Brexit	and	British	exceptionalism:	the	impossible
challenge	for	Remainers
Since	2016,	a	number	of	high	profile	‘Revocateurs’,	among	them	Tony	Blair,	Alastair	Campbell	and
Andrew	Adonis,	have	appealed	for	a	fresh	referendum	on	the	EU	in	Britain.	Leaving	aside	the
complex	practicalities	and	politics	of	the	‘neverendum’	idea,	Oliver	Daddow	(University	of
Nottingham)	argues	there	is	no	evidence	either	that	Revocateurs	were	the	victims	in	Act	One	of
the	‘Britain	and	Europe’	story,	or	that	they	possess	the	credibility	to	play	the	heroes	of	Act	Two.
Revocateurs	need	to	have	more	regard	for	history	as	it	happened,	not	as	they	choose	to	rewrite	it
now.
Narratives	of	British	exceptionalism	were	not	the	sole	preserve	of	the	Leave	campaign.	They	had	been	the	stock-in-
trade	of	pro-EU	British	politicians	for	decades.	There	was	no	compelling	pro-European	message	in	2016	because
supposed	pro-Europeans	had	for	decades	been	content	to	communicate	mixed	messages	on	a	low-salience	issue.
The	referendum,	however,	exercised	the	British	public	and	smoked	out	the	weakness	of	this	approach.	Asking	the
people	to	accept	the	logic	of	Eurosceptic	discourse	but	vote	to	Remain	was	a	strange	contract:	some	might	say
counter-intuitive	bordering	on	the	illogical.	The	Leave	side’s	anti-establishment,	anti-elite	messages	targeting	the
‘ordinary	voter’	with	messages	around	sovereignty,	immigration	and	‘control’	cut	through	much	better	with	voters.
The	tradition	of	British	exceptionalism	is	centuries	old	and	has	adapted	seamlessly	to	changing	policy	contexts	and
challenges.	Succinctly,	it	originated	in	the	idea	that	Britain	required	a	free	hand	in	Europe	to	pursue	liberal	free	trade
practices,	in	the	19th	and	early	20th	century	through	imperial	expansion.	This	meant	imprinting	on	British	foreign
policy	a	‘limited	liability’	approach	towards	Europe,	as	opposed	to	a	wholehearted	‘continental	commitment’.	The
supposed	uniqueness	of	Britain’s	past,	present	and	future	destiny	ran	through	a	panoply	of	British	identity
constructions	setting	it	apart	from	Europe:	all	were	rooted	in	the	spatial	geopolitics	of	its	‘island	story’.	‘Europe’	in	this
tradition	is	a	choice	for	Britain,	not	a	necessity.
Churchill	in	1943.	Picture:	Museum	Europäischer	Kulturen,	Staatliche	Museen	zu	Berlin	via	a
CC-BY-NC-SA	3.0	licence
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Date originally posted: 2018-04-10
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The	most	complete	iteration	of	British	exceptionalism	was	articulated	after	the	second	world	war	by	Winston
Churchill,	who	in	1948,	saw	Britain	operating	at	the	centre	of	three	circles	of	power	and	influence:	Empire,	the
‘English-speaking	peoples’	(Anglosphere)	and,	very	much	last,	Europe.	Clement	Attlee,	then	Labour’s	post-war	prime
minister,	did	not	take	much	convincing.	His	post-war	government	and	Churchill’s	1951-55	administration	met
Europe’s	integrative	ventures	very	frostily,	harnessing	a	defence	of	British	sovereignty	to	the	idea	that	the	schemes
would	not	work,	especially	not	without	Britain’s	involvement.	By	the	time	Britain	had	reluctantly	decided	to	throw	in	its
lot	with	Europe	in	the	1960s,	Charles	de	Gaulle	twice	vetoed	Britain’s	(England’s	as	he	called	it)	membership	of	the
original	European	Community	(EC),	because:	‘She	has	in	all	her	doings	very	marked	and	very	original	habits	and
traditions’.
De	Gaulle’s	indictment	in	1963	indicates	that	British	exceptionalism	was	not	just	an	ascribed	identity,	but	one
achieved	through	instinctive	foreign	policy	practices	after	1945.	It	might	have	been	supposed	that	Britain’s	accession
to	the	EC	would	have	created	a	‘turning	point’	or	opportunity	space	in	which	a	more	comfortably	‘European’	identity
would	be	devised	and	sold	to	the	public.	However,	membership	proved	to	be	a	temporary	exception	to	the	limited
liability	rule,	during	which	the	European	element	of	Britishness	was	never	truly	embraced.	Furthermore,	even	some
of	the	most	vaunted	pro-Europeans	from	the	time,	including	Edward	Heath,	treated	membership	as	a	tactical	shift	in
Britain’s	global	strategy,	as	much	as	a	chance	to	create	a	fully	Europeanised	identity.
Britain’s	membership	years	from	1973	thus	saw	the	historical	‘outsider’	try	but	fail	to	become	less	‘awkward’	in	the
conduct	of	its	European	policy,	but	without	anything	in	the	way	of	a	sustained	public	campaign	to	educate	or	inform
the	public	of	the	role	the	EC/EU	played	in	British	national	life.	Space	precludes	comprehensive	coverage	of	how
Britain	secured	its	‘privileged	terms	of	membership	inside	the	EU’,	but	the	steps	included	Margaret	Thatcher’s	budget
rebate,	Major’s	Maastricht	opt-outs,	Blair’s	bashing	of	the	European	‘superstate’,	and	David	Cameron’s	self-styled
‘veto’	of	the	2011	Fiscal	Compact	Treaty.
Ivan	Rogers,	Cameron’s	EU	ambassador,	has	remarked	that	in	2016,	with	Britain	‘in	the	EU	but	outside	the
Eurozone’,	it	had	achieved	an	uneasy	yet	‘special’	status	–	one	rooted	in	the	exceptionalist	ideal	and	expressed
discursively	by	political	‘double-speak’	on	Europe.	Some	of	the	most	progressive	British	governments,	in	which	many
of	today’s	Revocateurs	cut	their	teeth,	could	occupy	pro-European	or	Eurosceptic	subject	positions	depending
on	which	speech,	or	which	bit	of	a	single	speech,	one	quoted.	Take	these	words	from	Gordon	Brown,	from	a	1997
address	on	the	‘British	Genius’:	‘I	believe	that	we	should	have	the	confidence	to	engage	with	Europe	and	make	it
better	and	–	dare	I	say	it	–	more	British’.	By	2016,	the	British	people,	not	to	mention	Britain’s	EU	partners,	were
entitled	to	ask:	is	this	the	best	pro-Europeans	can	do?
In	sum,	it	is	something	of	a	leap	of	faith	to	imagine	that	today’s	Remainers	–	yesterday’s	Eurosceptic	pro-Europeans
(an	intentional	label)	–	have	the	public	trust,	credibility	or	indeed	the	capacity	to	construct	a	compelling	narrative	that
would	swing	a	public	vote	against	Brexit,	whether	the	plebiscite	took	place	on	the	government’s	final	negotiated	deal
or	membership	per	se.	In	many	significant	ways,	the	Revocateurs	were	the	architects	of	their	own	downfall.	The
referendum	ship	therefore	sailed	long	ago,	however	much	Revocateurs	might	wish	to	retell	the	history	in	their	favour.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
Oliver	Daddow	is	Assistant	Professor	in	British	Politics	and	Security	at	the	University	of	Nottingham.	He	is	the	author
of	Britain	and	Europe	Since	1945	(Manchester	University	Press,	2004),	New	Labour	and	the	European
Union	(Manchester	University	Press,	2011)	and	International	Relations	Theory	(SAGE,	2017).	He	edited	Harold
Wilson	and	European	Integration	(Frank	Cass,	2003),	co-edited	British	Foreign	Policy:	The	New	Labour	Years
(Palgrave	Macmillan,	2011),	co-edited	Interpreting	Global	Security	(Routledge,	2014)	and	co-edits	the	textbook
PoliticsUK	(Routledge,	2018).	He	tweets	@oliver​​_daddow.
‘Brexitannia’:	an	unsettling,	beautiful	insight	into	post-referendum	UK
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Date originally posted: 2018-04-10
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/04/10/brexit-and-british-exceptionalism-the-impossible-challenge-for-remainers/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/