

Realism, idealism and solipsism in Wittgenstein's Work

Jan Štěpánek

Masaryk University in Brno

5th December, 2019



STORY BY MARK ALPER
ART BY GARY SHAW

① Introduction

② The Early Wittgenstein

Jaakko Hintikka

Michael Morris

Michael Kremer

③ The Late Wittgenstein

Bernard Williams

Edward Minar

④ Conclusion

① Introduction

② The Early Wittgenstein

Jaakko Hintikka

Michael Morris

Michael Kremer

③ The Late Wittgenstein

Bernard Williams

Edward Minar

④ Conclusion

Introduction

- Wittgenstein's ideas influenced the most current theories in analytical philosophy (and not just there).



Introduction

- Wittgenstein's ideas influenced the most current theories in analytical philosophy (and not just there).
- They are still widely discussed because of their brevity, mostly no arguments but great and deep insights.

Introduction

- Wittgenstein's ideas influenced the most current theories in analytical philosophy (and not just there).
- They are still widely discussed because of their brevity, mostly no arguments but great and deep insights.
- But how can we understand Wittgenstein's ideas if we don't understand what his words refer to?
- Does the word "chair" refer to our picture of a chair, or to - on us independent - object? Did Wittgenstein hold some version of realism, idealism or even solipsism?

In this contribution we will deal just with the ontology. Not with the questions about realism in ethics, esthetics etc.



Introduction

New Search List of available journals and books at MU

Sign In Folder Preferences Čeština Contact Help Nápověda (CZ)




Search the information resources for **Masaryk University**

Keyword Search

[Search Options](#) [Basic Search](#) [Advanced Search](#) [Search History](#)

[Electronic resources portal](#) [Thesis archive \(IS MU\)](#) [Library system Aleph](#) [MU Libraries](#)



Access to this service has been supported by OP VaVpI MEDINFO - Informační zdroje pro medicínu a příbuzné obory, CZ.1.05/3.2.00/12.0225.



discovery.muni service is maintained by Institute of Computer Science, Masaryk University

<https://eds.b.ebscohost.com>



Introduction

- How to understand the definitions of (R) realism, (I) idealism and (S) solipsism?

Introduction

- How to understand the definitions of (R) realism, (I) idealism and (S) solipsism?
- Traditional opinion works with mind/subject/observer dependence:
 - (R) The world is independent of the observer.
 - (I) The world depends on the observer.
 - (S) The world depends just on me.



Introduction

- How to understand the definitions of (R) realism, (I) idealism and (S) solipsism?
- Traditional opinion works with mind/subject/observer dependence:
 - (R) The world is independent of the observer.
 - (I) The world depends on the observer.
 - (S) The world depends just on me.
- There are also other definitions (eg. Dummett) and another types of these -isms.

Introduction

- How to understand the definitions of (R) realism, (I) idealism and (S) solipsism?
- Traditional opinion works with mind/subject/observer dependence:
 - (R) The world is independent of the observer.
 - (I) The world depends on the observer.
 - (S) The world depends just on me.
- There are also other definitions (eg. Dummett) and another types of these -isms.
- Well, but would W agree with our dependence definitions?

Introduction

- During discussions with Friedrich Weismann Wittgenstein claimed:



Introduction

- During discussions with Friedrich Weismann Wittgenstein claimed:
 - (W's R) Der Sessel ist *nicht* die Vorstellung des Sessels, die Vorstellung ist nur ein Bild.
 - (W's I) Meine Vorstellung vom Sessel, das *ist* der Sessel.
 - W's S is missing but we can consider

Introduction

- During discussions with Friedrich Weismann Wittgenstein claimed:
 - (W's R) Der Sessel ist *nicht* die Vorstellung des Sessels, die Vorstellung ist nur ein Bild.
 - (W's I) Meine Vorstellung vom Sessel, das *ist* der Sessel.
 - W's S is missing but we can consider
 - ...
 - (W's S) *Nur meine* Vorstellung vom Sessel, das ist der Sessel.

Introduction

- During discussions with Friedrich Weismann Wittgenstein claimed:
 - (W's R) Der Sessel ist *nicht* die Vorstellung des Sessels, die Vorstellung ist nur ein Bild.
 - (W's I) Meine Vorstellung vom Sessel, das *ist* der Sessel.
 - W's S is missing but we can consider
 - ...
 - (W's S) *Nur meine* Vorstellung vom Sessel, das ist der Sessel.
- The difference lies in the relation between the observer and the world.

Introduction

Who could influenced Wittgenstein (in our matter)?



Introduction

Who could influenced Wittgenstein (in our matter)?

- Arthur Schopenhauer: "The world is my representation" (the first sentence of *The World as a Will and Representation*) and "The world is everything that is the case" (the first statement of *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*).

Introduction

Who could influenced Wittgenstein (in our matter)?

- Arthur Schopenhauer: "The world is my representation" (the first sentence of *The World as a Will and Representation*) and "The world is everything that is the case" (the first statement of *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*).
- Otto Weininger: *Sex and Character*.

Introduction

Who could influenced Wittgenstein (in our matter)?

- Arthur Schopenhauer: "The world is my representation" (the first sentence of *The World as a Will and Representation*) and "The world is everything that is the case" (the first statement of *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*).
- Otto Weininger: *Sex and Character*.
- Bertrand Russell: his treatment about solipsism and its strange definition.

Introduction

Who could influenced Wittgenstein (in our matter)?

- Arthur Schopenhauer: "The world is my representation" (the first sentence of *The World as a Will and Representation*) and "The world is everything that is the case" (the first statement of *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*).
- Otto Weininger: *Sex and Character*.
- Bertrand Russell: his treatment about solipsism and its strange definition.
- Luitzen E. J. Brouwer: the man who brought Wittgenstein back to philosophy. He also introduced solipsism in mathematics.

Introduction

Who could influenced Wittgenstein (in our matter)?

- Arthur Schopenhauer: "The world is my representation" (the first sentence of *The World as a Will and Representation*) and "The world is everything that is the case" (the first statement of *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*).
- Otto Weininger: *Sex and Character*.
- Bertrand Russell: his treatment about solipsism and its strange definition.
- Luitzen E. J. Brouwer: the man who brought Wittgenstein back to philosophy. He also introduced solipsism in mathematics.
- George E. Moore: his paper *The Proof of an External World* is the main source of Wittgenstein's remarks in the book *On Certainty*.



- Was Wittgenstein realist, idealist or solipsist?

- Was Wittgenstein realist, idealist or solipsist?
- What is Wittgenstein philosophical method?
- What does philosophy mean in Wittgenstein's view?
- What it looks like in contemporary philosophy?

① Introduction

② The Early Wittgenstein

Jaakko Hintikka

Michael Morris

Michael Kremer

③ The Late Wittgenstein

Bernard Williams

Edward Minar

④ Conclusion

The Early Wittgenstein

- As the early Wittgenstein we will understand: Notebooks 1914-1916, Prototractatus and Tractatus logico-philosophicus.



The Early Wittgenstein

- As the early Wittgenstein we will understand: Notebooks 1914-1916, Prototractatus and Tractatus logico-philosophicus.
- In the question of R, I and S there are important many notes, but Wittgenstein's view is in most coherent sense formulated in this three sections:

The Early Wittgenstein

- As the early Wittgenstein we will understand: Notebooks 1914-1916, Prototractatus and Tractatus logico-philosophicus.
- In the question of R, I and S there are important many notes, but Wittgenstein's view is in most coherent sense formulated in this three sections:
 - 5.6-5.641 ... World-Language relation

The Early Wittgenstein

- As the early Wittgenstein we will understand: Notebooks 1914-1916, Prototractatus and Tractatus logico-philosophicus.
- In the question of R, I and S there are important many notes, but Wittgenstein's view is in most coherent sense formulated in this three sections:
 - 5.6-5.641 ... World-Language relation
 - 6.43-6.4311 ... World-Death relation

The Early Wittgenstein

- As the early Wittgenstein we will understand: Notebooks 1914-1916, Prototractatus and Tractatus logico-philosophicus.
- In the question of R, I and S there are important many notes, but Wittgenstein's view is in most coherent sense formulated in this three sections:
 - 5.6-5.641 ... World-Language relation
 - 6.373-6.374 ... World-Will relation
 - 6.43-6.4311 ... World-Death relation

The Early Wittgenstein

- As the early Wittgenstein we will understand: Notebooks 1914-1916, Prototractatus and Tractatus logico-philosophicus.
- In the question of R, I and S there are important many notes, but Wittgenstein's view is in most coherent sense formulated in this three sections:
 - 5.6-5.641 ... World-Language relation
 - 6.373-6.374 ... World-Will relation
 - 6.43-6.4311 ... World-Death relation
- So let's look at these statements:

The Early Wittgenstein

5.6 *The limits of my language* mean the limits of my world.

5.61 Logic fills the world: the limits of the world are also its limits.

We cannot therefore say in logic: This and this there is in the world, that there is not.

For that would apparently presuppose that we exclude certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case since otherwise logic must get outside the limits of the world: that is if it could consider these limits from the other side also.

What we cannot think, that we cannot think: we cannot therefore say what we cannot think.

5.62 This remark provides a key to the question, to what extent solipsism is a truth.

In fact what solipsism *means*, is quite correct, only it cannot be *said*, but it shows itself.

That the world is *my* world, shows itself in the fact that the limits of the language (the language which only I understand) mean the limits of *my* world.

5.621 The world and life are one.

5.63 I am my world. (The microcosm.)



The Early Wittgenstein

5.631 The thinking, presenting subject; there is no such thing.

If I wrote a book "The world as I found it", I should also have therein to report on my body and say which members obey my will and which do not, etc. This then would be a method of isolating the subject or rather of showing that in an important sense there is no subject: that is to say, of it alone in this book mention could *not* be made.

5.632 The subject does not belong to the world but it is a limit of the world.


Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be noted?

You say that this case is altogether like that of the eye and the field of sight.

But you do *not* really see the eye.

And from nothing *in the field of sight* can it be concluded that it is seen from an eye.

For the field of sight has not a form like this:



The Early Wittgenstein

5.634 This is connected with the fact that no part of our experience is also a priori.

Everything we see could also be otherwise.

Everything we describe at all could also be otherwise.

There is no order of things a priori.

5.64 Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism. The I in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and there remains the reality coordinated with it.

5.641 There is therefore really a sense in which the philosophy we can talk of a nonpsychological I.

It occurs in philosophy through the fact that the "world is my world".

The philosophical I is not the man, not the human body or the human soul of which psychology treats, but the metaphysical subject, the limit – not a part of the world.



The Early Wittgenstein

6.373 The world is independent of my will.

6.374 Even if everything we wished were to happen, this would only be, so to speak, a favour of fate, for there is no *logical* connexion between will and world, which would guarantee this, and the assumed physical connexion itself we could not again will.

The Early Wittgenstein

6.43 If good or bad willing changes the world, it can only change the limits of the world, not the facts; not the things that can be expressed in language. In brief, the world must thereby become quite another, it must so to speak wax or wane as a whole.

The world of the happy is quite another than that of the unhappy.

6.431 As in death, too, the world does not change, but ceases.

6.4311 Death is not an event of life. Death is not lived through. If by eternity is understood not endless temporal duration but timelessness, then he lives eternally who lives in the present.

Our life is endless in the way that our visual field is without limit.

The Early Wittgenstein

Jaakko Hintikka

HINTIKKA, Jaakko. On Wittgenstein's "Solipsism". In *Mind* N.S. vol. 67 (1957): p. 88–91.



The Early Wittgenstein

Jaakko Hintikka

HINTIKKA, Jaakko. On Wittgenstein's "Solipsism". In *Mind* N.S. vol. 67 (1957): p. 88–91.

- Hintikka tries to answer the question "What does it mean that limits of my language mean limits of my world?"



The Early Wittgenstein

Jaakko Hintikka

HINTIKKA, Jaakko. On Wittgenstein's "Solipsism". In *Mind* N.S. vol. 67 (1957): p. 88–91.

- Hintikka tries to answer the question "What does it mean that limits of my language mean limits of my world?"
- The world is limited by the totality of objects. The boundary appears again in the totality of elementary propositions. (5.5561)



The Early Wittgenstein

Jaakko Hintikka

HINTIKKA, Jaakko. On Wittgenstein's "Solipsism". In *Mind* N.S. vol. 67 (1957): p. 88–91.

- Hintikka tries to answer the question "What does it mean that limits of my language mean limits of my world?"
- The world is limited by the totality of objects. The boundary appears again in the totality of elementary propositions. (5.5561)
- Logic fills the world: the limits of the world are also its limits. (5.61)



The Early Wittgenstein

Jaakko Hintikka

- There are two subjects: empirical and metaphysical



The Early Wittgenstein

Jaakko Hintikka

- There are two subjects: empirical and metaphysical
- ... no part of our experience is also a priori. (5.634)



The Early Wittgenstein

Jaakko Hintikka

- There are two subjects: empirical and metaphysical
- ... no part of our experience is also a priori. (5.634) So we can't ascribe to the empirical subject nothing logically necessary.



The Early Wittgenstein

Jaakko Hintikka

- There are two subjects: empirical and metaphysical
- ... no part of our experience is also a priori. (5.634) So we can't ascribe to the empirical subject nothing logically necessary.
- In the opposite, metaphysical subejct isn't in the world (5.632, 5.633)

The Early Wittgenstein

Jaakko Hintikka

- There are two subjects: empirical and metaphysical
- ... no part of our experience is also a priori. (5.634) So we can't ascribe to the empirical subject nothing logically necessary.
- In the opposite, metaphysical subejct isn't in the world (5.632, 5.633) So we have to ascribe him logically necessary statements (statements of logic).

The Early Wittgenstein

Jaakko Hintikka

- There are two subjects: empirical and metaphysical
 - ... no part of our experience is also a priori. (5.634) So we can't ascribe to the empirical subject nothing logically necessary.
 - In the opposite, metaphysical subejct isn't in the world (5.632, 5.633) So we have to ascribe him logically necessary statements (statements of logic).
- ⇒ Limits of logics = limits of my world = limits of my language


The Early Wittgenstein

Jaakko Hintikka

- There are two subjects: empirical and metaphysical
 - ... no part of our experience is also a priori. (5.634) So we can't ascribe to the empirical subject nothing logically necessary.
 - In the opposite, metaphysical subject isn't in the world (5.632, 5.633) So we have to ascribe him logically necessary statements (statements of logic).
- ⇒ Limits of logics = limits of my world = limits of my language
- ⇒ Metaphysical subject is the totality of its language. It means the set of all sentences.


The Early Wittgenstein Jaakko Hintikka

- But why can't we see the eye? (5.633)



The Early Wittgenstein Jaakko Hintikka


- But why can't we see the eye? (5.633)



- Because no proposition can say anything about itself (3.332).

The Early Wittgenstein Jaakko Hintikka

- But why can't we see the eye? (5.633)



- Because no proposition can say anything about itself (3.332).
- **Conclusion: Wittgenstein was realist.**

The Early Wittgenstein

Michael Morris

MORRIS, Michael. *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Wittgenstein and the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. New York: Routledge, 2008, p. 21–59, 114–202, 263–308.



The Early Wittgenstein

Michael Morris

MORRIS, Michael. *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Wittgenstein and the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. New York: Routledge, 2008, p. 21–59, 114–202, 263–308.

- Until the treatment 5.6-5.641 we can't answer the question about ontological status of the world.



The Early Wittgenstein

Michael Morris

MORRIS, Michael. *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Wittgenstein and the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. New York: Routledge, 2008, p. 21–59, 114–202, 263–308.

- Until the treatment 5.6-5.641 we can't answer the question about ontological status of the world.
- There can be seen two arguments: Kantian and Cartezian.



The Early Wittgenstein

Michael Morris

- Let S is the statement about some fact, eg. "It is the case that the Earth isn't flat.". The argument is as follows:



The Early Wittgenstein

Michael Morris

- Let S is the statement about some fact, eg. "It is the case that the Earth isn't flat.". The argument is as follows:
 - It can be seen that (S) makes sense.

The Early Wittgenstein

Michael Morris

- Let S is the statement about some fact, eg. "It is the case that the Earth isn't flat.". The argument is as follows:
 - It can be seen that (S) makes sense.
 - If it can be seen that (S) makes sense, there is someone (me) for whom it makes sense.

The Early Wittgenstein

Michael Morris

- Let S is the statement about some fact, eg. "It is the case that the Earth isn't flat.". The argument is as follows:
 - It can be seen that (S) makes sense.
 - If it can be seen that (S) makes sense, there is someone (me) for whom it makes sense.
 - So there is someone (me) for whom (S) makes sense.

The Early Wittgenstein

Michael Morris

- Let S is the statement about some fact, eg. "It is the case that the Earth isn't flat.". The argument is as follows:
 - It can be seen that (S) makes sense.
 - If it can be seen that (S) makes sense, there is someone (me) for whom it makes sense.
 - So there is someone (me) for whom (S) makes sense.
- What happened when (S) is the statement „的确地球不是平的“?.

The Early Wittgenstein

Michael Morris

- Let S is the statement about some fact, eg. "It is the case that the Earth isn't flat.". The argument is as follows:
 - It can be seen that (S) makes sense.
 - If it can be seen that (S) makes sense, there is someone (me) for whom it makes sense.
 - So there is someone (me) for whom (S) makes sense.
- What happened when (S) is the statement „的确是地球不是平的“?.
- This is the reason, why Wittgenstein talk about my language.

The Early Wittgenstein

Michael Morris

- Let S is the statement about some fact, eg. "It is the case that the Earth isn't flat.". The argument is as follows:
 - It can be seen that (S) makes sense.
 - If it can be seen that (S) makes sense, there is someone (me) for whom it makes sense.
 - So there is someone (me) for whom (S) makes sense.
- What happened when (S) is the statement „的确是地球不是平的“?.
- This is the reason, why Wittgenstein talk about my language.
- There can't be the single background world behind all subjective worlds because it would mean that there can exist some configuration of object, that this world creates, and languages that I'm not possible to understand.

The Early Wittgenstein

Michael Morris

- The important part of language is the syntax, so the second argument could be:



The Early Wittgenstein

Michael Morris

- The important part of language is the syntax, so the second argument could be:
 - If my judgement of the syntactic well-formedness of my own language were not infallible, it might be wrong (for all my confidence).

The Early Wittgenstein

Michael Morris

- The important part of language is the syntax, so the second argument could be:
 - If my judgement of the syntactic well-formedness of my own language were not infallible, it might be wrong (for all my confidence).
 - If my judgement of the syntactic well-formedness of my own language might be wrong, I ought to doubt it.

The Early Wittgenstein

Michael Morris

- The important part of language is the syntax, so the second argument could be:
 - If my judgement of the syntactic well-formedness of my own language were not infallible, it might be wrong (for all my confidence).
 - If my judgement of the syntactic well-formedness of my own language might be wrong, I ought to doubt it.
 - If I ought to doubt my judgement of the syntactic well-formedness of my own language, I can doubt it (given that 'ought', in general, implies 'can').

The Early Wittgenstein

Michael Morris

- The important part of language is the syntax, so the second argument could be:
 - If my judgement of the syntactic well-formedness of my own language were not infallible, it might be wrong (for all my confidence).
 - If my judgement of the syntactic well-formedness of my own language might be wrong, I ought to doubt it.
 - If I ought to doubt my judgement of the syntactic well-formedness of my own language, I can doubt it (given that 'ought', in general, implies 'can').
 - But I cannot doubt my judgement of the syntactic well-formedness of my own language.

The Early Wittgenstein

Michael Morris

- The important part of language is the syntax, so the second argument could be:
 - If my judgement of the syntactic well-formedness of my own language were not infallible, it might be wrong (for all my confidence).
 - If my judgement of the syntactic well-formedness of my own language might be wrong, I ought to doubt it.
 - If I ought to doubt my judgement of the syntactic well-formedness of my own language, I can doubt it (given that 'ought', in general, implies 'can').
 - But I cannot doubt my judgement of the syntactic well-formedness of my own language.
 - So my judgement of the syntactic well-formedness of my own language must be infallible.

The Early Wittgenstein

Michael Morris

- The important part of language is the syntax, so the second argument could be:
 - If my judgement of the syntactic well-formedness of my own language were not infallible, it might be wrong (for all my confidence).
 - If my judgement of the syntactic well-formedness of my own language might be wrong, I ought to doubt it.
 - If I ought to doubt my judgement of the syntactic well-formedness of my own language, I can doubt it (given that 'ought', in general, implies 'can').
 - But I cannot doubt my judgement of the syntactic well-formedness of my own language.
 - So my judgement of the syntactic well-formedness of my own language must be infallible.
 - But if realism were true, my judgement of the syntactic well-formedness of my own language would not be infallible.

- The important part of language is the syntax, so the second argument could be:
 - If my judgement of the syntactic well-formedness of my own language were not infallible, it might be wrong (for all my confidence).
 - If my judgement of the syntactic well-formedness of my own language might be wrong, I ought to doubt it.
 - If I ought to doubt my judgement of the syntactic well-formedness of my own language, I can doubt it (given that 'ought', in general, implies 'can').
 - But I cannot doubt my judgement of the syntactic well-formedness of my own language.
 - So my judgement of the syntactic well-formedness of my own language must be infallible.
 - But if realism were true, my judgement of the syntactic well-formedness of my own language would not be infallible.
 - So realism is not true.

The Early Wittgenstein

Michael Morris

- If the structure of language is clear to me, then the structure of world is also clear to me.



The Early Wittgenstein

Michael Morris

- If the structure of language is clear to me, then the structure of world is also clear to me.
- The clarity to me depends on me. That's the reason why is subject on the limit of the world.



The Early Wittgenstein

Michael Morris

- If the structure of language is clear to me, then the structure of world is also clear to me.
- The clarity to me depends on me. That's the reason why is subject on the limit of the world.
- Because of non-existence of metaphysical subject we can't speak about him.

The Early Wittgenstein

Michael Morris

- If the structure of language is clear to me, then the structure of world is also clear to me.
- The clarity to me depends on me. That's the reason why is subject on the limit of the world.
- Because of non-existence of metaphysical subject we can't speak about him.
- And because R, I and S depend on subject, we can't speak also about them.

The Early Wittgenstein

Michael Morris

- If the structure of language is clear to me, then the structure of world is also clear to me.
- The clarity to me depends on me. That's the reason why is subject on the limit of the world.
- Because of non-existence of metaphysical subject we can't speak about him.
- And because R, I and S depend on subject, we can't speak also about them.
- There is no subject, that could make a difference between them.

The Early Wittgenstein

Michael Morris

- If the structure of language is clear to me, then the structure of world is also clear to me.
- The clarity to me depends on me. That's the reason why is subject on the limit of the world.
- Because of non-existence of metaphysical subject we can't speak about him.
- And because R, I and S depend on subject, we can't speak also about them.
- There is no subject, that could make a difference between them.
- **Conclusion: Wittgenstein was rather an idealist.**

The Early Wittgenstein

Michael Kremer

KREMER, Michael. To What Extent is Solipsism a Truth? In *Post-Analytic Tractatus*, B. Stocekr, ed., 2004, p. 59–84.



The Early Wittgenstein

Michael Kremer

KREMER, Michael. To What Extent is Solipsism a Truth? In *Post-Analytic Tractatus*, B. Stocekr, ed., 2004, p. 59–84.

- All interpreters above were metaphysical readers of Tractatus.

The Early Wittgenstein

Michael Kremer

KREMER, Michael. To What Extent is Solipsism a Truth? In *Post-Analytic Tractatus*, B. Stocekr, ed., 2004, p. 59–84.

- All interpreters above were metaphysical readers of Tractatus. But there is another way.

The Early Wittgenstein

Michael Kremer

KREMER, Michael. To What Extent is Solipsism a Truth? In *Post-Analytic Tractatus*, B. Stocekr, ed., 2004, p. 59–84.

- All interpreters above were metaphysical readers of Tractatus. But there is another way. Something like **Dark magic!**





The Early Wittgenstein

Michael Kremer

KREMER, Michael. To What Extent is Solipsism a Truth? In
Post-Analytic Tractatus, B. Stocekr, ed., 2004, s. 59–84.

- All interpreters above were metaphysical readers of Tractatus. But there is another way. Something like Dark magic!
- It's resolute reading.

The Early Wittgenstein

Michael Kremer

KREMER, Michael. To What Extent is Solipsism a Truth? In Post-Analytic Tractatus, B. Stoeckr, ed., 2004, s. 59–84.

- All interpreters above were metaphysical readers of Tractatus. But there is another way. Something like Dark magic!
- It's resolute reading.
- These interpreters took literally the statement 6.54 and thus all other they grasp as some ethical practice.
- My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognize them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)
He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly.

The Early Wittgenstein

Michael Kremer

KREMER, Michael. To What Extent is Solipsism a Truth? In Post-Analytic Tractatus, B. Stoeckr, ed., 2004, s. 59–84.

- All interpreters above were metaphysical readers of Tractatus. But there is another way. Something like Dark magic!
- It's resolute reading.
- These interpreters took literally the statement 6.54 and thus all other they grasp as some ethical practice.
- My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognize them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)
He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly.
- In the letter to Ficker Wittgenstein wrote that the sense of Tractatus is ethical.

The Early Wittgenstein

Michael Kremer

- To explain the statement

5.62 This remark provides a key to the question, to what extent solipsism is a truth.

In fact what solipsism *means*, is quite correct, only it cannot be *said*, but it shows itself.

That the world is *my* world, shows itself in the fact that the limits of the language (the language which only I understand) mean the limits of *my* world.

The Early Wittgenstein

Michael Kremer

- To explain the statement

5.62 This remark provides a key to the question, to what extent solipsism is a truth.

In fact what solipsism *means*, is quite correct, only it cannot be *said*, but it shows itself.

That the world is *my* world, shows itself in the fact that the limits of the language (the language which only I understand) mean the limits of *my* world.

... we need explain expressions "truth", "means" and "shows".



The Early Wittgenstein

Michael Kremer

- Showing is crucial point in understanding. It's something like know-how. One who sees that which is shown, is simply one who knows how to go on.



The Early Wittgenstein

Michael Kremer

- Showing is crucial point in understanding. It's something like know-how. One who sees that which is shown, is simply one who knows how to go on.
- Truth isn't the correspondance between proposition and world. It's a path we should go in our life.

The Early Wittgenstein

Michael Kremer

- Showing is crucial point in understanding. It's something like know-how. One who sees that which is shown, is simply one who knows how to go on.
- Truth isn't the correspondance between proposition and world. It's a path we should go in our life.
- Meaning is like uncomplete attempt to say something. It's secret purpose.

The Early Wittgenstein

Michael Kremer

- Showing is crucial point in understanding. It's something like know-how. One who sees that which is shown, is simply one who knows how to go on.
- Truth isn't the correspondance between proposition and world. It's a path we should go in our life.
- Meaning is like uncomplete attempt to say something. It's secret purpose.
- So in 5.62 Wittgenstein tries to say:

This remark provides the key to the question as to how far solipsism can take us along the path of spiritual and ethical enlightenment. In fact, the intention of solipsism is a good one, but this cannot be communicated through a set of principles, but must be demonstrated in practice.



The Early Wittgenstein

Michael Kremer

- In Tractatus Wittgenstein plays a game with the reader. He let us create the world, master our own language which exactly pass to the world and became the king of all.

The Early Wittgenstein

Michael Kremer

- In Tractatus Wittgenstein plays a game with the reader. He let us create the world, master our own language which exactly pass to the world and became the king of all.
- Then he shows us that this imagine is incorrect because there is no subject in the world and solipsism is equal to realism.

The Early Wittgenstein

Michael Kremer

- In Tractatus Wittgenstein plays a game with the reader. He let us create the world, master our own language which exactly pass to the world and became the king of all.
- Then he shows us that this imagine is incorrect because there is no subject in the world and solipsism is equal to realism.
- **Conclusion: Solipsism serves only like an exercise.**

The Early Wittgenstein

What to take away

- In Tractatus 5.6 - 5.641 Wittgenstein investigates solipsism.
- There is no agreement on interpretation of this part.
- There are two different readings of Tractatus: metaphysical and resolute.

Outline

① Introduction

② The Early Wittgenstein

Jaakko Hintikka

Michael Morris

Michael Kremer

③ The Late Wittgenstein

Bernard Williams

Edward Minar

④ Conclusion



The Late Wittgenstein

- In distinction to the early the late Wittgenstein include the rest of his work.



The Late Wittgenstein

- In distinction to the early the late Wittgenstein include the rest of his work.
- For since beginning to occupy myself with philosophy again, sixteen years ago, I have been forced to recognize grave mistakes in what I wrote in that first book. (Preface of Pilosophical Investigations)

The Late Wittgenstein

- In distinction to the early the late Wittgenstein include the rest of his work.
- For since beginning to occupy myself with philosophy again, sixteen years ago, I have been forced to recognize grave mistakes in what I wrote in that first book. (Preface of Pilosophical Investigations)
- Does it mean that Wittgenstein changed his view about R, I or S?

The Late Wittgenstein

- In distinction to the early the late Wittgenstein include the rest of his work.
- For since beginning to occupy myself with philosophy again, sixteen years ago, I have been forced to recognize grave mistakes in what I wrote in that first book. (Preface of Pilosophical Investigations)
- Does it mean that Wittgenstein changed his view about R, I or S?
- Who knows? We will assume that his definitions still hold.

The Late Wittgenstein

- In distinction to the early the late Wittgenstein include the rest of his work.
- For since beginning to occupy myself with philosophy again, sixteen years ago, I have been forced to recognize grave mistakes in what I wrote in that first book. (Preface of Pilosophical Investigations)
- Does it mean that Wittgenstein changed his view about R, I or S?
- Who knows? We will assume that his definitions still hold.
- It's sure that Wittgenstein deal with R, I, S in all of his work.



The Late Wittgenstein

- I see, indistinctly, a connection between the problem of solipsism or idealism and the notational system of a proposition. In these cases is the "I" perhaps replaced by the proposition, and the relationship of the "I" to reality by the relationship between the proposition and reality? (Idealism, in The Big Typescript)
- Solipsism could be disproved by the fact that the word "I" doesn't occupy a central position in grammar, but is a word like any other. (Having Pain, in The Big Typescript)

The Late Wittgenstein

- Now the man whom we call a solipsist and who says that only his own experiences are real, does not thereby disagree with us about any practical question of fact, he does not say that we are simulating when we complain of pains, he pities us as much as anyone else, and at the same time he wishes to restrict the use of the epithet "real" to what we should call his experiences; and perhaps he doesn't want to call our experiences "experiences" at all (again without disagreeing with us about any question of fact). For he would say that it was inconceivable that experiences other than his own were real. He ought therefore to use a notation in which such a phrase as "A has real toothache" (where A is not he) is meaningless, a notation whose rules exclude this phrase as the rules of chess exclude a pawn's making a knight's move. The solipsist's suggestion comes to using such a phrase as "there is real toothache" instead of "Smith (the solipsist) has toothache". And why shouldn't we grant him this notation? I needn't say that in order to avoid confusion he had in this case better not use the word "real" as opposed to "simulated" at all; which just means that we shall have to provide for the distinction "real"/"simulated" in some other way. The solipsist who says "only I feel real pain", "only I really see (or hear)" is not stating an opinion; and that's why he is so sure of what he says. He is irresistibly tempted to use a certain form of expression; but we must yet find why he is. (The Blue and Brown Books, p. 59-60)



The Late Wittgenstein

- "It's true I say 'Now I am having such-and-such an image', but the words 'I am having' are merely a sign to someone else; the description of the image is a complete account of the imagined world."—You mean: the words "I am having" are like "I say!...." You are inclined to say it should really have been expressed differently. Perhaps simply by making a sign with one's hand and then giving a description. When as in this case, we disapprove of the expressions of ordinary language (which are after all performing their office), we have got a picture in our heads which conflicts with the picture of our ordinary way of speaking. Whereas we are tempted to say that our way of speaking does not describe the facts as they really are. As if, for example the proposition "he has pains" could be false in some other way than by that man's not having pains. As if the form of expression were saying something false even when the proposition *faute de mieux* asserted something true. For this is what disputes between Idealists, Solipsists and Realists look like. The one party attack the normal form of expression as if they were attacking a statement; the others defend it, as if they were stating facts recognized by every reasonable human being. (§402, *Philosophical Investigations*)

The Late Wittgenstein

- One man is a convinced realist, another a convinced idealist and teaches his children accordingly. In such an important matter as the existence or non-existence of the external world they don't want to teach their children anything wrong. What will the children be taught? Also to say: "There are physical objects" or the opposite? If someone does not believe in fairies, he does not need to teach his children "There are no fairies": he can omit to teach them the word "fairy". On what occasion are they to say: "There are..." or "There are no..."? Only when they meet people of the contrary belief. (§338, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology)
- But the idealist will teach his children the word "chair" after all, for of course he wants to teach them to do this and that, e.g. to fetch a chair. Then where will be the difference between what the idealist-educated children say and the realist ones? Won't the difference only be one of the battle cry? (§339, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology)

The Late Wittgenstein

- These quotes are just a small selection.



The Late Wittgenstein

- These quotes are just a small selection.
- Remarks about R, I and S are scattered in whole Wittgenstein's work.

The Late Wittgenstein

- These quotes are just a small selection.
- Remarks about R, I and S are scattered in whole Wittgenstein's work.
- That's not clear whether Wittgenstein changed his opinion or not.

The Late Wittgenstein

- These quotes are just a small selection.
- Remarks about R, I and S are scattered in whole Wittgenstein's work.
- That's not clear whether Wittgenstein changed his opinion or not.
- In contrast to his earlier attitude the late Wittgenstein deal with pain, grammar, using the word "I" etc.

The Late Wittgenstein Bernard Williams

WILLIAMS, Bernard. Wittgenstein and Idealism. In *Understanding Wittgenstein*. New York: The Royal Institute for Philosophy, 1974, p. 76–95.



The Late Wittgenstein

Bernard Williams

WILLIAMS, Bernard. Wittgenstein and Idealism. In *Understanding Wittgenstein*. New York: The Royal Institute for Philosophy, 1974, p. 76–95.

- Wittgenstein's late view is the same like the earlier.
- There can be seen change of using "we" instead of "I" in Wittgenstein's account.



The Late Wittgenstein

Bernard Williams

WILLIAMS, Bernard. Wittgenstein and Idealism. In *Understanding Wittgenstein*. New York: The Royal Institute for Philosophy, 1974, p. 76–95.

- Wittgenstein's late view is the same like the earlier.
- There can be seen change of using "we" instead of "I" in Wittgenstein's account.
 - If **I** wrote the book "The World as **I** found it" ...
 - The limits of **my** language mean the limits of **my** world.
 - **I** am **my** world.



The Late Wittgenstein Bernard Williams

WILLIAMS, Bernard. Wittgenstein and Idealism. In *Understanding Wittgenstein*. New York: The Royal Institute for Philosophy, 1974, p. 76–95.

- Wittgenstein's late view is the same like the earlier.
- There can be seen change of using "we" instead of "I" in Wittgenstein's account.
 - see quotes above and Wittgenstein's later work.



The Late Wittgenstein Bernard Williams

WILLIAMS, Bernard. Wittgenstein and Idealism. In *Understanding Wittgenstein*. New York: The Royal Institute for Philosophy, 1974, p. 76–95.

- Wittgenstein's late view is the same like the earlier.
- There can be seen change of using "we" instead of "I" in Wittgenstein's account.
 - see quotes above and Wittgenstein's later work.
- The word "we" doesn't mean the group of speakers of one language but rather the plural descendant of that idealist I who also was no one item rather than another in the world.



The Late Wittgenstein Bernard Williams

- After long dealing with phenomenism Williams concludes with this argument:



The Late Wittgenstein

Bernard Williams

- After long dealing with phenomenalism Williams concludes with this argument:
 - S has the meaning we give it.



The Late Wittgenstein

Bernard Williams

- After long dealing with phenomenalism Williams concludes with this argument:
 - S has the meaning we give it.
 - A necessary condition of our giving S a meaning is Q.

The Late Wittgenstein

Bernard Williams

- After long dealing with phenomenalism Williams concludes with this argument:
 - S has the meaning we give it.
 - A necessary condition of our giving S a meaning is Q.
 - So unless Q, S would not have a meaning.

The Late Wittgenstein

Bernard Williams

- After long dealing with phenomenalism Williams concludes with this argument:
 - S has the meaning we give it.
 - A necessary condition of our giving S a meaning is Q.
 - So unless Q, S would not have a meaning.
 - If S did not have a meaning, S would not be true.

The Late Wittgenstein

Bernard Williams

- After long dealing with phenomenalism Williams concludes with this argument:
 - S has the meaning we give it.
 - A necessary condition of our giving S a meaning is Q.
 - So unless Q, S would not have a meaning.
 - If S did not have a meaning, S would not be true.
 - So unless Q, S would not be true.

The Late Wittgenstein

Bernard Williams

- After long dealing with phenomenism Williams concludes with this argument:
 - S has the meaning we give it.
 - A necessary condition of our giving S a meaning is Q.
 - So unless Q, S would not have a meaning.
 - If S did not have a meaning, S would not be true.
 - So unless Q, S would not be true.
- **Conclusion: Wittgenstein was an idealist.**

The Late Wittgenstein
Edward Minar

MINAR, Edward. Wittgenstein on Metaphysics of the Self. In *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998, p. 329–354.



The Late Wittgenstein Edward Minar

MINAR, Edward. Wittgenstein on Metaphysics of the Self. In *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998, p. 329–354.

- Central statements connected with solipsism in Wittgenstein's later work are §398-410 of *Philosophical Investigations*



The Late Wittgenstein

Edward Minar

MINAR, Edward. Wittgenstein on Metaphysics of the Self. In *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998, p. 329–354.

- Central statements connected with solipsism in Wittgenstein's later work are §398-410 of *Philosophical Investigations*
 - §398-403 ... path into the solipsism and its apparent dismissal.
 - §404-410 ... failure of solipsist's using his own language.

The Late Wittgenstein Edward Minar

MINAR, Edward. Wittgenstein on Metaphysics of the Self. In *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998, p. 329–354.

- Central statements connected with solipsism in Wittgenstein's later work are §398-410 of *Philosophical Investigations*
 - §398-403 ... path into the solipsism and its apparent dismissal.
 - §404-410 ... failure of solipsist's using his own language.
- We will look at the use of term "I" and grammar of our ordinary language.



The Late Wittgenstein Edward Minar

MINAR, Edward. Wittgenstein on Metaphysics of the Self. In *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998, p. 329–354.

- Central statements connected with solipsism in Wittgenstein's later work are §398-410 of *Philosophical Investigations*
 - §398-403 ... path into the solipsism and its apparent dismissal.
 - §404-410 ... failure of solipsist's using his own language.
- We will look at the use of term "I" and grammar of our ordinary language.
- The 'visual room' is the one that has no owner. I can as little own it as walk about it, or look at it, or point to it. (§398, PI)



The Late Wittgenstein

Edward Minar

MINAR, Edward. Wittgenstein on Metaphysics of the Self. In *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998, p. 329–354.

- Central statements connected with solipsism in Wittgenstein's later work are §398-410 of *Philosophical Investigations*
 - §398-403 ... path into the solipsism and its apparent dismissal.
 - §404-410 ... failure of solipsist's using his own language.
- We will look at the use of term "I" and grammar of our ordinary language.
- The 'visual room' is the one that has no owner. I can as little own it as walk about it, or look at it, or point to it. (§398, PI)
- The echo of the seeing eye that is not part of its visual field.



The Late Wittgenstein

Edward Minar

MINAR, Edward. Wittgenstein on Metaphysics of the Self. In *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998, p. 329–354.

- Central statements connected with solipsism in Wittgenstein's later work are §398-410 of *Philosophical Investigations*
 - §398-403 ... path into the solipsism and its apparent dismissal.
 - §404-410 ... failure of solipsist's using his own language.
- We will look at the use of term "I" and grammar of our ordinary language.
- The 'visual room' is the one that has no owner. I can as little own it as walk about it, or look at it, or point to it. (§398, PI)
- The echo of the seeing eye that is not part of its visual field.
- So that's not possible to state "The world is my world". It must be presented indirectly by the grammar.



The Late Wittgenstein

Edward Minar

- The statement "I am having [a pain]" serves as a signal. The word "I" has no referential function.



The Late Wittgenstein

Edward Minar

- The statement "I am having [a pain]" serves as a signal. The word "I" has no referential function.
- For this is what disputes between Idealists, Solipsists and Realists look like. The one party attack the normal forms of expression as if they were attacking a statement; th other defend it, as if they were stating facts recognized by every reasonable human being. (§ 402, PI)

The Late Wittgenstein

Edward Minar

- The statement "I am having [a pain]" serves as a signal. The word "I" has no referential function.
- For this is what disputes between Idealists, Solipsists and Realists look like. The one party attack the normal forms of expression as if they were attacking a statement; th other defend it, as if they were stating facts recognized by every reasonable human being. (§ 402, PI)
- Solipsist can't fully fill up the requirements about his language.

The Late Wittgenstein

Edward Minar

- The statement "I am having [a pain]" serves as a signal. The word "I" has no referential function.
- For this is what disputes between Idealists, Solipsists and Realists look like. The one party attack the normal forms of expression as if they were attacking a statement; th other defend it, as if they were stating facts recognized by every reasonable human being. (§ 402, PI)
- Solipsist can't fully fill up the requirements about his language.
- **Conclusion: Wittgenstein wasn't a solipsist.**

The Late Wittgenstein

What to take away

- Studying grammar and language can serve to solving R, I, S problem.
- Some tractarian points Wittgenstein held in his later work also. Nevertheless there can be seen some change.
- Wittgenstein tries to understand the solipsist position from the first person view. Not from an independent point. There is no uncaptive or detached eye!

Outline

- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Early Wittgenstein
Jaakko Hintikka
Michael Morris
Michael Kremer
- 3 The Late Wittgenstein
Bernard Williams
Edward Minar
- 4 Conclusion



Conclusion

- Was Wittgenstein realist, idealist or solipsist?
- What is Wittgenstein philosophical method?
- What does philosophy mean in Wittgenstein's view?
- What it looks like in contemporary philosophy?



Conclusion

- Was Wittgenstein realist, idealist or solipsist?

Many post-analytical philosophers state none of these. Wittgenstein tried to show us that this question is useless because it doesn't solve anything. The solution wouldn't help us in understanding of the world and can't be derived from using the language.

- What is Wittgenstein philosophical method?
- What does philosophy mean in Wittgenstein's view?
- What it looks like in contemporary philosophy?

Conclusion

- Was Wittgenstein realist, idealist or solipsist?
- What is Wittgenstein philosophical method?
- What does philosophy mean in Wittgenstein's view?
- What it looks like in contemporary philosophy?



Conclusion

- Was Wittgenstein realist, idealist or solipsist?
- What is Wittgenstein philosophical method?

Wittgenstein's method across of whole his work is survey of language, not the empirical research of our world. And be aware of not every raised question should be answered.

- What does philosophy mean in Wittgenstein's view?
- What it looks like in contemporary philosophy?



Conclusion

- Was Wittgenstein realist, idealist or solipsist?
- What is Wittgenstein philosophical method?
- What does philosophy mean in Wittgenstein's view?
- What it looks like in contemporary philosophy?



Conclusion

- Was Wittgenstein realist, idealist or solipsist?
- What is Wittgenstein philosophical method?
- What does philosophy mean in Wittgenstein's view?

There is many definitions of philosophy. But one nice says that philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.

- What it looks like in contemporary philosophy?



Conclusion

- Was Wittgenstein realist, idealist or solipsist?
- What is Wittgenstein philosophical method?
- What does philosophy mean in Wittgenstein's view?
- What it looks like in contemporary philosophy?



Conclusion

- Was Wittgenstein realist, idealist or solipsist?
- What is Wittgenstein philosophical method?
- What does philosophy mean in Wittgenstein's view?
- What it looks like in contemporary philosophy?

Not good, I think. Wittgenstein is one of many philosophers and problem of R, I, S is also one of many in his work. Nevertheless there is no definitive solution and papers still accumulate.



Thank you!

