Is Psychology Relevant to Aesthetics?
Author(s): George Dickie
Source: The Philosophical Review , Jul., 1962, Vol. 71, No. 3 (Jul., 1962), pp. 285-302
Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review
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IS PSYCHOLOGY RELEVANT TO AESTHETICS?
THE major purpose of this paper is not to raise questions of
aesthetics but to raise some questions about aesthetics;
namely, the logic of the question "Is psychological information (or
scientific information in general) relevant to solving the problems
of aesthetics?" The attention of this paper will be focused on
the relation of psychological information to the philosophical
problems of aesthetics. In particular, I shall discuss (i) experiments
which are designed to discover if certain kinds of works of
art have meaning, (2) experiments which are designed to establish
preference orders among items of aesthetic interest, and (3) the
question of whether the description of aesthetic experience is a
psychological question. My thesis is that psychology is not relevant
to aesthetics.
Since the time of Fechner's Vorschule der Aesthetik, a considerable
body of empirical data has been collected under the titles "psychology
of art" and "psychological aesthetics." However, there has
been little or no examination of the relation of such information
to the solution of aesthetic problems. There has been, nevertheless,
no lack of writers who have assumed, believed, or asserted that
psychological information is useful. Edward Bullough, an early
advocate and practitioner of experimental or psychological
aesthetics, wrote a short article, "The Relation of Aesthetics to
Psychology."' The title of Bullough's discussion leads one to
think that he might treat the problem of this paper; all that he
does, however, is assert without analyzing the problem that it is;
a task of psychology to analyze "aesthetic consciousness."
It is assumed by some experimentalists that the positive relation
of psychology to aesthetics is so obvious that anyone who is
skeptical is either antiscientific or hopelessly woolly-minded. For
example, L. L. Thurstone writes of his participation in a seminar
devoted to aesthetic theory:
I British Journal of Psychology, X (I919), 43-50.
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GEORGE DICKIE
In some of those discussions it occurred to me that the question at issue
could be treated as a question of experimental fact, and I ventured to
suggest how the psychophysical methods could be adapted to obtain
an empirical answer.... It was an illuminating experience to discover
that some of my friends in the humanities were hostile to the very idea
of subjecting questions of aesthetic theory to empirical inquiry. On one
of those occasions a friend showed me a quotation from Aristotle that
settled the matter for him. It was heresy when I suggested that we knew
more about this problem than Aristotle.2
These remarks recall the philosophy professor who refused to look
through Galileo's telescope. Contemporary philosophers such as
Eliseo Vivas and Murray Krieger agree in some measure with
Thurstone. They assert in the introduction to their book of
readings in aesthetics that while aesthetic problems can be
defined analytically they cannot be solved in an a priori way.
"Aesthetics is an empirical discipline.... If we are to make any
headway in aesthetics we have to refer to the facts, and these,
we know, are not yet fully explored."3 Several pages later Vivas
and Krieger write, "The serious and intense labor which psychologists
have spent on aesthetics in the last seventy-five years
cannot be ignored, even if, unfortunately, all this labor has
panned out very little of genuine value to the aesthetician."4 The
paucity of results suggests that either we must work, wait, and
hope on the psychological aesthetics front or that the assumption
that psychological information is relevant to questions of aesthetics
is confused.
Thomas Munro has devoted very considerable space to the
discussion of science and aesthetics. The view that Munro sets
forth is wider than the question under discussion here, since he
maintains that aesthetics is or can become a science. If his view
is correct, however, psychological information is certainly relevant
to the problems of aesthetics. Munro attributes several kinds of
motives to opponents of his view: (i) the contention that artistic
2 Quoted in C. C. Pratt, "Aesthetics," in Annual Review of Psychology, XII
(i96i), 73.
3 Eliseo Vivas and Murray Krieger, eds., The Problems of Aesthetics (New York
and Toronto, 1953), p. 10.
'Ibid., p. 13.
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PSTCHOLOGr AND AESTHETICS
value is subjective and aesthetic feelings too subtle for scientific
treatment; (2) the fear that "science must mechanize and deaden
what it penetrates" ;5 or (3) the "attempt to revive the old absolutistic
belief in fixed principles of good art independent of human
nature." None of these is involved in the arguments I shall
present nor are the arguments motivated by any of them. What
does Munro mean when he says that aesthetics is a science?
An experimental attitude in aesthetics would imply making use of all
possible clues to the nature of aesthetic experience, from a variety of
sources and modes of investigation. It would imply putting all these
clues together, and on that basis working toward tentative generalizations
through induction and the testing of hypotheses.7
The object, then, of the science of aesthetics is a special kind of
experience, the aesthetic experience. Part II of this paper is devoted
to a discussion of what it means to take "aesthetic experience" as
an object of empirical inquiry. Munro's conception of aesthetics
omits the problem of the analysis of the concepts of critical
descriptions and evaluation. In any event, although Munro
repeatedly makes statements of the kind above, which very
generally characterize aesthetics as a science, summarizes the
methods and results of experimental aesthetics, and exhorts us to
intensify research efforts, he never penetrates to the problem I
am trying to deal with-to show the relation or lack of relation
of scientific information to aesthetics. In addition, the way in
which he conceives of the nature of science (as implied by some
of his assertions) vitiates much of what he has to say. Consider
his use of "scientific" in the following sentence: "The more
scientific view is that there is no one right definition for a word;
each word is a symbol to which various meanings are attached by
common usage."8 The problem of the analysis of the nature of
definition is not a scientific task at all; it is purely a philosophical
one. Munro is using "scientific" to mean "intelligent" or perhaps
"adequate." Of course, we all want to do aesthetics intelligently.
1f Thomas Munro, Toward Science in Aesthetics (New York, 1956), p. 4.
*Ibid., p. 13.
7Ibid., p. 14.
8 Ibid., p. 34.
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GEORGE DICKIE
It is usual for philosophers to discuss or at least mention two
distinct kinds of questions when they write about aesthetics,
especially when they write introductory texts. One group of
questions centers around what may be called logical considerations:
the meaning of critical concepts and the truth of critical
statements, both descriptive and evaluative. Typical problems of
this first type are "Can music have meaning?" "Can paintings
make statements ?" "Is it proper to make use of the intention of the
artist in criticism ?" The other group of questions centers around
what is thought of as clearly a psychological consideration, the
nature of aesthetic experience. Monroe C. Beardsley, for example,
makes this distinction in the introduction to his important book,
calling the former "philosophical aesthetics" and the latter
"psychological aesthetics," and asserts that his book is a book in
"philosophical aesthetics."9 But he adds:
Nevertheless, we shall see that we cannot ignore psychology; its data
and conclusions will bear upon ours at many points. For example,
when we consider the logic of evaluation, we are led to ask about the
nature of aesthetic experience, and this is a psychological question.
Where the psychological data are as yet too sparse to answer the
question decisively, we can at least analyze the question, and formulate
it as clearly as possible, so that we can see what sort of psychological
data would be required in order to answer it.10
Beardsley, however, devotes only four pages near the end of his
book to a description of aesthetic experience.
Beardsley asserts that the nature of aesthetic experience is
related to critical evaluation, and I think this contention is
correct. But he also says that there is a problem of the nature of
aesthetic experience, which is a psychological question, and that
all the data are not yet in. It would seem then that art criticism
is being hampered by the lack of psychological information.
To speak simply of the relation of psychological information to
aesthetics obscures a distinction which must be made. There are
at least two different ways in which the question of relevance of
psychological information to aesthetics can be raised: (i) "Is
9 Aesthetics (New York, 1958), p. 7.
10 Ibid.
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PSYCHOLOGr AND AESTHETICS
psychological information relevant to the solution of what I have
called logical problems (can music have meaning? and so
on) ?" and (2) "Is psychological information relevant to the
description of aesthetic experience?" The former question generally
is concerned with the results of the psychological laboratory
-the recording of data on the responses of subjects who listen to
music and the like. The relation of the latter question to the
psychological laboratory is not clear.
The main discussion of this article will revolve around these
two questions. However, I wish to discuss two points in order to
dismiss them. First, psychological information which relates to
the problem of why men create works of art is ruled out as
irrelevant because aesthetics (at least philosophical aesthetics) is
concerned only with the language and concepts which are used to
describe and evaluate works of art. Aesthetics is not concerned
with how works of art have come to be but only with the finished
consumer product. Second, psychological information may be
helpful to the critic whose job it is to describe and evaluate works
of art: for example, a drama critic may fruitfully draw upon
psychological information in analyzing the plot of a play, the
relationship between the characters in a play, and so on. In this
latter example the psychological information has no special
relevance to art as art: there is no difference important to the
problem under discussion between describing the neurotic
behavior of a character in a play and a real person. Consequently,
these two uses of psychological information are not included in
this discussion.
Now I shall turn to the first question, which is central to this
paper, "Is psychological information relevant to the solution of
logical problems of aesthetics?" I have selected for discussion
examples of experiments in the psychology of art which I hope
are representative of the various types of work done in that
field. The two main classes of experimental inquiry are experiments
designed to discover if particular works of art have meaning
(of various sorts), and experiments designed to discover preference
orders.
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GEORGE DICKIE
I shall begin by examining "meaning" experiments, a
first example concerns the question "Can music have m
(I am not going to try to answer the question, but only e
the logic of the question.) Vernon Lee tries to apply the questionnaire
method to this problem by asking a group of subjects
the question "Does music seem to you to have a message, a
meaning beyond itself?"" Half the subjects answered in the
affirmative, saying that if music did not have a message "it
would constitute only sensual enjoyment, and be unworthy of
their consideration."12 The other subjects answered in the
negative. The tie aspect of the results seems to prevent us from
drawing any conclusions about the- question asked. But is the
"vote" of the subjects relevant at all? Suppose there had been
IOO per cent agreement among the subjects, would the situation
be improved? No, because the "query a subject" approach misconceives
the nature of the problem. What is the proper way of
deciding whether a set of marks or sounds carries a message?
Suppose you found a piece of paper on which there were marks
and wondered if it were a message. What would you do? First,
you might work with the marks to see if they were a coded
English message, that is, a message originally written in English
and then put into a code. If this method failed, one might ask
foreigners if these marks were a message in their language.
Foreigner A says "No." Foreigner B truthfully says, "Yes," and
correctly reads you the message. Note that the situation is quite
different from the situation of subjects in a psychological experiment.
Foreigner A's negative answer is not a datum from which
one draws a scientific conclusion about the marks. Foreigner B's
behavior is not a scientific datum either, although it solves
the problem. What B's behavior proves is that the marks have
certain characteristics which enable them to convey a message;
B could teach us to use his language and then we could read the
message ourselves. The essential point to be distinguished here is
the logical difference between understanding a language and
drawing scientific conclusions from data.
11 Vernon Lee, "Varieties of Musical Experience," in Problems of Aesthetics,
pp. 298-299.
12 Ibid., p. 299.
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PSrCHOLOGr AND AESTHETICS
The situation with the set of musical sounds is not completely
parallel-there is no point in looking for musical "foreigners"but
the circumstances are similar enough to indicate what the
proper procedure is for settling the music-message question. One
should examine the sounds (as they interact with listeners) to see
if they have the characteristics which enable a set of marks or
sounds to bear meanings. This sort of inquiry is not a scientific
one to which the collection of data is relevant; it is a logical
inquiry about language. (Are the sounds part of language or
not?) Beardsley uses what I would call "the logical inquiry"
approach very acutely in discussing the music-meaning question.
In discussing the parallel question "Do paintings make statements?"
Beardsley even formulates the minimum features that a
set of marks (or whatever) must have in order to be symbols in
a language.13 If the point of my discussion is correct, then one
kind of inquiry in psychological aesthetics is pointless, since it
misconceives the nature of the problem to which it is addressing
itself: it has mistaken a logical problem for a scientific one.
A second kind of "meaning" experiment tests whether subjects
can match works of nonverbal art with descriptive adjectives.
Pratt characterizes such inquiries as attempts to see if a subject
can identify "tertiary qualities" in works of art.14 Pratt reports
the following experiment done with descriptive adjectives and
abstract paintings. (I suspect he means nonobjective paintings).
Expert judges selected several paintings and agreed that certain
adjectives "fittingly described the respective moods of the designs."15
The subject's "matchings were far above chance,
ranging from 66 per cent to one design correctly matched by
every subject."16 Pratt reports another experiment which made
use of musical passages rather than paintings. In this experiment
c227 subjects listened to passages from Brahms (stately), Mendelssohn
(sprightly), Mozart (wistful), and Tchaikowski (vigorous)
and made correct matchings well over go per cent in every case."17
3 Op. cit., pp. 372-373.
14 Op. cit., pp. 78-79.
1 Ibid., p. 79.
16 Loc. cit.
17 Ibid., pp. 78-79.
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GEORGE DICKIE
What do these kinds of experiments aim to show? Presumably,
that the nonexpert subjects agree with the experts; but where
does this leave us? Suppose the nonexperts had not agreed with
the experts, would we be willing to say that such works of art
do not have "tertiary qualities," that we ought not to speak of
Mendelssohn being sprightly? What would count as evidence for
the assertion, "This Mendelssohn passage is 'sprightly' "? We all
know what "sprightly" means, that is, know the various kinds of
situations to which it is appropriate to apply "sprightly"; so
there is no problem there. The only problem is whether the
Mendelssohn passage has characteristics which can properly be
said to be sprightly, but this is not a problem about which it is
necessary or even proper to poll subjects. The problem is to be
solved by -an analysis of the Mendelssohn passage to see if it has
the "right" kind of characteristics, possibly, for example, to see
if the sound rhythm has a structure similar to the pattern of a
lively, skipping movement of some animal. To decide whether the
Mendelssohn passage has the "right" kind of characteristics is a
matter of understanding or apprehending the structure of a set
of elements. If a critic is competent (has knowledge and understanding
of the kinds of works of art he is talking about), it
simply is unnecessary to seek information from others (especially
nonexperts; e.g., college sophomores) to ascertain if a certain set
of elements in a work of art has a particular form.
The actual problem which the experiment purports to be
solving has actually been solved (if it ever can be) in the designing
of the experiment, since the experts have already selected the
correct adjectives at the beginning. And, incidentally, the basis
of the selection of the correct adjectives by the experts would
have to be the kind of analysis of the works of art just described.
Furthermore, reflect on what would happen if the experts disagreed
about the appropriateness of a particular adjective to a particular
work of art. Would they settle the issue by waiting to see what the
nonexperts said? I think not. They would dispute among themselves
about the characteristics of the work of art, and such a
dispute can only be decided by "pointing" to the various features
of a work of art. No appeal to numbers is relevant to the question.
The second main type of psychology-of-art experiment is the
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PSYCHOLOGr AND AESTHETICS
preference test. Various elements (shapes, colors, sounds, etc.)
are paired (generally) and a subject is asked which of the elements
is preferred. Preference orders are established, although it is
possible that a subject prefers a to b and b to c but prefers c to a.
Even if this kind of "odd" case occurs, a preference order can be
established; it just will not be a simple transitive one. Some
aestheticians take a rather despairing, albeit still hopeful, attitude
toward the psychology of art (preference experiments, etc.).
Douglas N. Morgan outlines the work in the psychology of art
in an article.18 He concludes his article by saying that he does not
think that we have learned very much from experiments in the
psychology of art. He writes, "If pressed, I will admit that I do
not expect-unless we alter our approach somewhat-that we
will learn a great deal more in this direction, at least within the
next three thousand years."19 Morgan gives three reasons for the
lack of progress. The first is "the empirical fact that our experiences
of works of art in appreciation, and artists' experience in
creation, are admitted by all hands to be highly complex."20 To
this fact by way of contrast Morgan writes:
It is not at all evident, or perhaps it is even unlikely, that discrete
observations gleaned in the sterile atmosphere of the usual psychological
laboratory are now legitimate warrant for any very interesting or useful
generalizations about the aesthetic experience. Responding to an El
Greco on a museum wall simply isn't much like comparing cardboard
rectangles in a classroom.'21
Morgan does not give up on psychological aesthetics, however,
and as a second reason for a lack of progress suggests that the
psychology of art "is still in a stone age" of scientific development.22
The third reason Morgan suggests is that we have
failed to ask the right questions before setting up our experiments.
This difficulty can be corrected, he feels:
18 "Psychology and Art Today: A Summary and Critique," in Problems of
Aesthetics, pp. 30-47.
'9 Ibid., p. 44.
20 Ibid., p. 45.
21 Loc. cit.
22 Ibid., p. 47.
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GEORGE DICKIE
In the psychology of art we must imaginatively select in advance of
experiment which factors, when correlated, will give us interesting and
important results. This requires some hard thinking, some imagination,
some kind of theory, however tentative, some "exploratory hypothesis"
guessed at from earlier work, or from common sense observation, or
wherever.23
This last quotation has an air of quiet desperation about it.
Morgan is convinced that there is some scientific problem to be
solved but thinks that neither he nor anyone else has yet been
able to see the problem in a way that it can be fruitfully approached.
Morgan is right-looking at an El Greco and preferring
it to some other painting is more complicated than comparing
cardboard triangles. If there is a scientific problem to be solved
in this context, however, it would seem that there should be
some relevance of the simple preference choice to the complex
preference choice. It is a strange argument to reject x as evidence
which throws light on y because x is very simple and y is very
complex, when x andy are of the same logical type. One of the
reasons (among many others) that psychologists experiment with
rats, monkeys, and the like is that they are simpler organisms
than human beings. There is something odd about Morgan's
argument. In any event, it is not necessary that preference experiments
pair very simple elements. In fact, I know of one study
in progress which pairs a series of nonobjective paintings in an
attempt to arrive at a preference ordering of the paintings.
Once a preference order is established, however, it is not clear
how the ordering will be relevant to aesthetics.
At this point it is appropriate to raise the question "For what
aesthetic purpose is it supposed that preference orders are established?"
Certainly for more than to show that such orders can
be established. That preference in art is as orderly as preference
in other human activities scarcely needs establishing, although it
is perhaps comforting to know this as a well-established fact. I
suspect that the main purpose which is envisaged is that the
information about preference will serve as a basis for normative
principles which can be used in art criticism. But how can such
23 Ibid., p. 46.
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PSYCHOLOGr AND AESTHETICS
information form a basis for normative principles? In hi
The Philosophy of Art, C. J. Ducasse summarily rejects the
importance of the fact of preference orders: "What can
with that hard-won fact? Virtually nothing."24 The ir
of preference orders can be shown most clearly by re
upon the question: Would the result of any preference te
the mind of any critic or aesthetician about what is im
in art? I think the answer is clearly "No." The logic of th
is somewhat similar (although of course not completely
to the logic of the question: Would you change your m
arithmetic if you discovered that a pint of liquid A ad
pint of liquid B did not give you two pints of liquid? Both
metic and the preferable in art are impervious to experime
For example, how is a critic, in evaluating a work of art,
into account the fact that certain shapes, meters, and
preferred by one class of people, or for that matter, by al
Aestheticians and critics know what they need to kn
preference, if, in fact, they need to know anything abou
ence. The situation in aesthetics and criticism is not co
to a frequent situation in engineering when a project is
because of the lack of scientific information which is
available. Another point, or perhaps it is the same po
differently, involves the old problem of how can ought b
from is. No matter how many data are collected, they stil
descriptions (the is) and no normative principles (the ou
be derived from the descriptions alone. I am not, of
suggesting that critical reasons cannot be given in sup
evaluative judgments. I would deny, however, that statements
about the preferences of some person, group of persons, or all
persons can be used as supporting reasons. The only proper kind
of supporting statement or reason is one that points out some
characteristic of an art object. I shall return to the discussion of
preference tests at the conclusion of the paper, giving additional
arguments to show their pointlessness for aesthetic theory.
24 New York, 1929, p. 13.
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GEORGE DICKIE
II
I now wish to turn to the second and last question with which
I shall deal, namely, "Is psychological information relevant to
the description of aesthetic experience?" I am led to ask this
question by such assertions as Beardsley's in the already quoted
passage that the question of the nature of aesthetic experience is
a psychological question. Consider what Beardsley says near the
end of his book when he comes to a discussion of the nature of
aesthetic experience and particularly the question of what, if
anything, is common to all aesthetic experiences. He writes:
This is at least an empirical question, open to inquiry. And some
inquiry has been made, though many mysteries remain. However, we
can be reasonably confident of certain generalizations, which some
writers have obtained by acute introspection, and which each of us
can test in his own experience.25
Beardsley then proceeds to point out-as all books on aesthetics
do-that aesthetic experience is characterized by (i) rather
firmly fixed attention, (2) some degree of intensity, and (3) a
considerable degree of unity, that is, is coherent and complete
within itself. That aesthetic experience has these characterics is,
I suppose, beyond doubt. But what more is there to be said
about aesthetic experience? What are the mysteries which
Beardsley says remain? What sort of scientific experiments could
be set up to plumb these mysteries? We already know from
Aristotle and before that unity is a characteristic of works of art and
"of the experience of them." We know what kind of devices
make for unity-picture frames, rhyme, plot, geometric shape,
and so on. From time to time artists invent new means to achieve
unity in their works of art. We know what unity is; what more
is there to be discovered by scientific means? In the same way,
we know what coherence and completeness are and what the
devices are for achieving- them. We know what it means for a
work of art to be more or less intense and what it means to have
one's attention firmly fixed. Works of art which hold our attention
are generally intense, coherent, and complete, and therefore are
26 Op. cit., p. 527; italics mine.
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PS.CHOLOGY AND AESTHETICS
enjoyed, and we recommend them. But there are no mysteries
concerning these characteristics of works of art which aestheticians
and critics must wait for psychologists to clear up before they can
do their jobs better. The work that remains to be done in aesthetics
and criticism requires clear thinking and hard analysis but it
does not wait upon scientific discovery.
Some philosophers, however, have talked about aesthetic
experience as if it were some unique sort of entity which can
become the object of experimental inquiry. (Beardsley is not one
of these theorists.) There is something odd about any attempt to
make experience an object of inquiry, as if experience were of the
same type as a piece of copper, a frog, or even an example of
behavior. It has been noted by a number of philosophers that
experience is an odd notion, as is the related notion of sense-data.26
Earlier philosophers such as Bullough talked about the aesthetic
consciousness rather than aesthetic experience and conceived of the
task of aesthetics as an introspective and experimental examination
of this consciousness. Later philosophers abandoned the
word "consciousness" and talked instead about aesthetic experience;
I suspect, however, that the idea of a special sort of mental
thing (consciousness) still haunts the notion of aesthetic experience
and is responsible for the assumption that there is some object
to be scientifically dissected. Max Schoen, for example, writes
in "Aesthetic Experience in the Light of Current Psychology" in
such a way as to suggest experience is a kind of thing and that
aesthetic experience is a special species of it: "Aesthetic experience
can arise only from ordinary experience by doing something to
it."27 "The aesthetic experience therefore must arise by an act of
imagination in which experience is rid of that which is imposed
upon it by biological necessity."28
The hardiest holdover from the conception of aesthetic consciousness
is Bullough's notion of psychical distance, which is
accepted in one way or another by almost all contemporary
26 See G. A. Paul, "Is There a Problem about Sense-Data?" Proceedings of
the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. XV (1936), 6i-77; reprinted in Logic and
Language, First Series (A. G. N. Flew, ed., Oxford, 195 I), pp. i o i - i I 6.
27 Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, I (I941), 25.
28 Ibid., p. 26.
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GEORGE DICKIE
aestheticians who talk about the aesthetic experience or attitude.
Psychical distance as conceived by Bullough is a particular kind
of psychological event which must occur as a precondition to
having an aesthetic experience of some object. According to
Bullough, psychical distance is the phenomena of putting some
object "out of gear" with practical interests of the self. It is conceived
of as a psychological process which must be sustained in
order for aesthetic appreciation to occur and be sustained.
Presumably psychical distance is conceived of as similar to such
genuine psychological phenomena as hypnosis, in which attention
is transfixed, or shock, in which one becomes oblivious to one's
environment. In fact, one of Bullough's contemporaries, Ethel
D. Puffer, whose theory of detachment is very similar to the
notion of psychical distance, seems to think of aesthetic detachment
as a kind of hypnosis: "It is not necessary at this place to
emphasize the fact that our theory, if accepted, would constitute
a theory and a definition also of hypnotism."29
I think that Bullough and Puffer are dealing with something
which is important for aesthetic theory but that the psychologistic
way they talk about it is very misleading. Most aesthetic
experiences are rather casual in nature, but even when one is
intensely interested in, say, a drama these cases are not at all like
being hypnotized. It is not that one undergoes some special sort
of psychological occurrence which someone (or yourself) could
observe as when one is hypnotized or in shock. The thing being
described by Bullough, Puffer, and all theorists who follow them in
speaking about aesthetic distance or detachment is not a psychological
occurrence at all in the sense that something is undergone
or felt. The spectator who "distances an object" is merely following
a rule of the art game; namely, "Watch, listen, and so on,
but do not try to participate in the work of art." This tacit rule
is connected with the demand that a work of art be complete. If
the work of art is complete, then it is pointless or worse for a
spectator to try to add to the work by joining the dance or play,
or by painting in an area on the painting on the museum wall,
or the like. The words "distanced" and "detached," in addition
29 The Psychology of Beauty (Boston, 1905), p. 84.
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PSYCHOLOGr AND AESTHETICS
to the difficulties which they raise as to how we can be both
intensely interested in a work of art and detached (disinterested)
from it at the same time, are very misleading. It is not that we
are detached or distanced from a work of art, we are barred from
the work of art by the rules of the art game. It is not that picture
frames, raised stages, and the like are devices which help cause
a peculiar kind of psychological phenomenon, as Bullough
thought. These devices serve (along with other purposes) merely
as a signal (if any is needed) that certain rules are to be obeyed.
It would be better to speak of the aesthetic barrier than of
psychical distance.
Aestheticians have spoken of spectators "losing distance," for
example, running up on the stage and attacking the villain.
(Bullough would call this a case of underdistancing.) An adult who
"lost distance" and seriously tried to participate in a drama would
not merely be someone who in the heat of emotion has mistaken
stage play for reality. Such a person would be mentally deranged
-at least temporarily-that is, would have lost the ability to
follow a rule of sane behavior. To attack a political speaker
physically for what he says might or might not be an insane act,
but to attack an actor in a play for what he says as a character
certainly would be insane. If a person were to "lose distance"
(in the way described above), it would not be that a particular
kind of psychological process had ceased and the person had
begun to act in a usual practical way. Rather, if a person were to
"lose distance" in this way, he would have ceased to act in a
perfectly usual way (watching a play) and have begun to act
very oddly. In the other cases of "losing distance," as when one
forgets the play and thinks of something else (Bullough calls this
process a case of overdistancing), it is merely that one is no longer
attending to the play, not that some special kind of psychological
process has ceased to exist. In these latter kinds of cases, the rule
of which I spoke earlier is not being disobeyed; it is not relevant
to such cases. It might be said, however, that a maxim is being
ignored, the maxim, namely, "Attend to the work of art, you are
missing something" (your money's worth, perhaps).
Earlier I spoke of a rule of the art game. However, there is a
plurality of art games, and the rule of the aesthetic barrier applies
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GEORGE DICKIE
more strictly in some than in others. On one end of the range
there are dance situations in which the line between spectator and
dancer is blurred to the extent that spectator may become dancer
and dancer become spectator. On the other end of the range are
theater situations in which the barrier rule is rigidly adhered to.
Without trying to arrange them in any order, there are intermediate
cases: hissing the villain and cheering the hero in the
old-fashioned melodrama situation, applauding during an act
because of an especially well-performed piece of acting, and so on.
In short, I suggest it is better to speak of the aesthetic barrier
rule of art games and of attending or not attending to works of
art than it is to talk of psychical distance or detachment. It
is better because we are not then led to think that there are some
mysterious psychological processes which must be investigated.
We are not misled to mistake the observance of rules, conventions,
and maxims for peculiar psychological processes.
III
I am not denyng that there is a sense in which it is correct to
say that there is an empirical aspect to aesthetics and criticism:
certainly one looks at paintings, listens to music, and so forth. But
it does not follow from this obvious fact that scientific (empirical)
studies are going to throw light on the problems of aesthetics
and criticism. There is much confusion in the talk about works
of art and in talk about talk about works of art, but it is confusion,
not lack of information. Appreciating works of art is an ancient
and encrusted activity of men: it is, to borrow Wittgenstein's
metaphor,30 part of the old city in which the streets are narrow
and crooked but nevertheless we know them well, although we
often get confused if asked to describe them for someone or to
draw a map. The mechanisms involved in the appreciation of
art are similar to such concepts as knowing, believing, oughtness,
-concepts which all mature users of the language know how to
use. The same sort of difficulty is involved in saying that scientific
information is relevant to problems of aesthetics and criticism as
30 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (New York, 1953), p. 8e.
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PSYCHOLOGr AND AESTHETICS
in thinking that we can discover what it means to know or
believe something by instituting a scientific inquiry.
In the case of preference or of the nature of aesthetic experience
we already know what we need to know. The case of aesthetic
experience is similar to the nature of scientific experience (i.e.,
the application of scientific method): we already know the general
nature of scientific method, although many of the techniques of
scientific procedure obviously have not yet been created. Of
course, in the case of scientific method we have to teach each new
generation the procedure. Similarly, in the case of the appreciation
of art we have to teach each new generation the nature of
aesthetic experience (i.e., teach them to attend to the music, and so
forth, to recognize the intensity, to look for coherence and completeness).
We also teach how to analyze works of art, to show what
characteristics produce coherence, and the like. In the case of
preference, at a given time among a given group certain kinds of
works of art or certain art techniques are preferred. These preference
patterns will be taught to the next generation, who may accept
them but as often as not reject them and develop their own
patterns. Preference patterns quite obviously can be studied;
anthropologists and psychologists do it constantly. But such
studies cannot be turned back on themselves somehow to correct
preference patterns. How could it be done?
Earlier I said preference is impervious to the results of preference
discoveries. At least part of what accounts for this imperviousness
is the fact that preference is taught or built into people
similar to the way in which language is taught to them. People
are taught to have aesthetic experience, that is, taught to look at
paintings in a certain way and to listen to music in a similar way.
None of the foregoing argument should be taken as an attack
on psychology or science: any such attack would be silly. What I
have been trying to do is to draw lines and distinguish various
sorts of activities. Aesthetics, like ethics, philosophy of science,
and so on, is a philosophical activity and not to be confused
with science. All philosophical activities depend on nonphilosophical
activities: for example, ethics depends on the use of moral
language, and philosophy of science on the employment of
scientific concepts. But the problems of ethics are not solved by a
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GEORGE DICKIE
scientific study nor are the problems of the philosophy of science.
I do not wish to appear dogmatic about the relation of scientific
information to aesthetics. I am aware that I have discussed only
a few of the psychological experiments which have been carried
out in the psychology of art. I have tried, however, to select
examples for analysis which seem to me to be typical of the
various kinds of psychology-of-art experiments. It, of course,
remains an open question as to whether some scientific information
has been discovered or will be discovered to be relevant to
aesthetics. Consequently, I cannot say with complete assurance
that the conclusions of Part I of this paper (psychological information
and the logical problems of aesthetics) is final. However,
it does not seem to me at the moment that anyone has made
clear how any specific psychological information is relevant to
these problems. Not only has this matter not been made clear in
any specific instance, but no one appears to have any idea what
sort of procedure should be followed to establish the relevance
relation under discussion. Despite my theoretical tentativeness
concerning Part I, I am convinced that the problem of the description
of the nature of aesthetic experience is not a task to
which the techniques of empirical science are relevant. In any
event, if my arguments are not conclusive and completely
convincing (philosophers' arguments rarely are), I hope they at
least suggest a possible explanation for the feelings of futility
which envelop psychological aesthetics. At the very least, I hope
to evoke consideration and possibly controversy about questions
to which little or no attention has been given.
GEORGE DICKIE
Washington State University
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