'^"—^^•*^
1
i
JmB*7^•?
i
m
Xenophon. Respublica
Atheniensium
The Old Oligarch; being the
Gonstitution of the Athenians
«i-rjiiif.
OLD OLIGARCH
j the constitution of the
;nians ascribed to xenophon
Translated with an Introduction by
JAMES A. fetch, M.A.
Basil blackwelL
oxford
One Shilling and Sixpence net
fM
THE OLD OLIGARCH
THE OLD OLIGARCH
BEING THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
ATHENIANS ASCRIBED TO XENOPHON
Translated with an Introduction by
JAMES A. FETCH, M.A.
BASIL BLACKWELL
OXFORD
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
University of Toronto
http://www.archive.org/details/oldoligarchbeingOOxeno
INTRODUCTION
The Constitntion of the Athenians ascribed to Xenophon
in antiquity furnishes certain internal evidence for determining
the date of its composition. The tenour of the
whole work, and particularly of c. II, makes it evident that
it was composed at a time when the Athenian naval power
was at its height. That it belongs to the period of the
First Athenian Empire may be inferred from the use of
the word for the contribution of the allies, and
from the statement that the allies had to come to Athens
for legal business. Thus the work is anterior to the Peace
of Lysander (404 B.C.). Further no mention is made of
the Sicilian Expedition of 415-3, mention of which would
almost certainly have been made in any account, whether
friendly or hostile, of the Athenian democracy, if such
account were consequent to that grandiose failure ; indeed
c. 11, 5 could hardly have been written after that event if
the writer made any claim to exactitude. It has been
argued that the date may be placed still earlier ; thus
Roscher argued that c. II, 5 must have been written before
the expedition of Brasidas in 424. Further it has been
held that c. II, 18 can be applicable only to the interval
between the production of the Babylonians of Aristophanes
in 426 and that of the Knights two years later, but this is
not at all certain, for the whole of the passage concerned
breathes of partizan exaggeration. The passage taken by
Rosclier as fixing the terminus ante (c. II, 5) also suggests
a possible terminus post, for the Aetolian expedition of
8 THE OLD OLIGARCH
Demosthenes in 426 was a gross enough failure to point to
the conclusion that '
the land power cannot undertake a
march of many days away from their own country,' the
expedition of Brasidas sufficiently successful to suggest
that this work may have been written before that event.
^
While therefore it may be taken as almost certain that it
was composed before the failure of the Sicilian Expedition,
there is only probability to support the closer dating to the
period 426-4.
The problem of authorship is even more obscure.
If this document were, as tradition asserts, a composition
of Xenophon, he must have written it before he was
eighteen years of age at the most, for he was born in 430
B.C. ; but the style, the language and the political experience
revealed allow the definite assertion that the tradition
is wrong. Who then was the author? There have been
more claimants than one suggested, the most favoured
perhaps being Alcibiades and Critias. According to
Xenophon *
Critias was most deeply imbued with hatred
of the commons '.^ The moderate attitude taken up in
the first paragraph of the Constitution suggests that it
might well be a criticism of Critias' strictures. As for
Alcibiades, would he even in 426-4 have written c. II, 20?
Attempts to fasten the work upon some name or other are
unavailing. Of the identity of the author we know no more
than we know of the chances which caused the work to
be included among the writings of Xenophon ; of the
1 Although Thucydides (iv, 78, 2-5) shows that Brasidas did win
his way through Thessaly by conciliatory methods, this perhaps ought
not to bo stressed, tliough it does suggest the advisability of not attempting
to limit the date too definitely.
2 Hrll. TT. 3, 47.
INtRODUCTION 9
author's personality, beliefs and ability something can be
gathered.
It is clear from the very first that we have to deal with
one who is no democrat (c. I, i), and the admission of
adherence to the anti-democratic cause is repeatedly reinforced
by the nature of his references to his political opponents
and friends {e.g., c. I, 5). Hence the name of *
The
Old Oligarch,' with which title our ignorance of the identity
of the author has to be content. That the Did Oligarch
was an Athenian citizen seems to be probable from the
use of *
we '
in c. I, 12, and though certainty is precluded
on this point by the curious confusion of persons in
c. 1, II, the full acquaintance of the writer with the Athenian
constitution may support the conclusion. C. II, 7-8
and 11-12 have been taken as proof that the Old Oligarch
was a merchant, and while once again it is doubtful if much
stress can be laid upon *
my '
(c. II, 11), which may be
merely rhetorical, the inference may gain support from the
mercantile and geographical knowledge displayed in these
passages, though it is difficult to point out anything in them
which an ordinarily intelligent Athenian might not have
thought out for himself. That he was absent from Athens
when he wrote has been inferred from his frequent use
of ,*
there,' and from his references to the Athenians
and to the oligarchs in the third person, but here again it
has been suggested that these latter uses would be explained
if this is an oration delivered to a political club in
session at Athens, under which circumstances such an
orientation would not be irrational.
The style of the Old Oligarch is uneven, frequently
involved and obscure, more rarely forceful, incisive and
THE OLD OLIGARCH
sarcastic. Questions of style however, save in so far as
they might bear upon the question of authorship, are of
little interest beside the contents of the treatise. Here a
word of warning is imperative. At first sight it might
seem that, damning with feigned praise, the Old Oligarch
throws into the highest relief all the shortcomings and
excesses of the Athenian democracy. *
The City Beautiful
'
is, it might be thought, brushed aside after providing an
opportunity for a sneer at the grasping commons. Thus
instead of seeing in Athens the School of Greece, the Old
Oligarch would expose her as the home of litigation and
sheer self-seeking, the city of men with muck-rakes. The
modern reader may be shocked by the callousness imputed
to the Athenian democracy in its endeavours to achieve
the welfare and the prosperity of the commons. There is
nothing here of abstract Justice, Truth and Equity;
Liberty would be the opportunity to do ill, Equality the
partizan sharing of the fruits of tyrannic power. Fraternity
the pampering of slaves and aliens for the material benefit
of the citizens. But it will be obvious that to read such a
meaning into the Old Oligarch would be to view him in the
light at least of the ideals of modern politics. The Melians,
according to Thucydides,^ were bidden by the Athenians 'to
let right alone and talk only of interest '
;
just so the Old
Oligarch discusses not the morality but the expediency of
the policy of the Athenian democracy.
The answer of the democrats must be looked for elsewhere.
Herodotus^ had already mentioned briefly some of
the charges brought against democracy—love of slander
^ V, 90 (trs. Crawley).
^ III, 80-2.
INTRODUCTION 1
1
and tale-bearing, ignorance, and the immunity ai¥orded to
crime—and provided an equally brief defence, but passages
in Thucydides suggest arguments which the democratic
contemporaries of the Old Oligarch might have employed
in answering such criticisms as are to be found in him,
even if they did not actually do so ; thus there is the justification
of the judicial system of the empire,^ even the
justification of the number of feasts observed at Athens,*^
while the Funeral Oration of Pericles' presents the ideal
view of democracy. Such complementary passages however
are not numerous or individual enough to prove that
the Old Oligarch and Thucydides were acquainted either
personally or through their respective writings, and that
in such passages there is a conscious reference by one
writer to the other. In modern times Grote, among many
others, has openly contested the verdicts of the Old
Oligarch ; thus with reference to the Athenian courts he
concludes that 'All the encomiums which it is customary to
pronounce upon jury-trial, will be found predicable of the
Athenian dikasteries in a still greater degree : all the reproaches,
which can be addressed on good ground to the
dikasteries, will apply to modern juries also, though in a
less degree. "*
Mention has already been made of Kalinka's suggestion
that this work is part of a discussion which took place
before one of the oligarchical clubs which at the end of the
^ I» n. i-S•
• II, 38.
' II, 35-46.
8 History of Greece, V, pp. 517-8; cf. VI, 51 seq. For his criticism
of the charge of judicial corruption, vide V, 510, note.
12 THE OLD OLIGARCH
fifth century were of growing importance in Athens. This
is the extempore answer, it is suggested, to a previous
attack by an ardent hater of the Athenian democracy. He
who made the answer took as his objective the demonstration
that after all, however hateful democracy might be
to the oligarchs, in its Athenian form it was efficient for
certain ends. Such a suggestion would explain in some
measure the incompleteness, the lack of close reasoning
and the tendency to wander from the point that some critics
have thought to find. It surely must however be remembered
that there is no reason to suppose that Greek politicians
were any less averse to the strictly unnecessary or
more confined by the strictly relevant than are modern politicians.
Political tracts, addresses, expressions of political
thought in general are not to-day conspicuously coherent,
logical or well pondered. What is sought is a means to
enflame for the moment, not a work of reference for perpetuity.
In spite therefore of these common criticisms
of the Old Oligarch, the charge of incompleteness even
having led to the assumption that there must be several
extensive lacunae in the received text in which originally
such questions as state pay were more adequately dealt
with, there seems to be little that one could legitimately
demand in *
completion '
of the work when its aim as laid
down in the first section is borne in mind. The Old Oligarch
makes out a fair case for his original point and that must
suffice. His Constitution is manifestly not the work of an
Aristotle. Further at no place is there anything like a
complete break in thought. It is easy to err in considering
such a work by entertaining too great expectations. Whoever
the author was, he is not to be compared with his con-
INTRODUCTION 13
temporary Thucydides or with his predecessor Herodotus.
What would be faulty in a Thucydides must be allowed to
lesser men than he. Through some chance we have from
the past this partizan, contentiously political document,
whether it be debating speech or political pamphlet. As
such it is foolish to expect too much from it. Once but
little is expected its real worth and interest will be
apparent, for it '
affords us a refreshing and direct glimpse
of the life of Athens at that period and of the activity of
her domestic and foreign politics.' Indeed Murray de•
scribes the document as *
priceless,' and remarks that '
If
only we had a hundred pages of such matter as this instead
of thirteen, our understanding of Athenian history would
be a more concrete thing than it is.'
For the most part the Old Oligarch > speaks of *
the
people,' '
the commons,' but rarely of '
the popular party
'
or *
the democrats.' On the other hand his term for his
own party, ol ,which, as well as meaning *
my
friends,' signifies goodness or usefulness from the conservative
standpoint, may be misleading unless it is remembered
that the 'goodness' of these 'good citizens,' like
the excellence of the *
best element,' was as controversial as
might be the '
liberality '
of modern Liberals. It is hardly
likely that the democrats ever adopted as a party name
the title '
rascals,' 01 ,and so anticipated the Whigs
of our own history. Out of a too literal interpretation of
political epithets would arise hopeless misunderstanding.
The best edition is that of Kalinka,® to which the translator
is deeply indebted. The more recent monograph of
9 Die pseiidoxcnophontischeAQHN.;Kalinka ; Teubner
(191 3). (Full bibliography, pp. 1-4).
14 THE OLD OLIGARCH
StaiU** may also be mentioned. More general discussion
and comment will be found in Croiset : Histoire de la Litterature
Grecque (HI, p. 349, note) ; Murray : History of
Ancient Greek Literature (pp. 167-9) j Richards : Xenophon
and Others (c. VI, especially pp. 61-3) ; Bury : History of
Greece (p. 427) ; Holm : History of Greece (II, p. 439 ; Eng.
Trs., 1894). The text followed in the translation is,
except where otherwise stated, that of Marchant,^^ italics
being employed where the Greek text is corrupt and emendations
uncertain.
1" Uber die pseudoxenophontische ; Stall,
Rhetorische Sludien 9 Heft ; Paderborn (1921).
^^ Xenophoniis Opera Omnia; torn. V, Opnscula ; Marchant ; Ox-
ford.
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
ATHENIANS
CHAPTER I
(i) As for the constitution of the Athenians, their choice
of this type of constitution I do not approve, for in choosing
thus they chose that rascals should fare better than
good citizens. This then is why I do not approve. However
this being their decision, I shall show how well they
preserve their constitution, and how well otherwise they
are acting where the rest of Greece thinks that they are
going wrong.
(2) First of all then I shall say that at Athens the poor
and the commons seem justly to have the advantage
over the well-born and the wealthy ; for it is the commons
which mans the fleet and has brought the state her
power, and the steersmen and the boatswains and the shipmasters
and the lookout-men and the ship-builders—these
have brought the state her power much rather than the
infantry and the well-born and the good citizens. This
being so it seems just that all should have a share in
offices filled by lot or by election, and that any citizen who
wishes should be allowed to speak. (3) Then in those
offices which bring security to the whole commons if they
are in the hands of good citizens, but if not ruin, the
commons desires to have no share. They do not think
that they ought to have a share through the lot in the
supreme commands or in the cavalry commands, for the
i6 THE OLD OLIGARCH
commons realises that it reaps greater benefit by not having•
these offices in its own hands, but by allowing• men of
standing to hold them. All those offices however whose
end is pay and family benefits the commons does seek to
hold. (4) Secondly some folk are surprised that everywhere
they give the advantage to rascals, the poor and
the democrats rather than to good citizens. This is just
where they will be seen to be preserving the democracy.
For if the poor and the common folk and the worse elements
are treated well, the growth of these classes will exalt
the democracy ; whereas if the rich and the good citizens
are treated well the democrats strengthen their own
opponents. (5) In every land the best element is opposed
to democracy. Among the best elements there is very
little license and injustice, very great discrimination as to
what is worthy, while among the commons there is very
great ignorance, disorderliness and rascality ; for poverty
tends to lead them to what is disgraceful, as does lack of
education and the ignorance which befalls some men as a
result of lack of means. (6) It may be said that they
ought not to have allowed everyone in turn to make
speeches or sit on the Council, but only those of the highest
capability and quality. But in allowing even rascals to
speak they are also very well advised. For if the good
citizens made speeches and joined in deliberations, good
would result to those like themselves and ill to the democrats.
As it is anyone who wants, a rascally fellow maybe,
gets up and makes a speech, and devises what is to
the advantage of himself and those like him. (7) Someone
may ask how such a fellow would know what is tc
the advantage of himself or the commons. They know
THE OLD OLIGARCH 17
that this man's ignorance, rascality and goodwill are more
beneficial than the good citizen's worth, wisdom and illwill.
(8) From such procedure then a city would not
attain the ideal, but the democracy would be best preserved
thus. For it is the wish of the commons not that
the state should be well ordered and the" commons itself
in complete subjection, but that the commons should have
its freedom and be in control ; disorderliness is of little consequence
to it. From what you consider lack of order
come the strength and the liberty of the commons itself.
(9) If on the other hand you investigate good order,
first of all you will see that the most capable make laws
for them ; then the good citizens will keep the rascals in
check and will deliberate on matters of state, refusing
to allow madmen to sit on the Council or make speeches
or attend the general assemblies. Such advantages indeed
would very soon throw the commons into complete sub-
jection.
(10) The license allowed to slaves and aliens at Athens
is extreme and a blow is forbidden there, nor will a slave
make way for you. I shall tell you why this is the custom
of the country. If it were legal for a slave or an alien
or a freedman to be beaten by a freeman, you would often
have taken the Athenian for a slave and struck him ; for
the commons there does not dress better than the slaves
and the aliens, and their general appearance is in no way
superior. (11) If anyone is surprised also at their allowing
slaves, that is some of them, to live luxuriously and
magnificently there, here too they would be seen to act
with wisdom. In a naval state slaves must serve for hire,
that we may receive the fee for their labour, and we must
i8 THE OLD OLIGARCH
let them go free.^- Where there are rich slaves it is no
longer profitable that my slave should be afraid of you.
In Sparta my slave is afraid of you. If your slave is afraid
of me there will be a danger even of his giving his own
money to avoid personal risks. (12) This then is why
we placed even slaves on a footing of equality with free
men ; and we placed aliens on a footing of equality with
citizens because the state has need of aliens owing to the
number of skilled trades and because of the fleet. For this
reason then we were right to place even the aliens on a
footing of equality.
(13) The commons has put down those who make a practice
of athletics and music there. It considers this unseemly,
realising that it is unable to practise these pursuits. On
the other hand in the provision of dramatic choruses, the
superintendence of athletics and the command of ships of
the line, they know that it is the rich who provide choruses
while the commons is supplied with men to provide the
choruses, that it is the rich who superintend athletics and
command ships of the line, while the commons is supplied
with men to command and superintend. At any rate the
commons demands pay for singing, running, dancing and
voyaging, in order that its wealth may increase and the rich
become less rich. In the law-courts they do not pay more
heed to justice than to their own gain.
(14) As for the allies, that the Athenians leave home and,
as it is thought, bring false accusations against the good
citizens and hate them—they know that the ruler cannot
help but be hated by the ruled, and that if the rich and
12 Perhaps : ' In a naval state men must for financial reasons ht
slaves to their slaves , , , and Jet them (^n free,'
THE OLD OLIGARCH 19
the good citizens in the various cities have control the rule
of the commons at Athens will be very short-lived. This
then is why they disfranchise the good citizens, rob them
of their wealth, drive them into exile, or put them to death,
while they exalt the rascals. The good citizens of Athens
protect the good citizens in the allied cities, realizing that
it is to their own advantage always to protect the best
elements in the various cities. (15) It might be suggested
that the ability of the allies to pay tribute is the strength
of Athens. The democrats think it more advantageous
that each individual Athenian should possess the wealth of
the allies and the allies only enough to live on, and continue
working without having the power to conspire.
(16) The commons of Athens is also thought to be illadvised
in compelling the allies to travel to Athens to have
their law-suits tried. They meet this criticism by reckoning
up all the benefits to the Athenian commons that this
involves : first of all the receipt of pay out of the court
fees all the year round ; then while remaining at home
without sending out ships they manage the allied cities,
and protect the party of the commons while they ruin their
opponents in the courts. If each of the allies tried their
law-suits at home, out of hatred for Athenians they would
have destroyed those of their own people most friendly to
the Athenian commons. (17) In addition the commons of
Athens gains the following advantages from having the
allied law-suits tried at Athens. First the five per cent,
duty levied at the Peiraeus brings more in to the state
;
(18) next anyone who has a lodging-house is more prosperous,
and so is the man who has a couple of hacks or a
slave for hire ; then the heralds are more prosperous as a
20 THE OLD OLIGARCH
result of the visits of the alHes. Above all this if the
allies did not come to Athens for their law-suits they would
honour only those Athenians who leave home—the
generals, the naval commanders and envoys. As it is all the
allies individually must fawn upon the Athenian commons,
realizing that they must come to Athens and appear as
defendant or prosecutor before the commons and the commons
alone, for that forsooth is the law at Athens ; and in
the law-courts they must make supplications and grasp
so-and-so by the hand as he enters. This then is why the
allies are rather in the position of slaves of the Athenian
commons.
(19) Moreover owing to their over-seas possessions and
appointments they have unconsciously learned to row,
their attendants too. For on a voyage master and man
must often take an oar and learn the nautical terms.
(20) They become good steersmen by experience of boats
and by practise. Some get practise by steering a
boat, others by steering a merchant-man, and some go on
to command ships of the line. The mob however can
go on board and at once set about rowing, for they have
spent all their previous life in practise.
CHAPTER 11
() The situation with regard to their infantry, which is
at Athens thought to be least favourably situated of all,
is that they think themselves inferior to their enemies
and less than them in numbers, but to the allies who
bring in the tribute they are superior on land, and they
consider the infantry sufficient if they have the upper hand
of them. (2) Moreover chance has brought about a state
of affairs somewhat as follows. Subjects of a land power
can form a union of small cities and fight together as
one, whereas such subjects of a naval power as are
islanders cannot unite their cities in one, for the sea lies
between and their masters have command of it. Even if
the islanders can come together secretly on one island,
they will be starved out. (3) Of such mainland states as
are subject to Athenian rule the large are in subjection
because of fear, the small simply because of need ;
there is not a city which does not require both import and
export trade, and it will not have that unless it is subject
to the rulers of the sea. (4) Secondly a sea power can
always^^ do what a land power can do occasionally—that
is ravage the territory of a more powerful state. It is
possible for him to coast along wherever there are few or no
enemy troops and if they approach sail off in his ship ; such
tactics cause less inconvenience to him than to the man who
marches up a force on foot. (5) Again the sea power
can sail away as far as you like from their own land,
13 Lange inserts '
always '
as seems to be required.
22 THE OLD OLIGARCH
whereas the land power cannot undertake a march of many
days away from their own country ; for marching is slow,
and a man on foot cannot carry provisions for a long
period. He who marches on foot must march through
friendly country or win a way with the sword, whereas
the man aboard ship can disembark where he has the
superior force, and where he has not can refrain from disembarking
at this point, and sail along until he comes to
friendly country or meets with forces inferior to his own.
(6) Again the strongest land power is hard hit by the
blighted crops which are of God, but not so the sea power.
All countries do not suffer from blight simultaneously, so
that to those who rule the sea come imports from the
country with healthy crops.
(7) If there is any need to mention less important facts
too, command of the sea and contact with the different
people of different countries were the first means of introducing
luxurious ways of living. The delicacies of Sicily,
Italy, Cyprus, Egypt, Lydia, Pontus, the Peloponnese, in
fact of any country, all converge upon one point as a
result of the command of the sea. (8) Then hearing every
tongue they adopted a phrase from this tongue and a
phrase from that. The Greeks as a whole enjoy a language,
a way of life and a general appearance which is rather
their own, the Athenians a hotch-potch of those of all the
Greeks and foreigners.
(9) Sacrifices, temples, feasts and sacred inclosures too
—the commons realises that every poor man is not able
individually to offer sacrifices, give feasts, found temples,
and live in a city which is beautiful and great, so it has
devised a way of attaining this. The state sacrifices many
THE OLD OLIGARCH 23
victims at tlie public charge, but it is the commons which
partakes of the feasts and divides up the victims. (10) So
with sports-grounds, baths and changing-rooms, some rich
men have their own, but the commons gets many athletic
grounds, changing-rooms and baths built for itself on its
own account, and the rabble gets more enjoyment from
these than do the few well-to-do.
(11) They alone can possess the wealth of Greeks and
foreigners. If a city is rich in ship-building timber where
will it dispose of it unless it win the consent of the ruler
of the sea ? What if some city is rich in iron or bronze or
cloth? Where will it dispose of it unless it win the
consent of the ruler of the sea? These however are just
the very things of which my ships are made—somebody's
wood, somebody's iron, somebody's bronze, somebody's
cloth and somebody's wax. (12) Moreover they will not
our rivals to take their goods elsewhere or (if they
try) they will not use the sea. I pass my time in idleness,
and because of the sea I have all these products of
the earth, whereas no other single city has two of these
commodities ; the same city does not possess both timber
and cloth, but where cloth is plentiful the country is flat
and treeless, nor do bronze and iron come from the same
city, nor does one city possess two or three of the other
commodities, but one has one, another has another.
(13) Once more along every coastline there is either a
projecting headland or an island off the shore, or some
strait or other. Thus those who have command of
the sea can lie off there and ravage those who dwell on .
the mainland. (14) They lack one advantage. If the
Athenians lived on an island and held command of the
24 THE OLD OLIGARCH
sea, they would have had the power to inflict loss if they
wished without suffering any themselves so long as they
ruled the sea, either the ravaging of their land or the
waiting for invasion. As it is the farmers and the rich
Athenians cringe somewhat before the enemy, whereas
the commons, knowing well enough that the enemy will not
burn or ravage anything of theirs, lives without fear and
without cringing to them. (15) In addition there is a
second ground for fear from which they would have been
free had they lived on an island, the fear that the city
would ever be betrayed by a minority or the gates opened
or the enemy gain a footing. For how would this come
about if they lived on an island? There would be no fear
of a rising against the commons if they lived on an island.
At present a rising would be based upon the hope of being
able to invite the enemy in by land, but if they lived on an
island there would be no grounds for fear in this respect
either. (16) As therefore they did not originally happen
to settle on an island, what they do is to lay up their
wealth in the islands, trusting in their sea power, while
they put up with the ravaging of Attica, knowing that if
they take pity on her they will lose other greater advan-
tages.
(17) Again oligarchical states must abide by their
alliances and their oaths. If they do not keep to the agreement
penalties can be exacted from the few who made it.
But whenever the commons makes an agreement it can
lay the blame on the individual speaker or proposer, and
say to the other party that it was not present and does
not approve what they know was agreed upon in full
assembly ; and should it be decided that this is not so, the
THE OLD OLIGARCH 25
commons has discovered a hundred excuses for not doing
what they may not wish to do. If any ill result from a
decision of the commons it lays the blame on a minority
for opposing• and working its ruin, whereas if any good
results they take the credit to themselves.
(18) They do not allow caricature and abuse of the
commons, lest they should hear themselves evilly spoken
of, but they do allow you to caricature any individual
you wish to. They well know that generally the man who
is caricatured is not of the commons or of the crowd, but
someone rich or well-born or influential, and that few of the
poor and democrats are caricatured, and they only because
they are busy-bodies and try to over-reacTi the commons ;
so they are not angry when such men are caricatured either.
(19) I say then that the commons at Athens realizes which
citizens are g^ood citizens and which rascals. With this
knowledge they favour those who are friendly and useful
to them, even if they are rascals, whereas they hate rather
the good citizens. For they do not believe that their worth
exists for the good but for the ill of the commons. Conversely
certain men who in fact belong to the commons
are not democratic by nature. (20) I pardon the commons
itself its democracy, for it is pardonable that everyone
should seek his own interest. But the man who is not
of the commons yet chose to live in a democratic rather
than in an oligarchical state sought opportunity for wrongdoing,
and realized that it was more possible for his
wickness to go unnoticed in a democratic state than in an
oligarchical.
CHAPTER III
(i) The type of the constitution of the Athenians I do
not approve, but as they saw fit to be a democracy in my
opinion they preserve their democracy well by employing"
the means I have pointed out.
Further I notice that certain folk blame the Athenians
because sometimes there the Council or the commons cannot
deal with a man, though he waits about for a year.
(2) This happens at Athens simply because they are unable
owing to the multitude of their activities to deal with and
dismiss everybody. How could they do so, seeing that
first of all they have to celebrate more feasts than any other
Greek state, and in the course of these feasts it is less
possible to get state business through ? Secondly they
have to decide more private and public law-suits and official
scrutinies than all the rest of the world together, and the
Council has to deliberate on much relating to war, revenue,
legislation, contemporary happenings at home and among
the allies ; it has also to receive the tribute and look after
the dock-yards and the temples. Is it then to be wondered
at that with so much on hand they are unable to
deal with everyone? (3) It is said that if you approach
the Council or the commons with a bribe your business
will be dealt with. I would agree that much is got through
at Athens by means of bribery, and that still more would
be got through if still more people gave bribes. This
hov^'ever I am sure of, that the state is not capable of getting
through everybody's business when so much is needed,
even if you were to give them iuiy amount of gold and
THE OLD OLIGARCH 27
silver. (4) Furthermore judgments must be given if anyone
does not equip his ship, or if someone builds upon
public land ; there must be judgments upon appeals by
patrons of choruses for the Dionysia, the Thargelia, the
Panathenaia, the Promethia and the Hephaestia every
year ; four hundred naval commanders are appointed
annually, and every year judgments must be given on
appeals lodged by any of them. In addition to this there
must be preliminary and final scrutinies of the magistrates,
there is the examination of orphans and the appointment
of the custodians of prisoners. (5) This is annual business.
From time to time there must be decisions about military
service, or if any unlooked for crime is committed, whether
of unprecedented outrage or impiety. I pass over much,
but the most important duties have been mentioned except
the assessment of tribute. This generally takes place
every four years. Well then must we not suppose that
they ought to judge upon all these cases ? (6) Let any man
mention any case they ought not to judge upon there.
If we must agree that they ought not to give all these judgments
it must be done in the course of a year. Even now,
when the courts sit throughout the year, they do not suffice
to suppress crime because of the size of the population.
(7) Well then, you will argue, they ought to give judgment
but employ smaller juries. They must surely, unless
they have few courts, have small juries in each. As a
result it will be easy to trick the small jury and bribe them
to give much less just decisions. (8) Moreover you must
remember that the Athenians have to hold festivals also,
in the course of which the courts cannot sit. They hold
twice as many festivals as the rest of the world, but I
28 THE OLD OLIGARCH
consider them as equal to those of the city which holds
the fewest.
This then being• how matters stand, I maintain that the
state of things at Athens cannot be otherwise than it is at
present, unless it is possible in some small way to take
away this and add that. It is not possible to make many
alterations without robbing the democracy of power.
(9) It is possible to devise many ways of improving the
constitution, but to leave the denfiocracy in existence and
yet devise adequate ways of introducing better government
is not easy, unless, as I said just now, it is by way of
some small additions or subtractions.
(10) The Athenians are also thought^* to be ill advised
because they take sides with the worse elements in cities
divided by faction. They do this with good reason. If they
sided with the better elements they would not side with
those who hold the same opinions as themselves, for in no
city is the better element well inclined to the commons,
but in each the worse element is well inclined to the commons
; like favours like. This then is why the Athenians
side with the elements akin to themselves. (11) As often
as they attempted to side with the best it has brought them
no profit : within a short time the Boeotian commons was
in slavery, and again when they sided with the best at
Miletus within a short time the latter broke away and
massacred the commons. Then too when they sided with
the Lacedaemonians against the Messenians within a short
time the Lacedaemonians reduced the latter, and were at
war with Athens.
14 The MSS. are obviously wrong in giving '
/ think that the
Athenian'! are ill advi^'sed , , . etc,'
THE OLD OLIGARCH ig
(12) It might be imagined that no one at all has been
disfranchised at Athens unjustly. I maintain that there are
those who have been unjustly disfranchised ; however they
are but few. (13) But it needs not a few to attack the
democracy at Athens, the fact being that it is not those
who have been disfranchised justly who care, but those who
may have suffered unjustly. How then could anyone think
that at Athens the majority have been disfranchised unjustly
where it is the commons which holds office? Unjust
administration, unjust speaking, unjust action are the
causes of disfranchisement at Athens. Considering this
it must not be imagined that there is anything to fear from
the disfranchised at Athens.
ClxONiAN PRESS, OXtOREJ.
PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE
CARDS OR SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY
LGr Xenophon• Respublica
'A^^xe Atheniensium
.Epe The Old Oligarch; being the
Constitution of the Athenians;
tr. with an introduction byJames
A, Fetch