7
Fallacies (1)
Q
ESSENTIALS
When evaluating argumentative discourse, fallacies in the discourse
must be detected. Fallacies are violations of the rules
for critical discussion that prevent or hinder the resolution
of a difference of opinion. They can occur during any of the discussion stages
and can be committed by either party. In the presentation of standpoints and
arguments, the following moves are among the fallacies that may threaten
the resolution process: (1) putting the opponent under pressure or attacking
him personally (violation of freedom rule), (2) evading or shifting the burden
of proof (violation of burden-of-proof rule), (3) setting up a straw man
(violation of standpoint rule), (4) using irrelevant argumentation or rhetorical
tricks (violation of relevance rule), and (5) denying or magnifying an
unexpressed premise (violation of unexpressed premise rule).
7.1 VIOLATIONS OF THE FREEDOM RULE
There are a variety of ways in which parties to a difference of opinion
can make resolution difficult or even impossible. This can happen
during any stage of the discussion. Parties do not always do this on
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purpose. But each way of impeding the progress of the discussion
constitutes a violation of the discussion rules that must be followed
in order to successfully resolve a difference of opinion. Such violations
of the discussion rules are known as fallacies.
Violations are often difficult to spot. That is what is so treacherous
about fallacies. Strictly speaking, there can be a fallacy in discourse
only if the discourse is argumentative in nature, that is, if it is an attempt
to resolve a difference of opinion. But not every discussion is
argumentative; a discussion may be purely informative or be intended
to entertain. In case of doubt, it is advisable to treat a discourse
as an argumentative discussion and assume that both parties
are willing to work toward a resolution of their difference of opinion
and will follow the rules for doing this.
There are 10 rules that apply specifically to argumentative discussions.
The first 5 rules pertain to how parties should put forward
their standpoints and arguments in order to work constructively toward
a resolution of the difference of opinion. These rules are discussed
in this chapter. The other 5 rules pertain to the argumentation
and the conclusion of the discussion. These rules are discussed in
chapter 8. Although observing these 10 rules does not guarantee that
the difference of opinion will be satisfactorily resolved, violating
them will surely prevent such a resolution. Fallacies can be identified
by referring to these rules.
Rule 1: Parties Must Not Prevent Each Other From Putting
Forward Standpoints or Casting Doubt on Standpoints
A difference of opinion can be satisfactorily resolved only if it is first
brought to light. To avoid interfering with this process, parties to a
discussion must give each other unlimited freedom to put forward
and to criticize standpoints and arguments. This requirement is
stated in Rule 1.
Violations of Rule 1 sometimes occur during the confrontation
stage. The result is that the difference of opinion does not come to
light, or not completely, and therefore has no chance of being resolved.
Rule 1 can be violated in two ways: by placing limits on the
standpoints or doubts that may be expressed, or by restricting a
party’s freedom of action.
One way to limit the expression of standpoints and doubts is to declare
certain standpoints sacrosanct, or not open to question:
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I’m going to have the kitchen remodeled. We can discuss style
and layout or anything you want, but not whether it will be
done.
Another way of imposing limitations is to declare certain standpoints
taboo:
I don’t think you should say that Grandmother shouldn’t
have remarried. One should not speak ill of the dead.
Restricting the other party’s freedom of action is an attempt to dismiss
him as a serious party to the discussion. Two ways of doing this
are (a) to put him under pressure not to put forward a certain standpoint
or objection or (b) to discredit him in the eyes of the public by
casting doubt on his expertise, integrity, or credibility.
There are many ways to prevent a standpoint or an objection from
being presented. The most effective of these is, of course, to keep the
opponent out of the discussion by using physical force. Simply the
threat of violence or other sanctions may also be quite effective.
Any threat that aims to restrict the other party from freely putting
forward his standpoint or criticism is called a fallacy of the stick (argumentum
ad baculum). Sometimes the threat is expressed very directly:
“If you try to get the city council to approve that, I will send my thugs
after you.” Usually it is done in a more subtle way. Indirect reference
may be made to unpleasant consequences for the other party if the
speaker does not get his way: “Of course you must make your own decision,
but remember that we’re one of your top clients.” Or the
speaker may emphatically deny any intention of putting on pressure:
“I certainly wouldn’t want you to be influenced by the fact that I happen
to be chair of the committee that will be evaluating your work.”
Another effective way of putting pressure on the other party is to
play on his emotions: “How can you have given me a failing mark for
my thesis? I’ve worked on it night and day.” Such a fallacious move is
called an appeal to pity (argumentum ad misericordiam).
In addition to threats, emotional blackmail, and other ways of restricting
the other party’s moves, there are also ways to discredit
him. Presenting the other party to listeners as stupid, unreliable, biased,
or otherwise unworthy of credibility is a way to make sure his
arguments will fall on deaf ears. It in effect denies him the right to
participate in the discussion by convincing the audience that there is
no use listening to him. In principle, personal characteristics of the
other party should not be brought into the discussion unless they
FALLACIES (1) 111
play a direct role in it, for example because the reliability of a witness
is under question.
A personal attack is characterized by being directed not at the intrinsic
merits of someone’s standpoint or doubt, but at the person itself.
The traditional Latin name for this fallacy is argumentum ad hominem.
There are various kinds of personal attacks. One type is a direct
personal attack on the other party, which, because of its insulting nature,
is called the abusive variant:
It made me so drowsy to read his response in last week’s edition
that I will not even take the trouble to reply to his musings.
The man is weak in the head, and blessed are the
innocent of spirit.
In a direct personal attack, what is being kicked is the person rather
than the ball. The impression is given that someone stupid or evil
could not possibly have a correct standpoint or a reasonable doubt.
Attackers hope in this way to be relieved of the obligation to give reasons
for their criticism of the other party’s position.
In the second type, suspicion is cast on the other party’s motives,
for example by suggesting that the party has a personal interest in the
matter and is therefore biased. This is an indirect personal attack that is
known as the circumstantial variant. The following passage from a letter
to the editor contains such an indirect personal attack:
Marilyn French believes that men are the cause of the disadvantaged
position of women and of environmental problems.
I cannot avoid the impression that French must at some
time in the past have washed the dirty socks of a man she did
not love much, and therefore stopped thinking.
In an indirect personal attack, someone’s opinion is claimed to derive
from suspect personal motives, and the arguments advanced are unmasked
as rationalizations.
In the third type of an argumentum ad hominem, an attempt is made
to undermine the other party’s credibility by pointing out a contradiction
in that party’s words or deeds, for example a contradiction
between their opinions in the past and the present, or between what
they say and what they do. This type is called the you also variant (tu
quoque): You also do or think differently from what could reasonably
be expected. The following letter to the editor argues that there is a
contradiction between Mrs. Gardner’s opinions on the AFP test and
her own behavior:
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Mrs. A. Gardner discourages people from participating in the
so-called AFP test, which measures the chances of a pregnant
woman having a baby with spina bifida or Down’s syndrome.
Mrs. Gardner knows all about the consequences of the AFP
test. So why did she have such an AFP test done herself? Because
in fact she preferred not to have a mongoloid baby?
The reasoning behind the you also variant is that anyone who is not
consistent cannot be right. Anyone who does not practice what he or
she preaches is, of course, being inconsistent. But this does not automatically
mean that their standpoint is wrong. To be able to establish
the acceptability of the standpoint, the arguments must first be eval-
uated.
Note that pointing out inconsistencies is a fallacy only if it is based
on inconsistency with a standpoint that the opponent has advanced
outside the discussion. If someone puts forward contradictory
standpoints or arguments in the course of the discussion, then it is
not a fallacy to point this out. On the contrary, identifying inconsistencies
in the discussion itself is a necessary part of the evaluation.
7.2 VIOLATIONS OF THE BURDEN-OF-PROOF RULE
Rule 2: A Party Who Puts Forward a Standpoint Is Obliged
to Defend It if Asked to Do So
To resolve a difference of opinion, a person who puts forward a
standpoint must be prepared to defend this standpoint, and a person
who calls a standpoint into question must be prepared to assume the
role of antagonist. This latter requirement seldom poses a problem
because someone who voluntarily criticizes a standpoint can hardly
object to taking on the role of antagonist. However, not everyone
who expresses a standpoint is eager to actually defend it.
Protagonists can be released from the obligation to defend their
standpoint if they have previously defended it successfully against
the same antagonist and if nothing has changed in either the starting
points or the discussion rules. In this case, the defense would be a
pointless repetition. Protagonists can also be released from the obligation
to defend their standpoint if their opponents refuse to commit
themselves to anything and are not prepared to follow the rules. In
such a situation, it would be pointless to defend the standpoint because
the necessary conditions for resolving the disagreement are
not met.
FALLACIES (1) 113
Rule 2 is violated when someone tries to get out of the obligation to
defend a standpoint. If they get away with it, the discussion will stagnate
in the opening stage, in which it is determined who is protagonist
and who is antagonist.
The most drastic way to escape the obligation to defend your
standpoint is to shift the burden of proof onto the person criticizing
the standpoint: “You first prove that it isn’t so.” This is committing
the fallacy of shifting the burden of proof.
In a nonmixed difference of opinion, only one party puts forward a
standpoint, so there is only one party who has anything to defend. In
this case, shifting the burden of proof is entirely unjustified because
someone who criticizes a standpoint does not bear any burden of
proof. The antagonist is then being saddled with the role of protagonist
of the opposite standpoint, even though the antagonist has not
advanced a standpoint at all. The following text gives a good example
of the use of this trick in Holland, where viewers are obliged to
pay TV tax:
The Minister of Cultural Affairs mentions “the successful
hunt for TV tax evaders.” That is a good example of a fallacy.
The hunt goes like this: on March 11 you receive a letter from
the TV tax office that announces “A different look at your favorite
program.” You read that your name and address are
not in “our database” and since “these days nearly every
home has a television,” you are asked to pay your TV tax. Let
us assume that you are one of the few persons who have no
time to watch TV or no interest in what TV has to offer. You
have no TV in your home. You would like to just throw away
the unpleasant letter, but you can’t just do that. There is a
form that you have to fill out stating that you have no TV.
What the Minister of Cultural Affairs calls a “successful
hunt” is a plain and simple shifting of the burden of proof.
In a mixed difference of opinion, the situation is more complicated.
Because both parties have advanced a standpoint, they each have an
obligation to defend their own standpoint. The only decision to be
made is in what order they should present their defenses.
This problem of deciding the order of defense is often incorrectly
seen as a problem of choice. One party often attempts to lay the burden
of proof at the door of the other party, usually the one who is attacking
received wisdom, established opinion, traditional views, or
the existing state of affairs. The burden of proof then rests with the
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party who wants to change the status quo; he or she must prove that
the proposed alternative is better. In the terminology of criminal law,
one can say that the status quo has the status of presumption. In the
following text this principle of presumption is appealed to:
Supporters of the change are demanding that opponents
show that reducing working hours would have undesirable
consequences, such as reduced demand for labor or stagnation
of the economy. But in fact, it is customary that supporters
of a far-reaching measure (and reducing working hours is
indeed far-reaching) must show that such a measure will
have a beneficial effect, rather than that the other side must
show that it may have harmful consequences.
Applying the principle of presumption, however, must not result in
the burden of proof in a mixed dispute being assigned unilaterally to
one of the parties.
Another criterion that can help decide the order in which standpoints
are to be defended in mixed disputes is a principle known in
civil law as the principle of fairness. According to this principle, the
standpoint that is easiest to defend should be defended first. A legal
expert, Mr. Maarten Henket, once gave a good example of apportioning
the burden of proof according to the principle of fairness:
An example of an exception to the rule “He who makes a
claim must prove it” can be found in alimony cases. Let us
take the familiar situation of a woman who has a right to alimony
from her ex-husband. The woman notices that her
ex-husband’s income has gone up and wants more alimony.
According to the rule just stated, she should have to prove
that his income has risen. That is very difficult, in view of
bank privacy and so on, and in practice the judge shifts the
burden of proof to the husband: he must put his papers on the
table and then it will be seen whether his income has gone up
or not. This conflicts with the rule “He who makes a claim
must prove it.”
The principle of presumption and the principle of fairness may help
in certain situations when deciding what order to follow, but a mixed
difference of opinion can never be completely resolved in an argumentative
discussion unless both of the parties meet the obligation to
defend their standpoints. A subtle way to avoid the obligation to defend
a standpoint is to present the standpoint as something that
FALLACIES (1) 115
needs no proof at all. The protagonist in this case is guilty of committing
the fallacy of evading the burden of proof. A person commits this
fallacy when presenting the standpoint as something that is self-evident:
“It is obvious that …,” “Nobody in their right mind would deny
that …,” “It goes without saying that ….” If this ploy works, antagonists
may feel overwhelmed and fail to voice their doubts.
The protagonist can sometimes achieve a similar effect by giving a
personal guarantee for the correctness of the standpoint: “I can assure
you that …,” “There is no doubt in my mind that …,” “I am absolutely
convinced that …,” “You can take it from me that ….”
Another ploy for evading the burden of proof is to formulate the
standpoint in a way that amounts to making it immune to criticism because
it cannot be tested or evaluated. Examples of such hermetic formulations
of standpoints are “Women are by nature possessive,” “Men are
basically hunters,” “The Frenchman is essentially intolerant,” and “The
youth of today are lazy.” These standpoints refer to “men,” “women,”
“the youth,” “the Frenchman,” avoiding quantifiers such as “all,”
“some,” “most,” or “the average.” Often, intangible (essentialistic) qualifications,
such as “essentially,” “real,” “by nature,” are used as well. Because
of the imprecise formulation, it is unclear how the standpoint in
question can be satisfactorily defended or refuted. How many examples
or counterexamples are needed? If an attempt is made to refute the
standpoint “Women are by nature possessive” by citing one or more examples
of women who are not possessive, the opponent will most likely
claim that these counterexamples are irrelevant because the women
cited in these examples are not “real” women or are not acting according
to their “true nature.” All attempts at refutation thus bounce off an
armor of immunity.
7.3 VIOLATIONS OF THE STANDPOINT RULE
Rule 3: A Party’s Attack on a Standpoint Must Relate to the
Standpoint That Has Indeed Been Advanced by the Other Party
Rule 3 is violated when the standpoint attacked is not the standpoint
that was originally put forward by the protagonist. This causes a
shift in the proposition with respect to which one party adopts a positive
and the other party a neutral standpoint, so that in effect, and often
without it being noticed, the difference of opinion becomes
multiple. If parties talk at cross purposes like this, it will be impossible
for them to resolve the original disagreement. Even if the dis-
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agreement seems to be resolved, it will be, at most, a spurious
resolution. What the one party seems to have successfully defended
is not the same as what the other party has attacked.
Such shifts in standpoint can occur during any stage of the discussion.
It may happen at the very beginning of the discussion, in the confrontation
stage, if the antagonist’s criticism turns out to be directed at
a different standpoint than the one the protagonist has advanced. During
the opening stage, the parties may be referring to a different proposition
than the one that formed the starting point of the discussion in
the confrontation stage. During the argumentation stage, it may be
that the arguments of the protagonist and the antagonist relate to two
different propositions. In addition, the conclusion of the discussion
may be worded in such a way that it, in fact, relates to a proposition
somewhat different from the one in the original dispute.
There are two different ways of attacking a standpoint that is not
really the one presented by the opponent. The original standpoint
can be misrepresented, or a fictitious standpoint can be attributed to
the opponent. In either case, the strategy is more likely to succeed
with an audience that does not know exactly what the opponent’s
original standpoint was.
Parties who misrepresent the opponent’s standpoint or attribute a
fictitious standpoint to him or her commit the fallacy of the straw
man. In both cases, they plan their attack by taking the path of least resistance:
They attribute to their opponent a standpoint that can be attacked
more easily. By distorting their opponent’s standpoint, they
set up a straw man that they can easily knock down. In the most extreme
case, the standpoint attacked does not show any resemblance
to the original standpoint, but sometimes the two standpoints differ
only in details.
One of the techniques for attributing a fictitious standpoint to the
other party is to emphatically put forward the opposite standpoint. If
someone says firmly, “I personally believe the defense of our democracy
is of great importance,” she thereby suggests that her opponent
thinks otherwise. If the opponent does not hasten to declare that he
too is a great champion of democracy, he immediately draws on himself
the suspicion that he does not support democracy.
Another way of attributing a fictitious standpoint to the opponent
is to refer to a group to which the opponent belongs and to link that
group with the fictitious standpoint:
She says that she thinks this research is useful, but as a business
person she naturally sees it as a waste of money.
FALLACIES (1) 117
Here the speaker implies that it is obvious what this group (business
people) thinks about this matter and that what applies to the group
applies to all individual members of the group.
In a third technique, not only the standpoint is fictitious, but the
opponent too. By using expressions such as “Nearly everyone thinks
that …,” “Educators are of the opinion that …,” and “Everyone has
been saying lately that …,” it is not stated who actually holds the
standpoint being attacked. There is no reference made to surveys,
opinion polls, or other evidence that there really are people who adhere
to the standpoint.
When the opponent’s standpoint is misrepresented, it is presented
in a way that makes it more difficult to defend, or even untenable or
ridiculous. This is often achieved by taking a standpoint out of context,
by oversimplifying it, or by exaggerating it, as in the following
complaint:
The result is very discouraging because of the way he goes
about things: quoting some sentences completely out of context,
suggesting meanings that aren’t there, and finally, with
several well-chosen exaggerations—which aren’t there either—making
the prey ripe for his omniscient and omnivorous
voracity. I find this a superficial way of discussing
academic work.
Exaggerating a standpoint by generalizing it may be accomplished
by leaving out quantifiers like “some” and “a few” and replacing
them with “all.” The resulting standpoint is much easier to attack. If
you are defending the standpoint that some men are oversensitive,
your job is done as soon as you have given a couple of examples of
oversensitive men. Defending the standpoint that “all” men are
oversensitive is naturally much more difficult; your opponent has
only to give one example of an insensitive man to show that your
standpoint is untenable.
Techniques often used in simplifying standpoints are to leave out
nuances and restrictions. Agood example of the first is accusing someone
of having written that homeopaths are charlatans, whereas what
the person had actually written was that homeopaths are a group “in
which the line between legitimate and charlatan is very fuzzy.”
If the original formulation of the disputed standpoint can be consulted,
it is possible to verify whether it has been represented accurately.
This is difficult if the original formulation is not available.
Sometimes, however, the representation is so improbable that it is
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immediately suspect. An example of such a suspect representation of
a standpoint occurs in a Senator’s response to a Deputy Health Secretary’s
argumentation for his plans to promote sports as leisure-time
pursuits:
The first argument, whose unsoundness is obvious, has to do
with the costs of health care. The Deputy Secretary is afraid
that parts of the body that are little used will quickly become
brittle or fall off, after which the help of the medical establishment—charging
for a single day what an average person
earns in a month—will be needed. Since sports trainers are
cheaper than surgeons, health care costs can be reduced if
more people participate in sports.
In other cases, it helps to watch out for certain signals in the way the
standpoint is represented. Some skepticism is called for when the
speaker too emphatically proclaims the opponent’s standpoint:
“Clearly the author is of the opinion that …,” “The author obviously
assumes that …” Although the formulations suggest otherwise, it often
turns out that the standpoint proclaimed was not the author’s
standpoint.
7.4 VIOLATIONS OF THE RELEVANCE RULE
Rule 4: A Party May Defend His or Her Standpoint Only
by Advancing Argumentation Related to That Standpoint
Rule 4 places two minimum requirements on the defense of standpoints:
The defense must be conducted by means of arguments, and
those arguments must be genuinely relevant to the standpoint being
defended. If the antagonist fails to notice that these requirements
have not been met, he or she may end up accepting the standpoint on
the basis of an irrelevant argument. In this case, the difference of
opinion has not really been resolved.
Violations of Rule 4 occur during the argumentation stage. There
are two kinds of violations. The first is when the argumentation has
no relation whatsoever to the standpoint that was advanced in the
confrontation stage. This is a case of irrelevant argumentation. The second
kind of violation is when a standpoint is defended with means
other than argumentation, while at the same time the protagonist
acts as though he or she were providing argumentation. This is called
non-argumentation.
FALLACIES (1) 119
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Irrelevant argumentation, in fact, defends a standpoint that is not
the standpoint that caused the difference of opinion. Just as in the
case of the straw man, there is a shift in the proposition to which the
standpoint relates. But in the case of irrelevant argumentation, it is
the protagonist who distorts his or her own standpoint. Instead of
making it easier to attack, the shift is intended to make the standpoint
easier to defend. Then the fallacy is committed of putting forward
argumentation relevant only to a standpoint that is not the one at
issue, which is better known as ignoratio elenchi. Here is an example:
Amateur sports are being ruined by all the alcohol that is sold
at sports canteens, because research shows that 85% of all
sports canteens sell alcohol.
At first sight the argument and the standpoint seem to be related, but
actually the argument (alcohol is sold in 85% of all sports canteens)
does not support the standpoint that “amateur sports are being ruined
by all the alcohol that is sold at sports canteens.” The argument
would, however, support a different standpoint: “It is easy to buy alcohol
in sports canteens.”
When non-argumentation is used, it is not usually for the purpose
of convincing the other party, but of winning over a third party. Instead
of putting forward argumentation to support the standpoint at
issue, the protagonist plays on the emotions, sentiments or biases of
the intended audience. If we use the classical categories of means of
persuasion—logos, ethos, and pathos—we could say that pathos takes
the place of logos here. That is why playing on the emotions of the audience
is called a pathetic fallacy.
Pathetic fallacies generally thrive in public discussions about
which many people have strong feelings. In such situations, whoever
most successfully manipulates the (positive or negative) feelings of
the audience has the best chance of having a standpoint accepted. Examples
of positive emotions that can be appealed to are feelings of security
or loyalty. Examples of negative emotions that can be
appealed to are fear, greed, and shame. The following letter to the editor
accuses one of the participants in a discussion on anti-terrorism
of playing on people’s sentiments:
When Mr. Carter talks about innocent women and children
who have been victims of terrorism, he is playing unfairly on
the sentiments of the members of the jury. Because in fact it is
just as terrible a thing when the victims are men, whether
they are ordinary men, police agents, or soldiers.
FALLACIES (1) 121
Appeals to prejudices and emotions are not normally presented as if they
were arguments. It often suffices to emphasize in an emotional way the
significance of certain interests or values. The audience itself will make
the desired connection between these and the standpoint at issue.
In addition to the rhetorical means of persuasion pathos, a protagonist
may also make use of ethos. Aristotle believed this means to be
the most effective. Speakers use ethos when they attempt to decide
the difference of opinion in their favor on the strength of their own
expertise or good character. They attempt to increase the audience’s
faith in their expertise, credibility, or integrity, so that the audience
will simply take their word for the standpoint’s acceptability. If a
protagonist has a particularly strong ethos, he or she may not need to
present any defense at all for the standpoint.
In itself, there is nothing wrong with making use of ethos. In many
cases, there is no other choice than to accept something on the authority
of experts. Certain topics require so much specialized knowledge
that laypeople cannot independently verify them. In other instances,
the protagonist may be the only witness to a certain event or the only
one who can verify the accuracy of a certain statement. Examples of
this are statements about the speaker’s own mood or physical
well-being. There is nothing wrong with depending on someone
else’s judgment in such cases, but it is important to realize that a difference
of opinion cannot really be resolved in this way because it is
left to the expert to settle the dispute.
Something to watch out for, however, is when a person who claims
to have expertise does not actually possess it or when the expertise is
not relevant to the matter at hand. Then the ethical fallacy of abuse of authority
is committed (which is on a par with the fallacy that is traditionally
known as argumentum ad verecundiam). An example of this is when
someone suggests, without providing actual argumentation, that he
or she possesses the required amount of expertise on the basis of being
a professor and proceeds to make statements about the dangers of nuclear
energy, when in fact his field of expertise is Egyptology.
7.5 VIOLATIONS OF THE UNEXPRESSED PREMISE RULE
Rule 5: A Party May Not Falsely Present Something as a Premise
That Has Been Left Unexpressed by the Other Party or Deny
a Premise That He or She Has Left Implicit
Violations of Rule 5 are related to the fact that in everyday language,
all kinds of things are implied or are expressed only indirectly.
Parties to a discussion of course should not try to take improper advantage
of implicit or indirect language. That is what happens when
the antagonist attacks the protagonist by producing a reconstruction
of the unexpressed premise that goes further than what the protagonist
can actually be held to. Exaggerating the unexpressed premise
makes the standpoint easier to attack, and the fallacy is called magnifying
what has been left unexpressed. Protagonists can violate Rule 5 by
refusing to accept commitment to an unexpressed premise implied
by their own defense, thereby committing the fallacy of denying an
unexpressed premise.
Violations of Rule 5 occur during the argumentation stage. The result
is that the difference of opinion cannot be brought to resolution
because parties deny their commitments or put words in each other’s
mouth. Rule 5 essentially means that protagonists can be held to
nothing they are not really committed to and to everything they really
are committed to.
The fallacy of magnifying an unexpressed premise consists of adding
an unexpressed premise that goes beyond what is warranted and
attributing a premise to the protagonist that goes beyond the commitments
created by the protagonist’s defense. In the following example,
Heather commits this fallacy:
Jerome: It could be that he doesn’t like dogs very much, because
he has a cat.
Heather: So you think that everyone who has a cat by definition
hates dogs?
Jerome: No, I didn’t say that. I only mean that there are a lot of
cat owners who don’t much like dogs.
Given the cautious way Jerome has formulated his standpoint (“It
could be …”), it is incorrect to attribute to him the unexpressed
premise that everyone who has a cat by definition hates dogs. Furthermore,
“not liking dogs much” is not the same as “hating dogs.” In
this respect as well, Heather has exaggerated what Jerome left unex-
pressed.
Speakers commit the fallacy of denying an unexpressed premise if
they refuse responsibility for elements that are indeed implied by
their defense. If the opponent correctly makes explicit something
that is implied by the protagonist’s argumentation, then the protagonist
commits a fallacy by denying it. By hiding behind the claim “I
never said that,” the protagonist stands in the way of true resolution
of the disagreement.
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FALLACIES (1) 123
The inclination to deny unexpressed premises is strongest when
they contain weak or controversial elements. The following is a good
example:
I have nothing against homosexuals. I just think that the age
of consent for homosexual sex should not be lowered, because
of the danger that young boys would be pushed into becoming
homosexuals.
The use of the word “danger” is clear evidence that the speaker does
not really have the tolerant attitude claimed in the first sentence: The
unexpressed premise in this argumentation is that homosexuality is
something that should be prevented if at all possible.
FURTHER READING
An influential historical study of fallacies is C. L. Hamblin, Fallacies,
London: Methuen, 1970, reprinted by Vale Press, Newport News, VA.
A formally oriented approach to the fallacies is also taken in J. Woods
and D. Walton, The Logic of the Fallacies, Toronto: McGraw-Hill:
Ryerson, 1982. The pragma-dialectical approach to the fallacies is explained
in F. H. van Eemeren and R. Grootendorst, Argumentation,
Communication, and Fallacies: A Pragma-Dialectical Perspective,
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1992, chapters 8–19. An
overview of the state of the art in the study of the fallacies is provided
by F. H. van Eemeren in F. H. van Eemeren (Ed.), Crucial Concepts in Argumentation
Theory, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2001,
chapter 6.
8
Fallacies (2)
Q
ESSENTIALS
Among the fallacies that may occur in the argumentation stage are
(6) falsely treating a starting point as agreed on, or denying a
commitment to something that was an agreed-on starting point
(violation of starting point rule), (7) using an inappropriate argument
scheme or using an argument scheme incorrectly (violation of argument
scheme rule), and (8) using invalid reasoning (violation of validity rule). In
the concluding stage of the discussion (9) unwarranted consequences may
be attached to a successful defense or a failed defense (violation of closure
rule). Finally (10), the resolution of a difference of opinion can be obstructed
during any stage of the discussion by the use of unclear or ambiguous language
(violation of usage rule).
8.1 VIOLATIONS OF THE STARTING POINT RULE
To satisfactorily resolve a difference of opinion, the parties to a discussion
must give each other the freedom to express the difference of
opinion, must be prepared to accept the burden of proof for their
standpoints by presenting argumentation in their defense, must not
127
falsely attribute standpoints or arguments to the other party, and
must not try to dissociate themselves from the standpoints or arguments
to which they have committed themselves. Although it is a big
step forward if all these rules are followed, it is not sufficient. The arguments
advanced should also meet several requirements.
A difference of opinion is resolved in favor of the protagonist if he
conclusively defends his standpoint; otherwise, it is resolved in favor
of the antagonist. The defense can be regarded as conclusive only
if the arguments of the defense are directly acceptable to the opponent
because they form part of the common starting points, or if they
are acceptable because they are based on valid reasoning and appropriate
argument schemes. If the parties fail to observe the rules for
the conclusive defense of standpoints, their argumentation will contain
fallacies that make their defense unacceptable.
Rule 6: No Party May Falsely Present a Premise as an Accepted
Starting Point, or Deny a Premise Representing an Accepted
Starting Point
Just as it is pointless to have a discussion with someone who refuses
to abide by any discussion rules, it also makes no sense to have a discussion
with someone who will not commit himself to any starting
points. In order to resolve a difference of opinion, both parties must
have in common some minimum of facts, beliefs, norms, and value
hierarchies. If they cannot agree on any of these, they will never succeed
in convincing each other of the acceptability of any standpoint.
Ultimately, the defense of a standpoint rests on some set of statements
that are acceptable to both parties.
Explicit agreements about common starting points are rare.
Parties normally operate on the assumption that they share certain
starting points. The better the parties know each other, the more
likely it is that their assumptions about common starting points are
accurate. Then it will sometimes be unnecessary to come to an explicit
agreement about starting points.
The protagonist and antagonist do not actually have to believe
that the propositions serving as common starting points are all true
or acceptable, but they must conduct the discussion as if they believed
this. Sometimes a proposition is temporarily accepted as true
only in order to test its acceptability or even to demonstrate that it is
unacceptable because it has untenable consequences. This would not
be possible if both parties had to really believe in the acceptability of
all of the starting points.
128 CHAPTER 8
Rule 6 is violated if a party falsely presents a premise as belonging to
the common starting points or denies a premise that does in fact belong to
the starting points.
The antagonist violates Rule 6 if he questions either a proposition
that was agreed on as a common starting point or one that the protagonist,
based on verifiable background information, may rightly assume
the antagonist to be committed to. A proposition with the
status of starting point may not be questioned in the discussion. Of
course, the proposition can always be questioned later in a separate
discussion. If all assumptions are open to question at the same time,
there cannot be a meaningful discussion, and the difference of opinion
will never be resolved. The same is true if an antagonist in the
middle of the discussion suddenly starts questioning a previously
agreed-on proposition for opportunistic reasons: “But did I ever say
the earth is round?,” “But what is wrong with incest anyway?”
The protagonist violates Rule 6 if he acts as though a certain proposition
was accepted as a starting point when that is not the case. A familiar
trick for preventing a proposition from being attacked is to
formulate something controversial in such an inconspicuous way
that it is not noticed. This can be done by presenting the controversial
proposition as a presupposition (an assumption tacitly assumed by
the speaker) of another statement; for example, instead of directly
saying “Fred is addicted to gambling,” saying something like “I can’t
understand why Fred doesn’t do something about that gambling addiction.”
In the second formulation, Fred’s addiction to gambling is
assumed, thus falsely giving the impression that the addiction is an
established fact.
The protagonist can make unfair use of presuppositions not only
in making assertions but also in asking questions:
Who have you quarreled with today?
If it has not yet been established that any quarreling took place, then
the formulation of this question is misleading because it creates the
impression that it is a common starting point that there has been a
quarrel. To go about it properly, the question would need to be split
in two: “Have you quarreled with anyone today?” and “Who have
you quarreled with?” Asking the question in its original form is an
example of the fallacy of many questions.
Another way protagonists sometimes wrongly assume that a
proposition belongs to the common starting points is when in defending
their standpoints they use an argument that amounts to the
FALLACIES (2) 129
130 CHAPTER 8
same thing as the standpoint. Because the standpoint is precisely that
which is being debated, they know very well that a statement that is
identical to or synonymous with the standpoint cannot possibly belong
to the common starting points. If they nevertheless act as
though it does, they are committing the fallacy of circular reasoning
(also called begging the question or petitio principii).
Here is a simple example of circular reasoning:
Racial discrimination is a punishable offense because it’s
against the law.
The circularity is perhaps not immediately obvious, until one realizes
that “a punishable offense” implies violating the law. Thus, the
argument and the standpoint in this example are nearly identical. A
less obvious example of circular reasoning was challenged by Rudy
Kousbroek (1970):
In a recent issue of Tirade, G. van het Reve berates someone
who took recourse to W.F. Hermans’s motto: “the human being
is a chemical process just like any other.” Van het Reve attacked
the motto by saying “I have never had a letter from a
chemical process.” This is a classic case of using that which
has not been proved as proof: assuming the motto is correct,
then Van het Reve will regularly and exclusively receive letters
from chemical processes. (p. 37)
8.2 VIOLATIONS OF THE ARGUMENT SCHEME RULE
Rule 7: A Standpoint May Not Be Regarded as Conclusively
Defended if the Defense Does Not Take Place by Means
of an Appropriate Argument Scheme That Is Correctly Applied
Even if all of the statements making up the argumentation are accepted
by both parties, the defense cannot be considered successful if
these statements do not adequately support the standpoint (or whatever
part of the argumentation they were intended to support). Only
if the protagonist uses an appropriate argument scheme for his defense
and applies that scheme correctly can the defense be judged
successful. If the protagonist uses an inappropriate argument scheme or
applies a scheme in an incorrect way, then he or she violates Rule 7. Such
violations occur during the argumentation stage.
Some argument schemes are rarely acknowledged to be sound.
The odds are that the opponent will not accept these schemes, so that
FALLACIES (2) 131
a violation of Rule 7 occurs. One such scheme (a variant of argumentation
based on a symptomatic relation) is the populist fallacy (argumentum
ad populum). In the populist fallacy, the opinion of some
number of people is used in arguing for the acceptance of the standpoint:
It is claimed the standpoint should be accepted because so
many people agree with it. However, in the following example it is
pointed out that this is not true:
Hundreds of thousands of cheering readers, viewers, or listeners
are no proof at all of the correctness of an idea, and it is
pure demagoguery to use their opinion as an argument.
Another well-recognized unsound way of arguing is to appeal inappropriately
to a causal relation. The mistake of confusing facts with
value judgments is a fallacy that is traditionally known as the argumentum
ad consequentiam. In support of a standpoint with a factual proposition,
an argument is advanced that is normative because it points
out undesirable effects of the standpoint: “It isn’t true, because I
don’t want it to be true” or “It’s true, because I want it to be true.” An
example of ad consequentiam is:
It can’t be raining, because that would mean we’d have to
cancel our picnic.
Even if the argument scheme itself is appropriate, not all ways of applying
it are correct. If an argument scheme is correctly applied, then
all critical questions corresponding to this scheme can be satisfactorily
answered. For example, in committing a fallacy of abuse of authority (argumentum
ad verecundiam), a proposition is presented as acceptable because
some person or written source that is inappropriately presented
as an authority says that it is so. This is a wrong application of a particular
kind of argumentation based on a symptomatic relation.
Another example of improper use of an argument scheme based
on a symptomatic relation is the fallacy of hasty generalization
(secundum quid). The fallacy here is generalizing on the evidence of
too few observations:
After having spent our 1991 vacation in Cuba, we went there
again in 1992, which shows that it’s a great place for tourists.
The fact that one tourist couple is prepared to visit Cuba twice in a
row is no proof that it is a great place for tourists in general.
If the argumentation is based on a relation of analogy, then the
analogy must be a sound one. The two things compared must really
be comparable and there must be no special circumstances that invalidate
the comparison. If these requirements are not met, then we
have the fallacy of false analogy.
When establishing causal relations, using the third main category
of argument schemes, the reasoning may also go astray. Sometimes a
cause-and-effect relation is based on no more than the fact that the
one thing preceded the other. This is the fallacy of post hoc ergo propter
hoc (“after this, therefore, because of this”). A soccer coach commits
this fallacy by suggesting that the rise in ticket sales was due to his
taking on the job:
I like the Milan team. I like the way they play, their courage,
their drive to win. Since I came we have gone from 40 to 71
thousand season ticket holders. There must be a reason for
that.
Another common way of using a causal argument scheme incorrectly
has to do with pragmatic argumentation. The mistake here is to
wrongly suggest that adopting a certain course of action will inevitably
be going from bad to worse, when in fact there is no evidence that
such an effect will occur. Because it has not been shown that the predicted
negative consequences will really ensue, one of the critical
questions appropriate to causal argumentation cannot be satisfactorily
answered. This is the fallacy of the slippery slope. A slippery slope
can be detected in Gerrit Komrij’s sketch of the consequences of government
support of activities designed to protect women (but not homosexuals)
from sexual violence:
Those who find sexual violence important only when it is
aimed at a limited and arbitrary group like girls and women
will end up, if their reasoning is carried to its logical conclusion,
finding any form of violence acceptable as long as it is
aimed at an enemy specially marked out for that purpose.
8.3 VIOLATIONS OF THE VALIDITY RULE
Rule 8: The Reasoning in the Argumentation Must Be Logically
Valid or Must Be Capable of Being Made Valid by Making
Explicit One or More Unexpressed Premises
Violations of Rule 8 have long been considered to be the most important
of the fallacies. Nevertheless, invalid reasoning is certainly not
132 CHAPTER 8
the most important cause of failure to reach resolution of a difference
of opinion—if for no other reason than that arguments in everyday
language, which are so often incomplete, can easily be rendered
valid by filling in one or more premises.
Rule 8 is violated only if the reasoning, after making explicit everything
that was left unexpressed, is still invalid. Violations have to
do with the logical form of the reasoning underlying the argument.
There are several forms of faulty reasoning that occur with some
regularity during the argumentation stage. The two best-known
ones are affirming the consequent and denying the antecedent; these are
the invalid counterparts of the modus ponens and modus tollens types
of reasoning. The mistake made in both of these forms of invalid reasoning
is that a sufficient condition is treated as a necessary condition.
Lines of reasoning that take the form of affirming the
consequent or denying the antecedent have the following pattern:
If you eat spoiled fish (antecedent) you get sick. (conse-
quent)
Anne is sick. (affirmation of the consequent)
Therefore: Anne has eaten spoiled fish.
If you eat spoiled fish (antecedent) you get sick. (consequent)
Anne hasn’t eaten any spoiled fish. (denial of the antecedent)
Therefore: Anne is not sick.
It is easy to see that both lines of reasoning are invalid when one stops
to think that Anne could have got sick due to causes other than eating
spoiled fish.
Another violation of Rule 8 is incorrectly attributing a property of
the whole to the component parts or vice versa. The first is called the
fallacy of division, the second the fallacy of composition. These fallacies
involve treating the whole as a simple sum of the separate parts and
assuming every property of the whole also applies to each of the component
parts. But in fact, what is true for the parts is not necessarily
true for the whole. If a stew is composed of ingredients each of which
by itself is delicious, this is no guarantee that the stew will also be delicious.
The following comment from the manager of the school cafeteria
seems overly optimistic:
We use real butter, real cream, and fresh lettuce, so our meals
are always delicious!
FALLACIES (2) 133
Another example of the composition fallacy is:
The Catholic church is a church for poor people.
Therefore: The Catholic church is poor.
What exactly is wrong with this argumentation? In the first place, it
does not take into consideration the fact that the term “poor” is a relative
one: Standards of wealth are different for individuals than for
churches. Whether the Catholic church is poor or not can only be established
by comparing its wealth with that of other churches or similar
institutions. In the second place, the impression is given that the
wealth of the church is simply the sum of the income and property of
individual members, whereas other factors are involved, for instance,
what portion of their income members donate to the church.
An example of the division fallacy is:
The Cabinet is indecisive.
Therefore: The Ministers are indecisive.
In this argumentation, it is wrongly assumed that if the Cabinet as a
whole is indecisive, then all of the members of the Cabinet are necessarily
also indecisive. In fact, it is entirely possible that each member
individually is decisive, but that each Minister wants something different
so that the Cabinet as a whole is unable to reach a decision.
8.4 VIOLATIONS OF THE CLOSURE RULE
Rule 9: A Failed Defense of a Standpoint Must Result in the
Protagonist Retracting the Standpoint, and a Successful Defense
of a Standpoint Must Result in the Antagonist Retracting His
or Her Doubts
Resolution can still be obstructed even in the last stage of the resolution
process, when the argumentation is completed and the discussion
only needs to be brought to a close. The concluding stage of the
discussion must establish whether the difference of opinion has been
resolved and in whose favor. If the parties do not succeed in coming
to agreement on this, the difference of opinion persists. If the protagonist
is convinced that the standpoint has been conclusively defended,
but the antagonist insists that this is not so, then the
discussion ends in a stalemate.
134 CHAPTER 8
If the protagonist and the antagonist agree on the outcome, then
they must also accept the consequences. A protagonist who has not
managed to successfully defend the standpoint must be prepared to
give up this standpoint. Otherwise, the protagonist commits the fallacy
of refusing to retract a standpoint that has not been successfully defended.
If, on the contrary, the protagonist has succeeded, then the
antagonist must be prepared to retract the criticism of the standpoint.
Otherwise, the antagonist commits the fallacy of refusing to retract
criticism of a standpoint that has been successfully defended. Here is
an example:
Well, if that’s the case, then I can’t think of any more objections.
But I still don’t agree with it.
Other violations of Rule 9 arise when inflated consequences are attached
to the successful attack or defense. Successful protagonists
are entitled to expect the other party to retract their doubts about the
standpoint, but no more than that. Otherwise, these protagonists
commit the fallacy of concluding that a standpoint is true because it has
been defended successfully. If protagonists conclude that they have
now proved that their standpoint is true, then they are going too far.
The only thing they have shown is that their standpoint, based on the
agreed-on starting points, can be successfully defended. This does
not imply that the standpoint is necessarily true or acceptable in any
broader sense. The acceptability of the starting points outside the
context of the discussion, after all, has not been established. The protagonist
and antagonist do not even need to believe in the truth or acceptability
of their common starting points. Likewise, the failure of a
defense does not warrant the conclusion that the standpoint has been
shown to be false or that the opposite standpoint is true. An antagonist
who makes this claim is guilty of the fallacy of concluding that a
standpoint is true because the opposite has not been successfully defended
(argumentum ad ignorantiam).
The first mistake made in this fallacy is to confuse the roles of protagonist
and antagonist. In a nonmixed difference of opinion, only
one of the parties is obliged to defend their position, namely, the protagonist.
The antagonist has merely doubted the standpoint, so it is
impossible for him or her to have successfully defended the opposite
standpoint. Only in a mixed discussion are there two protagonists
and two standpoints, so that both protagonists are obliged to defend
their positions. But even then, one party’s defense failure does not
cancel the other party’s burden of proof.
FALLACIES (2) 135
The second mistake is to assume that the standpoint adopted in relation
to a proposition must always be either positive or negative.
This ignores the possibility of a “middle course,” that is, taking a
neutral position with no standpoint. If protagonists fail in their defense
of a standpoint, this certainly does not mean that they must immediately
accept the opposite standpoint. Anyone who acts as
though this is a necessary consequence is committing the fallacy of
argumentum ad ignorantiam. In the following example, both mistakes
are made:
Mother: You must never hit children, because then they lose
trust in society and ten years later they’ll be hitting ev-
erybody.
Father: It has not in any way been proved that hitting children
leads to violence later. So a slap once in a while for a
good reason can’t do any harm.
8.5 VIOLATIONS OF THE USAGE RULE
Rule 10: Parties Must Not Use Any Formulations That
Are Insufficiently Clear or Confusingly Ambiguous,
and They Must Interpret the Formulations of the Other
Party as Carefully and Accurately as Possible
Unclear or ambiguous language can have direct negative consequences
for the resolution of a difference of opinion. Lack of clarity
during the confrontation stage can lead to a spurious disagreement,
where the formulations chosen suggest a difference of opinion that
does not exist. Lack of clarity can also lead to spurious agreement:
The parties think they have reached agreement, when in fact their
agreement is based on their having given different definitions to the
terms used in the standpoint.
Ambiguity and lack of clarity in violation of Rule 10 can occur during
any stage of the discussion. Any time a party makes use of unclear
or ambiguous language to improve his or her own position in
the discussion, they are guilty of the fallacy of unclarity or of the fallacy
of ambiguity.
These fallacies occur not only by themselves, but also—even often—in
combination with violations of other discussion rules. Lack
of clarity sometimes accompanies a fallacy and enhances its effect.
An argumentum ad baculum or an argumentum ad hominem is often
more effective if the threat or accusation is made indirectly. Some-
136 CHAPTER 8
times lack of clarity is inherent to a fallacy, for instance, the fallacy of
magnifying an unexpressed premise. The antagonist can magnify an
unexpressed premise precisely because it was not explicitly stated.
Some kinds of unclarity have to do with the structure of larger
pieces of text; this is called structural unclarity at the textual level, resulting
from “illogical” order, lack of coherence, obscure structure,
and so on. Goudsblom describes the effect of such lack of clarity (in
Folia, October 17, 1981):
In many discussions … a capricious intermingling takes place
of descriptive, interpretive, explanatory and evaluative elements
that results in an elusive combination of “sense” and
“nonsense” that can perhaps best be termed “unsense.” […] It
is striking how many discussions about politics and morals—
that is, about society—are conducted by the grace of unsense.
The starting points, the terms, the conclusions, even the statement
of the problem, together constitute a hopeless tangle of
description, interpretation, explanation and value judgment.
To take part in such a discussion is to poke about in a rhetorical
hornet’s nest. This realization renders us powerless and
speechless.
Four main types of unclarity at sentence level can be distinguished:
unclarity resulting from (1) implicitness, (2) indefiniteness, (3) unfamiliarity,
and (4) vagueness. The best way of explaining these is to
give examples. Suppose someone says “Charles is a kleptomaniac.”
The listener may ask for clarification in any of a number of ways:
1 Are you warning me or just informing me?
2 Charles? Charles who?
3 A kleptomaniac? What’s that?
4 What do you mean, he’s a kleptomaniac? Do you mean once
upon a time he stole something, or do you mean he makes a
habit of stealing things?
Question 1 indicates the unclarity was due to implicitness: The listener
is not sure what the communicative function of the speech act
is because the context and situation allow for more than one inter-
pretation.
Question 2 indicates the unclarity was due to indefiniteness; it seeks
clarification of the propositional content. The listener cannot determine
who the speaker is referring to; the reference is unclear.
FALLACIES (2) 137
Question 3 also indicates unclarity in the propositional content,
but this time it is the predication that is problematic: The listener does
not understand exactly what the speaker is trying to say about
Charles because he does not know the meaning of the word “kleptomaniac”
and perhaps has not even heard of the illness it designates.
So the unclarity here is due to unfamiliarity with the word or with the
illness it refers to.
Question 4 is the listener’s attempt to obtain a clearer idea of what
the speaker means by “kleptomaniac,” thereby reducing the vagueness
of this term. Although the listener knows the meaning of the
word, he or she does not yet know what criteria the speaker is using.
How often must someone steal to earn the label of “kleptomaniac”?
Ambiguity has to do with the fact that words and phrases can have
more than one meaning. For example, the sentence “That is
Herman’s portrait” can be interpreted in three different ways: (1) the
portrait was painted by Herman, (2) the portrait is owned by
Herman, and (3) Herman is the subject of the portrait.
Questions can be ambiguous as well. There are, for instance, at
least five possible interpretations of the question “Who is Tony?”:
1 Which of you three is Tony?
2 Who in this picture is Tony?
3 Who is the actor that plays Tony?
4 What can you tell me about Tony?
5 Why the hell should we listen to Tony?
Ambiguity includes ambiguity of reference, as in the following sentence,
where it is not clear who her refers to, Carla or Sandra:
Carla gave Sandra the mail; it was her last day here.
The following text offers a good example of a different kind of improper
use of ambiguity:
Although Mr. Wylie claimed he would be open about everything,
he started out by lighting up a large cigar and
promptly disappeared in a cloud of smoke.… Mr. Wylie is silent
when he should be speaking as a liberal.… Mr. Wylie
smokes, and where there is smoke, there is fire.
The expression “where there is smoke there is fire” is used here in
two senses. It is used literally, in that “smoke” refers to the smoke
from Wylie’s cigar, and it is used figuratively: Because Wylie himself
138 CHAPTER 8
FALLACIES (2) 139
says nothing about them there must be some truth to all the rumors
about him. This use of ambiguity serves to camouflage the fact that
the standpoint “Wylie is not being open” is being supported by the irrelevant
argument that he smokes cigars.
FURTHER READING
In-depth studies of the fallacies can be found in J. Woods and D.
Walton, Fallacies: Selected Papers 1972–1982, Berlin: Foris/Walter de
Gruyter, 1989, and H. V. Hansen in R. C. Pinto (Eds.), Fallacies: Classical
and Contemporary Readings, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State
University Press, 1995. See also D. N. Walton, Informal Fallacies: Towards
a Theory of Argument Criticisms, Amsterdam-Philadelphia: John
Benjamins, 1987, and A Pragmatic Theory of Fallacies, Tuscaloosa: University
of Alabama Press, 1995. A discussion of Walton’s approach to
fallacies can be found in C. W. Tindale, “Fallacies, blunder and dialogue
shifts: Walton’s contributions to the fallacy debate,” Argumentation,
1997, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 341–354. For a typology of arguments from
authority, see J. Goodwin, “Forms of authority and the real ad
verecundiam,” Argumentation, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 267–280.