Justice, Deviance, and the Dark Ghetto
Author(s): Tommie Shelby
Source: Philosophy & Public Affairs , Spring, 2007, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Spring, 2007), pp.
126-160
Published by: Wiley
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4623785
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TOMMIE SHELBY Justice, Deviance, and the
Dark Ghetto
The truth of the dark ghetto is not merely a truth about Negroes; it reflects the deeper
torment and anguish of the total human predicament.
Kenneth B. Clark, Dark Ghetto
Unjust social arrangements are themselves a kind of extortion, even violence, and
consent to them does not bind.
John Rawls, A Theory oflustice
In the United States, some citizens sharply criticize poor people who live
in ghettos. These critics demand that the urban poor take greater "personal
responsibility" for their choices and stop blaming the government
or racism for hardships that they have imposed on themselves through
self-defeating attitudes and bad conduct. The problems of the ghetto,
on this view, are primarily the result of a crisis of values, best remedied
by reaffirming a collective commitment to living morally upright lives.
On the other side are those who criticize the government for its failure
to ameliorate the social conditions of the ghetto poor. They believe
the government and affluent citizens have an obligation to improve the
impoverished lives of the ghetto poor and should stop "blaming the
victim," that is, should stop criticizing the poor for a situation brought
about by the failure of the society to live up to its professed ideals. Rather
than demand that the ghetto poor change, they argue that the social
system should be made more equitable.
This debate raises highly contentious and urgent practical issues. It
also raises difficult philosophical questions. I am not thinking primarily
about traditional problems of free will and moral responsibility. The
problems I will focus on lie in the domain of the theory of justice. Specifically,
my concern is to determine what kinds of criticisms of the
ghetto poor's behavior and attitudes are or are not appropriate given that
@ 2007 by Blackwell Publishing, Inc. Philosophy & Public Affairs 35, no. 2
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127 Justice, Deviance, and the Dark Ghetto
the social circumstances under which they make thei
least in part, the result of injustice. If the overall s
which the ghetto poor live is unjust, this requires t
what their obligations are quite differently than we
were judged to be just.' In particular, I will argue th
distinguish the civic obligations citizens have to e
natural duties all persons have as moral agents,
affected, though in different ways, by the justness
ments. In addition, among the natural duties all per
duty to uphold, and to assist in bringing about, just
cal duty that has important, though generally over
for the debate about ghetto poverty.
Throughout I will stress the importance of assessi
of the ghetto poor's conduct within nonideal politica
developed part of the theory of justice that spec
respond to or rectify injustice. This is not, of cours
evaluative point of view. It is, however, a crucia
neglected one, at least when it comes to thinking ab
poor urban blacks. In addition, viewing these proble
point of justice-rather than, say, that of traditiona
I have benefited greatly from discussions of drafts of this arti
pants and audiences at UC Berkeley, Princeton University, Co
Society for the Study of Africana Philosophy, Harvard University
and a moral philosophy conference in Dubrovnik, Croatia, spon
versity, University of Maribor, and University of Rijeka. For com
grateful to Anthony Appiah, Nir Eyal, Samuel Freeman, Niko Kolo
Mallon, John Pittman, Amelie Rorty, Jessie Scanlon, Tim Scanlon
Sinnott-Armstrong, Melissa Williams, William Julius Wilson, and
& Public Affairs. Research for this article was generously supp
Human Values at Princeton University.
1. Norman Daniels makes this important point when discussi
compliance" (i.e., the extent to which social institutions satisfy a
justice) affects how we should assess the relative priority of (i) pr
benefits to the poor, (ii) avoiding the creation of work disincent
equity between low-income earners. Most relevant to my con
which I believe is correct, that the extent to which background
have implications for determining who among the jobless poor are
or refusing to work. (See his "Conflicting Objectives and the Prior
Support: Conceptual and Policy Issues, ed. Peter G. Brown, Co
Vernier [Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981], pp. 147-64.) I d
consequences of this insight for the debate over the obligations
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128 Philosophy & Public Affairs
technocratic social engineering--would, I believe
beyond the behavior-versus-structure impasse th
public discussions of race and urban poverty.2
To avoid misunderstanding, a few further introduc
order. I use the word 'deviant' throughout in its l
divergent from widely accepted norms. In using
concede is not wholly satisfactory, I am not endorsi
notations or expressing disapproval.3 Moreover, ther
attitudes and behavior associated with the ghetto
whether rightly or wrongly, as deviant or even pat
these are relevant to my argument. The principal for
discuss are crime, refusing to work in legitimate jo
tempt for authority.
I. JUSTICE AND THE BASIC STRUCTURE
To define the problem I will rely on some familiar notions from John
Rawls's theoretical framework: justice as fairness. Some hold that
Rawls's theory of domestic justice is too austere and utopian. So t
address those less sympathetic to his account and to show that m
conclusions rest on relatively weak normative principles, I will make m
argument in a way that does not depend on the soundness of the overa
Rawlsian apparatus or on its most demanding egalitarian claim
Instead, I will limit myself to a few core yet moderate ideas from this
2. Recent work in sociology has attempted to transcend the behavior-versus-structur
debate by carefully demonstrating the subtle interaction between structural and cultur
factors in the explanation of ghetto conditions. See, for example, Douglas S. Massey a
Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Undercla
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993); William Julius Wilson, When Wo
Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor (New York: Knopf, 1999); and Elijah Ande
son, Code of the Street: Decency, Violence, and the Moral Life of the Inner City (New Yor
Norton, 1999). Unfortunately, journalistic writing, public debate, and elite political d
course do not generally reflect this more nuanced view of urban poverty.
3. For helpful discussions of how the public discourse surrounding urban poverty
including social scientific discourse, is often stigmatizing and even racist, see Michael B
Katz, The Undeserving Poor: From the War on Poverty to the War on Welfare (New Yor
Pantheon, 19go); Herbert J. Gans, The WarAgainst the Poor: The Underclass andAntipover
Policy (New York: Basic, 1995); Martin Gilens, Why Americans Hate Welfare: Race, Medi
and the Politics of Antipoverty Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); a
Ange-Marie Hancock, The Politics of Disgust: The Public Identity of the Welfare Que
(New York: NYU Press, 2004).
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129 Justice, Deviance, and the Dark Ghetto
well-known theory, ideas that have an intuitive app
available in our public political culture.4
Rawls suggests that if we were to conceive of society a
cooperation over time and take an impartial view of w
of benefits and burdens of participating in this sch
could arrive at objective conclusions about what soci
This is not a sociological claim. Thinking of society
cooperation is a moral idea. Social justice is defined b
mate claims and obligations individuals have within
arrangement. Thought about this way, justice is, at le
of reciprocity between persons who regard each oth
this approach to questions of social justice is particu
considering criticisms often made against the ghett
framework for asking when the urban poor are doin
upholding the scheme of cooperation and when they
share due them as equal participants in this scheme.
Rawls also emphasizes the paramount significance
ture for social justice. The basic structure is constit
major social, political, and economic institutions o
the benefits and burdens of social cooperation. A
impartially administered basic structure may no
achieve or maintain social justice. Yet it should
chooses to focus on it: the effects of the basic structure on an individual's
life prospects are immense and wide-ranging, and these effects
have an impact on the quality of individuals' lives from the cradle to
the grave.6 Given that each of us must make a life for ourselves under
the dominion of such institutions, we each have a legitimate claim that
these institutions treat us fairly. The institutions of the basic structure
fix a person's initial position within society, and some individuals
will be more, and some less, favored in the distribution of benefits
4. An additional advantage of drawing on Rawls's theory is that it allows me to rebut the
charge, frequently made by Critical Race Theorists and others on the Left, that this brand
of liberalism, like its classical ancestor, has little insightful to say about issues of race and
class.
5. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996),
pp. 15-18.
6. John Rawls, A Theory oflustice, rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1999), p. 82; and Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed. Erin Kelly (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 200), p. 55.
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130 Philosophy & Public Affairs
and burdens-of liberties, duties, opportunities, an
tages-of this association over the course of their
their starting places within the social arrangement.
This does not mean that a person's life prospec
determined by the particular social circumstances he
since a person's own choices, the good or bad will of
and brute luck will have a significant impact as well;
liberal democratic regime, where individual auton
ought to be) respected, each person should take prim
for how his or her life goes. But each individual's life
ously deeply shaped by a social structure that he or
Moreover, it is largely through institutions-gov
firms, markets, and families-that social, natural, and
gencies come to affect our individual life chance
arrangement we participate in should be organized to
fair chance to flourish. And on Rawls's theory, provid
means ensuring that no citizen's life prospects are di
the social scheme disadvantages him or her in ways t
tified on impartial grounds.
It is also important to outline how we should unders
It is now a widely shared moral conviction that racia
unjust.8 But there is considerable disagreement over w
nation consists in. Some think that racial discrimination must be motivated
by racial animus or an explicit intention to exclude on racial
grounds. Others believe that racial discrimination occurs whenever race
is considered in decisions about how public institutions ought to treat
persons, even if the proposed race-conscious policy is designed to
promote some otherwise worthy social goal, such as reducing the economic
marginalization of groups who have been historically oppressed or
attenuating the legacy of racial exclusion by creating integrated schools
7. The remarks in this paragraph and the next are developed in greater detail in my
"Race and Social Justice: Rawlsian Considerations," Fordham Law Review 72 (2004): 1697-
1715; and "Is Racism in the 'Heart'?" Journal of Social Philosophy 33 (2002): 411-20.
8. For evidence of this, see Howard Schuman, Charlotte Steeh, Lawrence Bobo, and
Maria Krysan, Racial Attitudes in America: Trends and Interpretations, rev. ed. (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997).
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131 Justice, Deviance, and the Dark Ghetto
and neighborhoods.' Rejecting both views, I hold that r
tion is operating when a so-called racial characteristic
teristics) possessed by or attributed to the members of
wrongly treated as a source or sign of disvalue, incompe
ority. Thus, racial animus is not a necessary condition f
nation, and not every invocation of race in public
discrimination, at least not if "discrimination" suggests
When the administration of the institutions of the basic structure is
distorted by racial prejudice or bias, Rawls regards this as a violation of
"formal justice."'0 Building on this, we can say that institutional racism
exists when the administration or enforcement of the rules and procedures
of a major social institution-say, the labor market or the criminal
justice system-is regularly distorted by the racial prejudice or bias of
those who exercise authority within the institution. Institutional racism
can exist even when the content of the rules and procedures of an institution,
when viewed in the abstract, is perfectly just, provided there is
pervasive racial bias in the application of those rules and procedures.
Rawls also allows that in some societies, for instance, those with a long
history of racism, it may be necessary to make special constitutional
provisions that explicitly prohibit racial discrimination in the institutions
of the basic structure, and even to grant special powers to the
government to ensure that all citizens, regardless of their race, receive
the equal protection of the laws." The core moral idea behind the principles
of racial justice, and an obviously attractive one, is that in a just
society each has a chance to carry out his or her own plan of life without
being unfairly inhibited in this pursuit by others' racial prejudice or
racial bias.
Some think that equal opportunity exists if no important position or
good afforded by social cooperation is unfairly denied persons on account
of their race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, disability, religion,
creed, or national origin. On this view, equal opportunity is simply nondiscrimination.
However, Rawls thinks of equal opportunity as entailing
9. For forceful criticisms of this "colorblind" principle, see Bernard R. Boxill, Blacks
and Social lustice, rev. ed. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1992), chap. 1. Also see
Glenn C. Loury, The Anatomy of Racial Inequality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 2002), chap. 4.
to. Rawls, A Theory of ustice, p. 51.
11. Rawls, A Theory ofJustice, pp. 173-74.
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132 Philosophy & Public Affairs
much more than this. In particular, he thinks fair equ
requires equal life prospects (as measured by primar
similar natural talents and motivation. One shoul
similar income and wealth over a life as anyone else
abilities and the same willingness to use them regardle
one has been born into. There should be no class bar
tion of knowledge or the development of skills, whi
educational system must be set up and administered
same chance to cultivate his or her abilities regardles
This brief description of the moral ideal of racial
opportunity within a fair basic structure is perhaps t
these principles more concrete, let me describe an
tional arrangement that seems, on its face, to violate
the basic structure of a liberal democratic, market-b
following characteristics. There is uneven growth
different sectors of the economy; however, the gov
ensure that workers hit hardest by economic restru
wages, or periodic recessions are able to maintai
living. For example, there is little attempt to provid
grams, jobs in the public sector, or subsidized inc
declining industries. In general, the economy is not s
full employment at decent wages, so there are a
number of unemployed persons who find it difficul
Social entitlements are so meager that many of t
forced to live in poverty while they look for wor
qualify for public subsidies at all.
Let us also suppose that in this same society, there
some time, a vastly higher rate of social mobility for
than for the poorly educated. However, the quality
grade 12 education varies widely from neighborhood
In affluent, middle-class, and mixed-income suburba
the public schools are generally good; in urban work
neighborhoods, the education offered is often signif
substandard. Yet despite these manifest and widel
between suburban and urban schools, the governmen
ute resources in a way to create equal educational
different neighborhoods, and most citizens in subur
not push for a more equitable allotment of education
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133 Justice, Deviance, and the Dark Ghetto
Finally, let us assume that this society is a multiraci
majority and several smaller nonwhite racial groups
long and brutal history of racial domination, exploita
Indeed, it was once based on explicit white supremac
it practiced race-based slavery and de jure racial s
through terror. These practices have now been aboli
tional and legislative provisions have been enacted to
ties equal civil rights. Explicit expressions of ra
declined sharply. Nevertheless, covert forms of racia
and attenuate the impartial administration of the m
the society. Antidiscrimination law is not effectivel
often, one must hire a private attorney to make sure
are adequately protected. Ongoing racial discriminat
and housing is a particularly acute problem and has
negative impact on the poorer members of racial min
education, financial resources, and social capital o
members allow them greater social mobility despite
If under this institutional arrangement the tax sc
mous intergenerational wealth transfers within fam
will maintain considerable socioeconomic advant
which allows them to provide better educations a
ments (both residential and familial) for their child
dren's children. Moreover, the wealthy and well edu
advantaged in the competition for positions of politi
their superior material assets and educational opportu
tickets to political power, augmenting their alrea
influence on government policy via campaign con
port for various lobbying efforts. Even in a constitu
which each citizen has a publicly recognized claim to
cal and civil liberties, these socioeconomic inequaliti
informal social hierarchy by birth: some would be bo
and other social and political advantages while ot
into poverty and its associated disadvantages. Raw
inequities are manifestly incompatible with basi
believes that each citizen should have roughly eq
equal prospects for influencing public policy.
There are of course many who think that the fair e
nity principle is too strong, demanding too much equ
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134 Philosophy & Public Affairs
those who reject all egalitarian interpretations of th
principle. Still, if, because a social scheme had th
described above, the life prospects of some children w
to those of others, it would be reasonable to regard
children as members of the lowest stratum in a descent-based social
hierarchy. When such a hierarchy is, and has long been, marked by racial
distinctions, equal citizenship, in any meaningful sense, does not
obtain.12 In a society with an established democratic tradition, such a
quasi-feudal order does not warrant the allegiance of its most disadvantaged
members, especially when these persons are racially stigmatized.
Indeed, the existence of such an order creates the suspicion that, despite
the society's ostensible commitment to equal civil rights, white
supremacy has simply taken a new form.
II. DEVIANCE AS A RESPONSE TO THE GHETTO PLIGHT
Ghettos are defined by three core characteristics: race, urban lo
and poverty. In the United States, ghettos are generally understo
(1) predominantly black, (2) urban neighborhoods, (3) with high
trations of poverty.'3 Although ghettos exist in other advanced c
societies and my analysis is relevant to them as well, the issues o
that U.S. ghettos raise are especially acute and in some ways uniq
course, there are poor neighborhoods in the United States that
predominantly black, and much of what I will go on to say abou
ghettos (or analogous things) could be said about white slums
12. For a classic discussion of the relationship between being respected as an
the principle of equal opportunity, see Bernard Williams, "The Idea of Equality,
the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument, ed
Hawthorn (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005), pp. 97-114.
13. See Paul A. Jargowsky, Poverty and Place: Ghettos, Barrios, and the Ame
(New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1997), pp. 12-17.
14. For comparative accounts of U.S. ghettos with similar urban comm
Western European societies, see Barbara Schmitter Heisler, "A Comparative Pers
the Underclass: Questions of Urban Poverty, Race, and Citizenship," Theory and
(1991): 455-483; Loic J. D. Wacquant, "The Rise of Advanced Marginality: Notes on
and Implications," Acta Sociologica 39 (1996): 121-39; and Roger Lawson and Will
Wilson, "Poverty, Social Rights, and the Quality of Citizenship," in Poverty, Ineq
the Future of Social Policy: Western States in the New World Order, ed. Katheri
Roger Lawson, and William Julius Wilson (New York: Russell Sage Foundati
pp. 693-714.
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135 Justice, Deviance, and the Dark Ghetto
barrios, some Indian reservations, and some Asian communities.15 I
focus on black ghettos because they figure most prominently in the
public imagination as enclaves of the pathological "underclass" and they
are an especially salient example of the problems of racial and economic
justice I am concerned with. I focus on high-poverty urban neighborhoods
rather than on poor people wherever they happen to live because
the high concentration of poverty in inner-city neighborhoods is associated
with behavior and attitudes that are not only deviant (i.e., in sharp
conflict with commonly accepted norms) but are also widely perceived
as a threat to the freedom, property, and safety of others and that therefore
lead some to regard many in such neighborhoods as not deserving
of further government attempts to improve their lot.
I should emphasize that many who live under ghetto conditions
respect the law, accept conventional morality, and make an effort to
conform to "mainstream" standards of public and private conduct.
Some accept dead-end, menial, and low-wage jobs as they struggle to
maintain a decent life for themselves and their families.16 Most value
work and desire to be economically self-sufficient." Some graduate from
high school or pass the GED; some of these get post-secondary education
or job training; and a few even go on to graduate from college. In
15. These other ethnoracial minority communities present complications for questions
of justice that black ghettos generally do not. For instance, many Asian enclaves and Latino
barrios contain large numbers of first-generation immigrants. Fair equality of opportunity
is not an appropriate standard for judging whether immigrants are treated fairly by the
social system. Their place in the system did not begin at birth, and their life prospects will
obviously depend, not only on whether they receive fair treatment in the United States, but
also on the social advantages or disadvantages (e.g., in education and wealth) they had in
their country of origin prior to immigration. Many from poor countries can substantially
improve their material condition by immigrating to the United States, and so some do not
resent the existing opportunity structure but are often grateful for the chance to enhance
their lives, even if that chance is not equal to that of native-born citizens. Moreover, unlike
native-born black Americans, immigrants generally have the option to return to their
country of origin. Indians who live on reservations, on the other hand, are nations or
quasi-nations unto themselves, with some rights of group self-determination. The recognized
group rights and treaties between indigenous peoples and the United States complicate
questions of social justice for Native Americans. African Americans, while a
protected group under antidiscrimination law, do not enjoy such group-based rights,
although I do not mean to imply that they should.
16. Katherine S. Newman, No Shame in My Game: The Working Poor in the Inner City
(New York: Vintage and Russell Sage, 1999).
17. Wilson, When Work Disappears, pp. 67-70.
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136 Philosophy & Public Affairs
short, a substantial segment of the ghetto poor are
wider society, its major institutions, or its basic so
many are alienated, some deeply so.
High-poverty neighborhoods with few good emp
poor schools lead some residents, especially those
periods, to consider securing income through
Ghetto poverty creates desperation and feelings
seeking to escape the weight of their social conditio
it more bearable, resort to crime. Of course, crime
the ghetto. People from all races, classes, and t
engage in criminal activity for money, status,
When persons from the ghetto choose crime, howe
conditions of material deprivation and institution
criminal activity might express something more,
than a character flaw or a disregard for the author
Some rely on crime to supplement legitimate
work, welfare benefits, or private aid. Others, su
dropped out of the legitimate labor market altoge
for welfare benefits, or cannot rely on kin suppo
primary source of income. Although the line is fi
some persons commit crimes without allowing "
their social identity or corrupt their souls.20 N
profitably in street crime one must develop the ap
egies, and dispositions. This repertoire is simpl
that one can use to secure income in the undergro
Just as one may use financial capital without bein
"capitalist," one can draw on street capital withou
However, crime can become a vocation, and as suc
18. See Jennifer L. Hochschild, Facing Up to the American D
Soul of the Nation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press
19. As with the term 'deviant,' by 'illegitimate' I do not mea
beg the question. Rather, these are means, should one use them
recognized behavioral norms, whether legal, moral, or trad
"legitimate," in the relevant sense, without being fully justifie
20. See Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, Off the Books: The Undergro
Poor (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006).
21. It is just this distinction between having committed crim
ally disposed to criminal behavior that is elided in Michael
Differences in Crime," Journal of Social Philosophy 23 (1992): 5
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137 Justice, Deviance, and the Dark Ghetto
of disciplines or what I will call "ethics." There are
ethics that I want briefly to describe. Note that thes
be understood as ideal types, constructed to highlig
of a particular action-orientation by abstracting aw
istics that are extraneous. Real people will rarely
consistently or fully, although some may aspire to.
"Gangsters" use violence, threats, and intimidation
money, goods, and services from others. They are fea
the threat of it to get what they want. They are skilled
the use of weapons. They can strike fear in their victim
To achieve their aims, they maim and even kill, some
or remorse. The criminal domain they operate in inc
bling rackets, loan sharking, and extortion. "Hustler
deception, manipulation, and treachery to achieve th
are skillful liars. They are cunning and proficient at sub
victims' personal weaknesses. As amateur psychologi
for understanding human nature, a talent they use to
trust, only to betray them. Their domain includes th
tion, and swindling. Both gangsters and hustlers flo
little if any respect for the authority of mainstream
attitudes are appropriate to their trade; it is rational to c
one has chosen street crime as a way of life.22 It shou
that these two ethics are not mutually exclusive; on
the modus operandi of many pimps.23 Nowhere is
however, than in the selling of illegal drugs in the gh
Although few accumulate significant wealth from
illegal narcotics is a way to make money fast, as ther
especially for cocaine, heroin, and amphetamines.
trade provides a strong incentive to turn to it when
cial need. It is also a dangerous business, howeve
22. The "gangster" and the "hustler" are familiar social identit
munities, and these terms are generally associated with male p
adopting these urban vernacular expressions, I do not mean to im
boys perform these roles or accept their associated ethics. M
women, boys and girls, use street capital and deploy the tactics an
and hustlers, though obviously not always in the same ways or w
23. See my "Parasites, Pimps, and Capitalists: A Naturalistic
tion," Social Theory and Practice 28 (2002): 381-418.
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138 Philosophy & Public Affairs
law-and-order politics--with its accelerated growth
widespread punitive attitudes, aggressive policing, l
cial discretion in sentencing, and increased prosecut
can lead to long prison terms.24 Those who practice t
and are willing to accept these risks and costs someti
heartedly identify with the gangster-hustler ethic. G
embrace this ethic and develop forms of group so
defend their financial interests against rival gangs. T
gangs are generally expected and encouraged to sh
members but not to outsiders.25
Many who engage in street crime are eventually caught and spend
time in federal penitentiaries, state prisons, county jails, or juvenile
detention centers. Under state confinement, the street repertoire is augmented,
the gangster-hustler ethics are reinforced, and hostility toward
the institutions and officials of the criminal justice system hardens.26
Once released, the incentive to return to crime often increases, as the
ex-convict's job prospects and earning potential are even dimmer with a
criminal record.27 The constant cycling of increasing numbers of people
from ghetto to prison and back again spreads a criminal-minded ethos,
an outlaw subculture, throughout many poor urban areas.
The norms that govern the world of street crime also have an enormous
impact on ghetto residents who want to avoid criminal deviance.28
For example, the widespread use of guns among drug dealers and
muggers creates a demand for these weapons in ghetto neighborhoods.
Because they believe the police cannot be relied upon to provide
adequate security, many residents, including children, arm themselves
24. See Bruce Western, Punishment and Inequality in America (New York: Russell
Sage Foundation, 2006), chap. 3; Lawrence D. Bobo and Devon Johnson, "A Taste for
Punishment: Black and White Americans' Views on the Death Penalty and the War on
Drugs," Du Bois Review 1 (2004): 151-80; and Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the Law
(New York: Vintage Books, 1997), chap. to.
25. Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh and Steven D. Levitt, " 'Are We a Family or a Business?'
History and Disjuncture in the Urban American Street Gang," Theory and Society 29
(2000): 427-62.
26. Loic Wacquant, "Deadly Symbiosis: When Ghetto and Prison Meet and Mesh,"
Punishment and Society 3 (2001): 95-133.
27. Western, Punishment and Inequality, chap. 5.
28. Venkatesh, Off the Books; Wilson, When Work Disappears, pp. 59-72; and Anderson,
Code of the Street, chap. 3.
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139 Justice, Deviance, and the Dark Ghetto
for protection.29 A looming sense of danger and a h
violent interpersonal conflict sow seeds of distrust
hoods, making it difficult for a broad sense of comm
maintained. Residents are always on guard and view
picion, for one can never be sure that others are
advantage of you. In adapting to these conditions, m
directly involved in crime develop survival strategie
or mimic the strategies of gangsters and hustlers. To
ized one must appear shrewd and capable of defe
deadly violence if necessary. Here the familiar male
appear "tough" can take on lethal dimensions, with
quences for those who live in urban communities; an
girls, though under somewhat less pressure to di
resort to violence, are also drawn into some of thes
Under these conditions a ghetto subculture emerges
the gangster and hustler, usually condemned in mai
sometimes viewed as virtues.
So far I have not mentioned the racial significance of deviance in ghetto
communities. Yet this dimension is crucial to understanding the choices
many poor urban blacks make. Notwithstanding the widespread belief
that racism is a thing of the past and the growing demand for color-blind
public policy, racial prejudice continues to have a negative impact on the
life chances of racial minorities in the United States, especially black
citizens.3" The impact of institutional racism is deepest in dark ghettos,
because here racism and extreme poverty combine to create a uniquely
stigmatized subgroup of the black population. The peculiar consequences
of this dynamic, especially when joined with the ghetto subculture
just described, play themselves out in many arenas, but here
29. Jeffrey Fagan and Deanna L. Wilkinson, "Guns, Youth Violence, and Social Identity
in Inner Cities," in Crime and Justice, Vol. 24, ed. Michael Tonry and Mark H. Moore
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), pp. 104-88.
30. See, for example, Lawrence Bobo, James R. Klugel, and Ryan A. Smith, "LaissezFaire
Racism: The Crystallization of a Kinder, Gentler, Antiblack Ideology," in Racial Attitudes
in the 1990os, ed. Steven A. Tuch and Jack K. Martin (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997),
pp. 15-41; Thomas C. Holt, The Problem of Race in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000); Tali Mendelberg, The Race Card: Campaign Strategy,
Implicit Messages, and the Norm of Equality (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 2001); and Michael K. Brown, Martin Carnoy, Elliot Currie, Troy Duster, David B.
Oppenheimer, Marjorie M. Shultz, and David Wellman, Whitewashing Race: The Myth of a
Color-Blind Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).
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140 Philosophy & Public Affairs
I focus on just three: employment, housing, a
justice system.
Many working-age ghetto residents have little
skilled, and have gone long periods without legitima
labor market there are often many more applicants
than there are jobs available, so employers can af
engaging in so-called statistical discrimination. T
aware that a criminal subculture affects social life i
there are high drop-out rates among urban blacks, a
people do not work regularly. This leads some e
blacks from the ghetto to be generally violent, disho
ignorant.3' Because of longstanding racial stereot
quency of these traits among the ghetto poor may se
to racist beliefs. For example, the joblessness of som
will appear to many employers as laziness and this i
type that blacks strongly resent.32 One consequence
many employers avoid hiring blacks from the ghetto
nonblack or suburban workers, and given the su
workers in the labor pool this is easily accompli
stigma attached to the ghetto affects the job prospe
residents, even those who reject the outlaw ethic and
mainstream norms. The frustration of dealing with
by employers leads more blacks into the criminal su
otherwise end up there.
Many of those who want to find work probably cou
to move to suburban neighborhoods or integrated m
areas. There tend to be considerably more job
31. Joleen Kirschenmen and Kathryn M. Neckerman, " 'W
But...': The Meaning of Race for Employers," in The Urban Un
Jencks and Paul E. Peterson (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institut
Wilson, When Work Disappears, chap. 5.
32. For a general account of how racist beliefs and attitude
conditions, see my "Ideology, Racism, and Critical Social Theory,
(2003): 153-88. Also see Robert Miles, Racism (London: Routledge,
"Slavery, Race and Ideology in the United States of America," Ne
95-118; John T. Jost and Mahzarin R. Banaji, "The Role of S
Justification and the Production of False Consciousness," British
ogy (1994): 1-27; Bobo, Klugel, and Smith, "Laissez-Faire Racism
Felicia Pratto, Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), chap. 4.
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141 Justice, Deviance, and the Dark Ghetto
low-skilled workers in these areas than in or near t
are of much higher quality there too. Housing is mor
other communities, however, often way out of reac
Most middle-class people, including many middle
want to live among the ghetto poor and do not want
forced to attend the same schools with them either;
to pay a high premium to reside in better neighb
already high housing costs.
Yet it would be a mistake to think that the black po
exit the ghetto solely because of the uncoordinate
viduals or impersonal market forces (and even if th
complete explanation, it would not follow that justi
erate these unintended consequences). Racial discrim
and practices of neighborhood organizations designe
blacks in the inner city (including opposition to bus
neighborhood schools) also play a large part.35 Th
mously difficult for the black poor to escape ghetto
cannot afford to move out or residents of nongh
because of racial prejudice, class bias, or narrow selfability
of the urban poor to join these better com
high-quality schools. Many of the black urban poor
fined to ghetto neighborhoods, isolated from the res
33. William Julius Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner C
Public Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 39
"Urban Industrial Transition and the Underclass," in The Ghetto
Perspectives, updated edition, ed. William Julius Wilson (Newbur
cations, 1993), pp. 43-64.
34. Low-skilled inner-city workers could also get to jobs in the
which most cannot afford. Public transportation systems in mos
woefully inefficient, creating long commuting times, and are of
working poor to use daily.
35. Massey and Denton, American Apartheid; Mary Pattill
Fences: Privilege and Peril Among the Black Middle Class (Chicag
Press, 1999); Camille Zubrinsky Charles, Won't You Be My Neighb
dence in Los Angeles (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2006); a
and Richard P. Taub, There Goes the Neighborhood (New York: K
36. It is worth noting that the ghetto poor do sometimes man
borhoods but then only to return to the same or a similar neighbo
Indeed, some are able to move to nonpoor neighborhoods and t
hoods become poor later, as more poor people move in and th
many poor urban blacks, the problem is not so much getting out
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142 Philosophy & Public Affairs
must therefore confront the miserable job prospect
that exist in the inner core of U.S. metropolises
tremendous obstacles, many choose to drop out of t
market, turning to illegitimate means to generate in
One of the many tragic consequences of this sit
incarceration of poor black people, especially young
making up only 13 percent of the male population o
black men constitute almost half of the male prison
any given day, nearly a third of all black men in their t
on probation, or on parole."3 These black men are ov
ghetto communities. The high levels of police survei
ing, stiff penalties for minor parole violations, felon
laws, and general harassment of young urban blacks i
tility toward the criminal justice system, and invite
clude that they are living under a race-based police sta
prevent them from enjoying all the benefits of equ
contain social unrest. Because of the extreme rac
numbers of persons under the supervision of the crim
the general stigma attached to a criminal convicti
especially young black men and boys from the ghet
urban youth are sometimes seen as having a prop
behavior."3 These factors greatly disadvantage those f
seek employment, decent housing, and good schoo
often presumed to be ("naturally") prone to lawlessn
To be clear, I am not denying the obvious fact tha
ghetto poverty can, and do, manage to escape povert
out. See Lincoln Quillian, "How Long Are Exposures to Poor Ne
Term Dynamics of Entry and Exit from Poor Neighborhoods,"
Policy Review 22 (2003): 221-49.
37. Becky Pettit and Bruce Western, "Mass Imprisonment and th
Class Inequality in U.S. Incarceration," American Sociological Revi
Wacquant, "From Slavery to Mass Incarceration: Rethinking t
U.S.," New LeftReview13 (2002): 41-60; see also Wacquant, "Deadly
summary of the racist causes and racial consequences of mass inc
States, see Brian Barry, Why SocialJustice Matters (Cambridge: Po
38. Marc Mauer, Race to Incarcerate (New York: New Press, 199
39. Lincoln Quillian and Devah Pager, "Black Neighbors, High
Racial Stereotypes in Evaluations of Neighborhood Crime," Amer
107 (2001): 717-67.
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143 Justice, Deviance, and the Dark Ghetto
whether through state assistance, the help of other
sonal determination, or good luck. Yet if an unjust
significant causal factor in explaining the rise and p
conditions and such conditions diminish the life p
who live under them, the fact that some from the g
improve their lot through legitimate means and ult
ghetto does not invalidate the claim for redress o
behind. After all, some enslaved blacks during the a
eventually able to buy their freedom or were volunta
owners, and some southern blacks attained middle-class economic
status through hard work and perseverance despite Jim Crow segregation
and the terror of the Klan. Although the racial status hierarchy in the
United States is itself largely impermeable, it has never been so powerful
that all blacks are confined to the lowest socioeconomic strata. The
obstacles that the system continues to place in the way of poor black
though in some ways less burdensome than in the past, are neverthel
objectionable on grounds of justice.
III. IS DEVIANCE REASONABLE?
Imprudence is rightly regarded as a vice, and some of the choices ghetto
residents make are no doubt unwise, given their risks, costs, and negative
long-term consequences for the actors themselves. Certain selfregarding
duties are also relevant to assessing the behavior and attitudes
of the ghetto poor: obligations to cultivate one's basic capacities, to
respect oneself as a moral person, or to avoid courses of action that
would undermine one's autonomy. While the ghetto poor are sometimes
criticized on these grounds, and while such criticisms have led some to
conclude that paternalistic or punitive responses are warranted, these
questions, although important, are not what I want to focus on. My
primary concern is to determine whether the deviant conduct and attitudes
prevalent in the ghetto are unreasonable.40 That is, do these forms
40. For a discussion of the distinction between the rational and the reasonable in
practical affairs, see Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 48-54. Also see T. M. Scanlon, What We
Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), pp. 189-94. A similar
distinction, between cognitive-instrumental rationality and communicative rationality, is
elaborated in Jiirgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume I: Reason
and the Rationalization of Society (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1984), pp. 8-42.
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144 Philosophy & Public Affairs
of deviance express an unwillingness to honor the fa
cooperation that others accept and abide by? If the g
the benefits of the social scheme but violate the norms that make the
scheme possible whenever doing so would advance their self-interests,
then their nonconformity is opportunistic and may therefore appear
unjustified to those complying with these norms. But, and this is the
crucial point, whether their deviance is unreasonable depends on the
justness of the overall social scheme. When people criticize the ghetto
poor for failing to play by the rules that others honor, they are assuming,
if only implicitly, that these rules are fair to all who play. As we have seen,
however, the fairness of the scheme is open to doubt.
Let us distinguish three possible assessments of the basic structure of
U.S. society. On the first, we judge the United States to be a fully just
society. In light of the observations summarized above, I do not regard
this as a plausible view and so will not consider it further. On the second,
we judge that there are some injustices that should be addressed but that
the United States is not fundamentally unjust. On the third, we judge
that the society is fundamentally unjust and will require radical reform to
bring it in line with what basic justice demands. The question, then, is
what obligations would the ghetto poor have if the second or third
assessments were correct.
To sharpen the question, I will invoke the familiar distinct
civic obligations and natural duties.41 Civic obligations are o
whom one is cooperating with to maintain a fair basic struct
the obligations that exist between citizens of a democra
defined by the principles of justice that underpin their assoc
obligations have binding normative force because of the
associational ties between citizens, that is, because of the formal or
informal bonds that define a set of persons as a distinct people or nation.
By contrast, natural duties are unconditionally binding, in that they hold
between all persons regardless of whether they are fellow citizens or are
bound by other institutional ties. Both civic obligations and natural
duties are moral requirements. The key difference is that one has civic
obligations qua citizen and natural duties qua moral person.
41. In elaborating this distinction I draw on Rawls's distinction between social obligations
and natural duties, though perhaps not in the same way he intended. See Rawls, A
Theory oflustice, pp. 93-101.
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145 Justice, Deviance, and the Dark Ghetto
Within a liberal framework, civic obligations are ro
value of reciprocity. As a beneficiary of the primary goo
scheme of cooperation, each citizen has an oblig
requirements of the basic institutions of his or her
institutions are just. Such reciprocity forbids the ex
members of the society. Rawls rightly insists that on
to gain from the cooperative labors of others witho
share. Just as important, he also correctly maintains
obligations to submit to unjust institutions, or at lea
that exceed the limits of tolerable injustice. One diff
then, is ascertaining just where to draw the line bey
becomes intolerable.
Rawls does not provide such a standard. One standard we might use,
though, is to live with unjust socioeconomic inequalities if the constitutional
essentials are secure. For Rawls these essentials are the familiar
basic rights of a liberal democratic regime-such as freedom of speech,
conscience, assembly, and association; the right to vote and run for
office; the right to due process and judicial fairness-and the political
procedures that ensure democratic rule.42 The constitutional essentials
also include freedom of movement, free choice of occupation, formal
justice, and a social minimum that secures the basic material needs of all
citizens. The constitutional essentials do not, however, include fair
equality of opportunity (i.e., Rawls's egalitarian interpretation of the
equal opportunity principle); nor do they include the difference principle
(i.e., his requirement that socioeconomic inequalities always work
to the benefit of the least advantaged).
A plausible rationale for using this standard for tolerable injustice is
that it is most urgent to secure the constitutional essentials, given their
indispensable role in creating social stability, and that reasonable people
can disagree over how much socioeconomic inequality can be justified
and over when existing institutional arrangements satisfy the principles
of economic justice. The constitutional essentials establish the political
legitimacy of a social order by publicly affirming the equal status of all
citizens under the rule of law. If an otherwise unjust society met this
standard, this would not mean that citizens should not agitate for more
socioeconomic equality or use democratic processes or other legitimate
42. Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 227-30.
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146 Philosophy & Public Affairs
political channels to fight for policies that would ach
tarian basic structure. It would simply mean that the
were still fully binding and thus that they should fulf
as they work for a more just social arrangement.
Assume for the moment that this proposed stand
injustice is currently met in the United States. Would
to expect the ghetto poor to fulfill their civic obligat
justifiably resent and protest continuing socioecon
Many U.S. citizens, regarding their society as imperfe
just, believe that the ghetto poor are not entitled
expenditures to improve their lives apart from, pe
ance for basic subsistence (e.g., food stamps). The
and values of many of the black urban poor are widel
conflict with legitimate expectations for civic re
citizen reasonably expects other citizens to fulfill the
as a citizen, to do their fair share in sustaining an ins
ment that works to everyone's advantage. In particula
zens think that everyone, including the poor, should
that all able-bodied, working-age citizens (unless t
care for dependent relatives, are economically self-su
working, or are engaged in full-time education or job
support themselves through legitimate work, even if
low-paying, and unsatisfying. Thus, when the ghet
criminal activity or refuse to work legitimate job
regarded as a failure of reciprocity on their part.
This would be the wrong conclusion to draw, howev
we first should remind ourselves that job opportuniti
43. One way to deny at least the job aspect of this conclusion is
work requirement is incompatible with liberal principles of justice,
with respect to reasonable conceptions of the good and must not
notion of moral desert. Criticizing the ghetto poor for not working
as illiberal, insofar as such criticism is premised on the idea that work
or that only those who work are deserving of equal respect and co
White, relying on a Rawlsian fair-play argument, makes a strong ca
work is a requirement of civic reciprocity, provided background
that all who are able, including the wealthy, are expected to make
the common good. See his "Is Conditionality Illiberal?" in Welfar
Theory, ed. Lawrence M. Mead and Christopher Beem (New York: R
2005), pp. 82-109.
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147 Justice, Deviance, and the Dark Ghetto
workers are severely limited and the jobs that a
menial, dead-end service positions that pay wage
adequate economic security for a family. Now it mi
the ghetto poor do not want to take these low-w
develop their skills so that they can compete for be
mean graduating from high school and getting
education, which too few from urban communities
be argued that even if one accepted the demanding
according to his or her ability, to each according to
would be unreasonable-and not merely a violatio
duty-for citizens to refuse to develop their abilities
however, the quality of education available to g
generally so substandard that most cannot get a ba
let alone proper preparation for college.4 Moreo
housing costs and racial discrimination, most are
neighborhoods where the schools are better. Furth
nificant public subsidies, those admitted to college u
resources to pay. This lack of equal educational o
turn creates an unfair employment opportunity
obligation to work (should such a duty exist).45
No doubt many U.S. citizens criticize the poor on perfectio
grounds that desert requires a good work ethic), and some believ
poor, should work. One could also believe, however, as I think
sidering their attitudes toward taxes on inheritance, that civic
work per se, but economic self-sufficiency: doing one's part in
cooperation means not forcing one's fellow citizens to support
are unable to support yourself). To refuse to take care of you
imposing unfair burdens on others, say, through high taxes. So
critic of the ghetto poor is necessarily committed to a general c
44. See Gary Orfield, Susan E. Eaton, and The Harvard Project
Dismantling Desegregation: The Quiet Reversal of Brown v. Boa
The New Press, 1996); and Jennifer L. Hochschild and Nathan
Dream and the Public Schools (New York: Oxford University Pre
45. Again, I am not here assuming a general civic obligation to
if such an obligation exists, each citizen should have a fair c
desirable jobs and should be reasonably well compensated if h
among undesirable employment options. It goes without saying
able, the duty to work could not be binding. For contrasting v
general obligation to work, see Lawrence C. Becker, "The Obliga
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148 Philosophy & Public Affairs
One might object that if the ghetto poor will not acc
qualify for and they refuse, or cannot afford, to contin
they should simply get by on whatever public welfar
are available or on private aid, but without resorting
aside for the moment the adequacy of current welfar
appreciate the weakness in this objection if we keep
basic structure of any society will, in predictable a
encourage certain desires and ambitions in its citize
generally take into account how the overall incentive s
will be affected by the policies they enact. Any afflue
capitalist society will encourage-indeed actively cu
tion to live comfortably (if not get rich). This is, after all
mies reproduce themselves: by creating continual mas
range of consumer goods and services. If such a societ
the constitutional essentials, however, without provid
with a real opportunity to reach the goal of material comf
from obvious that those who, because of lack of resou
in this pursuit are being unreasonable when they c
alternative to subsistence living.46
As noted earlier, the core value underlying civic obl
demanding egalitarian standard but simple recipro
with using the constitutional essentials as the thres
injustice is that it does not ensure genuine conditions
the most disadvantaged in the scheme. Each citizen sh
(1980): 35-49; and Philippe Van Parijs, "Why Surfers Should Be Fed:
Unconditional Basic Income," Philosophy & Public Affairs 20 (1991):
"Is Conditionality Illiberal?"
46. This is a different point from the one Jeffrie G. Murphy m
Retribution," Philosophy & Public Affairs 2 (1973): 217-43. Murp
capitalist societies encourage greed, envy, and selfishness, it wou
poor citizens who, in acting on these socially sanctioned motives,
says, "There is something perverse in applying principles that pres
munity in a society which is structured to destroy genuine commu
I am sympathetic to Murphy's position, I am suggesting something
rather that affluent capitalist societies encourage the expectation t
degree of effort, any able-bodied person has a fair chance to live a
comfort. So if a person develops a life-plan based on this expectatio
frustrated, not because of one's lack of effort or ability, but becau
prevailing opportunity structure, one is not necessarily being u
chooses illegitimate means to attain the expected standard of living
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149 Justice, Deviance, and the Dark Ghetto
the thought that he or she has equal standing wi
cooperation. This means that the scheme should be o
publicly conveys to each participant that his or her
important as any other participant's. Perhaps fair e
nity sets the bar too high for tolerable injustice.47 S
does not ensure a wide distribution of wealth and th
the market to distribute income, the standard fo
should include an adequate opportunity to develo
Those who are denied this can legitimately object tha
treated as equally valued members of a scheme of
supposed to be mutually advantageous.
It might be objected that the ghetto poor, despite t
do have some chance, albeit not the same chance as
acquire marketable skills and to find good jobs. Why
cient sign that the system accords them equal concer
the ghetto poor are not taking full advantage of
employment opportunities that are available, how ca
about the intolerable injustice of the system be take
If substandard schools and poverty wages w
byproducts of social cooperation under modern c
first objection would have merit. However, with adj
scheme, schools could be dramatically improved and
could be brought up to a decent standard of living.
elected representatives simply lack the commitment
the relevant adjustments. To the second objection I w
the moment, that one way to register one's princip
unjust social system is to forgo chances to benefit fr
tunity structure.48
47. But perhaps not. For compelling considerations in favor of
opportunity as a constitutional essential, see Seana Valentine Sh
the Fair Equality of Opportunity Principle," Fordham Law Revie
48. A similar point is suggested in G. A. Cohen, "The Structure
dom," Philosophy & Public Affairs 12 (1983): 3-33. Cohen is respon
claim that the members of the working class are not forced to se
any one of them, or almost any, could start their own small b
proletarian class. He raises the important possibility that some w
with the others, may object to taking an individual escape that
liberation for all. Some members of the lumpen-proletarian ghet
take a similar position.
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150 Philosophy & Public Affairs
Not only does the constitutional-essentials stan
injustice allow too much inequality, but there is a
that not even this standard is currently met in the
tutional racism still exists across a number of major
There has in addition been a sharp reduction in w
other social entitlements for the poor and unemploy
arguably, were not adequate to begin with), and man
work for poverty wages to receive even these meager
fare programs and the earned-income tax credit). Th
suggest that the constitutional essentials are not sec
stitutional essentials codified in law is not sufficien
secure, as even a cursory knowledge of the history of
for equal citizenship should make clear. Civil righ
impartially and effectively enforced, so that all citize
or class background, can be confident that those
power will respect their rights. The existence of the
combination of social stigma, extreme poverty,
(including poorly funded and segregated schools), an
ceration rates-is simply incompatible with any meani
procity among free and equal citizens.
The ghetto poor justifiably feel that by demanding
miserable, low-paying jobs to secure their basic need
citizens are simply trying to keep their taxes fro
attempting to exploit the labor of poor people. And w
this unfair arrangement, they are either stigmatize
serving or they are penalized for trying to gain inc
ground economy. From the standpoint of many g
social order lacks legitimacy.49 There appears to
contain, exploit, and underdevelop the black urban p
equal civic standing and punish them when they ref
themselves to injustice. This appearance of conspirac
reflection of an underlying failure of the social sche
the value of reciprocity. If we are to take equal citizen
not only should we not attempt to gain from oth
49. This point is developed, within a broadly Rawlsian framewo
"The Black Underclass and the Question of Values," in The Under
Lawson (Philadelphia, Pa.: Temple University Press, 1992), PP. 57
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151 Justice, Deviance, and the Dark Ghetto
carrying our fair share of the burdens of maintaining
eration, but we should not demand labor from thos
their fair share of the benefits from the system. I woul
an affluent society with a recent history of overt r
reasonable standard for tolerable injustice is compat
ghetto conditions. If this conjecture is correct, then
poor in the United States refuse to accept menial jo
authority of the law qua law, they do not thereby vi
reciprocity or shirk valid civic obligations."50
IV. OPPRESSION AND THE DUTY OF JUSTICE
However, even if a society is fundamentally unjust, i.e., it exceeds the
limits of tolerable injustice, it does not follow that the ghetto poor have
no moral duties to one another or to others. Only someone who hold
that the cognitive-instrumental or utility-maximizing conception o
reason is the only legitimate conception could think that an unjust social
order rationally justifies a war of all against all, in which the only vali
value systems are those of the gangster and hustler. The ghetto poor d
have duties, natural duties, that are not defined by civic reciprocity and
thus are not negated by the existence of an unjust social order."'
Among these is the duty not to be cruel. Each also has the duty to help
the needy and vulnerable provided this is not too personally risky o
costly. There is a duty to not cause unnecessary suffering. There is a dut
of mutual respect: to show due respect for the moral personhood o
others. There are also many other basic duties. Such duties are not suspended
or void because one is oppressed. The existence of these dutie
50. It is perhaps worth noting that Rawls insists that even within a reasonably jus
society there is a limit to how much injustice people should have to endure. In particular
he thinks that the burdens of injustice should, over time, be distributed more or less evenly
across different sectors and groups in society, so that the weight of oppression does not fall
mostly on any one group. Thus he says, "[T]he duty to comply [with reasonably just
institutions] is problematic for permanent minorities that have suffered from injustice fo
many years" (Rawls, A Theory ofJustice, p. 312). Even if the United States is reasonably ju
(according to some defensible standard for tolerable injustice), the burdens that the blac
urban poor are forced to carry, and the length of time they have had to carry them, might
justify their refusal to comply with institutional demands; and if they do not, strict
speaking, provide a justification for such deviance, they almost certainly provide
legitimate excuse.
51. Rawls, A Theory ofJustice, pp. 98-1oo.
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152 Philosophy & Public Affairs
makes some of the deviant attitudes and action
impermissible, not because they are forbidden by
cannot be fully justified from a moral point of v
minimum, that the reckless and gratuitous violenc
ence to others' suffering, and the disregard for t
fellow human beings that are all too common in so
borhoods should not be tolerated. There should als
ness of how impressionable youth are and, i
observing the behavior of adults shapes a child's m
Yet fulfillment of one's natural duties to others
compatible with certain forms of crime. Taking th
in self-defense or in defense of others, is hardly e
taking the property of others, especially when th
ably well off, may be legitimate. Mugging someon
show sufficient respect for the victim's personhoo
other forms of theft might be justified. Given the
in gang culture, recruiting children into gang
concern for the weak and vulnerable; yet given th
certed group action, participating in gangs ma
effective means to secure needed income. There are also "victimless"
crimes such as prostitution, welfare fraud, tax evasion, selling stol
goods, and other off-the-books transactions in the underground
economy.52 There are of course many complex questions here abou
when coercion, threats, or deception may legitimately be used, and ther
is the salient question of which, if any, illegal narcotics may be sold t
consenting adults without wronging them.53 I will not pursue the
issues further, however. My goal is not to draw the precise line between
permissible crimes and impermissible ones but only to offer reasons f
thinking that the former set is not empty.
I do, however, want to draw out the practical implications of on
natural duty, the duty of justice. According to Rawls, this duty require
each individual (1) to support and comply with just institutions, and (2
where just institutions do not exist, to help to bring them about.54 No ju
52. See Venkatesh, Off the Books.
53. For a helpful discussion of this latter issue, see Douglas N. Husak, "Liberal Neutra
ity, Autonomy, and Drug Prohibitions," Philosophy & Public Affairs 29 (2000): 43-80.
54. Rawls, A Theory of ustice, p. 99.
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153 Justice, Deviance, and the Dark Ghetto
societies or institutions could exist, at least not for v
als did not work to create and sustain them. The very
would seem to presuppose the duty of justice: no on
treated unjustly and also consistently reject the dut
argues for the validity of this duty by pointing out t
original position, seeing their common rational inte
and stability of just institutions, would naturally ag
should support and further such institutions. The d
each person a strong moral reason to protest or resi
The duty of self-respect, which is fulfilled by recogni
one's equal moral worth as a person, also provides a
resist injustice." But it differs from the duty of ju
self-respect by, for example, standing up for oneself
treated unjustly, rather than meekly acquiescing. The
is a matter of defending one's dignity in the face of
justice is a matter of taking proactive steps to end inj
relevant institutions more just. The duty of self-resp
duty; the duty of justice is one owed to others. The
demands action from those who have been wronged
demands action regardless of whether one has been
There have been important recent philosophical
what relatively advantaged persons ought to do to e
unjust circumstances.56 Yet there has been little atten
tions to promote just institutions disadvantaged
liberals are no doubt reluctant to discuss the mor
downtrodden out of an understandable distaste for "b
Moreover, they rightly maintain that indignation sho
and foremost, toward the complacency of the well off
unjust system. I want to insist, however, that the d
applies to the oppressed and in particular to the ghe
Of course, it would be unreasonable to expect indi
bring about a just society when doing so would b
costly. Given the conditions in most ghettos, perhaps
55. For a particularly insightful discussion of the duty of self-r
and Social Justice, chap. 9.
56. See, for example, G. A. Cohen, If You're an Egalitarian, How
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000); and Liam Mu
Nonideal Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
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154 Philosophy & Public Affairs
of ghetto denizens that they make significant contrib
social justice. After all, many have more than they can h
meet their basic needs and maintain their dignity. Ye
expect the ghetto poor, in addition to fulfilling their
to not take courses of action that would clearly exace
the system or that would increase the burdens of in
ghetto communities or others similarly situated, at
negative consequences could be avoided without too
Nor should they do things that would clearly make
difficult to achieve, provided in refraining from su
maintain their self-respect and meet their other basi
Expecting the ghetto poor to honor their natural d
duty of justice, does not blame the victims. The ghe
be held responsible for the appalling social condit
imposed on them because of the workings of an unj
but they should be held accountable for how they c
these conditions. Demanding this basic level of m
treats them as full moral persons and as political
right. Too often ghettos are viewed as "sick" com
with myriad pathologies, that the state-as-physic
social service organization, such as a charity or chur
only is this doctor-patient approach to the ghetto to
of offensive paternalistic sentiments (which have w
noblesse oblige variants), but also it is the wrong pa
dealing with a social problem whose origin lies in sy
all, whether we belong to dominant or subjugated gr
help establish just social arrangements. Given that t
are features of a system of social cooperation that w
losers, participate in, we should view the project to
tices as a joint one, or at least it should be so viewed
want to live in a just society rather than to profit f
Unfortunately, in light of the ill will, selfishness,
ence of many of their fellow citizens, social justice m
able unless the ghetto poor take on a good deal of the
their society. As has so often been true in human hi
must play a large role-sometimes they have t
agents-in ending the unjust practices they are subjec
black citizens had to play significant roles in abolish
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155 Justice, Deviance, and the Dark Ghetto
Crow, despite having suffered most because of these
tion. The fact that this is, in some sense, unfair is ir
justice is not based on the principle of civic reciproci
has qua moral person, not qua citizen. Therefore, on
this duty because one's fellow citizens fail to fulfill it
short of doing more than others in the struggle for
that were these others to do their part one would no
(though the criticism of these others is no doubt wa
one should go about fulfilling the duty of justice, th
courses of action would satisfy it, will depend on w
circumstances one faces. In light of these circumsta
an assessment of how best to contribute to improvin
ment will necessarily involve determining just how
can realistically expect from others and how best to
viewed from this vantage point, ghetto residents sh
about how they respond to the injustices of the socia
whether the forms of deviance they sometimes eng
obstacles to effecting positive social change.
Many people claim that they would be willing to h
vided the poor would make an honest effort to help
working, getting an education, and staying out of j
citizens do not want to feel that they are being tak
they often suspect that the urban poor lag behind b
necessary work ethic. So one might think that, if n
motives then from the duty of justice, the ghett
deviant behavior and take greater responsibility for
as this would assure their fellow citizens that they ar
and thereby encourage them to do something about
ditions in the ghetto.57 However, if the ghetto p
reasons to think that they are not being treated as
because a tolerable level of injustice has been exc
being forced to carry the bulk of the burdensome c
injustice), then they should be the ones worried a
Given rising inequality and the worsening of the ghe
which show no signs of abating, they have every re
57. This argument is suggested in Jennifer L. Hochschild, "The
Poor," Ethics lot (1991): 560-78.
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156 Philosophy & Public Affairs
their interests are not being given equal consideratio
think that if they were only to behave better things
over, to ask them to demonstrate their worthiness f
they are entitled to as a matter of justice would add
suggestion that the ghetto poor "prove themselves"
triots offer help fails to appreciate that acquiescing t
incompatible with the maintenance of self-respect.
V. FROM SPONTANEOUS DEFIANCE TO POLITICAL RESISTANCE
One of the ways that the ghetto poor have sometimes respo
plight is to engage in spontaneous rebellion. This may take
openly transgressing conventional norms, expressing co
authority, desecrating revered symbols, pilfering from
state institutions, vandalizing public and private property, o
public events.58 Spontaneous rebellion reaches its apot
urban riot, where looting, mass destruction of property, an
lence are on public display. When legitimate avenues for po
fail to produce results or are closed off, such public unrest c
the only power the ghetto poor can wield collectively that h
garnering concessions from the state."59
Many of these acts of defiance, though perhaps politically
may be necessary for the ghetto poor to maintain their se
nothing else, such actions can be cathartic and can help
to keep from turning on each other as they seek an out
justified anger. Yet not all expressions of rebellion are aim
ing or changing the social order. Some ostensible defian
scrutiny, reveals itself to be no more than a desire to exploi
opportunistically, as when demagogues take advantage of t
the poor to gain personal power or when gangsters and
advantage of others' desperation merely for their own gain
by other means, as it were. What may have begun a
58. See Robin D. G. Kelley, Race Rebels: Culture, Politics, and the Black
(New York: Free Press, 1996).
59. See Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Poor People's Movem
Succeed, How They Fail (New York: Vintage, 1979), pp. 18-23. For insightf
the significance of a recent urban riot, see the essays in Reading Rodn
Urban Uprising, ed. Robert Gooding-Williams (New York: Routledge, 1993
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157 Justice, Deviance, and the Dark Ghetto
resistance can become, because of encroaching cynic
resignation. Some juvenile deviance is little more th
lion unchecked by proper adult supervision. The key
of course, is how, if at all, can this general impulse
U.S. ghettos be transformed into enduring and effect
resistance. I will not pretend to have the answer to th
I would, however, like to briefly outline what kinds
the ghetto poor might be appropriate in light of th
constructive forms of resistance, thus giving some
the abstract duty of justice.
Rawls distinguishes two different ways a society mi
first way is when the publicly recognized standards f
of the basic structure are sound but the institutional
society fails to satisfy these standards. In this case, th
up to its own professed ideals, ideals that are worthy
Alternatively, social arrangements may fit the prev
justice in the society or the political views of the ruling
less be unjust. In this case, the dominant concept
ideology, a set of widely held beliefs and implicit ass
mates and thereby helps to sustain an oppressive reg
If the first situation obtains, the political oppositi
appeal to their fellow citizens' sense of justice, h
between ideals and practice. Here, nonviolent civil d
demonstrations, or other forms of mass protest tha
the public's sense of moral outrage may be producti
New World slavery, the dominant tradition in Africa
from Frederick Douglass to Martin Luther King, Jr.,
this approach. However, if the society is stabilized b
conception of justice, for example one that serves th
corporate and political elites, then more drastic or u
sures may be warranted. Given a dominant ideolo
distorted view of what justice demands and that
because of narrow self-interests or illegitimate group
60. Rawls, A Theory ofJustice, pp. 3o8-1o.
61. For a more developed account of when a socially accepted se
an ideology, with a particular focus on racial ideology, see my
Critical Social Theory."
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158 Philosophy & Public Affairs
not be sufficient to appeal to the majority's sense
suasion and electoral politics may simply not be enoug
alists, from Martin Delany to Malcolm X, have taken e
with respect to the United States, regarding this societ
and plutocratic social order. Those who oppose such
have to develop a militant social movement that p
in a more progressive direction, not "by any mea
perhaps through means widely, though mistakenly, r
tified. The black urban poor have often been attra
nationalist doctrines.62
Of course this contrast between the two ways a regime can be unjust,
although analytically useful, is too stark for practical purposes. Some
aspects of an overall social arrangement (for instance, its educational and
economic institutions) may be regulated by a corrupt ideology, while
other parts (say, its constitution or basic political organization) may be
just or diverge from reasonable public standards of justice. Indeed, contrary
to the view of some black radicals (who believe that liberal political
thought and practice is rotten to the core), this mixed assessment may be
the one most applicable to post-civil rights America, as the civil rights
movement did, I believe, help to make blacks' constitutional rights considerably
more meaningful. Thus, the political resistance, even if it takes
a militant form, must take into account the reasonableness of existing
aspects of the social scheme and choose measures of opposition accordingly.63
To be sure, militant leaders must be willing to take political measures
that some might find unacceptable if overcoming serious injustices
requires these tactics. And political insurgency aimed at overthrowing an
oppressive regime is sometimes justified. However, given the proven
difficulty of establishing and maintaining just institutions in the modern
62. There is a variant of this point of view that would appear to have traction in some
urban black communities. On this alternative view, the United States is thoroughly corrupt
and cannot be redeemed. Given that mass emigration would be impossible for the poor,
the only viable option is to build self-reliant ghetto communities without any expectation
that justice will someday prevail throughout the whole of the society. Even if this pessimistic
prognosis were correct (although I do not believe it is or, rather, hope it is not), the duty
of justice would still need to be honored in this black nation within a nation. However, I will
not explore the practical implication of the duty in this context. For my response to this
brand of black nationalism, see my We Who Are Dark: The Philosophical Foundations of
Black Solidarity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005), chaps. 3-4.
63. I owe this point to Tim Scanlon.
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159 Justice, Deviance, and the Dark Ghetto
world, preserving the reasonably just components o
system while pushing insistently for broader reform
better strategy than abrupt radical reconstruction. M
organizing and populist collective action would s
measure of public order to be effective, and so the
currently in place-with their provisions protecting
association, and assembly-could prove useful, thei
character notwithstanding.
These are difficult and complex questions of po
theory can only do so much to illuminate. Yet no ma
opposition should take, the ghetto poor should be in
tance effort. In fulfilling the duty of justice, ghetto
build bonds of political solidarity with each other a
allies.64 Such solidarity requires not only shared pol
common goal of ending ghetto conditions but also
sion for those similarly oppressed. It calls for specia
ness to help the most disadvantaged among yo
Solidarity demands loyalty to those you are workin
change things for the better. Perhaps most importan
of mutual trust, without which collective action can
If such solidarity is to form and be sustained, h
subculture cannot reign in the ghetto. A climate of
erodes any chance of developing mutual trust. It un
and compassion because those who appear to be in n
trying to exploit you, or worse. If loyalty to one's g
loyalties or leads one to disregard the legitimate inter
the gang, then no broader form of loyalty in ghetto
shape, let alone stable forms of political organization
gangster and hustler ethics, qua value system, must
I am not, however, suggesting that the ghetto poor are
engaging in street crime. On the contrary, lacking ac
crime may be necessary to meet one's needs or the
am I saying that one should never make use of the cr
64. I describe the general requirements of political solidarity i
67-71. For a helpful discussion of what duties the members of
each other, see Michael Walzer, "The Obligations of Oppressed Mi
tions: Essays on Disobedience, War, and Citizenship (Cambridge, M
Press, 1970), pp. 46-70.
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160 Philosophy & Public Affairs
gangsters and hustlers-street capital-to secure ne
political economy of the underground may require t
am suggesting is that the techniques of the gangster
not be used merely to gain power, status, or riches;
allow these practices to constitute one's enduring soci
one should be careful not to let the use of these t
character. Gangsterism and hustling must not be re
but as survival tactics, means of self-defense, or exp
rebellion. Moreover, if street capital is to be con
capital in a resistance movement, then ghetto reb
merely opportunistic or cathartic but, whenever poss
register dissent. It is crucial, given the duty of justic
self-respect, that the ghetto poor make manifest the
isfaction with the existing social order, either throu
vated modes of deviance or in some other recognizab
VI. CONCLUSION
The urban poor should not be demonized, stigmatized,
dehumanized, just as surely as they should not be romanti
would be a mistake to think that they should never be mor
Moral criticism can be appropriate even when the targeted
attitudes have been shaped and encouraged by unjust c
even when those subjected to criticism are not responsible
that these conditions exist. Such criticism is one way for th
oppressed groups to hold one another accountable and to
ingful bonds of solidarity, and can even be offered by sy
siders seeking to build political alliances. But there are
constructive forms of moral criticism and illegitimate and
forms. By appreciating how the lack of justice in a basic st
what obligations citizens have, we might better distinguish
of criticism, and in the process invite the kind of joint ac
establish and maintain justice.
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