

Nástroje a možnosti internetu

Internet jako nástroj sledování

22. 10. 2021

Fu*kUp Night:

selhali jste někdy
při ochraně své
kyberbezpečnosti?






komeracionalizace Internetu

data-driven svět

soukromí a anonymita

Měli jste někdy pocit,
že jste na Internetu
sledováni?





from Amazon for replacement blades



I happened to be on Facebook at



and starts scrolling through my Insta



ads a few days before I get




One day was talking with my friends



just pictures.



is Hammermill Color Copy 28lb,



idea of getting therapy.



for pregnancy tests and dating sit

Marketing Technology Landscape

The Martech 5000

Total Solutions 8,000

Advertising & Promotion 922

Content & Experience 1,936

Social & Relationships 1,969

Commerce & Sales 1,314

Data 1,258

Management 601

Access all the data of this landscape & more at martech5000.com

2019

7,040 solutions



2018

6,829 solutions



2017

5,381 solutions



2016

3,874 solutions




2015

1,876 solutions



2014

947 solutions



Anonymity na internetu a Dark We... Anonymity is the internet's ne... X

https://www.theguardian.com/media-network/2015/jun/22/anonymity-internet-battleground-data-adverti

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Media & Tech Network

Anonymity is the internet's next big battleground

Users are growing twitchy about how their data is being used, with major ramifications for advertisers, marketers and the entire internet industry

Jon Card
Mon 22 Jun 2015 12.00 BST

f t e 45 0



▲ Online users are rebelling against those tracking and snooping them by adopting a variety of privacy tools.
Photograph: Epoxydude/Corbis

The use of personal data is a thorny subject for the public and for the many companies that use it. By allowing companies to take their data, internet users are enabling the creation of a fast, free and relevant online experience.

Kdo všechno může
mít zájem nás
sledovat on-line
a proč?



Řešíte **aktivně**
své soukromí
na Internetu?



Časté argumenty

„Když nemáš co skrývat...“

Časté argumenty

„Když nemáš co skrývat...“

- Jeremy Bentham - *Panopticon*
- vězení mysli
- *disident či novinář = špatný člověk?*
- společenské změny

Časté argumenty

„Soukromí už není sociální norma...“

„Nelze se tomu vyhnout, tak nemá cenu to řešit...“

Michal Kosinski:

- soukromí je mrtvé
- řešení je odstraňování tabu, ne návrat soukromí

„Facebook’s “People You May Know” tool was outing sex workers’ real identities to their clients, and vice versa. [...] A sex worker using the pseudonym Leila told me she had gone to great lengths to hide her identity from clients by using an alternate name, alternate email address, and burner phone number—contact information she didn’t provide to Facebook—yet Facebook was still inextricably linking her with her clients, suggesting them to her real-name account as people she might want to friend. “

FACEBOOK

How Facebook Schemed Against Its Users

Kashmir Hill
12/12/18 10:15AM · Filed to: ENOUGH OF THIS BULLSHIT

105 8



Photo: Getty

Last year, I was [trying to solve a mystery](#). Facebook’s “People You May Know” tool was outing sex workers’ real identities to their clients, and vice versa, and I was trying to figure out how. A sex worker using the pseudonym Leila told me she had gone to great lengths to hide her identity from clients by using an alternate name, alternate email address, and burner phone number—contact information she *didn’t* provide to Facebook—yet Facebook was still inextricably linking her with her clients, suggesting them to her real-name account as people she might want to friend.

Časté argumenty

„Nepoužívám *to*, tak *to* nemusím řešit...“

„Nepíšu nikam, co nechci, aby se vědělo.“


- metadata jsou cenná
- stínové profily
- [shadow contact](#)
- děti na síti – vývoj člověka

Časté argumenty

„Personalizovaná reklama je OK...“

„Nějak se ty služby platit musí.“

- *kapitalismus dohledu*
- Cambridge Analytica
- [technologie není apolitická](#)



Časté argumenty

„Když to pomůže zastavit špatné lidi..“

- soukromí vs. bezpečnost
- evaluace efektivity

Přístupy k ochraně dat

- 27 % dospělých uživatelů využívalo VPN
- 57 % lidí se bálo, že jejich data nejsou v bezpečí
- 14 % uživatelů bylo OK se sdílením dat společnostmi
- 1 ze 4 četl [ToS](#) před přihlášením do služby


„Despite much concern about the security and privacy of data, many are unsure what to do to better protect their data [...] the behaviour of many Europeans is not reflected by their actions towards data protection.“

bezpečnostní gramotnost




You've gone incognito

Do you know what private browsing is?




2012



2017

What do you use private browsing for?




Anonymní režim

prohlížeče používám,
abych se ochránil/a
před sledováním ze
strany...



You use private browsing to hide from...



ALE...!

profilování & targeting

Profilování

- *Michal Kosinski*
- modelování vlastností

f i @ s t
m x ñ d @
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Gaydar: Facebook friendships expose sexual orientation

Carter Jernigan
Behram F.T. Mistree

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v14i10.2611>

Abstract

Public information about one's coworkers, friends, family, and acquaintances, as well as one's associations with them, implicitly reveals private information. Social-networking websites, e-mail, instant messaging, telephone, and VoIP are all technologies steeped in network data—data relating one person to another. Network data shifts the locus of information control away from individuals, as the individual's traditional and absolute discretion is replaced by that of his social-network. Our research demonstrates a method for accurately predicting the sexual orientation of Facebook users by analyzing friendship associations. After analyzing 4,080 Facebook profiles from the MIT network, we determined that the percentage of a given user's friends who self-identify as gay male is strongly correlated with the sexual orientation of that user, and we developed a logistic regression classifier with strong predictive power. Although we studied Facebook friendship ties, network data is pervasive in the broader context of computer-mediated communication, raising significant privacy issues for communication technologies to which there are no neat solutions.

HTML

Published
2009-09-25

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Psychological targeting as an effective approach to digital mass persuasion

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Edited by Susan T. Fiske, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, and approved October 17, 2017 (received for review June 17, 2017)

People are exposed to persuasive communication across many different contexts: Governments, companies, and political parties use persuasive appeals to encourage people to eat healthier, purchase a particular product, or vote for a specific candidate. Laboratory studies show that such persuasive appeals are more effective in influencing behavior when they are tailored to individuals' unique psychological characteristics. However, the investigation of large-scale psychological persuasion in the real world has been hindered by the questionnaire-based nature of psychological assessment. Recent research, however, shows that people's psychological characteristics can be accurately predicted from their digital footprints, such as their Facebook Likes or Tweets. Capitalizing on this form of psychological assessment from digital footprints, we test the effects of psychological persuasion on people's actual behavior in an ecologically valid setting. In three field experiments that reached over 3.5 million individuals with psychologically tailored advertising, we find that matching the content of persuasive appeals to individuals' psychological characteristics significantly altered their behavior as measured by clicks and purchases. Persuasive appeals that were matched to people's extraversion or openness-to-experience level resulted in up to 40% more clicks and up to 50% more purchases than their mismatching or unpersonalized counterparts. Our findings suggest that the application of psychological targeting makes it possible to influence the behavior of large groups of people by tailoring persuasive appeals to the psychological needs of the target audiences. We discuss both the potential benefits of this method for helping individuals make better decisions and the potential pitfalls related to manipulation and privacy.

persuasion | digital mass communication | psychological targeting | personality | targeted marketing

Persuasive mass communication is aimed at encouraging large groups of people to believe and act on the communicator's viewpoint. It is used by governments to encourage healthy behaviors, by marketers to acquire and retain consumers, and by political parties to mobilize the voting population. Research suggests that persuasive communication is particularly effective when tailored to people's unique psychological characteristics and motivations (1–5), an approach that we refer to as *psychological persuasion*. The proposition of this research is simple yet powerful: What convinces one person to behave in a desired way might not do so for another. For example, matching computer-

from that displayed in the laboratory (7). Consequently, it is questionable whether—and to what extent—these findings can be generalized to the application of psychological persuasion in real-world mass persuasion (see ref. 8 for initial evidence).

A likely explanation for the lack of ecologically valid research in the context of psychological persuasion is the questionnaire-based nature of psychological assessment. Whereas researchers can ask participants to complete a psychological questionnaire in the laboratory, it is unrealistic to expect millions of people to do so before sending them persuasive messages online. Recent research in the field of computational social sciences (9), however, suggests that people's psychological profiles can be accurately predicted from the digital footprints they leave with every step they take online (10). For example, people's personality profiles have been predicted from personal websites (11), blogs (12), Twitter messages (13), Facebook profiles (10, 14–16), and Instagram pictures (17). This form of *psychological assessment from digital footprints* makes it paramount to establish the extent to which behaviors of large groups of people can be influenced through the application of psychological mass persuasion—both in their own interest (e.g., by persuading them to eat healthier) and against their best interest (e.g., by persuading them to gamble). We begin this endeavor in a domain that is relatively uncontroversial from an ethical point of view: consumer products.

Significance

Building on recent advancements in the assessment of psychological traits from digital footprints, this paper demonstrates the effectiveness of psychological mass persuasion—that is, the adaptation of persuasive appeals to the psychological characteristics of large groups of individuals with the goal of influencing their behavior. On the one hand, this form of psychological mass persuasion could be used to help people make better decisions and lead healthier and happier lives. On the other hand, it could be used to covertly exploit weaknesses in their character and persuade them to take action against their own best interest, highlighting the potential need for policy interventions.

Author contributions: S.C.M. and M.K. designed research; S.C.M., M.K., and D.J.S. performed research; S.C.M. analyzed data; and S.C.M., M.K., G.N., and D.J.S. wrote the paper. Conflict of interest statement: D.J.S. received revenue as the owner of the myPersonality Facebook application until it was discontinued in 2012. Revenue was received from disclosure only within the application and through the myPersonality website. The

Datové zplodiny

- *data exhaust*
- NPI vs. **PII**
- digitální stopa

- *aktivní a pasivní digitální stopa*
- *nepřímá digitální stopa (skrze sociální propojení)*

Jak můžeme
na Internetu
jednoznačně
identifikovat
uživatele?



Identifikace


- *datoví paraziti*
- *retargeting*
- cookies
- sledovací skripty
- *FB Pixel*
- fingerprinting



cookies

sledovací skripty

browser & canvas fingerprinting




**COVER
YOUR
TRACKS**

AmlUnique x +

https://amiunique.org

AmlUnique My fingerprint My history My extension Global statistics FAQ Privacy policy More !

Learn how identifiable you are on the Internet



Help us investigate the diversity of web browsers.

This website aims at studying the diversity of browser fingerprints and providing developers with data to help them design good defenses. Contribute to the efforts by viewing your own browser fingerprint or consult the current statistics of data provided by users around the world!

[View my browser fingerprint](#)

If you click on this button, we will collect your browser fingerprint, we will put a cookie on your browser for a period of 4 months. More details are available in the privacy policy

We have an open postdoctoral position! More details [here](#)

You can find some tools to improve your privacy [here](#)

What is a browser fingerprint? [FAQ](#)



„Anonymní“ prohlížeče


- prohlížeče se striktním přístupem ke sledování
- většina blokací přímo zabudována
- [EPIC Browser](#)
- [Brave](#)




„Anonymní“ vyhledávání

- vyhledávače s odlišným modelem monetizace
- nesbírají data o uživatelích
- neprodávají reklamní prostor
- *za jakou cenu?*

- [DuckDuckGo](#)
- [Další anonymní vyhledávače](#)




DuckDuckGo®



Jak to mám já?

- Firefox – *implementované nástroje*
- blokování reklamy (*uBlock Origin*)
- blokování skriptů (*Privacy Badger*)
- [Firefox Containers](#)





The screenshot shows a web browser window with the URL <https://nolog.cz/services/>. The page header features the NoLog.cz logo and navigation links: "O nás", "Služby", "Bezpečnost", "Kontakt", "Podpořte nás", "Status", and "Blog". A language selector for "English" is visible in the top right.

Služby

Většinu služeb provozujeme ve spolupráci s konkrétní skupinou nebo organizací v rámci uzavřeného kolektivu.

Dokážeme poskytnout nástroje pro vnitřní komunikaci, hosting webů, e-mailů, sdílené úložiště souborů i celé virtuální servery.

Pokud se shodujete s našimi hodnotami a máte o naše služby zájem, napište nám.

Některé služby provozujeme veřejně, to znamená že je může využít kdokoli, bez registrace, anonymně.

- 👁️ - Služba **nevyužívá** E2E šifrování.
- 🔒 - Služba **využívá** E2E šifrování.

pad.nolog.cz 👁️
Pad.nolog.cz umožňuje tvořit a editovat textový dokument ve více lidech. Vhodné pro tvorbu tiskových prohlášení, checklistů při organizování demonstrací apod.

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Upload.nolog.cz slouží k nahrávání a sdílení souborů (až 2GB).

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Služby / Services

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