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TURGUT ÖZAL PERIOD IN TURKISH FOREIGN
POLICY: ÖZALISM
Sedat LAÇøNER
‘People are not the servants of the state, but the state must
be servant of the people.’
Turgut Özal, 1993
‘‘The next century will be a Turkish century.’
Turgut Özal, 1992
‘Turkey cannot be prisoner of the Misak-i Milli (National Pact) borders.’
Turgut Özal, 1992
Abstract
This study examines the factors underlying the Özalist approach, such
as Özal’s personality, the 1980 coup and the isolation of Turkey, the
economic boom, change in the socio-economic structure, globalisation of
the Turkish economy and finally Kurdish separatism. A special emphasis
will be laid on the ideological background of Özalist foreign policy, with a
view to demonstrating the close relationship between Özal’s Ottomanist
foreign policy and his domestic approach and its translation to foreign
policy.
Keywords: Turgut Özal, Turkish Foreign Policy, Ideology, Kemalizm,
EU, Turkey
RETURN OF KEMALISM AS IDEOLOGY AND THE
COUP AS PRELUDE OF ÖZAL POWER
The developments of the 1970s literally invited the third military coup.
After the terror and years of instability, the army intervened yet again on
12 September 1980 with four distinct aims in mind: to suppress terrorism
and radicalism; to restore economic growth and stability; to introduce a
new constitution and legal arrangements that would stabilise the system
and prevent anarchy; to re-establish civilian democracy on a Kemalist
785*87 g=$/ 3(5,2' ,1 785.,6+ )25(,*1 32/,&<
basis.1
In other words, in line with previous take-overs, the 1980 coup was
not envisaged as a permanent military regime but aimed at the eventual
restoration of civilian parliamentary rule once the army had put the
government’s house in order.2
The Army was not against the democratic
political system but its results. Were the political system to be truly
Kemalist, the army would not intervene in its affairs any more. Indeed, the
constitution and other laws defined the army as the ‘guardian of the
regime’; however the rules had been re-written by the military leaders in
1960 and 1971. Similar to previous take-overs, General Kenan Evren
declared that the 1980 coup had been carried out in accordance with
Article 34 of the military by-law, charging the army with the defence of the
Republic, the Kemalist regime and unity. Hence it is arguable that the
Turkish military intervention was fundamentally different from the Latin
American and indeed most Third World coups since the Turkish Army has
been legalist and based its acts on the ‘law’.
Having suppressed the internal anarchy and terror, one of the first acts
of the military rulers was to revive the Kemalist doctrine.3
For the army,
left and right-wing ideologies were alien to the Turkish people, responsible
for the 1970s’ catastrophe. Only Kemalism (Atatürkçülük)4
was a suitable
ideology for Turkey that could foster national unity. Accordingly, a
massive Kemalist campaign was launched: Kemalist books were
published; 1981 was named the ‘Atatürk Year’ and new institutions were
established or financially supported to boost Kemalism in society. Streets,
roads and buildings were re-named after Atatürk. The various institutions
were consolidated in one central Supreme Atatürk Society. Kemalism had
been restored as the state ideology while all others were swept away from
power. Yet the 1980 Coup’s Kemalism was very different from previous
versions of Kemalism. It was a neutral and pragmatic ideology lacking
unchangeable principles, instead arguing that what was good for the
Turkish nation was good for Kemalism. Secondly, this new Kemalism,
contrary to ønönü’s autocracy, was loyal to democracy. Third, unlike
Ecevit’s Kemalism, it was pro-Western and pro-American. For Evren, the
coup leader, the United States was the most important ally and the Soviet
Union still posed the greatest threat to Turkish security.5
Finally, this
1
William Hale, ‘Transition to Civilian Governments in Turkey: The Military
Perspective’, in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (eds.), State, Democracy and the
Military, Turkey in the 1980s, (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), p.
166.
2
Karpat, ‘Military’, p. 149.
3
For the military’s Kemalism see: Kenan Evren, ‘Atatürk Yılı Açılıú Konuúması’, in
Kemalizm ve Türkiye (Kemalism and Turkey), 6, 52, January 1981, pp. 5-8.
4
12 Eylul 1980 Coup leaders used ‘Atatürkcülük’ term instead of Kemalism. It can be
argued that they thought ‘Kemalism’ remind leftism, not Mustafa Kemal’s ideology.
5
Milliyet, 23 October 1984, Tercüman, 21 October 1984.
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Kemalism was capitalist in orientation viewing Turkey’s future in the
capitalist rather than socialist world.
The thing the generals understood least of all was the economy, and
without economic success the coup could not be successful. Therefore,
when Bülent Ulusu formed the first government, the Turkish National
Security Council (NSC) announced that it would retain Turgut Özal,
having been the spirit behind the last Demirel government’s liberal
economic reforms, as Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs. In
1981 inflation dropped, exports increased rapidly, the GDP increased by
4.5 %. Tourism revenues and Turkish construction activities abroad
increased dramatically. As a result the current account deficit was sharply
reduced.6
Özal’s and the army’s liberal policies showed them as closer to
the capitalist world and more conservative than previous Kemalist military
take-overs. In other words, the 1980 coup was a conservative-capitalist
interpretation of Kemalism. Secondly, thanks to the government’s success
in the economy and the suppression of terrorism, the NSC gained credit
before the people and continued its reforms. The military restored the
regime’s ideology of Kemalism; restored the economic system as a free
capital market, yet the political structure remained unsettled. Some
generals like Nurettin Ersin viewed this as proof that ‘Our social structure
is not suitable for an advance and open democracy. We need an autocratic
administration.’7
However, the dominant opinion among the generals was
that the civilian rule should be restored. American and European pressure
gave further impetus to this view.8
The NSC was ready to do that, yet
before handing over power it wanted to guarantee its favoured political
structure. In the autumn of 1982 the constitution, written by the military
and its favoured academics, was put to a national referendum. With the
referendum, Kenan Evren became the President and the NSC gained
extraordinary powers over government and parliament. As one of its first
move, the NSC banned all political activities. It did not initially abolish the
two major political parties (RPP and JP) or arrest deputies, but a few party
leaders were temporarily detained and some deputies associated with
radical groups and Kurdish separatists were taken into custody.9
However
6
Ahmet Kılıçbay, Türk Ekonomisi, Modeller, Politikalar, Stratejiler, (Turkish
Economy, Models, Policies, Strategies), (Ankara: Türkiye øú Bankası, 1991); Jeffry
D. Lewis and Shujiro Urata, Turkey: Recent Economic Performance and Mediumterm
Prospects, 1978-1990, (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Working papers, No.
602, 1983).
7
Cüneyt Arcayürek, Demokrasi Dur, 12 Eylül 1980, (Democracy Stops, 12
September 1980), (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1990), p. 150.
8
Ihsan D. Dagi, ‘Democratic Transition in Turkey, 1980-1983: The Impact of
European Diplomacy’, in Sylvia Kedourie (ed.), Turkey, Identity, Democracy,
Politics, (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. 124-141.
9
Kemal H. Karpat, ‘Military Interventions: Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey before
and After 1980’, in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (eds.), State, Democracy and the
Military, (Berlin: Walter de Gryter, 1988), p. 153.
785*87 g=$/ 3(5,2' ,1 785.,6+ )25(,*1 32/,&<
in a short time the NSC understood that it could not reshape the Turkish
political system with the old parties, abolished the two and banned all old
political leaders from re-entering politics. Evren and his friends did not
want to repeat the DP case, where the banned parties had re-established
themselves under different names after the 1960s and 1970s coups against
the DP. According to the new rules, the chairmen, general secretaries and
all other senior office holders in the former political parties could not join
or have ‘any kind of relations’ with future political parties, or run for
election (even as independent) for the next ten years.10
Moreover, the new
constitution forbade political organisations based on religion, a religious
sect, regional considerations or Marxism. Having banned the old
politicians and ideologies, the NSC encouraged new names. Before the
elections the moderate right-wings Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi
(Nationalist Democracy Party, NDP) and the moderate left Halkçi Parti
(Populist Party, PP) were established. The leader of the NDP was a former
general and Evren had implied that this party was the army’s choice. The
NSC hoped that with these moderate and Kemalist right and a left party a
permanent democratic system could be established, and it was sure for the
victory of NDP. When Özal, as a prestigious bureaucrat, formed a new
party - Anavatan Partisi or ANAP (Motherland Party, MP) - the army’s
plans were spoiled. As the architect of the economic reforms Özal was a
well-known person now, both inside and outside the country. Evren
indicated that the military did not favour Özal’s party, yet the NSC could
not ban the party, and in the first elections Özal’s Motherland Party won 45
% of the votes and 212 of the 400 seats in parliament. Thus the 1983
elections marked the beginning of the Özal era, which would last for some
10 years and would transform Turkey economically, technologically,
educationally and politically. For the first seven years the military rulers
provided the President with special authority to protect the system they had
established, hence Özal could not carry out his all ideas, particularly in the
field of social and human rights and foreign policy. However, when the
military gradually lost its power over government, Özal implemented his
revolutionary ideas.
During these years Özal also created a new foreign policy: Özalism or
neo-Ottomanism, which in Çandar’s words constituted the ‘funeral’ of
Kemalism.11
It is true, as Özal accepted that he came from the same school
as Bayar, Menderes and Demirel, and that Özalism can be viewed as a
representative of the neo-Democrat or neo-JP current. However, as will be
shown, despite the continuity of the democratic-liberal-conservative
current since the Ottoman Empire, Özalism is distinguished from these
currents in domestic and foreign policy term.
10
Provisional Article 4, William Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military, (London and
New York: Routledge, 1994), p.260.
11
Interview with Cengiz Çandar in Metin Sezer and Cem Dizdar, 2. Cumhuriyet
Tartıúmaları (Second Republic Debates), (Ankara: Baúak Publications, 1993), p. 91.
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The Army’s Foreign Policy (1980-1983)
Before moving to the Özal era, we need to explore the military’s
foreign policy, because it deeply affected Özalist foreign policy. As noted
earlier, Turkey had been isolated from the EC, from the Third World and
from the United States due to the Cyprus crisis the American arms
embargo, and the Kemalist block on relations with the Muslim countries.
In addition, the Kemalist legacy and Turkey’s NATO membership
prevented the improvement of relations with the communist bloc while
internal problems (terror, economic collapse) and the oil crisis exacerbated
Turkey’s isolation so did the 1980 military coup. The EC’s reaction to the
coup was very moderate in the first days because it stabilised the domestic
situation. Yet when the military regime retarded the restoration of
democracy, the EC toughened its policy towards Turkey. First the
European Parliament suspended financial aid to Turkey on 22 January
1982. Then, the European wing of the Joint Turkish-European
Parliamentary Committee was abolished. The Commission also froze the
Fourth Protocol. As a result, ironically, the Kemalist generals saw the
Muslim world as the only way to get away from this economic and
political isolation. Bülent Ulusu, the Prime Minister of the military
government, for example, announced that Turkey would continue to
develop and consolidate its relations with the Muslim world. In December
1980 the Turkish Foreign Ministry declared the new government’s
decision to reduce diplomatic representation with Israel to a minimum
level in order to underscore Turkey’s support of the Arabs, as a member of
the Islamic Conference.12
In particular, Turkey looked for IOC members’
support on the Cyprus issue and succeed in some degree. In the military
period, Turkey joined almost all ICO meetings. Even Prime Minister
Bulent Ulusu participated at the third ICO summit and made a speech
underlining change in Turkish foreign policy towards détente. Despite this,
Turkey rejected basing its relations on a Third World approach or Islamic
values. Turkish Foreign Minister Ilter Turkmen, for example, refused to
sign some decisions of the 1981 Mecca Declaration regarding on embargo
on Afghanistan, Islamic principles and values, and Third World
movement.13
Turkey-Israel relations can be considered a perfect reflection of
Turkish-Western relations. Since the West had closed all doors down
against Turkey, it needed new political support and economic markets. The
Arabs offered money, markets and political support for Turkey, while
12
Aykan, Ideology, pp. 231-232.
13
Cumhuriyet (daily, Istanbul), 23 January 1981; Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Baúbakanı
Bülent Ulusu’nun Üçüncü øslam Zirvesi Konferansı’ndaki Beyanatı’ (Prime Minister
Bülent Ulusu’s Speech and declarations in the Third Islamic Summit), Mekke and
Taif, 25-28 January 1981, Ankara: Baúbakanlık.
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Israel’s effect on the West’s Turkey policy was extremely limited. In these
years Turkey’s reputation among the European states was low. The only
countries that the Turkish President could visit were Pakistan, the Arab
world and the Balkans. In short, when Özal came to power he found a
country isolated from both West and East. Turkey needed a radical shift in
domestic and foreign policy in order to escape this political and
economical isolation.
1980’s AS PRELUDE OF ÖZALISM AND FACTORS
CREATED ÖZALISM
Özal’s Personality
Turgut Özal’s personality played a crucial role in the formation and
success of Özalism. In the words of Zürcher, ‘he had a foot in both camps:
he had been a successful manager in the private industry in the 1970s and
was very well connected in big business circles, which liked his
liberalisation of the economy. On the other hand, he was known to have
connections with the Nakúibendi order of dervishes.’14
In fact he had a foot
in more than two camps. He was not only a successful businessman, and a
religious person with good relations with religious sects: he was a
successful bureaucrat and had very good relations with the IMF, the World
Bank (between 1971-1973 Turgut Özal was adviser to the World Bank on
special projects) and the US administration. He was a religious, nationalist,
conservative, liberal politician, businessman, economist and bureaucrat.15
Above all, Özal was a moderate who could do business with everyone
regardless of their social or ideological background. For example, in the
1970s he was an Islamist NSP candidate, before becoming head of the
economy under secular military rule. Özal’s other key feature was his
Americanism. Having graduated from Istanbul Technical University in
1950 as an electrical engineer, Özal studied in the United States, and
during these years became an admirer of the United States. In his view, the
United States owed its success to its liberalism. Özal further argued that
the United States and the Ottoman Empire were similar political structures:
Both allowed different cultures and gave people freedom to exercise their
religion, nationality and economic preferences. From this perspective,
14
Zürcher, Turkey, p. 297.
15
Özal was a member of the technical Advisory Board of the Turkish Prime Ministry,
and from 1967 to 1971 was under-secretary of the State Planning Organisation; also
after returning from United States to Turkey he was appointed under-secretary to the
Prime Minister in 1979. On 12 September 1980 he was made Deputy Prime Minister
in charge of economic affairs.
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Turkey had to desert its authoritarian official understanding, namely the
Kemalist state ideology.
Coup, Isolation and Thirst for Economic Success
The military coups had put an end to the Menderes and Demirel
governments. Ironically, the 1980 military coup provided a suitable
political base for Özalist foreign, economic and domestic politics, though
he was from the same school of thought as Demirel and Menderes. First,
the coup eliminated Özal’s political rivals by banning old politicians like
Demirel, Ecevit, Türkeú and Erbakan. Secondly, Özal’s co-operation with
the Kemalist army legitimised his ideology in the system. Özal’s cooperation
with the Army and the authoritarian nature of the Army rule also
contributed to implementation of the economic reforms. For Özal the coup
provided stability and order which needed for economic success:
“In the past 32 months the sacrifices and courage of our nation,
and its supreme ability to understand what was best for it, together
with the restoration of peace and order through the successful war
waged against anarchy and violence by the September 12 operation,
has turned the bleak picture of the economy into a promising
one.”16
Nevertheless the Army was a political rival for Özal too and the
military elements were gradually banished from politics by the Özal
governments.
Third, the lack of political rivals granted Turgut Özal a respite to
concentrate on the country’s problems. Thus, Özal became one of the most
creative and productive political figures in Turkish politics. Until the 1990s
Özal won the election with new projects. Finally, the unique environment
of the 1980s provided enormous public support for Özal’s governments.
For example, in the 1983 elections his Motherland Party (MP) scored an
overwhelming victory, with 45 per cent. Thus, MP received an absolute
majority in the new assembly.
Economic Boom and Re-gaining of Confidence
In the 1980s, Turkey’s political agenda was dominated by a high
economic growth rate, and a revolutionary structural change towards an
industrialised country. Thanks to Özal’s liberal economic policies, the
Turkish economy grew at an annual rate of over 5 %, the highest among
16
Briefing, 19-26 July 1982, as cited in Henze, Turkey..., p. 111.
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the OECD countries.17
The volume of Turkish exports rose from $ 2,910
million in 1980 to over $ 20 billion in the early 1990s, with an annual
increase of 15,6 %; a staggering 350 % increase in 10 years.18
Moreover,
the share of industrial products in Turkish exports rose from 41,1 % to 84
% in 1990. Now only 14 % of the exports were agricultural. Likewise,
imports rose from $ 7,909 million in 1980 to $ 22.5 billion in 1990 (a
182% increase) while tourism leaped from a marginal industry to a major
earner of foreign currency with an increase from $212 million in 1980 to
about $3 billion in 1990. For its part the Turkish construction sector
dramatically increased its projects in the Middle East, the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe.
Despite this remarkable record, the real figures were even higher than
the official statistics due to the underground economy. That is to say,
Turkey in the 1980s was a miracle economy, or in the words of Mango ‘a
young tiger’.19
Moreover, the Turkish economy had by now been
liberalised and globalised. The Turkish government adopted the EC’s
nomenclature for commodity classification and in 1988 initiated legislative
adjustments for adopting EC legislation. The main aim was integration of
the Turkish economy with the world economy. For some scholars, all these
developments were ‘the Özal revolution’.20
The first effect of the economic success was the regaining of national
confidence lost in the 1970s. Özal’s slogan was ‘again a great Turkey’.
This also affected the conduct of Özalist foreign policy. With economic
power, Turkey’s foreign policy horizons were widened, as Turkey
gradually became a regional power.
Change in Social and Economic Structures
Another effect of the economic boom was the radical change in
economic and social structures. As noted earlier, economic power had been
in the hands of the Kemalist bureaucracy and state-sponsored businessmen.
Although the Menderes and Demirel governments supported the
conservative Anatolian capital, their success was limited. Thanks to Özal’s
policies, the periphery, villagers, workers and traditional religious groups
17
R. Hine, ‘Turkey and the European Community: Regional Integration and Economic
Convergence’, in S. Togan and V.N. Balasubramanyam, The Economy of Turkey
since Liberalization, (London: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1996), p. 146.
18
‘General Outlook of Turkish Economy’, via internet, http:// www.foreigntrade.
gov.tr/ENGLISH? ECONOMYYECONO.htm, visited May 1997, p. 2.
19
Andrew Mango, ‘Unfriendly Neighbours’, The World Today, Vol. 50, No. 3, March
1994, pp. 60-61, p. 60.
20
Nicole and Hugh Pope, Turkey Unveiled, Ataturk and After, (London: John Murray
Publishers Ltd., 1997), pp. 158-179.
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entered the economy, and as a result, strengthened their autonomy against
the core, namely the bureaucracy, the military and the state-created
industry. During these years, industrialisation of many towns increased
immigration from the rural areas, and the portion of those who lived in
urban areas rose to 75 %. These developments, together with the high
economic growth, urbanisation and Özal’s liberal reforms accelerated the
restoration of democracy. Many non-democratic rules were abolished, and
the masses gained legal rights to resist pressure from the establishment.
When ordinary Turks and minority ethnic groups gained power they
insisted on good relations with those with whom they shared common
values, namely the Muslim and the Turkish worlds.
Changing Turkish Economy
Changes in Sectoral Shares (%) 1970-198521
Year Agriculture Industry Services
1965 34.1 17.8 48.1
1970 28.5 20.2 51.3
1975 24.8 22.3 52.9
1980 24.1 21.8 54.1
1985 22.1 24.5 53.4
Re-emergence of Ethnic Pluralism and Its Impact on
Foreign Policy Pressure Groups
Indeed, the restoration of democracy and a growing income enabled the
political and ethnic minorities to join the democratic system fully.
Bosnians, Albanians, Azerbaijanis, Georgians, Chechens and Turkmens in
particular brought their problems to the foreign policy agenda. No
government could any longer ignore these groups because they sponsored
or supported the main political parties both through financial assistance
and voter power.
Already during the Ottoman epoch Turkey had been a migrant-country.
With the collapse of the Empire millions of the Ottoman subjects,
particularly Muslims and Turks poured into Anatolia from Russia,
Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria and Greece. This trend continued
throughout the Republican era. In addition to the Turkish and Kurdish
population the number of Caucasian, Balkan and Russian immigrants was
very high. However these people were not allowed to use their ethnic
21
T.C. Maliye ve Gümrük Bakanlı÷ı, 1985 Yıllık Ekonomik Raporu, (Ankara: 1986),
p. 4; Z. Y. Hershlag, The Contemporary Turkish Economy, (London: Routledge,
1988), p. 65.
785*87 g=$/ 3(5,2' ,1 785.,6+ )25(,*1 32/,&<
identity in politics, and were seriously warned not to interfere in the affairs
of the country of their origin. The early Republican policy was based on
the Turkification of these people, and this policy continued until the end of
the Cold War. In the 1980s the leftist and Kemalist groups perceived the
outside Turks and the problems of the ethnic groups in Turkey as
endangering Turkish independence. For them, any connection between
Turkish citizens and any other country was unacceptable. However there
were millions of them.
By now their numbers had grown substantially. According to Edward
Shvardnadze, the President of Georgia, the number of the Georgians in
Turkey was about 2 million.22
There was similar number of Azerbaijanis
and Chechens. Though most of these people had been Islamised and
Turkified, they still spoke their language and had a different identity
awareness. As a result, thanks to the democratisation and economic
growth, each of these minorities came to its own lobbying organisations,
publishing houses and established links with political parties. Particularly
active were the Azerbaijanis and the Chechens. Another large migrant
group, Balkan migrants, settled down in the Bursa, Adapazarı and Istanbul
provinces. Millions of them had come during the Ottoman years, like
Albanians, Bosnians, Pomaks, Bulgarian and Macedonian Muslims. With
the exchange of populations between Turkey and Greece in the 1920s and
in subsequent years, their numbers dramatically increased and they became
an important pressure group. In the 1980s, the ethnic cleansing campaign
in Bulgaria forced about 300,000 Bulgarian Turks and Muslims to move to
Turkey which made the Balkan community as one of the biggest lobbies in
Turkey. As a result the Balkan migrants became one of the largest pressure
group in Turkey. Apart from the Balkan and Caucasia migrants, there were
Central Asian migrants as well, like the Kazaks and Uygurs Turks, who
came to Turkey after the communist revolution in China, and the Kyrgyzs
and Afghanis, who came after the Soviet occupation.
The effect of these ethnic groups on foreign policy was dramatic. With
the increasing role of ethnic groups, Turkey’s relations with the region
intensified. These ethnic pressure groups forced Turkish policy makers into
a more sensitive foreign policy towards these countries. As a result, the
problems in these countries became Turkey’s own problems, as witnessed
by the Bosnian War and the Nagorna-Karabagh problem between Armenia
and Azerbaijan. In other words, the ethnic groups created their own foreign
policy aims, which were different from the state’s Kemalist foreign policy.
Turgut Özal saw this change and sought to develop a foreign policy
covering all these sector demands.
22
Milliyet, 26 June 1996.
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Globalisation of the Turkish Economy
Apart from the structural change and the rapid development of the
Turkish economy, the share of exports in the economy was dramatically
increased. In the first years, when the difficulties with the EC markets
increased, Turkish businessmen focused on the Middle East countries,
notably Iran, Iraq, Libya and Saudi Arabia. Thus, for the first time in
Republican history, the Turkish economy became dependent on economic
conditions in the Muslim world. In addition to the oil trade, Turkey
attached great importance to export, tourism and the construction sectors.
Moreover, in time, the European Community, became the first and most
important export area for Turkish goods, with over a 50 % share. In
addition to the EC and the Middle East, trade with the US, the Balkans,
Central Asia and the Russian Federation markets became vital for Turkish
businessmen, and the dependant classes. Thanks to the Özalist economic
measures of the early 1980s, by abandoning its inward-oriented economic
policies Turkey succeeded not only in diversifying its exports but also in
becoming an important market for direct foreign investment.23
The Istanbul
exchange was now considered one of the most important financial markets
in south-eastern Europe, together with that of Athens. That is to say,
contrary to the small Turkish market in the 1920s-30s, Turkey was now
one of the most rapidly developing international markets, with billionsdollars
of foreign investments. Hence, an isolationist policy, like Kemalist
foreign policy of the early Republican years, was virtually impossible.
Turkey became the third biggest market among the non-EC European
countries, after Switzerland and Russia. All these factors affected and
sometimes forced the Özal administration to improve Turkey’s economic
and political relations with the EC and other economic partners. Thus, for
example, Turkey was very careful not to annoy Germany, its biggest
economic partner. Similarly, contrary to the early Republican indifference
towards the region Turkey’s growing economic interests in the region and
new export-oriented policies inevitably raised Turkish consciousness
toward the Middle East.24
In short, with the internationalisation of the economy, Turkish
businessmen imposed their agenda on the state or manipulated the official
foreign policy.
23
Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question, (New York:
Rowman, 1998), p. 164.
24
Graham E. Fuller, ‘Turkey’s New Eastern Orientation’, in Fuller and Lesser (eds.),
Turkey’s, p. 39.
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Kurdish Separatism and the Need for a New Identity
Kemalist nationalism let many Kurdish nationalists down after the
Independence War. As a Turkist, Kemal sought to establish a
homogeneous country and eliminated other ethnic and cultural differences
from the state machinery. Kurdish was banned and Kurdish names of
towns were changed into Turkish names. In the Seyh Sait Revolt (1925)
and in the Dersim (Tunceli) Revolts (1937-1938), the Kemalist state
suppressed the Kurdish-Islamist separatists by using violence. Many were
hanged. The main factor that united the Kurds and Turks was Islam. The
secular and nationalist Republicans undermined that, hence, the unrest in
the region continued. Yet the separatists were too weak to launch a general
riot. However, thanks to the anarchic environment of the 1970s, the
separatist Kurds united groups and claimed an independence or autonomy
for the Kurdish people. In 1980s the separatist Kurdish became a
significant armed movement under the PKK’s leadership. In a decade the
PKK gathered about 10,000 armed men and thousands more sympathisers.
By the late 1980s, the Kurdish question dominated the political agenda,
and all political parties searched for a solution. Kemalist Turkish identity,
thus, was no longer satisfying for some parts of Turkish society, and the
Kurdish problem underscored this problem. Kurds and other ethnic and
political groups (Islamists, socialists etc.) demanded a new identity and
citizenship definition that would include ethnicity, cultures, religion,
political ideas and minority languages. Özal claimed that the main pillars
of the Republic needed to be re-considered, notably Turkish citizenship,
unity, individual rights and the state’s rights and responsibilities.
This policy created a Second Republican current in domestic politics.25
In foreign policy matters it created neo-Ottomanism or Özalist Foreign
Policy understanding. This manifested itself in a wider identity abroad,
Ottoman rather than Turkish covering all neighbouring Muslim peoples
(like the Kurds in the northern Iraq) and all minorities in Turkey. For
example, after the Gulf War Özal claimed that Turkey was the protector of
the Iraqi Kurds and Turkmens in its capacity as the ‘big brother’ of these
peoples, arguing that a federation between these peoples was possible
under Turkish sponsorship. In sum, the Kurdish problem not only
increased the political liberalism of Özalism but also nourished its
Ottomanist elements.
25
The leading Second Republicanists are: Mehmet Altan, Ahmet Altan, Asaf Savaú
Akat, Ethem Mahçupyan.
86$. <($5%22.  
IDEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND OF ÖZALIST FOREIGN
POLICY: DEMOCRAT, WESTERN, MUSLIM AND
TURKISH
A New Civilisation Understanding and Özalist Westernism
It will be recalled that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his friends had
aimed at creating a mostly religious-free and European Turkey by
changing the civilisational mode of the country, as they viewed Islam and
Ottoman tradition as responsible for poverty, political corruption and
economic collapse. For Özal there was no compulsory relationship
between progress and Western civilisation. Contrary to the positivist
øttihatcilar and Republicanists, Özal argued that Western civilisation was
not the only civilisation on earth, and that Turkey did not have to choose
between either the European, Turkish or Islamic civilisations. For Özal, the
Turks were European Muslims; therefore Turkey did not need to change its
mentality or civilisational mode to be European. In his book ‘Turkey in
Europe, Europe in Turkey’26
, he argued that Turkey had always been, still
was, and would be a part of Europe. In brief, the main difference between
Kemal and Özal’s European vocation was that the former internationalised
the European values while the latter did not see any problem with Turkish
civilisation. For Özal, responsibility for Turkish backwardness lay in the
lack of liberalism and scientific thinking. He formulated his understanding
as ‘ça÷ atlamak’ (skipping an age), whereby Turkey did not have to reexperience
the enlightenment process undergone by the West because the
fruits of the enlightenment could easily be adopted by today’s Turkey.
These, in his view, were liberalism, human rights, democracy,
technological and scientific developments and Turkish culture was not an
obstacle to receive all of them. Özal even claimed that if Turkey tried to reexperience
the European positivist, autocratic past, it would never reach
these aims. In other words, Özal’s Western vocation, contrary to Atatürk’s,
was based on the assumption that the Europeans must accept the Turks as
they were. Undoubtedly, the reason for this confidence was Özal’s
ideological background and dramatic economic performance, which let to
the stability and co-existence between Islamic values and modernity
witnessed in the 1980s.
For Özal, the Islamic awakening was also on advantage in integrating
Turkey with the rest of Europe and the Western system because the
Turkish version of Islam was different from the Iranian or the Arab Islam.
He claimed that the Turkish Islamic outlook could provide peace between
26
Turgut Özal, Turkey in Europe and Europe in Turkey, (Nicosia, Northern Cyprus: K.
Rustem & Brother, 1991).
785*87 g=$/ 3(5,2' ,1 785.,6+ )25(,*1 32/,&<
Muslims and the others, since religion and progress could go hand in
hand.27
As a Westernist and a pious Muslim, Özal accommodated his
Islamic understanding to Westernism:
“I have demonstrated that Turkey has never abandoned
secularism. In this context one can refer to Ghazali’s distinction
between faith and reason. The Turks are aware that faith in itself
does not affect secularism, nor does prevent him from being
rational, provided that their respective realms are not encroached.
In life today there is no difference in this respect between the
Christian European and the Muslim Turk. Thus a synthesis has been
achieved between the West and Islam, a synthesis which has put an
end to the identity crisis of the Turks… the universal humanism
created by secularised Islam, together with the concept of the
brotherhood of mankind, a product of Turkish Sufism.”28
For Özal, Turks do not need to be shamed of their civilisation, because
Turkish civilisation was not a lower civilisation, but one of the many
advanced civilisations in the world:
“The Turks living in this territory for a thousand years, have
inherited some part of culture of every civilisation which flourished
here since prehistory. They have evolved a synthesis derived from
the cultural legacy of Anatolia, from the culture they brought with
them from Central Asia, and from the Muslim religion. Their talent
for synthesis and their ecumenical character have enabled them to
blend these three strands together.”29
Apart from his different civilisation understanding, Turgut Özal,
contrary to Kemalist Western scepticism, believed that Turkey could solve
its security problem only through integration with the West, because
Turkey and the Western countries were opposed to any possible conflict or
instability. If Turkey managed to enter the EC, it would be far away from
any war risk: ‘Like the founding members of the EC, we favour integration
primarily in order to eliminate any possibility of war between the
constituent nation-states. Turkey like all European countries, has suffered
enormously from wars.’30
In line with this view, Özal made efforts to convince the Europeans to
accept the Turks as Muslim Europeans into the European political system.
27
Nicole and Hugh Pope, Turkey Unveiled, Ataturk and After, (London: John Murray
Publishers Ltd., 1997), p. 163.
28
Özal, Turkey, pp. 296-297.
29
Özal, Turkey, p. 345.
30
Özal, Turkey, p. 343.
86$. <($5%22.  
On the other hand he tried to demolish the Turkish Western scepticism,
were Turkey to be integrated with the West, it would be advanced in terms
of democracy and economy:
“Political integration with Europe will further ease the
institutionalisation of democracy in the Turkish political system. A
secular and pluralist culture has been gradually taking root in
Turkey. Integration with the EC will only enhance its ability to
persist into the twenty-first century.”31
A New Look at the Ottoman Past and the Region
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk had sought to eradicate anything reminiscent of
the Ottoman-Islamic past. For Özal, Turkey’s past was its most important
advantage in entering the Western club. Moreover, while Mustafa Kemal
saw the Ottoman heritage as the source of problems in the region, Özal
claimed that Turkey could solve the regional problems due to the Ottoman
past. He even argued that the Ottoman heritage granted Turkey great power
to control the region, saying that ‘Turkey cannot be prisoner of the Misak-i
Milli (National Pact) borders’. He further implied that the only solution to
the Kurdish problem and other matters in the Middle East was a federation
between Turkey, Syria and Iraq, which was considered as the resurgence of
the Ottoman Empire by the leftist groups in Turkey. For Özal, Ottoman
political and cultural systems could be a perfect model for 20th
century
Turkey. For example, his eyalet sistemi (state system), the localisation of
the administration, and the presidential system suggestions were all
inspired by the Ottoman past.
Turkish Islam and Turkish-Islamic Synthesis
In spite of Kemalism’s anti-religion stance, Özal was known as a pious
Muslim, if not an Islamist. As noted earlier, he was one of the candidates
of Islamist NSP in the 1979 elections. However, his Islam was different
from either the Kemalist or the NSP Islam. His friend and follower Cengiz
Çandar spelled out the difference:
Republican secularism was inspired by French and Soviet atheism.
Therefore, in the 1920s Republican secularism became atheism. In time,
Kemalist secularism became an anti-religion and anti-Islam concept. When
Turkish Islam, rooted in the Ottoman and Seljuki Islamic cultures was
suppressed by the State, Arabic Islam, which is a less moderate, more
radical version, became the leader in the world. Now when Özal and me
31
Özal, Turkey, pp. 330-331.
785*87 g=$/ 3(5,2' ,1 785.,6+ )25(,*1 32/,&<
visited the Turkish communities in the Balkans, in Bosnia, in Kosovo, in
Central Asia, in Azerbaijan, in Kazakhstan, we saw a completely different
Islam from the Arab version: a Turkified Islam. A more moderate Islam.
An Islam which is suitable for liberalism and democracy. I mean Turkish
Islam is so different. Kemalists cannot accept that a country needs religion
as well, because their ideology was an imported ideology and not suitable
for Turkish cultural structure. We have to accept that Turkey is a Muslim
country.32
In other words, Özal was against the Kemalist interpretation of
secularism and Arab Islamism. He argued that Turkey needed an AngloSaxon
secularism and a Turkish version of Islam, which was much more
tolerant of other religious groups and more moderate than French and
Soviet secularism, or rather atheism. He searched for a middle-way
between Islamism and Turkism, his aim being to formulate a religious
understanding which was suitable for democracy, liberalism and
capitalism. The answer was Türk-øslam Sentezi (Turkish-Islamic
synthesis). Originally developed by the Turkist Aydınlar Oca÷ı (Hearts of
the Enlightened Society), this synthesis was seen by Özal as the answer for
1980s Turkey, hence it became the guiding principle of his policies.
According to this approach, Islam held a special attraction for the Turks
owing to a number of striking similarities between their pre-Islamic and
Islamic cultures. ‘They shared a deep sense of justice, monotheism and a
belief in the immortal soul, and a strong emphasis on family life and
morality.’33
However, despite these similarities, Turkish culture was not
merely based on Islamic or pre-Islamic culture but on both of them.
Therefore, Turkish Islam is more tolerant, more liberal and democratic
than the other interpretation of Islam.
Özalist Turkism
Turkism constituted one of the main elements of Özalism. However, his
Turkism was neither irredentist, like Enver Pasha’s Turkism, nor
isolationist, like Kemal’s. For Ottoman Turkists, the ultimate aim was a
Turkish Empire covering all Turkish tribes who were under Russian,
Chinese and Iranian rules. On the other hand, as a reaction to adventurist
Turkism, Atatürk developed an isolationist Turkism, viewing the outside a
danger for the Anatolian Turks. Hence Atatürk’s Turkey had no interest in
the outside Turks, and gave no support for Turkish resistance against any
power, like the Azerbaijanis against the communist attacks in the 1920s.
32
Interview with Cengiz Çandar in Metin Sezer and Cem Dizdar, 2. Cumhuriyet
Tartıúmaları (Second Republic Debates), (Ankara: Baúak Publications, 1993), p.
101.
33
Zürcher, Turkey, p. 303.
86$. <($5%22.  
Conversely, for Özal Turkism was an important element in Turkish
citizens’ identity and in Turkish foreign policy particularly after the Cold
War, when the new world order was based on economic alignment and
solidarity among kin states. As a result Özal saw Turkism as one of the
cornerstones of Turkish modernisation inside and of the transformation of
Turkish foreign policy. However, territorial nationalism or an irredentism
did not match his Turkism. Özalist Turkism was a cultural concept aimed
at economic and cultural domination of the Turks rather than territorial
expansionism. The Turkish states were relatively poor and weak countries,
therefore possible co-operation among them would be useful to overcome
their problems. Özal saw Turkey at the heart of a possible Turkish bloc and
he predicted that it would benefit from the leadership of a Turkish
alignment.
Moreover, unlike Kemalist Turkism, Özalist Turkism was not a
reactionary movement in domestic politics. As noted earlier, Atatürk’s
nationalism was a reaction to the minority separatism, Western antagonism
and Ottoman Islamism. However Özal’s Turkism was not against the West
or any minority group in Turkey. On the contrary, it was a search to
accommodate all different ethnic and political groups under a wide Turkish
concept. Özal’s Turkism can be likened to Americanism in United States.
Liberalism and Americanism
As mentioned, during his studies in the United States Özal became an
admirer of the American political, cultural and economic system. His
dream was to make Turkey another America – his role model. It can be
Özal fused the previous Turkism, Ottomanism,
Conservatism and Liberalism into a new kind of
Ottomanism or rather Özalism
785*87 g=$/ 3(5,2' ,1 785.,6+ )25(,*1 32/,&<
argued that Özal’s ideology consisted of American secularism, American
democracy, American capitalism and American liberalism. Therefore,
Turkish-American relations were vital for Özal’s domestic and external
policies.34
When comparing the American and the Turkish system, Özal
argued that Turkey had a communist system in bureaucracy and economy.
For him the Kemalist etatist principle was one of the culprits for the failure
of the Turkish economy. He further argued that protectionism had made
the Turkish industry inefficient, un-competitive and expensive. Moreover,
from the Özalist perspective there was a very close relationship between
economic liberalism and democratisation. He gave special importance to
individual rights in contrast to the Kemalist approach which gave the state
the first priority. In 1979 Özal said:
“A strong state does not mean a patriarchal state. The aim is not
richness of the state but richness of the nation. If people are rich, it
means that the state is rich. In economy or political spheres the state
should not compete with the people, but support them. The people
are not the servants of the state, but the state must be servant of the
people.”35
It can be said that one of the main pillars of Özalism, with its Turkism
and Islamism, was liberalism and American-type democracy. For Özal, all
these principles were compatible, not contradictory.
Özalism vs. Kemalism?
Against this backdrop it is hardly surprising that Özal was not happy
with the Kemalist establishment and its principles. Çandar argues that
although he was Prime Minister, then President of the Turkish State, Özal
was an anti-state person:
“He was opposed to almost all the principles of the regime
dominating the state. While he was the President he opposed the
state, and when he died he was buried not in a state cemetery. He
now lies near by those who were hanged by the state, like
Menderes.”36
Çandar claims that Özal represented the people’s anti-Kemalist and
anti-regime feelings, having attacked virtually all Kemalist principles, like
34
Özal pursued an EC-type relation with United States in economics and politics.
35
Metin Sever and Cem Dizdar, 2. Cumhuriyet Tartıúmaları (Second Republic
Debates), (Ankara: Baúak, 1993), p. 17.
36
Interview with Cengiz Çandar in Metin Sever and Cem Dizdar, 2. Cumhuriyet
Tartıúmaları (Second Republic Debates), (Ankara: Baúak, 1993), p. 103.
86$. <($5%22.  
secularism, etatism, nationalism and populism. His civilisational
understanding was completely different from the Kemalist Westerncentred
civilisation understanding. Mustafa Kemal had dreamed of a
Turkified, secular, Western society in Europe. Özal’s dream was of a
Muslim, democratic, liberal, capitalist society with multi-cultural, multilingual,
multi-religion aspects and with a secular state which respected its
subjects’ cultural and religious differences.37
ÖZALISM IN FOREIGN POLICY: IMPLEMENTATION
Having provided the ideological and political background of Özal’s
foreign policy, his actual policies can now be examined. The Özal era in
foreign policy can be divided into two separate periods: during the early
years (1983-1989) the Özal government had to focus on the domestic
problems, notably the economy, competition between the civilian
politicians and the coup leaders and political stability, while in the second
period (1989-1992) Özal concentrated on foreign policy and
democratisation.
Top Decision Makers in Turkish Politics
1982-1990
President Prime Minister Minister of Foreign
Affairs
Saim Bülent Ulusu
(Ulusu Government
20 Sep. 1980-13 Dec.
1983)
ølter Türkmen
Turgut Özal
(1. Özal Government
13 Dec. 1983-21 Dec.
1987)
Vahit Melih Halefoglu
Kenan Evren
(7 Nov. 1982-9 Nov.
1989)
Turgut Özal
(2. Özal Government
21 Dec. 1987-9 June
1989)
Ahmet Mesut Yılmaz
37
Özal’s critics for Kemalism produced two theoretical prescriptions: inside, Second
Republicanism and in foreign policy issues neo-Ottomanism and Second
Republicanists formulated Özal’s ideology as re-establish the main pillars of the
Republic on democracy, liberalism, a moderate secularism, a pluralist nationalism
and free market economy instead of the Kemalist Jacobinism, absolute positivism,
revolutionarism, laicism, etatism and Turkism. Since the details of the Second
Republicanism fall outside of the limits of this study, we will just note its impact on
foreign policy.
785*87 g=$/ 3(5,2' ,1 785.,6+ )25(,*1 32/,&<
Prelude to Neo-Ottomanism (1983-89): First Özal Period
It is difficult to talk about Özalist foreign policy understanding in most
of the 1980s because, thanks to the effect of the military coup, Turkey had
been isolated from the democratic world, and the internal economic and
political transformation prevented it from opening to the world. Therefore,
Özal’s firs task in foreign policy was to restore Turkey’s external relations.
In the first years of the Özal government, Turkey was under heavy
European and American pressure on human rights and democratisation
issues. Despite Özal’s efforts, the European Community in particular
refused to normalise relations. This raised formidable obstacles in addition
to the traditional and structural problems. The most important barrier
during these years was the lack of communication, as the institutions and
instruments for communication were removed by the EC. Also, the
negative propaganda of Turkish deportees and exiles in Western Europe,
who escaped after the coup, fortified the historical image of the Turks in
European mind. Meanwhile, anti-European feelings in Turkey were
dramatically increasing. Turkey was overcoming its problems despite the
EC, and now the EC did not even want to listen to it. The second barrier to
improved relations was the Greek factor. While Turkey had been isolated
from Europe, Greece had become the tenth member of the Community.
Greece, which had always viewed Turkey as a hostile country, used the EC
as a weapon against Turkey.38
Relations with the United States
Turkish-American relations had been under severe tension since the
1964 Johnson Letter. The Poppy Growing Crisis the Turkish Cyprus
Operation and Arms Sale Embargo worsened the relations. However with
the 1982 military coup the tension in the relations abated markedly.39
Several developments and factors in the 1980s contributed to put the
relations back on stronger footing.40
First of all the United States was more
understanding about the coup and its domestic ‘anti-democratic’ policies
compared with the EC’s intolerance. The Americans even said that the
Turkish military coup was no ordinary coup but a necessary intervention in
politics. The ideological background of the 12 September Coup leaders
also helped to improve relations. Most of the coup generals were proWestern.
For Evren and friends, communism was one of the deadly threats
38
Mehmet Ali Birand, Türkiye’nin Ortak Pazar Macerası: 1959-1985, (Turkey’s
Common Market Adventure), (Istanbul: Milliyet, 1986), p. 412.
39
Hale, Turkish Foreign…, p. 163.
40
Sabri Sayarı, ‘Turkey and the United States: Changing Dynamics of an Enduring
Alliance’, in Tareq Y. Ismael and Mustafa Aydin (eds.), Turkey’s Foreign Policy in
the 21st
Century, A Changing Role in World Politics, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), p.
30.
86$. <($5%22.  
to Turkish security and Turkish-American friendship was vital to prevent
the Soviet threats outside and communist activities inside. The Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan and rise of radical Islamism in Iran with 1979
Revolution were also common concerns of the US and the military regime
in Turkey. After the Iran Islamic Revolution Turkey became the only
Western ally in the northern ties.41
With the increasing possibility of Soviet
advance towards the Middle East after the Afghanistan occupation, Turkey
became much more important in American politics while Turkey felt more
Soviet threat in its eastern borders. Finally the rise of Turgut Özal in
Turkish politics impacted Turkish-American relations more positively.
Özal was an US admirer and considered the Reagan and Thatcher
liberalism as a model for the new Turkey. Apart from these factors, the
arms embargo had been repealed and the US military bases were
functioning again in the beginning of 1980.42
The signature of a new Defence and Economic Cooperation agreement
(DECA)43
in March 1980 was a clear sign of the new period in AmericanTurkish
relations. Negotiations for anew DECA were started in 1979
Winter yet with the failure of Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit in the 1979
October Elections the new Demirel Government continued the
negotiations. Süleyman Demirel was very enthusiastic to reach an
agreement, however as a result of the disagreements over some issues the
negotiations continued for months. The draft agreement covered three main
areas:
- US security assistance to Turkey,
- Turkish provisions of electronic and other facilities to the US
- Co-production of defence hardware and supplies.
The only problem-free area was hardware and supplies co-production.
After the arms sale embargo Turkey wanted more financial commitments
from Washington to cover several years and concrete presidential
guarantees for long-term promises.44
With the compromises the agreement
was signed on 29 March 1980 in Ankara. However as the Turkish
Parliament was busy with the presidential elections for the months, the
agreement was ratified on 18 November 1980 by the Cabinet after the 12
September military coup.45
With the new DECA the American assistance
41
Hale, Turkish Foreign…, p. 163.
42
James W. Spain, American Diplomacy in Turkey, Memoirs of an Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, (New York: Praeger, 1984), p. 30.
43
Savunma ve øúbirli÷i Anlaúması, SEøA.
44
Spain, American…, p. 31.
45
Ça÷rı Erhan, ‘ABD ve NATO’yla øliúkiler’ (Relations with the US and NATO), in
Baskın Oran (ed.), Türk Dıú Politikası, Kurtuluú Savaúı’ndan Bugüne Olgular, Bel-
785*87 g=$/ 3(5,2' ,1 785.,6+ )25(,*1 32/,&<
to Turkey increased and Turkey became the third largest recipient of U.S.
military assistance, after Israel and Egypt.
U.S. Aid to Turkey
1980-1990
million U.S. dollars
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1980-
1990
Security
Assistance
Grants
- - 57 110 130 215 206 312 312 410 412 2.164
Security
Assistance
Credit
208 250 343 290 585 485 409 178 178 90 86 3.102
Total
Security
Assistance
208 250 400 400 715 700 615 490 490 500 498 5.266
Economic
Aid
198 201 300 245 175 185 119 100 32 60 14 1.629
Another problem was that Demirel Government did not give any
commitment regarding to Greece’s entrance into the NATO’s military
wing.46
The DECA with the reduction tendency of conventional forces in
Western Europe also contributed to development of the Turkish national
defence industry. The U.S and some other NATO members transferred
surplus military material to Turkey, Greece and Portugal.47
Apart from the
weapon transfers, Özal government made enormous efforts to establish its
own defence industry. There is no doubt that the main reason for this was
the traumatic experience of the American arms embargo of the 1970s.
Though the first coup leaders had attached great importance to a national
defence industry, it was Özal who devoted huge budgets to defence
development projects and encouraged Turkish businessmen to invest in the
security industry. The humble efforts resulted in a sophisticated national
defence industry in the late 1980s and Turkey became a supplier of anticraft
weapons, small arms, communication equipment, military vehicles
and other equipment to NATO members and some other friendly countries,
geler, Yorumlar (Turkish Foreign Policy), (østanbul: øletiúim, 2001, Second edition),
Vol. 1, p. 712.
46
Omer Goksal Isyar,’An analysis of Turkish-American Relations from 1945 to 2004:
Initiatives and Reactions in Turkish Foreign Policy’, Alternatives, Vol. 4, No. 3, Fall
2005, p. 28.
47
Hale, Turkish…, p. 165.
86$. <($5%22.  
American Bases in Turkey after the DECA 1980
øncirlik Air Base, Adana
Sinop Electro Magnetic Surveillance Base
Pirinçlik Radar Warning and Space Surveillance Base
Yamanlar, øzmir
ùahintepe, Gemlik
Elmada÷, Ankara
Karataú, Adana
Mahmurda÷, Samsun
Alemda÷, østanbul
Kürecik, Malatya
Belbaúı Seismic
Kargaburun
like Egypt and
Pakistan. On 10 June
1987, in co-operation
with an American
consortium, an F-16
project was started
and Turkey entered
the aircraft industry
as a producer. Some
of the Turkish F-16s
were exported to
other countries, like
Egypt. That is to say,
despite Özal’s Americanism,
Turkey had learned the lessons of the arms embargo and realised
importance of being independence on defence industry. As a result, unlike
Menderes and Demirel, Özal did not rely solely on the West in the security
matters.
During Ronald Reagan’s first administration, relations between Turkey
and the United States improved significantly. President Reagan saw the
Soviet Union as ‘the focus of evil in the modern world and took a firm
anti-Communist line against Moscow.48
The competition between two
blocs was dramatically escalated and Turkey was a valuable partner in the
increasing tension. However, in the second Reagan term, the change in the
international balance of power and increasing pressure from Armenian and
Greek lobbies in the American Congress prevented the expansion of close
relations. The Greek and Armenian lobbies tried to limit U.S. aid to
Turkey. The Congress adopted a 10:7 ratio policy in aid to Turkey and
Greece which allowed 10 US dollars in aid to Turkey for every 7 US
dollars to Greece. The Congress under the anti-Turkey lobbies for example
cut the proposed aid package to Turkey for 1988 from 914 million dollars
to 570 million dollars.49
Another source of frustration and dismay in
Turkey was the congressional and executive treatment of the Armenian
issue.50
Although no resolution was officially accepted, Turkey was
continually insulted by American politicians and media. The Armenians
named the 1915 Relocation decision as ‘genocide’ against the Armenians.
When the pro-Armenian congressmen in 1984 made campaign to declare
24 April as an official day of mourning for the Armenians who they
48
Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism, American Foreign Policy since 1938, (New
York: Penguin, 1993), p. 303.
49
Hale, Turkish…, p. 166.
50
Ian O. Lesser, ‘Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West After the Cold War’, in
Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser, Turkey’s New Geopolitics, from the Balkans to
Western China, (Boulder: Westview, 1993), p. 122.
785*87 g=$/ 3(5,2' ,1 785.,6+ )25(,*1 32/,&<
claimed had been killed by the Ottoman Turks in 191551
Turkish Premier
Özal blamed the Congress of encouraging Armenian terrorism:
“ We see all these resolutions and attempts in the U.S. Congress
are thoughtlessness. We are shocked that some follow such a dirty
and chip policies aiming short term gaining before the local
elections. This kind of decisions provide a clear support to ASALA
and other (Armenian) terrorist organizations bloody activities which
also target the U.S. citizens too. If tomorrow one more innocent
Turkish diplomat is massacred by these murderers will those, who
accepted this resolution, feel any responsibility for such
murders?”52
The Armenian resolutions increased anti-American reactions in Turkey
and the main opposition party RPP (Republican People’s Party) called to
withdraw from the NATO.53
Armenians continued their anti-Turkey efforts
in the U.S. and after another Armenian resolution attempt in 1987, Turkish
President Kenan Evren called off a long-planned trip to Washington. In
addition the government restricted the use of the øncirlik air base in Adana.
As a result the Armenian resolution caused a crisis in DECA negotiations.
The new DECA was eventually signed in 1988 for four more years yet the
relations continued to be exposed to the bad effects of the anti-Turkey
lobbies in the Congress.
Obviously the most important reason for weakening Turkish-American
relations in the second Reagan term was the decline in the Soviet threat.
The rise to power of Mikhail Gorbachev, the gradual thaw in US - Soviet
Union relations, the impending Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, all
these made Turkey’s defence needs less urgent from the American
51
When the Ottoman Armenians in the eastern provinces rioted against the Ottoman
Empire and many Armenians joined the Russian occupying forces the Istanbul
Government decided to relocate the Eastern Armenian population to another
Ottoman province, Syria. However the war circumstances, communal clashes and
bad weather caused a tragedy and thousands of Armenians died. In the armed
Armenian nationalist attacks more than 520.000 Turkish and Kurdish were
massacred in the same years. However the Armenian nationalists accused the
Ottoman Empire of committing ‘genocide’. Thanks to about 1-million Armenian
population in the U.S. and strong Armenian lobby in the Congress, pro-Armenian
approach dominated the American politics. For the Armenian issue see: Sedat
Laçiner, ‘Türk – Amerikan øliúkilerinde Ermeni Faktörü’ (The Armenian factor in
Turkish – American Relations), Avrasya Dosyası journal, Vol. 11, No. 2, May-JuneJuly-August
2005, pp. 82-125; Sedat Laçiner, Türkler ve Ermeniler, Bir
Uluslararası øliúkiler Çalıúması (Turks and Armenians, An International Relations
Study), (Ankara: USAK Press, 2005).
52
‘Özal’dan ABD’ye Sert Tepki: øliúkiler Zedelenebilir, Çirkin Politika’, Cumhuriyet
(østanbul daily), 15 September 1984.
53
‘Özal’dan...’, Cumhuriyet (østanbul daily), 15 September 1984.
86$. <($5%22.  
standpoint. Under economic and social pressures, the Congress cut the
defence budget. The decreased American aid to Turkey with the Greek and
Armenian lobbies’ anti-Turkey campaigns worsened relations.
Nevertheless, Özal continued his efforts to develop a special relationship
with the United States and the Gulf War gave a special opportunity to
restore the relations.
Turkey-US Trade
1980-1989
million US dollars
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Export
to U.S.
127 267 251 231 368 506 549 713 760 971
Total
Export
- 4.703 5.746 5.728 7.134 7.958 7.457 10.190 11.662 11.625
Import
from
the
U.S.
442 589 813 695 1.073 1.150 1.176 1.365 1.519 2.094
Total
Import
- 8.933 8.842 9.235 10.757 11.343 11.104 14.157 14.335 15.800
Relations with the Middle East
Although, Özal continued to see integration with the West as a prime
foreign policy goal due to its isolation from the West, he had to make
efforts to develop relations with the region. Also, the growing Turkish
exports forced Turkish policy makers to look at the neglected regions such
as the Balkans, the Black Sea and the Middle East. Despite the crisis with
Bulgaria, Greece, Lebanon and Syria in the 1980s, Turkey’s relations with
these regions were improved, particularly in the economic sphere.
785*87 g=$/ 3(5,2' ,1 785.,6+ )25(,*1 32/,&<
Turkish Export to the Middle East Neighbour Countries
1981-1989
Million U.S. Dollars
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Iran 233 791 1.087 751 1.079 564 439 546 561
Iraq 559 610 319 934 961 553 945 986 445
Syria 129 63 59 62 56 62 60 143 177
Export to 3
ME
Neighbour
Countries
921 1.464 1.465 1.747 2.096 1.179 1.444 1.675 1.183
Export to
Middle
East
1.894
(40,3%)
2.544
(44,3%)
2.442
(42,6%)
2.826
(39,6%)
3.247
(40,8%)
2.306
(30,9%)
2523.8
(24.7%)
3321.1
(28.4%)
Total
Export
4.703 5.746 5.728 7.134 7.958 7.457 10.190 11.662 11.625
Turkish Import from the Middle East Neighbour Countries
1981-1989
Million U.S. Dollars
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Iran 514 748 1.222 1.565 1.264 221 948 659 233
Iraq 1.564 1.417 946 926 1.137 769 1.154 1.440 1.650
Syria 19 14 3.75 18 16 19 5 4.4 17.7
Import
from 3 ME
Neighbour
Countries
2.097 2.179 2.175 2.509 2.417 1.009 2.107 2.103 1.900
Total
Import
8.933 8.842 9.235 10.757 11.343 11.104 14.157 14.335 15.800
Although exports to all regions grew substantially, trade with the
Middle Eastern countries exploded.54
Thus the economic factors became
more important role in shaping relations with the Middle East. With the
rise of oil prices and growing Turkish consumption Turkish dependency on
54
Tercan Baysan and Charles Blitzer, ‘Turkey’s Trade Liberalization in the 1980s and
Prospects for Its Sustainability’, in Tosun Arıcanlı and Dani Rodrik, The Political
Economy of Turkey, Debt, Adjustment and Sustainability, (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1990), p. 24; Philip Robins, Turkey and the Middle East, (London: Pinter
Publishers Ltd., 1991), p. 101.
86$. <($5%22.  
the Middle East oil continued to increase in the 1980s. Turkish import
from the Middle East rose from about 64 million dollars in 1970 to 2.8
billion dollars in 1985.55
Turkey needed to find new markets in the region
in order to balance its energy imports and Turkish export boomed to the
region. Turkey’s export to the region was only 54 million dollars in 1970.
The Turkish export figure to the region dramatically rose and reached 3
billion dollars in 1985.56
40.8 % of Turkish export goods went to the
regional countries in 1985. The Middle East and Islamic countries in
general became main consumer of Turkish industrial goods while Turkey
exported to the West chiefly agricultural and textile goods.57
The share of
Middle Eastern countries in Turkish manufactured exports rose from 15.1
% in 1979 to 33.2 % in 1981, 40.3 % in 1983 and 41.9 % in 1985.58
Apart from foreign trade, Turkish companies won about 18.3 billion
dollars worth contracts from the Middle Eastern countries between 1974
and 1990. In 1978 there were 22 Turkish contracting companies in the
region. The number first increased to 113 in 1981 and 242 in 1982. More
than 300 Turkish companies poured into the Middle East during the 1980s
and made billions of dollars business. Libya became the biggest market for
Turkish contracting companies. Saudi Arabia and Iraq were also popular
markets. The Government supported Turkish contracting and trade
companies with low interest credits in the Middle East region and Turkey
became one of the significant creditors especially for Iraq and Iran. Iraqi
debt to Turkey was about 2 billion dollars in 1989.59
When the contracting companies demanded more Turkish workers for
their Middle East businesses, the number of Turkish emigrant workers in
these countries reached 250.000 people.
The economic ties strengthened the political relations and Ankara made
more efforts for more co-operations. Decline and crash of oil prices in
1985 and the end of the Iran-Iraq War caused greater competition for
Turkish companies yet the region did not lose its special place in Turkish
economic and political relations. The economic slow down of the Arab
economies badly affected Turkish contracting sector and the number of
Turkish workers in the Arab world shrank to 151.860 in 1987.
55
Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy…, p. 170.
56
Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy…, p. 170.
57
Z. Y. Hershlag, The Contemporary Turkish Economy, (London and New York:
Routledge, 1988), p. 84.
58
Fikret ùenses, ‘An Assessment of the Pattern of Turkish Manufactured Export
Growth in the 1980s and Its Prospects’, in Tosun Arıcanlı and Dani Rodrik, The
Political Economy of Turkey, Debt, Adjustment and Sustainability, (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1990), p. 64.
59
Robins, Turkey..., p. 110.
785*87 g=$/ 3(5,2' ,1 785.,6+ )25(,*1 32/,&<
Turkey in the coup regime and Özal period sought to avoid taking sides
in the regional disputes. It for example maintained strict neutrality in IranIraq
War.60
The booming economic relationship with both sides was one of
the reasons. Another reason was that Turkey still saw the Middle East
problems as source of instability. Turkey, different from the Menderes
period, also became more cautious in supporting the U.S.’ and European
powers’ policies in the Middle East. Turkish and Western interests in the
region were not considered identical although the similarities and common
interests were accepted.
Turkey became more pro-Palestinian under the 12 September Military
regime. Özal Governments continued this policy. The Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) had opened its first Turkey office in 1976. However
the close relations between some of the PLO groups and the Armenian
ASALA terror organization61
, some far left Turkish terrorists and Kurdist
separatist terrorists made Turkey more careful. The Syrian and Lebanon
support for the Turkish Marxist and Kurdist terrorists also undermined
Turkey-Arab relations during the 1980s. The disagreements over the flow
of water from Euphrates (Fırat) and Tigris (Dicle) also deteriorated
Turkish-Syrian and Turkish-Iraqi relations.62
The construction of huge
dams in the South-eastern region of Turkey angered the downstream
countries, Syria and Iraq, and they made political pressure to get legal
60
Yasemin Çelik, Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy, (Westport, Connecticut:
Praeger, 1999), p. 62.
61
For Armenian terror see: Michael M. Gunter, ‘Pursuing Just Cause of Their
People’, A Study of Contemporary Armenian Terrorism, (New York and London:
Greenwood Press, 1986); Francis P. Hyland, Armenian Terrorism, The Past, The
Present, The Prospects, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991).
62
Çelik, Turkish…, p. 65.
Change in Turkey’s Import from the Middle East
Million Dollars
64
2800
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
1970 1985
Year
Million Dollar
86$. <($5%22.  
guarantees on the water. Almost all Arab countries supported Syria and
Iraq as part of ethnic solidarity. Greece and some other countries also
abused the water issue to weaken Turkey’s position in the region. Greece
(and Greek Cyprus) also tried to establish an anti-Turkish bloc with Syria
and other countries. Terrorists, especially the PKK, abused this
international competition and the eastern provinces of Turkey became
more destabilised in these years.
Relations with the Balkan Countries
In the first Özal period, in spite of a significant détente, the Cold War
circumstances continued to shape Turkey-Balkan relations. Bulgaria,
Romania, Albania and Yugoslavia were the socialist countries while
Turkey and Greece were in the capitalist bloc. Ironically Turkey’s relations
with Greece thanks to the Cyprus and Aegean issues, were worse than its
relations with the other Balkan countries although Turks and Greeks were
allies in the NATO defence system.
Although Bulgaria was a Soviet ally in the Balkans; Turkey sought
Bulgarian friendship since 1964. The reason was partly economic and
partly political. Turkey saw Bulgaria as an important balancing power
against the Greeks in the region. Bulgaria was also a strategic country for
Turkey because it with Greece is one of the only two territorial border
gates to other European countries. However the assimilation and
discrimination of the Bulgaria Turks caused serious problems. The
subsequent repressive measures and discrimination against the Turks and
some other Muslim groups like Pomaks in Bulgaria during the 1980s
became a subject of international outrage (Bulgarize Campaign).63
The
crises erupted at the end of 1984, when Bulgaria began a sudden and
violent campaign to compel all members of the Turkish minority to change
their Turkish names and adopt Bulgarian names. In 1986 Amnesty
International said it had received the names of more than 100 ethnic Turks
reported to have been killed and more than 250 arrested.64
The Sofia
Government repeated denials of such violence and at the same time did not
recognise the Bulgarian Turkish and other Muslim groups’ separate
identity. For Bulgaria all Muslim Bulgarians had to change their name to
‘true Bulgarian names’, and they were forced to deny their basic minority
rights. Those who resisted the racist campaign were arrested and some of
them were even tortured by the Bulgarian police. At the end of 1984 the
repressive measures and official racist attacks became an obvious
63
J. F. Brown, ‘Turkey: Back to the Balkans?’, in Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser,
Turkey’s New Geopolitics, From the Balkans to Western China, (Boulder: Westview
Press, 199), p. 149.
64
Henry Kamm, ‘Bulgarian-Turkish Tensions on Minority Ries’, The New York
Times, 4 October 1987.
785*87 g=$/ 3(5,2' ,1 785.,6+ )25(,*1 32/,&<
assimilation campaign. The Turkish people were forbidden to speak
Turkish language. Many Turkish Bulgarians resisted the decisions in the
northeast and southeast of Bulgaria and many of them were arrested and
injured. The racist campaign lasted for years and Todor Zhivkov regime in
1988 strongly encouraged the Turks to leave the country for Turkey.65
More than 350.000 Bulgarian Turkish crossed the border as a result of state
terror and repressive policies against the minorities.66
With the deposition
of Zhivkov in November 1989 in Bulgaria the new regime officially
encouraged the Turkish refugees to return to Bulgaria because the Turkish
immigration had badly affected Bulgarian economy and caused labour
shortage. As a result about half of the Bulgarian Turkish refugees returned
to Bulgaria and ‘the situation of the Turks continued to improve in the
post-communist Bulgaria despite the difficulties of many returning Turks
in regaining their land and property’.67
The Bulgarian Turkish refugees
crisis nourished the public interest towards the former Ottoman societies in
the Balkans. The Bulgarian Crisis also witnessed the Özalist activism:
Prime Minister Turgut Özal harshly criticised the Zhivkov regime and even
threatened Bulgaria.68
Relations with the EC
The last significant Turkish initiative in foreign policy, in the first Özal
period, was its application for full EC membership. Turkey had been an
associate member of the EEC since September 1963 and according to Özal,
there were three requirements for full membership: being European,
democracy and a developed liberal economy. As he saw it, Turkey had met
these criteria. The increasing share of the EEC countries in Turkish
economic relations also convinced Özal that Turkey’s economic future lay
with the EEC.69
However Özal’s enthusiasm for membership was not
shared by the EC, notably by Germany. As a result, the Community
warned Turkey unofficially that the timing for membership application was
not right.70
Ignoring these warnings, Turkey applied for full-membership
on 14 April 1987, being confident of the acceptance of its application.
Turkey the following day also applied for full membership in the West
European Union. Özal asserted that ‘according to the written agreements,
65
Brown, ‘Turkey….’, p. 149.
66
‘Göç Çı÷ Gibi’ (Immigration Avalanche), Cumhuriyet, 14 June 1989.
67
Brown, ‘Turkey….’, p. 149.
68
‘Binlerce Hançereden Tek Ses Yükseliyor: Ordu Sofya’ya’ (Thousands: Army to
Sofia), Hürriyet, 18 June 1989.
69
Paul B. Henze, Turkey and Atatürk’s Legacy, (Haarlem, NL: SOTA, 1998), p. 118.
70
A. Bozer, ‘Turkey’s Relations and Prospects with the European Community’,
Turkish Review Quarterly Digest, Summer 1997, pp. 9-14, p. 10.
86$. <($5%22.  
there is no other way, they can delay it, but they cannot refuse it.’71
The
Commission’s response took thirty months and it issued the official
Opinion in December 1989. The Council of Ministries accepted the
Opinion in February 1990. The reluctance of the EC was clear though the
Commission tried not to spell out its negative opinion. For the EC the
official obstacles were economic gap and the political problems, notably
human rights issues and Turkey’s problems with Greece. The disappointed
Özal, in contrast, argued that the real reason was cultural differences and
European biases about the Turks. Paul Henze argues that the real reasons
to reject the Turks were the German fear that Europe will be flooded with
Turkish workers and the reluctance of the many EEC members to accept a
state with a large and growing Muslim population as a full member.72
Many studies in these years concentrated on Turkish identity crisis, yet the
EEC decision vividly showed that Turkey was not alone who faced an
identity crisis.
The EC Commission recommended that no accession negotiations
should begin until after 1993 at the earliest.
71
‘Turkey’s EEC Full Membership Can Be Delayed But Not Refused’, Interview with
Turgut Özal, Turkish Review, Summer 1987, pp. 15-24, p. 15.
72
Henze, Turkey..., p. 119.
785*87 g=$/ 3(5,2' ,1 785.,6+ )25(,*1 32/,&<
As has been seen, thanks to internal problems and the international
environment Özal could not apply his principles to foreign policy as much
as he wanted during this period. Nevertheless, with the growing exports,
Turkey became much more directly connected with the world during the
1980s. Also the international developments in the 1980s prepared Turkey
for the radical changes of the 1990s. In these years Turkey for the first time
in Republican history turned its face towards its region, in contrast to
Kemal’s ‘escape from the region policy’ and Menderes’ Cold-Warobsessed
policies. Moreover, unlike previous policies, with the growing
economic ties with the region, Turkey set permanent relations with its
neighbours.
Post-Cold War and Neo-Ottomanist Foreign Policy After
1989
In the second period of his rule two important factors emerged. First,
Özal felt increasingly free to focus on foreign policy issues, as the
military’s effect on politics decreased. Second, with the end of the Cold
War, Turkey found itself facing a new environment -alone philosophically,
politically, and militarily and uncomfortable in such an isolated position.73
Thus Turkish leaders sought ways to extricate Turkey from its
73
Many in the West, including some Western leaders, saw Turkey as no longer of vital
importance claiming that the expensive Western ties constructed with Turkey to
contain the former Soviet Union were no longer affordable. Steve Coll, ‘The Turkish
Question: How Important is it?’, The Washington Post, 24 May 1993.
86$. <($5%22.  
predicament.74
As has been seen throughout this study, despite some
differences, the path all Turkish governments have chosen was integration
with the West. The axis of the Kemalists’ (The Army and leftist-Kemalists)
and liberal-conservative right-wing parties’ (Democrat Party, Justice Party,
Motherland Party etc.) foreign policy was a fully integration with the West.
That is to say, except for the Islamists, the radical left and the ultranationalists,
all moderate political groups in Turkey solved Turkey’s
historically isolated position with integration with the West. Even some of
the radical groups were arguing partly Westernism. Particularly for the
Westernist Kemalists integration with the West was a matter of life and
death. It was not only base of Turkish security and foreign policy but also a
security for the secular regime. Therefore the end of the Cold War made
most Turks panic. The simplest explanation was that: ‘Now the West does
not need us. Hereafter they will not give any financial, political and
military aid. Similarly, the EEC, which had implied cultural biases in its
Turkey policy, will close down its doors to Turkey. Turkey separated from
the ‘civilised world’ (the West), will be alone with the traditional enemy,
Russia, and the regional conflicts, poverty, instability. Regional instability
will undermine Turkish economy and integrity and all the foreign powers
will work to disunite Turkey.’75
Kemalists, who believed that the end of the Cold War threatened the
Turkish economy, security and democracy, suggested returning to the early
Republican policy of isolation. They further argued that after the Cold War
the West’s aim was to disintegrate Turkey as witnessed in the Soviet Union
and Yugoslavia. For the Kemalists and other isolationists, Kurdish problem
and the European refuse for Turkish application were clear signs for the
Western intention. Kemalists (leftist and traditional) argued that separatist
Kurds were encouraged by the EU countries.
Islamists, on the other hand, were happy with the developments,
because for them the end of the Cold War confirmed their ideas. They, as a
result, re-suggested a common market between the Muslim countries.
However, Turgut Özal’s prescription was quite different from the
Kemalist and Islamist prescriptions. Özal saw the end of the Cold War as
an opportunity for Turkey. From his perspective, the collapse of the
communist block freed the Turkish Republics and dissolved the system in
neighbouring regions, which had prevented Turkey from developing good
relations with these regions. In other words, now not only the Turks turned
to these regions, but also the peoples of Bosnia, Azerbaijan, Albania,
74
Stephen J. Blank, Stephen C. Pelletiere and William T. Johnsen, Turkey’s Position
at the Crossroads of World Affairs, (Washington: Department of Defense, 3
December 1993) via the net, Part IV.
75
Cumhuriyet (daily, Istanbul), 27 December 1989; Hürriyet (daily, Istanbul), 2
January 1990.
785*87 g=$/ 3(5,2' ,1 785.,6+ )25(,*1 32/,&<
Kosova, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Kirghizistan and Uzbekistan
turned towards Ankara. In the words of Sezer,
“new geopolitical developments mobilised mutual awareness
and sympathy among the Turks of Turkey, their ethnic and linguistic
kin in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and the Balkan peoples of
Muslim heritage who look to Turkey as a source of moral and
material support in the formidable task of transition to postcommunist
societies.”76
One of the reasons for this mutual awareness was the eruption of
regional conflicts, like Karabagh and the Bosnian crisis which motivated
these countries to look for Turkey’s support. Now there was no
communist-capitalist competition, and therefore they could not get support
from the superpowers. Thus, the cultural and ethnic similarities became
important to get political and military support. Fuller argued ‘neogeopolitics’
activated psychological and cultural dynamics among
nations.77
Thus group identity of a cross-national and cross-cultural
became very important in international relations. Especially in the Balkans
and Caucasia these factors were more important due to these regions’
multi-cultural structures. Apart from Fuller’s neo-geopolitical formulation,
Huntington argued that the end of the Cold War implied a clash of
civilisations and cultures.78
According to this approach, a cultural
polarisation was inevitable and Turkey’s region was the most dangerous
era in the world. Whether these theories are right or wrong falls out of the
scope of this study, yet it is obvious that Turkey became an attraction
centre for the Turks, Muslims and former Ottoman Empire’s peoples. For
example, while the Serbs took the Greek and Russian support Turkey
appealed as a natural ally for the Muslim population of the former
Yugoslavia. Likewise, in Caucasia in the face of Russian-Armenian cooperation
the Azerbaijanis looked to their ‘Muslim, Turkish brothers’ for
support. While in the wake of the Cold War, almost all leaders of the
Turkic world, Bosnia, Albania and Macedonia rushed to Ankara for
support over their economic and political problems.
Moreover, the strategic withdrawal of the Soviets changed the balance
of power in the region. The centuries-old Turkish-Russian border ceased to
exist. This was a development of historic significance for Turkey, because
76
Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, ‘Turkey in the New Security Environment in the Balkan and
Black Sea Region’, in Mastny and Nation, Turkey between East and West, New
Challenges for a Rising Regional Power, (Oxford: Westview Prss, 1998), p. 73.
77
Graham E. Fuller, ‘The New Mediterranean Security Environment: Turkey the Gulf,
and Central Asia’, in RAND Conference Proceedings, (Santa Monica: RAND,
1993), p. 45.
78
Samuel P. Huntington, ‘Clash of Civilisations’, Foreign Affairs, Summer, 1993.
86$. <($5%22.  
now the primary threat f Russia was relatively distant from Turkish
borders, and the Russians were busy with their own domestic problems,
and even they invited Turkish businessmen to their territories to contribute
to Russian economic reconstruction. Furthermore, as the monolithic power
of Russia on the northern and eastern shores of the Black Sea was gone,
now the littoral was now divided among Ukraine, Georgia, Turkey and
Russia.79
Particularly emerge of an independent Ukraine balanced the
Russian power in Black Sea and Turkey felt itself more comfortable in the
straits question. Likewise, in Caucasia the Soviet sovereignty was replaced
by three different states: Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. This new
arrangement destroyed Russian domination in the region. Now in Caucasia
Russia, Iran and Turkey became the dominant powers. Apart from the
Black Sea and Caucasia, in the Balkans Soviet Union lost its privileged
position. The disintegration of Yugoslavia granted new friends to Turkey.
Also, the ideological changes in Bulgaria, Romania and Albania changed
these countries’ attitude towards Turkey. Turkey and Bulgaria, for
example, looked to increase co-operation.
Apart from security concerns newly established republics (like
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan) and the former communist states (such as
Bulgaria) with limited economic and political resources looked to Turkey
viewing it as economic and political model (Turkish model). Also they
made efforts to lure Turkish investment to their countries because they
could not finance all needs for structural changes in lack of Russian and
Western aid. Under these circumstances, Turkey had a great opportunity to
increase its investments and export to these states.
The most important development for Turkey in the post-Cold War was
the emergence of the Turkic world. When Turkish peoples in the Soviet
Union were freed from 150 years of Russian rule, Turkey saw these
Republics as a solution to its isolation. As the most advanced of them,
Turkey dreamed of being the leading Turkish republic and to benefit from
this position.
The Turkish economy and ethnic structure were very suited to close cooperation
with these regions and the West’s indifferent policy towards
Turkey also forced Turkish policy-makers to develop closer relations with
its kin countries. Thanks to the West’s attitude, even Turkish Westernists
realised that cultural and religious differences were a crucial factor in
Turkey’s neglect by Europe and this weakened resistance to Özal’s
policies.
Given this situation, for Turgut Özal despite its disadvantages the end
of the Cold War offered Turkey many regional opportunities. Although the
West was questioning Turkey’s value, for Özal the West could not neglect
79
Sezer, ‘Turkey’, p. 72.
785*87 g=$/ 3(5,2' ,1 785.,6+ )25(,*1 32/,&<
such an important country. Therefore, Özal made efforts to persuade the
West of Turkey’s post-Cold War importance locally and within the Islamic
and Turkic world. Secondly, because Turkish businessmen played a crucial
role in his foreign policy concept, Özal argued that the state had a duty to
prepare the legal and political ground for Turkish economic enterprises in
these regions. As such the Özal government took initiative to set up EClike
regional co-operation institutions in the area surrounding Turkey, like
the Black Sea Economic Co-operation (BSEC) with an aim of stabilising
Turkey’s region for a co-operation. Then he intensified his efforts to
establish bilateral and multilateral links between Turkey, neighbouring
countries, Turkey’s kin states and the Muslim world.
Black Sea Economic Co-operation (BSEC)
The BSEC was a Turkish initiative and Özal’s personal idea. Its main
objectives were to stabilise the region by using economic means and to
open new export destinations for Turkish enterprises.80
This 1990 proposal
was greeted with enthusiasm by the Black Sea, Caucasia and the Balkan
states. Apart from Turkey, Russia, Greece and Ukraine almost all-regional
countries participated in the organisation. The BSEC had a political as well
as economic dimension but Özal hesitated from focusing on political
matters because most of the countries in the region had serious political
problems with each other (for example Azerbaijan and Armenia; Russia
and Ukraine; Turkey and Greece).
Also, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia many
regional countries faced economic catastrophe, and Özal wanted Turkey,
which lost its Arab market after the Iran-Iraq and the second Gulf War, to
fill the economic vacuum. Özal also emphasised the cultural dimension of
the BSEC. In almost all his trips to these countries Özal signed cultural
protocols or agreements which covered education, language, science and
art. As a result of these efforts, some countries sent their military and civil
servants to Istanbul or Ankara to study, often funded by Turkey. Turkey
also gave credits to poorer regional states, like Georgia, Azerbaijan and
Macedonia. Contribution of these policies to BSEC was so limited yet,
thanks to Özalist policies, Turkey became a regional power-centre for
many countries, like Ukraine and Bulgaria. Further, some countries saw
Turkey as a balancing power against their traditional enemies. For example
for Albania, Turkey became a fresh credit source and a balancing political
support against Greece. Despite Russian scepticism over the BSEC, the
economic needs of newly-emerging states and other former communist
states nourished the organisation and a joint Black Sea Bank was
80
Faruk Sen, ‘Black Sea Economic Co-operation’, Aussen Politik, vol. 44, no.: 33,
1993, pp. 281-287.
86$. <($5%22.  
established; and even political and economic committees were formed in
order to discuss the regional problems.
For some academics like Gençkaya, BSEC was a Turkish-led challenge
to European integration.81
However, as the Turkish under-secretary for
Foreign affairs clearly stated, BSEC was not an alternative to the EC, but it
was thought as an assistance factor for Turkey’s integration with Europe.82
Also, contrary to the 1930s’ Balkan Pact and 1950s’ second Balkan Pact,
BSEC was an economy-culture oriented organisation, rather than a security
block. Another characteristic of Özal’s BSEC initiative was that, contrary
to Atatürk’s, ønönü’s and Menderes’ security-oriented regional policies,
Özal formed such a policy for peaceful aims, like economic and cultural
co-operation. Fourth, in establishing the BSEC Turkey played a leading
role as a regional power. Fifth, before Özal, Turkey had never perceived
the Black Sea as a co-operation region. With Turkey’s new Black Sea
policy, apart from the Balkans and the Caucasia the Black Sea rim was
perceived as a whole political entity by the Turkish policy makers. Finally,
after the BSEC the trade between Turkey and the other members
significantly increased, and Turkey hugely benefited from the emergence
of the Black Sea as a new political and economic entity.
The Balkans and Turkey: The Resurgence of the Ottoman
Empire?
Apart from the BSEC, the Balkans was a very important area for
Özalist foreign policy as former Ottoman territories millions of Muslim
and Turkish minorities lived there. Also apart from Turkey, there were four
Muslim countries in the region: Kosova, Macedonia, Bosnia and Albania.
That is to say historical and cultural similarities provided a suitable ground
for co-operation, and this co-operation was viewed as an opportunity to
end Turkey’s aloneness in Europe. Moreover, after the disintegration of the
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the great Slavic block, which destroyed
Ottoman predominance in the 19th
century, now vanished. As a result,
Muslim peoples and those states that had problems with Serbia and Greece,
such as Macedonia and Albania, turned their faces to Ankara. Turkey,
81
Ömer Faruk Gençkaya, ‘The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Project: A Regional
Challenge to European Integration’, International Social Science Journal, Vol. 45,
No. 4, November 1993.
82
Sanberk said ‘it is not an alternative policy: Özden Sanberk, Cumhuriyet, 26 May
1991. Ozuye, another Turkish diplomat, also stated that the BSEC was a part of the
pan-European integration project saying ‘this is not a new compartmentalisation of
Europe’: Oktay Ozuye, The Independent, 26 June 1992 and Oktay Ozuye, ‘Black
Sea Economic Co-operation’, Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 3, Summer
1992, p. 51.
785*87 g=$/ 3(5,2' ,1 785.,6+ )25(,*1 32/,&<
similar to its policies in other regions, first of all, tried to develop
economic and cultural relations with these states instead of the military or
political groupings. For example Özal’s first priority was to unite these
countries with Turkey by using telecommunication and transportation
systems. In this context an Albania-Bulgaria-Turkey highway project (the
Balkan Highway Project) was significant. For Yinanç, this highway would
connect all Balkan states into Turkey and lessen Turkey and the regional
countries’ dependence on Greece.83
Turkey made efforts not to be seen as
over-enthusiastic. As Çandar84
has noted Turkey did not want to
antagonise regional opponents, like Greece, however, perceived the
growing friendship between Bulgaria, Albania, former Yugoslavia,
Romania and Turkey as a direct threat to its security and Greek academics
and politicians referred Turkey’s Balkan policy as ‘containment policy.’85
For the Greeks Turkey was surrounding Greece by using Muslims and
former Ottoman subjects. According to the Greek perception Turkey’s
efforts created a Muslim-Orthodox competition in the Balkans.86
Ironically
Greece accused Bulgaria and Macedonia of being in a Muslim conspiracy.
As a result Greece sought Serb and Russian friendship to balance Turkey.
In spite of the Greek unrest, it can be said that the Özalist Balkan policy
put an end to Turkey’s isolated position in the Balkans, and in a short time
even Greece understood that Turkey was not a new Ottoman Empire and
its new Balkan policy was not based on a Muslim conspiracy against
Greece, but a cultural and economic co-operation. Second, different from
the Cyprus and the Aegean issues, the developing ethnic conflicts in the
Balkans Turkey and the West shared common interests. While Greece was
a reluctant NATO ally in dealing with the Balkan conflicts Turkey offered
great help to the US and the Europan allies. Thus the Balkan conflicts
contributed to restore Turkey-West relations.
The Bosnian crisis demonstrated the Özalist policies’ difference; when
the crisis erupted, Turkey, with the pressure from Islamic and ethnic
83
Author’s interview with Barçın Yinanç, 22 February 1999, Ankara. Also for the
details of the project see M. Türker Arı and Sedat Laçiner, ‘Balkan Seferinin
Ardından’, (After the Balkan Visit), U.I.O.Y., December 1993, pp. 54-58 and
Cumhuriyet, 16 December 1993.
84
Personal interview with Cengiz Çandar.
85
Stephanos Constantinides, ‘Turkey: The Emergence of a New Foreign Policy the
Neo-Ottoman Imperial Model’, Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Vol. 24,
1996, pp. 323-334; N.A. Stavrau, ‘The Dismantling of the Balkan Security System:
Consequences for Greece, Europe and NATO’, Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 6,
No. 1, Winter 1995.
86
Emilja Simoska, ‘Macedonia and the Myths of the ‘Muslim Conspiracy’ and
‘Endangered Orthodoxy’, Balkan Forum, Vol. 1, No. 4, September 1993, pp. 189-
196.
86$. <($5%22.  
circles, felt that it had to follow a more active foreign policy. Özal arguing
the arms embargo on Bosnia must be lifted immediately, even publicly
stated Turkey’s intention to intervene militarily in the Bosnian conflict in
order to help the Muslims.87
Çalıú argues that Özal’s Balkan policy was in
conformity with Turkey’s traditional foreign policy.88
It is true Turkish
Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin declared Özal’s announcements did not
reflect Turkey’s official policy89
, yet Çetin’s words did not mean Turkey
followed a traditional Kemalist policy in the Balkans but underscored the
great competition and differences between the Kemalist approach and
Özal’s Ottomanist Balkan policy. Turkey had never officially set its
foreign policy on a common religious and cultural values neither in the
Balkans nor in the Middle East since Atatürk. Moreover, in all Turkish
initiatives in the region Turkey had been defensive and had never followed
an active foreign policy in the Balkans except Özal’s Ottomanist policies.
From the Adriatic to the ‘Chinese Wall’: Turkey as a
Development Model for the ‘Turkic World’
Turkey had no relations with the Turkic republics of the former Soviet
Union and other Turkic peoples prior to 1989, despite common cultural,
linguistic, and religious ties to these peoples.90
The causes for this were
mainly Kemalist isolationism and Cold War circumstances. The end of the
Soviet Union freed the Turkic peoples under communist rule and five of
them established their own independent states. Now there were six Turkish
states: Turkey, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Uzbekistan,
Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. Kemalism had
clearly warned against any kind of Pan-Turkist foreign policy. Though
Turkey was the first country to recognise these states and relations
developed at a feverish face.91
Despite the discussion among pan-Turkists about the creation of a
Union of the Turks,92
Turkey chose not to establish a Turkish
Commonwealth between these countries. The reason is debatable yet it can
be said that the primary reason was not to provoke the Russians and other
regional powers, like Iran. Özal concentrating on the relations with the
87
Milliyet and Hürriyet, 30 January 1990.
88
Calis.
89
Sabah, 28 February 1993.
90
Kemal H. Karpat, ‘Turkish Foreign Policy: Some Introductory Remarks’,
International Journal of Turkish Studies, Winter 1992-94, Vol. 6, Nos.: 1 & 2, pp. 1-
19, p. 7.
91
Sedat Laçiner and M. Türker Arı, ‘21. Yüzyılın Eúi÷inde Türk Cumhuriyetleri’
(Turkish Republics at the Threshold of the 21st
Century), Milliyet (daily, Istanbul),
10-15 May 1993.
92
Cumhuriyet (daily, Istanbul), 16-20 January 1990.
785*87 g=$/ 3(5,2' ,1 785.,6+ )25(,*1 32/,&<
outside Turks were economy, education and culture, hoped secular Turkey
would provide a development model for these new emerging republics.
Indeed, Özal argued that the ‘Turkish model’ was much more suited to the
region than the Iranian, Russian or Saudi models. He further argued that
the Turkish model was better for Turkey, Turkic states, the West, even for
Russia because it would stimulate development, secularism, democracy
and stability in the region, and it would down play fundamentalism and
conflict. To realise the Turkish model Özal needed to persuade the Turkic
states, the Turkish public, the West and the Russians. As a first step, Özal
added a new section to the Foreign Ministry and established new
institutions with large budgets to deal with relations with the Turkic world,
like TIKKA (Turkish Development Assistance Agency). Moreover, he
frequently visited the Turkic republics and by 1993 had signed several
agreements with these countries on areas ranging from health to education.
Bilateral committees and organisations were also established. Moreover,
Turkey granted about ten thousand scholarships to university students from
the Turkic world, and sent some Turkish students to these countries. TRT,
Turkish national television, started to broadcast in the region under the
name of Avrasya (Eurasia) and other private television stations followed
the TRT move. State-owned Turkish Airlines established regular flights to
Baku, Alma Ati, Taskent, Ashkabad and Bishkek. While Turkish
Eximbank and other Turkish banks gave about $7 billion in credits to
Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan. Some
former Soviet Republics, like Georgia and some Turkic autonomies in the
Russian Federation also benefited from Turkish aid. Apart from state aid,
Özal encouraged Turkish businessmen, religious groups, Turkists and
media to invest in these countries. As a result, many Turkish businessmen
and idealists poured into these countries and established their own
businesses in these countries. Private aid programmes were inaugurated,
particularly in the education, media, telecommunication and textile sectors,
and private Turkish companies opened branches and increased their
investment in these countries, especially in Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and
Kazakhstan. In particular the ultra-Turkist and Nurcu religious groups, led
by Fethullah Gülen, established their own business and media in Central
Asia and Azerbaijan and Gülen group’s daily newspaper Zaman became
the second or third biggest newspaper in these countries. As a result of
these efforts Turkish people and media as a first time in the Republican
history named some other countries as ‘brother Republics’.93
This was a
turning point in Turkey’s sceptic world perception and underlined the
effects of the new Turkist policies. Despite the welcome of the masses,
Özal’s Turkic policies confronted a weak leftist-Kemalist resistance in the
first years of the post-Cold War era. Particularly Turkist, Islamist and
Westernists features of Özalist policies disturbed the left and the leftist-
93
Milliyet, 15 March 1993.
86$. <($5%22.  
Kemalists who opposed any support or privileged position for Turkic
republics. The left viewed Özal as a ‘servant’ of American interests in
Central Asia, and claimed his aim was to demolish socialist solidarity in
the region. They also argued that Turkey’s policies would provoke Russian
anger and risk Turkey’s independence and security. In spite of the
opposition the resistance was so weak and their effect on the public was so
limited.
Özal’s efforts to revive the Turkic world were warmly welcomed by
other Turkic peoples, and in his latest visit to Central Asia and Azerbaijan
Özal was received by enthusiastic crowds and these states decided to meet
annually under the banner of ‘Turkic Summits’, with the first held in
Ankara.
Turkey’s interest extended beyond the independent Turkic Republics
and covered other Turkic tribes in the Russian Federation, China and the
Balkans. In particular Crimean Tartars, Bashkir, Kazan Turks, Turks of
Yakutistan (Russia), Uygurs of China, Gagavuz Turks of Moldavia and
Volga Turks attracted interest from Turkey and Turkey made extreme
efforts not to provoke the mainland countries by using economic and
cultural investments.
In light of all this, Özal was optimistic and claimed that the 21st
century
would be a ‘Turkish century’ and adopted the slogan ‘Adriyatik’ten Çin
Seddi’ne’ (From Adriatic to the Chinese Wall). This slogan was defining
Turkey’s new interest areas. Contrary to Kemalist isolationism, Özal
argued that Turkey had vital interests in the Balkans, Middle East,
Caucasia, Black Sean rim, Central Asia, even in Western China where a
Turkish tribe, Uygurs, lives under the Chinese rule. In doing so Özal
brought about a historical change in Turkey’s relation with Turkic states.
Moreover, the emergence of the Turkic world can also be viewed as a
historical turning point for Turkish foreign policy, because Turkic World
put an end to Turkey’s isolated position in the world. It also helped Turkey
to overcome its cultural isolation and identity crisis. Turks now did not
have to be just European or Arab-styled Muslim. They had their own
world, a Turkish world to which they can relate culturally, politically and
economically without any dilemma. All this inevitably created a more
active ‘Turkist’ foreign policy towards the East, and Turkey left its
Kemalist isolationism. As has been witnessed in the Azerbaijan-Armenia
conflicts, Turkey’s support to Azerbaijan on the basis of ‘brotherhood’
underscored the dramatic change. Özal in this crisis threatened the
Armenians with sending troops to the region saying ‘if we frighten the
Armenians what can they do?’94
94
Milliyet (daily, Istanbul), 3-6 March 1992.
785*87 g=$/ 3(5,2' ,1 785.,6+ )25(,*1 32/,&<
Cyprus Issue
The Turkish intervention to the Cyprus (1974 Peace Operation) saved
the Turkish Cypriot people from a possible genocide yet worsened
Turkey’s relations with the West. In September 1975 the passage of a
Congress resolution banning military sales and aid to Turkey until the U.S.
president could show that substantial progress had been registered towards
a settlement of the Cyprus problem highly disappointed the Turks. For
many Turkish people with the Johnson Letter, the arms embargo of 1975-
1978 proved the US’ pro-Greek position in the Cyprus issue. Turgut Özal
saw the Cyprus problem as a poisoning factor in Turkey-West relations
and aimed to solve the problem immediately. Özal different from the coup
leaders was against an independent Turkish state on the island and
preferred a federal Cyprus state. However the coup generals were still so
powerful and Özal could not prevent the proclamation of Turkish republic
on the northern Cyprus on 15 November 1983.95
The independence
declaration of the TRNC (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) was
perceived as a challenge by the American Government and the White
House expressed its displeasure over the Turkish action. The U.S. did not
recognise the Turkish Cypriot state and the State Department prevented the
recognition of the new state by Muslim and other countries which were
friendly to the Turkish case by warning all of them one by one.96
The proximity talks continued in 1984-1986 period. The US defended a
federal Cyprus state and made great pressure on Turkey. For President
Reagan Turkey should have forced the Cypriot Turks for solution.
Therefore Reagan sent a special letter to Turkish President Kenan Evren on
22 November 1984 calling for more efforts to solve the problems. The
Americans promised the Turks that they would put an end to the pressures
if Turkey accepts the UN written proposals on 17 January 1985 and 29
March 1986. Turkey approved the offer yet the Greek side rejected the
proposals. Nevertheless thanks to the Greek lobby in the Congress the US
continued its pressures over the Turks instead of Greece and the Greek
Cyprus. TRNC opened a bureau in New York and established closer ties
with the State Department and the Pentagon in the following years.
However the U.S. under the shadow of the Greek lobby did not recognise
the TRNC and the Cyprus issue with the Armenian lobby’s anti-Turkey
activities continued to be one of the greatest obstacles in Turkish-American
relations. For Özal both the Greek and Turkish Cypriots did not want a
long-lasting solution and were not ready for nay concession. The ultimate
95
‘KTFD’nin Adı Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti Oldu, Kutlu Olsun’, Tercüman
(daily, østanbul), 16 November 1983.
96
Nasuh Uslu, The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and
Turkish-American Relations, 1959-2003, (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc.,
2002), p.172.
86$. <($5%22.  
Greek aim was to force the Turks to leave the island while Turkish Cypriot
President Rauf Denktash insisted on an independent Turkish state. Under
these circumstances, like the U.S. “in Özal’s view if the four leaders came
together in the style of the Camp David negotiations and discussed the
problem, a serious progress could be achieved in the solution of the Cyprus
question”.97
Özal’s efforts to solve the problem was met scepticism inside
Turkey and even the ANAP leader Mesut Yılmaz did not agree with Özal.
Some newspapers in Turkey accused Özal of betraying the national case.
When the Greek authorities in Cyprus and in Greece rejected the proposal
the tension between Özal and Denktash decreased. The Greeks made a new
proposal to meet in an international conference, but the Turkish side
rejected this time. Özal continued to make pressure over government in
Turkey and in the TRNC. However when Süleyman Demirel became
prime minister, Özal’s influence on Lefkoúe and Ankara government
dramatically weakened. At the end of 1991 Süleyman Demirel, the new
Prime Minister, rejected to make pressure on TRNC President Denktash
when Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis asked him to persuade the TRNC
President. Intensive initiatives were launched in 1992 however no solution
could be reached. The main problem was that the Greeks never wanted to
share power with the Turks. For the Greek side the island was a Greek
island, and the Turks were only a minority. On the other hand the Turkish
Cypriots argued that the island was belonged to the Turks and Greeks and
they never accept to be a minority but a founding nation. Özal made
enormous efforts to solve the problem because the Cyprus issue was
abused by the Greeks and all Turkey-sceptic European Community
members. The problem was also an obstacle before Turkey-U.S. relations.
However Özal in his prime ministery and presidential periods could not
solve the decades-old problem.
Turkey and Russia: From Potential Threat to Market
As has been shown throughout this study, historically not only Atatürk
but almost all Turkish and Ottoman policy-makers, except the socialists,
perceived the Russians as the greatest threat to Turkish security. As such,
the end of the Cold War had significant security implications. A former
American Ambassador to Ankara pointed out: ‘The threat of the past 400
years – Russia – has been virtually eliminated. Turkey is now more secure
than it has been since the birth as a republic after the First World War’.98
In reality, Russia was still a great potential threat to Turkey and was
unhappy with Turkey’s activities among the Turkish peoples in Central
97
Uslu, The Cyprus..., p. 178.
98
Morton Abramowitz, ‘Foreword’, in Fuller and Lesser, Turkey’s New Geopolitics,
From the Balkans to Western China, (Boulder: Westview, 1993), pp. vii-xii, p. viii.
785*87 g=$/ 3(5,2' ,1 785.,6+ )25(,*1 32/,&<
Asia and Russian Federation. Yet the Turks were considered a lesser
menace compared with the Iranian and Saudi efforts in the region.
Moreover, Turkey went to great efforts not to antagonise Russia, and Özal
was much more interested in the economic potential of the Russian
Federation as an export and investment destination more than political
issues. For Özal, Russia had more opportunity than the small Turkic
Republics had. Therefore, Turkey could benefit from these two different
markets by not provoking them.
On 11 March of 1991 Özal paid an official visit to Russia with a
delegation of businessmen and officials, and a Treaty of Friendship, Good
Neighbourhood and Co-operation and some other agreements and
protocols were signed. This 1991 Treaty can be considered as the high
point in Turkish-Russian relations. Moreover, unlike previous agreements
the focus of these agreements was financial and economic, rather than
political and security ones. After Özal’s visit, Turkish Eximbank increased
Turkish credits to Russia from $300 million to $400 million, and also gave
a $200 million credit to finance Russia’s imports from Turkey. As a result,
Turkish-Russian trade tripled in 1990 and by 1991 had reached $2.5
billion. The trend continued in the following years and Russia became the
second biggest economic partner of Turkey with about $5 billion trade.
Özal hoped that the trade volume might reach $ 10-15 billion by the end of
the century. In addition to the official export-import figures, millions of
Russians poured into Istanbul and other Turkish cities to make unofficial
trade. According to the state figures, in a short time, the unofficial trade
climbed to the billions of dollars. Moreover, the Russia-Turkey natural gas
pipeline increased economic dependency between these two traditional
enemies. Turkish credits to Russia, which reached $1.5 billion in 1993, and
the bilateral agreements made more trade and Turkish investment in Russia
possible. As a result of these policies Turkish construction and
consumption sectors boomed in Russia. By 1993 the value of the Turkish
construction sector in Russia was more than $2 billion. Many Russian
prestigious buildings, like hospitals, hotels later even parliament building
and other cities were build by the Turkish firms. The increasing
dependency between Turkey and Russia decreased the tension in the
relations and forced both sides to search friendship and co-operation. As a
result Turkey’s biggest fear became one of the biggest markets for Turkish
exporters.
The Gulf War: Return of Activism and Westernism
By developing close relations with the Turkic world and Turkey’s
region, Özal did not challenge the United States or Europe. On the
contrary, he made efforts to unite Turkish and Western interests in Central
Asia and the Caucasus. In other words, having provided legal and political
86$. <($5%22.  
frameworks at home and in the region for the Turkish economy, Turkey
tried to persuade the West that Turkey was an influential regional power in
the Balkans, the Middle East, Caucasia, Black Sea and in the Central Asia;
and with its democratic, secular and pro-Western system Turkey could be a
good partner for the West. Özal meant that the West needed Turkey as a
partner to defend its interests against instability, Islamic fundamentalism,
unpredictable states (like Iraq, Iran), ethnic conflicts (like Yugoslavian
crisis) and against Russia’s unpredictable policies (as witnessed in
Chechnya). In the first years the West ignored Turkey’s arguments.
However, the Gulf War provided the opportunity to show Turkey’s
importance. Also the Gulf War revealed the Republican bureaucracy’s and
the Army’s unrest about Özalist foreign policy. Finally, the Gulf War
showed the clear difference between the Republican-Kemalist foreign
policy and Özalist foreign policy. Therefore we now examine Özal’s Gulf
War diplomacy and his Middle East policy.
As has been seen, relations with the Islamic world and the Middle East
had been an important indicator in the regime’s Kemalist character. Even
the neo-democrat Menderes and Demirel governments could not change its
essence. Turkey’s relations with this region were based on these Kemalist
principles:99
Non-interference in the domestic affairs of Middle Eastern
states; non-interference in disputes between the states in the area; noninterference
in inter-Arab relations; non-interference in religious
groupings.
When the Gulf Crisis erupted, Turkey’s initial reaction was within the
traditional approach – Turkey did not approve of the invasion, but saw it as
merely a problem between two Arab states100
and the principle of
maintaining the status quo became the dominant consideration.101
However, as mentioned, Özal saw the crisis as an opportunity to show
Turkey’s value to the Western security system especially to the United
States. In the words of Ahmad ‘Özal took matters into his own hands and
placed the country squarely behind President Bush’s policy.’102
For Özal,
the US-led anti-Iraq grouping was right, and Turkey had to give clear
support for the Alliance. In addition to the legal considerations, from the
Özalist perspective, Turkish support for the Alliance was very important in
order to show Turkey’s strategic importance for the West. Moreover, Özal
believed that Turkey would benefit from the post-war situation. ‘The
99
For the principle see also: Gulnur Aybet, Turkey’s Foreign Policy and Its
Implications for the West: A Turkish Perspective, (London: RUSI, 1994) and Seyfi
Tashan, ‘Contemporary Turkish Policies in the Middle East: Prospects and
Constraints’, Dıú Politika (Foreign Policy), Vol. XII, Nos.: 1-2, June 1985.
100
Milliyet (daily, Istanbul), 3-4 August 1990.
101
Aybet, Turkey’s, p. 16.
102
Ahmad, The Making, p. 200.
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Middle East was in the midst of irreversible change and it was, therefore
vital for Turkey to be in a position to take full benefit from future
opportunities.’103
For some, this benefit might be annexation of the
northern oil-rich regions of Iraq. For Özal, for the first time in 100 years,
Turkey might have backed the winning side in a war.104
According to Özal,
ønönü by not to supporting the Allies in the Second World War risked
Turkish security and prosperity, now Turkey had to use this chance and
support the winning side.
Özal was so determined and when he perceived parliament and the
government as timid in taking initiative he bypassed both and carried out a
secret telephone-diplomacy with the White House. Moreover by
manipulating the public he created pressure on parliament in favour of the
Western position. Republican-Kemalist and leftist groups argued that such
a policy might draw Turkey into a war and turn Turkey into an agent of
American policy. On 8 August Turkey rushed to cut the oil pipelines,
which carried 1.52 million barrels of oil a day between Turkey and Iraq
and under Özal’s influence parliament approved the government’s request
to send troops to the Gulf. Özal’s personal role in cutting off the oil
pipelines was viewed as a sign of deviation from Kemalism and his
activism in foreign policy resulted in three important resignations from the
government and bureaucracy. First Foreign Minister Ali Bozer resigned on
12 October. Defence Minister Sefa Giray followed Bozer on 18
December.105
Not only the isolationist and cautious liberals and leftists but
also the Army was upset. Chief of the Staff Necip Torumtay criticised
Özal’s foreign policy as ‘adventurist’ and implied that the army was
against to such a foreign policy. Torumtay implied that Özal endangered
Turkish security for the Western interests.106
But now the balance of power
was different than in previous years, and the Chief of Staff had to resign
when he understood that he could not persuade civilians. For the Turkish
press the resignation was a shock and underlined the civilian character of
the regime and Özal’s overwhelming influence on foreign policy
matters.107
Özal blamed the opponents of being ønönist and of not
understanding the new circumstances in international politics.108
President
Özal declared Turkey’s new foreign policy position as:
103
Robins, Turkey, p. 71.
104
Lawrance Friedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991, (London and
Boston: Faber and Faber, 1993), p. 354.
105
Hürriyet, 19 October 1990.
106
Necip Torumtay, Org. Torumtay’ın Anıları (Torumtay’s Memoirs), (Istanbul:
Milliyet, 1994).
107
Milliyet, 31 December 1990; Hürriyet, 1 January 1991.
108
Milliyet, 3 January 1991; Zaman, 4 January 1991.
86$. <($5%22.  
“Many things have changed in Turkey… In foreign policy the
days of taking a cowardly and timid position are over. From now we
will pursue an active policy based on circumstances…109
My
conviction is that Turkey should leave its former passive and
hesitant policies and engage in an active foreign policy.”110
Compared with Menderes and Demirel’s timid attitude in the face of
army opposition, Özal’s self-confidence was significant. No doubt the
main reason behind this confidence was internal changes. As Özal
expressed, his foreign policy was a result of his internal policies. Also, his
opponents were in an ideological dilemma with the end of the Cold War
bankrupting most of the leftist and Kemalist values. They were attacking
Özal yet they had no prescription for the problems. For example in the
Iraqi Crisis they condemned Iraq for its invasion, yet they could not
provide any policy towards Iraq and United States.111
Thus this ideological
dilemma helped Özal in shaping a new foreign policy.
Özal claimed that entering the Gulf War was a ‘profitable move’ saying
‘this is the most profitable deal of my life. We are betting one getting
three.’112
Despite Özal’s enthusiasm, due to public pressure, Turkey did
not join the war actively, but gave clear support to the alliance forces.
Turkey also allowed American forces to use military bases (like øncirlik in
Adana) in Turkey to bomb Iraqi forces.113
Turkey’s importance was
underlined by the war, and particularly the Americans understood that
Turkey was a vital country for American interests in the Middle East as
Robins noted:
“... the action of President Özal in helping to isolate and
confront the Iraqi regime greatly endeared him to the US
administration and the White House. This in turn brought benefits
on a wide front – from greater access to American markets for
Turkish textiles to help in improving the quality of military
109
Ahmad, The Making, p. 201.
110
Robins, ‘Turkish’, p. 70.
111
Except Bülent Ecevit and Mümtaz Soysal, who argued that Turkey should oppose
the UN-led campaign, almost all opponents of Özal were in favour of implementing
the UN decisions, including Erdal ønönü, President of the leftist-Kemalist Social
Democrat Populist Party, Süleyman Demirel, leader of the right-wing The True Path
Party an d the former coup leader and former President Kenan Evren: Milliyet, 6-7-
8- August 1990; Hürriyet, 8-9 August 1990. Inönü further suggested an international
army against Saddam (Hürriyet, 7 August 1990) while Ecevit opposed any military
action against Iraq, Milliyet, 26 December 1990.
112
Hürriyet, 16-17 January 1991. For some profit was Northern Iraq while Turkish
press viewed the war as an opportunity for Turkey’s EC membership: Hürriyet, 14
August 1990.
113
Hürriyet, 18 January 1991.
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hardware possessed by the armed forces. The US now appears to
place greater value on the importance of Turkey than before.”114
Moreover, after the Gulf War Turkey’s importance as a regional power
rose. On the negative side, however, new troubles appeared, like the
Kurdish problem. When the Kurdish rebellion against Saddam failed, some
700,000 people poured into the Turkish territories. Also the war created a
power vacuum in Northern Iraq, which was filled by the PKK. Thus, the
PKK gained a strategic base to attack Turkey and increased its authority in
this region and south-eastern Turkey. On top of all this, the war caused an
economic and political crisis in Turkey as Turkey lost an important market.
Though Turkey asked for compensation from the West, the aid was
limited.
Post-war Developments
In June 1991, in a defeat for conservative-nationalists, the leading
secular liberal Mesut Yılmaz was elected as the leader of MP. The October
elections indicated the end of the Özal era as Demirel’s Do÷ru Yol Partisi
(True Path Party, TPP) emerged the winner with 27 per cent of the vote.
Yılmaz’s MP came second with 24 per cent. Surprisingly the leftistKemalist
Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti (The Social Democrat Populist
Party, SDPP), that carried out an anti-war and anti-Özal campaign during
the Gulf War fell to third place with 20.8 per cent. Özal continued to
challenge the traditional foreign policy position and blamed the official
understanding of being timid, isolationist, bureaucratic and useless, but the
domestic changes limited his influence over the government and
parliament. According to his close circle115
, Özal thought that he could not
affect Turkish politics from the Presidential Palace, therefore he was
making plans to return the politics as party leader in order to implement his
radical policies including a new foreign policy understanding, and a new
human rights and nation-state concept, which was more tolerant to the
Kurdish groups. However, in the spring of 1993 Turgut Özal died and
never found an opportunity to carry out his ideas. His death increased the
dilemma of Turkish foreign and internal politics. As Çandar pointed out
Özalism continued its effect after Özal’s death116
and many parties
including the MP, TPP and Islamist WP (Welfare Party) claimed Özal’s
heritage.
114
Robins, ‘Turkish’, pp. 85-86.
115
Yusuf Bozkurt Özal, Turgut Özal’s brother told me that Özal prepared a party
program suggesting a more active foreign policy. Author’s interview with Yusuf
Bozkurt Özal, Ankara 15 December 1994.
116
Interview with Cengiz Çandar in Metin Sever and Cem Dizdar, 2. Cumhuriyet
Tartıúmaları (Second Republic Debates), (Ankara: Baúak, 1993).
86$. <($5%22.  
NEO-OTTOMANISM: AN ALTERNATIVE TO
KEMALIST FOREIGN POLICY?
The left and Kemalist groups117
have accused neo-Ottomanism of being
aggressive118
while some European and Greek academics have called it an
irredentist movement, 119
and some in the Western press saw the Özalist
policies as pan-Ottomanist, pan-Turkist, even pan-Islamist march of the
Turks.120
Yet despite its name, neo-Ottomanism is not an aggressive
foreign policy and is not aimed only at the former Ottoman territories. It
looks to the imperial Ottoman past but it is a product of a very different
economic and social structure and is a reaction to a Kemalist isolationist
foreign policy, not an irredentist, expansionist or aggressive foreign policy.
In fact, neo-Ottomanism does not suggest a renewed interest in the former
territories and people of the Ottoman Empire. But it aimed at a certain
organic geopolitical, cultural, and economic relationship that had been
absent during the Cold War and the early Republican years could reemerge
in the new suitable international and regional environment. In the
words of Fuller, ‘It suggests that the Turks may now come to see
themselves once again at the centre of a world re-emerging around them
rather than at the tail-end of a European world that is increasingly
uncertain about whether or not sees Turkey as part of itself.’121
Moreover, because of Özal’s obsession with the economy, his foreign
policy focused on the economic aspects of external relations. For example
for Özal, Turkey’s export-import capacity was far more important than
military capacity.122
For Özal Turkey needed time to develop its economy.
Having developed its economy Turkey would have to follow an active
foreign policy in order to protect its economic interests in the world.
However this protectionism was not aggressive or isolationist. On the
contrary economic interests played a crucial role in Özalist activism and
Özal’s compromise policy in Cyprus and in relations with Greece.
117
Like Mümtaz Soysal, Erdal ønönü and Emin Çölaúan.
118
Emin Çölaúan, Hürriyet (daily, Istanbul), 26 June 1992.
119
Stavrau views Ottomanist orientation as abandonment of the Kemalist philosophical
basis of foreign policy arguing Turkish Balkan policy was based on common
religion instead of secular considerations. Stavrau, ‘The Dismantling’, pp. 45-46.
Also for Ottomanist irredentism see: Constantinides, ‘Turkey’, pp. 323-334;
120
A. Zaman, ‘Ottoman Heirs Seek New Balkan Role’, Sunday Telegraph, 29
November 1992; D. Sneider, ‘Turkey and Iran Play Out New “Great Game” in
Asia’, The Christian Science Monitor, 15-21 May 1992; R. Marthner, Horizon Shift
to Central Asia’, Financial Times, 24 May 1992.
121
Graham E. Fuller, ‘Turkey’s New Eastern Orientation’, in Graham E. Fuller and Ian
O. Lesser (eds.), Turkey’s New Geopolitics, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), p. 48.
122
TRT, 22 November 1991, Zaman 23 November 1991; Hasan Cemal, Özal Hikayesi
(Özal Story), (Ankara: Bilgi, 1990), p. 294.
785*87 g=$/ 3(5,2' ,1 785.,6+ )25(,*1 32/,&<
For Çandar, Özal was against the militarist character of TurkishWestern
relations:
“Turkey, until Özal, saw its relations as political or security
relations. The West needed Turkey, and Turkey used the West’s need
to enter the Western society. For Özal, the only way to join the
Western club was economy. He emphasised that the West has to
accept Turkey as an equal partner if Turkey become a developed
state. Further, Turkey will not need anybody if it success this.”123
Similarly, Özal’s solution to Turkish-Greek and Turkish-Russian
problems was to develop economic ties. As a result, Turkey, in the Özal
period, searched for good relations with the promising foreign markets and
focused on the economic matters more than political ones. Contrary to the
independence-obsessed Kemalist foreign policy, with increasing economic
power, Özal’s Turkey re-gained its confidence in the world and pursued an
internationalist foreign policy, because with rapid economic change not
only the independence concept but also the national interest concept was
changed. Now Turkey’s interest was not in isolationism but in a close
relationship with the world. In other words, Turkey’s new economic
interests had a crucial role in Özalist activism.
In addition to the economic aspects, neo-Ottomanism placed great
importance in the cultural similarities of Turkey to the Middle East, the
Balkans and the Central Asia. In this context, Islam, Turkism, and
Ottomanism were three key concepts. Neo-Ottomanists argued that Turkey
was a natural part of the Islamic, Turkish and Ottoman world and this
provides a suitable ground for economic and political co-operation.124
They
further argued that Turkey could be a perfect model for the countries in
these regions. That is to say, contrary to Kemalist indifference and
isolationist policies, Özalist neo-Ottomanism was very keen to improve
relations with these regions. While Kemal had strictly avoided from setting
out relations based on the Ottoman and Islamic past, Özal particularly
emphasised the importance of these values. For instance, Kemal had seen
the outside Turks as a dangerous issue, although for the neo-Ottomanists
the outside Turks with the Turkish diaspora in Europe were crucial to
improve Turkey’s relations with Germany, Russia and other states.
Integration with the West was another main pillar of neo-Ottomanism,
and for Özal, neither the Islamic nor Turkish world was a viable alternative
to the West. Özal argued that Turkey with its good relations with these
regions would be integrated into the West. In other words, Turkist, Islamist
123
Interview with Cengiz Çandar in Metin Sever and Cem Dizdar, 2. Cumhuriyet
Tartıúmaları (Second Republic Debates), (Ankara: Baúak, 1993).
124
Interview with Cengiz Çandar...
86$. <($5%22.  
and Ottomanist elements in Turkish foreign policy were part of Turkey’s
European integration aim, and Özal never gave up the European Turkey
dream.
Moreover, as a result of his Americanism and ideological
considerations, Özal attached a great importance to relations with United
States. For him, the Americans could understand Turkey more than the
Europeans. Also he argued that the American political model was more
suitable for Turkey because of Turkey’s unique social structure. In
addition, for Özal, the American realist foreign policy suited Turkey’s
foreign policy priorities. In particular in the Middle East and Caucasia, he
saw the United States as a natural ally for Turkey.
The Third World was not a very important issue for Özalist foreign
policy. Unlike the socialists and leftist-Kemalists, Özal did not have an
ideological framework for these countries. Muslim Third World states,
however, had a special place in Ozalist policies. As noted earlier he
restored relations with Iran, Iraq and other Muslim states in his early years.
He also tried to demolish the historical mistrust between the Turks and
Arabs, created partly by the Ottoman experiences, partly by Kemalist
isolationism and Westernism. For example, Özal apologised to the
Algerians for Turkey’s pro-French policies during the Algerian
Independence War.125
Özal saw the Third World countries as export destinations. In
particular, the difficulties in the European and American markets forced
neo-Ottomanists to turn these countries. As a result, Turkey’s political
relations with these countries were almost the same, on the other hand, in
the Özal era, Turkey’s trade with the African and Asian countries increased
by more than % 100.
In conclusion, unlike the Kemalist and leftist foreign policy approaches
Özalism added new dimensions to Turkish foreign policy, like cultural and
economic areas. National interest, independence and many more concepts
of foreign policy were re-defined by Özalism. All these caused a multidimensional
and more internationalist foreign policy understanding. Özal
did not see Islam, Turkism and Ottomanism as an obstacle to Turkey’s
integration into the West, but an important contribution to that ultimate
target. In brief, Özalist foreign policy was a clear deviation from
Kemalism, however it was not an absolute rejection of the Mustafa Kemal
Atatürk’s ideas. In the words of Fuller, ‘it does not represent a wholesale
rejection of Atatürk, but rather a recognition that not every idea and value
of Atatürk has to be forever valid in Turkish consideration of the future.’126
125
Fikret Ertan, ‘Menderes’in ve Türkiye’nin Cesareti’ (Menderes’ and Turkey’s
Courage), Zaman (daily, Istanbul), 26 January 1999.
126
Fuller, ‘Turkey’s’, p. 47.
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In the light of this information it can be said that Özalism was a new
approach and provided a new way in foreign policy. However Özal did not
directly attack Kemalism or Atatürk. On the contrary Özal attacked
Kemalist policies, but on the other hand he said that Atatürk was the
greatest Turkish hero. Özal, instead of attacking Atatürk, attacked ønönü’s
Kemalism. He, in one of his speeches divided Turkish foreign policy
history into two different periods: Atatürk and ønönü period.127
According
to this analysis, Atatürk symbolised a more pragmatic, active and brave
period, while ønönü closed Turkey to the world with his extremely
isolationist, pacific, bureaucratic and etatist policies. Despite the words, as
discussed, Özal’s critics were for Kemalist foreign policy.
CONCLUSION
Özal provided the last challenge to the Republican foreign policy
concept. As a synthesis of Liberalism, Turkism, Islamism and Ottomanism,
Özalism produced Second Republicanism in domestic politics and
Özalism’s liberal, moderate religious, nationalist and economy-oriented
policies produced neo-Ottomanism in foreign policy. However not only
Özal’s ideological orientation but also the radical structural changes in the
Turkish economy and ethnical structure helped to form neo-Ottomanism
and activism in foreign policy. While the Kemalist elite advocated a
pacifist, isolationist and pro-Western foreign policy based on Kemalist
civilisation understanding the Turkish people created its own foreign
policy aims. The state was not Muslim yet the overwhelming majority of
the people were and very close relations with the Muslim world. Also, for
the Kemalist legacy any kind of pan-Turkism was dangerous, therefore, the
Kemalist state machinery had always avoided to develop close relations
with the Turkic groups of the Central Asia, the Balkans, Caucasia and the
Middle East. Özal, with the help of international developments, deserted
this Kemalist tradition as well, and the improvement of relations with the
Turkic World became one of the primary aims of Turkish foreign policy.
With the development of an export-oriented Turkish economy and the
spread of economic welfare and democratisation the ethnic groups of
Turkey created pressure on the governments for co-operation with these
regions. Further, urbanisation and industrialisation nourished Islamic and
traditional values in Turkey and created a suitable environment for
Islamism and Ottomanism. All these changes determined his policies and
127
Gülistan Gürbey, ‘Özal Dönemi Dıú Politikası’, (Foreign Policy in the Özal Period),
in Devlet ve Siyaset Adamı Turgut Özal, (Turgut Özal, as a Statesman and
Politician), (Istanbul: 20 Mayıs Kültür Vakfı, 1996), p. 78. Özal used Atatürk’s
Hatay policy as proof for his activism: Mehmet Barlas, Turgut Özal’ın Anıları
(Turgut Özal’s Memoirs), (Istanbul: 1994), p. 127.
86$. <($5%22.  
helped Özal to develop a new foreign policy understanding. Indeed, Özalist
foreign policy was a direct response to these internal changes. It was also a
response to international developments. The European unwillingness to
integrate Turkey and the end of the Cold War left no alternative for Turkey
but the Balkans, Caucasia, Black Sea, Middle East and Central Asia. In
addition to the growing Turkish economy’s interests towards these regions,
the peoples of these countries turned towards Ankara. As a result, Turkish
foreign policy dramatically shifted from isolationist Kemalist policies
towards a more active foreign policy. Despite Atatürk’s neglectful policy
Turkey developed close economic, cultural and political relations with the
Muslim world, Turkic states and with former Ottoman nations, like
Bulgarians and Albanians.
In conclusion, Özal combined Islamist, Turkist and Ottomanist values
under Özalism or neo-Ottomanism while the internal and international
developments undermined the Republican orthodoxy. Moreover, the left
lost its persuasiveness with the collapse of the communist block. As a
result, despite the Republican state machinery, Özalism with its popular
support became the most significant foreign policy alternative for Turkey.
For a first time in the Republican history the people’s foreign policy goals
and the government’s foreign policy goals did not contradict. In summary
Özal’s economy-oriented, Turkist, ‘Islamist’, Ottomanist, Westernist and
active foreign policy understanding demolished many Republican taboos in
foreign policy. Turkey started to interest in Ottoman, Muslim and Turkic
territories; changed its priorities and aimed to be a regional power in its
region. As a final word, in these years Özal’s ideology, international
developments and the internal changes in Turkey determined Turkey’s
foreign policy and in doing so they left permanent mark on Turkish
politics.