own terms. Instead,
we must understand them in terms of other entities and experiences, typically other
kinds of entities and experiences’’ (p. 177).
112 M.S. McGlone / Language & Communication 27 (2007) 109–126
On this view, metaphor provides a way to ‘‘piggyback’’ our understanding of abstract concepts
on the structure of concrete concepts, which are presumably represented in a standalone
fashion.
Given their insistence on the role of metaphor in conceptual representation, it is surprising
that CM theorists have not offered a detailed model of how metaphoric representations
are constructed or used. In the absence of an explicit model from the theory’s framers,
Murphy (1996) formulated two versions of what this model might look like, a strong version
and a weak version. In the strong version, all concepts other than those based directly
on sensorial-perceptual experience have no intrinsic structure of their own. Instead, they
are represented entirely as a set of mappings to the representational structure of more concrete
concepts. For example, consider the hypothesized conceptual metaphor THEORIES
ARE BUILDINGS (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). This metaphoric mental structure is
inferred from idiomatic expressions such as She constructed a theory to explain the incident,
That theory is on shaky ground, etc. According to the strong version, the structure of
the target concept (‘‘theory’’) is a set of argument-related entities (see Fig. 1) that are
organized by correspondences to entities in the source concept (‘‘buildings’’). The strong version
assumes that we cannot reason about theories in and of themselves, but must instead
apply our knowledge of buildings to theory properties. This version suggests that we don’t
understand theories in any real sense; we can only understand buildings, and must piggyback
the ‘‘theory’’ concept on this understanding. Although Lakoff and his colleagues do
not explicitly endorse this version, they have made several claims consistent with it. For
example, Lakoff and Turner (1989) argue that conventional love-journey expressions demonstrate
that the ‘‘structure of our understanding of love comes from the structure of our
knowledge of journeys’’ (p. 62). Similarly, Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) assertion that ‘‘the
essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of
another’’ is also consistent with this view (p. 5).
The strong version of the metaphoric representation claim is problematic for at least
two reasons. First, it is not clear how the mind could construct such a representation without
at least some semantic primitives in the target concept that exist independently from
Fig. 1. Hypothesized correspondences between attributes of the concepts ‘‘theory’’ and ‘‘building’’.
M.S. McGlone / Language & Communication 27 (2007) 109–126 113
those in its corresponding source concept. For example, we must have some direct representation
of theory-related entities (e.g., theories themselves, theorists, ideas, assumptions,
etc.) if they are to be distinguished from building-oriented entities to which they conceptually
correspond. Without a minimally independent representation of theories, we would
assume that theory terms are synonymous with building terms, and would be conceptually
incapable of distinguishing between their referents. Second, the strong version predicts
that our knowledge of abstract concepts includes incorrect information that is a byproduct
of their metaphoric structure (Murphy, 1996). For example, if we understand theories
entirely in terms of buildings, then we should occasionally make erroneous inferences
about the applicability of building properties to the abstract concept – e.g., theories not
only can have foundations (assumptions), architects (formulators), and blueprints (origins),
but also stairwells (?), hallways (?), sprinkler systems (?), etc. People rarely, if ever,
make inferences of this sort; however, someone whose concept of theories is entirely
parasitic on her knowledge of buildings could learn to distinguish correct from incorrect
inferences only through a lengthy (and unlikely) process of trial and error.
The strong version of the metaphoric representation claim is theoretically untenable,
but Murphy’s (1996) weak version might seem more plausible. According to this version,
abstract concepts are not piggybacked on concrete concepts, but are nonetheless influenced
by their conceptual structure. Metaphor still plays a role in organizing the abstract
concept, but the representation of the abstract concept is not metaphorical per se. For
example, our knowledge of theories may be represented in a stand-alone fashion, complete
with semantic primitives that are intrinsic to theories and independent from our knowledge
of buildings. However, the ubiquity of building-oriented idioms about theories in
our culture may have exerted an influence on our understanding of theories, resulting in
a concept of theories that is structurally similar to our concept of buildings. Thus, the
weak version assumes that metaphor plays a causal role in the structure of abstract concepts,
but is not the sine qua non of their conceptual representation.
In contrast to the strong version, the weak version is conducive to empirical investigation.
A reasonable test of the claim would, at a minimum, involve three steps. First, one
would identify an abstract concept for which the idiomatic expressions used to describe it
in a particular culture suggest a conceptual metaphor, such as the THEORIES ARE
BUILDINGS metaphor in our culture. Next, one would explore the idiomatic expressions
used in another culture to describe the concept and determine whether this culture employs
a different metaphor. Third, having established that members of the different cultures talk
about theories in different ways, one would then demonstrate that they think about theories
in different ways, as evidenced by their performance in non-verbal reasoning about
theories. This third step is crucial, for without it there is no empirical basis for the claim
that conceptual metaphors transcend their linguistic manifestations (Lakoff, 1993).
To date, conceptual metaphor researchers have not ventured beyond the first step of
this investigation. Lakoff and his colleagues base the metaphoric representation claim
solely on their intuitions about how certain idioms thematically cohere. As evidence for
this claim, the idiomatic corpus suffers from two problems. First, the early history of
the Whorfian hypothesis demonstrates the pitfalls of using only linguistic evidence to
argue for deep connections between thought and language (McGlone, 2001). Whorf
(1964) hypothesized that language influences thought by providing semantic distinctions
and categories that we use to perceive and reason about objects and events in the world.
However, the early evidence for this hypothesis was linguistic – specifically, differences in
114 M.S. McGlone / Language & Communication 27 (2007) 109–126
syntax and semantics among the world’s languages. For example, Whorf’s celebrated
claim that Inuit speakers think of snow differently from English speakers was supported
only by the observation from which the claim was derived – that Inuit languages have
more snow descriptors than English (as it turns out, this observation was either a misunderstanding
or a deliberate fabrication; see Pullum, 1991, for an account of the ‘‘Great
Eskimo Vocabulary Hoax’’ in linguistics and anthropology). Thus, the linguistic evidence
was treated as both the cause and effect of relativity. Analogously, Lakoff’s claim that metaphors
transcend their linguistic manifestations to influence conceptual structure rests
solely on these manifestations. How do we know that people think of theories in terms
of buildings? Because they use building-oriented terminology to talk about theories.
Why do people think about theories in terms of buildings? Because they use buildingoriented
terminology to talk about theories. CM theorists clearly must abandon circular
reasoning of this sort and seek substantiation of their claims that is independent from
the linguistic evidence.
A second problem with the idiomatic evidence is that its support for the metaphoric
representation claim may be illusory. Our intuitions about how idioms metaphorically
reflect their meanings are often quite compelling, but are shaky grounds for developing
an account of how their meanings are represented in semantic memory. In fact, the very
act of generating an intuitive theory about an idiom’s meaning can make us resistant to
alternative accounts that are demonstrably more accurate. Philological fixedness of this
sort was demonstrated in a clever set of experiments by Keysar and Bly (1995). Participants
studied a series of unfamiliar idioms, each of which was presented in one of two
story contexts. For example, the archaic British idiom the goose hangs high was presented
in a story that biased participants to interpret it as referring to success or in a second story
suggesting that it refers to failure. After participants read the idiom in one of these biasing
contexts, they were asked to evaluate the likelihood that people might interpret the idiom
in the opposite manner if it were presented in isolation. Once participants had learned one
meaning for the idiom, they were doubtful about the possibility that someone might interpret
it in a different way. This conditioned incredulity is a form of hindsight bias in which
participants developed a rationale for how each idiom metaphorically reflected the initial
meaning it was ascribed. Once the rationale was articulated, it impeded their ability to
consider a different metaphorical scheme that would justify the idiom’s opposite meaning.
Someone who was initially led to believe that the goose hangs high refers to success might
assume that the metaphorical basis for its meaning is the conventional correspondence
between ‘‘high’’ and positive affect (e.g., HAPPY IS UP, SAD IS DOWN, Lakoff and
Johnson, 1980). In contrast, someone initially led to believe that it describes failure might
assume that the goose’s death symbolizes defeat (FAILURE IS DEATH, Johnson, 1987).
Without knowledge of the idiom’s actual etymology and meaning (the former account is in
fact more accurate), both of these metaphoric schemes seem plausible, but clash with
meanings of the idiom other than one they were designed to explain.
CM theorists interpret the idiomatic corpus in a manner similar to the post-hoc rationalization
process observed by Keysar and Bly. They assume that our intuitions about idioms’
meanings directly reflect the way these meanings are represented in semantic
memory. However, introspective evidence in no way guarantees that the epistemological
account is accurate, and in some cases may be downright misleading. To illustrate, consider
your intuitions about the metaphorical structure of the idiom the spittin’ image. This
idiom is used to refer to the striking physical resemblance of one thing to another – e.g.,
M.S. McGlone / Language & Communication 27 (2007) 109–126 115
Martha is the spittin’ image of her mother. But how does the idiom metaphorically reflect
this meaning? One might construct an account in which reference to a bodily fluid (spit) is
meant to symbolize the genuine, physical quality of the resemblance. Such an account
comports with Johnson’s (1987) arguments for the metaphoric grounding of psychological
experience in bodily functions (e.g., I couldn’t swallow the idea reflects a THINKING IS
DIGESTION metaphor). Moreover, the ‘‘bodily fluid’’ account is also compatible with
the idiom’s status as an impolite expression (Makkai et al., 1995; McGlone and Batchelor,
2003). Nevertheless, this theory of the idiom’s origin is entirely erroneous: The spittin’
image is a contraction of the phrase The spirit and the image (Feldman, 1990). In this
example, the availability of objective etymological information enables us to evaluate
(and ultimately discredit) our intuitive theory about the expression’s origin. Analogously,
the claim that idioms reflect the metaphoric structure of abstract concepts cannot be objectively
evaluated without evidence that is independent from our intuitions. At present, there
is simply no evidence suitable for this evaluation.
3. Conceptual metaphors in figurative language comprehension
The strong and weak versions of the metaphoric representation claim have not fared
well empirically. However, an even weaker version of the claim might be worth considering.
According to this version, schemata like THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS do not
structure our understanding of theories in general (the strong version), nor do they exert
an indirect influence on the structure of our theory knowledge (the weak version). They
nonetheless are part of our knowledge of how people talk about abstract concepts, and
play a role in our comprehension of figurative expressions about these concepts. Gibbs
(1992, 1994) has been the major proponent of this version, which amounts to a process
claim – i.e., that conceptual metaphors underlie the cognitive process by which we interpret
figurative language.
Gibbs has proposed that our comprehension of the vast majority of linguistic metaphors
– both idiomatic and novel figurative expressions – is fundamentally a recognition
process. Consider the statement Our marriage is a rollercoaster ride. According to Gibbs,
we comprehend this statement by first recognizing it as an instantiation of the LOVE IS A
JOURNEY schema. We then use the conceptual mappings the schema entails (e.g., lovers
! travelers, relationship ! vehicle, excitement ! speed, positive affect ! upward
direction of travel, negative affect ! downward direction of travel, etc.) to interpret the
statement as an assertion that the marriage in question is emotionally unstable. These conceptual
mappings are presumably retrieved to comprehend other love-journey expressions
as well – e.g., Love is a two-way street, Our relationship is at a crossroads, etc.
Gibbs’ account contrasts sharply with the ‘‘attributive categorization’’ discourse model
of metaphor comprehension (Glucksberg et al., 1997; McGlone, 1996; McGlone and
Manfredi, 2001). According to this model, metaphors such as Our marriage is a rollercoaster
ride are understood as what they appear to be: Category-inclusion assertions of
the form X is a Y. The vehicle term (rollercoaster ride) is understood as referring to a category
that its literal referent exemplifies (‘‘exciting and/or scary situations’’) and may plausibly
include the topic concept (our marriage) as a member. When such a category is used
to characterize a metaphor topic, it functions as an ‘‘attributive category’’ by providing
properties to be attributed to the topic. The properties provided by this category can often
be attributed to a wide range of topics. Thus, we can characterize things like adolescence,
116 M.S. McGlone / Language & Communication 27 (2007) 109–126
careers, elections, or films as being metaphorical ‘‘rollercoaster rides’’ as well as certain
marriages. With extensive use in metaphoric contexts, the vehicle’s attributive category
referent can become a conventional meaning of the term. For example, the secondary
meaning of the term butcher in the Random House Dictionary of the English Language
is ‘‘to bungle or botch,’’ which reflects the term’s frequent use as a metaphoric descriptor
of incompetence.
The CM and attributive categorization models differ in the degree to which they portray
metaphor comprehension as an active, constructive process. Gibbs argues that metaphor
meanings are retrieved as mappings between source and target topics. In contrast, the
attributive categorization model contends that the meanings of conventional metaphor
vehicles (e.g., butcher) may be retrieved from semantic memory, but are actively instantiated
in different and sometimes novel ways for different topics. For example, understanding
That surgeon is a butcher entails a different construal of the category of ‘‘incompetent,
bungling people’’ butchers exemplify than understanding that carpenter is a butcher. Novel
metaphors (e.g., The U.S. has become stepfather to the Middle East) draw on our knowledge
of the vehicle’s stereotypical properties (in charge, despite being unfamiliar, unwelcome,
and resented) and the attributional dimensions of the topic to construct
attributive categories de novo (McGlone and Manfredi, 2001).
McGlone (1996) used a variety of experimental paradigms to investigate whether people
retrieve conceptual metaphors or construct attributive categories to interpret nominal metaphors.
In general, the results of these experiments did not support the CM view. For
example, consider the statement Dr. Moreland’s lecture was a three-course meal for the
mind, which instantiates (hypothetically) the conceptual metaphor IDEAS ARE FOOD
(Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). When people were asked to paraphrase this statement, they
rarely made mention of the potential correspondences between ideas and food (e.g.,
thinking ! cooking, understanding ! digestion, etc.), instead focusing on the high quantity
and/or quality aspects of three-course meals that can be attributed to lectures. When
asked to generate other metaphors that were similar in meaning to this statement, people
modally generated metaphor vehicles from the same attributive category as three-course
meals (e.g., Dr. Moreland’s lecture was a truckload of information) and infrequently generated
vehicles from the food domain (e.g., Dr. Moreland’s lecture was a steak for the intellect).
In a similarity ratings task, people’s perceptions of the similarity among metaphors
did not reflect CM groupings. For example, the steak expression above was not perceived
as being more similar to the original three-course meal statement than the goldmine expression,
even though the first two vehicles are both from the food domain. Similarly, people’s
comprehension of a metaphorical three-course meal was not facilitated by prior exposure
to metaphors from the food domain (e.g., That book was a snack), but was facilitated by
others from its attributive category (e.g., That book was a goldmine). Finally, people’s performance
in cued recall for the three-course meal statement was far better when the cue
describe the vehicle’s abstract attributes (large quantity) than when its source domain
(food). McGlone obtained similar findings for a wide range of statements instantiating various
conceptual metaphors. Taken as a whole, these findings cast serious doubt on the
claim that conceptual metaphors underlie people’s comprehension of nominal metaphors
in discourse. Instead, people appear to infer, articulate, and remember the attributive categories
these metaphors imply.
As the above analysis indicates, there are good reasons to doubt the role of conceptual
metaphors in metaphor comprehension. However, their potential role in idiom
M.S. McGlone / Language & Communication 27 (2007) 109–126 117
comprehension might seem more plausible. While idioms cannot be taken as strong
evidence that certain concepts are metaphorically structured (as I argued in the previous
section), it is still plausible that people can recognize the metaphoric coherence
of idioms in certain linguistic domains, and perhaps use this knowledge in idiom
comprehension.
Evidence consistent with this proposal was reported by Nayak and Gibbs (1990). These
researchers found that people can not only recognize the metaphoric similarities among
idioms, but also use this knowledge to make judgments about the appropriateness of idioms
in certain discourse contexts. For example, consider the idioms we use to describe
anger. Lakoff (1987) has described anger idioms as clustering around two distinct conceptual
metaphors, ANGER IS HEATED FLUID UNDER PRESSURE and ANGER IS
ANIMAL-LIKE BEHAVIOR. Idioms like flip your lid, blow your top, and get hot under
the collar are consistent with the former; others like bite someone’s head off, foam at the
mouth, and jump down someone’s throat are consistent with the latter. Nayak and Gibbs
found that participants in their studies based their judgments of the semantic similarity
among anger idioms in part on their metaphoric similarities. Thus, flip your lid was judged
to be more similar in meaning to blow your top than jump down someone’s throat. In addition,
people use metaphoric similarity to judge the stylistic consistency of anger idioms in
stories such as the following (emphases added):
Mary was very tense about this evening’s dinner party. The fact that Chuck had not
come home to help was making her fume. She was getting hotter with every passing
minute. Dinner would not be ready before the guests arrived. As it got closer to five
o’clock the pressure was really building up. Mary’s tolerance was reaching its limits.
When Chuck strolled in at ten minutes to five whistling and smiling, Mary. . .
After reading this partial vignette, participants were asked to judge the appropriateness of
blew her top and bit his head off as descriptions of Mary’s angry behavior in the final sentence.
Blew her top was overwhelmingly preferred as a completion for this vignette. Bit his
head off was preferred for the following:
Mary was getting very grouchy about this evening’s dinner party. She prowled around
the house waiting for Chuck to come home to help. She was growling under her breath
about Chuck’s lateness. Her mood was becoming more savage with every passing minute.
As it got closer to five o’clock, Mary was ferociously angry with Chuck. When
Chuck strolled in at 4:30 whistling and smiling, Mary. . .
The appropriateness ratings participants made for these and other idiom-vignette pairings
clearly suggest that people can appreciate the metaphoric consistency of idioms in certain
discourse contexts. However, Nayak and Gibbs (1990) argued that the appropriateness
ratings indicated the relative difficulty participants had in comprehending the competing
idiom completions. Idioms that metaphorically matched their story contexts – e.g., blew
her top in a story describing anger in heat and pressure terms – were easier to interpret
than idioms in nonmatching contexts. The appropriateness ratings, on this account, directly
reflect the ease of idiom comprehension.
There are, however, plausible alternative interpretations of these data. The pattern of
idiom preferences Nayak and Gibbs report is consistent with three different scenarios
regarding the conceptual status of the ANGER IS HEATED FLUID UNDER PRESSURE
metaphor. First, the metaphor might not be part of our conceptual knowledge
118 M.S. McGlone / Language & Communication 27 (2007) 109–126
at all. It could be the case that we can simply appreciate how idioms imply a conceptual
metaphor in interpretive contexts that motivate us to look for such metaphors, such as the
appropriateness ratings task. Second, the metaphor might be in semantic memory and is
available for use in processing idioms when appropriate occasions arise. In this scenario,
the anger-heat equation is available in semantic memory and is accessed to understand
blew her top in contexts that encourage consideration of the idiom’s metaphoric underpinnings.
Third, the metaphor might be available in semantic memory and accessed in any
context in which anger-heat idioms are encountered, and thus serves as the conceptual
basis for idiom comprehension. Lakoff (1993) appears to endorse this scenario when he
suggests that the system of conceptual metaphors ‘‘. . .is used constantly and automatically,
with neither effort nor awareness’’ (pp. 227–228). However, people’s ratings of idiom
appropriateness cannot validate or discredit this strong on-line processing claim.
To explore the hypothesized role of conceptual metaphors in on-line idiom comprehension,
Glucksberg et al. (1993, Experiment 2) adapted the stories used by Nayak and Gibbs
in the appropriateness ratings experiment for a reading-time task. The vignettes were presented
to participants one line at a time on a computer screen, with either a metaphorically
consistent idiom completion or an inconsistent completion. If conceptual metaphors are,
as Lakoff (1993) argued, automatically accessed during reading, then metaphorically consistent
idiom completions should have been read faster by participants than the inconsistent
completions. However, there were no differences whatsoever in the reading times
between the consistent and inconsistent conditions. Gibbs (1992) reported a similar failure
to find effects of metaphoric consistency on idiom comprehension performance as measured
by reading times.
Similarly, other studies have found evidence that, although compatible with Lakoff’s
(1993) strong on-line processing claim, is open to other interpretations. Albritton et al.
(1995) explored the role of conceptual metaphors in people’s memory for textual information.
Participants in their study read texts containing metaphoric expressions that were
potential instantiations of conceptual metaphors. For example, one text about urban
crime read that The city’s crime epidemic was raging out of control, and later stated that
Public officials desperately looked for a cure. Both sentences presumably reflect the metaphor
CRIME IS A DISEASE (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). Using a post-comprehension
cued recognition measure, Allbritton et al. found that recognition of the first sentence
was facilitated when cued with the second, suggesting that a link in memory had been
established between these two sentences. While Allbritton et al. concluded that this link
was a by-product of on-line comprehension, the post-comprehension recognition measure
they used does not preclude the possibility that the link was the product of a deliberate
memory strategy. Furthermore, their failure to include appropriate controls for lexical
priming (e.g., from epidemic to cure) renders any claim of on-line conceptual metaphor
use dubious (Kreuz and Graesser, 1991).
McGlone and Harding (1998; see also McGlone et al., 1995) investigated the hypothesized
CM mediation of temporal language comprehension. Linguists have long noted
that two distinct movement perspectives are implicit in English expressions about temporal
sequencing: One in which events are stationary relative to a moving observer
(e.g., We have passed the due date) and a second in which events move relative to a stationary
observer (e.g., The due date has passed; Bennett, 1975; Clark, 1973; McTaggart,
1908; Traugott, 1975). Lakoff (1993) described these perspectives as special cases of a
more general TIME PASSING IS MOTION metaphor that maps temporal relations
M.S. McGlone / Language & Communication 27 (2007) 109–126 119
to spatial relations. McGlone and Harding found two pieces of evidence suggesting that
the entailments of these perspectives play a role in on-line language comprehension.
First, people took less time in a timed judgment task to comprehend temporal sentences
when they were presented in perspectivally consistent blocks (i.e., all moving-observer or
moving-event sentences) than in perspectivally inconsistent blocks (i.e., moving-observer
and moving event sentences juxtaposed). Second, people used the perspectival information
in the different sentences types to interpret ostensibly ambiguous temporal sentences
such as The meeting originally scheduled for next Wednesday has been moved forward two
days. When participants encountered this sentence following an unambiguous movingobserver
sentence (e.g., We passed the deadline two days ago), they modally interpreted
the term forward as indicating that the meeting had been postponed, consistent with a
perspective in which the direction of temporal movement is toward the future. However,
when the ambiguous sentence was encountered following an unambiguous moving-event
sentence (e.g., The deadline passed two days ago), they modally interpreted forward as
indicating that the meeting had been moved earlier, consistent with a perspective in
which events move from the future toward the past.
Do these data reflect participants’ use of different cases of the TIME PASSING IS
MOTION metaphor in on-line temporal language comprehension? Perhaps. However,
McGlone and Harding noted that such a claim cannot be empirically distinguished from
the more parsimonious claim that the moving-observer and moving-event perspectives in
temporal language are structurally similar to (but not metaphorically derived from) the
moving-observer and moving-object perspectives in spatial language. Jackendoff (1983)
argued that although our conceptions of time and space may be thematically parallel
(as evidenced by spatiotemporal expressions), the presumed primacy of spatial relations
as the metaphoric grounding of temporal relations may be illusory. Spatial relations seem
primary because of their relationship with nonverbal cognitive capacities such as vision
and motor coordination. Nevertheless, it is epistemologically more plausible that space,
time and other concepts are organized by a common set of abstract parameters that are
simply more transparent in spatial language than other linguistic domains (Talmy,
1996). Jackendoff’s argument applies with equal force to the hypothesized role of conceptual
metaphors in our understanding of conventional expressions in domains other than
time and space. For example, the semantic and syntactic similarities among conventional
expressions we use to describe anger (e.g., John was fuming) and heat (e.g., The furnace is
fuming) might reflect the organizational influence of conceptual structures that are superordinate
to either concept. The similarities among these expressions may create comprehension
facilitation effects consistent with the conceptual metaphor view, yet the true
cause of these effects might be derived from these superordinate structures, rather than
the anger or heat concepts themselves.
While the evidence that conventional expressions are understood via conceptual metaphors
is scant and problematic, there is some evidence that people can spontaneously construct
conceptual mappings to understand novel metaphoric expressions. Noting the
failure of previous studies to unequivocally demonstrate the use of metaphoric mappings
in conventional language comprehension, Keysar et al. (2000) reasoned that the novelty
and explicitness of an expression might ‘‘invite’’ readers to construct such mappings.
For example, people probably don’t need to use the mapping SAD IS DOWN to understand
a conventional expression such as I’m depressed, Lakoff’s (1993) assertion to the
contrary notwithstanding. However, the mapping might well be constructed for a novel
120 M.S. McGlone / Language & Communication 27 (2007) 109–126
utterance such as I’m feeling lower than a piece of gum stuck on the bottom of your boots.
The novelty and humor of the statement invite (and perhaps require) the reader to consider
a metaphoric mapping between emotional state and elevation. To test this possibility,
Keysar et al. presented vignettes to their participants that employed either stock phrases or
novel extensions of a conceptual mapping that was relevant to the meaning of a target
metaphoric sentence. The following vignette uses stock phrases to encourage construction
of the mapping ARGUMENT IS WAR (emphases added):
An argument follows the conduct of war. Stan and Jake argue whenever they get
together. Stan always strikes first, throwing his rival off balance. But Jake keeps his
defenses up and shoots down Stan’s arguments. Sirens wail every time they meet.
In contrast, the version below employs novel ARGUMENT IS WAR expressions:
An argument follows the conduct of war. Stan and Jake argue whenever they get
together. Stan always begins the siege by launching his verbal grenades. But Jake keeps
his barracks fortified and deliverst a defensive strike. Sirens wail every time they meet.
In a reading time task, Keysar et al. found that participants read the target sentence (Sirens
wail every time they meet) faster following the latter than former vignette version.
Since the wording of the stock phrases was no less semantically associated to the target
sentence than the novel expressions, this effect cannot be attributed to simple lexical priming.
Furthermore, both versions begin with a sentence explicitly equating arguments with
war, and so the ostensible applicability of the metaphor to the target passage was made
transparent in both versions. Yet only the version with novel expressions appeared to facilitate
interpretation of the target sentence.
Keysar et al.’s results support a straightforward claim regarding the role of conceptual
metaphors in figurative language comprehension. People can understand stock expressions
such as the argument was shot down without recourse to conceptual mappings like ARGUMENT
IS WAR. Stock expressions appear to be understood in the same way as ‘‘frozen
metaphors’’ such as brake shoe – directly and literally. In contrast, understanding novel
expressions such as Rush Limbaugh’s bloated ego gobbled up his integrity and then used
the airwaves as a toilet might very well involve inferring a conceptual mapping between
arrogance and digestion. If you had previously encountered digestion as a metaphor for
arrogance (which seems unlikely), then you could have retrieved this mapping, in theory,
to understand the expression above. If, on the other hand, you had never encountered this
metaphor previously, you had to create the mapping on the fly. As Bowdle and Gentner
(2005) have suggested, the processes used to understand any particular metaphoric expression
will change as a function of its conventionality. When an expression is completely
novel, it will require different kinds of inferential work than when it is familiar. Thus,
the conceptual metaphor view fails as an account of figurative language comprehension
in part because it does not recognize the important processing differences between conventional
and novel expressions.
4. Conclusions
The CM view has been extremely influential in recent communication research and
theory. This influence has been invaluable in at least two respects. First, it has drawn
much needed scholarly attention to the linguistic codability of abstract concepts
M.S. McGlone / Language & Communication 27 (2007) 109–126 121
(Kovecses, 2000; McGlone, 2001). While philologists (with the notable exception of
Wittgenstein) have traditionally focused on tidy superordinate object concepts like furniture,
fruit, and vegetable, CM theorists are among the few who have explored complex
concepts like anger, love, time, theories, causality, and the like. Perhaps the
scholarly debate over metaphoric representation and process claims will lead to more
research on these topics. Second, the CM view has generated renewed interest in
how language structure might reflect conceptual structure. Although certain episodes
(e.g., early explorations of the Whorfian hypothesis) in the history of this research
problem have been rather disappointing, it clearly warrants further attention (Lucy,
1992; Gumperz and Levinson, 1996).
Its atmospheric influence notwithstanding, the CM view has not fared well theoretically
or empirically. There is an ironic quality to its shortcomings: the view trumpets the importance
of metaphor in human cognition, yet its major flaw is a hyper-literal construal of the
relationship between metaphoric language and thought. Although the linguistic evidence
can support only the limited claim that certain abstract and concrete concepts are thematically
parallel (Jackendoff, 1983; McGlone and Harding, 1998), Lakoff asserts that our
knowledge of abstract concepts is quite literally subsumed by our knowledge of concrete
concepts. A conceptual system arranged in this fashion, however, would seem incapable of
generating propositions about abstract concepts with figurative intent. For example, a
conceptual system whose knowledge of theories was a subset of building knowledge
should assume that theories are not merely metaphoric ‘‘buildings,’’ but literal buildings!
Lacking a concept of theories that is representationally independent from that for buildings,
the system cannot cogitate about theories in and of themselves, and consequently is
incapable of appreciating the literal-metaphorical distinction. This scenario is clearly not a
realistic portrayal of the human conceptual system; nevertheless, it is entirely consistent
with Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) assertion that abstract concepts are parasitic on concrete
concepts.
Literal-mindedness of this sort also underlies the hypothesized role of conceptual metaphors
in figurative language comprehension. Consider the cues that a reader would have
to use to recognize the conceptual metaphor relevant to understanding a linguistic metaphor
encountered in discourse. To recognize that LOVE IS A JOURNEY is the relevant
conceptual metaphor for Our marriage was a rollercoaster ride, the reader must construe
rollercoaster ride as a reference to its literal superordinate category – ‘‘journey.’’ However,
the participants in McGlone’s (1996) paraphrase study did not interpret this metaphoric
use of rollercoaster ride so literally, as evidenced by the paucity of paraphrases that
referred to its journey-oriented properties. Rollercoaster rides’ status as ‘‘journeys’’ is,
for the most part, irrelevant to this metaphor; their status as ‘‘exciting, potentially scary
situations’’ is relevant, and thus the properties of this category figured prominently in participants’
paraphrases. The generalization that follows from this example is that one cannot
identify the ground of a metaphor from the literal, taxonomic category of the
metaphor vehicle (Stern, 2000; Bortfeld and McGlone, 2001). In some cases, interpreting
the vehicle in this way would be bizarre – e.g., My recent trip to L.A. was a rollercoaster
ride. If rollercoaster ride in this statement were to be interpreted as referring simply to
‘‘journey,’’ then one would understand the statement as uninformatively asserting that
the trip in question was a journey! Clearly, no one would interpret the statement in such
an inane manner. Our interpretation of this and other metaphor vehicles is not limited to
their literal category memberships, and more often than not transcends them.
122 M.S. McGlone / Language & Communication 27 (2007) 109–126
Paradoxically, Lakoff couples this hyper-literal model of metaphor understanding to a
hyper-metaphoric construal of literal language. Many expressions that most people would
consider literal are treated by CM theorists as metaphorical. For example, Lakoff (1993)
argues that the statements I have troubles and I’m in trouble reflect the conceptual metaphors
ATTRIBUTES ARE POSSESSIONS and STATES ARE LOCATIONS, respectively:
‘‘In both cases, trouble is being attributed to me, and in both cases, trouble is metaphorically
conceptualized as being in the same place as me (collocation) – in one
case, because I possess the trouble-object and in the other case, because I am in
the trouble-location’’ (p. 225).
An alternative to this metaphoric account of the statements’ meanings is that words like
have and in are polysemous, capable of referring to physical objects and locations as well
as psychological states and attributes. Stern (2000) notes that such expressions lack the element
of semantic incongruity that is typical of expressions that have been traditionally described
as metaphors. For example, the concepts ‘‘love’’ and ‘‘journey’’ are semantically
distinct, even though they share similarities that could conceivably motivate expressions
such as Our love has been an exciting journey. In contrast, ‘‘states’’ and ‘‘locations’’ are
not semantically distinct (i.e., being in a location is literally a type of ‘‘state’’); consequently,
characterizing I’m in trouble as metaphorical is not only odd, but paradoxical.
Metaphorical expressions are assumed to be understood in terms of their constituents’ literal
category memberships, yet our knowledge of these literal categories is assumed to be
metaphorical at some deep level. By blurring the distinction between the literal and metaphorical,
the CM framework becomes incoherent, both as a theory of conceptual structure
and as a model of language understanding.
In drawing these pessimistic conclusions about the notion of a ‘‘conceptual metaphor,’’
I do not intend to deny the importance of metaphor in human communication. To the
contrary, I concur with linguists who treat the trope as the principal device of lexical innovation
(Breal, 1899; Makkai et al., 1995; McGlone et al., 1994). According to this view,
metaphors fill lexical ‘‘gaps’’ in discourse by extending existing words to name novel categories
and concepts. The cognitive processes underlying the creation and interpretation of
these ‘‘innovative metaphors’’ are active and contemplative (McGlone, 1996), not passive
and unconscious (Lakoff and Johnson, 1998). I also do not deny that the conventional figurative
expressions we use to talk about abstract concepts and emotions cluster around
common metaphoric themes like LOVE IS A JOURNEY. The origin of such idioms might
very well derive from contemplation of the figurative schemata CM theorists have
described. However, etymology is not epistemology, nor is the typical speaker a lexicographer.
Thus, I am skeptical when researchers draw inferences about people’s attitudes and
beliefs based solely on the idioms they use to talk about personal experiences. Most of us
harbor no prejudice against the good people of Holland, yet we blithely call a pay-yourown-way
lunch a Dutch treat and a small roasting pot a Dutch oven, unaware that these
expressions originated as ethnic slurs (Feldman, 1990). Analogously, it is presumptuous
to infer that a spouse who confesses that she has ‘‘fallen out of love’’ with her partner
has mentally invoked (let alone embraced) the schema RELATIONSHIPS ARE CONTAINERS.
Evidence independent from the mere occurrence of idioms in conversation
is necessary to demonstrate the conscious or unconscious deployment of a conceptual metaphor.
Although metaphors in discourse sometimes seem to stick out like a sore thumb,
metaphors in the mind are far harder to find.
M.S. McGlone / Language & Communication 27 (2007) 109–126 123
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Matthew S. McGlone (Ph.D., Princeton) is Assistant Professor of Communication Studies at The University of
Texas at Austin. E-mail: matthew_mcglone@mail. utexas.edu.
126 M.S. McGlone / Language & Communication 27 (2007) 109–126