Religious thought and behaviour as
by-products of brain function
Pascal Boyer
Departments of Anthropology and Psychology, Washington University in St Louis, MO 63130, St Louis, USA
Religious concepts activate various functionally distinct
mental systems, present also in non-religious contexts,
and ‘tweak’ the usual inferences of these systems. They
deal with detection and representation of animacy and
agency, social exchange, moral intuitions, precaution
against natural hazards and understanding of misfortune.
Each of these activates distinct neural resources
or families of networks. What makes notions of supernatural
agency intuitively plausible? This article reviews
evidence suggesting that it is the joint, coordinated
activation of these diverse systems, a supposition that
opens up the prospect of a cognitive neuroscience of
religious beliefs.
Religious beliefs and practices are found in all human
groups. What makes religion so ‘natural’? A common
temptation is to search for the origin of religion in general
human urges, for instance in people’s wish to escape
misfortune or mortality or their desire to understand the
universe. However, these accounts are often based on
incorrect views about religion (see Table 1) and the
psychological urges are often merely postulated [1,2].
Recent findings in psychology, anthropology and neuroscience
offer a more empirical approach, focused on the
mental machinery activated in acquiring and representing
religious concepts [1,3–7]. This approach suggests three
crucial changes to common views of religion:
(1) Most of the relevant mental machinery is not
consciously accessible. People’s explicitly held, consciously
accessible beliefs, as in other domains of
cognition, only represent a fragment of the relevant
processes. Experimental tests show that people’s
actual religious concepts often diverge from what
they believe they believe [8]. This is why theologies,
explicit dogmas, scholarly interpretations of religion
cannot be taken as a reliable description of either the
contents or the causes of people’s beliefs [9];
(2) What makes religious thoughts ‘natural’ might be the
operation of a whole collection of distinct mental
systems rather than a unique, specific process;
(3) In each of these systems religious thoughts are not a
dramatic departure from, but a predictable byproduct
of, ordinary cognitive function.
In the past five years, substantial progress has been
made in the description of these different systems and
their contribution to the ‘naturalness’ of religious beliefs.
A limited catalogue of the supernatural
Religious notions are products of the supernatural
imagination. To some extent, they owe their salience
(likelihood of activation) and transmission potential to
features that they share with other supernatural concepts,
such as found in dreams, fantasy, folktales and legends.
This might be why one finds recurrent templates in
religion despite many variations between cultures (see
Table 1 on misleading notions about cultural similarities
and differences). Imagination in general is strongly
constrained [10]. Supernatural concepts are informed by
very general assumptions from ‘domain concepts’ such as
person, living thing, man-made object [11,12]. A spirit is a
special kind of person, a magic wand a special kind of
artefact, a talking tree a special kind of plant. Such notions
are salient and inferentially productive because they
combine (i) specific features that violate some default
expectations for the domain with (ii) expectations held by
default as true of the entire domain [9] (see Fig. 1).
For example, the familiar concept of a ghost combines
(i) socially transmitted information about a physically
counter-intuitive person (disembodied, can go through
walls, etc.), and (ii) spontaneous inferences afforded by the
Fig. 1. Culturally widespread supernatural concepts (only the most frequent are
represented here) correspond to a small number of templates that combine [a]
activation of a domain concept with its default assumptions and [b] culturally
transmitted, limited violations of expectations for that domain.
Person
+ counter-intuitive physics
Person
+ counter-intuitive biology
Artefact
+ animacy, psychology
TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences
‘Ghost entered room
through the wall’!!!!!
‘Spirits never die’!!!!!
‘This statue will listen
to your prayers’!!!!!
Corresponding author: Pascal Boyer (pboyer@artsci.wustl.edu).
Review TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences Vol.7 No.3 March 2003 119
http://tics.trends.com 1364-6613/03/$ - see front matter q 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/S1364-6613(03)00031-7
general person concept (the ghost perceives what happens,
recalls what he or she perceived, forms beliefs on the basis
of such perceptions, and intentions on the basis of beliefs)
[13]. These combinations of explicit violation and tacit
inferences are culturally widespread and may constitute a
memory optimum [11]. Associations of this type are
recalled better than more standard associations but also
better than oddities that do not include domain-concept
violations [14,15]. The effect obtains regardless of exposure
to a particular kind of supernatural beliefs, and it has been
replicated in different cultures in Africa and Asia [14].
Informed agents and moral intuitions
A subset of the supernatural repertoire consists in
religious concepts proper, which are taken by many people
as, firstly, quite plausibly real and secondly, of great social
and personal importance. Religion is largely about intentional
agents [3] that one does not physically encounter.
Far from being intrinsically irrational or delusive, the
capacity to imagine non-physically present agents and run
‘off-line’ social interaction with them can be said to be
characteristic of human cognition [16,17]. A good deal of
spontaneous reflection in humans focuses on past or future
social interaction and on counterfactual scenarios. This
capacity to run ‘off-line’ social interaction is already
present in young children [18]. Thinking about supernatural
agents certainly activates such off-line capacities,
although in a particular way because most information
about such agents is socially transmitted and they are seen
as quite real.
What psychological processes create this intuition of
actual presence? Some psychologists of religion emphasize
the role of salient personal experience, such as a vision or
trance (see Box 1). However, most religious people find
supernatural agents plausible without the benefit of such
experience. A possible explanation is that the representation
of supernatural agents activates and modifies
inference systems involved in the representation of
ordinary agents.
As an illustration, concepts of gods and ancestors with
whom you can interact require a minor but consequential
‘tweaking’ of standard theory of mind. Normal adults
pass standard false-belief tests because they assume a
‘principle of imperfect information’: that a situation s is
the case does not entail that all agents represent s
[19–21]. Social intelligence requires that we gauge other
agents’ true and false beliefs about the situation at hand.
But supernatural agents are represented as simpler
intentional agents. They are tacitly construed as
‘perfect-access’ intentional agents [22] (if s is the case,
then the god or spirit knows s).
Another illustration is the way supernatural agents are
involved in moral judgments. Moral intuitions bind a
particular type of social interaction with a specific feeling
[23,24], according to principles developed early in life [25].
The principles are implicit so that people often have
definite moral intuitions that they cannot entirely explain.
This explanatory background can be provided by religious
concepts. Gods and ancestors are sometimes represented
as ‘legislators’ or moral exemplars but the most widespread
connection with morality is that they are ‘interested
parties’ in moral judgments [6]. The ancestors know,
for instance, what you are up to, know you feel bad about it,
and know that it is bad; the spirits know that you are
generous, know how proud you feel and know that that is
praiseworthy. A default assumption in such inferences is
that gods and ancestors empathise with one’s own moral
intuitions. One’s own moral feelings are made easier to
represent when construed as resulting from another
agent’s judgments, because of our intuitive capacity for
emotional empathy [26].
Misfortune and death
A popular explanation of religion is that people create gods
and spirits to explain misfortune, accidents and disease in
Table 1. Do’s and dont’s in the study of religion
Do not say… But say…
Religion answers people’s metaphysical questions Religious thoughts are typically activated when people deal with concrete
situations (this crop, that disease, this new birth, this dead body, etc.)
Religion is about a transcendent God It is about a variety of agents: ghouls, ghosts, spirits, ancestors, gods, etc., in
direct interaction with people
Religion allays anxiety It generates as much anxiety as it allays: vengeful ghosts, nasty spirits and
aggressive gods are as common as protective deities
Religion was created at time t in human history There is no reason to think that the various kinds of thoughts we call ‘religious’ all
appeared in human cultures at the same time
Religion is about explaining natural phenomena Most religious explanations of natural phenomena actually explain little but
produce salient mysteries
Religion is about explaining mental phenomena (dreams,
visions)
In places where religion is not invoked to explain them, such phenomena are not
seen as intrinsically mystical or supernatural
Religion is about mortality and the salvation of the soul The notion of salvation is particular to a few doctrines (Christianity and doctrinal
religions of Asia and the Middle-East) and unheard of in most other traditions
Religion creates social cohesion Religious commitment can (under some conditions) be used as signal of
coalitional affiliation; but coalitions create social fission (secession) as often as
group integration
Religious claims are irrefutable. That is why people believe
them
There are many irrefutable statements that no-one believes; what makes some of
them plausible to some people is what we need to explain
Religion is irrational/superstitious (therefore not worthy of
study)
Commitment to imagined agents does not really relax or suspend ordinary
mechanisms of belief-formation; indeed it can provide important evidence for
their functioning (and therefore should be studied attentively)
Review TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences Vol.7 No.3 March 2003120
http://tics.trends.com
particular, and that people need such explanations
because they misunderstand probability. Psychologists
have often described folk understandings of chance as
irrational [27] although this is in fact mostly confined to
situations where people represent the probability of a
single event (versus judging the relative frequencies of
multiple occurrences) [28]. Interestingly, many of the
events for which supernatural causes are invoked are
either represented as single events (e.g. death of a relative)
or repeated misfortune that deviates strongly from
expected frequencies (e.g. ‘this is the third time my
house has been hit by lightning’).
This could explain why such events are remarkable but
not why agents are thought to be involved. A possible
explanation is that many cases of misfortune are represented
in terms of social interaction in the first place,
whether the person is religious or not. This might be a byproduct
of the hypertrophy of ‘social intelligence’ in
humans, itself a reflection of how much human beings
depend on each other for survival [16]. Two facts seem to
Box 1. Trance vs. doctrine: does salient experience shape ordinary practice?
In many different places around the world, rituals induce what are called
‘altered states of consciousness’: trance, possession, meditation, andso
on (Fig. I). The techniques include self-stimulation, visual fixation,
verbal satiation, hyper-ventilation, mood-enhancing or hallucinogenic
drugs, sensory deprivation, and music [67]. How do such techniques
contribute to the creation, spread and intuitive plausibility of religious
notions?
Psychologists of religion have often suggested that the specific
phenomenology of such states inform religious notions [68], and
propose the following causal links:
(1) specific brain events in a particular person lead to specific
experience of supernatural entities or agents;
(2) a mystic’s specific experience leads to that person’s specific
concepts;
(3) the mystic’s concepts lead to the group’s religious tradition.
This is the path taken in the modern study of altered states of
consciousness, including the very few experimental studies of their
neural underpinnings [66].
Such studies might one day be able to document causal links 1 and 2
above. But what about link 3? As anthropologists point out, most
religious concepts in most minds at most times in most cultures are built
on the basis of other people’s statements (e.g. ‘the gods are awesome’),
sometimes completed by some personal experience (e.g. feeling awed
at the thought of the gods), and very seldom accompanied by any
‘mystical’ experience (e.g. of feeling the presence of the god). So it is
difficult to say whether extraordinary experience really has much impact
on religious concepts. Many anthropologists argue that the phenomenology
of altered states is intrinsically indeterminate. Culturally
transmitted concepts are required to give the experience any content
at all [69].
The production of exceptional experience could be part of what R.N.
McCauley and E.T. Lawson call the ‘high sensory pageantry’ of rituals
that create exceptional emotional states, from elation to terror and from
intense pleasure to excruciating pain [70]. By contrast, many rituals are
based on repetitive lessons. Why this difference? For McCauley and
E.T. Lawson, high sensory rituals have supernatural agents acting; low
sensory rituals are those in which they are being acted upon. The two
ritual modes perhaps also use two distinct resources of human
memory: salient perceptually encoded autobiographical events versus
conceptually integrated scripts [71].
Fig. I. Two contrasted aspects of religious practice: (a) exceptional experience
(here darwish Muslim mystic) and (b) routinized worship (Christians in the
Philippines).
Box 2. Magic, pollution, ritual and other obsessions
Magic and ritual the world over obsessively rehash the same themes, in
particular ‘concerns about pollution and purity […] contact avoidance;
special ways of touching; fears about immanent, serious sanctions for
rule violations; a focus on boundaries and thresholds’ [72]. These
themes are also characteristic of obsessive–compulsive disorder
(OCD). Indeed, the domains of magical ritual and personal obsessions
do not just share similar themes but also similar principles characteristic
of magical thinking [55]:
(1) dangerous elements or substances are invisible;
(2) any contact (touching, kissing, ingesting) with such substances is
dangerous;
(3) the amount of substance is irrelevant (e.g. a drop of a sick person’s
saliva is just as dangerous as a cupful of the stuff).
Many situations to which people spontaneously apply these
principles include sources of pathogens and toxins: dirt, faeces, bugs,
diseased or decayed organisms. The three principles are particularly
apposite when dealing with such situations, as most pathogens are
invisible, use diverse vectors for transmission, and there is no dose
effect.
So ‘magical’ thoughts could be an extension of inferences about
contagion [73]. Rituals are often performed with a sense of urgency, an
intuition that great danger would be incurred by not performing them.
This particular emotional tenor of rituals might derive from their
association with neural systems dedicated to the detection and
avoidance of invisible hazards.
Further light is shed on this question by the study of OCD pathology.
Neuroimaging studies generally show a significant increase of activity
in the caudate nucleus in response to stimuli perceived as dangerous.
Specific activity modulation extends beyond the basal ganglia,
however, to a network comprising anterior cingulate and orbitofrontal
cortex as well as the caudate [57,74]. The pathology might consist in a
failure to inhibit or keep ‘off-line’ a set of normal neural reactions to
potential sources of danger.
We are still far from understanding to what extent this network is also
involved in the production of ‘mild’, controlled, socially transmitted
notions about purity and the need for magical ritual. But it seems that
the salience of a particular range of ritual themes to do with hidden
danger and noxious contact [72] and a susceptibility to derive rigid,
emotionally vivid sequences of compulsory actions from such themes
[55], could be spectacular cultural by-products of neural function.
Review TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences Vol.7 No.3 March 2003 121
http://tics.trends.com
support this interpretation: (1) when people explain
salient misfortune without mentioning supernatural
agents, they still assume agents as causally involved
(e.g. in witchcraft accusations, a human agent is said to
use special techniques to bring about misfortune); (2) the
way people connect misfortune or protection on the one
hand and gods, spirits or ancestors on the other is
generally in terms of social exchange, that is, in terms of
services and goods given versus received. They attribute to
supernatural agents an intuitive ‘logic of social exchange’
[29] that is active in non-religious contexts.
Fear of death is also often described as the ‘origin’ of
religion (although all not religion is reassuring; see
Table 1). Social psychologists know that reminding people
of their mortality triggers a whole variety of non-obvious
cognitive effects (e.g. a punishing attitude towards social
deviance, ethnic-racial intolerance or stereotyping, illusory
consensus) [30,31]. The mechanisms responsible are
not yet properly understood [32] but they probably
highlight culturally acquired notions of powerful and
protective agents [7].
The association between death and concepts of
supernatural agency is most obvious in death rituals.
However, rather than commenting on mortality, these
rituals are usually mostly concerned with what to do
with corpses. This is partly to do with the fear of
contamination, apparently a salient aspect of magical
thinking and ritual (see Box 2). Dead people also create a
discrepancy between the output of different mental
systems. On the one hand, systems that regulate our
intuitions about animacy have little difficulty understanding
that a dead body is a non-intentional, inanimate
object [33]. On the other hand, social-intelligence
systems do not ‘shut off’ with death; indeed most people
still have thoughts and feelings about the recently dead.
This discrepancy between incompatible intuitions about
a single object might explain why recently dead people
are so often seen as supernatural agents [6]. The effect of
these different mental systems is also visible in
Table 2. A framework for a cognitive neuroscience of religionp
Gods and spirits as agents: they do things and react to one’s
behaviour
Goal detection1
Agents ¼ objects that react to others1,2
Gods and spirits have perceptions, beliefs
Ordinary mind reading2
The dead as supernatural agents
Ordinary mind reading2,5
Social relations with dead people2,3
Sacredness, purity, pollution and taboo
[normal] fear of contagion4
Rituals protect against invisible danger
[normal] fear of contagion4
Gods as interested parties in moral judgement; moral
empathy
Detection of emotional states5
Moral feelings and empathy5
Gods and spirits ‘really there’ despite no physical presence
[normal] imaginary companions, off-line interaction2,6
[pathological] thought insertion, delusions2,6
Gods and spirits give and receive (sacrifice, protection)
Social exchange, trust-signalling, cheater-detection2,7
Mystical experience, fusion with supernatural agent
Altered states, meditation8
1
System independent from Theory-of-Mind [41] from infancy [42], needs no
human-like agent [43]. NC: involvement of STS in inferring goals and other social
cues from static displays [44], modulation of sup. PC in detecting agency from
reactivity [45]. Questions: Is activation of such systems involved in representing
non-directly perceived agency?
2
Specific system [46], selective impairment [47,48]. NC: joint activation of medial
FC [49,50] and regions dedicated to social cues [44], imitation [51] and emotional
empathy (see below). Questions: How do these systems generate inferences
about non-physically present agents (imaginary companions, spirits)?
3
Face-recognition [52] and agency cues (above). NC: those of social agency and
person files [53]. Questions: Do dead bodies produce disjunction between social
agency and animacy detection? How does this connect with emotional effects of
mortality?
4
Contagion-avoidance system: early developed [54], like magic [55], specific
emotions [56]. Joint activation of Ac, Caud., OFC [57]. Questions: How does
magical ritual modulate this activity? Are contagion-related cues sufficient?
5
Empathy, emotion and off-line simulation, NC: those of emotional states in
general (including sub cortical structures, amygdala, thalamus, also involved in
moral feelings [58] together with STS for social cues. Questions: Is moral feeling
neurally (as well as phenomenologically) distinct? Does moral feeling presuppose
other’s a well as own viewpoint on action?
6
Monitoring of self-non-self distinction in action [59,60] breaks down in particular
pathologies [61]. NC: disjunction between insula and inferior PC activity for selfinitiated
vs. non-self initiated action [62], also later-alization of inf. PC activation as
effect of imitation vs. being imitated [51]. Questions: Is limited
suspension/modulation of such activity involved in “real presence” of
supernatural agents?
7
Inferential systems detached from general mental logic [63] and cultural factors
[64], possible selective im-pairment [65]. Questions: Are the emotions triggered
specific to these systems? How are the emotions transferred to non-physical
resources?
8
NC: Probably specific modulation of sub-cortical structures and TC [66].
Questions: Does phenomenology of such states constrain conceptual
descriptions of supernatural agency? (see Box 1)
p
The argument presented in this article is that religion does not involve a specific mental faculty or neural system. A cognitive neuroscience of religion would require a twostep
reduction. First, different aspects of religion (left column, bold) require diverse inference systems (left column, below headings) also found in non-religious contexts.
Second, each inference system corresponds not to a single neural system but to the joint activation of a family of systems (right column). Abbreviations: NC: neural correlates;
FC: frontal cortex; PtdCho: parietal cortex; STS: superior-temporal cortex; Ac: anterior cingulate; OFC: orbito-frontal cortex; Caud.: caudate nucleus; TC: temporal cortex. All
numbers refer to main text bibliography.
Review TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences Vol.7 No.3 March 2003122
http://tics.trends.com
culturally widespread distinctions between the social
part of the dead person that is still sentient and the
‘impure’ and dangerous decaying body [34].
Evolved disposition or multiple by-product?
Some aspects of religion have a long history, as documented
by Palaeolithic drawings of imaginary objects [35]
and apparently ritualized burials in both humans and
Neanderthals [36]. Most attempts at an evolutionary
account of religion have proved unsatisfactory because a
single characteristic identified as crucial to the origin of
religion is not in fact general (Table 1). The attempt to find
the single evolutionary track for religion is another
manifestation of a general urge to identify the single
mechanism that motivates religious thought or makes it
plausible to believers. However, evolution by natural
selection is certainly relevant to understanding the
functional properties of each of the distinct mental systems
described here [37]. The way animate beings are detected,
agents represented, moral intuitions processed or contagion
feared are all plausible outcomes of evolutionary
processes. There is now a growing body of evolutionary
thinking that connects the following elements of a
potential evolutionary framework: (1) features of religious
concepts; (2) experimental evidence for underlying cognitive
systems; (3) clues about the genetic basis of these
systems; and (4) precise hypotheses about the reproductive
advantage provided by possession of such capacities [6,7].
Belief and neuroscience
People do not generally have religious beliefs because they
have pondered the evidence for or against the actual
existence of particular supernatural agents. Rather, they
grow into finding a culturally acquired description of such
agents intuitively plausible. How does that happen? We
know a lot about the external factors that predict differences
in religious adherence [38] but we know little
about the cognitive processes involved, about the difference
between imaginary companions and supposedly real
protective ancestors. The cognitive findings summarized
here offer a speculative explanation.
First, religious representations activate a variety of
specialized (non-religious) conceptual capacities. In this
review, I mentioned the effect of several of these systems,
and many more are certainly involved. None of these
systems handles explicit judgments about the existence of
spirits, for example, but all of them run off-line inferences
on the assumption of spirits being around.
Second, belief in supernatural agents (like many other
explicit beliefs) is a high-level, conscious and metarepresentational
state. That is, people are aware of their
assumption that ancestors are around (by contrast, they
also assume that objects fall downwards but are not
necessarily aware of that assumption). In other words,
explicit beliefs of this kind are interpretations of one’s own
mental states [39].
It is a plausible hypothesis in cognitive neuroscience
that some mental systems, possibly supported by specific
networks, are specialized to produce such explicit, relevant
interpretations or post-hoc explanations for the
operation and output of other mental systems [40].
Perhaps the impression that elusive agents really are
around is an interpretation of this kind, as a result of the
coordinated activity of many automatic mental systems
[6]. In this view, spirits and ancestors would be seen by
some as plausibly real because thoughts about them
activate ‘theory-of-mind’ systems and agency-detection
and contagion-avoidance and social exchange. Whether or
not this interpretation holds will depend on progress in the
cognitive neuroscience of religion (see Table 2).
Religious believers and sceptics generally agree that
religion is a dramatic phenomenon that requires a
dramatic explanation, either as a spectacular revelation
of truth or as a fundamental error of reasoning. Cognitive
science and neuroscience suggests a less dramatic but
perhaps more empirically grounded picture of religion as a
probable, although by no means inevitable by-product of
the normal operation of human cognition.
References
1 Lawson, E.T. and McCauley, R.N. (1990) Rethinking Religion:
Connecting Cognition and Culture, Cambridge University Press
2 Saler, B. (1993) Conceptualizing Religion. Immanent Anthropologists,
Transcendent Natives and Unbounded Categories, Brill
3 Guthrie, S.E. (1993) Faces in the Clouds. A New Theory of Religion,
Oxford University Press
4 Mithen, S. (1996) The Prehistory of the Mind, Thames & Hudson
5 Pyysiainen, I. (2001) How Religion Works. Towards a New Cognitive
Science of Religion, Brill
6 Boyer, P. (2001) Religion Explained: Evolutionary Origins of Religious
Thought, Basic Books
7 Atran, S. (2002) Gods We Trust. The Evolutionary Landscape of
Religion, Oxford University Press
8 Barrett, J.L. and Keil, F.C. (1996) Conceptualizing a non-natural
entity: anthropomorphism in God concepts. Cogn. Psychol. 31,
219–247
9 Boyer, P. (1994) The Naturalness of Religious Ideas: A Cognitive Theory
of Religion, University of California Press
10 Ward, T.B. (1994) Structured imagination: the role of category
structure in exemplar generation. Cogn. Psychol. 27, 1–40
11 Boyer, P. (1994) Cognitive constraints on cultural representations:
natural ontologies and religious ideas. In Mapping the Mind: Domainspecificity
in Culture and Cognition (Hirschfeld, L.A. and Gelman, S.,
eds) pp. 391–411, Cambridge University Press
12 Barrett, J.L. (2000) Exploring the natural foundations of religion.
Trends Cogn. Sci. 4, 29–34
13 Leslie, A. (1994) ToMM, ToBy and agency: core architecture and
domain-specificity. In Mapping the Mind: Domain-Specificity in
Cognition and Culture (Hirschfeld, L.A. and Gelman, S.A., eds)
pp. 119–148, Cambridge University Press
14 Boyer, P. and Ramble, C. (2001) Cognitive templates for religious
concepts: cross-cultural evidence for recall of counter-intuitive
representations. Cogn. Sci. 25, 535–564
15 Barrett, J. and Nyhof, M. (2001) Spreading non-natural concepts: the
role of intuitive conceptual structures in memory and transmission of
cultural materials. J. Cogn. Culture 1, 69–100
16 Povinelli, D.J. and Preuss, T.M. (1995) Theory of mind: evolutionary
history of a cognitive specialization. Trends Neurosci. 18, 418–424
17 Scott, F.J. et al. (1999) ‘If pigs could fly’: a test of counterfactual
reasoning and pretence in children with autism. Br. J. Dev. Psychol. 17,
349–362
18 Taylor, M. (1999) Imaginary Companions and the Children who Create
Them, Oxford University Press
19 Leslie, A. (1987) Pretense and representation: the origins of ‘Theory of
Mind’. Psychol. Rev. 94, 412–426
20 Perner, J. (1991) Understanding the Representational Mind, MIT
Press
21 Frith, C.D. (1996) Brain mechanisms for ‘having a theory of mind’.
J. Psychopharmacol. 10, 9–15
Review TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences Vol.7 No.3 March 2003 123
http://tics.trends.com
22 Boyer, P. (2000) Functional origins of religious concepts: conceptual and
strategic selection in evolved minds. J. R. Anthropol. Inst. 6, 195–214
23 Krebs, D. and Rosenwald, A. (1994) Moral reasoning and moral
behavior in conventional adults. In Fundamental Research in Moral
Development (Puka, B. et al., eds), pp. 111–121, Garland Publishing
24 Wilson, J.Q. (1993) The Moral Sense, Free Press
25 Turiel, E. (1983) The Development of Social Knowledge. Morality and
Convention, Cambridge University Press
26 Decety, J. and Chaminade, T. (2003) Neural correlates of feeling
sympathy. Neuropsychologia 41, 127–128
27 Kahnemann, D., et al. eds (1982) Jugdments under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases Cambridge University Press
28 Gigerenzer, G. and Hoffrage, U. (1995) How to improve Bayesian
reasoning without instruction: frequency formats. Psychol. Rev. 102,
684–704
29 Cosmides, L. (1989) The logic of social exchange: has natural selection
shaped how humans reason? Studies with the Wason selection task.
Cognition 31, 187–276
30 Simon, L. et al. (1997) Perceived consensus, uniqueness, and terror
management: compensatory responses to threats to inclusion and
distinctiveness following mortality salience. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull.
23, 1055–1065
31 Rosenblatt, A. et al. (1989) Evidence for terror management theory:
I. The effects of mortality salience on reactions to those who violate or
uphold cultural values. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 57, 681–690
32 Buss, D.M. (1997) Human social motivation in evolutionary perspective:
grounding terror management theory. Psychol. Inq. 8, 22–26
33 Barrett, H.C. (2001) On the functional origins of essentialism. Mind &
Society 3, 1–30
34 Bloch, M. (1992) Prey Into Hunter. The Politics of Religious Experience,
Cambridge University Press
35 Mithen, S. (1999) Symbolism and the supernatural. In The Evolution
of Culture (Dunbar, R. et al., eds), pp. 147–171, Rutgers University
Press
36 Trinkhaus, E. and Shipman, P. (1993) The Neandertals: Changing the
Image of Mankind, Knopf
37 Duchaine, B. et al. (2001) Evolutionary psychology and the brain. Curr.
Opin. Neurobiol. 11, 225–230
38 Batson, C.D. (1993) Religion and the individual. A Socio-Psychological
Perspective, Oxford University Press
39 Sperber, D. (1996) Explaining Culture: A Naturalistic Approach,
Blackwell
40 Gazzaniga, M.S. (1995) Principles of human brain organization
derived from split-brain studies. Neuron 14, 217–228
41 Frith, U. (2000) Cognitive explanations of autism. In Childhood
Cognitive Development: The Essential Readings (Lee, K. et al., eds),
pp. 324–337, Blackwell Publishers
42 Meltzoff, A.N. (1995) Understanding the intentions of others: reenactment
of intended acts by 18-month-old children. Dev. Psychol. 31,
838–850
43 Csibra, G. et al. (1999) Goal attribution without agency cues: the
perception of ‘pure reason’ in infancy. Cognition 72, 237–267
44 Allison, T. et al. (2000) Social perception from visual cues: role of the
STS region. Trends Cogn. Sci. 4, 267–278
45 Blakemore, S-J., et al. (2003) Detection of contingency and animacy in
the human brain. Cereb. Cortex. (in press)
46 Baron-Cohen, S. (1995) Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and
Theory of Mind, MIT Press
47 Baron-Cohen, S. et al. (1985) Does the autistic child have a ‘theory of
mind’? Cognition 21, 37–46
48 Leslie, A.M. and Thaiss, L. (1992) Domain specificity in conceptual
development: neuropsychological evidence from autism. Cognition 43,
225–251
49 Frith, C.D. and Frith, U. (1999) Interacting minds: a biological basis.
Science 286, 1692–1695
50 Frith, U. (2001) Mind blindness and the brain in autism. Neuron 32,
969–979
51 Decety, J. and Chaminade, T. (2002) A PET exploration of the neural
mechanisms involved in reciprocal imitation. Neuroimage 15, 265–272
52 Farah, M.J. et al. (1995) The inverted face inversion effect in
prosopagnosia: evidence for mandatory, face-specific perceptual
mechanisms. Vis. Res. 35, 2089–2093
53 Kanwisher, N. et al. (1997) The fusiform face area: a module in human
extrastriate cortex specialized for face perception. J. Neurosci. 17,
4302–4311
54 Siegal, M. (1988) Children’s knowledge of contagion and contamination
as causes of illness. Child Dev. 59, 1353–1359
55 Nemeroff, C.J. (1995) Magical thinking about illness virulence:
conceptions of germs from ‘safe’ versus ‘dangerous’ others. Health
Psychol. 14, 147–151
56 Rozin, P. (1993) Disgust. In Handbook of Emotions (Lewis, M. and
Haviland, J.M., eds) pp. 575–595, Guildford Press
57 Adler, C.M. et al. (2000) fMRI of neuronal activation with symptom
provocation in unmedicated patients with obsessive compulsive
disorder. J. Psychiatr. Res. 34, 317–324
58 Moll, J. et al. (2002) The neural correlates of moral sensitivity: a
functional magnetic resonance imaging investigation of basic and
moral emotions. J. Neurosci. 22, 2730–2736
59 Blakemore, S-J. et al. (1999) The cerebellum contributes to somatosensory
cortical activity during self-produced tactile stimulation.
Neuroimage 10, 448–459
60 Blakemore, S-J. and Decety, J. (2001) From the perception of action to
the understanding of intention. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 2, 561–567
61 Blakemore, S-J. et al. (2000) The perception of self-produced sensory
stimuli in patients with auditory hallucinations and passivity
experiences: evidence for a breakdown in self-monitoring. Psychol.
Med. 30, 1131–1139
62 Farrer, C. and Frith, C.D. (2002) Experiencing oneself vs another
person as being the cause of an action: the neural correlates of the
experience of agency. Neuroimage 15, 596–603
63 Cosmides, L. and Tooby, J. (1992) Cognitive adaptations for social
exchange. In The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the
Generation of Culture (Barkow, J.H. et al., eds), pp. 163–228, Oxford
University Press
64 Sugiyama, L.S. et al. (2002) Cross-cultural evidence of cognitive
adaptations for social exchange among the Shiwiar of Ecuadorian
Amazonia. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 99, 11537–11542
65 Stone, V.E. et al. (2002) Selective impairment of reasoning about social
exchange in a patient with bilateral limbic system damage. Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 99, 11531–11536
66 Newberg, A.B. and D’Aquili, E.G. (1998) The neuropsychology of
spiritual experience. In Handbook of Religion and Mental Health
(Koenig, H.G. et al., eds), pp. 75–94, Academic Press
67 Bourguignon, E. ed. (1973) Religion, Altered States of Consciousness
and Social Change Ohio State University Press
68 James W. (1902, reprinted 1972) Varieties of Religious Experience
Fontana Press
69 Fernandez, J. (1982) Bwiti. An Ethnography of the Religious
Imagination in Africa, Princeton University Press
70 McCauley, R.N. and Lawson, E.T. (2002) Bringing Ritual to Mind,
Cambridge University Press
71 Whitehouse, H. (2000) Arguments and Icons. Divergent Modes of
Religiosity, Oxford University Press
72 Fiske, A.P. and Haslam, N. (1997) Is obsessive-compulsive disorder a
pathology of the human disposition to perform socially meaningful
rituals? Evidence of similar content. J. Nerv. Ment. Dis. 185, 211–222
73 Cosmides, L. and Tooby, J. (1999) Toward an evolutionary taxonomy of
treatable conditions. J. Abnorm. Psychol. 108, 453–464
74 Rauch, S.L. et al. (2001) Probing striato-thalamic function in
obsessive- compulsive disorder and Tourette syndrome using neuroimaging
methods. Adv. Neurol. 85, 207–224
Review TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences Vol.7 No.3 March 2003124
http://tics.trends.com