

1. Charakterizujte text.
2. Popište problematiku, kterou text řeší (základní pozice, argumenty, cokoli víte).
3. Parafrázujte argumentaci obsaženou v textu.
4. Zhodnoťte argumentace, doplňte své vlastní úvahy, komentáře.

III. Fine Individuation

Levinson is pushing for a uniform treatment of the arts. This requires that we conceive of musical works according to a parent-offspring model. Previously, I analyzed and explored the causal connection and causal uniqueness features of this model. There is one more feature. According to Levinson, musical works are not only causally and uniquely connected to their composers. They are also finely individuated by their having been composed by a certain composer in a certain way at a certain time. In this section, I analyze and explore this fine individuation feature of the parent-offspring model.

Musical works are composed by a certain composer in a certain way at a certain time. According to Levinson, composers bestow musical works with a certain set of musicohistorical, artistic, and aesthetic properties by composing them. A musicohistorical property is a musical work's property of being composed in a certain musicohistorical context. An artistic property is a musical work's property of being composed in a certain way at a certain time by a certain composer, with respect to that composer's training, knowledge, style, etc. An aesthetic property is a musical work's property of being composed to sound a certain way: say, craggy or smooth, whimsical or pensive, extravagant or minimalist, etc. These properties finely individuate musical works.

According to Levinson, musicohistorical, artistic, and aesthetic properties are not essential properties of musical works. But they are "relevant ... to *individuating*" musical works, and they "*truly belong*" to musical works "in a *reasonably determinate* fashion."¹⁵ Composers bestow musical works with certain musicohistorical properties by composing them in a certain musicohistorical context; with certain artistic properties by composing them according to a certain compositional style, such as twelve-tone serialism; and with certain aesthetic properties by composing them to sound a certain way. Composers "connect with" musical works "by *creating* them — by mixing their labor and identity in with them, so to speak, and thus assuring their uniqueness[.]"¹⁶

Suppose that composers, Mozart and Schmozart, compose works with exactly the same sound structure. Although these works are identical in sound structure, they differ in many ways. Mozart composes in a different musicohistorical context than Schmozart. Mozart has a different working knowledge of music theory, a different compositional style, a different oeuvre, and Mozart is differently influenced by predecessor composers that he finds inspirational. Thus, Mozart's work has musicohistorical, artistic, and aesthetic properties that Schmozart's work does not have. Leibniz's law states that if two entities are identical, then they share the same properties. Since Mozart's and Schmozart's works do not share the same properties, they are not identical.

Levinson's view closely resembles a cluster concept theory of reference.¹⁷ For Levinson, a musical work is finely individuated by a unique cluster of causally or historically determined descriptions, or properties, predications, concepts, etc. If Mozart's and Schmozart's works are identical, then they are finely individuated by the same cluster of descriptions. But they are not finely individuated by the same cluster of descriptions. Mozart's work has a certain cluster of descriptions: 'that which was composed by *this* composer, at *this* location, at *this* time, etc.' Schmozart's work has a different cluster of descriptions: 'that which was composed by *that* composer, at *that* location, at *that* time, etc.' The former cluster of descriptions fixes a certain referent: Mozart's work. The latter cluster of descriptions fixes another referent: Schmozart's work. These two clusters of descriptions refer to two distinct objects. This implies that Mozart's and Schmozart's works are not identical. If they were identical, they would have the same cluster of descriptions, and it would fix the same referent. But this is not the case.

Suppose that Mozart and Schmozart both compose *Eine Kleine Nachtmusik* (*EKN*) in 1787, and they both coincidentally name their musical works *EKN*. In this possible world, Mozart and Schmozart have no knowledge of each other's existence. Mozart's most avid patron learns that Mozart's *EKN* is going to be performed on a Saturday at Mozart's venue. The patron then learns that Schmozart's *EKN* is going to be performed on a Sunday at Schmozart's venue. Intrigued that two composers with such similar names have composed musical works with identical titles, the patron decides to attend both performances to see

about the matter. The patron attends the Saturday and Sunday performances. How many types of musical work does the patron hear performed?

A Musical Platonist would say that the patron hears only one type of musical work performed twice, since the patron hears one sound structure performed twice, and that sound structure is *EKN*. Levinson would agree that the patron hears one sound structure performed twice, but still insist that the patron hears two different types of musical work. This is because Mozart's *EKN* has musicohistorical, artistic, and aesthetic properties that Schmozart's *EKN* does not have, and vice versa. Moreover, Mozart composed his *EKN*, whereas Schmozart composed his *EKN*. Mozart has an exclusive causal connection with his *EKN*, whereas Schmozart has an exclusive causal connection with his *EKN*. The patron hears two aurally indistinguishable performances, since they both acoustically instantiate the same sound structure. But the patron nevertheless hears two different types of musical work.