Realism, idealism and solipsism in Wittgenstein’s
Work
Jan ˇStˇep´anek
Masaryk University in Brno
5th December, 2019
Outline
1 Introduction
2 The Early Wittgenstein
Jaakko Hintikka
Michael Morris
Michael Kremer
3 The Late Wittgenstein
Bernard Williams
Edward Minar
4 Conclusion
Outline
1 Introduction
2 The Early Wittgenstein
Jaakko Hintikka
Michael Morris
Michael Kremer
3 The Late Wittgenstein
Bernard Williams
Edward Minar
4 Conclusion
Introduction
• Wittgenstein’s ideas influenced the most current theories in
analytical philosophy (and not just there).
Introduction
• Wittgenstein’s ideas influenced the most current theories in
analytical philosophy (and not just there).
• They are still widely discussed because of their brevity, mostly no
arguments but great and deep insights.
Introduction
• Wittgenstein’s ideas influenced the most current theories in
analytical philosophy (and not just there).
• They are still widely discussed because of their brevity, mostly no
arguments but great and deep insights.
• But how can we understand Wittgenstein’s ideas if we don’t
understand what his words refer to?
• Does the word ”chair” refer to our picture of a chair, or to - on us
independent - object? Did Wittgenstein hold some version of
realism, idealism or even solipsism?
In this contribution we will deal just with the onthology. Not with the
questions about realism in ethics, esthetics etc.
Introduction
https://eds.b.ebscohost.com
Introduction
• How to understand the definitions of (R) realism, (I) idealism and
(S) solipsism?
Introduction
• How to understand the definitions of (R) realism, (I) idealism and
(S) solipsism?
• Traditional opinion works with mind/subject/observer dependence:
• (R) The world is independent of the observer.
• (I) The world depends on the observer.
• (S) The world depends just on me.
Introduction
• How to understand the definitions of (R) realism, (I) idealism and
(S) solipsism?
• Traditional opinion works with mind/subject/observer dependence:
• (R) The world is independent of the observer.
• (I) The world depends on the observer.
• (S) The world depends just on me.
• There are also other definitions (eg. Dummett) and another types
of these -isms.
Introduction
• How to understand the definitions of (R) realism, (I) idealism and
(S) solipsism?
• Traditional opinion works with mind/subject/observer dependence:
• (R) The world is independent of the observer.
• (I) The world depends on the observer.
• (S) The world depends just on me.
• There are also other definitions (eg. Dummett) and another types
of these -isms.
• Well, but would W agree with our dependence definitions?
Introduction
• During disscussions with Friedrich Weismann Wittgenstein claimed:
Introduction
• During disscussions with Friedrich Weismann Wittgenstein claimed:
• (W’s R) Der Sessel ist nicht die Vorstellung des Sessels, die
Vorstellung ist nur ein Bild.
• (W’s I) Meine Vorstellung vom Sessel, das ist der Sessel.
• W’s S is missing but we can consider
Introduction
• During disscussions with Friedrich Weismann Wittgenstein claimed:
• (W’s R) Der Sessel ist nicht die Vorstellung des Sessels, die
Vorstellung ist nur ein Bild.
• (W’s I) Meine Vorstellung vom Sessel, das ist der Sessel.
• W’s S is missing but we can consider
...
• (W’s S) Nur meine Vorstellung vom Sessel, das ist der Sessel.
Introduction
• During disscussions with Friedrich Weismann Wittgenstein claimed:
• (W’s R) Der Sessel ist nicht die Vorstellung des Sessels, die
Vorstellung ist nur ein Bild.
• (W’s I) Meine Vorstellung vom Sessel, das ist der Sessel.
• W’s S is missing but we can consider
...
• (W’s S) Nur meine Vorstellung vom Sessel, das ist der Sessel.
• The difference lies in the relation between the observer and the
world.
Introduction
Who could influenced Wittgenstein (in our matter)?
Introduction
Who could influenced Wittgenstein (in our matter)?
• Arthur Schopenhauer: ”The world is my representation” (the first
sentence of The World as a Will and Representation) and ”The
world is everything that is the case” (the first statement of
Tractatus logico-philosophicus).
Introduction
Who could influenced Wittgenstein (in our matter)?
• Arthur Schopenhauer: ”The world is my representation” (the first
sentence of The World as a Will and Representation) and ”The
world is everything that is the case” (the first statement of
Tractatus logico-philosophicus).
• Otto Weininger: Sex and Character.
Introduction
Who could influenced Wittgenstein (in our matter)?
• Arthur Schopenhauer: ”The world is my representation” (the first
sentence of The World as a Will and Representation) and ”The
world is everything that is the case” (the first statement of
Tractatus logico-philosophicus).
• Otto Weininger: Sex and Character.
• Bertrand Russell: his treatment about solipsism and its strange
definition.
Introduction
Who could influenced Wittgenstein (in our matter)?
• Arthur Schopenhauer: ”The world is my representation” (the first
sentence of The World as a Will and Representation) and ”The
world is everything that is the case” (the first statement of
Tractatus logico-philosophicus).
• Otto Weininger: Sex and Character.
• Bertrand Russell: his treatment about solipsism and its strange
definition.
• Luitzen E. J. Brouwer: the man who brought Wittgenstein back to
philosophy. He also introduced solipsism in mathematics.
Introduction
Who could influenced Wittgenstein (in our matter)?
• Arthur Schopenhauer: ”The world is my representation” (the first
sentence of The World as a Will and Representation) and ”The
world is everything that is the case” (the first statement of
Tractatus logico-philosophicus).
• Otto Weininger: Sex and Character.
• Bertrand Russell: his treatment about solipsism and its strange
definition.
• Luitzen E. J. Brouwer: the man who brought Wittgenstein back to
philosophy. He also introduced solipsism in mathematics.
• George E. Moore: his paper The Proof of an External World is the
main source of Wittgenstein’s remarks in the book On Certainity.
Introduction
Our task
• Was Wittgenstein realist, idealist or solipsist?
Introduction
Our task
• Was Wittgenstein realist, idealist or solipsist?
• What is Wittgenstein philosophical method?
• What does philosophy mean in Wittgenstein’s view?
• What it looks like in contemporary philosophy?
Outline
1 Introduction
2 The Early Wittgenstein
Jaakko Hintikka
Michael Morris
Michael Kremer
3 The Late Wittgenstein
Bernard Williams
Edward Minar
4 Conclusion
The Early Wittgenstein
• As the early Wittgenstein we will understand: Notebooks
1914-1916, Prototractatus and Tractatus logico-philosophicus.
The Early Wittgenstein
• As the early Wittgenstein we will understand: Notebooks
1914-1916, Prototractatus and Tractatus logico-philosophicus.
• In the question of R, I and S there are important many notes, but
Wittgenstein’s view is in most coherent sense formulated in this
three sections:
The Early Wittgenstein
• As the early Wittgenstein we will understand: Notebooks
1914-1916, Prototractatus and Tractatus logico-philosophicus.
• In the question of R, I and S there are important many notes, but
Wittgenstein’s view is in most coherent sense formulated in this
three sections:
- 5.6-5.641 ... World-Language relation
The Early Wittgenstein
• As the early Wittgenstein we will understand: Notebooks
1914-1916, Prototractatus and Tractatus logico-philosophicus.
• In the question of R, I and S there are important many notes, but
Wittgenstein’s view is in most coherent sense formulated in this
three sections:
- 5.6-5.641 ... World-Language relation
- 6.43-6.4311 ... World-Death relation
The Early Wittgenstein
• As the early Wittgenstein we will understand: Notebooks
1914-1916, Prototractatus and Tractatus logico-philosophicus.
• In the question of R, I and S there are important many notes, but
Wittgenstein’s view is in most coherent sense formulated in this
three sections:
- 5.6-5.641 ... World-Language relation
- 6.373-6.374 ... World-Will relation
- 6.43-6.4311 ... World-Death relation
The Early Wittgenstein
• As the early Wittgenstein we will understand: Notebooks
1914-1916, Prototractatus and Tractatus logico-philosophicus.
• In the question of R, I and S there are important many notes, but
Wittgenstein’s view is in most coherent sense formulated in this
three sections:
- 5.6-5.641 ... World-Language relation
- 6.373-6.374 ... World-Will relation
- 6.43-6.4311 ... World-Death relation
• So let’s look at these statements:
The Early Wittgenstein
5.6 The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.
5.61 Logic fills the world: the limits of the world are also its limits.
We cannot therefore say in logic: This and this there is in the world, that there
is not.
For that would apparently presuppose that we exclude certain possibilities, and
this cannot be the case since otherwise logic must get outside the limits of the
world: that is if it could consider these limits from the other side also.
What we cannot think, that we cannot think: we cannot therefore say what we
cannot think.
5.62 This remark provides a key to the question, to what extent solipsism is a
truth.
In fact what solipsism means, is quite correct, only it cannot be said, but it
shows itself.
That the world is my world, shows itself in the fact that the limits of the
language (the language which only I understand) mean the limits of my world.
5.621 The world and life are one.
5.63 I am my world. (The microcosm.)
The Early Wittgenstein
5.631 The thinking, presenting subject; there is no such thing.
If I wrote a book ”The world as I found it”, I should also have therein to report
on my body and say which members obey my will and which do not, etc. This
then would be a method of isolating the subject or rather of showing that in an
important sense there is no subject: that is to say, of it alone in this book
mention could not be made.
5.632 The subject does not belong to the world but it is a limit of the world.
Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be noted?
You say that this case is altogether like that of the eye and the field of sight.
But you do not really see the eye.
And from nothing in the field of sight can it be concluded that it is seen from
an eye.
For the field of sight has not a form like this:
The Early Wittgenstein
5.634 This is connected with the fact that no part of our experience is also a
priori.
Everything we see could also be otherwise.
Everything we describe at all could also be otherwise.
There is no order of things a priori.
5.64 Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism.
The I in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and there remains the
reality coordinated with it.
5.641 There is therefore really a sense in which the philosophy we can talk of a
nonpsycholohical I.
It occurs in philosophy through the fact that the ”world is my world”.
The philosophical I is not the man, not the human body or the human soul of
which psychology treats, but the metaphysical subject, the limit – not a part of
the world.
The Early Wittgenstein
6.373 The world is independent of my will.
6.374 Even if everything we wished were to happen, this would only be, so to
speak, a favour of fate, for there is no logical connexion between will and
world, which would guarantee this, and the assumed physical connexion itself
we could not again will.
The Early Wittgenstein
6.43 If good or bad willing changes the world, it can only change the limits of
the world, not the facts; not the things that can be expressed in language.
In brief, the world must thereby become quite another, it must so to speak wax
or wane as a whole.
The world of the happy is quite another than that of the unhappy.
6.431 As in death, too, the world does not change, bud ceases.
6.4311 Death is not an event of life. Death is not lived through.
If by eternity is understood not endless temporal duration but ttimelessness,
then he lives eternally who lives in the present.
Our life is endless in the way that our visual field is without limit.
The Early Wittgenstein
Jaakko Hintikka
HINTIKKA, Jaakko. On Wittgenstein’s ”Solipsism”. In Mind N.S. vol. 67
(1957): p. 88–91.
The Early Wittgenstein
Jaakko Hintikka
HINTIKKA, Jaakko. On Wittgenstein’s ”Solipsism”. In Mind N.S. vol. 67
(1957): p. 88–91.
• Hintikka tries to answer the question ”What does it mean that
limits of my language mean limits of my world?”
The Early Wittgenstein
Jaakko Hintikka
HINTIKKA, Jaakko. On Wittgenstein’s ”Solipsism”. In Mind N.S. vol. 67
(1957): p. 88–91.
• Hintikka tries to answer the question ”What does it mean that
limits of my language mean limits of my world?”
• The world is limited by the totality of objects. The boundary
appears again in the totality of elementary prospositions. (5.5561)
The Early Wittgenstein
Jaakko Hintikka
HINTIKKA, Jaakko. On Wittgenstein’s ”Solipsism”. In Mind N.S. vol. 67
(1957): p. 88–91.
• Hintikka tries to answer the question ”What does it mean that
limits of my language mean limits of my world?”
• The world is limited by the totality of objects. The boundary
appears again in the totality of elementary prospositions. (5.5561)
• Logic fills the world: the limits of the world are also its limits. (5.61)
The Early Wittgenstein
Jaakko Hintikka
• There are two subjects: empirical and metaphysical
The Early Wittgenstein
Jaakko Hintikka
• There are two subjects: empirical and metaphysical
• ... no part of our experience is also a priori. (5.634)
The Early Wittgenstein
Jaakko Hintikka
• There are two subjects: empirical and metaphysical
• ... no part of our experience is also a priori. (5.634) So we can’t
ascribe to the empirical subject nothing logically neccesary.
The Early Wittgenstein
Jaakko Hintikka
• There are two subjects: empirical and metaphysical
• ... no part of our experience is also a priori. (5.634) So we can’t
ascribe to the empirical subject nothing logically neccesary.
• In the opposite, metaphysical subejct isn’t in the world (5.632,
5.633)
The Early Wittgenstein
Jaakko Hintikka
• There are two subjects: empirical and metaphysical
• ... no part of our experience is also a priori. (5.634) So we can’t
ascribe to the empirical subject nothing logically neccesary.
• In the opposite, metaphysical subejct isn’t in the world (5.632,
5.633) So we have to ascribe him logically neccesary statements
(statements of logic).
The Early Wittgenstein
Jaakko Hintikka
• There are two subjects: empirical and metaphysical
• ... no part of our experience is also a priori. (5.634) So we can’t
ascribe to the empirical subject nothing logically neccesary.
• In the opposite, metaphysical subejct isn’t in the world (5.632,
5.633) So we have to ascribe him logically neccesary statements
(statements of logic).
⇒ Limits of logics = limits of my world = limits of my language
The Early Wittgenstein
Jaakko Hintikka
• There are two subjects: empirical and metaphysical
• ... no part of our experience is also a priori. (5.634) So we can’t
ascribe to the empirical subject nothing logically neccesary.
• In the opposite, metaphysical subejct isn’t in the world (5.632,
5.633) So we have to ascribe him logically neccesary statements
(statements of logic).
⇒ Limits of logics = limits of my world = limits of my language
⇒ Metaphysical subject is the totality of its language. It means the set
of all sentences.
The Early Wittgenstein
Jaakko Hintikka
• But why can’t we see the eye? (5.633)
The Early Wittgenstein
Jaakko Hintikka
• But why can’t we see the eye? (5.633)
• Because no proposition can say anything about itself (3.332).
The Early Wittgenstein
Jaakko Hintikka
• But why can’t we see the eye? (5.633)
• Because no proposition can say anything about itself (3.332).
• Conclusion: Wittgenstein was realist.
The Early Wittgenstein
Michael Morris
MORRIS, Michael. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Wittgenstein and the
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. New York: Routledge, 2008, p. 21–59,
114–202, 263–308.
The Early Wittgenstein
Michael Morris
MORRIS, Michael. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Wittgenstein and the
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. New York: Routledge, 2008, p. 21–59,
114–202, 263–308.
• Until the treatment 5.6-5.641 we can’t answer the question about
ontological status of the world.
The Early Wittgenstein
Michael Morris
MORRIS, Michael. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Wittgenstein and the
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. New York: Routledge, 2008, p. 21–59,
114–202, 263–308.
• Until the treatment 5.6-5.641 we can’t answer the question about
ontological status of the world.
• There can be seen two arguments: Kantian and Cartezian.
The Early Wittgenstein
Michael Morris
• Let S is the statement about some fact, eg. ”It is the case that the
Earth isn’t flat.”. The argument is as follows:
The Early Wittgenstein
Michael Morris
• Let S is the statement about some fact, eg. ”It is the case that the
Earth isn’t flat.”. The argument is as follows:
• It can be seen that (S) makes sense.
The Early Wittgenstein
Michael Morris
• Let S is the statement about some fact, eg. ”It is the case that the
Earth isn’t flat.”. The argument is as follows:
• It can be seen that (S) makes sense.
• If it can be seen that (S) makes sense, there is someone (me)
for whom it makes sense.
The Early Wittgenstein
Michael Morris
• Let S is the statement about some fact, eg. ”It is the case that the
Earth isn’t flat.”. The argument is as follows:
• It can be seen that (S) makes sense.
• If it can be seen that (S) makes sense, there is someone (me)
for whom it makes sense.
• So there is someone (me) for whom (S) makes sense.
The Early Wittgenstein
Michael Morris
• Let S is the statement about some fact, eg. ”It is the case that the
Earth isn’t flat.”. The argument is as follows:
• It can be seen that (S) makes sense.
• If it can be seen that (S) makes sense, there is someone (me)
for whom it makes sense.
• So there is someone (me) for whom (S) makes sense.
• What happened when (S) is the statement ?
The Early Wittgenstein
Michael Morris
• Let S is the statement about some fact, eg. ”It is the case that the
Earth isn’t flat.”. The argument is as follows:
• It can be seen that (S) makes sense.
• If it can be seen that (S) makes sense, there is someone (me)
for whom it makes sense.
• So there is someone (me) for whom (S) makes sense.
• What happened when (S) is the statement ?
• This is the reason, why Wittgenstein talk about my language.
The Early Wittgenstein
Michael Morris
• Let S is the statement about some fact, eg. ”It is the case that the
Earth isn’t flat.”. The argument is as follows:
• It can be seen that (S) makes sense.
• If it can be seen that (S) makes sense, there is someone (me)
for whom it makes sense.
• So there is someone (me) for whom (S) makes sense.
• What happened when (S) is the statement ?
• This is the reason, why Wittgenstein talk about my language.
• There can’t be the single background world behind all subjective
worlds because it would mean that there can exist some
configuration of object, that this world creates, and languages that
I’m not possible to understand.
The Early Wittgenstein
Michael Morris
• The important part of language is the syntax, so the second
argument could be:
The Early Wittgenstein
Michael Morris
• The important part of language is the syntax, so the second
argument could be:
• If my judgement of the syntactic well-formedness of my own
language were not infallible, it might be wrong (for all my
confidence).
The Early Wittgenstein
Michael Morris
• The important part of language is the syntax, so the second
argument could be:
• If my judgement of the syntactic well-formedness of my own
language were not infallible, it might be wrong (for all my
confidence).
• If my judgement of the syntactic well-formedness of my own
language might be wrong, I ought to doubt it.
The Early Wittgenstein
Michael Morris
• The important part of language is the syntax, so the second
argument could be:
• If my judgement of the syntactic well-formedness of my own
language were not infallible, it might be wrong (for all my
confidence).
• If my judgement of the syntactic well-formedness of my own
language might be wrong, I ought to doubt it.
• If I ought to doubt my judgement of the syntactic
well-formedness of my own language, I can doubt it (given
that ’ought’, in general, implies ’can’).
The Early Wittgenstein
Michael Morris
• The important part of language is the syntax, so the second
argument could be:
• If my judgement of the syntactic well-formedness of my own
language were not infallible, it might be wrong (for all my
confidence).
• If my judgement of the syntactic well-formedness of my own
language might be wrong, I ought to doubt it.
• If I ought to doubt my judgement of the syntactic
well-formedness of my own language, I can doubt it (given
that ’ought’, in general, implies ’can’).
• But I cannot doubt my judgement of the syntactic
well-formedness of my own language.
The Early Wittgenstein
Michael Morris
• The important part of language is the syntax, so the second
argument could be:
• If my judgement of the syntactic well-formedness of my own
language were not infallible, it might be wrong (for all my
confidence).
• If my judgement of the syntactic well-formedness of my own
language might be wrong, I ought to doubt it.
• If I ought to doubt my judgement of the syntactic
well-formedness of my own language, I can doubt it (given
that ’ought’, in general, implies ’can’).
• But I cannot doubt my judgement of the syntactic
well-formedness of my own language.
• So my judgement of the syntactis well-formedness of my own
language must be infallible.
The Early Wittgenstein
Michael Morris
• The important part of language is the syntax, so the second
argument could be:
• If my judgement of the syntactic well-formedness of my own
language were not infallible, it might be wrong (for all my
confidence).
• If my judgement of the syntactic well-formedness of my own
language might be wrong, I ought to doubt it.
• If I ought to doubt my judgement of the syntactic
well-formedness of my own language, I can doubt it (given
that ’ought’, in general, implies ’can’).
• But I cannot doubt my judgement of the syntactic
well-formedness of my own language.
• So my judgement of the syntactis well-formedness of my own
language must be infallible.
• But if realism were true, my judgement of the syntactic
well-formedness of my own language would not be infallible.
The Early Wittgenstein
Michael Morris
• The important part of language is the syntax, so the second
argument could be:
• If my judgement of the syntactic well-formedness of my own
language were not infallible, it might be wrong (for all my
confidence).
• If my judgement of the syntactic well-formedness of my own
language might be wrong, I ought to doubt it.
• If I ought to doubt my judgement of the syntactic
well-formedness of my own language, I can doubt it (given
that ’ought’, in general, implies ’can’).
• But I cannot doubt my judgement of the syntactic
well-formedness of my own language.
• So my judgement of the syntactis well-formedness of my own
language must be infallible.
• But if realism were true, my judgement of the syntactic
well-formedness of my own language would not be infallible.
• So realism is not true.
The Early Wittgenstein
Michael Morris
• If the structure of language is clear to me, then the structure of
world is also clear to me.
The Early Wittgenstein
Michael Morris
• If the structure of language is clear to me, then the structure of
world is also clear to me.
• The clarity to me depends on me. That’s the reason why is subject
on the limit of the world.
The Early Wittgenstein
Michael Morris
• If the structure of language is clear to me, then the structure of
world is also clear to me.
• The clarity to me depends on me. That’s the reason why is subject
on the limit of the world.
• Because of non-existence of metaphysical subject we can’t speak
about him.
The Early Wittgenstein
Michael Morris
• If the structure of language is clear to me, then the structure of
world is also clear to me.
• The clarity to me depends on me. That’s the reason why is subject
on the limit of the world.
• Because of non-existence of metaphysical subject we can’t speak
about him.
• And because R, I and S depend on subject, we can’t speak also
about them.
The Early Wittgenstein
Michael Morris
• If the structure of language is clear to me, then the structure of
world is also clear to me.
• The clarity to me depends on me. That’s the reason why is subject
on the limit of the world.
• Because of non-existence of metaphysical subject we can’t speak
about him.
• And because R, I and S depend on subject, we can’t speak also
about them.
• There is no subject, that could make a difference between them.
The Early Wittgenstein
Michael Morris
• If the structure of language is clear to me, then the structure of
world is also clear to me.
• The clarity to me depends on me. That’s the reason why is subject
on the limit of the world.
• Because of non-existence of metaphysical subject we can’t speak
about him.
• And because R, I and S depend on subject, we can’t speak also
about them.
• There is no subject, that could make a difference between them.
• Conclusion: Wittgenstein was rather an idealist.
The Early Wittgenstein
Michael Kremer
KREMER, Michael. To What Extent is Solipsism a Truth? In Post-Analytic
Tractatus, B. Stocekr, ed., 2004, p. 59–84.
The Early Wittgenstein
Michael Kremer
KREMER, Michael. To What Extent is Solipsism a Truth? In Post-Analytic
Tractatus, B. Stocekr, ed., 2004, p. 59–84.
• All interpreters above were metaphysical readers of Tractatus.
The Early Wittgenstein
Michael Kremer
KREMER, Michael. To What Extent is Solipsism a Truth? In Post-Analytic
Tractatus, B. Stocekr, ed., 2004, p. 59–84.
• All interpreters above were metaphysical readers of Tractatus. But
there is another way.
The Early Wittgenstein
Michael Kremer
KREMER, Michael. To What Extent is Solipsism a Truth? In Post-Analytic
Tractatus, B. Stocekr, ed., 2004, p. 59–84.
• All interpreters above were metaphysical readers of Tractatus. But
there is another way. Something like Dark magic!
The Early Wittgenstein
Michael Kremer
KREMER, Michael. To What Extent is Solipsism a Truth? In
Post-AnalyticTractatus, B. Stocekr, ed., 2004, s. 59–84.
• All interpreters above were metaphysical readers of Tractatus. But
there is another way. Something like Dark magic!
• It’s resolute reading.
The Early Wittgenstein
Michael Kremer
KREMER, Michael. To What Extent is Solipsism a Truth? In
Post-AnalyticTractatus, B. Stocekr, ed., 2004, s. 59–84.
• All interpreters above were metaphysical readers of Tractatus. But
there is another way. Something like Dark magic!
• It’s resolute reading.
• These interpreters took literaly the statement 6.54 and thus all
other they grasp as some ethical practice.
• My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me
finally recognize them as senselless, when he has climbed out through
them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder,
after he has climbed up on it.)
He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly.
The Early Wittgenstein
Michael Kremer
KREMER, Michael. To What Extent is Solipsism a Truth? In
Post-AnalyticTractatus, B. Stocekr, ed., 2004, s. 59–84.
• All interpreters above were metaphysical readers of Tractatus. But
there is another way. Something like Dark magic!
• It’s resolute reading.
• These interpreters took literaly the statement 6.54 and thus all
other they grasp as some ethical practice.
• My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me
finally recognize them as senselless, when he has climbed out through
them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder,
after he has climbed up on it.)
He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly.
• In the letter to Ficker Wittgenstein wrote that the sense of
Tractatus is ethical.
The Early Wittgenstein
Michael Kremer
• To explain the statement
5.62 This remark provides a key to the question, to what extent solipsism
is a truth.
In fact what solipsism means, is quite correct, only it cannot be said, but
it shows itself.
That the world is my world, shows itself in the fact that the limits of the
language (the language which only I understand) mean the limits of my
world.
The Early Wittgenstein
Michael Kremer
• To explain the statement
5.62 This remark provides a key to the question, to what extent solipsism
is a truth.
In fact what solipsism means, is quite correct, only it cannot be said, but
it shows itself.
That the world is my world, shows itself in the fact that the limits of the
language (the language which only I understand) mean the limits of my
world.
... we need explain expressions ”truth”, ”means” and ”shows”.
The Early Wittgenstein
Michael Kremer
• Showing is crucial point in understanding. It’s something like
know-how. One who sees that which is shown, is simply one who
knows how to go on.
The Early Wittgenstein
Michael Kremer
• Showing is crucial point in understanding. It’s something like
know-how. One who sees that which is shown, is simply one who
knows how to go on.
• Truth isn’t the correspondance between proposition and world. It’s
a path we should go in our life.
The Early Wittgenstein
Michael Kremer
• Showing is crucial point in understanding. It’s something like
know-how. One who sees that which is shown, is simply one who
knows how to go on.
• Truth isn’t the correspondance between proposition and world. It’s
a path we should go in our life.
• Meaning is like uncomplete attempt to say something. It’s secret
purpose.
The Early Wittgenstein
Michael Kremer
• Showing is crucial point in understanding. It’s something like
know-how. One who sees that which is shown, is simply one who
knows how to go on.
• Truth isn’t the correspondance between proposition and world. It’s
a path we should go in our life.
• Meaning is like uncomplete attempt to say something. It’s secret
purpose.
• So in 5.62 Wittgenstein tries to say:
This remark provides the key to the question as to how far solipsism can
take us along the path of spiritual and ethical enlightenment. In fact, the
intention of solipsism is a good one, but this cannot be communicated
through a set of principles, but must be demonstrated in practice.
The Early Wittgenstein
Michael Kremer
• In Tractatus Wittgenstein plays a game with the reader. He let us
create the world, master our own language which exactly pass to
the world and became the king of all.
The Early Wittgenstein
Michael Kremer
• In Tractatus Wittgenstein plays a game with the reader. He let us
create the world, master our own language which exactly pass to
the world and became the king of all.
• Then he shows us that this imagine is incorrect because there is no
subject in the world and solipsism is equal to realism.
The Early Wittgenstein
Michael Kremer
• In Tractatus Wittgenstein plays a game with the reader. He let us
create the world, master our own language which exactly pass to
the world and became the king of all.
• Then he shows us that this imagine is incorrect because there is no
subject in the world and solipsism is equal to realism.
• Conclusion: Solipsism serves only like an exercise.
The Early Wittgenstein
What to take away
• In Tractatus 5.6 - 5.641 Wittgenstein investigates solipsism.
• There is no agreement on interpretation of this part.
• There are two different readings of Tractatus: metaphysical and
resolute.
Outline
1 Introduction
2 The Early Wittgenstein
Jaakko Hintikka
Michael Morris
Michael Kremer
3 The Late Wittgenstein
Bernard Williams
Edward Minar
4 Conclusion
The Late Wittgenstein
• In distinction to the early the late Wittgenstein include the rest of
his work.
The Late Wittgenstein
• In distinction to the early the late Wittgenstein include the rest of
his work.
• For since beginning to occupy myself with philosophy again, sixteen
years ago, I have been forced to recognize grave mistakes in what I
wrote in that first book. (Preface of Pilosophical Investigations)
The Late Wittgenstein
• In distinction to the early the late Wittgenstein include the rest of
his work.
• For since beginning to occupy myself with philosophy again, sixteen
years ago, I have been forced to recognize grave mistakes in what I
wrote in that first book. (Preface of Pilosophical Investigations)
• Does it mean that Wittgenstein changed his view about R, I or S?
The Late Wittgenstein
• In distinction to the early the late Wittgenstein include the rest of
his work.
• For since beginning to occupy myself with philosophy again, sixteen
years ago, I have been forced to recognize grave mistakes in what I
wrote in that first book. (Preface of Pilosophical Investigations)
• Does it mean that Wittgenstein changed his view about R, I or S?
• Who knows? We will assume that his definitions still hold.
The Late Wittgenstein
• In distinction to the early the late Wittgenstein include the rest of
his work.
• For since beginning to occupy myself with philosophy again, sixteen
years ago, I have been forced to recognize grave mistakes in what I
wrote in that first book. (Preface of Pilosophical Investigations)
• Does it mean that Wittgenstein changed his view about R, I or S?
• Who knows? We will assume that his definitions still hold.
• It’s sure that Wittgenstein deal with R, I, S in all of his work.
The Late Wittgenstein
• I see, indistinctly, a connection between the problem of solipsism or
idealism and the notational system of a proposition. In these cases is the
”I” perhaps replaced by the proposition, and the relationship of the ”I” to
reality by the relationship between the proposition and reality? (Idealism,
in The Big Typescript)
• Solipsism could be disproved by the fact that the word ”I” doesn’t occupy
a central position in grammar, but is a word like any other. (Having Pain,
in The Big Typescript)
The Late Wittgenstein
• Now the man whom we call a solipsist and who says that only his own
experiences are real, does not thereby disagree with us about any
practical question of fact, he does not say that we are simulating when
we complain of pains, he pities us as much as anyone else, and at the
same time he wishes to restrict the use of the epithet ”real” to what we
should call his experiences; and perhaps he doesn’t want to call our
experiences ”experiences” at all (again without disagreeing with us about
any question of fact). For he would say that it was inconceivable that
experiences other than his own were real. He ought therefore to use a
notation in which such a phrase as ”A has real toothache”(where A is not
he) is meaningless, a notation whose rules exclude this phrase as the rules
of chess exclude a pawn’s making a knight’s move. The solipsist’s
suggestion comes to using such a phrase as ”there is real toothache”
instead of ”Smith (the solipsist) has toothache”. And why shouldn’t we
grant him this notation? I needn’t say that in order to avoid confusion he
had in this case better not use the word ”real” as opposed to ”simulated”
at all; which just means that we shall have to provide for the distinction
”real”/”simulated” in some other way. The solipsist who says ”only I feel
real pain”, ”only I really see (or hear)” is not stating an opinion; and
that’s why he is so sure of what he says. He is irresistibly tempted to use
a certain form of expression; but we must yet find why he is. (The Blue
The Late Wittgenstein
• ”It’s true I say ’Now I am having such-and-such an image’, but the words
’I am having’ are merely a sign to someone else; the description of the
image is a complete account of the imagined world.”–You mean: the
words ”I am having” are like ”I say!....” You are inclined to say it should
really have been expressed differently. Perhaps simply by making a sign
with one’s hand and then giving a description. When as in this case, we
disapprove of the expressions of ordinary language (which are after all
performing their office), we have got a picture in our heads which
conflicts with the picture of our ordinary way of speaking. Whereas we
are tempted to say that our way of speaking does not describe the facts
as they really are. As if, for example the proposition ”he has pains” could
be false in some other way than by that man’s not having pains. As if the
form of expression were saying something false even when the proposition
faute de mieux asserted something true. For this is what disputes
between Idealists, Solipsists and Realists look like. The one party attack
the normal form of expression as if they were attacking a statement; the
others defend it, as if they were stating facts recognized by every
reasonable human being. (§402, Philosophical Investigations)
The Late Wittgenstein
• One man is a convinced realist, another a convinced idealist and teaches
his children accordingly. In such an important matter as the existence or
non-existence of the external world they don’t want to teach their
children anything wrong. What will the children be taught? Also to say:
”There are physical objects” or the opposite? If someone does not believe
in fairies, he does not need to teach his children ”There are no fairies”:
he can omit to teach them the word ”fairy”. On what occasion are they
to say: ”There are...” or ”There are no...”? Only when they meet people
of the contrary belief. (§338, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology)
• But the idealist will teach his children the word ”chair” after all, for of
course he wants to teach them to do this and that, e.g. to fetch a chair.
Then where will be the difference between what the idealist-educated
children say and the realist ones? Won’t the difference only be one of the
battle cry? (§339, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology)
The Late Wittgenstein
• These quotes are just a small selection.
The Late Wittgenstein
• These quotes are just a small selection.
• Remarks about R, I and S are scattered in whole Wittgenstein’s
work.
The Late Wittgenstein
• These quotes are just a small selection.
• Remarks about R, I and S are scattered in whole Wittgenstein’s
work.
• That’s not clear whether Wittgenstein changed his opnion or not.
The Late Wittgenstein
• These quotes are just a small selection.
• Remarks about R, I and S are scattered in whole Wittgenstein’s
work.
• That’s not clear whether Wittgenstein changed his opnion or not.
• In contrast to his earlier attitude the late Wittgenstein deal with
pain, grammar, using the word ”I” etc.
The Late Wittgenstein
Bernard Williams
WILLIAMS, Bernard. Wittgenstein and Idealism. In Understanding
Wittgenstein. New York: The Royal Institute for Philosophy, 1974, p. 76–95.
The Late Wittgenstein
Bernard Williams
WILLIAMS, Bernard. Wittgenstein and Idealism. In Understanding
Wittgenstein. New York: The Royal Institute for Philosophy, 1974, p. 76–95.
• Wittgenstein’s late view is the same like the earlier.
• There can be seen change of using ”we” instead of ”I” in
Wittgenstein’s account.
The Late Wittgenstein
Bernard Williams
WILLIAMS, Bernard. Wittgenstein and Idealism. In Understanding
Wittgenstein. New York: The Royal Institute for Philosophy, 1974, p. 76–95.
• Wittgenstein’s late view is the same like the earlier.
• There can be seen change of using ”we” instead of ”I” in
Wittgenstein’s account.
• If I wrote the book ”The World as I found it”...
• The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.
• I am my world.
The Late Wittgenstein
Bernard Williams
WILLIAMS, Bernard. Wittgenstein and Idealism. In Understanding
Wittgenstein. New York: The Royal Institute for Philosophy, 1974, p. 76–95.
• Wittgenstein’s late view is the same like the earlier.
• There can be seen change of using ”we” instead of ”I” in
Wittgenstein’s account.
• see quotes above and Wittgenstein’s later work.
The Late Wittgenstein
Bernard Williams
WILLIAMS, Bernard. Wittgenstein and Idealism. In Understanding
Wittgenstein. New York: The Royal Institute for Philosophy, 1974, p. 76–95.
• Wittgenstein’s late view is the same like the earlier.
• There can be seen change of using ”we” instead of ”I” in
Wittgenstein’s account.
• see quotes above and Wittgenstein’s later work.
• The word ”we” doesn’t mean the group of speakers of one language
but rather the plural descendant of that idealist I who also was no
one item rather than another in the world.
The Late Wittgenstein
Bernard Williams
• After long dealing with phenomenalism Williams concludes with this
argument:
The Late Wittgenstein
Bernard Williams
• After long dealing with phenomenalism Williams concludes with this
argument:
• S has the meaning we give it.
The Late Wittgenstein
Bernard Williams
• After long dealing with phenomenalism Williams concludes with this
argument:
• S has the meaning we give it.
• A necessary condition of our giving S a meaning is Q.
The Late Wittgenstein
Bernard Williams
• After long dealing with phenomenalism Williams concludes with this
argument:
• S has the meaning we give it.
• A necessary condition of our giving S a meaning is Q.
• So unless Q, S would not have a meaning.
The Late Wittgenstein
Bernard Williams
• After long dealing with phenomenalism Williams concludes with this
argument:
• S has the meaning we give it.
• A necessary condition of our giving S a meaning is Q.
• So unless Q, S would not have a meaning.
• If S did not have a meaning, S would not be true.
The Late Wittgenstein
Bernard Williams
• After long dealing with phenomenalism Williams concludes with this
argument:
• S has the meaning we give it.
• A necessary condition of our giving S a meaning is Q.
• So unless Q, S would not have a meaning.
• If S did not have a meaning, S would not be true.
• So unless Q, S would not be true.
The Late Wittgenstein
Bernard Williams
• After long dealing with phenomenalism Williams concludes with this
argument:
• S has the meaning we give it.
• A necessary condition of our giving S a meaning is Q.
• So unless Q, S would not have a meaning.
• If S did not have a meaning, S would not be true.
• So unless Q, S would not be true.
• Conclusion: Wittgenstein was an idealist.
The Late Wittgenstein
Edward Minar
MINAR, Edward. Wittgenstein on Metaphysics of the Self. In Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998, p. 329–354.
The Late Wittgenstein
Edward Minar
MINAR, Edward. Wittgenstein on Metaphysics of the Self. In Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998, p. 329–354.
• Central statements connected with solipsism in Wittgenstein’s later
work are §398-410 of Philosophical Investigations
The Late Wittgenstein
Edward Minar
MINAR, Edward. Wittgenstein on Metaphysics of the Self. In Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998, p. 329–354.
• Central statements connected with solipsism in Wittgenstein’s later
work are §398-410 of Philosophical Investigations
• §398-403 ... path into the solipsism and its apparent dissmisal.
• §404-410 ... failure of solipsist’s using his own language.
The Late Wittgenstein
Edward Minar
MINAR, Edward. Wittgenstein on Metaphysics of the Self. In Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998, p. 329–354.
• Central statements connected with solipsism in Wittgenstein’s later
work are §398-410 of Philosophical Investigations
• §398-403 ... path into the solipsism and its apparent dissmisal.
• §404-410 ... failure of solipsist’s using his own language.
• We will look at the use of term ”I” and grammar of our ordinary
language.
The Late Wittgenstein
Edward Minar
MINAR, Edward. Wittgenstein on Metaphysics of the Self. In Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998, p. 329–354.
• Central statements connected with solipsism in Wittgenstein’s later
work are §398-410 of Philosophical Investigations
• §398-403 ... path into the solipsism and its apparent dissmisal.
• §404-410 ... failure of solipsist’s using his own language.
• We will look at the use of term ”I” and grammar of our ordinary
language.
• The ’visual room’ is the one that has no owner. I can as little own it
as walk about it, or look at it, or pint to it. (§398, PI)
The Late Wittgenstein
Edward Minar
MINAR, Edward. Wittgenstein on Metaphysics of the Self. In Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998, p. 329–354.
• Central statements connected with solipsism in Wittgenstein’s later
work are §398-410 of Philosophical Investigations
• §398-403 ... path into the solipsism and its apparent dissmisal.
• §404-410 ... failure of solipsist’s using his own language.
• We will look at the use of term ”I” and grammar of our ordinary
language.
• The ’visual room’ is the one that has no owner. I can as little own it
as walk about it, or look at it, or pint to it. (§398, PI)
• The echo of the seeing eye that is not part of its visual field.
The Late Wittgenstein
Edward Minar
MINAR, Edward. Wittgenstein on Metaphysics of the Self. In Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998, p. 329–354.
• Central statements connected with solipsism in Wittgenstein’s later
work are §398-410 of Philosophical Investigations
• §398-403 ... path into the solipsism and its apparent dissmisal.
• §404-410 ... failure of solipsist’s using his own language.
• We will look at the use of term ”I” and grammar of our ordinary
language.
• The ’visual room’ is the one that has no owner. I can as little own it
as walk about it, or look at it, or pint to it. (§398, PI)
• The echo of the seeing eye that is not part of its visual field.
• So that’s not possible to state ”The world is my world”. It must be
presented indirectly by the grammar.
The Late Wittgenstein
Edward Minar
• The statement ”I am having [a pain]” serves as a signal. The word
”I” has no referential function.
The Late Wittgenstein
Edward Minar
• The statement ”I am having [a pain]” serves as a signal. The word
”I” has no referential function.
• For this is what disputes between Idealists, Solipsists and Realists
look like. The one party attack the normal forms of expression as if
they were attacking a statement; th other defend it, as if they were
stating facts recognized by every reasonable human being. (§ 402,
PI)
The Late Wittgenstein
Edward Minar
• The statement ”I am having [a pain]” serves as a signal. The word
”I” has no referential function.
• For this is what disputes between Idealists, Solipsists and Realists
look like. The one party attack the normal forms of expression as if
they were attacking a statement; th other defend it, as if they were
stating facts recognized by every reasonable human being. (§ 402,
PI)
• Solipsist can’t fully fill up the requirements about his language.
The Late Wittgenstein
Edward Minar
• The statement ”I am having [a pain]” serves as a signal. The word
”I” has no referential function.
• For this is what disputes between Idealists, Solipsists and Realists
look like. The one party attack the normal forms of expression as if
they were attacking a statement; th other defend it, as if they were
stating facts recognized by every reasonable human being. (§ 402,
PI)
• Solipsist can’t fully fill up the requirements about his language.
• Conclusion: Wittgenstein wasn’t a solipsist.
The Late Wittgenstein
What to take away
• Studying grammar and language can serve to solving R, I, S
problem.
• Some tractarian points Wittgenstein held in his later work also.
Nevertheless there can be seen some change.
• Wittgenstein tries to understand the solipsist position from the first
person view. Not from an independent point. There is no uncaptive
or detached eye!
Outline
1 Introduction
2 The Early Wittgenstein
Jaakko Hintikka
Michael Morris
Michael Kremer
3 The Late Wittgenstein
Bernard Williams
Edward Minar
4 Conclusion
Conclusion
• Was Wittgenstein realist, idealist or solipsist?
• What is Wittgenstein philosophical method?
• What does philosophy mean in Wittgenstein’s view?
• What it looks like in contemporary philosophy?
Conclusion
• Was Wittgenstein realist, idealist or solipsist?
Many post-analytical philosophers state none of these. Wittgenstein
tried to show us that this question is useless because it doesn’t solve
anything. The solution wouldn’t help us in understanding of the
world and can’t be derived from using the language.
• What is Wittgenstein philosophical method?
• What does philosophy mean in Wittgenstein’s view?
• What it looks like in contemporary philosophy?
Conclusion
• Was Wittgenstein realist, idealist or solipsist?
• What is Wittgenstein philosophical method?
• What does philosophy mean in Wittgenstein’s view?
• What it looks like in contemporary philosophy?
Conclusion
• Was Wittgenstein realist, idealist or solipsist?
• What is Wittgenstein philosophical method?
Wittgenstein’s method across of whole his work is survey of
language, not the empirical research of our world. And be aware of
not every raised question should be answered.
• What does philosophy mean in Wittgenstein’s view?
• What it looks like in contemporary philosophy?
Conclusion
• Was Wittgenstein realist, idealist or solipsist?
• What is Wittgenstein philosophical method?
• What does philosophy mean in Wittgenstein’s view?
• What it looks like in contemporary philosophy?
Conclusion
• Was Wittgenstein realist, idealist or solipsist?
• What is Wittgenstein philosophical method?
• What does philosophy mean in Wittgenstein’s view?
There is many definitions of philosophy. But one nice says that
philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by
means of language.
• What it looks like in contemporary philosophy?
Conclusion
• Was Wittgenstein realist, idealist or solipsist?
• What is Wittgenstein philosophical method?
• What does philosophy mean in Wittgenstein’s view?
• What it looks like in contemporary philosophy?
Conclusion
• Was Wittgenstein realist, idealist or solipsist?
• What is Wittgenstein philosophical method?
• What does philosophy mean in Wittgenstein’s view?
• What it looks like in contemporary philosophy?
Not good, I think. Wittgenstein is one of many philosophers and
problem of R, I, S is also one of many in his work. Nevertheless
there is no definitive solution and papers still accumulate.
Thank you!