L. WITTG ENSTEIN
LECTURES & CONVERSATIONS
on Aesthetics, Psychology and
Religious Belief
Compiled/rom Notes
taken byYorick Smythies,
Rush Rhees and]ames Taylor
Edited by Cyril Barrett
.UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS
Berkeley and Los Angeles· 1967
University of California Press
Berkeley and Los Angeles, California
All Rights Reserved
Second printing, 1967
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 66-19347
Printed in the United States of America
CONTENTS
Preface
Lectures on Aesthetics
Conversations on Freud
Lectures on Religious Belief
vii
1
41
53
PREFACE
The first thing to be said about this book is that nothing contained
herein was written by Wittgenstein himself. The notes
published here are not Wittgenstein's own lecture notes but notes
taken down by students, which he neither saw nor checked. It is
even doubtful if he would have approved of their publication,
at least in their present form. Since, however, they deal with
topics only briefly touched upon in his other published writings,
and since for some time they have been circulating privatdy, it
was thought best to publish them in a form approved by their
authors.
The lectures on aesthetics were delivered in private rooms in
Cambridge in the sumer of 1938. They were given to a smail
group of students, which included Rush Rhees, Yorick Smythies,
JamesTaylor,CasmirLewy, Theodore RedpathandMauriceDrury
(whose names occur in the text). The name of another student,
Ursell, also occurs in the text (p. 28), but he did not attend the
lectures. The lectures on religious belief bdong to a course on
belief given about the same time. The conversations on Freud
between Wittgenstein and Rush Rhees took place between 1942
and 1946.
Besides the notes of the. conversations on Freud, those of the
fourth lecture on aesthetics are by Rush Rhees; the rest are by
Smythies. Since· we possess three versions of the first three
lectures on aesthetics (by Smythies, Rhees and Taylor-referred
to respectively as S, R, and T) and two versions of the fourth
lecture, the most complete version has been chosen as the text
and significant variants have been added in footnote. The notes
have been printed as they were taken down at the time, except
for some minor gramtical corrections and a few omissions
where the original was indecipherable. Although the diferent
versions agree to a remarkable extent, their authors·do not vouch
for their accuracy in every detail: they do not claim to give a
verbatim report of what Wittgenstein said.
The inclusion of variants may give to what were, after al, no
more than informal discussions, an importance and solemnity
PREFACE
which may seem inappropriate. On the other hand, as should be
clear, the difrent versions complement and clarify each other,
and at the same time hint at their close agreement (which could be
demonstrated only by printing al versions in ful). It might have
been possIble to confiate the versions into a single text, but it
seemed better to preserve each version as it was taken down and
leave the reader to reconstruct a composite text for himself. At
times, in the interests of clarity and smoother reading, some of the
variants have been introduced into the text. Wherever this is
done, and also where editorial emendations have been made,
square brackets have been employed. The use of three dots (...)
usualy indicates that there is a lacuna or an indecipherable passage
in the text.
Finally, a w.ord about the choice of material. This is only a
selection from the extant students' notes of Wittgenstein's
lectures. Yet, in spite of appearances, it is not a random selection.
The notes printed here reflect Wittgenstein's opinions on and
attitude to life, to religious, psychological and artistic questions.
That Wittgenstein himself did not keep these questions separate
is clear, for example, from G. E. Moore's account of the 1930-33
lectures (Mind 1955).
C. B.
LECT U R E S ON A E S THETIC S
I
1 . The subject (Aesthetics) is very big and entirely misunderstood
as far as I can see. The use of such a word as 'beautiful'
is even more apt to be misunderstood if you look at the linguistic
form of sentences in which it occurs than most other words.
'Beautiful' [and 'good'-R] is an adjective, so you are inclined
to say: "This has a certain quality, that of being beautiful".
2. We are going from one subject-matter of philosophy to
another, from one group of words to another group of words.
3. An intelligent way of dividing up a book on philosophy
would be into parts of speech, kinds of words. Where in fact
you would have to distinguish far more parts of speech than an
ordinary gram does. You would talk for hours and hours on
the verbs 'seeing', 'feeling', etc.,. verbs describing personal
experience. We get a peculiar kind of confusion or confusions
which comes up with al these words.1 You would have another
chapter on numerals-here there would be another kind of
confusion: a chapter on 'al', 'any', 'some', etc.-another kind of
confusion: a chapter on 'you', '1', etc.-another kind: a chapter
on 'beautiful', 'good'-another kind. We get into a new group of
confusions; language plays us entirely new tricks.
4. I have often compared language to a tool chest, containing
a hamer, chisel, matches, nails, screws, glue. It is not a chance
that al these things have been put together-but there are important
differences between the diferent tools-they are used in a
family of ways-though nothing could be more diferent than
glue and a chisel. There is constant surprise at the new tricks
language plays on us when we get into a new field.
5. One thing we always do when discussing a word is to
ask how we were taught it. Doing this on the one hand destroys
a variety of misconceptions, on the other hand gives you a
primitive language in which the word is used. Although this
language is not what you talk when you are twenty, you get a
1 Here we find similarities-we find peculill1' sorts of confusion which come up
with ali these W01'ds.-R.
2 LECTURES AND CONVERSATIONS
rough approximation to what kind of Ia.ngua.ge game is going to
be played.. a. How did we leam 'I dreamt so and so'? The
interesting point is that we didn't learn it by being shown a
dream. If you ask yourself how a· child learns 'beautiful', 'fine',
etc., you find it learns them roughly as interjections. ('Beautiful'
is an odd word to talk about because it's hardly ever used.) A
child generally applies a word like 'good' first to food. One
thing that is inunensely important in teaching is exaggerated
gestures and facial expressions. The word is taught as a substitute
for a facial expression or a gesture. The gestures, tones of voice,
etc., in this case are expressions of approval. What makes the
word an interjection of approval?l It is the game it appears in,
not the form of words. (If I had to say what is the main mistake
made by philosophers of the present generation, including
Moore, I would say that it is that when language is looked at,
what is looked at is a form of words and not the use made of the
form of words.) Language is a characteristic part of a large group
of activities-talking, writing, travelling on a bus, meeting a
man, etc.2 We are concentrating, not on the words 'good' or
'beautiful', which are entirely uncharacteristic, generally just
subject and predicate ('This is beautiful'), but on the occasions on
which they are said-on the enormously complicated situation in
which the aesthetic expression has a place, in which the expression
itself has almost a negligible place.
6. If you came to a foreign tribe, whose language you didn't
know at al and you wished to know what words corresponded to
'good', 'fine', etc., what would you look for? You would look
for smiles, gestures, food, toys. ([Reply to objection:] If you went
to Mars and men were spheres with sticks coming out, you
wouldn't know what to look for. Or if you went to a tribe
where noises made with the mouth were just breathing or making
music, and language was made with the ears. Cf. "When you see
trees swaying about they are talking to one another." ("Every-
1 And not of disappl:'oval 01:' of sutpl:'ise, fol:' example?
(The child undetStands the gestUl'es which you use in teaching him. If he did
not, he could undel'Stand nothing.)-R.
I When we build houses, we talk and wl:'ite. When I take a bus, I say to the
conductol:': 'Thl'ecpeny.' We ue concenttating not just on the word 01:' thesentence
in which it is used-which is highly unc:huac:tistic-but on the ocion on which
it is said: the framework in which (nota bene) the actual aesthetic judgment is
pl'actically nothing at al.-R.
LECTURES ON AESTHETICS 3
thing has a soul.") You compare the branches with arms. Certainly
we must interpret the gestures of the tribe on the analogy
of ours.) How far this takes us from normal aesthetics [and
ethics-T]. We don't start from certain words, but from certain
occasions or activities.
7.. A characteristic thing about our language is that a large
number of words used under these circumstances are adjectives
-'fine', 'lovely', etc. But you see that this is by no means
necessary. You saw that they were first used as interjections.
Would it matter if instead of saying "This is lovely", I just said
"Ah!" and smiled, or just rubbed my stomach? As far as these
primitive languages go, problems about what these words are
about, what their real subject is, [which is called 'beautiful' or
'good'.-R.]l don't come up at al.
8. It is remarkable that in real life, when aesthetic judgements
are made, aesthetic adjectives such as 'beautiful', 'fine', etc., play
hardly any role at alt Are aesthetic adjectives used in a musical
criticism? You say: "Look at this transition'',Z or [Rhees] "The
passage here is incoherent". Or you say, in a poetical criticism,
[Taylor]: "His use of images is precise". The words you use are
more akin to 'right' and 'correct' (as these words are used in
ordinary speech) than to 'beautiful' and'lovely'.3
9. Words such as 'lovely' are first used as interjections.
Later they are used on very few occasions. We might say of a
piece of music that it is lovely, by this not praising it but giving
it a character. (A lot of people, of course, who can't express
themselves properly use the word very frequently. As they use it,
it is used as an interjection.) I might ask: "For what melody
would I most like to use the word 'lovely'?" I might choose
between calng a melody 'lovely' and calling it 'youthful'. It is
stupid to cal a piece of music 'Spring Melody' or 'Spring Symphony'.
But the word 'springy' wouldn't be absurd at all, any
more than 'stately' or 'pompous'.
1 What the thing that is really good is-T.
I 'The transition was made in the right way.'-T.
a It would be better to use 'lovely' descriptively, on a level with 'stately', 'pompous,'
etc.-T.
4 LECTURES AND CONVERSATIONS
10. If I were a good draughtsman, I could convey an innumerable
number of expressions by four strokesSuch
words as 'pompous' and 'stately> could be expressed by
faces. Doing this, our descriptions would be much more flexible
and various than they are as expressed by adjectives. If I say of a
piece of Schubert's that it is melancholy, that is like giving it a
face (I don't express approval or disapproval). I could instead
use gestures or [Rhees] dancing. In fact, if we want to be exact,
we do use a gesture or a facial expression.
11. [Rhees: What rule are we using or referring to when we
say: "This is the correct way"? If a music teacher says a piece
should be played this way and plays it, what is he appealing to?]
12. Take the question: "How should poetry be read? What
is the correct way of reading it?" If you are talking about blank
verse the right way of reading it might be stressing it correctlyyou
discuss how far you should stress the rhythm and how far
you should hide it. A man says it ought to be read this way and
reads it out to you. You say: "Oh yes. Now it makes sense."
There are cases of poetry which should almost be scannedwhere
the metre is as clear as crystal-others where the metre is
entirely in the background. I had an experience with the 18th
century poet Klopstock.1 I found that the way to read him was to
stress his metre abnormally. Klopstock put .. -� (etc.) in front
of his poems. When I read his poems in this new way, I said:
"A.h-ha, now I know why he did this." What had happened? I
had read this kind of stuff and had been moderately bored, but
when I read it in this particular way, intensely, I smiled, said:
"This is grand," etc. But I might not have said anything. The
important fact was that I read it again and again. When I read
these poems I made gestures and facial expressions which were
what would be called gestures of approval. But the important
1 Friedrich Gottlieb K!opstock (1724-1803). Wittgenstein is referring to the
Odes. (Gesammelte Werke, Stuttgart, 1886-7). Klopstock believed that poetic diction
was distinct from popular language. He rejected rhyme as vulgar and introduced
instead the metres of ancient literature. Ed.
LECTURES ON AESTHETICS 5
thing was that I read the poems entirely differently, more intensely,
and said to others: "Look ! This is how they should be read."l
Aesthetic adjectives played hardly any role.
13. What does a person who knows a good suit say when
trying on a suit at the tailor's? "That's the right length", "That's
too short", "That's too narrow". Words of approval play no
role, although he will look pleased when the coat suits him.
Instead of "That's too short" I might say "Look!" or instead of
"Right" I might say "Leave it as it is". A good cutter may not
use any words at all, but just make a chalk mark and later alter
it. How do I show my approval of a suit? Chiefly by wearing it
often, liking it when it is seen, etc.
14. (If I give you the light and shadow on a body in a picture
I can thereby give you the shape of it. But if I give you the highlights
in a picture you don't know what the shape is.)
15. In the case of the word 'correct' you have a variety of
related cases. There is first the case in which you learn the rules.
The cutter learns how long a coat is to be, how wide the sleeve
must be, etc. He learns rules--he is drilled-as in music you are
drilled in harmony and counterpoint. Suppose I went in for
tailoring and I first learnt al the rules, I might have, on the whole,
two sorts of attitude. (1) Lewy says: "This is too short." I say:
"No. It is right. It is according to the rules." (2) I develop a
feeling for the rules. I interpret the rules. I might say: "No. It
isn't right. If isn't according to the rules."2 Here I would be
making an aesthetic judgement about the thing which is according
to the rules in sense (1). On the other hand, if I hadn't learnt the
rules, I wouldn't be able to make the aesthetic judgement. In
learning the rules you get a more and more refined judgement.
Learning the rules actualy changes your judgement. (Although,
if you haven't learnt Harmony and haven't a good ear, you may
nevertheless detect any disharmony in a sequence of chords.)
16. You could regard the rules laid down for the measurement
of a coat as an expression of what certain people want.3
People separated on the point of what a coat should measure:
1 If we speak of the right way to read a piece of poetry-approval enters, but it
plays a fairly small r6le in the situation.-R.
2 'Don't you see that if we made it broader,it isn't right and it isn't according to
the rules.'-R.
8 These may be extremely explicit and taught, or not formulated at al.-T.
6 LECTURES AND CONVERSATIONS
there were some who didn't care if it was broad or narrow, etc.;
there were others who cared an enormous lot.l The rules of
harmony, you can say, expressed the way people wanted chords
to follow-their wishes crystallized in these rules (the word
'wishes' is much too vague.)! All the greatest composers wrote in
accordance with them. ([Reply to objection :] You can say that
every composer changed the rules, but the variation was very
slight; not al the rules were changed. The music was still good
by a great many of the old rules.-This though shouldn't come in
here.)
17. In what we call the Arts a person who has judgement
developes. (A person who has a judgement doesn't mean a person
who says 'Marvelous!' at certain thingS.)8 If we talk of aesthetic
judgements, we think, among a thousand things, of the Arts.
When we make an aesthetic judgement about a thing, we do not
just gape at it and say : "Oh! How marvellous!" We distinguish
between a person who knows what he is talking about
and a person who doesn't.4 If a person is to admire English
poetry, he must know English. Suppose that a Russian who
doesn't know English is overwhelmed by a sonnet admitted to be
good. We would say that he does not know what is in it at al.
Similarly, of a person who doesn't know metres but who is
overwhelmed, we would say that he doesn't know what's in it.
In music this is more pronounced. Suppose there is a person
who admires and enjoys what is admitted to be good but can't
remember the simplest tunes, doesn't know when the bass comes
in, etc. We say he hasn't seen what's in it. We use the phrase
'A man is musical' not so as to cal a man musical if he says "Ah!"
when a piece of music is played, any more than we cal a. dog
musical if it wags its tail when music is played.&
1 But-it is just a fact that people have1aid down such and such rules. We say
'people' but in fact it was a particular class• . • . When we say 'people', these were
although we have talked of 'wishes' here, the fact is just that these rules
were laid down.-R.
I In what we cal the arts there developed what we cal a 'judge'-i.e. one who
has judgment. This does not mean just someone who admires or does not admire.
We have an entirely new element.-R.
, He must react in a consistent way over a long period. Must know all sorts of
things.-T.
6 cr. the who likes hearing music but canot talk about it at all, and is
<luite on the subject. 'He is musical'. We do not say this if he is just
happy when he hears music and the other things aren't present.-T.
LECTURES ON AESTHETICS 7
18. The word we ought to talk about is 'appreciated'. What
does appreciation consist in ?
19. If a man goes through an endless number of patterns in
a tailor's, [and] says: "No. This is slightly too dark. This is
slightly too loud", etc., he is what we cal an appreciator of
material. That he is an appreciator is not shown by the interjections
he uses, but by the way he chooses, selects, etc. Similarly
in music: "Does this harmonize? No. The bass is not quite loud
enough. Here I just want something diferent. . .." This is what
we cal an appreciation.
20. It iSJonot only difcult to describe what appreciation
consists in, but impossible. To describe what it consists in We
would have to describe the whole environment.
21. I know exactly what happens when a person who knows
a lot about suits goes to the tailor, also I know what happens
when a person who knows nothing about suits goes-what he
says, how he acts, etc.1 There is an extraordinary number of
diferent cases of appreciation. And, of course, what I know is
nothing compared to what one could know. I would have-to
say what appreciation is-e.g. to explain such an enormous wart
as arts and crafts, such a particular kind of disease. Also I would
have to explain what our photographers do today-and why it is
impossible to get a decent picture of your friend even if you pay
£1,000.
22. You can get a picture of what you may cal a very high
culture, e.g. .German music in the last century and the century
before, and what �ppens when this deteriorates. A picture of
what happens in Architecture when y!>u get imitations-or when
thousands of people are interested in the minutest details. A
picture of what happens when a dining-room table is chosen more
or less at random, when no one knows where it came from.2
23. We talked of correctness. A good cutter won't use any
words except words like 'Too long', 'All right'. When we talk of
t That is aesthetics.-T.
I Explain what happens when a craft deteriomtes. A period in which everything
ismed and extraordinary care is lavished on certain details; and a period in which
is copied and nothing is thought about.-T. .
great number of people are highly interested in a detail of a dining-room
chair. And then there is a period when a dining-room chair is in the dmwing-room
a d no one knows where this came from or that people had once given enormous
thou ht in order to know how to design it.-R.
8 LECTURES AND CONVERSATIONS
a Symphony of Beethoven we don't talk of correctness. Entirely
diferent things enter. One wouldn't talk of appreciating the
tremendous things in Art. In certain styles in Architecture a door
is correct, and the thing is you appreciate it. But in the case of a
Gothic Cathedral what we do is not at al to find it correct-it
plays an entirely diferent role with us.1 The entire game is diferent.
It is as diferent as to judge a human being and on the one
hand to say 'He behaves well' and on the other hand 'He made a
great impression on me'.
24. 'Correcdy', 'charmingly', 'finely', etc. play an entirely
diferent role. Cf. the famous address of Bufon-a terrific man
-on style in writing; making ever so many distinctions which I
only understand vaguely but which he didn't mean vague1y-all
kinds of nuances like 'grand', 'charming', 'nice'.2
25. The words we cal expressions of aesthetic judgement
play a very complicated role, but a very definite role, in what we
cal a culture of a period. To describe their use or to describe
what you mean by a cultured taste, you have to describe a culture.S
What we now cal a cultured taste perhaps didn't exist in the
Middle Ages. An entirely diferent game is played in diferent
ages.
26. What belongs to a language game is a whole culture.
In describing musical taste you have to describe whether children
give concerts, whether women do or whether men only give
them, etc., etc.' In aristocratic circles in Vienna people had [such
and such] a taste, then it came into bourgeois circles and women
joined choirs, etc. This is an example of tradition in music.
27. [Rhees: Is there tradition in Negro art? Could a European
appreciate Negro art?]
28. What would tradition in Negro Art be? That women
wear cut-grass skirts ? etc., etc. I don't know. I don't know how
Frank Dobson's appreciation of Negro Art compares with an
1 Here there is no of Mgre8.-R.
2 Ducolil'S .rut' /8 the addres on his reception into L'Ac:ademie Fran�se.
1753.-Ed.
8 To describe a set ot aesthetic rules fuly means realy to describe the culture of
a period.-T.
.
, That children are taught by adults who go to concerts, etc., that the schools
are like they are, etc.-R.
LEcrURES ON AESTHETIGS 9
educated Negro's.l If you say he appreciates it, I don't yet know
what this means.2 He may fil his room with objects of Negro
Art. Does he just say: "Ah!"? Or does he do what the best..
Negro musicians do? Or does he agree or disagree with so and
so about it? You may call this appreciation. Entirely diferent
to an educated Negto's. Though an educated Negro may also
have Negro objects of art in his room. The Negro's and Frank
Dobson's are diferent appreciations altogether. You do some·
thing diferent with them. Suppose Negroes dress in their own
way and I say I appreciate a good Negro tunic-does this mean
I would have one made, or that I would say (as at the tailor's):
"No... this is too long",or does it mean I say: "Howcharmingl"?
29. Suppose Lewy has what is called a cultured taste in
painting. This is something entirely diferent to what was called
a cultured taste in the fifteenth century. An entirely diferent
game was played. He does something entirely diferent with it to
what a man did then.
30. There are. lots of people, well-offish, who have been to
good schools, who can afford to travel about and see the Louvre,
etc., and who know a lot about and can talk fluendy about dozens
of painters. There is another person who has seen very few
paintings, but who looks intensely at one or twl:) paintings which
make a profound impression on him.3 Another person who is
broad, neither deep nor wide. Another person who is very
narrow, concentrated and circumscribed. Are these diferent
kinds of appreciation? They may al be called 'appreciation'.
31. You talk in entirely diferent terms of the Coronation
robe of Edward II and of a dress suit.' What did they do and say
about· Coronation robes? Was the Coronation robe made by a
tailor? Perhaps it was designed by Italian artists who had their
own traditions; never seen by Edward II until he put it on.
Questions like 'What standards were there?', etc. are al relevant
1 FrankDobson (1888-1963) painterand sculptor;W8S thefirst to bring toEngland
the interest in African and Asian sculpture which characteri%ed the work of Picasso
and the other Cubists during the years immediately prece and following the
First World War.-Ed.
I Here you haven't made what you mean by 'appreciate Negro.Ad clear.-T.
8 Someone who has not traveled but who makes certain observations which
show that he 'realy does appreciate' • • . an appreciation which concentrates on one
thing and is very that you would give your last penny for it.-R.
'Edward the
B
10 LECTURES AND CONVERSATION'S
to the question <Could you criticize the robe as they critized
it?'. You appreciate it in an entirdy diferent way; your attitude
to it is entirdy diferent to that of a person living at the time it
was designed. On the other hand <This is a fine Coronation robe \'
might have been said by a man at the time in exactly the same
way as a man says it now. '-,:
32. I draw your attention to diferences and say: «Look how
diferent these diferences are I" "Look what is in common to the
diferent cases", "Look what is common to Aesthetic judgements".
An imensdy complicated family of cases is left, with
the highlight-the expression of admiration, a smile or a gesture,
etc.
33. [Rhees asked Wittgensteiri. some question about his
<theory' of deterioration.]
Do you think I have a theory? Do you think I'm saying what
deterioration is? What I do is describe diferent things caled
deterioration. I might approve deterioration-UAll very well
your fine musical culture; I'm very glad children don't learn
harmony now." [Rhees: Doesn't what you say imply a preference
for using <deterioration' in certain ways?] Al right, if you like,
but this by the way-no, it is no matter. My example of deterioration
is an example of something I know, perhaps something I
dislike-I don't know. <Deterioration' applies to a tiny bit I
may know.
34. Our dress is in a way simpler than dress in the 18th
century and more a dress adapted to certain violent activities,
such as bicycling, walking, etc. Suppose we notice a similar
change in Architecture and in hairdressing, etc. Suppose I
talked of the deterioration of the style of living.1 If someone
asks: «What do you mean by deterioration?" I describe, give
examples. You use <deterioration' on the one hand to describe a
particular kind of devdopment, on the other hand to express
disapproval. I may join it up with the things I like; yo� with the
things you dislike. But the word may be used without any
afctive dement; you use it to describe a particular kind of thing
that happened.a It was more like using a technical term-possibly,
1 Deterioration of style and of living.-R.
a 'DeterioIltion' gets its sense from the I can give. 'That's a deterioration,'
may be an expreson of disapproval or a
LECTURES ON AESTHETICS 11
though not at al necessarily, with a derogatory element in it.
You may say in protest, when I talk of deterioration: "But this
was very good." I say: "Al right. But this wasn't what I was
talking about. I used it to describe a particular kind of develop­
ment."
35. In order to get clear about aesthetic words you have to
describe ways ofliving.1 We think we have to talk about aesthetic
judgements like 'This is beautiful', but we find that if we have to
talk about aesthetic judgements we don't find these words at al,
but a word used something like a gesture, accompanying a
complicated activity.2
36. [Lewy: If my landlady says a picture is lovely and I say
it is hideous, we don't contradict one another.]
In a sense [and in certain examples-R] you do contradict one
another. She dusts it carefuly, looks at it often, etc. You want
to throw it in the fire. This is just the stupid kind of example
which is given in philosophy, as if things like 'This is hideous',
'This is lovely' were the only kinds of things ever said. But it is
only one thing amongst a vast realm of other things-one special
case. Suppose the landlady says : "This is hideous", and you
say: "This is lovely"-all right, that's that.
n
1. One interesting thing is the idea that people have of a
kind of science of Aesthetics. I would almost·like to talk of what
could be meant by Aesthetics.
2. You might think Aesthetics is a science telling us what's
beautiful-almost too ridiculous for words. I suppose it ought to
include also what sort of coffee tastes welS
3. I see roughly this-there is a realm of utterance of delight,
when you taste pleasant food or smell a pleasant smell, etc., then
there is the realm of Art which is quite difent, though often you
1 Cf. 'This is a fine dress!-R.
I The judgment is a gesture accompanying a vast· structure of actions not
expressed by one judgment.-R.
'This is fine' is on a level with a gesture. almost-conected with al sorts of
other gestures and actions and a whole situation and a culture. In Aesthetics just as
in the arts what we caled expletives play a very small part. The adjectives used in
these are doser related to 'correct'.-T.
a It is hard to find boundaries.-R.
12 LECTURES AND CONVERSATIONS
may make the same face when you hear a piece of music as when
you taste good food. (Thol}gh you may cry at something you
like very much.)
4. Supposing you meet someone in the street and. he tells
you he has lost his greatest friend, in a voice extremely expressive
of his emotion.1 You might say: "It was extraordinarily beautiful,
the way he expressed himself." Supposing you then asked:
"What similarity has my admiring this person with my eating
vanila ice and liking it?" To compare them seems almost disgusting.
(But you can connect them by intermediate cases.)
Suppose someone said: "But this is a quite diferent kind of
delight." But did you learn two meanings of 'delight'? You use
the same word on both occasions.2 There is some connection
between these delights. Although in the first case the emotion
of delight would in our judgement hardly count.a
5. It is like saying: "I classify works of Art in this way: at
some I look up and at some I look down." This way of classifying
might be interesting.' We might discover al sorts of connections
between looking up or down at works of Art and looking up or
down at other things. If we found, perhaps, that eating vanilla
ice made us look up, we might not attach great importance to
looking up� There may be a realm, a small realm of experiences
which may make me look up or down where I can infer a lot
from the fact that I looked up or down; another realm of experiences
where nothing can be inferred from my looking up or
down.5 a wearing blue or green trousers may in a certain society
mean a lot, but in another society it may not mean anything.
6. What are expressions of liking something? Is it only
what we say or interjections we use or faces we make? Obviously
not. It is, often, how often I read something or how often I wear
a suit. Perhaps I won't even say: "It's fine", but wear it often
and look at it.8
1 Someone • • • who tels you he has lost his friend, in a restrained way.-R.
, But notice that 'you use the same word and not in the same chance way yon
use the same word 'bank' for two things [like 'river bank' and 'money bank'-R.]
-T.
aAlthough in the first case the gesture or expression of delight may be most
unimportant in a way.-T.
, You might discover further characters of things which make us look up-.R.
5 Some one might exaggerate the importance of the type of indication.-T.
• H I like a suit I may buy it, or wear it often-without interjections or making
faces.-R. I may never smile at it.-T.
LECTURES ON AES'l'HETICS 13
7. Suppose we build houses and we give doors and windows
certain dimensions. Does the fact that we like these dimensions
necessarily show in anything we say? Is what we like necessarily
shown by an expression ofliking?l [For instance-R] suppose our
children draw windows and when they draw them in the wrong
way we punish them. Or when someone builds a certain house
we refuse to live in it or run away.
8. Take the case of fashions. How does a fashion come
about? Say, we wear lapels broader than last year. Does this
mean that the tailors like them better broader? No, not necessarily.
He cuts it like this and this year he makes it broader.
Perhaps this year he finds it too narrow and makes it wider.
Perhaps no expression [of delight-R] is used at al.2
9. You design a door and look at it and say: "Higher,
higher, higher ... oh, al right."a (Gesture) What is this? Is it
an expression of content?
.
10. Perhaps the most important thing in connection with
aesthetics is what maybe caled aesthetic reactions, e.g. discontent,
disgust, discomfort. The expression of discontent is not
the same as the expression of discomfort. The expression of
discontent says: "Make it higher ... too low! ... do something
to this."
11. Is what I cal an expression of discontent something
like an expression of discomfort plus knowing the cause of the
discomfort and asking for it tobe removed? If I say: "This door
is too low. Make it higher", should we say I know the cause of
my discomfort?
12. 'Cause' is used in very many diferent ways, e.g.
(1) "What is the cause of unemployment?" "What is the
cause of this expression?"
(2) "What was the cause ofyour jumping?" "That noise."
(3) "What was the cause of that wheel going round?"
You trace a mechanism.'
1 Out preferring these shows itselfin al sorts of ways.-T.
2 But the tailor does not say: 'This is nice.' He is a good cutter. He is
contented.-R. If you mean 'this year he cuts it broader' then you can say
This way we are contented, he other not.-T.
• '• • • lime: thank God.'-R. '• • • yes, that's right.'-T.
'Cause: (1) Experiment and statistics.
(2) Reason.
(3) Mcchanism.-T.
14 LECTURES AND CONVERSATIONS
13. [Redpath: "Making the door higher removes ,your dis­
content."]
Wittgenstein asked: "Why is this a bad way of putting it?"
It is in the wrong form because it presupposes '-removes-'.
14. Saying you know the cause of your discomfort could
mean two things. ,
(1) I predict correctly that if you lower the door, I wil be
satisfied.
(2) But that when in fact Isay: "Too highl" 'Toohighl' is
in this ease not conjecture. Is 'Too high' comparable with
'I think I had too many tomatoes today'?
15. IfI ask: "If I make it lower will your discomfort cease?",
you may say: "I'm slIre it will." The important thing is that I
say: "Too high!" It is a reaction analogous to my taking my
hand away from a hot plate-which may not relieve my discomfort.
The reaction peculiar to this discomfort is saying 'Too
high' or whatever it is.
16. To say: "I feel discomfort and know the cause", is
entirely misleading because 'know the cause' normally means
something quite diferent. How misleading it is depends on whether
when you said: "1 know the cause", you meant it to'be an explanation
or not. 'I feel discomfort and know the cause' makes it
sound as if there were two things going on in my soul-discomfort
and knowing the cause.
17. In these cases the word 'cause' is hardly ever used at all.
You use 'why?' and 'because', but not 'cause'.i
18. We have here a kind of discomfort which you may cal
'directed', e.g. if I am afraid of you, my discomfort is directed.s
Saying 'I know the cause' brings in mind the case of statistics or
tracing a mechanism. If I say: "I know the cause", it looks as if
I had analysed the feelings (as I analyse the feeling of hearing my
own voice and, at the same time, rubbing my hands) which, of
course, I haven't done. We have given, as it were, a grammatical
explanation [in saying, the feeling is 'directed'].
19. There is a 'Why?' to aesthetic discomfort not a 'cause' to
it. The expression of discomfort takes the form of a criticism
1 Why are disgusted ? Because it is to high.-R.
• What is advantage of 'My feeling offear is directed' as opposed to 'I know
the cause' ?-R.
LECTURES ON AESTHETICS 15
and not 'My mind is not at rest' or something. It might take the
form of looking at a picture and saying: "What's wrong with
it?"l
20. It's al very well to say: "Can't we get rid of this
analogy?" Well, we cannot. If we think of discomfort�use,
pain�use of pain naturaly suggests itself.
21. The cause, in the sense of the object it is directed to is
also the cause in other senses. When you remove it, the discomfort
ceases and what not.
·22. If one says: "Can we be immediately aware of the
cause?", the first thing that comes into our mind is not statistics
[(as in 'the cause of the rise in unemployment')-R], but tracing
a mechanism. It has so very often been said that if something
has been caused by something else this is only a matter of concomitance.
Isn't this very queer? Very queer. 'It's only concomitance'
shows you think it can be something else.II It could
be an experiential proposition, but then I don't know what it
would be. Saying this shows you know of something different,
i.e. connection. What are they denying when they say: "There
is no necessary connection"?
23. You say constandy in philosophy things like: "People
say there is a super-mechanism, but there isn't." But no one
knows what a sup.er-mechanism is.
. .
24. (The idea of a. super-mechanism doesn't realy come in
here. What com�s in is the idea of a mechanism.)
.
25. We have the idea of a. super-mechanism when we talk of
logical necessity, e.g. physics tried as an ideal to reduce things to
mechanisms or something hitting sometlg else.s
26. We say that people condemn a man to death and then
we say the Law condemns him to death. "Although the Jury can
1 If I look at a picture and say: 'What's wrong with this?', then it is better to
say that my feeling has direction, and not that my feeling has a cause and I don't
mow what it is. Otherwise we suggest an analogy with 'pain' and 'cause of�'i.e.
what you have eaten. This is wrong or misleading, because, although we do use
the word 'cause'in the sense of 'what it is directed to' ('What made you jump?'him
appear in the doorway'), we often use it in other senses also.-R.
I you say: 'To speak of the cause ofsome development is only to speak of the
concomitants'-'cause is a question of concomitants'-then if you put 'only'.
you are admitting that it be something else. It means that you know of something
entirely difierent.-R.
a You want to say: there is a conection.' But w at is a conection?
Wel levers, chains, These are conections, and here we have them.
but here what we ought to explain is 'super'.-R.
16 LECTURES AND CONVERSA'l'IONS
pardon [acquit ?] him, the Law can't." (This IIltry mean the Law
can't take bribes, etc.) The idea of something super-strict, something
stricter than any Judge can be,l super-rigidity. The point
being, you are inclined to ask : "Do we have a picture of something
more rigorous?" Hardly. But we are inclined to express
ourselves in the form of a superlative.
27.
.. --
.. --
"
, .. ..
.. -­
.- 'Cf.
a lever-fulcrum. The idea of a super-hardness. " The
geometrical lever is harder than any lever can be. It can't bend."
Here you have the Case oflogical necessity. "Logic is a mechanism
made of an infinitely hard material. Logic cannot bend.'11 (Well,'
no more it can.) This is the way we arve at a super-something.
This is the way certain superlatives come about, how they are
used, e.g. the infinite.
28. People would say that even in the case of tracing a
mechanism there is also concomitance. But need 'there be ? I
just follow the string to the person at the other end.
29. Suppose there was a super-mechanism in the Sense that
there was a mechanism inside the string. Even if there was such a
mechanism, it would do no good. You do recognize tracing the
mechanism as tracing a peculiar kind of causal reaction.
30. You wish to get rid of the idea of connection altogether.
"This is also only concomitance." Then there is nothing more
to be said.8 You would have to specify what is a case you wouldn't
1 Something that ClIlot be swayed.-R.
B Suppose that we treat of kinematics. Give the distance of the lever from tho
po nt, and c:alculate the distance ofthe arc.
But then we say: 'If the lever is made of metl, however hard, it will bend a
little, and the will not come just there.' And so we have the idea of a superrigidity:
the ofa geomelrical lever which Gtll bend. Here we have the ide3 of
logical necessity: a mechanism of infinitely hard material.-R. .
H someone says: 'You mustn't think that logic is made of an infinitely hard
material', you must ask : 'What mustn't I think.?'-T.
• What we cal ',xpllion' is a form of GfJI1ItUlitm. And we wish to get rid of
conection alto�. We wish to get rid of the notion of mechanism, and say:
'It's al CODCOlDltants.' Why 'al' jI-R.
LECTURES ON AESTHETICS 17
call concomitance. "Tracing a mechanism is only finding concomitance.
In the end it can all be reduced to concomitance." It
It might be proved that people never traced a mechanism unless
they had had a lot of experience of a certain sort. This could be
put in the way : "It al reduces to concomitance."
31 . Cf. " Physics doesn't explain anything. It just describes
cases of concomitance."
32. You could mean by 'There is no super-mechanism',
'Don't imagine mechanisms between the atoms in the case of a
lever. There aren't any mechanisms there'.l (You are taking for
granted the atomistic picture.II What does this come to ? We are
so used to this picture that it's as though we had al seen atoms.
Every educated eight-year old child knows that things are made
of atoms. We would think it lack of education if a person didn't
think of a rod as being made of atoms.)
33. (You can look on the mechanism as a set of concomitant
causal phenomena. You don't, of course.) You say : ccWell, this
moves this, this this, this this, and so on."
34. Tracing ,a mechanism is one way of finding the cause;
we speak ·of 'the cause' in this case. But if cases of wheels made
of butter and looking like steel were frequent we might say : ccThis
('this wheel') is not the only cause at all. This may only look like
a mechanism."3
35. People often say that aesthetics is � branch of psychology.
The idea is that once we are more advanced, everything-all the
mysteries of Art-wil be understood by psychological experiments.
Exceedingly stupid as the idea is, this is roughly it.
36. Aesthetic questions have nothing to do with psychological
experiments, but are answered in an entirely different way.'
1 You reduce the actual mechanism to a more c mplicated atomic mechanism,
but don't go n.-T.
I We might have a primitive mechanism. Then we have the picture of its al
being formeCI. of particles-iltoms, etc. And we might then want to say: 'Don't go
on to think of atoms between these atoms.' Here we take for granted the atomic
picture-which is a queer business. If we had to say what a super-mechanism was,
we say it was one which did not consist of atoms : bits of the mechanism were
just
• We are constantly inclined to reduce to other �s. So excited by
finding that it's sometimes concomitance, we to say it's al really concomitance.
-T.
, I wish to make it clear that the important problems in aesthetics are not settled
by research.-T.
problems are answered in a different way-more in the form 'What is in
my mind ·when I say so and so ?'-R.
18 LECTURES AND CONVERSATIONS
37. "What is in my mind when I say so and so ?"! I write a
sentence. One word isn't the one I need. 1 find the right word.
"What is it I want to say ? Oh yes, that is what 1 wanted." The
answer in these cases is the one that satisfied you, e.g. someone
says (as we often say in philosophy) : "1 will tell you what is at the
back. of your mind: . . ."
"Oh yes, quite so."
The criterion for it being the one that was in your mind is
that when I tell .you, you agree. This is not what is called a
psychological experiment. . An example of a psychological experiment
is: you have twelve subjects, put same question to each and
the result is that each says such and such, i.e. the result is something
statistical.2
38; You could say: "An aesthetic explanation is not a
causal explanation."3
39. Cf. Freud : Wit and the Unconscious. Freud wrote about
jokes. You might cal the expla.nation Freud gives a causal
explanation. "!f it is not causal, how do you know it's correct ?"
You say: "Yes, that's right.'" Freud transforms the joke into a
diferent form which is recognized by us as an expression of the
chain ofideas which led us from one end to another of a joke. An
entirely new account of a correct explanation. Not one agreeing
with experience, but one accepted. You have to give the expla.nation
that is accepted. This is the whole point of the explanation.
40. Cf. "Why do 1 say "Higher !" ?" with "Why do I say "1
have a pain" ?"5
1 Compare: 'What realy Wlt to say is so and so.'-R. .
t Is this a narrowing the sense of psychological experiment?-T.
8 It is true that 'psychology' is used in very different ways. We could say that
aesthetic explanation is not causal explanation. Or that it is causal explanation of
this sort: that the person who a$1'ccs with you sees the cause at once.-R.
' Al we can say is that if It is presented to you, you say 'Yes, that's what
happened.'-R.
The unrest when you ask: 'Why ?' in this sort of case is similar to the unrest
in the case of 'Why?' when you look for the mechanism. 'Explanation' here is on
the level ofutterance. In some respect on a level. Cf. the two games with 'He's in
pain.' 0" the two games with 'He's in
Here 'explanation' is on the same as an utterance-where the utterance
(when say that you have pain, for instance) is the sole criterion. Explanation
here is an utterance supplied by another person-like teaching him to cry. ( his
takes the sutprisingness away from the fact that the whole point of an explanation
is that it is There are corresponding to these explanations uterances
which look just as there are utterances which look like assertions.)-R.
LECTURES ON AESTHETICS 19
il
1. One asks such aquestion as 'Whatdoesthisremindme of?"
or one says of a piece of music: "This is like some sentence, but
what sentence is it like ?"l Various things are suggested; one
thing, as you say, clicks. What does it mean, it 'clicks' ? Does it
do anything you can compare to the noise of a click? Is there the
ringing of a bell, or something comparable ?2
2. It is as though you needed some criterion, namely the
clicking, to know the right thing has happened.3
3. The comparison is, that some one particu:lar phenomenon
happened other than my saying: "That's right." You say: "That
explanation is the right one which clicks." Suppose someone
said: "The tempo of that song will be al right when I can hear
distinctly such and such.'" I have pointed to a phenomenon
which, if it is the case, will make me satisfied.
4. You might say the clicking is that I'm satisfied. Take a
pointer movinginto place opposite another one. You are satisfied
when the two pointers are opposite one another.1i And you coUld
have said this in advance.8
5. We are again and again using this simile of something
clicking or fitting, when really there is nothing that clicks or
that fits anything.
6. I should like to talk of the sort of explanation one longs
for when one talks about an aesthetic impression.
7. People stil have the idea that psychology is one day
going to explain al our aesthetic judgements, and they mean
experimental psychology. This is very funny-very funy
indeed. There doesn't seem any connection between what
psychologists do and any judgement about a work of art. We
1 There may be an 'explanation' in the form of an answer to a question like 'What
does this remind me of?'. In a piece of music there may be a theme of which I
say. . •-R.
I Does it click in any sense? So that, for instance'
J
ou say: 'Now it has made
that noise' ? Of course not. What do we compare the icking with here? 'With a
feeling,' 'So you have a feeling ?' Do you have a sign that it has falen into place?
-R;
8 Is there any necessary criterion for this happening?-T.
, If it is sung slowly• . .-R. played degrees faster• . .-T.
& (Something moving along a clicks when it fal into place.) -T.
8 But why not say the clicking is just that I am satis ed? Whereas it might
look as clicking were something else, which I wait for, and when it comes
I am In some circumstances you could point to such a phenomenon.-R.
20 LECTURES AND CONVERSA nONS
might examine what sort of thing we would call an explanation
of an aesthetic judgement.
8. 'Supposing it was found that al our judgements proceeded
from o� brain. We discovered particular kinds of mechanism in
the brain, formulated general laws, etc. One could show that
this sequence of notes produces this particular kind of reaction ;
makes a man smile and say : "Oh, how wonderful!'l (Mechanism
for English language, etc.)2 Suppose this were done, it might
enable us to predict what a particular person would like and
dislike. We could calculate these things. The question is whether
this is the sort of explanation we should like to have when we are
puzzled about aesthetic impressions, e.g. there is a puzzle-"Why
do these bars give me such a peculiar impression ?" Obviously
it isn't this, i.e. a calculation, an account of reactions, etc., we
want-apart from the obvious impossibility of the thing.
9. As far as one can see the puzzlement I am talking about
can be cured only by peculiar kinds of comparisons, e.g. by an
arrangement of certain musical figures, comparing their effect on
us.8 "If we put in this chord it does not have that effect; if we
put in this chord it does." You could have a sentence and say
"This sentence sounds queer somehow". You could point what's
queer. What would be the criterion that you had pointed out the
right thing ? Suppose a poem sounded old-fashioned, what would
be the criterion that you had found out what was old-fashioned
in it. One criterion would be that when something was pointed
out you were satisfied. And another criterion: "No-one would use
that word today"'; here you might refer to a dictionary, ask other
people, etc.6 I couldpoint out the wrong thing and yet you would
still be satisfied.
10. Suppose someone heard syncopated music of Brahms
played and asked : "What is the queer rhythm which makes me
wobble ?"8 "It is the 3 against 4." One could play certain phrases
1 IIyou knew the mechanism ofmolecules there, and then knew the sequence of
Dotes in the music, we could show that. • .-R.
• That he says it in English and not in French would also be explained by the
fact that sometlig is embodied in his brain: we could see the diferences.-R.
• When the written notes or the played notes are spread out, then you say• . .T.
, 'It is this word. you see. No one today would say so and so.'-R.
. I IOU asked: 'Whatis it that sounds American about this sentence ?' But
you Dna out whether the word was an americanism or not, for instance;
other people might corborate this.-R.
• FCel wobbly.-R.
LECTURES ON AESTHETICS 21
and he would say: "Yes. It's this peculiar rhythm I meant." On
the other hand, ifhe didn't agree, this wouldn't be the explanation.
11. The sort of explanation one is looking for when one is
pU2%l.ed by an aesthetic impression is not a causal explanation,
not one corroborated by experience or by statistics as to how
people react.1 One of the curious [characteristic-R] things about
psychological experiments is that they have to be made on a
number of subjects. It is the agreements of Smith, Jones and
Robinson which allows you to give an explanation-in this sense
of explanation, e.g. you can try out a piece of music in a psychological
laboratory and get the result that the music acts in such
and such a way under such and such a drug.2 This is not what
one means or what one is driving at by an investigation into
aesthetics.
12. This is connected with the diference between cause and
motive. In a law-court you are asked the motive of your action
and you are supposed to know it. Unless you lie you are supposed
to be able to tel the motive of your action. You are not supposed
to know the laws by which your body and mind are governed.
Why do they suppose you know it? Because you've had such a
lot of experience with yourself? People sometimes say: "Noone
can see inside you, but you can see inside yourself" , as though
being so near yourself, being yourself, you know your own
mechanism.s But is it like that? "Surely he must know why he
did it or why he said such and such."
13. One case is, where you give the reason for your doing
something.' "Why did you Write 6249 under the line?" You give
the multiplication you had done. "I arved at it by this multi.,.
plication." This is comparable to giving a mechanism. One
might cal it giving a motive for writing down the numbers. It
means, I passed through such and such a process of reasoning.II
1 You canot arive at the aplanation by means ofpsychological aperiment.­
R..
S Or on people of a certain race:-R..
8 Obviously this has nothing to do with your having observed yourselfso often.
(Often we do seem to sugest that because you are so near to yourself, you could
see what happened. This is like knowing your own mechanism.)-R.
, There is one thing here that could be compared with knowing a mechanism'Surely
he must know he did it, or why he said so and so.' But how do you
know why you did it ? is one kind of case where the answer is to give the
ntI: you are writing out a multiplicatiOtl, and I ask• • •-R..
• Where I give a reason in this sense• • •-R..
22 LECTURES AND CONVERSATIONS
Here 'Why did you do it?' means CHow did you get there?'. You
gi\re a reason, the road you went.
14. If he tells us a peculiar process by which he arrived at the
thing, this inclines us to say,: "Only he knows the process which
led to it."
15. Giving a reason sometimes means 'I actually went this
way', sometimes 'I could have gone this way', i.e. sometimes
what we say acts as a justification, not as a report of what was
done, e.g. 1 remember the answer to a question; when asked why I
give this answer, I gave a process leading to it, though I didn't
go through this process.!
16. "Why did you do it?" Answer: "I said to myself such
and such . . ." In many cases the motive is just what we give on
being asked.2
17. When you ask : "Why did you do it ?", in an enormous
number of cases people give an answer--podictic-and are
unshakable about it, and in an enormous number of cases we
accept the answer given. There are 'other cases where people say
they have forgotten their motive. Other cases where you are
puzzled imediately after you have done something and ask:
"Why did I do this ?'?3 Suppose Taylor was in this state and I
said: "Look here, Taylor. The molecules in the sofa attract the
molecules in your brain, etc. . . and so . . ."
18. Suppose Taylor and I are walking along the river and
Taylor stretches out his hand and pushes me in the river. When
I ask why he did this he says : "I was pointing out something to
you", whereas the psycho-analyst says that Taylor subconsciously
hated me.' Suppose e.g. it often happened that when two people
were walking along a river:
(1) they were talking amicably;
1 We give the proces which led to it before. Or it may be what we DOW see
would it.-R.
(It is not a natural usage of ,motive'.) You might say: "He knows what he was
doing, nobody else does.'-T.
I Thus "reason' does not always mean the same thing. And similarly with
"motive'. "Why did you do it?' One sometimes answers: 'Wel, I said to myself:
"r must see him because he is il." '-ac:tualy remembering having said things to
oneself. Or again, in many cases the motive is the justification we give on being
asked-just tbat.-R.
8 But is it clear why one should be puzed ?-R.
'A lot of things confirm this. At the same time a psycho-analyst has another
explanation.-T. We might have evidence that the psycho-analyst's explanation is
cor.-R. "
LECnJRES ON AESTHETICS 23
(2) one was obviously pointing out something and pushed the
other in the river;
(3) the person pushed in had a similarity with the father of
the other person.
Here we have two explanations:
(1) He subconsciously hated the other man.
(2) He was pointing at something.
19. Both explanations may be correct. When would we say
that Taylor's explanation was correct? When he had never
shown any unfriendly feelings, when a church-steeple and I were
in his field of vision, and Taylor was known to be truthful.
But, under the same circUmstances, the psycho-analyst's
explanation may also be correct.1 Here there are two motivesconscious
and unconscious. The games played with the two
motives are utterly difent.2 The explanations could in a sense
be contradictory and y�t both be correct. (Love and Hate.)3
20. This connects up with something that Freud does.
Freud does something which seems to me immensely wrong. He
gives what he calls an interpretation of dreams. In his book The
Interjmt of Dreams he describes one dream which he cals a
�beautiful dream' ['Ein schoner Traum'-R].· A patient, after
saying that she had had a beautiful dream, described a dream in
which she descended from aheight, saw flowers and shrubs, broke
of the branch of a tree, etc. Freud shows what he cal the
'meaning' of the dream. The coarsest sexual stuf, bawdy of the
worst lcirid-ifyou Wish to cal it that-bawdy from A to Z. We
knoW what we mean by bawdy. A remark sounds to the uninitiated
harmless, but the initiated, say, chuckle when they h� it.
Freud says the dream ,is bawdy. Is it bawdy? He shows relations
between the dream images and certain objects of a sexual nature.
The relation he establishes is roughly this. By a chain of associations
which comes naturaly under certain circumstances, this
1 He hated me because I reminded him of something. And the PiSychoanalyst's
statement is then corroborated. HtJ1I corroborated?-R.
· 1 Utterly dillerent things are done with the statement of conscious motive and
with the statement of unconscious motive.-R. .
• One could be love and one could be hatred.-R..
' Freud's 'Bin schooer Traum' (D;, Trtli4rdtmg Frankfurt: Fisher Bicherei,
1961. p. 240) does not contain the features of the 'beautiful dream' described here.
But the dream which does contain them (the 'Bowery dream'-'Blumentraum'-p.
289) is in fact described as 'beautiful' or 'pret ('schOOe') : 'Der schOe Traum
wolte der Triumerin nach der Deutung gar nicht mehr gefa1len.'-Bd.
24 LECTURES AND CONVERSATIONS
leads to that, etc.1 Does this prove that the dream is what is
caled bawdy? Obviously not. Ifa person talks bawdy he doesn't
say something which seems to him harmless, and is then psychoanalysed.\I
Freud caled this dream 'beautiful', putting 'beautiful'
in inverted commas. But wasn't the dream beautiful ? I would
say to the patient : "Do these associations make the dream not
beautiful? It was beautiful.3 Why shouldn't it be ?" I would
say Freud had cheated the patient. Cf. scents made of things
having intolerable smells. Could we therefore say: "The 'best'
scent is realy al sulphuric acid ?"4 Why did F�ud give this
explanation at al? Two things people might say :
(1) He wishes to explain everything nice in a nasty way,
meaning almost that he isfond ofbawdy. This is obviously
not the case.
(2) The connections he makes interest people imensely.
They have a charm. It is cha.rming6 to destroy prejudice.
21. a. "If we boil Redpath at 2000 C. al that is left when the
water vapour is gone is some ashes, etc.S This is al Redpath
realy is." Saying this might have a certain charm, but would be
misleading to say the least.
22. The attraction of certain kinds of explanation is overwhelming.
At a given time the attraction of a certain kind of
explanation is greater than you can conceive.7 In particular,
explanation of the kind 'This is realy only this'.
23. There is a strong tendency to say: "We can't get round
the fact that this dream is realy such and such."s It may be the
fact that the explanation is extremely repellant that drives you to
adopt it.
24. If someone says : "Why do you say it is realy this ?
Obviously it is not this at al", it is in fact even difcult to see it as
something else.
1 From a flower to this, a tree to that, etc.-R.
• You dont say a person talks bawdy when his intention is innocent.-T.
I This is what is cal beautifUl.-T.
, If there is a conection between acid which stinks and the best perfumes,
could we on that account put 'the perfume' in quotes.-T.
I To some people.-R.
• 'If we heat this man to 200 degrees Centegrade. the water evapolltes • • :-R.
, If you haven't just the right examples in mind.-T. ,
8 If we see the conection of something like this beautifUl dream to something
ugly . • .-R.
LECTURES ON AESTHETICS 25
25. Here is an extremely interesting psychological phenomenon,
that this ugly explanation makes you say you realy had
these thoughts, whereas in any ordinary sense you realy didn't.
(1) There is the process ['freier Einfal'-R] which connects
certain parts of the dream with certain objects.
(2) There is the process 'So this is what I meant'. There is a
maze for people to go astray in here.1
26. Suppose you were analysed when you had a stamer.
(1) You may say that that explanation [analysis-R] is correct
which cures the stamer. (2) If the stamer is not cured the
criterion may be the person analysed saying : "This explanation
is correct",2 or agreeing that the explanation given him is correct.
(3) Another criterion is that according to certain rules of experienceS
the explanation given is the correct one, whether the person
to whom it is given adopts it or not.' Many of these explanations
are adopted because they have a peculiar charm. The picture of
people having subconscious thoughts has a charm. The idea of
an underworld, a secret cellar. Something hidden, uncanny. Cf.
Keller's two children putting a live fly in the head of a doll,
burying the doll and then rung away.5 (Why do we do, this
sort of thing ? This is the sort of thing we do do.) A lot of things
one is ready to believe because they are uncany.
27. One of the most important things about an explanation
[in Physics R, T] is that it should work, that it should enable us
to predict something [successfuly-T]. Physics is connected
with Engineering. The bridge must not fal down.
28. Freud says : "There are several instances (cf. Law) in the
mind."8 Many of these explanations (i.e. of psycho-analysis) are
not bome out by experience, as an explanation in Physics is.7 The
1 These two need not go together. Either might work and the other noto-R.
I 'Oh yes, that's what I meant.'-R. Or you may say that the analogy is correct
which the person analyzed agrees to.-T.
• Of explaining such phenomena.-R.
, Or you may say that the correct analogy is the accepted one. The one ordinarily
given.-T.
• Gottfried Keler (1819-1890). A Swiss poet, novelist and short-atory writer.
The incident to which Wittgenstein refers ocs in Ro1leo tmd Julia aufM1I Dotft.
W".h V-VI, Berlin, 1889, p. 84. Ed.
• If you look at what Freud says in in his clinical procedure.
but, for instance, what we say about the 'Instanzen' ('instances', in the sense
in which we speak of a, court ofhigher instance) of the mind.-R.
, An explanation in a diferent sense often. Ita attractiveness is important, morc
important than in the case ofan explanation in physics.-T.
C
26 LECTURES AND CONVERSATIONS
attitude they express is important. They give us a picture which
has If. peculiar attraction for us.1
29. Freud has very intelligent reasons for saying what he
says, great imagination and colossal prejudice, and prejudice
which is very likely to mislead people.II
30. Suppose someone like Freud stresses enormously the
importance of sexual motives :
(1) Sexual motives are imensely important.
(2) Often people have good reason to hide a sexual motive as
a motive.-
31. Isn't this also a good reason for admitting sex as a motive
for everything, for saying : "This is realy at the bottom of everything"
? Isn't it clear that a particular way of explaining can bring
you to admit another thing. Suppose I show Redpath fifty cases
where he admits a certain motive, twenty cases where this motive
is an important link. I could make him admit it as a motive in al
cases.'
32. Cf. The Darwin upheaval. One circle of adQlirers who
said : "Of course", and another circle [of enemies-R] who said :
"Of course not".li Why in the Hel should a man say 'of course' ?
(The idea was �t of monocellular organisms becoming more
and more complicated until they became mamals, men, etc.)
Did anyone see this process happening ? No. Has anyone seen it
happening now? No. The evidence of breeding is just a drop in
the bucket. But there were thousands of books in which this
was said to be the obvious solution. People were certain on
grounds which were extremely thin. Couldn't there have been
an attitude which said: "I don't know. It is an interesting hypothesis
which may eventually be well confirmed" ?8 This shows
how you
.,
can be persuaded of a certain thing. In the end you
1 This does not hc:lp us to P!'JitI anything, but it has a peculiar attraction.-R.
• People can be convinced ofmany things acrding to whatyou tc:lthem.-R.
• It is disagreeable to have to ac:Jmit it so often.-R.
C If you get him to admit that Ihis is at the bottom of everything, is it therefore
at the botm of everything? Al you can say is that you can bring certain people
to think that it is.-T.
• What does their saying this mean ?-T. We could say the same thing against
both of them.-R.
• But people were immensc:ly attracted by the unity of the theory, by the single
principle-which was taken to be the obvious solution. The certainty ('of course')
was created by the enormous charm of this unity. People could have said: ' • • •
Perhaps sometime we shal Bod grounds.' But hardly anyone said this; they were
either sure that it was so, or sure that it was not so.-R.
LECTURES ON AESTHETICS 27
forget entirely every question of .verification, you are just sure
it must have been like that.
33. If you are led by psycho-analysis to say that really you
thought so and so or that really your motive was so and so, this
is .not a matter of discovery, but of persuasion.1 In ·a diferent
way you could have been persuaded of something diferent. Of
course, if psycho-analysis cutes your stamer, it cutes it, and that
is an achievement. One thinks of certain results of psychoanalysis
as a discovery Freud made, as apart from something
persuaded to you by a psycho-analyst, and I wish to say this is not
the case.
34. Those sentences have the form of persuasion in particular
which say 'This is reallY this'. [This means-R] there are
certain diferences which you have been persuaded to neglect.8 It
reminds me of that marvellous motto : 'Everything is what it is
andnotanotherthing.' The dreamis notbawdy, itis somethingelse.
35. I very often draw your attention to certain difences,
e.g. in these classes I tried to show you that Infinity is not so
mysterious as it looks. What I'm . doing is also persuasion. If
someone says : "There is not a diference", and I say: "There is
a diference" I am persuading, I am saying "I don't want you to
look at it like that."s Suppose I wished to show how very misleading
the expressions of Cantor are. You ask: "What do you
mean, it is misleading ? Where does it lead you to ?"
36. Jeans has written a book called The MYsterious Universe
and I loathe it and cal it misleading. Take the title. This alone
I would cal misleading.' Cf. Is the thumb-catcher deluded or
not?6 Was Jeans deluded when he said it was mysterious ? I
might say the title The MYterious Universe includes a kind of idol
worship, the idol being Science and the Scientist. .
1 We are likely to think of a person's admitting in analysis that he thought so
and so as a kind of discovery which is independent of.having been persuaded by a
psychoanalyst.-R.
8 This means you are neglecting certain things and have been persuaded to
neglect them.-R.
a I am saying I want you to look at the thing in a cl.ifent way.-T.
, But in what way is it misleading? Isn't it mysterious. or is it ?-R.
6 I have been talking about the game of 'thumb catching'. What's with
that?-R 'Thumb-c:atching': holding the right thumb, say. in the then
trying to grasp it with right hand. The thumb 'mysteriously' disappears beforeit can
be graspei:l.-Ed.
28 LECTURES AND CONVERSATIONS
37. I am in a sense making propaganda for one style of
thinking as opposed to another. I am honesdy disgusted with the
other. Also I'm trying to state what I think. Nevertheless I'm
saying : "ForGod's sakedon'tdo thiS."l E.g. lpuledUrsell's proof
to bits. But after I had done, he said that the proofhad a charm
for him. Here I could only say: "It has no charm for me. I
loathe it.":! Cf. the expression 'The Cardinal number of al
Cardinal numbers'.
38. a. Cantor wrote how marvellous it was that the mathematician
could in his imagination [mind-T] transend al limits.
39. I would do myutmost to show it is this charmthat makes
one do it.a Being Mathematics or Physics it looks incontrovertible
and this gives .it a �til greater charm. If we explain the surroundings
of the expression we see that the thing could have been
expressed in an entirely diferent way. I can put it in a way in
which it wil lose its charm for a great number of people and
certainly wil lose its charm for me.'
40. Howmuchwe are doing is cbailging the style ofthinking
and how much I'm doing is cbailging the style of and
how much I'm doing is persuading people to cbailge their style of
thinking.
41. (Much of what we are doing is a question of cbailging
the style of thinking.)
IV
(prom Rhees's Notes)
1 . Aesthetic puzles-puzes about the efects the arts have
on us:i
Paradigm of the sciences is mecbailics. If people imagine a
1 I stop being uz2ded and I to do something diferent.-T.
• Cantor's proofs:-I try to show that it is this charm which
attractive: (¥= I �d discussed these proofs with Ursel, and he
had With me, he sald: And stil• • •)-R.
8 would do my utmost to show the efFects of the charm, and of the associations
of 'Mathematics'.-T.
, If I describe the Sutto\Uldings of the then you may see that the thing
could have be in an entirely way; and then you see that the
similarity of No a cardinal number is very smal. The matter can be put in a
way which loses the charm it has for many
6 The puzes which arise in aesthetics, are puz arising &om the efFecta
the arts have, are not puzes about how these things are caused•...
LECTURES ON AESTHETICS 29
psyChology, their ideal is a mechanics of the soul.1 If we look
at what actualy corresponds to that, we find there are physical
experiments and there are psychological experiments. There are
laws of physics and there are laws-if you wish to be polite-of
psychology. But in physics there are almost too many laws; in
psychology there are hardly any. So, to talk about a mechanics
of the soul is slighdy funy.
2. �ut we can dream of predicting the reactions of human
beings, say to works of art. If we imagine the dream realized,
we'd not thereby have solved what we feel to be aesthetic puzlements,
although we may be able to predict that a certain line of
poetry wil, on a certain person, act in such and such a way. What
we really want, to solve aesthetic puzlements, is certain comparisons-grouping
together of certain cases.2
There is a tendency to talk about the 'efect of a work of
art'-feelings, images, etc.3 Then it is natural to ask: "Why do
you hear this minuet?", and there is a tendency to answer : "To
get this. and that efect." And doesn't the minuet itself matter ?hearing
this: would another have done as well?
You could play a minuet once . and get a lot out of it, and
play the saine minuet another time and get nothing out of it.
But it doesn't follow that what you get out of it is then independent
of the minuet. Cf. the mistake of thinking that the meaning or
thought is just an accompaniment .of the word, and the word
doesn't matter. 'The sense of a proposition' is very similar to
the business of 'an appreciation of art'. The idea that a sentence
has a relation to an object, such that, whatever has this efect is
the sense of the sentence. "What about a French sentence ?There
is the same accompaniment, namely the thought."
A man may singasongwithexpressionand without expression.
Then why not leave out the song--ould you have the expression
then?
1 I suppose the paradigm of al science i s mechanics, e.g. Newtonian mechanics.
Psychology : Three laws for the 5Ou1.-5.
• A picture, 'Creation of Adam' by Michelangelo, comes to mind. I have a
que idea which could be expressed by : 'There is a tremendous philosophy behind
this picture.'-S.
a Does that mean that if you gave a person the efects and removed the picture it
would be al right? Surely(the) fitst thing is, you see the picture or say thewords ofa
poem. Would a syringe which produces these efects on you do just as wel as the
picture?-S.
30 LECTURES AND CONVERSATIONS
If a Frenchman says : "It is raining" in · French and an
Englishman also says it in English, it is not that something
happens in both minds which is the real sense of 'It is raining'.
We imagine something like imagery, which is the international
language. Whereas in fact :
(1) Thinking (or imagery) is not an accompaniment of the
words as they are spoken or heard;
(2) The sense-the thought 'It's raining'-is not even the
words with the accompaniment of some sort of imagery.
It is the thought 'It's raining' only within the English
language.1
3. If you ask : "What is the peculiar effect of these words ?",
in a sense you make a mistake. What if they had no effect at al ?
Aren't they peculiar words ?
"Then why do we admire this and not that ?" "1 don't know.»
Suppose I give you a pill
(1) which makes you draw a picture-perhaps 'The Creation of
Adam' ;
(2) which gives you feelings in the stomach.
.Which would you cal the more peculiar effect ? Certainly-that
you draw just this picture. The feelings are pretty simple.
"Look at a face-what is important is its expression-not
its colour, size, etc."
,
"Well give us the' expression without the face."
The expression is not an effect of the face-on me or anyone.
You could not say that if anything else had this effect, it would
have the expression on this fa.ce.2
I want to make you sad. , I show you a picture, and you are
sad. This is the effect of this face.
4. The importance of our memory for the expression of a.
face. You ma.y show me sticks at diferent times-one is shorter
than the other. I may not remember that the other time it was
longer. But I compare them, and this shows me they are not the
same.
1 (You could cal the music the scraping of the fiddles. etc., arid the efect the
Doises we hear, but aren't the auditory impressions as important as the visual one ?)
Thinking is not even speaking with accompaniment, noises accompanied with
whatever may be, is not the sort 'It rains' at al, but is within English language. A
Chinaman who makes noise 'It rains' with same accompaniments-Does he think 'It
rains' ?-S.
I Face is not a means to produce the exptession.-S.
LECTURES ON AESTHETICS '31
1 may draw you a face. Then at another time I draw
another face. You say : "That's not the �ame face."-but you
can't say whether the eyes are closer tog�er, or mouth longer
[eyes bigger or nose longer-S1, or anY!hing of this sort. "It
looks diferent, somehow."l l
This is enormously important for al p)ilosophy.
5. If I draw a meaningless curve [squiggle-S1
and then draw another later, pretty much like it, you would not
know the difrence. But if I draw this peculiar thing which .I
cal a face, and then draw one slighdy diferent, you wil know at
once there is a diference.
Recognising an expression. Architecture :-draw a door
-"Slighdy too large." You might say : "He has an excellent eye
for measurement." N�he sees it hasn't the right expression-it
doesn't make the right gesture.2
If you showed me a stick of diferent length, I'd not have
known. Also, in this case I don't make queer gestures and noise ;
but I do when I see a door or a face.
I say, e.g. of a smile : "It wasn't quite genuine."
"Oh bosh, the lips were parted only 1 /1000th of an inch too
much. Does it matter ?"
"Yes."
"Then it is because of certain consequences."
But not only that: the reaction is difer�t.
We can give the history of the matter-we react so
because it is a human face. But apart from history-our reaction
to these lines is entirely ditf'erent from our reaction to any other
lines. Two faces might have the same expression. Say they are
both sad. But if ! say : "It has exacdy this expression. . ." . . ..8
1 It is (the) fact of remembering a facial expression.-S.
I Not a matter of measurement.-S.
a Can squiggle have same efect as picture of a face? (1) Brothers had same sad
expression. (2) It had this expression, photograph and gesture.-S.
32 LECTURES AND CONVERSATIONS
6. I draw a few dashes with a pencil and paper, and then
ask: '"Who is this ?" and get the answer: '"It is Napoleon". We
have never been taught to cal these marks, 'Napoleon'.
The phenomenon is similar to that of weighing in a balance,
I can easily distinguish between a few scratches, on the
one hand, and a picture of a man properly drawn, on the other.
No one would say: "This is the same as that" in one sense. But,
on the other hand, we say : "That's Napoleon". On one peculiar
[particular ?] balance we say: "This is the same as that". On one
balance the audience easily distinguishes between the face of the
actor and the face of lloyd George.
All have learnt the use of ' = '. And suddenly they use
it in a peculiar way. They say : "This is lloyd George," although
in another sense there is no similarity. An equality which we
could call the 'equality of expression'. We have learnt the use of
'the same'. Suddenly we automaticaly use 'the same' when there
is not similarity of length, weight or anything of the sort.1
In a lecture on description Wittgenstein raised another point about
similarity which deserves to be quoted and might be included here-Ed. 'Take a case
where you notice a peculiarity in poems of one poet. You can sometimes find the
similarity between the style of a musician and the style of a poet who lived at the
same time, Ot a painter. Take Brahms and Keller. I often found that certain themes
of Brahms wete extremely Kellerian. This was emaordinarily sttiking. First I said
this to people. You might say: "What would be the interest of such an utterance ?"
The interest partlylay in that they lived at the same time.
If I had said he was Shakespearean or Miltonian, this might have had no interest
or an entirely different one. IfI had constantly wantedto say : "Thisis Shakespearean"
of a certain theme, this would have had little or no interest. It wouldn't connext
up with anything. 'This word ('Shakespearean') forces itself on me.' Did I have
a certain scene in mind ? If I say this theme of Brahms is extremely Kelerian, the
interest this has is first that these two lived at the same time. Also that you can
the same sort of things of both of them-the culture of the time in which they
IfI say this, this comes to an objective interest. . The interest might be that my words
suggest a hidden connection.
.
E.g. Here you actually have a case different from that of faces. With faces you
can generally soon find something which makes you say: "Yes that's what made
them so similar." Whereas 1 couldn't say now what it is that made Brahms similar to
Keller. Nevertheless, I find that utterance of mine interesting. It derives its main
interest from the fact that these two lived [at the same time]. "That was [wasn't]
written before Wagner." The interest ofthis statement would lie in the fact that on
the whole such statements are true when I make them. One can actually judge when
a piece of poetry was written by hearing it, by the style. You could imagine this was
impossible, if people in 1850 wrote the same way as in 1750, but you could still
imagine people saying : "I am sure that was written in 1850." Cf. [A man on a
railway journey to Liverpool saying.1 "I am sure Exeter is in that direction." '-So
1 We use 'agreed' in another way. This is equality and is equality of
We suddenly, automaticaly, use 'the same' when it's not length, or etc.,
although we've learnt it in connection with these.-S.
LECTURES ON AESTHE'ITCS 33
The most exact description of my feelings here would be
that I say : "Oh, that's Lloyd George l"l
Suppose the most exact description of a feeling is "stomachache".
Bnt why isn't the most important description of feeling
that you say : "Oh, this is the same as that l" ?
7. Here is the point of Behaviorism. It isn't that they deny
there are feelings. But they say our description of behaviour is
our description of feelings.
.
"What did he feel when he said : 'Duncan is in his
grave' ?" Can I describe his feelings better than by describing
how he said it?2 All other descriptions are crude compared with
a description of the gesture he made, the tone of voice with
which he made it.
What is a description of feeling at al? What is a description
of pain ?3
Discussion of a comedian doing imitations, sketches.
Suppose you want to describe the experience of the audiencewhy
not describe first of al what they saw ? Then perhaps that
they.shook with laughter, then what they said.4
., "This can't be a description of their feelings." One says
this because one is thinking of their organic feelings-tension of
the muscles in their chest, etc. This would obviously be an
experience. But it doesn't seem half as important as the fact that
they said so and so. One �ks of a description of experience
not as a description of action, but as of a description of pain or
organic feelings.
Cf. what we said about the way in which fashions arise :
whether he feels so and so when he cuts lapel of coat bigger. But
that he cuts it in this way, etc.i-this is the most important part of
the experience.
1 Important thing is I say: 'Yes, this is Drury.' If you wish to describe fe
the best way is to describe reactions. Saying 'This is Drury' is the most exact
description of feelings I can give at al. Idea that most exact way of describing is by
feelings in the stomach.-S.
� Can I liescribe his feelings better than (by) imitating the way he said it? Isn't
this most impressive ?-S.
8 'He felt this' (touching head).-S.
, Suppose I said: 'The crowd roared with laughter: without what
they were laughing at; describing what they were laughing at but not them
Why not first describe what they saw, then what they did or said, then
' • • • his making it bigger or saying: 'No, no, no?'-5.
34 LECTURES AND · CONVERSATIONS .
8. "Is the most important impression which a picture
produces a visual impression or not ?"
[(1)] "No. Because you can do things which visually
change the picture and yet not change the impression." This
sounds as though one wished to say it wasn't an impression of
the eyes : an effect, but not a purely visual effect:
[(2)] "But it is a visual impression". Only these are the
features of the visual impression which matter, and not the others.
Suppose [someone says] : "Associations are what · matter
-change it slightly and it no longer has the same associations."
But can you separate the associations from the picture,
and have the same thing? You can't say: "That's just as good as
the other : it gives me the same associations."
9. You could select either of two poems to remind you of
death, say. But supposing you had read a poem and admired it,
could you say : "Oh, read the other it :wil do the same" ?
•
How do. we use poetry ? Does it play this role-that we
say such a thing as : "Here is something just as good. . . . " ?
Imagine an entirdy diferent civilization.1 Here there is
something you might cal music, since it has notes. They t:J:eat
music like this : certain music makes them walk like this. They
play a record to do this. One says : "I need this record now. Oh
no, take the other, it is just as good."
If I admire a minuet I can't say : "Take 'another. It dQes
the same thing." What do you mean? It is not the same.9
If someone talks bosh, imagine a case in which it is
not bosh. The moment you imagine it, you see .at once it is not
like that in our case. We don't read poetry to get associations. We
don't happen to, but we might.
10. Two schools :
(1) "What matters is the patches of colour [and lines-S] ."
(2) "What matters is the expression on these faces."
In a sense, these two don't contradict one another. Only
(1) doesn't make clear that the difrent patches have difent
lAnother culture where music makes them do different things. Cf. (the) rille
music plays with us with the t6le music plays with others. One can't say now: 'Play
Mozart it does just as well!-S.
B Cf. language where producing pictures by words is important thing. You can
see how our language is not like that.
Poems, sea, sea-picture. Ask him. Show him the difence, etc.-5.
LECTURES ON AESTHETrCS 35
importance, . and that diferent alterations have totally diferent
effects : some make all the diference in the world.
"A picture must be good even if you look at it upside
down." Then, the smile may not be noticeable.
[Suppose you said:] "That tiny smile by which you change
the kindly smile into an ironic one, is not a purely visual diference,"
(Cf. a picture of a monk looking at a vision of the Virgin
Mary.) [Suppose you said:] "It changes your whole attitude
towards the picture." This may be entirely true. How would
this be expressed? Perhaps by the smile you make. The one
picture might be blasphemous; with the other you are as you
might be in a church. Your attitude might be in the one case that
you stand beforeitalmostinprayer,inthe othercase almost leering'
This is a diference of attitude.
"Well, there you are. It is al the attitude." But you could have
these attitudes without a picture. They are important�ertain1y.
1 1 . "You have given a rough description of the attitude.
What you have to describe is something more subde." But if we
describe the attitude more exactly, how do you know that this is
the essential thing for this picture-that al this must always be
present?
Don't imagine a description which you have never heard,
which describes an attitude in unheard of detail. For you know
nothing about such an attitude. We have no idea of such an
attitude.
. An attitude is pretty well described by the position of the
body. This is a good description. But accurate? In a way it is
inaccurate. "But if you knew al the muscular sensations, yQU
would point to just those which matter."l I don't know them and
I don't know what such a description would be like.2 This is
not what we mean by description: Don't imagine an imaginary
kind of description of which you realy have no idea.
If you say 'description of attitude', tell us what you cal
a description of attitude, then you wil see the attitude matters.
Some changes change the attitude-We say: "the whole thing is
changed."
lWho says he always must have this feeling in this muscle? He distinguishes
between looking at the picture and looking at this, but he does not distinguish
between his muscular fee1ings.-S.
I·I can describe how a man stands and then I can describe the picture. Man who
makes twelve changes in Michae1angelo.-S.
36 LECTURES AND CONVERSATIONS
12. Associations also [enormously] matter. These are shown
chiefly by the things we say. We ca.l this 'God the Father', the
other 'Adam' ; we could go on : "That comes in the Bible, etc."
Is this al that matters ? We could have al these associations with
a diferent picture, and would stil want to see this picture.
"That means the chief impression is the visual impression."
Yes, it's the ·picture which seems to matter most. Associations
may vary, attitudes may vary, but change the picture ever so
slightly, and you won't want to look at it any mote.
The craving for simplicity. [people would like to say:]
"What realy matters is only the colours." You say this mostly
because you wish it to be the case. H your explanation is
complicated, it is disagreeable, especialy if you don!t have strong
feelings about the thing itself.
FROM A LECTURE BELONGING TO A COURSE
OF LECTURES ON DESCRIPTION
One of the most interesting points which the question of not
being able to describe is connected with, [is that] the impression
which a certain verse or bar in music gives you is indescribable.
"I don't know what it is. . . Look at this transition. . . . What is
it? . . ." 1 think you would say it gives you experiences which
can't be described. First of al it is, of course, not true that
whenever we hear a piece of music or a line of poetry which
impresses us gready, we say : "This is indescribable". But it is
true that again and again we do feel inclined to say: ''1 can't
describe my experience". 1 have in mind a case that saying one is
incapable of describing comes from being intrigued and wanting
to describe, asking oneself: "What is this ? What's he doing.
wanting to do here?-Gosh, if 1 could only say what he's doing
here."
Very many people have the feeling: "I can make a gesture
but that's al". One example is that you say of a certain phrase of
music that it draws a conclusion. "Though 1 couldn't say for my
life why it is a 'therefore' I" You say in this case that it is indescribable.
But this does not mean that you may not one day say that
something is a description. You may one day find the word or you
find a verse that fits it. "It is as though he said : ' . . .'," and you
have a verse. And now perhaps you say : "And now I understand
it."
If you say: "We haven't got the technique" (I. A. Richards),
what in such a case are we entided to cal such a description ?
You might say some such thing as : "Wel, now, if you hear this
piece of music. you·get certain sense impressions. Certain images.
certain organic feelings, emotions, etc.", meanings, "we stil don't
know how to analyse this impression."
The mistake seems to me in the idea of description. I said
before, with some people, me especialy, the expression of an
emotion in music, say, is a certain gesture. If I make a certain
gesture. . . . "It is quite obvious that you have certain kinesthetic
feelings. It means to you certain kinesthetic feelings." Which
38 LECTURES AND CONVERSA1'IONS
ones ? How can you describe them? Except, perhaps, just by the
gesture ?
.
Suppose you said: "This phrase in music alwa.ys makes me
make one peculiar gesture." A painter might draw this gesture.
A man, instead of making a gesture, would draw a gesture.
For him it would be an expression to draw this gesture, or a face
going with it, as for me it is to make a gesture. "Wittgenstein,
you talk as if this phrase gave you sensations you couldn't
describe. Al you get is sensations in your muscles." This is
utterly misleading. We look up muscles in a book on anatomy,
we press certain parts and give these sensations names, 'A', 'B',
'C', etc. All that would be needed for a piece of music would he
the description 'A', etc. , giving the sensations in each muscle.
It now seems as though you could do something like this. What
a. man sees can generaly be described. Names of colours etc.
One assumes at least a picture can be described. One goes on
and says not only a visual picture but picture of Kinesthetic
Sensations.
.
By the way, in what way is it wrong for a picture ? Suppose
we said, that we cannot describe in words the expression of God
in Michelangelo's 'Adam'. "But this is only a matter of technique,
because if we drew a lattice-work over his face, numbered,
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I would just write down numbers and you might say: "My Godl
It's grand." It wouldn't be any description. You wouldn't say
LECTURES ON AESTHETICS 39
such a thing at al. It would only be a description if you could
paint (act?) according to this picture, which, of course, is conceivable.
But this would show that you can't at al transmit the
impression by words, but you'd have again to paint.
Could you imagine: it is an odd fact that we sometimes
imitate someone else? I remember walking in the street and
saying: "I am now walking exa.ctly like Russell." You might
say it was a kinesthetic sensation. Very queer.
A person who imitates another's face doesn't do it before a
mirror but it is a fact that there is such a thing as saying: "The
face is so and so."
Suppose I make a gesture and I think the gesture characteristic
for the impression I get. Suppose I gave the gesture by
co-ordinates and I wish to make it clear to Mr. Lewy. He might
have to make an analogous gesture. His muscles, hands, etc.,
are diferendy shaped. So in one sense, he can't copy and in
another sense he can. What are we to regard as the copy? "It
wil depend on how such muscles contract." But how on earth
are you to know? . IfI make a gesture, and you are good imitators,
these gestures wil have to be similar, but diferent; the shape of
the fingers, etc., is diferent. The criterion for its being this
gesture wil be the clicking of it in you. You say: "Now this."
To say what's similar is impossible (to say). Each one makes a
gesture immediately and says : "That's the one." .
If I wish to convey an impression to Mr. Lewy, it might only
be made in this way, that he copies my gesture. Then what
about this technique of describing kinesthetic sensations ? This
isn't coordinates; it is something else: imitating the person.
"Wittgenstein, if you make a gesture, al you get are certain
kinesthetic sensations." It is not at al clear in what case we do
say we have conveyed them. But it may, e.g., be by what we cal
'imitating'.
Whether it is this wil depend on. . . .
"There is a phenomenon, the following: if you give me a
piece of music and ask me in what tempo it ought to be played, I
may or may not be absolutely certain. "Perhaps, like this . . .
I don't know." Or "Like this", telling you exacdy what tempo
it is to be. I always insist on one tempo, not necessarily the same.
In the other case I am uncertain. Suppose the question were to
40 LECTURES AND CONVERSATIONS
transmit to you a certain impression I get of a piece of music.
That mig4t depend on the fact that a certain number of you, on
my playing it to you, (that you) "get it", 'get hold of it'. What
does it consist in to get hold of a tune or a piece of poetry ?
You may read a stanza. I let you al read it. Everyone reads
it slightly diferently. I get the definite impression that "None of
them has got hold of it." Suppose then I read it out to you and
say : "Look, this is how it ought to be". Then four of you read
this stanza, no one exactly like the other, but in such a way that
I say : "Each one is ,exactly certain. of himself." This is a phenomenon,
being certain of yourself, reading it in one way onlY. He is
absolutely exact as to what pause to ma.k�. I might say in this
case that you four have got hold of it. I would have conveyed
something to you. I would perfectly correctly say, that I have
exa.ctly conveyed to you the exact experience I had.
But what about the technique of imagery, etc. ? This (convention/communication/description)
is not based on copying me
exactly. If I had a chronometer by which I can measure exactly
the interval between the vowels, they may not be the same but
entirely diferent.
If someone says : "We lack this technique", he presupposes
that, if we had it, we would have a new expression, a new way of
transmitting, not the old one. But how does he know that if we
describe in the new way-suppose I had a way of describing
kinesthetic sensations or way of describing gestures-I get the
same as I got if I transmit gesture. Suppose I said: "I get a little
tickling there" [rung finger down hand]. Suppose I had six
ticklings and I had a method of producing eacil one. Suppose I
had instruments attached to my nerves in such a way that an
electric current going through the nerves was measured by the
instrument. You get an instrument reading. "Now I'll represent
this in Mr. Lewy." But would this be the representa.tion we want?
I might read a stanza and you might say: "Wittgenstein obviously
has got hold of it. He had got my interpretation." Mr. Lewy
reads it and you say the same. But voice, strength, etc., are
diferent. "My interpreta.tion is that which produces the same
kinesthetic impressions." But how do you know ? This simply
isn't an a.na.1ysis at al. We have one way of comparing and if you
say: "And also we could get a scientific one," I'd ask: "Yes, but
what makes you think that these wil go paralel at al ?"
C ON V E R S A T I ON S ON F R EUD
In these discussions Wittgenstein was critical of Freud. But
he was also bringing out how much there is in what Freud says
about the notion of "dream symbolism", for instance, or the
suggestion that in dreaming I am-in some sense-'saying something'.
He was trying to separate what is valuable in Freud from
that 'way of thinking' which he wanted to combat.
He told me that when he was in Cambridge before 1914 he
had thought psychology a waste of time. (Although he had not
ignored it. I heard him explain the Weber-Fechner law to a
student in a way rpat canot have come simply from reading
Meinong's article or from discussions with Russell.) "Then some
years later I happened to read something by Freud, and I sat up
in surprise. Here was someone who had something to say." I
think this was soon after 1919. And for the rest of his life Freud
was one of the few authors he thought worth reading. He would
speak of himself-at the period of these discussions-as "a
disciple of Freud" and "a follower of Freud".
He admired Freud for the observations and suggestions in
his writings; for "having something to say" even where, in
Wittgenstein's view, he was wrong. On the other hand, he
thought the enormous influence of psychoanalysis in Europe and
America was harmful-"although it will take a long time before
we lose our subservience to it". To learn from Freud you have to
be critical ; and psychoanalysis generaly prevents this.
I spoke of the harm it does to writing when an author tries
to bring psychoanalysis into the story. "Of course," he said,
"There's nothing worse;" He was ready to illustrate what Freud
meant by referring to a story; but then the story had been written
independently. Once when Wittgenstein was recounting something
Freud had said and the advice he had given someone, one
of us said that this advice did not seem very wise. " Oh certainly
not," said Wittgenstein. "But wisdom is something I never would
expect from Freud. Cleverness, certainly ; but not wisdom."
Wisdom was something he did admire in his favourite story
writers-in Gottfried Keller, for instance. The kind of criticism
D
42 LECTURES AND CONVERSATIONS
which would help in studying Freud, would have to go deep;
and it is not common.
RUSH RHEs.
WITTGENSTEIN (notes by R. R. after a conversation, Sumer
1942).
When we are studying psychology we may feel there is something
unsatisfactory, some difculty about the whole subject or
study-because we are taking physics as our ideal science. We
tbin.k of formulating laws as in physics. And then we find we
canot use the same sort of 'metric', the same ideas of measurement
as in physics. This is especially clear when we try to
describe appearances: the least noticeable difences of colours;
the least noticeable difences of length, and so on. Here it
seems that we cannot say: "If A :-B, and B=C, then A=C," for
instance. And this sort of trouble goes al through the subject.
Or suppose you want to speak of causality in the operation
of feelings. ''Determinism applies to the mind as truly as to
physical things." This is obscure because when we think of
causal laws in physical things we think of experiments. We have
nothing like this in connexion with feelings and motivation. And
yet psychologists wants to say: "There must be some law"although
no law has been found. (Freud: "Do you want to say,
gendemen, that changes in mental phenomena are guided by
chance?") Whereas to me the fact that there aren't actualy any
such laws seems important.
Freud's theory of dreams. He wants to say that whatever
happens in a dream wil be found to be connected with some wish
which analysis can bring to light. But this procedure of free
association and so on is queer, because Freud never shows how
we know where to stop-where is the right solution. Sometinies
he says that the right solution, or the right analysis, is the one
which satisfies the patient. Sometimes he says that the doctor
knows what the right solution or analysis of the dream is whereas
the patient doesn't: the doctor can say that the patient is
wrong.
The reason why he cals one sort of analysis the right one,
does not seem to be a matter ofevidence. Neither is the proposition
that halucinations, and so dreams, are wish ful6lments.
CONVERSAnONS ON FREUD 43
Suppose a starving man has an hallucination of food. Freud
wants to say the halucination of anything requires tremendous
energy : it is not something that could normally happen, but the
energy is provided in the exceptional circumstances where a man's
wish for food is overpowering. This is a speculation. It is the
sort of explanation we"areinclined to accept. It is not put forward
as a result of detailed examination of varieties of halucinations.
Freud in his analysis provides explanations which many
people are inclined to accept. He emphasizes that people are
dir-inclined to accept them. But if the explanation is one which
people are disinclined to accept, it is highly probable that it is
also one which they are inclined to accept. And this is what Freud
had actually brought out. Take Freud's view that anxiety is
always a �epetition in some way of the anxiety we felt at birth.
He does not establish this by reference to evidence-for he could
not do so. But it is an idea which has a marked attraction. It
has the attraction which mythological explanations have, explanations
which say that this is all a repetition of something that has
happened before. And when people do accept or adopt this,
then certain things seem much clearer and easier for them. So
it is with the notion of the unconscious also. Freud does claim
to find evidence in memories brought to light in analysis. But at
a certain stage it is not clear how far such memories are due to the
analyst. In any case, do they show that the anxiety was necessarily
a repetition of the original anxiety ?
Symbolizing in dreams. The idea of a dream language. Think
of recognizing a painting as a dream. I (L.W.) was once looking
at an exhibition of paintings by a young woman artist in Vienna.
There was one painting of a bare room, like a cel. Two men in
top hats were sitting on chairs. Nothing else. And the tide :
"Besuch" ("Visit"). When I saw this I said at once "This is a
dream", (My sister described the picture to Freud, and he said 'Oh
yes, that is quite a common dream'-connected with virginity.)
Note that the the tide is what clinches it as a dream-by which I do
not mean that anything like this was dreamt by the painter while
asleep. You would not say of every painting 'This is a dream'.
And this does show that there is something like a dream language.
Freud mentions various symbols : top hats are regularly
phallic symbols, wooden things like tables are women, etc. His
44 LECTURES AND CONVERSATIONS
historical explanation of these symbols is absurd. We might say it
is not needed anyway : it is the most natural thing in the world
that a table should be that sort of symbol.
But dreaming-using this sort of language�though it may
be used to refer to a woman or to a phalus, may also be used not
to refer to that at all. If some activity is shown to be carried out
often for a certain purpose-striking someone to inflict painthen
a hundred to one it is also carried out under other circumstances
not for that purpose. He may just want to strike him
without thinking of inflicting pain at all. The fact that we are
inclined to recognize the hat as a phallic symbol does not mean
that the artist was necessarily referring to a phallus in any way
when she painted it.
Consider the difculty that if a symbol in a dream is not
understood, it does not seem to be a symbol at all. So why call
it one ? But suppose I have a dream and accept a certain interpretation
of it. Then-when I superimpose the interpretation on
the dream-l can say " Oh yes, the table obviously corresponds
to the woman, this to that etc."
I might be making scratches on the wall. It seems in a way
like writing, but it is not a writing which either I or anyone else
would recognize or understand. So we say I'm doodling. Then
an analyst begins to ask me questions, trace associations and so
on; and we cOme to an explanation of why I'm doing this. We
may then correlate various scratches which I make with various
elements in the interpretation. And we may then refer to the
doodling as a kind of writing, as using a kind of language,
although it was not understood by anyone.
Freud is constantly claiming to be scientific. But what he
gives is speculation-something prior even to the formation of an
hypothesis.
He speaks ofovercoming resistance. One "instance" is deluded
by another "instance". (In the sense in which we speak of "a
court of higher instance"withauthority to overrule the judgment
of the lower court. RR.) The analyst is supposed to be stronger,
able to combat and overcome the delusion of the instance. But
there is no way of showing that the whole result of anaIysis may
not be "delusion". It is something which people are inclined to
accept and which makes it easier for them to go certain ways :,
CONVERSATIONS ON FREUD 45
it makes certain ways of behaving and thinking natural for
them. They have given up one way of thinking and adopted
another.
Can we say we have laid bare the essential nature of mind ?
"Concept formation". Couldn't the whole thing have been
diferendy treated ?
WITTGENSTEIN (notes following conversations in 1943;
Rush Rhees).
DREAMS. The interpretation of dreams. Symbolism.
When Freud speaks of certain images-say the image of a
hat-as symbols, or when he says the image "means" so and so, he
is speaking of interpretation; and of what the dreamer can be
brought to accept as an interpretation.
It is characteristic of dreams that often they seem to the
dreamer to cal for an interpretation. One is hardly ever inclined
to write down a day dream, or recount it to someone else, or to
ask "What does it mean ?" But dreams do seem to have something
puzg and in a special way interesting about them-so
that we want an interpretation of them. (They were often regarded
as messages.)
There seems to be something in dream images that has �
certain resemblance to the signs of a language. As a series of
marks on paper or on sand might have. There might be no mark
which we recognized as a conventional sign in any alphabet we
knew, and yet we might have a strong feeling that they must
be a 9nguage 6f some sort : that they mean something. There is a
cathedral in Moscow with five spires. On each of these there is a
diferent sort of curving configuration. One gets the strong
impression that these difent shapes and arrangements must
mean something.
When a dream is interpreted we might say that it is fitted into
a context in which it ceases to be puzzling. In a sense the dreamer
re-dreams, his dream in suroundings such that its aspect changes.
It is as though we were presented with a bit of canvas on which
were painted a hand and a' part of a face and certain other shapes,
arranged in a puzg and incongruous maner. Suppose this
bit is surrounded by considerable stretches of blank canvas, and
that we now paint in forms-say an arm, a trunk, etc.-leading
46 LECTURES AND CONVERSATIONS
up to and fitting on to the shapes on the original bit;.and that the
result is that we' say: " Ah, now I seewhy it is like that, how it al
comes to be arranged in that way, �d what these various bits
are . . ..' and so on.
Mixed up with the shapes on the original bit of canvas there
might be certain forms of which we should say that they do not
join on to further figures in the wider canvas; they are not parts
of bodies or trees, etc., but bits ofwriting. We might say this ofa
snake, perhaps, or a hat or some such. (These would be like the
configurations of the Moscow cathedral.)
What is done in interpreting dreams is not all of one sort.
There is a work of interpretation which, so to speak, stil bdongs
to the dream itsdf. In considering what a dream is, it is important
to consider what happens to it, the way its aspect changes when
it is brought into rdation with other things, remembered, for
instance. On first awaking a dream may 'impress one in various
ways. One may be terrified and anxious; or when one has written
the dream down one may have a certain sort of thril, fed a very
livdy interest in it, fed intrigued by it. If one now remembers
certain events in the previous day and connects what was dreamed
with these, this already makes a diference, changes the aspect of
the dream. If reflecting on the dream then leads one to r�member
certain things in early childhood, this wil give it a diferent aspect
stil. And so on. (All this is connected with what was said about
dreaming the dream over again. It still belongs to the dream, in
a way.)
On the other hand, one might form an hypothesis. On reading
the report of the dream, one might predict that the dreamer can
be brought to recall such and such memories. And this hypo�
thesis might ormightnot be verified. This mightbe called a scien�
tific treatment of the dream.
Freier Binjall and wish fulfilments. There are various criteria
for the right interpretation: e.g., (1) what the analyst says or
predicts, on the basis of his previous experience; (2) what the
dreamer is led to by jreier Binjall. It would be interesting and
important if these two generally coincided. But it would be queer
to claim (as Freud seems to) that they mllSt alwtgs coincide.
What goes on in jreier Binjall is probably conditioned by a
whole host of circumstances. There seems to be 'no reason for
CONVERSATIONS ON FREUD 47
saying that it must be conditioned only by the sort of wish in
which the analyst is interested and of which he has reason to say
that it must have been playing a part. If you want to complete
what seems to be a fragment of a picture, you might be advised
to give up trying to think hard about what is the most likely way
the picture went, and instead simply to stare at the picture and
make whatever dash first comes into your mind, without thinking.
This might in many cases be very fruitful advice to give. But it
would be astonishing if it a/wqys produced the best results. What
dashes you make, is likely to be conditioned by everything that
is going on about you and within you. And if I knew one of the
factors present, this could not tell me with certainty what dash
you were going to make.
'To say that dreams are wish fulfilments is very important
chiefly because it points to the sort of interpretation that is wanted
-the sort of thing that would be an interpretation of a dream.
As contrasted with an interpretation which said that dreams were
simply memories of what had happened, for instance. (We don't
feel that memories cal for an interpretation in the same way
as we feel this about dreams.) And some dreams obviously are
wish fulfilments ; such as the sexual dreams of adults, for instance.
But it seems muddled to say that all dreams are hallucinated wish
fulfilments. (Freud very commonly gives what we might cal a
sexual interpretation. But it is interesting that among all the
reports of dreams which he gives, there is not a single example ofa
straightforward sexual dream. Yet these are common as rain.)
Partly because this doesn't seem to fit with dreams that spring
from fear rather than from longing. Partly because the majority
of dreams Freud considers have to be regarded as camolljlagerl
wish fulfilments ; and in this case they simply don't fulfil the wish.
Ex hypothesi the wish is not alowed to be fulfiled, and something
else is halucinated instead. If the wish is cheated in this way, then
the dream can hardly be caled a fulfilment of it. Also it becomes
impossible to say whether it is the wish or the censor that is
cheated. Apparently both are, and the result is that neither is
satisfied. So that, the dream is not·an hallucinated satisfaction of
anything.
It is probable that there are many difent sorts of dreams,
and that there is no single line of explanation for al ofthem. Just
48 LECTURES AND CONVERSATIONS
as there are many diferent sorts of jokes. Or just as there are
many difrent sorts of language.
Freud was influenced by the 19th century idea of dynamicsan
idea which has influenced the whole treatment of psychology.
He wanted to find some one explanation which would show what
dreaming is. He wanted to find the essence of dreaming. And he
would have rejected any suggestion that he might be partly right
but not altogether so. If he was partly wrong, that would have
meant for him that he was wrong altogether-that he had not
really found the essence of dreaming.
WITTGENSTEIN. (Notes following conversations, 1943.
R.R.)
Whether a dream is a thought. Whether dreaming is thinking
about something.
Suppose you look on a dream as a kind oflanguage. A way of
saying something, or a way of symbolizing something. There
might be a regular symbolism, not necessarily alphabetical-it
might be like Chinese; say. We might then find a way of translating
this symbolism into the language of ordinary speech,
ordinary thoughts. But then the translation ought to be possible
both ways. It ought to be possible by emplC?ying the same technique
to translate ordinary thoughts into dream language. As
Freud recognizes, this never is done and canot be done. So we
might question whether dreaming is a way ofthinking something,
whet;her it is a language at al.
.
Obviously there are certain similarities with language.
Suppose there were a picture in a comic paper, dated shortly
after the last war. It might contain one figure ofwhich you would
say it was obviously a caricature of Churchil, another figure
marked somehow with a hammer and sickle so that you would
say it was obviously supposed to be Russia. Suppose the title of
the picture was lacking. Still you might be sure that, in vieW- of
two figures mentioned, the whole picture was obviously trying to
make some point about the political situation at that time.
The question is whether you would always be justified in
assuming that there is some one joke or some one point which is
the point which the cartoon is making. Perhaps even the picture
as a whole has no "right interpretation" at all. You might say:
CONVERSATIONS ON FREUD 49
" There are indications-such as the two figures mentionedwhich
suggest that it has." And I might answer that perhaps these
indications are al that there is. Once you have got an interpretation
of these two figures, there may be no ground for saying
that there must be an interpretation of the whole thing or of
every detail of it on similar lines.
The situation may be similar in dreams.
Freud would ask : "What made you hallucinate that situation
at all ?" One might answer that there need not have been anything
that made me hallucinate it.
Freud seems to have certain prejudices about when an interpretation
could be regarded as complete-and so about when it
still requires completion, when further interpretation is needed.
Suppose someone were ignorant of the tradition among sculptors
of making busts. If he then came upon the finished bust of some
man, he might say that obviously this is a fragment and that there
must have been otherparts belonging to it, making it a whole body.
Suppose you recognized certain things in the dream which
can be interpreted in the Freudian manner. Is there any ground
at al for assuming that there must be an interpretation for everything
dse in the dream as well ? that it makes any sense to ask
what is the right interpretation of the other things there ?
Freud asks "Are you asking me to believe that there is anything
which happens without a cause ?" But this means nothing.
If under 'cause' you include things like physiological causes,
then we know nothing about these;, and in any case they are not
relevant to the question of interpretation. Certainly you can't
argue from Freud's question to the proposition that everything
in the dream must have a cause in the sense of some past event
with which it is connected by association in that way.
Suppose we ·were to regard a dream as a kind of game which
the dreamer played. (And by the way, there is no one cause or
one reason why children always play. This is where theories of
play generally go wrong.) There might be a game in which paper
figures were put together to form a story, or at any rate were
somehow assembled. The materials might be collected and stored
in a scrap-book, ful of pictures and anecdotes. The child might
then take various bits from the scrap-book to put into the construction;
and he might take a considerable picture because it
50 LECTURES AND CONVERSATIONS
had something in it which he wanted and he might just include
the rest because it was there.
Compare the ·question of why we dream and why we write
stori�s. Not everything .in the story is allegorical. What would
be meant by trying to explain why he has written just that story
in just that way ?
There is no one reason why people talk. A small child babbles
often just for the pleasure of making noises. This is also one
reason why adults talk. And there are countless others.
Freud seems constantly to be influenced by the thought that
a hallucination is something requiring a tremendous mental
force-seelische Kraft. 'Ein Traum findet sich niemals mit Halbheiten
ab.' And he thinks that the only force strong enough to
produce the hallucinations of dreams is to be found in the deep
wishes of early childhood. One might question this. Supposing
it is true that hallucinations in waking state require an extraordinary
mental force-why should not dream hallucinations be
the perfectly normal thing in sleep, not requiring any extraordinary
force at all ?
(Compare the question : " Why do we punish criminals ? Is it
from a desire for revenge ? Is it in order to prevent a repetition of
the crime ?" And so on. The truth is that there is no one reason.
There is the institution of punishing criminals. Diferent people
support this for diferent reasons, and for diferent reasons in
different cases and at diferent times. Some people support it out
of a desire for revenge, some perhaps out of a desire for justice,
some out of a wish to prevent a repetition of the crime, and so on.
And so punishments are carried out.)
WITTGENSTEIN (notes following conversation, 1946 R.R.)
I have been going through Freud's "Interpretation of Dreams"
with H. And it has made me feel how much this whole way of
thinking wants combatting.
. If I take any one of the dream reports (reports of his own
dreams) which Freud gives, I can by the use Qf free association
arve at the same results as those he reaches in his analysisalthough
it was not my dream. And the association will proceed
through my own experiences and so on.
The fact is that whenever you are preoccupied with some-
CONVERSATIONS ON FREUD 51
thing, with some trouble or with some problem which is a big
thing in your life-a.s sex is, for instance-then no matter what
you start from, the association will lead fina.ly and inevitably
back to that same theme. Freud remarks on how, after the analysis
of it, the dream appears so very logical. And of course it does.
You could start with any of the objects on this table-which
certainly are not put there through your dream a.ctivity-a.nd
you could find that they a.l could be connected in a pattern like
that; and the pattern would be logical in the same way.
One may be able to discover certain things about oneself by
this sort offree association, but it does not explain why the dream
occurred. ,
Freud refers to various ancient myths in these connexions,
and claims that his researches have now explained how it came
about that anybody should think or propound a myth of that sort.
Whereas in fact Freud has done something diferent. He has
not given a scientific explanation of the ancient myth. What he
has done is to propound a new myth. The attractiveness of the
suggestion, for instance, that a.l anxiety is a repetition of the
anxiety of the birth trauma., is just the attractiveness of a mythology.
"It is a.l the outcome of something that happened long
ago." Almost like referring to a totem.
Much the same could be said of the notion of an ·Urszene'.
This often has the attractiveness of giving a sort of tragic pattern
to one's life. It is a.l the repetition of the same pattern which was
settled long ago. Like a tragic figure carrying out the decrees
under which the fates had placed him at birth. Many people have,
at some period, serious trouble in their lives-so serious as to
lead to thoughts of suicide. This is likely to appear to one as
something nasty, as a situation which is too foul to be a subject
of a tragedy. And it may then be an imense relief if it can be
shown that one's life has the pattern rather of a tragedy-the
tragic working out and repetition of a pattern which was determined
by the prima.! scene.
There is of course the difculty of determining what scene is
the primal scene-whether it is the scene which the patient
recognizes as such, or whether it is �e one whose recollection
effects the cure. In practice these criteria are mingled together.
Analysis is likely to do harm. Because although one may
S2 LEC'I'URES AND CONVERSATIONS
discover in the course of it various things about oneself, one must
have a very strong and keen and persistent criticism in order to
recognize and see through the mythology that is offe�ed or imposed
on one. There is an inducement to say, 'Yes, of course, it
must be like that'. A powerful mythology.
L E C TU R E S O N R E L I G I O U S B E L I E F
I
An Austrian general said to someone : ''! shal think of you
after my death, if that should be possible." We can imagine on�
group who would find this ludicrous, another who wouldn't.
(During the war, Wittgenstein saw consecrated bread being
cared in chromium steel. This struck him as ludicrous.)
Suppose that someone believed in the Last Judgement, and I
don't, does this mean that 1 believe the opposite to him, just that
there won't be such a thing ? I would say: " not at al, or not
always."
Suppose I ·say that the body will rot, and another says "No.
Particles wil rejoin in a thousand years, and there wil be a
Resuron of you."
If some said : "Wittgenstein, do you believe in this ?" I'd say :
"No." "Do you contradict the man ?" I'd say: "No."
If you say this, the contradiction already lies in this.
Would you say : "1 believe the opposite", or "There is no
reason to suppose such a thing" ? I'd say neither.
Suppose someone were a believer and said : "1 believe in a
Last Judgement," and I said : "Well, I'm not so sure. Possibly."
You would say that there is an enormous gulf between us. If he
said "There is a German aeroplane overhead," and I said "Possibly
I'm not so sure," you'd say we were fairly near.
It isn't a question of my being anywhere near him, but on an
entirely diferent plane, which you could express by saying :
" You mean something altogether diferent, Wittgenstein."
The diference might not show up at al in any explanation of
the meaning.
Why is it that in this case I seem to be missing the .entire
point ?
Suppose somebody made this guidance for this life: believing
in the Last Judgment. Whenever he does anything, this is
before his mind. In a way, how are we to know whether to say he
believes this will happen or not ?
Asking him is not enough. He wil probably say he has proof.
54 LECTURES .AND CONVERSATIONS
But he has what you might call an unshakeable belief; It wil
show, not by reasoning or by appeal to ordinary grounds for
belief, but rather by regulating for in al his life.
This is a very much stronger fact-foregoing pleasures,
always appealing to this picture. This is one sense must be caled
the firmest of al beliefs, because the man risks things on account
of it which he would not do on things which are by far better
established for him. Although he distinguishes between things
well-established and not well-established.
Lewy: Surely, he would say it is extremely well-established.
First, he may use "well-established" or not use it at all. He
wil treat this belief as extremely well-established, and in another
way as not well-established at al.
If we have a belief, in certain cases we appeal again and again
to certain grounds, and at the same time we risk pretty little:-if
it came to risking our lives on the ground of this belief�
There are instances where you have a faith-where you say
"1 believe"-and on the other hand this belief does not rest on the
fact on which our ordinary everyday beliefs normaly do rest.
How should we compare beliefs with each other ? What
would it mean to compare them?
You might say : 'We compare the states of mind."
How do we compare states of mind ? This obviously won't
do for al occasions. . First, what you say won't be taken as the
measure for the firmness of a belief? But, for instance, what risks
you would take ?
The strength of a belief is not comparable with the intensity
of a pain.
An entirely diferent way of comparing beliefs is seeing what
sorts of grounds he will give.
A belief isn't like a momentary state of mind. "At 5 o'clock he
had very bad toothache."
.
Suppose you had two people, and one of them, when he had
to decide which course to take, thought of retribution, and the
other did not. One person might, for instance, be inclined to
take everything that happened to him as a reward or punishment,
and another person doesn't think of this at al.
If he is il, he may think: "What have I done to deserve this ?"
This is one way of thinking of retribution. Another
·
way is, he
LECTURES ON RELIGIOUS BELIEF 55
thin,ks in a general way whenever he is ashamed of himself:
" This wil be punished."
Take two people, one of whom talks of his behaviour and of
what happens to him in terms of retribution, the other one does
not. These people think entirely differently. Yet, so far, you can't
say they believe diferent things.
Suppose someone is il and he says: "This is a punishment,"
and'! say: "If I'm il, I don't think of punishment at al." If you
say: "Do you believe the opposite?"-you can call it believing the
opposite, but it is entirely diferent from what we would normaly
call believing the opposite.
1 think difrently, in a different way. I say diferent things to
myself. I have different pictures.
It is this way: if someone said: "Wittgensteiil, you don't take
iless as punishment, so what do you believe?"-I'd say: "I don't
have any thoughts of punishment."
There are, for instance, these entirely diferent ways of thinking
first of al-which needn't be expressed by one person saying
one thing, another person another thing.
What we cal believing in a Judgement Day or not belieVing
in a Judgement Day-The expression . of belief may play an
absolutely minor role.
.
If you ask me whether or not I believe in a Judgement Day,
in the sense in which religious people have beliefin it, I wouldn't
say: ''No. 1 don't believe there will be such a thing." It would
seem to me utterly crazy to say this.
And then 1 give an explana.tion: "I don't believe in . . .", but
then the religious person never believes what r describe.
I can't say. I can't contradict that person.
In one sense, I understand al he says-the English words
"God", "separate", etc. 1 understand. 1 could say: "I don't believe
in this," and this would be true, meaning I haven't got these
thoughts or anything that hangs together with them. But not
that 1 could contradict the thing.
You might say: "Well, if you can't contradict him, that means
you don't understand him. If you did understand him, then you
might." That again is Greek to me. My normal technique of
languageleaves me. I don't know whether to say they understand
one another or not.
56 LECTURES AND CONVERSATIONS
These controversies look quite diferent from any normal
controversies. Reasons look entirely diferent from normal
reasons.
They are, in a way, quite inconclusive.
The point is that if there were evidence, this would in fact
destroy the whole business.
Anything that I normally cal evidence wouldn't in the
slightest influence me.
Suppose, for instance, we knew people who foresaw the
fu�re ; make forecasts for years and years ahead; and they
described some sort of a Judgement Day. Queerly enough, even
if there were such a thing, and even if it were more convincing
th.a.Q. I have described but, belief in this happening wouldn't be
at al a religious belief.
Suppose that I would have to forego al pleasures because of
such a forecast. If I do so and so, 'someone will put me in fires in
a thousand years, etc. I wouldn't budge. The best scientific
evidence is just nothing.
A religious beliefmight in fact fly in the face of such a forecast,
and say " No. There it wil break down."
As it were, the belief as formulated on the evidence can only
be the last result-in which a number of ways of thinking and
acting crystallize and come together.
A man would fight for his life not to be dragged into the fire.
No induction. Terror. That is, as it were, part of the substance of
the belief.
That is partly why you don't get in religious controversies,
the form of controversy where one person is sure of the thing,
and the other says : 'Well, possibly.'
You might be surprised that there hasn't been opposed to
those who believe in Resurrection those who say "Wel, possibly."
Here believing obviously plays much more this role : suppose
we said that a certain pictw:e might play the role of constandy
admonishing me, or I · always think of it. Here, an enormous
diference would be between those people for whom the picture
is constandy in the foreground, and the others who just didn't
use it at al.
Those who said: "Well, possibly it may happen and possibly
not" would be on an entirely diferent plane.
LECTURES ON RELIGIOUS BELIEF 57
This is partly why one woUld be reluctant to say: "These
people rigorously hold the opinion (or view) that there is a Last
Judgement". "Opinion" sounds queer.
It is for this reason that difent words are used: 'dogma',
'faith'.
We don't talk about hypothesis, or about high probability.
Nor about knowing.
In a religious discourse we use such expressions as : ''I believe
that so and so wil happen," and use them diferently to the way
in which we use them in science.
Although, there is a great temptation to think we do. Because
we do talk of evidence, and do talk' of evidence by experience.
We coUld even talk of historic events.
'
It has been said that Christianity rests on an historic basis.
It has been said a thousand times by intelligent people that
indubitability is not enough in this case. Even if there is as much
evidence as for Napoleon. Because' the indubitability woUldn't be
enough to make me change my whole life.
It doesn't rest on an historic basis in the sense that the ordinary
belief in historic facts coUld serve as a foundation.
Here
we have a beliefin historic facts diferent from a beliefin
ordinary historic facts. Even, they are not treated as historical,
empirical, propositions.
Those people who had faith didn't apply the doubt, which
woUld ordinarily apply to 4'!Y historical propositions. Especialy
propositions of a time long past, etc.
What is the criterion of reliability, dependability? Suppose
you give a general description as to when you say a proposition
has a reasonable weight of probability. When you cal it reasonable,
is this onlY to say that for it you have such and such evidence,
and for others you haven't?
For instance, we don't trust the account given of an event by
a. drunk man.
Father O'Hara! is one of those people who make it a q�stion
of science.
Here we have people who treat this evidence in a different
way. They base things on evidence which taken in one way woUld
1 Contribution to a Symposium on SdetKetlReligion (Lond: Gcmld Howe; 1931,
pp. 107-116).
E
58 LECTURES .AND CONVERSATIONS
seem exceedingly flimsy. They base enormous things on this
evidence. Am. I to say they are unreasonable ? I wouldn't Cal
them unreasonable.
I would say, they are certainly not reasonable, that's obvious.
'Unreasonable' implies, with everyone, rebuke.
1 want to say : they don't treat this as a matter of reasonability.
Anyone who reads the Episdes wil find it said: not only that
it is not reasonable, but that it is folly.
Not only is it not reasonable, but it doesn't pretend to.be.
What seems to me ludicrous about O'Hara is his making it
appear to be reasonable.
" Why shouldn't one form of life culminate in an utterance of
belief in a Last Judgement? But I couldn't either say "Yes" or
" No" to the statement that there wil be such a thing. Nor
"Perhaps," nor "I'm not sure."
It is a statement which may not allow of any such answer.
If Mr. Lewy is religious and says he believes in a Judgement
Day, I won't even know whether to say I understand him or not.
I've read the same things as he's read. In a most important sense,
I know what he means.
If an atheist says : "There won't be a Judgment Day, and
another person says there wil," do they mean the same ?-Not
clear what criterion of meaning the same is. They might describe
the same things. You might say, this already shows that they
mean the same.
We come to an island and we find beliefs there, and certain
beliefs we are inclined to cal religious. What I'm driving at is,
that religious beliefs wil not . . . They have sentences, and there
are also religious statements.
These statements would not just difer in respect to what they
are about. Entirely difent connections would make them into
religious beliefs, and there can easily be imagined transitions
where we wouldn't know for our life whether to cal them
religious beliefs or scientific beliefs.
You may say they reason wrongly.
In certain cases you would say they reason wrongly, meaning
they contradict us. In other cases you w:ould say they don't
reason at al, or "It is an entirely clerent kind of reasoning." The
LECTURES ON RELIGIOUS BELIEF 59
first, you would say in the case in which they reason in. a similar
way to us, and make som.ething corresponding to our blunders.
Whether a thing is a blunder or not-it is a blunder in a
particalar system. Just as something is a blunder in a particalar
game and not in another.
You could also say that where we are reasonable, they are not
reasonable-meaning they don't use reason here. .
If they do something very like one of our blunders, I would
say, I don't know. It depends on further suroundings of it.
It is difcult to see, in cases in which it has al the appearances
of trying to be reasonable.
I would definitely cal O'Hara unreasonable. I would say, if
this is religious belief; then it's al superstition.
But I would ridicule it, not by saying it is based on insufcient
evidence. I would say: here is a man who is cheating himself.
You can say : this man is ridiculous because he believes, and bases
it on weak reasons.
II
The word 'God' is amongst the earliest learnt-pictures and
catechisms, etc. But not the same consequences as with pictures
of aunts. I wasn't shown [that which the picture pictured].
The word is used like a word representing a person. God sees,
rewards, etc.
"Being shown al these things, did you understand what this
word meant?" I'd say: "Yes and no. I did learn what it didn't
mean. I made myself understand. I could answer questions,
understand questions when they were put in diferent ways-and
in that sense could be said to understand."
If the question arises as to the existence of a god or God, it
plays an entirely diferent role to that ofthe existence ofany person
or object I ever heard of. One said, had to say, that one believedin
the existence, and if one did not believe, this was regarded as
something bad. Normally if I did not believe in the existenCe of
something no one would think there was anything wrong in this.
Also, there is this extraordinary use of the word 'believe'.
One talks of believing and at the same time one doesn't use
'believe' as one does · ordinarily. You might say (in the normal
60 LECTURES .AND CONVERSATIONS.
use): "You only believe-oh well. . . ." Here it is used entirely
cliferendy; on the other hand it is not used as we generally use
the word 'know'.
If I even vaguely remember what I was taught about God, I
might say: ''Whatever believing in God may be, it can't be believing
in something we can test, or find means of testing." You
might say: "This is nonsense, because people say they believe ?n
! evidence or say they believe on religious experiences." I would say:
"The mere fact that someone says they believe on evidence
doesn't tell me enough for me to be able to say now whether I
can say of a sentence 'God exists' that your evidence is unsatisfactory
or insufficient."
Suppose I know someone, Smith. I've heard that he has been
kiled in a hatde in this war. One day you come to me and say:
"Smith is in Cambridge." I inquire, and find you stood at Guildhal
and saw at the other end a man and said: "That was Smith."
I'd say: "Listen. This isn't sufficient evidence." If we had a fair
amount of evidence he was kiled I would try to make you say
that you're being credulous. Suppose he was never heard of
again. Needless to say, it is quite impossible to make inquiries :
''Who at 12.05 passedMarketPlace into Rose Crescent?" Suppose
you say: "He was there". I would be extremely puzzled.
Suppose there is a feast on Mid-Sumer Common. A lot of
people stand in a ring. Suppose this is done every year and then
everyone says he has seen one of his dead relatives on the other
side of the ring. In this case, we could ask everyone in the ring.
"Who did you hold by the hand?" Nevertheless, we'd al say that
on that day we see our dead relatives. You could in this case
say: ''1 had an extraordinary experience. I had the experience I
can express by saying: '1 saw my dead cousin'." Would we say
you are saying this on insufcient evidence? Under certain
circumstances I would say this, under other circumstances I
wouldn't. Where what is said sounds a bit absurd I would say:
''Yes, in this case insufficient evidence." If altogether absurd,
then I wouldn't.
Suppose I went to somewhere like Lourdes in France.
Suppose I wentwith a very credulous person. There we see blood
comingout ofsomething. He says: "There you are, Wittgenstein,
how can you doubt?" 1'd say: "Can it only be explained one way?
LECTURES ON RELIGIOUS BELIEF 61
Can't it be this or that ?" I'd try to convince him that he'd seen
nothing of any consequence. I wonder whether I would do that
under al circumstances. I certainly know that I would under
normal circumstances.
"Oughtn't one after al to consider this ?" I'd say: "Come on.
Come on." I would treat the phenomenon in this case just as I
would treat an experiment in a laboratory which I thought badly
executed.
"The balance moves when I wil it to move." I point out it is
not covered up, a draught can move it, etc.
I could imagine that someone showed an extremely passionate
belief in such a phenomenon, and I couldn't approach his belief
at al by saying : "This could just as well have been brought about
by so and so" because he could think this blasphemy on my side.
Or he might say : "Itis possible that these priests cheat, but nevertheless
in a d.i£erent sense a miraculous phenomenon takes place
there."
I have a statue which bleeds on such and such a day in the
year. I have red ink, etc. "You are a cheatf but nevertheless the
Deity uses you. Red ink in a sense, but not red ink in a sense."
a. Flowers at seance with label. Pe'Ople said : "Yes, flowers
are materialized with label." What kind of circumstances must
there be to make this kind of story not ridiculous ?
I have a moderate education, as al of you have, and therefore
know what is meant by insufficient evidence for a forecast.
Suppose someone dreamt of the Last Judgement, and said he
now knew what it would be like. Suppose someone said : " This
is poor evidence." I would say : "If you want to compare it with
the evidence for it's raining to-morrow it is no evidence at al."
He may make it sound as if by stretching the point you may cal
it evidence. But it may be more than ridiculous as evidence.
But now, would I be prepared to say: "You are basing your belief
on extremely slender evidence, to put it mildly." Why should I
regard this dream as evidence-measuring its validity as though
I were measuring the validity of the evidence for meteorological
events ?
If you compare it with anything in Science which we cal
evidence, you can't credit that anyone could soberly argue :
"Well. I had this dream . . . therefore . . . Last Judgement" . You
62 LECTURES AND CONVERSATIONS
might say: "For a blunder, that's too big." If you suddenly
wrote numbers down on the blackboard, and then said : "Now,
I'm going to add," and then said : "2 and 21 is 13," etc. I'd say :
"This is no blunder."
There are cases where I'd say he's mad, or he's making fun.
Then there might be caseS where I look for an entirely diferent
intetpretation altogether. In order to see what the explanation is
I should have to see the sum, to see in what way it is done, what
he makes follow from it, what are the diferent circumstances
wider which he does it, etc.
I' mean, if a man said to me after a dream that he believed in
the Last Judgement, I'd try to find what sort of impression it
gave him. One attitude : "It will be in about 2,000 years. It will
be bad for so and so and so, etc." Or it may he one of terror. In
the case where there is hope, terror, etc., would I say there is
insufficient evidence if he says : "I believe . . ." ? I can't treat
these words as J normally treat 'I believe so and so'. It would be
entirely beside the point, and also if he said his friend so and so
and his grandfather had had the dream and believed, it would be
entirely beside the point.
I would not say : "If a man said he dreamt it would happen
to-morrow," would he take his coat ?, etc.
Case where Lewy has visions of his dead friend. Cases where
you don't try to locate him. And case where you try to locate
him in a busine�s-like way. Another case where I'd say : "We
can pre-suppose we have a broad basis on which we agree."
In general, if you say : "He is dead" and I say: "He is not
dead" no-one would say : "Do they mean the same thing by
'dead' ?" In the case where a man has visions I wouldn't offhand
say: "He means something diferent."
Cf. A person having persecution mania.
What is the criterion for meaning something diferent ? Not
only what he takes as evidence for it, but also how he reacts, that
he is in terror, etc..
How. am I to find out whether this proposition is to be
regarded as an empirical proposition-'You'll see your dead
friend again ?' Would I say : "He is a bit superstitious ?" Not a
bit.
He might have been apologetic. (The man who stated it
LECTURES ON RELIGIOUS BELIEF 63
categorica.ly was more intelligent than the man who was apologetic
about it).
'Seeing a dead friend,' again means nothing much to me at all.
I don't think in these terms. I don't say to myself: "I shal see so
and so again" ever.
He always says it, but he doesn't make any search. He puts
on a queer smile. "His story had that dreamlike quality." My
answer would be in this case "Yes," and a particular explanation.
Take "God created man'. Pictures of Michelangelo showing
the creation of the world. In general, there is nothing which
explains the meanings of words as well as a picture, and I take it
that Michelangelo was as good as anyone can be and did his best,
and here is the picture of the Deity creating Adam.
If we ever saw �s, we certainly wouldn't think this the
Deity. The picture has to be used in an entirely diferent way if
we are to call the man in that queer blanket 'God', and so on.
You could imagine that religion was taught by means of these
pictures. "Ofcourse, we can only express ourselves by means of
picture." This is rather queer . . . . I could show Moore the
pictures of a tropical plant. There is a technique of comparison
between picture and plant. If I showed him the picture of Michela�gelo
and said : "Of course, I can't show you the real thing, only
the picture" . . . . The absurdity is, I've never taught him the
technique of using this picture.
It is quite clear that the role of pictures of Biblical subjects
and role of the picture of God creating Adam are totally diferent
ones. You might ask this question : "Did Michelangelo think
that Noah in the ark looked like this, and that God creating
Adam looked like this ?" He wouldn't have said that God or
Adam looked as they look in this picture.
It might seem as though, if we asked such a question as :
"Does Lewy reallY mean what so and so means when he says so
and so is alive ?"-it might seem as though there were two sharply
divided cases, one in which he would say he didn't mean it
literally. I want to say this it not so. There will, be cases where
we will difer, and where it won't be a question at all of more or
less knowledge, so that we can come together. Sometimes it will
be a question of experience, so you can say : "Wait another 10
years." And I would say : "I would disencourage this kind of
64 LECTURES AND CONVERSATIONS
reasoning" and Moore would say: "I wouldn't disencourage it."
That is, one would do something. We would take sides, and that
goes so far that there would really be great diferences between
us, which might come out in Mr. Lewy saying : "Wittgenstein is
trying to undermine reason", and this wouldn't be false. This is
actually where such questions rise.
LECTURES ON RELIGIOUS BELIEF 65
III
Today I saw a poster saying: " 'Dead' Undergraduate speaks. "
The inverted commas mean : "He isn't realy dead." "He isn't
what people cal dead. They cal it 'dead' not quite correcdy."
We don't sp'eak of "door" in quotes.
It suddenly struck me: "If someone said 'He , isn't reaJ1y
dead, although by the ordinary criteria he is dead'--ouldn't
I say "He is not only dea.d by the ordinary criteria.;he is what we
aJ1 cal 'dead'."
If you now cal him 'alive', you're using language in a queer
way, because you're almost deliberately preparing misunderstandings.
Why don't you use some other word, and let "dead"
have the mea.ning it a.1ready has ?
Suppose someone said: "It didn't always have this meaning.
He's not dead according to the old meaning" or "He's not dea.d
according to the old idea.".
What is it, to have diferent ideas of death? Suppose you
say : "I have the idea. of myself being a chair after death" or "I
have the idea. of myself being a chair in ha.lf-a.n-hour"-you aJ1
know under what circumstances we say of something that it has
become a chair. '
C.f. (1) "This shadow will cea.se to exist."
(2) "This chair will cease to exist." You say that you know
what this chair cea.sing to exist is like. But you have to think.
You may find that there isn't a use for this sentence. You think
of the use.
I imagine myself on the dea.th-bed. I imagine you aJ1 looking
at the air above me. You say "You have an idea".
Are you clear when you'd say you had ceased to exist ?
You have six difrent ideas [of 'ceasing to exist'] at dif
times.
If you say: "I can imagine myself being a disembodied spirit.
Wittgenstein, can you imagine yourself as a disembodied spirit?"
-I'd say: "I'm sorry. I [sofar] connect nothingwith thesewords."
I connect aJ1 sorts of complicated things with these words.
I think of what people have said of suferings after dea.th, etc.
eel have two diferent ideas, one of ceasing to exist after dea.th,
the other of being a disembodied spirit."
66 LECTURES AND CONVERSATIONS
What's it like to have two diferent ideas ? What is the criterion
for one man having one idea, another man having another idea ?
You gave me two phrases, "ceasing to exist", "being a
disembodied spirit". "When I say this, I think of myself having
a certain set of experiences." What is it like to think of this ?
If you think of your brother in America, how do you know
that what you think is, that the thought inside you is, of your
brother being in America ? Is this an experiential business ?
Cf. How do you know that what you want is an apple ?
[Russell].
How do you know that you believe that your brother is in
America?
A pear might be what satisfied you. But you wouldn't say:
"What I wanted was an apple."
Suppose we say that the thought is some sort of process in
his mind, or his saying something, etc.-then I could say : "All
right, you cal this a thought of your brother in America, well,
what is the connection betweenthis andyourbrotherin America ?"
Lewy: You might say that this is a question of convention.
Why is it that you don't doubt that it is a thought of your
brother in America?
One process [the thought] seems to be a shadow or a picture
of something else.
How dol know that a picture is a picture ofLewy ?-Normaly
by its likeness to Lewy, or, under certain circumstances, a picture
of Lewy may not be like him, but like Smith. If I give up the
business of being like [as a criterion], I get into an 'awful mess,
because anything may be his portrait, given a certain method of
projection.
If you said that the thought was in some way a picture of his
brother in America-Yes, but by what method of projection is it
a picture of this ? How queer it is that there should be no doubt
what its a picture of.
.
If you're asked : "How do you know it is a thought of such
and such ? .. the thought that immediately comes to your mind is
one of a shadow, a picture. You don't think of a causal relation.
The kind of relation you think of is best expressed by "picture",
"shadow," etc.
LECTURES ON RELIGIOUS BELIEF 67
The word "picture" is even quite al right-in many cases
it is even in the most ordinary sense, a picture. You might
translate my very words into a picture.
But the point is this, suppose you drew this, how do I know it
is my brother in America? Who says it is him-unless it is here
imi!ari' , �s ty . .
What is the connection between these words, or anything
substitutable for them, with my brother in America?
The first idea [you have] is that you are looking at your own
thought, and are absolutely sure that it is a thought that so and
so. You are looking at some mental phenomenon, and you say
to yourself "obviously this is a thought of my brother being in
America". It seems to be a super-picture. It seems, with thought,
that there is no doubt whatever. With a picture, it stil depends on
the method of projection, whereas here it seems that you get rid
of the projecting relation, and are absolutely certain that this is
thought of that.
Smythies's muddle is based on the idea of a super-picture.
We once talked about how the idea of certain superlatives
came about in Logic. The idea of a super-necessity, etc.
"How do I know that this is the thought of my brother in
America?"-that what is the thought?
Suppose my thought consists of my sqying "My brother is in
America"-how do I know that I sqy my brother is in America ?
How is the connection made ?-We imagine at first a connection
like strings.
Lewy : The connection is a convention. The word designates.
You must explain "designates" by examples. We have learnt
a rule, a practice, etc.
Is thinking of something like painting or shooting at somethin
�g .
It seems like a projection connection, which seems to make it
indubitable, although there is not a projection relation at al.
If I said "My brother is in America"-I could imagine there
being rays projecting from my words to my brother in America.
But what if my brother isn't in America?-then the rays don't
hit anything.
[If you say that the words refer to my brother by expressing
the proposition that my brother is in America-the proposition
68 LECTURES AND CONVERSATIONS
being a middle link between the words and what they refer to]
-What has the proposition, the mediate link, got to do with
America?
The most important point is this-if you talk of painting, etc.
your idea is that the connection exists now, so that it seem as
though as long as I do this thinking, this connection exists.
Whereas, if we said it is a connection of convention, there
would be no point in saying it exists while we think. There is a
connection by convention-What do we mean?-This connection
refers to events happening at various times. Most of all, it refers
to a technique.
["Is thinking something going on at a particular time, or is it
spread over the words ?" "It comes in a flash." "Always?-it
sometimes does come in a flash, although this may be al sorts of
diferent things.]
If it does refer to a technique, then it can't be enough, in
certain cases, to explain what you mean in a few words; because
there is something which might be thought to be in conflict with
the idea going on from 7 to 7.5, namely the practice of using it
[the phrase.] .
When we talked of: "So and so is an automaton", the strong
hold of that view was [due to the idea] that you could say: "Wel,
I know what I mean" . . . , as though you were looking at something
happening while you said the thing, entirely independant of
what came before and after, the application [of the phrase]. It
looked as though you could talk of understanding a word,
without any reference to the technique of its usage. It looked as
though Smythies said he could understand the sentence, and that
we then had nothing to say.
What was it like to have diferent ideas of death?-What I
meant was-Is having an idea of death something like having a
certain picture, so that you can say "I have an idea of deathfrom
5.to 5.1 etc." ? ''In whatever way anyone wil use this word, I
have now a certain idea"-if you cal this "having an idea", then
it is not what is commonly caled "having an idea", because
what is commonly called "having an idea", has a reference to the
technique of the word, etc.
We are al here using the word "death", which is a public
LECTURES ON RELIGIOUS BELIEF 69
instrument, which has a whole technique [of usage]. Then
someone says he has an idea of death. Something queer; because
you might say '"You are using the word 'death', which is an
instrument functioning in a certain way."
If you treat this [your idea] as something private, with what
right are you calg it an idea of death?-l say this, because we,
also, have a right to say what is an idea of death.
He might say '"1 have my own private idea of death"-why
cal this an 'idea of death' wil.ess it is something you connect
with death. Although this [your 'idea'] might not interest us at
al. [In this case,] it does not belong on the game played with
'death', which we all know and understand.
If what he cals his "idea of death" is to become relevant, it
must become part of our game;
'My idea of death is the separation of the soul from the body'
-if we know what to do with these words. He can also say: "1
connect with the word 'death' 'a certain picture-a .woman lying
in her bed"-that may or may not be of some interest.
If he connects
with death, and this was his idea, this might be interesting
psychologicaly.
"The separation of soul from body" [only had a public
interest.] This may act like black curtains or it may not act like
black curtains. 1'd have to find out what the consequences [of
your saying it] are. 1 am not, at least, at present at al clear. [You
say this]-"So what?"-1 know these words, 1 have certain
pictures. Al sorts of things go along with these words.
If he says this, 1 won't know yet what consequences he wil
draw. 1 don't know what he opposes this to.
l.: "You oppose it to being extinguished."
If you say to me-uDo you cease to exist ?"-l should be
bewildered, and would not know wP.a.t exactly this is to mean.
70 LECTURES AND CONVERSATIONS
"If you dont cease to exist, you will sufer after death"�· there I
begin to attach ideas, perhaps ethical ideas of responsibility.
The point is, that although these are well-known words, and
although I can go from one sentence to another sentence, or to
pictures [I don't know what consequences you draw from this
statement].
Suppose someone said: "What do you believe, Wittgenstein?
Are you a sceptic? Do you know whether you wil survive
death?" I would really, this is a fact, say "I can't say. I don't
know", because I haven't any clear idea what I'm saying when
I'm saying "I don't cease to exist," etc.
Spiritualists make one kind of connection.
A Spiritualist says "Apparition" etc. Although he gives me
a picture I don't like, I do get a clear idea. I know that much,
that some people connect this phrase with a particular kind of
verification. I know that some people don't-religious people
e.g.-they don't refer to a verification, but have entirely dif£er�t
ideas.
A great writer said that, when he was a boy, his father set
him a task, and he suddenly felt that nothing, not even death,
could take away the responsibility [in doing this task] ; this was
his duty to do, and that even death couldn't stop it being his
duty. He said that this was, in a way, a proof of the immortality
of the soul-because if this lives on [the responsibility won't die.]
The idea is given by what we cal the proof. Well, if this is the
idea, [all right].
Jf a Spiritualist wishes to give m� an idea of what he means or
doesn't mean by 'survival', he can say all sorts of things[If
I ask what idea he has, I may be given what the Spiritualists
say or I may be given what the man I quoted said, etc., etc.]
I would at least [in the case of the Spiritualist] have an idea
of what this sentence is connected up with, and get more and
more of an idea. as I see what he does with it.
As it is, I hardly connect anything with it at all.
Suppose someone, before going to China, when he might
never see me again, said to me: "We might see one another
after death"-would I necessarily say that I don't understand
LECTURES ON RELIGIOUS BELIEF 71
him ? I might say [want to say] simply, "Yes. I understand him
entirely."
Lewy "In this case, you might only mean that he expressed a
certain attitude."
I would say "No, it isn't the same as saying 'I'm very fond of
you' " -and it may not be the same as saying anything else. It
says what it says. Why should you be able to substitute anything
else?
Suppose I say: "The man used a picture."
"Perhaps now he sees he was wrong." What sort of remark
is this ?
"God's eye sees everything"-I want to say of this that it
uses a picture.
I don't want to belittle him [the person who says it.]
Suppose I said to him "You've been using a picture", and he
said "No, this is not al"-mightn't he have misunderstood me?
What do I want to do [by saying this] ? What would be the real
sign of disagreement ? What might be the real criterion of his
disagreeing with me ?
Lewy: "If he said : 'I've been making preparations [for death]."
Yes, this might be a disagreement-if he himself were to use
the word in a way in which I did not expect, or were to draw
conclusions I did not expect him to draw. I wanted only to
draw attention to a particular technique of usage. We should
disagree, if he was using a technique I didn't expect.
We associate a particular use with a picture.
Smythies : 'This isn't al he does--associate a use with a picture.'
Wittgenstein: Rubbish. Imeant : what conclusionsare yougoing
to draw? etc. Are eyebrows going to be talked of, in connection
with the Eye of God ?
"He could just as well have said so and so"-this [remark] is
foreshadowed by the word "attitude". He couldn't just as well
have said something else.
IfI sayhe used a picture, I don'twantto sayanything he himself
wouldn't say. I want to say that he draws these conclusions.
Isn't it as important as anything else, what picture he does use ?
Of certain pictures we say that they might . just as well be
replaced by another-e.g. we could, under certain circumstances,
have one projection of an ellipse drawn instead of another.
72 LECTURES AND CONVERSATIONS
[He may say] : "I would have been prepared to use another
picture, it would have had the same efect. . . ."
The whole weight may be in the picture.
We can say in chess that the exact shape of the chess-men plays
no role. Suppose that the main pleasure was, to see people ride;
then, playing it in writing wouldn't be playing the same game.
Someone might say: "All he's done is change the shape of the
head"-what more could he do ?
When I say he's using a picture I'm merely making a grammatical
remark: [What I say] can only be verified by the consequences
he does or does not draw.
If Smythies disagrees, I don't take notice of this disagreement.
Al I wished to characterize was the conventions he wished
to draw. If I wished to say anything more I was merely being
philosophicaly arogant.
Normaly, if you say "He is an automaton " you draw consequences,
if you stab him, [he'll feel pain]. On the other hand,
you may not wish to draw any such consequences, and this is
al there is tQ it-except further muddles.
l