111 Securitas Imperii 39/2021
studies
Uncovering enemies in the regional leadership of the Communist Party
of Czechoslovakia, 1950–1951
marián lóži
Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes,
Prague, The Czech Republic
e‑mail: marian.lozi@ustrcr.cz
https://doi.org/10.53096/RRXH7382
Abstract
The study examines the phenomenon of searching for internal party “enemies” at
the regional level of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ) in 1950–1951. It
describes and compares the course of the campaign in four regional party organi‑
zations (Ústí nad Labem, Plzeň /Pilsen/, Olomouc, Prešov), in which it observes the
actions of central, regional and district level actors. It monitors general trends and
local specifics. It analyses which factors determined the course of the search for
“enemies” in the leadership of the regions of the KSČ and its results.1
Keywords
Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (ÚV KSČ), Regional
Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KV KSČ), District Commit‑
tee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (OV KSČ) search for the “inner ene‑
my”, “purgative” campaign, criticism, self­‑criticism, caution and vigilance, dictator
1	 This study was created as a result of institutional research at the Institute for the Study of Totalitarian
Regimes.
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112 Securitas Imperii 39/2021
When the Chief Secretary of the Regional Committee of the Communist Party
of Czechoslovakia (KV KSČ) in Brno Otto Šling on the night of 6 October 1950
left a public assembly at which he had been the main speaker, he was arrested by
members of the State Security (StB).2
A model official for many years became at
the directions of the highest official places a “traitor and enemy”.3
With his fall,
the search for “enemies” within the KSČ turned into a massive campaign,4
which
gradually affected even the highest­‑ranking party officials – in February 1951 Marie
Švermová, the deputy of the party’s secretary general, was publicly condemned, in
December 1951 then the secretary general himself Rudolf Slánský. The campaign
culminated in a notorious trial “with the leadership of an anti­‑state conspiracy
centre led by Rudolf Slánský”, conducted on 20 through 27 November 1952 before
the senate of the State Court in Prague.5
However, in its course, the campaign did
not limit itself only to central actors, during the months immediately following
Šling’s arrest it was also carried out at the regional level, where so­‑called dictators,
elite regional officials, were deposed. This was a major upheaval for the party hier‑
archical structure, as they have so far been one of the main pillars of power for the
establishment of the Communist Party’s dictatorship.6
According to Czech historiography, the “cleansing” campaign in regional organi‑
zations was caused by a wide range of factors. As in the central party bodies, the es‑
calating international and domestic political situation played a role here. Through‑
out the Eastern bloc, the threat of conflict with the Western powers, led by the
United States, resonated and the rift with Yugoslavia deepened. Within the KSČ,
nationwide vetting inspections took place in 1948 and 1950, which were to mobi‑
lise the regular members and officials to “watchfulness and vigilance” and provide
a wide range of antagonisms. Finally, it is not possible to ignore the Machiavellian
tendency of the highest Czechoslovak and Soviet officials to strengthen their own
2	 ŠLINGOVÁ, Marian: Truth Will Prevail. Merlin, London, pp. 49–51.
3	 The whole case was elaborated in detail by the historian Václav Kaška. KAŠKA, Václav: Neukáznění
a neangažování. Disciplinace členů Komunistické strany Československa v letech 1948–1952
(Disorderly and Unengaged. Disciplining members of the KSČ in 1948–1952). ÚSTR, Praha 2014,
pp. 159–178. On Šling’s career, see further SLABOTINSKÝ, Radek: Otto Šling – pokus o politický
portrét komunistického funkcionáře (Otto Šling – An attempt at a political portrait of a communist
functionary). In: KÁRNÍK, Zdeněk – KOPEČEK, Michal: Bolševismus, komunismus a radikální
socialismus v Československu, č. 4 (Bolshevism, Communism and Radical Socialism in Czechoslovakia,
Vol. 4). ÚSD AV ČR – Dokořán, Praha 2005, pp. 177–198; PERNES, Jiří: Mládež vede Brno – Otto Šling
a jeho brněnská kariéra (1945–1950) (The Youth Lead Brno – Otto Šling and his career in Brno
/1945–1950/). Soudobé dějiny, 2004, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 45–60.
4	 Communist Party officials had been arrested since the spring of 1949. The Brno case of Otto Šling
was preceded by the Karlovy Vary case with the Regional Security Secretary of the Communist Party
Alex Tannenbaum in April 1949 and the Olomouc case with the Chief Regional Secretary of the
Communist Party Josef Stavinoha in January 1950. However, their impact was incomparably smaller.
5	 KAPLAN, Karel: Report on the Murder of General Secretary. Ohio State University Press, Columbus
1990; BARTON, Paul: Prague à l’heure de Moscou. Analyse d’une démocratie populaire. P. Horay, Paris
1954.
6	 LÓŽI, Marián: A Case Study of Power Practices. The Czechoslovak Stalinist Elite at the Regional Level
(1948–1951). In: BLAIVE, Muriel (ed.): Perceptions of Society in Communist Europe. Regime Archives
and Popular Opinion. Bloomsbury, London – New York 2019, pp. 49–64.
Uncovering enemies in the regional leadership
113Securitas Imperii 39/2021
influence and reinforce the power monopoly of the KSČ, or its dependence on the
Soviet protector.7
Relatively little attention has been paid so far to the regional organizations them‑
selves, as the course of the campaign was influenced by the conditions that pre‑
vailed in them in the autumn of 1950. This omission was reflected in the regional
research, and in recent years several component studies have been published on
the topic of “searching for enemies” in the regional leadership of the Stalinist KSČ.8
However, a generalizing narrative is still lacking. The ambition of this study is to
offer it.9
In my search for inspiration, I was greatly influenced by the work of scientists
Thomas H. Rigby and Gerald M. Easter, dedicated to the provincial elite in the Soviet
Union in the 1920s and 1930s. Rigby studied how this elite had constituted. He
concluded that although the senior officials of the Bolshevik Party’s provincial and
district committees were originally delegated by Moscow headquarters to the So‑
viet periphery, they had to establish themselves in the region with almost no out‑
side help, through personal authority and creating client networks.10
Easter then
focused on the conflict that the provincial elite had in the second half of the 1930s
with the central structures, and in particular with Joseph Stalin, a conflict in which
its own political capital was insufficient and was liquidated politically and physical‑
7	 I refer to the extensive publishing activity of the historian Karel Kaplan. In English, see KAPLAN,
Karel: Report on the Murder of General Secretary. Ohio State University Press, Columbus 1990, and
Idem: The Communist Party in Power. A Profile of Party Politics in Czechoslovakia. Westview Press,
London – Boulder 1987.
8	 HRADECKÝ, Tomáš: Hodnocení činnosti krajského tajemníka KSČ Mikuláše Landy pohledem
regionálních politických složek z doby před procesem (Evaluation of the activities of the Regional
Secretary of the KSČ Mikuláš Landa from the point of view of regional political units from the period
before the trial). In: HRADECKÝ, Tomáš – HORÁK, Pavel (eds.): České, slovenské a československé
dějiny 20. století, č. 8 (Czech, Slovak, and Czechoslovak History of 20th century, Vol. 8). Univerzita
Hradec Králové – Oftis, Hradec Králové – Ústí nad Orlicí 2013, pp. 347–354; HEMZA, Tomáš: Ve
jménu boje proti „diktátorům“, „spiklencům“ a „zrádcům“ (In the name of the battle against
“dictators”, “conspirators” and “traitors”). Soudobé dějiny, 2017, Vol. 24, No. 1–2, pp. 127–163;
KABEŠOVÁ, Monika: „Zbaveni škůdců, pevně semknuti kolem ÚV a s. Gottwalda, s vědomím síly
strany rychleji vpřed k socialismu.“ Čistky v KV KSČ Pardubice v letech 1949–1951 (“Removal
of pests, firmly set around the ÚV and comrade Gottwald, with the awareness of the strength
of the party gong faster forward to socialism”. Cleansings in the KV KSČ in Pardubice in 1949–
1951). In: KABEŠOVÁ, Monika – BEKERA, Tomáš – PARCHANSKÁ, Pavlína a kol.: České, slovenské
a československé dějiny 20. století, č. 14. Univerzita Hradec Králové – Gaudeamus, Hradec Králové
2020, pp. 89–106 and KABEŠOVÁ, Monika: Andrej Kaboš a Ervín Polák. Odvolaní vedoucí tajemníci
KV KSS Bratislava v kontextu hledání „vnitřních zrádců“ počátkem 50. let 20. století (Andrej Kaboš
and Ervín Polák. Dismissed chief secretaries of the KV KSS Bratislava in the context of the search for
“internal traitors” in the early 1950s). Historický časopis, 2021, Vol. 62, No. 4, pp. 317–344.
9	 I approached the topic before, but with different set of questions – see LÓŽI, Marián: Hledání nepřátel
uvnitř KSČ. Fóra, aktéři a konfliktní témata vnitrostranické komunikace v regionální perspektivě
(podzim 1950 – jaro 1951) (The Search for Enemies within the Communist Party. Forums, actors
and conflict issues of intra­‑party communication in a regional perspective /Autumn 1950 – Spring
1951/). Securitas Imperii, 2018, No. 32, pp. 222–249.
10	 RIGBY, Thomas H.: Early Provincial cliques and the rise of Stalin. In: RIGBY, Thomas H.: Political Elites
in the USSR. Central leaders and local cadres from Lenin to Gorbachev. Elgar, London – Aldershot
1990, pp. 43–72.
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114 Securitas Imperii 39/2021
ly.11
Of course, the conclusions of both scientists cannot be rigidly transferred to
the KSČ in the early 1950s; a typical Soviet guberniya was larger than Czechoslova‑
kia itself in its size, much less the regional party organisations. The conditions were
completely different in many respects. Moreover, in the studies of Rigby and espe‑
cially Easter, I somewhat lack an emphasis on relationships within the provincial
leadership and downwards, on functionary and party ranks. They focus exclusively
on the vertical relationship between headquarters and the province. Nevertheless,
I find them stimulating because they do not see the regional elite only as executors
of the centre’s order, but also as a group with their own identity and – albeit, of
course, a limited one – a position of power.
To process the results of my research, I decided to apply a broader comparative
point of view.12
I examined in detail the cases of the removal of the so­‑called dicta‑
tors in four regional organizations – Ústí nad Labem, Plzeň, Olomouc and Prešov.
I chose them because they were characterised by different courses and therefore
allowed me to capture both the basic general tendencies and the degree of varia‑
bility present. It is necessary to note that the KSČ was divided into 19 regional or‑
ganizations in this period (13 in the Czech lands and 6 in Slovakia). Therefore, I do
not attach any claim to universal validity to the findings, although I consider the
sample to be sufficiently representative, and in the analytical part I also mention
examples of other regions and offer several generalizing theses. It is also important
to note that each region has in its own way a unique milieu.
After a brief content analysis of the resolution, which the Secretariat of the Cen‑
tral Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (ÚV KSČ) devoted to
Šling’s case, and who was one of the important initiators of the “cleansing” cam‑
paign in the regions, I prepared case studies for four selected regions in the pre‑
sented text. I was interested in the actions of the central, regional and local party
actors, their mutual relations and how these conditioned the specific outcome of
the campaign in the given region. The archival sources here were the information
messages sent by the headquarters and especially the protocols of the actual meet‑
ings of the regional bodies – the operational regional presidiums (Předsednictvo
krajského výboru, PKV) and representative regional committees (Krajský výbor,
KV). In a mediated way also the meetings of the lower district bodies, the dis‑
trict presidiums (Předsednictvo okresního výboru, POV) and district committees
(Okresní výbor, OV) as well as other district and local meetings. Finally, I focused on
analysing the deeper reasons the course and results of the purges differed.
11	 EASTER, Gerald M.: Reconstructing the State. Personal Networks and Elite Identity in the Soviet
Russia. Cambridge University Press, London – New York 2000.
12	 In this direction, I was inspired by the work on the project Převzetí, upevnění a proměny panství KSČ
v českých zemích 1945–1956, regionální komparace (Takeover, consolidation and transformation of
the KSČ domination in the Czech lands 1945–1956, a regional comparison) – see BÍLÝ, Matěj – LÓŽI,
Marián – ŠLOUF, Jakub: Nervová vlákna diktatury. Regionální elity a komunikace uvnitř KSČ v letech
1945–1956 (Nerve fibres of the dictatorship. The regional elites and communication within the KSČ
in 1945–1956). ÚSTR, Praha 2019.
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115Securitas Imperii 39/2021
The resolution of the centre on Šling as the trigger of the campaign
After the discussion of the case of the arrested Otto Šling at a meeting of the ex‑
panded KV KSČ in Brno on 10 and 11 November 1950, a resolution was sent out
a week later on 17 November to the regional presidiums of the KSČ. It was entitled
About the discovery of a hostile agent in Brno and the elimination of the political
consequences of his activities.13
They were to discuss the document thoroughly and
acquaint the wider party ranks with it. Its significance was utterly essential – it
was precisely this document that initiated the large “cleansing” campaign in the re‑
gional party organisations. Therefore, it is necessary to pay attention to its content
and implications. In this resolution, Otto Šling, the former Chief Secretary of the
Communist Party, was officially described as a “dictator”. He was to have appointed
his personal supporters to important posts, suppressed the role of elected party
bodies, ruled despotically and ignored any criticism of his person.14
It is important
to note that the description provided reflected the critical voices of Šling’s oppo‑
nents directly in the Brno region.15
The headquarters completely identified with
them and protected them with its authority. From the very beginning, the whole
campaign was motivated not only by pressure from above, but also by local actors.
Nevertheless, the Secretariat of the ÚV KSČ was not limited to the role of recip‑
ient and mediator of the Brno critics. It enriched the interpretation with a fun‑
damental “revelation” that made Šling a spy working for the enemy camp: Such
facts were discovered, unknown to the party until then from the past of Otto Šling,
which clearly revealed Šling as an enemy agent and pest.16
This fantastic accusa‑
tion, carried entirely in the spirit of Stalinist ideology, had its rationality: it provid‑
ed the central leadership with a suitable tool for exculpation. According to him,
Šling’s dictatorship did not stem from the failure of the narrowest power group
or perhaps even systemic defects of the party mechanism, but from the malice of
foreign intelligence, willing to use even the dirtiest intrigues. At the same time,
Šling’s condemnation became a touchstone of membership loyalty to the party. An‑
yone who showed insufficient zeal or tried to stop the detection of the pests could
suddenly be identified as another agent and enemy. The eradication of the “trai‑
tors” had to be complete, without any compromises. The path to purification was
seen in a thorough examination of all the officials of the region, which would rid
the apparatus of unreliable, hostile foreign elements and elevate those who proved
13	 Národní archiv (The National Archives, hereinafter only NA), f. Organizační oddělení Marie Švermová
1945–1951 (hereinafter only 1261/2/5), sv. (Vol.) 54, a. j. (Archival Unit) 315, Pardubice – Kádrová
práce (Pardubice – Personnel work), Materiál pro schůzi mimořádného předsednictva KV KSČ dne
28. 11. 1950 (Material for the meeting of the extraordinary presidium of the KV KSČ on 28. 11. 1950),
p. 4.
14	 Ibid., pp. 139–140.
15	 KAŠKA, Václav: Neukáznění a neangažování, pp. 175–177.
16	 NA, f. 1261/2/5, sv. 54, a. j. 315, Pardubice – Kádrová práce, Materiál pro schůzi mimořádného
předsednictva KV KSČ on 28. 11. 1950, p. 4.
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116 Securitas Imperii 39/2021
particularly worthy by their wariness and vigilance. The party organization was to
be permeated by a truly Bolshevik form of criticism and self­‑criticism.17
The procedure approved for the Brno region was to become a guide for all other
regional organizations as well. This is evidenced by the call of Central Secretary
Rudolf Slánský, which was attached to the resolution: It is necessary to examine
whether criticism is being suppressed in your region as well, how it responds to
voices from below, to examine working methods in the activity of the party in your
region and to mobilize all citizenship and officials to increase wariness and vigilance
so that the detection of a hostile agent in Brno leads to even greater strengthening
of our party.18
This written appeal by the headquarters was completely identical for
all regions. It is all the more interesting to see the different ways it could have been
adopted and practiced in regional organisations.
The nerveless unseating of Mikuláš Landa (Ústí nad Labem region)19
Mikuláš Landa held the most administratively important position of Chief Secre‑
tary in the Ústí nad Labem regional organization of the KSČ. At the time of the issu‑
ance of the resolution on Šling, he had worked here only briefly (he was appointed
in June 1950) to replace Květoslav Innemann, who was transferred to the position
of director of the Central Political School. Unlike him, Landa had no direct previous
connection to the region. He was born in 1911 into a middle­‑class Jewish family
in Budapest, served as a central official of the Communist Youth Union during the
1930s, and spent the war in the Czechoslovak foreign army in Great Britain. After
1945, he worked in the central party apparatus, mainly in the post of an instructor
in the organizational department of the ÚV KSČ. The Otto Šling affair was personal‑
ly unpleasant for him from the very beginning, as he had often met with the former
Brno Secretary as an instructor.20
The regional presidium in Ústí nad Labem first came to discuss Šling’s case at its
meeting on 31 October 1950, before the resolution of the Central Secretariat was
sent. The Chief Secretary of the KV KSČ Landa informed the other members about
the report from Comrade Slánský about the Chief Secretary in Brno. He was very
brief and emphasised the need in personnel policy to fight consistently and openly
for one’s views and the need to defend internal party democracy. His concise ap‑
proach was summed up in a laconic summary: We are not critical enough.21
The en‑
suing discussion did not develop much either. The members of the presidium, Jan
Budil and Antonín Šťastný, mentioned Landa’s potentially problematic relationship
17	 Ibid., pp. 7–8.
18	 Ibid., p. 3.
19	 For comparison, see HRADECKÝ, Tomáš: Hodnocení činnosti krajského tajemníka KSČ Mikuláše
Landy pohledem regionálních politických složek z doby před procesem, pp. 347–354.
20	 Ibid., pp. 344–345.
21	 NA, f. 1261/2/5, sv. 42, a. j. 260, Ústí nad Labem – Předsednictvo (Ústí nad Labem – presidium)
Uncovering enemies in the regional leadership
117Securitas Imperii 39/2021
with his subordinates in disguised allusions, but another member Rovný sharp‑
ly cut them off, noting that comrades who hated constructive criticism spoke of
fear.22
Landa’s position in the region seemed to be solid. This was also confirmed by
a meeting of the presidium on 19 November, when the headquarters representative
Jiří Hendrych attacked Otto Šling very sharply, but he assessed the party leadership
in Ústí nad Labem positively.23
The situation changed fundamentally a week later, at a presidium meeting on
27 November. The protocol of the meeting do not seem to have survived, but there
is a report from Central Instructor Josef Koliáš on 4 December, which, despite sub‑
jective tone, provides invaluable information: Comrade Landa read the resolution
on the case of Šling and made a self­‑criticism in which he tended to blame and criti‑
cize others.24
As the Chief Regional Secretary, who moreover had met regularly with
Šling in his former post of instructor of the Brno region,25
Landa sensed the fickle‑
ness of his position and chose an attacking tone. However, it did not help him. Oth‑
er members of the presidium formed a united front against him and attacked him
fiercely, some even speaking openly about Landa […] as an enemy of the party.26
The Chief Secretary understood that his situation was extremely serious and be‑
gan a cautious retreat. He admitted a particular mistakes and the fact that he thor‑
oughly mastered Šling’s working methods: He didn’t see people, but he wanted the
tasks to be accomplished at all costs. However, his confession was not enough for
the rest of the presidium: Following Comrade Landa’s self­‑criticism, the members
of the presidium re­‑entered and […] either directly or indirectly said that they did
not trust Comrade Landa and that they could not cooperate with him. All mem‑
bers of the presidium unanimously expressed their disbelief of Comrade Landa and
approached the Secretariat of the ÚV KSČ about his dismissal from the position of
Chief Secretary of the KV KSČ. The headquarters complied with their request and
recommended the former instructor of the Ústí nad Labem Region, Josef Tesla, for
Landa’s position, which was accepted by all votes at the meeting of the regional
presidium.27
The darkest perspectives opened up before Mikuláš Landa himself. In February of
the following year, he was arrested by the StB on his way back to Prague from a fic‑
tional and unrealized meeting of the presidium of the KV KSČ in Ústí nad Labem,28
1950/5, Zápis ze schůze předsednictva KV KSČ z 31. 10. 1950 v Ústí nad Labem (Minutes of the
meeting of the presidium of the KV KSČ from 31. 10. 1950 in Ústí nad Labem), p. 1.
22	Ibid.
23	 HRADECKÝ, Tomáš: Hodnocení činnosti krajského tajemníka KSČ Mikuláše Landy pohledem
regionálních politických složek z doby před procesem, pp. 347–348.
24	 NA, f. 1261/2/5, sv. 41, a. j. 254, Ústí nad Labem – Kádrová práce (Ústí nad Labem – Personnel work),
Zpráva z kraje Ústí nad Labem, psána 4. 12. 1950 Josefem Koliašem (Report from the Ústí nad Labem
region, written on 4. 12. 1950 by Josef Koliaš), p. 2.
25	 Ibid., Dopis Mikuláše Landy Bruno Köhlerovi (Letter of Mikuláš Landa to Bruno Köhler), 7. 7. 1950.
26	 Ibid., Zpráva z kraje Ústí nad Labem, psána 4. 12. 1950 Josefem Koliašem, p. 2.
27	Ibid.
28	 Archiv Národního muzea (ANM), f. Bedřich Hájek (434), k. (Box) 1, Moje vzpomínka na padesátá léta
marián lóžistudies
118 Securitas Imperii 39/2021
brutally investigated and sentenced three years later to a 20-year prison sentence
in a closed trial.29
The absolute harmony shown by the members of the regional presidium in the
meeting with the Chief Secretary evokes the appearance of sincerely experienced
hostility and resentment, but such a judgement would be misleading at the very
least, because it would ignore the fundamental role played by the central instructor
Josef Koliáš, the author of the above­‑mentioned report, in provoking opposition
to Landa. He had been active in the Ústí Region since the beginning of October
195030
, during which time he saw no significant resistance to Landa’s person.31
He himself did the same and supported the Chief Secretary at the meetings of
the presidium several times.32
However, this did not prevent him from provoking
hostile sentiments against Landa at an opportune moment, through instructively
guided conversations with individual members of the presidium. He asked about
their relationship with the Chief Secretary and spoke about the tense situation at
the party Secretariat. The chairman of the KV KSČ in Ústí nad Labem Václav Poko‑
rný was surprised by the questions asked and considered Landa’s behaviour to be
correct. Instructor Koliáš found more understanding listeners in other members
of the presidium Jan Budil, Miloslav Špatenko and Antonín Šťastný, “who, at my
urging, confided in me and complained badly about Comrade Landa”33
Significantly,
it was these officials who subsequently became Landa’s most active critics, not
avoiding even the most acute attacks. They diligently performed the task assigned
to them. However, they did not receive any appreciation for their deed. Koliáš him‑
self described their performance as tense: A number of the statements made by
Comrade Budil and Comrade Šťastný were exaggerated.34
All the credit for the “un‑
veiling” of Mikuláš Landa should have belonged to a higher instance. Personally,
this applies to instructor Koliáš, who could present himself as a vigorous fighter
against the local dictatorship. Jiří Hendrych, the delegate of the headquarters, also
played an important role, commuting regularly to Ústí nad Labem at the time
and gradually becoming very critical of Landa – among other things, during that
a jejich dozvuky, rukopis (My memory of the 1950s and their resonances, manuscript), 9. 7. 1968,
p. 82.
29	 ČTK: Proces s pomahači protistátního spikleneckého centra (Trial with the assistants of the anti‑state
conspiracy centre). Rudé právo, 30. 1. 1954, p. 2.
30	 NA, f. 1261/2/5, sv. 42, a. j. 260, Ústí nad Labem – Předsednictvo 1950/5, Zápis ze schůze předsednictva
KV KSČ v Ústí nad Labem konané dne 2. 10. 1950 (Minutes of the meeting of the presidium of the
KV KSČ in Ústí nad Labem taking place on 2. 10. 1950), p. 6.
31	 Ibid., sv. 41, a. j. 254, Ústí nad Labem – Kádrová práce, Zpráva z kraje Ústí nad Labem, psána
4. 12. 1950 Josefem Koliašem, p. 1.
32	 For instance still in the evaluation of the vetting of the village organisation in Líšťany. NA, f. 1261/2/5,
sv. 42, a. j. 260, Ústí nad Labem – Předsednictvo 1950/5, Zápis ze schůze předsednictva KV KSČ,
konané dne 20. 11. 1950 v Ústí nad Labem (Minutes of the meeting of the presidium of the KV KSČ
in Ústí nad Labem taking place on 20. 11. 1950), pp. 2–8.
33	 Ibid., sv. 41, a. j. 254, Ústí nad Labem – Kádrová práce, Zpráva z kraje Ústí nad Labem, psána
4. 12. 1950 Josefem Koliašem, p. 1.
34	 Ibid., p. 3.
Uncovering enemies in the regional leadership
119Securitas Imperii 39/2021
heated session on 27 November, he gave a closing speech in the discussion of the
resolution on Šling35
and at the meeting of the KV KSČ on 16 December he added
a sharply denunciating introductory speech on Landa and his work in the region.36
Through Koliáš and Hendrych, the then plan of the central actors was completely
implemented. The dexterous intervention relieved them of responsibility for the
previous policies while maintaining status of the party centre as the primary mov‑
er and monopoly holder of power. The basic principles of the party hierarchy have
been complied with.
However, the local context cannot be ignored entirely. The motivation for ousting
Landa, although not decisive, also existed directly in the region. This is evidenced
by the already mentioned member of the presidium and the regional head of the
party’s organizational and instructor department, Jan Budil, who with his prickly
outbursts not only fulfilled the wishes of the highest places, but also gave passage
to purely personal antipathies. He was in a hostile relationship with Landa, which
dated back at least to the party vetting in August 1950, because the Chief Secretary
then in addition to words of praise included also sharp criticism. Inter alia, he rep‑
rimanded him that he did not rely on co­‑workers and could not use the help provided
by the party.37
This unflattering assessment did not go unanswered. Budil in the
Regional Secretariat deliberately created an atmosphere of fear around Landa,38
in
order to make his position harder. When the opportunity arose, he struck at him
with full force.
Even more markedly, opposition to Chief Secretary Landa was felt in the Com‑
munist Party’s district organizations. For example, Bohumil Lipert, the Secretary
in the Děčín district, described the results of his work in the darkest colours: […]
Landa’s policy was introduced into the districts. The form of criticism was such
that people did not want to work, they were afraid.39
The report on Landa’s over‑
throw was therefore received very positively. Enthusiasm was even such that Tesla,
the new regional Chief Secretary, feared the disintegration of the discipline: There
was a general relief in the region, but there was a second danger that many might
go to the other extreme. There is no need to meet the deadlines, we must not insist
35	 Ibid., p. 2.
36	 The historian Tomáš Hradecký attributes a fundamental share in Landa’s appeal to Hendrych (and
the former Chief Secretary of the KV KSČ Ústí nad Labem Květoslav Innemann). HRADECKÝ, Tomáš:
Hodnocení činnosti krajského tajemníka KSČ Mikuláše Landy pohledem regionálních politických
složek z doby před procesem, pp. 349–350.
37	 NA, f. 1261/2/5, sv. 41, a. j. 254, Ústí nad Labem – Kádrová práce, Zápis z mimořádné schůze
předsednictva KV KSČ, konané dne 10. 8. 1950 (Minutes of the extraordinary meeting of the
presidium of the KV KSČ, taking place on 10. 8. 1950), p. 1.
38	 Ibid., Opis dopisu, který byl předán Marii Švermové Miroslavem Kárným (Copy of a letter which was
handed to Marie Švermová by Miroslav Kárný), 16. 11. 1950, p. 1.
39	 Ibid., Zpráva ze schůze krajských instruktorů a vedoucích tajemníků OV z 12. 12. 1950 (Report from
the meeting of the regional instructors and chief secretaries of the OV from 12 December 1950),
p. 2.
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120 Securitas Imperii 39/2021
on compliance, because that would be a dictatorship.40
Landa’s fall thus satisfied not
only the top management, but also local, more directly oriented actors.
Nevertheless, the interest of the headquarters was the key factor. Regional and
district officials remained passive for a long time and only began to act when they
were called upon to do so. The question arises as to why this was the case. The most
inspiring clue provides an indication of how long Landa served as Chief Secretary of
the region. He held the post for five months, from June to November 1950, which
was a mere fraction of Šling’s five­‑year leadership in the Brno Region. Previously,
he had not held any post in the Ústí’s party apparatus, he came from headquarters.
It is therefore possible to express a hypothesis that in such a short period of time,
his so­‑called dictatorial practices could not have manifested themselves sufficiently
and could not have created too many enemies for him. At the same time, he did not
manage to build his own position, which therefore stood on very unstable founda‑
tions. This is also confirmed by the fact that Landa did not have time to appoint any
deputies, which he justified by the fact that there were not so capable comrades in
the regional apparatus who could be nominated for such important positions.41
The
chairman of the KV KSČ in Ústí nad Labem Pokorný saw in the absence of a deputy
a major problem for Landa’s leadership and expected a remedy from one’s estab‑
lishment.42
However, that did not happen. A group of loyal collaborators, which is
an important support for every member of the regional Stalinist elite, was very
poorly developed by Landa. Mikuláš Landa thus lacked more fundamental oppo‑
nents and allies in the local framework. Therefore, the decisive role in the cleansing
campaign could fall to the headquarters, which removed him from office in relative
calm, only with a temporary and not very significant activation of local officials and
organisations.
The irreconcilable fight against the “Lomský group” (Pilsen region) 43
The Chief Secretary of the regional organisation of the KSČ in Pilsen was Hanuš
Lomský. He became one in December 1948 after a series of reorganizations caused
by an internal party conflict. At that time, the local leadership came under fire due
to poor management of the region, and Lomský was sent by the headquarters to
restore order in July. Prior to that, he had not held any position in the Pilsen re‑
gional apparatus. He was born in 1917 in Mariánské Lázně, just like Mikuláš Landa
40	Ibid.
41	 Ibid., Opis dopisu, který byl předán Marii Švermové Miroslavem Kárným, 16. 11. 1950, p. 2.
42	 NA, f. 1261/2/5, sv. 42, a. j. 260, Ústí nad Labem – Předsednictvo 1950/5, Zápis ze schůze předsednictva
KV KSČ ze dne 31. 10. 1950 in Ústí nad Labem (Minutes of the meeting of the presidium of the KV
KSČ in Ústí nad Labem from 31. 10. 1950), p. 1.
43	 For comparison, see ŠLOUF, Jakub: Podvedená strana. Zrod masového komunistického hnutí na
Plzeňsku, jeho disciplinace, centralizace a byrokratizace (1945–1948) (Deceived party. The birth of the
mass communist movement in the Pilsen region, its discipline, centralization and bureaucratization
/1945–1948/). Západočeská univerzita v Plzni, Plzeň 2016, pp. 149–152.
Uncovering enemies in the regional leadership
121Securitas Imperii 39/2021
into a Jewish family. He had been a member of the KSČ since 1937, during the
occupation he lived in England, after the war he worked as a Secretary in the Sec‑
retariat of the ÚV KSČ.44
He also had a close acquaintance with the arrested Brno
Secretary Šling.
The Regional presidium in Pilsen received the resolution on Šling’s case for dis‑
cussion on 1 December 1950. The Chief Secretary of the KV KSČ Lomský opened
the meeting with partial self­‑criticism, in which he pointed out a number of short‑
comings in party work. He confirmed the occurrence of dictatorial methods, which
were especially reflected in the suppression of any criticism of the Secretariat and
the leading officials of the region. He asked the plenary a suggestive question,
which he immediately answered himself: Are we heloing criticism or killing it? We
kill it by formally admitting mistakes, as well as our impatience with criticism or
brushing it off. He strongly condemned the personnel policy, for which he took per‑
sonal responsibility. However, it is not without significance that he did not expect
any “enemy” cadres in his own party apparatus. He consciously distinguished the
situation in the Pilsen Region from the Brno conditions, where the alleged “ene‑
mies” within the Communist Party Secretariat were to pose the greatest danger. At
the end of the appearance, Lomský moved to a personal level when he admitted
a close working relationship with Šling and wanted to know whether this fact did
not affect him in the performance of his duties.45
The other speakers also more or less continued in the direction set by the Chief
Secretary Lomský. Although they did not avoid sharp criticism of the party bodies,
mostly the regional secretariat, they primarily attacked their insufficient interest
in institutions outside the communist party. For example, Josef Hora, a trade un‑
ion official, explained the poor work of the unions by saying that the staff of the
party secretariat did not take trade union officials seriously and never had time
for them.46
The outputs did not lack urgency, but they were within clearly defined
boundaries. The degree of Lomský’s guilt was assessed very benevolently. The au‑
thoritarian practices were not explained by his personal inclinations, but were to
stem from the inadequacy of other senior officials. The overall wording of the ple‑
nary was moderate: some inappropriate procedures were called out, but the per‑
petrators were not identified and punished. The group of personalities standing at
the head of the regional organization was to remain unchanged.
There was no change in this direction at the meeting of the KV KSČ on 16 and
17 December, but the downward pressure intensified. Hanuš Lomský found the
culprits among district and local officials. Specifically, he attacked a member of
the presidium of the OV KSČ Rokycany, who had abused his post for 3 years […]
44	 Ibid., p. 145.
45	 NA, f. 1261/2/5, sv. 32, a. j. 217, Plzeň – Kádrová práce (Plzeň – Personnel work), Projednání
brněnského případu v předsednictvu KV Plzeň (Discussion of the Brno case in the presidium of the
KV KSČ Plzeň), 1. 12. 1950, pp. 1–2.
46	 Ibid., p. 7.
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interfered with the vetting of his wife, who had not attended meetings for a year […].
He pursued a personal family policy. According to Lomský, the share of the regional
leadership was limited to passivity: We were informed of all these things, but it was
our fault that we did not manage to intervene. He continued to present himself as
a “fighter for the purity of the party” in the ongoing, “sharpening struggle!”: The
class enemy will continue to try to send agents to our party or acquire its agents di‑
rectly from party members. The more we grow, the harder […] the enemy’s method
will be. […] We must educate the whole party to greater revolutionary wariness and
vigilance.47
Lomský’s interpretation was not in any way questioned during the meeting. In
several articles, criticism was levelled at individual regional officials, but not at the
regional party elite. At the end, the chairman of the KV KSČ Plzeň Karel Poláček
could thus put the search for the enemy in the proper limits: We have to make
sure that, where work gets stuck, individuals who hinder work are exposed like Šling
in Brno.48
The detection of “traitors” should not become more massive; in no case
should the regional party leaders be endangered.
However, this assumption was refuted in the following weeks, as the party head‑
quarters began an investigation with Hanuš Lomský due to his personal acquaint‑
ance with Šling and Švermová, working in the central organizational department
and, of course, activity in Pilsen itself. Lomský was repeatedly summoned to Prague,
and at the end of January 1951 he was investigated for two days by the head of the
personnel department, Bruno Köhler, who alerted him to serious mistakes in party
work.49
It was undoubtable that the endangered Chief Secretary of the KV KSČ
Plzeň was in a difficult position. He largely confessed the offense, even publicly. At
the meeting of the Pilsen KV KSČ on 3 February, he embarked on a wide­‑ranging
self­‑criticism, in which he reproached himself for many mistakes: I have insuffi‑
ciently understood the question of the class struggle, I have underestimated for us
the Marx­‑Leninist teachings on the sharpening of the class struggle during the peri‑
od of socialist building, and I have been deceived by great successes. I did not learn
enough from the Soviet Union to fight the class enemy. For these reasons, albeit un‑
knowingly, he should have been involved in “traitorous” activities: These mistakes
have led me to play, albeit unknowingly, a role aimed at […,] allowing Šling or peo‑
ple under his influence to take power in the party, which would mean nothing less
than re­‑establishing capitalism. Finally, Lomský told the KV KSČ that he had asked
the presidium of the ÚV KSČ to remove him from the position of Chief Secretary.50
47	 Státní oblastní archiv (hereinafter only SOA) v Plzni, f. KV KSČ Plzeň, k. 27, Zápis ze zasedání krajského
výboru strany v Plzni dne 16. 12. 1950 (Minutes from the meeting of the regional committee of the
party in Pilsen on 16. 12. 1950), pp. 18, 20.
48	 Ibid., p. 98.
49	 NA, f. ÚV KSČ – Komise I. (Commission I), sv. 18, a. j. 346, Dopisy Hanuše a Marty Lomských (Letters
of Hanuš and Marta Lomský), 26. 12. 1955, p. 1.
50	 SOA v Plzni, f. KV KSČ Plzeň, k. 27, Zápis ze schůze KV KSČ (Minutes from the meeting of the KV
KSČ), 3. 2. 1951, pp. 4–5.
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The initial reaction of the participants in the meeting was very moderate towards
Lomský. The remark was made by Hana Sojková, a member of the KV KSČ, who
told the plenary that many of the mistakes which [comrade Lomský] has spoken of
here were made by every one of us.51
The discussants were so conciliatory towards
Lomský that they upset the present representative of the headquarters, Jiří Hend‑
rych. He said irritably: Only a small debate developed here on the announcement of
comrade Lomský.52
In Hendrych’s judgement, the meeting of the KV KSČ in Pilsen
was simply insufficient in assessing the alleged mistakes of the Chief Secretary.
Of the same, if not even more critical, opinion were also the functionaries of the
party’s district organizations, who until then had rather been on the defensive. At
the convened committees, they bitterly complained about the situation in the re‑
gion and demanded an extensive personnel cleansing. They pointed out that there
was a bad personnel policy, that there was a police regime. […] The criticism of the
comrades at the OV KSČ calls for all Lomský’s collaborators to be removed.53
The
exasperation of the party members in the districts was also supported by the fact
that Hanuš Lomský was arrested on 7 February at the behest of the headquarters.
The StB arrested him when he left an interview with Köhler, right in the door of
the building of the ÚV KSČ. 54
At the end of the month, at a meeting of the ÚV KSČ,
Minister of Information Václav Kopecký spoke about him, along with Šling and
Švermová, as one of the insidious conspirators who had been detected and caught55
Lomský spent the next three years in pre­‑trial detention before being sentenced
on 28 January 1954 at the same trial as Mikuláš Landa to fifteen years in prison.56
Another regional committee met on 1 March 1951 in Pilsen in an atmosphere
aggravated by Lomský’s arrest and an influx of criticism from district officials.
General Secretary of the ÚV KSČ Rudolf Slánský himself delivered the introductory
speech this time. He spoke minimally about the local context of the ongoing “de‑
tection of enemies in the party” and Lomský was mentioned only twice, but Slán‑
ský included him in the narrative of the so­‑called big conspiracy, which formed the
axis of his interpretation. He told the plenary that alliance was based on the kinship
of political views, anti­‑party, anti­‑Soviet, anti­‑communist, and this also brought the
whole faction closer. Its alleged members were to abuse their positions in the party
apparatus and manipulate other regional secretaries. In the end, they thought of
51	 Ibid., p. 6.
52	 Ibid., p. 10.
53	 NA, f. 1261/2/5, sv. 32, a. j. 217, Plzeň – Kádrová práce, Záznam z předsednictva KV KSČ Plzeň ze dne
9. 3. 1951 (Record from the presidium of the KV KSČ Plzeň from 9. 3. 1951), p. 1.
54	 NA, f. ÚV KSČ – Komise I., sv. 18, a. j. 354, Záznamy o pohovoru s H. Lomským (Records from the
conversation with H. Lomský), 22. 2. 1963, p. 2.
55	 KOPECKÝ, Václav: Zpráva vyšetřujícíci komise předsednictva Ústředního výboru k případu Otty
Šlinga, Marie Švermové a druhých zločinných škůdců a spiklenců (Report of the investigating
commission of the presidium of the Central Committee on the case of Otto Šling, Marie Švermová
and other criminal saboteurs and conspirators). Rudé právo, 27. 2. 1951, p. 7.
56	ČTK: Proces s pomahači protistátního spikleneckého centra, p. 2.
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convening a nationwide conference, at which, according to their plan, it would be
possible to make a change in the party’s leadership, and with it changes in govern‑
ment and the removal of the president of the republic. The KSČ had been saved
only by the presence of mind of its highest representatives: Today, the whole party
owes the ÚV KSČ and, above all, [president] comrade [Klement] Gottwald for the
fact that the conspiracy of treacherous pests had been defeated.57
It is obvious that
Slánský conceived the whole affair as a matter of the highest importance, a true
turning point in the history of the KSČ.
The local participants of the meeting on the other hand focused strictly on the
regional context of the affair. In their contributions, they drew attention to vari‑
ous shortcomings on a regional, district and local scale, and looked for culprits.
The functionaries of the OV KSČ also resorted to self­‑criticism, but it very often
slipped into more or less veiled accusations upwards. The contribution of František
Monhart, the Chief Secretary in the Pilsen 3 party organization, was symptomatic
in this regard. He admitted that the district had made mistakes. He saw the main
cause, however, in the disinterest and dictatorial practices of Hanuš Lomský: “De‑
spite the fact that Lomský lived almost next to the [District] Secretariat, he almost
never came to take a look at the Secretariat. […] It was a hunt for results […]. It
was Lomský, who forced us to make the results ever larger, since we are a border
region”. 58
The Chief Secretary of the OV KSČ Přeštice Jan Škácha spoke in a similar
vein, according to whom erroneous instructions were enforced against the will of
the district presidium, because Lomský said so.59
The district party elite had thus
relinquished the responsibility it had delegated to a higher authority.
As at previous district committee meetings, the criticism expressed was not lim‑
ited to Lomský, but also indirectly included other regional officials. Roman Bek,
a member of the KV KSČ, formulated their interconnection mildly: Many of Lom‑
ský’s collaborators took over his working methods and separated from the party
base. This isolation must be overcome. We must remove the Great Wall of China in
the KV [KSČ]..60
The instructor of the OV KSČ Stanislav Bálek spoke much more
sharply: When we look at the collaborators Lomský chose, we see that he relied on
people to whom the working class was foreign who could not benefit the party. The
content of his work and the content of the work of our agitation reflected this.61
The
relationship between the regional and district elites has changed dramatically since
December of the previous year.
The leading regional party leaders were completely taken aback by the rapid
development of events. The confused speech of the chairman of the KV KSČ Plzeň,
57	 SOA v Plzni, f. KV KSČ Plzeň, k. 27, Zápis krajského výboru konaného dne 1. 3. 1951 v Plzni (Minutes
of the regional committee held on 1. 3. 1951 in Pilsen), p. 8.
58	 Ibid., p. 62.
59	 Ibid., p. 67.
60	 Ibid., p. 19.
61	 Ibid., p. 32.
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Karel Poláček, at the meeting of the presidium on 9 March is illustrative in this
respect: We have caused chaos in our heads. There was a spy in our ranks, and we
followed him. We did our policy so badly that we did not expose him. If there were
no other circumstances, he would still be sitting here. Lomský was recalled not only
because there were mistakes, but mainly because he did not tell the party what he
knew about Šling. It is not yet clear why he was recalled. It has not yet been made
clear in what way he hurt the party the most.62
However, helplessness did not affect everyone. Miroslav Finek, Deputy Chief Sec‑
retary, temporarily entrusted with being in charge of the Regional Secretariat, took
a very proactive approach at the meeting.63
Although he was referred to in the
region “as Lomský’s striking fist”,64
he fully identified with the criticism of the re‑
gional leadership coming from the districts: […] comrades on district committees
are right to ask… We must admit that comrades are right. And he immediately
announced the dismissal of the first two most criticized employees of the party
apparatus, Ivan Lewinger and Jarmila Krýslová: Lewinger is removed from the par‑
ty apparatus and goes into production, Krýslová is put on leave. At the end of his
speech, he recommended that commissions be set up to investigate the work of the
KV KSČ apparatus and all members of the presidium.65
Finek showed the same zeal
the next day at a meeting of the KV KSČ, at which he advocated the consistent use
of criticism and self­‑criticism to eliminate the shortcomings and methods used by the
people of Šling and Lomský. To introduce constant monitoring in the daily scrutiny of
the work of each official and party member.66
The whole speech lasted almost three
hours, and the Deputy Chief Secretary clearly presented himself as the main fight‑
er against dictatorship and for the purge of the regional organization. A project
initiated by him was submitted to the KV KSČ for the election of a four­‑member
commission of inquiry to investigate the entire case.67
The proposal was approved
unanimously. Everything seemed to be going according to Finek’s intentions.
However, the situation got out of hand very quickly. The established commission
of inquiry showed surprising independence from its originator and came into di‑
rect contact with headquarters. On 4 April 1951, its members went to see General
Secretary Slánský to inform him on the course of the investigation. The findings
they reached were devastating for the highest officials of the Pilsen region. For
62	 NA, f. 1261/2/5, sv. 32, a. j. 217, Plzeň – Kádrová práce, Záznam z předsednictva KV KSČ Plzeň ze dne
9. 3. 1951 (Record from the presidium of the KV KSČ from 9. 3. 1951], p. 8.
63	 SOA v Plzni, f. KV KSČ Plzeň, k. 27, Zápis ze schůze KV KSČ (Minutes from the meeting of the KV
KSČ), 3. 2. 1951, pp. 11–12.
64	 NA, f. 1261/2/5, sv. 32, a. j. 217, Plzeň – Kádrová práce, Záznam pro členy sekretariátu ÚV (Minutes
for the members of the Secretariat of the ÚV), 4. 4. 1951, p. 1.
65	 Ibid., Záznam z předsednictva KV KSČ Plzeň ze dne 9. 3. 1951 (Minutes from the meeting of the
presidium of the KV KSČ in Plzeň form 9. 3. 1951), p. 1.
66	 Ibid., Zpráva ze zasedání KV KSČ v Plzni dne 11. 3. 1951 (Minutes from the meeting of the KV KSČ
in Plzeň form 11. 3. 1951), p. 2.
67	 Ibid., p. 1.
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example, the second Deputy Chief Secretary, Ladislav Čada, was accused of a collab‑
orative past and incorrect activities: During the occupation, he was commissioned
to run a German photo company, married a German woman who claimed German
nationality and had the whole family deported to West Germany as active fascists.68
[…] He had suspicious contacts with Lomský. Above all, however, the commission
included the serious accusations against Finek himself: There is a mood against
him in the region, he is strongly criticized at the district conferences that have taken
place so far, they say that he was Lomský’s striking fist. In this way, the commission
discredited four members of the presidium and one member of the KV KSČ.69
The
conclusions of the commission were clear – to recall them all immediately. Head‑
quarters reacted most favourably: Comrade Slánský recommended the members of
the commission to continue in their work, examine all the members of the KV KSČ,
[and] prepare proposals for new members of the presidium.70
The position of the attacked against such an onslaught was unsustainable. At the
meeting of the presidium of the KV KSČ Plzeň 10 April 1951 they resorted to a des‑
perate defence. Ladislav Čada protested and stressed that he remained the son of
the Pilsen working class despite his mistakes.71
Miroslav Finek was humbler. He ex‑
plained his close relationship with Lomský by the fact that deposed Secretary once
possessed a great amount of prestige: […] he did not come here just like that. After
all, as a member of the Central Secretariat, as a Regional Secretary, it was a per‑
sonality and he was trusted. And how could some Finek have afforded to distrust
a man who is far ahead of him politically… However, he understood that because of
this bond, and given past transgressions, his position was unsustainable, that such
a person could not stand in the party apparatus. 72
The next day he was fired by the
KV KSČ. And with him the rest of the once powerful “Lomský group”.73
A member
of the investigative labour commission, the pre­‑war communist Marie Hergetová
could legitimately take on a sovereign tone in her contribution: The commission
relied on what it received from the members below. I do not think it can be said that
something in the Commission’s report is not based on the truth and that something
is not substantiated. […] It is clear from the questionnaires that many should not be
68	 Understandably, the level of actual guilt cannot be proved retroactively. Marriages between Czechs
and Germans were common before 1938; the “families of active fascists” were not by far the only
ones removed after the war. For me, it is proof of the period language and moods.
69	 Besides Čada and Finek, they were also the planning referent of the Regional National Committee
(Krajský národní výbor, KNV) Plzeň Josef Vostradovský, the chairman of the KNV Karel Frous and MP
Jaroslava Krafková.
70	 NA, f. 1261/2/5, sv. 32, a. j. 217, Plzeň – Kádrová práce, Záznam pro členy sekretariátu ÚV (Record
for the members of the Secretariat of the ÚV), 4. 4. 1951, pp. 1–3.
71	 Ibid., Zpráva ze zasedání PKV a KV v Plzni konané ve dnech 20.–21. 4. 1951 (Report from the meeting
of the presidium of the KV and KV in Pilsen held on 20.–21. 4. 1951), p. 1.
72	 Ibid., Zápis z mimořádné schůze předsednictva KV KSČ v Plzni, konané dne 20. 4. 1951 (Minutes of
the extraordinary meeting of the presidium of the KV KSČ, taking place on 10. 8. 1950), p. 7.
73	 Ibid., Zpráva ze zasedání PKV a KV v Plzni konané ve dnech 20.–21. 4. 1951, p. 3. Other than the
persons mentioned by the investigative commission on 4. 4. 1951, the deputy head of the cultural
promotion section Břetislav Poncar was also recalled.
Uncovering enemies in the regional leadership
127Securitas Imperii 39/2021
in their places.74
This is how she spoke about the once most powerful representa‑
tives of the Communist Party in the Pilsen region.
The gradually formed “coalition” of the headquarters with dissatisfied lower offi‑
cials in the region celebrated a full victory. It is obvious that the variable compared
to the situation in Ústí nad Labem was the activity at the regional and district level.
The lower ranks of officials used Šling’s case to depose the unpopular regional
Stalinist elite. At first glance, Hanuš Lomský’s position seemed to be more stable
than that of Mikuláš Landa – Lomský had been in Pilsen for a relatively long time
and surrounded himself with a group of close collaborators, especially representa‑
tives Miroslav Finek and Ladislav Čada. However, over time, this group managed to
antagonize more people at the same time. That is why the course of the campaign
was so dynamic and as a result not only Lomský fell, which was certainly the inten‑
tion of the headquarters, but with him the whole suite of his former supporters.
A defensive match for František Řezníček (Olomouc region)
The Chief Secretary of the KV KSČ in Olomouc was František Řezníček. He was
appointed to the post on 11 January 1950 under the extraordinary circumstances
of the so­‑called Olomouc case. His predecessor, a former foundry worker from Vít‑
kovice and a long­‑time KSČ official Josef Stavinoha, was then recalled and arrested
by members of the StB by a decision of the presidium of the ÚV KSČ.75
As the new
Chief Secretary, Řezníček consistently dealt with the consequences of the so­‑called
Stavinoha­‑ism. He dismissed Stavinoha’s collaborators from the Regional Secre‑
tariat on a large scale – for instance, on 10 February, 29 of them, including purely
administrative workers, were “released” by a resolution of the presidium of the KV
KSČ in Olomouc.76
Řezníček thus introduced himself as a strong member of the re‑
gional Stalinist elite. Like Landa and Lomský, he had not worked in his new domain
before. He was born on 11 May 1915 in Prague to Czech working­‑class parents, and
for a long time he made a living as a modeler in the metal industry. In the 1930s,
he was active in the Communist Youth Union and worked illegally during the war.
After 1945, he rose rapidly in the party hierarchy, from district to highest regional
office.77
He did not know Otto Šling personally, but he was in contact with Mikuláš
Landa, who came to visit him in Olomouc several times as an instructor and also
attended meetings of the regional presidium.
74	 SOA v Plzni, f. KV KSČ Plzeň, k. 27, Zápis krajského výboru, který se konal dne 21. 4. 1951 v Plzni
(Record of the regional committee, which took place on 21. 4. 1951 in Pilsen), p. 42.
75	 This was the first case of the “search for enemies in the party” after Karlovy Vary, initiated by the
Central Commission of Party Control, using disputes in the regional leadership. BIEBERLE, Josef:
K politickým procesům (Olomoucký případ 1949–1950) (On political trials /The Olomouc case,
1949–1950/). In: Slezský sborník, 1990, Vol. 88, No. 3, pp. 167–182.
76	 Ibid., pp. 176–177.
77	 NA, f. Oddělení stranických orgánů – krajské, městské a okresní konference KSČ, zasedání a plány
práce KV KSČ a MV KSČ 1945–1960 (Department of Party Bodies – Regional, Municipal and District
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It is not surprising that Řezníček first took a very proactive approach in the
campaign against so­‑called Šling­‑ism. At the meeting of the presidium of the KV
KSČ in Olomouc on 27 November 1950 he spoke extensively about the lessons
learned from the Brno case, which he divided into nine points for clarity, ranging
from the need not to create too close staff ties in the regional presidium to the
threat of so­‑called bad people in positions of responsibility.78
At no point, according
to Řezníček, was the situation in Olomouc comparable to the situation in Brno,
however, there were many partial shortcomings that he said needed to be rectified.
He considered it essential to be open to criticism: We must listen carefully to every
comment, investigate every important message.79
He assessed the current situation
as insufficient in this respect. Řezníček’s approach was rather modest; he lacked
a tendency to expressive statements and a leader’s self­‑presentation. He saw the
solution in a gradual correction rather than vigorous interventions. However, he
did not fail to appeal to the need for criticism, especially from below.
If Řezníček did not place his person in the spotlight, other participants of the
meeting did so for him. Deputy Chief Secretary Vlastimil Bělohlávek considered it
necessary to point out in particular that Řezníček, unlike Otto Šling, could not be
accused of dictatorial conduct: There is also talk here of dictatorship. I do not think
it is possible to say that a single official in the Regional Secretariat had manifested
such a behaviour, let alone in the slightest case Comrade Řezníček.80
The delegate
of the headquarters Vladimír Štička then directly appreciated the way in which
the Chief Secretary managed the regional organisation: I would like to tell you that
you have one advantage in the Olomouc region namely that Comrade Řezníček has
always had things handled from the party’s point of view, as the party should react
to these things.81
The entire discussion took place in a similar vein; the Brno case
did not seem to endanger Řezníček in any way. This was also reflected in the adopt‑
ed resolution, which summarized the consequences of the case for the Olomouc
region: it paid the main attention to the district organizations of the Communist
Party, touched briefly on the work of the Regional Secretariat, and completely kept
silent about any mistakes made by the Chief Secretary.82
Řezníček’s reputation in Olomouc remained spotless for a surprisingly long time,
even though more and more potentially dangerous signals came from the head‑
quarters and some regions. Already on 4 December, Řezníček informed the presid‑
Conference of the KSČ, meetings and work plans of the KV KSČ and MV KSČ 1945–1960) (hereinafter
only 1261/2/33), a. j. 840, VI. krajská konference v Olomouci ve dnech 22. a 23. 4. 1950 (VI. regional
conference in Olomouc on 22. and 23. 4. 1950), p. 294.
78	 NA, f. 1261/2/5, sv. 67, a. j. 376, Olomouc – Předsednictvo (Olomouc – Presidium) 1950/5), Zápis
ze schůze předsednictva KV KSČ, která se konala dne 27. 11. 1950 v Olomouci (Minutes from the
meeting of the presidium of the KV KSČ, which took place on 27. 11. 1950 in Olomouc), pp. 13–16.
79	 Ibid., p. 17.
80	 Ibid., pp. 18–19.
81	 Ibid., p. 20.
82	 Ibid., p. 21.
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129Securitas Imperii 39/2021
ium of the recall of the Chief Secretary of the KV KSČ in Ústí nad Labem Mikuláš
Landa.83
The two were not only united by holding the same position, but Landa, as
a central instructor, helped Řezníček to establish himself in Olomouc.84
From the
amount of partial information and indications, it can be concluded that there was
a confidential relationship between them.85
An instructor from the headquarters,
Václav Sova, then spoke very sinisterly at the meeting of the KV KSČ on 22 Decem‑
ber. Řezníček evaluated his contribution as follows: […] I do not, however, know
why comrade Sova, instructor of the KV KSČ (correctly ÚV KSČ – author’s note), ap‑
peared and said in the discussion that it went to little depth in the Brno case, and his
discussion showed that he would like to uncover a new case in the party at all costs.86
Finally, the most fundamental omen of future changes was the meeting of the
regional presidium on 1 February 1951, during which members were informed by
statements from the ÚV KSČ about the allegations against the party’s deputy Gen‑
eral Secretary Maria Švermová and the removal of Řezníček’s Deputy Bělohlávek.
Švermová had so far been criticized relatively moderately, and Bělohlávek was ap‑
parently recalled only because of his alleged collaborative activity during the war,
however, Řezníček thus lost two of his supports.87
Without the patronage of Šver‑
mová, he would hardly have achieved the post of secretary, while Bělohávek was his
right­‑hand man in the Regional Secretariat. All three were bound by close staff ties,
which must have been extremely uncomfortable for Řezníček. Personally, however,
he has not yet faced any attacks from headquarters.
That changed in the second half of February. František Řezníček was summoned
to Prague for an interview with the head of the central personnel department Bru‑
no Köhler. The meeting gradually took on the form of an interrogation, especially
when two members of the ÚV KSČ, Minister of Information Václav Kopecký and
Deputy Secretary General Gustav Bareš joined it. Řezníček described the event at
the meeting of the KV KSČ in Olomouc on 1 March as follows: They talked to me for
a full 6 hours and I think I explained some things to them and that helped. One mo‑
ment Comrade Bareš and Comrade Kopecký came into the room and they treated
83	 NA, f. 1261/2/5, sv. 67, a. j. 376, Olomouc – Předsednictvo (Olomouc – presidium) 1950/5, Zápis
o schůzi předsednictva KV KSČ, která se konala dne 4. 12. 1950 v Olomouci (Minutes from the
meeting of the presidium of the KV KSČ, which took place on 4. 12. 1950 in Olomouc), p. 22.
84	 Landa attended the meeting of the presidium of the KV KSČ Olomouc in January 1950, when
Řezníček was appointed to the post of Chief Secretary.
85	 For instance, they lived together for a week in a hotel in Olomouc. NA, f. 1261/2/5, sv. 67, a. j. 377,
Olomouc – Předsednictvo 1951/1, Zápis ze schůze předsednictva KV KSČ, která se konala 26. 2. 1951
v Olomouci (Minutes from the meeting of the presidium of the KV KSČ, which took place on
26. 2. 1951 in Olomouc), p. 11.
86	 NA, f. 1261/2/5, sv. 67, a. j. 376, Olomouc – Předsednictvo 1950/5, Zápis o mimořádné schůzi
předsednictva KV KSČ, která se konala dne pátek, 29. 12. 1950 v Olomouci (Minutes from the
extraordinary meeting of the presidium of the KV KSČ, which took place on Friday, 29. 12. 1950 in
Olomouc), p. 20.
87	 Ibid., a. j. 377, Olomouc – Předsednictvo 1951/1, Zápis o mimořádné schůzi předsednictva KV KSČ,
která se konala ve čtvrtek dne 1. 2. 1951 v Olomouci (Minutes from the extraordinary meeting of
the presidium of the KV KSČ, which took place on Thursday, 1. 2. 1951 in Olomouc), pp. 2–4.
marián lóžistudies
130 Securitas Imperii 39/2021
me differently, as in the disciplinary proceedings.88
Řezníček had avoided the fate of
Lomský, who was arrested immediately after leaving Köhler, but was still in a very
bad position. The course of the interview did not bode well for him.
It was under these circumstance on 1 March 1951 in Olomouc that the meeting
of the KV KSČ took place, which was attended by the minister of national defence
and son­‑in­‑law of the president of the republic Klement Gottwald himself, Alexej
Čepička, famous for his confrontational approach. It is possible to adopt only with
assuagement Řezníček’s assessment that the minister “came there to dispatch”
him.89
Čepička attacked immediately in the initial speech, if in a veiled way. He
seemingly only described Šling’s activity: Šling placed great emphasis on gradu‑
ally dominating all of the regions. Šling managed to put his people in the leading
positions in most of the regions. […] For five years, something has been created
that cannot be cured by one meeting of the party’s bodies. Here, it is necessary to
look carefully and responsibly at the activities of those who are responsible for the
activities of the party, and if it is found to be a bad thing, to relentlessly go against
it. This must be underlined in time in the Olomouc region as well. I do not think that
things have been resolved to date.90
The implications for Řezníček were clear. The
next step seems all too obvious – to state his guilt directly. Řezníček understood
the delicacy of his position well and did not hesitate to address it himself: I think
the ÚV KSČ, the KV KSČ and the whole [communist] party and mainly the regional
organisation of the party in Olomouc can rightly ask me – well and what about you?
Which group of regional officials did you belong to? How guilty do you feel? Howev‑
er, he refused to admit a fundamental mistake and presented himself as a staunch
communist without fear and shame: From the age of sixteen, I have not betrayed
the party and the working class, the Soviet Union and Comrade Stalin, proletarian
internationalism, the party leadership and Comrade Gottwald for a moment not
even in thought.91
An open conflict ensued between the minister and the Chief Sec‑
retary. Čepička accused Řezníčka of not saying everything honestly and that he had
left a back door for himself.92
He now openly pointed out his affiliation with the al‑
leged traitors: Comrade Řezníček was in touch with Švermová, he also visited her in
a flat in Prague.93
And the victim defended himself strongly: However, I cannot feel
anything that I would have done against the party and the republic. Švermová was
88	 Zemský archiv v Opavě, pobočka Olomouc (Provincial Archive in Opava, Olomouc branch), f. KV
KSČ Olomouc, inv. č. (Inventory Number) 16, Zasedání pléna 1. 3. 1951 (Meeting of the Plenary on
1. 3. 1951), p. 52.
89	 The evaluation comes from František Řezníček himself. NA, f. 1261/2/5, sv. 68, a. j. 378, Olomouc –
Předsednictvo 1951/2, Zápis ze schůze předsednictva KV KSČ, která se konala 5. 3. 1951 v Olomouci
(Minutes from the meeting of the presidium of the KV KSČ which took place on 5. 3. 1951 in
Olomouc), p. 23.
90	 Zemský archiv v Opavě, pobočka Olomouc, f. KV KSČ Olomouc, k. 9, inv. č. 16, Zasedání pléna
1. 3. 1951, p. 12.
91	 Ibid., p. 31.
92	 Ibid., p. 61.
93	 Ibid., p. 66.
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131Securitas Imperii 39/2021
the deputy of Comrade Slánský. I obeyed her orders; she did not give me any personal
orders.94
The tense personal skirmish defined the course of the entire meeting.
Behind Čepička stood the headquarter’s power authority and the thickening at‑
mosphere of the “hunt for hidden enemies”; Řezníček was covered with allegations
and was on the defensive. Members of the KV KSČ and other participants would
have been able to join the attack with impunity, thus proving loyalty to the head‑
quarters. Instead, most of those involved in the clash stood in support of Řezníček.
The pre­‑war communist Herma Barfusová saw in him the best human qualities:
I have known Comrade Řezníček from the time when I was in the central political
school. I can say that he seemed to me there as one of the few people who were very
thorough and honest and tried to acquire as much knowledge as possible and then
pass on their experience to the rest. Then I greatly appreciated his honesty.95
The
chairman of the company organisation in the factory for machinists’ tools Mikeš‑
ka testified to Řezníček’s popularity with ordinary labourers: As far as Comrade
Řezníček is concerned, he gives me the impression of an honest fighter for a better
tomorrow for labourers. It is the opinion of all comrades who meet him. Our com‑
rades also asked me, on their behalf, to tell Comrade Řezníček to come to us, that
they would like to see him again.96
Babica, a former member of the workers’ scruti‑
ny commission, summed up the prevailing sentiment about the Chief Secretary: We
believed him and still do.97
Čepička’s escalating attacks on Řezníček and his support‑
ers only strengthened this defensive reaction, and in the end it was not Řezníček,
but the headquarters, who came under the criticism. Antonín Plíska, a member
of the KV KSČ, went the furthest to ask a suggestive rhetorical question: All the
blame here is falling on Comrade Řezníček. However, the question is whether there
were no more competent people in the Central Office who were supposed to look at
what Švermová was doing.98
Due to the prevailing atmosphere, Čepička decided to
temporarily postpone the whole matter: I recommend that you wait until the ÚV
KSČ deals with this.99
Řezníček maintained his position in Olomouc for the time
being and seemingly even went on the offensive. At a meeting of the presidium on
5 March 1951 he criticised Čepička for his indiscriminate behavior towards mem‑
bers of the KV KSČ: I think that Comrade Čepička did not have the right to inter‑
rogate in this way.100
In retrospect, he appreciated the help he had received at the
meeting, and at the same time acted as an advocate of internal party democracy.
Undoubtedly, he did not miss how important the support from the region was
94	 Ibid., p. 65.
95	 Ibid., p. 40.
96	 Ibid., p. 49.
97	 Ibid., p. 57.
98	 Ibid., p. 67.
99	 Ibid., p. 71.
100	 NA, f. 1261/2/5, sv. 68, a. j. 378, Olomouc – Předsednictvo 1951/2, Zápis ze schůze předsednictva KV
KSČ, která se konala 5. 3. 1951 v Olomouci (Minutes from the meeting of the presidium of the KV
KSČ which took place on 5. 3. 1951 in Olomouc), p. 23.
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132 Securitas Imperii 39/2021
for him to survive the fight with the Minister of National Defence and Gottwald’s
son­‑in­‑law.
However, he overestimated his prospects. He went to Prague to the secretariat of
the ÚV KSČ for an interview with the General Secretary of the ÚV KSČ Rudolf Slán‑
ský. He described his motivation briefly: I wanted to go there and complain about
Comrade Čepička. Instead, he came under criticism himself. He was reprimanded
by top party officials and Řezníček succumbed to this concentrated onslaught, ac‑
cepting all the accusations made: I then spoke to Comrade Slánský, Köhler and Com‑
rade Bareš. […] I recognised […,] that I had made some serious errors, that I had
led the entire KV of the party astray.101
In the following days, he embarked on more
and more self­‑criticism. At a meeting of the presidium of the KV KSČ in Olomouc
on 19 March 1951, he assessed himself in this way: It is clear to me that I am that
comrade from the province who was short­‑sighted, politically blind, that I was a so‑
ber instrument, forgiving, that I saw a god in Švermová, that I was a hypocrite.102
He
condemned himself even more sharply at a meeting of the KV KSČ on 23 March:
Now I see that I was no workers’ leader, that I was not even a proper communist.103
It was not just about playing a learned role, Řezníček was probably going through
a painful personal crisis.
The whole session, with regard to Řezníček’s self­‑blame, took place fundamen‑
tally differently from the KV KSČ meeting on 1 March. This time, almost all par‑
ticipants unequivocally stood up for envoy of the ÚV KSČ Gustav Bareš, attacked
Řezníček indiscriminately in their speeches and assessed his self­‑criticism as insin‑
cere and insufficient. They probably felt what was expected of them in Prague with
a delay; also important to them was the fact that Řezníček himself accepted the
role of the culprit, thereby making the accusations against him ring true and losing
any credibility in the eyes of many of his previous supporters. Bareš could be satis‑
fied in his closing speech: As for Comrade Řezníček’s statement, I think most of the
comrades reacted correctly.104
The headquarters could celebrate another important
success, albeit belatedly.
However, isolated voices of resistance rose against the approved interpretation.
The alternate member of the KV KSČ Marie Skřičilová spoke very strongly: One
thing amazes me in the criticism of Comrade Řezníček [by the others]: we sat her
three weeks ago and the comrades who today spoke of and knew of these shortcom‑
ings did not draw attention to them earlier. I cannot understand it. […] It is neces‑
sary to knock on everyone’s hearts, how responsibly did we help Comrade Řezníček
101	 Ibid., Zápis ze schůze předsednictva KV KSČ, která se konala 19. 3. 1951 v Olomouci (Minutes from
the meeting of the presidium of the KV KSČ which took place on 19. 3. 1951 in Olomouc), p. 2.
102	 Ibid., p. 3.
103	 Zemský archiv v Opavě, pobočka Olomouc, f. KV KSČ Olomouc, k. 9, inv. č. 16, Zasedání pléna
(Meeting of the Plenary), 23. 3. 1951, p. 13.
104	 Ibid., p. 62.
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133Securitas Imperii 39/2021
by criticism? We suffered from the very shortcoming he suffered from.105
And an‑
other member Václav Hanečka directly appreciated the person of Řezníček: When
I have to judge Comrade Řezníček as I know him and how comrades look at him at
our plant in Lutín in Sigma, I cannot understand that it can be said here that he did
not have a good relationship with the people, I think that the officials did it them‑
selves. He has been to our company many times and there he never showed himself
in such a way that he did not want to be criticized, he rejected criticism, etc. On the
contrary, he explained and convinced.106
Neither the direct criticism from above nor
the general atmosphere of the meeting forced all participants to stop defending
“their” Chief Secretary.
However, the next step was obvious. Řezníček was recalled from his post as Chief
Secretary and member of the KV KSČ right at the meeting “unanimously”; Václav
Uhlíř chosen by the Secretariat of the ÚV KSČ, took his place for the time be‑
ing until the holding of the regional conference.107
Finally, new KV KSČ elected by
a conference decided during its first meeting on 8 June 1951 that it would expel
Řezníček from the KSČ as a traitor to the party and people’s democratic establish‑
ment.108
At first glance, this is a typical outcome. However, it is important to men‑
tion that Řezníček, unlike Landa in Ústí nad Labem and Lomský in Pilsen, was never
prosecuted. And his two representatives, Ladislav Bernát and František Řeháček,
were able to hold office without penalty until the June conference.109
Thus, no so‑called
Řezníček group was constructed, which stands out especially in contrast to
the brutal punishments of the alleged associates of Hanuš Lomský. It can be stated
that the reason for the relatively mild course of the campaign was the reluctance
of regional party actors to participate more significantly in the disparagement of
the Chief Secretary, and on the contrary the willingness to stand up in his defence
against the intentions of the headquarters. How can this behaviour be explained?
After taking office, František Řezníček got rid of the real and alleged support‑
ers of his predecessor Josef Stavinoha and replaced them with people who then
owed him their functions. This is especially true for the group of Řezníček’s clos‑
est collaborators, who may have felt a degree of personal loyalty to him. Such
a form of loyalty, of course, had its limits, as evidenced by Miroslav Finek’s behav‑
iour in Pilsen, and in the time of the “search for the internal enemy” could often
be an aggravating circumstance, which shows the fall of a whole group of officials
around Hanuš Lomský. It is clear that Řezníček’s support was set on a wider base.
This was also stated retroactively by the chairman of the KV KSČ Olomouc Augus‑
tin Šlezar, although he of course perceived the mentioned support as a result of
105	 Ibid., p. 30.
106	 Ibid., p. 44.
107	 Ibid., p. 61.
108	 Zemský archiv v Opavě, pobočka Olomouc, f. KV KSČ Olomouc, k. 10, inv. č. 17, Zasedání pléna
(Meeting of the Plenary), 9. 6. 1951, pp. 29–30.
109	 Ibid., p. 30.
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134 Securitas Imperii 39/2021
Řezníček’s manipulation: He deceived the entire KV KSČ and tried to make it a wall
for his plans, a wall that would stand behind him and that would protect him, that
would stand against the ÚV KSČ, against his Gottwaldian leadership.110
Řezníček
could “deceive” the KV KSČ because he enjoyed a certain popularity among its
members for his friendly demeanour and constructive approach to problems. Men‑
tions of Řezníček’s popularity in the companies cannot be ignored, for the very
reason when and in what context they were made. At the regional level, there had
long been no nominal criticism of him. After Řezníček’s fall, three local organisa‑
tions of the KSČ in Náměšť na Hané on 27 March 1951 requested the punishment
of him and his closest collaborators, but this was caused by a long­‑term personal
dispute and it was a singular phenomenon.111
It makes no sense to embark on
counterfactual considerations about the extremes that the KV KSČ in Olomouc
could reach under Řezníček’s leadership. After all, Řezníček stepped back as soon
as he found out that Čepička’s attack was not an accidental manifestation, but the
result of the headquarters’ deliberations. However, his “affair” shows how a com‑
plicated web of relations could have existed both amongst regional officials and in
their relationship to central actors.
The timed overthrow of Arnošt Pšenička (Prešov region)
The Chief Secretary of the KV of the Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS) in Prešov
was Ján Šiška, however, the chairman of the regional organisation Arnošt Pšenička
claimed a decisive position for a long time. He authoritatively chaired the presid‑
ium’s meetings and took the floor at them. Unlike Landa, Lomský and Řezníček,
Pšenička was bound by a lifelong connection to his region. He was born on 8 June
1916 in a Slovak family in Bardejov, he worked in construction – his original profes‑
sion was a construction assistant. In 1945 he became the chief functionary of the
District National Committee (Okresní národní výbor, ONV) in Prešov, a year later he
was elected territorial chairman of the KSS. After the establishment of the regions
in 1949, he took the position of regional chairman.112
Pšenička did not maintain
any confidential contacts with the Brno Secretary Šling, they knew each other at
most by sight.
The presidium of the Prešov Region first discussed the resolution on the affair of
Otto Šling on 22 November 1950. The preserved protocol of the meeting is laconic.
110	 Ibid., p. 28.
111	 NA, f. 1261/2/5, sv. 64, a. j. 358, Olomouc – Kádrová práce (Olomouc – Personnel work), Dopis
místních organisací KSČ I, II, III Náměšť Rudolfu Slánskému (Letter from local KSČ organisations I,
II, and III in Náměšť to Rudolf Slánský), 29. 3. 1951. On the dispute at the square Náměstí na Hané
briefly see BÍLÝ, Matěj – LÓŽI, Marián – ŠLOUF, Jakub: Nervová vlákna diktatury, pp. 163–164.
112	 Archiv bezpečnostních složek (hereinafter only ABS), f. Inspekce ministra vnitra ČSSR, I. díl
(Inspection of the Minister of the Interior, Part I) (hereinafter only A 8/1), inv. j. (Inventory Unit) 412
Arnošt Pšenička, Protokol o výpovědi odsouzeného, v Jáchymově dne 27. 11. 1956 (Arnošt Pšenička,
Protocol on the answers of the sentenced, in Jáchymov on 27. 11. 1956), pp. 1, 6.
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135Securitas Imperii 39/2021
It only records that the resolution was read and that all the members of the presid‑
ium discussed it. However, this was not the only debate. The Chief Secretary of the
KV KSS Prešov, Ján Šiška, proposed to convene another extraordinary meeting due
to the case, at which the participants would discuss all the important issues in de‑
tail.113
The extraordinary meeting took place on 11 December and was thoroughly
recorded.
The members of the presidium immediately related the case of the Brno region
to the local context. The mutual similarity was most accented by the chairman of
the KNV in Prešov Ludovít Medveď: According to the resolution, it seems that this
did not happen in Brno, but in Prešov.114
This relationship was reflected in some
points of criticism. For example, MP Ivan Prokipčák bitterly complained about
dictatorial practices: When we came to the meeting, we got really scolded, we were
beaten on our backs and so we went home. We felt a kind of dictatorship here.115
Other allegations were specific to the Prešov Region or Slovakia. The member
of the presidium Štefan Štenko pointed out that party members were too often
swayed by nationalism and did not behave like real communists.116
The most com‑
prehensive list of shortcomings was provided by Chief Secretary Šiška in the call
for their correction: I think that it will be necessary to take a clear position on the
methods of work, the violation of personnel policy, personal popularity and other
things that have been done in the KV KSČ in our region. They have almost complete
identity with the case of O. Šling, so it is necessary to go critically to things from the
past and in the current work.117
It is obvious that someone had to be held responsible for these mistakes. The
member of the presidium Blaža Lančaričová conceived broadly, that the work of the
presidium of the KV KSČ was insufficient, it is shown on our districts ... [...]. I have
the opportunity to look at the basic organisations and we see that distrust of indi‑
vidual OV KSS officials in the region is large. […] I was also in some villages. If you
heard those voices from below, one’s heart hurts that those cases had not yet been
resolved.118
The others, however, saw the culprit primarily in one person: chairman
of the KV KSS in Prešov Arnošt Pšenička. Literally, an outpouring of reproaches
and accusations fell on his head. The head of the regional agricultural department,
Michal Špak, portrayed him as a dictator: I myself was sometimes afraid to come to
113	 NA, f. 1261/2/5, sv. 88, a. j. 478, Prešov – Předsednictvo (Prešov – presidium) 1950/5, Zápisnica
napísaná na 28. zasadnutí predsedníctva krajského výboru KSS, ktorá sa konala dňa 22. 11. 1950
v Prešove (Minutes written down at the 28th meeting of the presidium of the regional committee
of the KSS, which took place on 22. 11. 1950 in Prešov), p. 15.
114	 Ibid., Zápisnica napísaná na mimoriadnom zasadnutí predsedníctva krajského výboru KSS v Prešove,
ktorá sa konala dňa 11. 12. 1950 (Minutes written down at the extraordinary meeting of the
presidium of the regional committee of the KSS in Prešov, which took place on 11. 12. 1950), p. 4.
115	 Ibid., p. 2.
116	 Ibid., pp. 1–2.
117	 Ibid., p. 1.
118	 Ibid., p. 7.
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Comrade Pšenička’s office. The reports were not adopted at the presidium, we did
not know what to do next. There was no principle of criticism and self­‑criticism. The
criticism was only on the part of Comrade Pšenička.119
The member of the presidium
Július Haluška explained it using an example how authoritarily Pšenička organized
signing events: Comrade Pšenička came to us, mobilized everything and said: You
will not come from the villages until you bring so many and so many signatures. The
signatures were made so that one was signed by the left and the other by the right
hand. It only depended on the quantity, not the content.120
Josef Rychvalský, chair‑
man of the ONV in Bardejov, attacked Pšenička for promoting family members:
He has put his family in a high position, but they are as far away from the party as
“heaven is from the earth”.121
Štenko went even further, throwing the support of
the so­‑called class enemies to him, that he was dragging all the former capitalists
with him.122
The recently dismissed dairy manager in Prešov, Štefan Tomko, men‑
tioned Pšenička’s partner and former Chief Secretary Pavel Fleischer, who was to
commit an intrigue on his behalf, come intoxicated to Tomek and trade with him
for a nomination for a parliamentary seat.123
Finally, a member of the presidium
Pavol Zubkovič spoke of Pšenička and Fleischer clearly as internal enemies: These
gentlemen will not deceive the party, even if they take their senses from higher lords.
The party cannot be deceived and therefore our case and the Brno case cannot be
separated.124
The agreement was almost universal. The members of the presidium
of the KV KSS Prešov gave the impression that the headquarters resolution on
Otto Šling launched a cleansing process in the regional leadership. The designated
culprit Arnošt Pšenička was not present at the meeting. Although he remained
chairman of the regional party organization, he last attended a meeting of the
presidium on 10 October 1950, before the public announcement of Šling’s arrest.125
Pšenička’s long­‑term absence was caused by a conflict that dated from 1949 and
set against one another the Chairman of the KV KSS Prešov and the chief officials
of the district committees of the KSS – primarily former Chairman of the OV KSS
Prešov Štefan Tomek, chairman of the OV KSS Giraltovce Tomáš Girmal and chair‑
man of the OV KSS Bardejov Andrej Nicák. The allegations included poor personnel
policy, greedy interests, and dubious acquaintances. Arnošt Pšenička especially re‑
sented the cooperation of said district chairmans with the owner of the company
for mineral springs Sultan Alexander Weis and the director of the timber cooper‑
119	 Ibid., p. 10.
120	 Ibid., p. 8.
121	Ibid.
122	 Ibid., pp. 11–12.
123	 Ibid., p. 3.
124	 Ibid., p. 9.
125	 NA, f. 1261/2/5, sv. 88, a. j. 477, Prešov – Předsednictvo 1950/4, Zápisnica z 21. zasadnutia
predsedníctva krajského výboru KSS, ktorá sa konala dňa 10. 10. 1950 v Prešove (Meetings from
the 21st meeting of the presidium of the regional committee of the KSS, which took place on
10. 10. 1950 in Prešov), p. 1.
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137Securitas Imperii 39/2021
ative Echaus. For profit, the officials were to have falsified reports so that neither
the company nor the cooperative would be nationalised. In his later testimony,
Pšenička stated that in the confirmations the data on the state of the company
were manipulated. […] In the recommendation, they stated a lower number of em‑
ployees and capacity of the company than was the case in reality.126
The other side
focused on the type of people, who Pšenička was to have put in leading positions.
For instance, Štefan Tomko claimed that he had sabotaged him as a labourer in
the election as chairman of the OV KSS in Prešov and replaced him with a teacher
as Agricultural Secretary.127
Dissatisfied district officials wrote complaints, which
they sent to the KSS Party Control Commission in Bratislava. Pšenička said what
followed: On the basis of these complaints, party control headed by Rybanský came
to Prešov in the middle of the year 1950. This commission was in Prešov for about
a month, and when it was over, it called me to the party control room at the Regional
Secretariat, where they handed me some records to comment on.128
Pšenička denied
the allegations, but found himself in a difficult position. It is very likely that it was
precisely after meeting the commission that he stopped attending the meetings of
the regional presidium. On a recommendation or at his own discretion, he decided
to seclude himself until his case was finally decided.
The resolution on Šling, which was extremely unfortunate for Pšenička, provided
an opportunity for a final showdown. At the described meeting of the regional pre‑
sidium on 11 December 1950, the members assigned him the role of “dictator” and
“enemy”. Two days later, the plenary of the KV KSS Prešov expelled him from the
party along with Pavel Fleischer.129
The fall of Arnošt Pšenička received the approval
of the party headquarters and national publicity. At a meeting of the ÚV KSČ on
21 February 1951, KSS Secretary General Štefan Bašťovanský explained his exclu‑
sion as follows: This happened for a serious violation of intra­‑party democracy, for
the suppression of criticism, for dictatorial methods of work and for the promotion
of hostile elements in party, public functions, all of which helped to expose Pšenička
himself to the party as a foreign and hostile element.130
Not quite a month later, on
126	 ABS, f. A 8/1, inv. j. 412, Arnošt Pšenička, Protokol o výpovědi odsouzeného, v Jáchymově dne
27. 11. 1956, pp. 1–2.
127	 Ibid., pp. 2–3; NA, f. 1261/2/5, sv. 88, a. j. 478, Prešov – Předsednictvo 1950/5, Zápisnica napísaná
na mimoriadnom zasadnutí predsedníctva krajského výboru KSS v Prešove, ktorá sa konala dňa
11. 12. 1950 (Minutes written down at the extraordinary meeting of the presidium of the regional
committee of the KSS in Prešov, which took place on 11. 12. 1950), p. 3.
128	 ABS, f. A 8/1, inv. j. 412, Arnošt Pšenička, Informace pro s. ministra vnitra (Arnošt Pšenička,
Information for comrade minister of interior), 29. 11. 1956, p. 3.
129	 NA, f. 1261/2/5, sv. 88, a. j. 478, Prešov – Předsednictvo 1950/5, Zápisnica napísaná na 31. zasadnutí
predsedníctva krajského výboru KSS v Prešove, ktorá sa konala dňa 20. 12. 1950 (Minutes written
down at the 31st meeting of the presidium of the Regional Committee of the KSS in Prešov, which
took place on 20. 12. 1950), p. 2.
130	BAŠŤOVANSKÝ, Štefan: O odhaleniu špionážnej záškodnickej činnosti V. Clementia
a o frakčnej protistranníckej skupine buržoázných nacionalistov v KSS (On the revelation of
V. Clementis’s espionage activities and on the factional anti­‑party group of bourgeois nationalists
in the KSČ). Rudé právo, 27. 2. 1951, p. 9.
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8 March 1951, Pšenička was arrested and sentenced to seven years in prison for
the crime of sabotage by the Supreme Court in Prague after three and a half years
in detention.131
On the same days, he and his colleague Fleischer were arrested and
sentenced – Fleischer to nine years in prison.132
Although Pšenička’s case became part of a great story about a “conspiracy of
enemies within the Communist Party”, it cannot be overlooked that it originally
was a strictly local affair. The accusations made against the chairman of the KV
KSS Prešov by dissatisfied district officials and later by almost all members of the
regional presidium were certainly exaggerated. After all, Pšenička strongly rejected
them even in a later statement. However, with an available source base, it is quite
impossible to definitively verify or disprove their credibility. It is indisputable that
the position of Pšenička in the regional organization was exceptional and that it
showed authoritative elements. This deserves a deeper reasoning. As well as the
position of his opponents, who primarily pursued their particular interests and
tried to cover their own shortcomings. It was not just Pšenička who noticed that.
The chairman of the OV KSS in Giraltovce Tomáš Girmal was openly blamed in the
regional presidium that he made policies for his family.133
Štefan Tomko was recalled
from the post of the administrator of the Prešov dairy supposedly because he did
not allow any revision into the dairy134
and the overall loss of the company under
his management was 2.5 million Czechoslovak crowns.135
At the meeting of the
presidium on 11 December 1950, the chairman of the KNV Medveď, otherwise very
critical of Pšenička, mentioned the share of district officials in the poor functioning
of the regional organization: Mistakes were also made from below, instead of the OV
KSS taking a critical stance, it bypasses the KV KSS and proposes the exchange of
personnel at the committees or ministries according to its own proposals.136
It was
part of a wider phenomenon. The personal form of government has developed par‑
ticularly strongly in the Prešov Region. Ján Šiška, the Chief Secretary of the KV KSS
Prešov, described its gradual establishment: When we examine the development of
the party in the Prešov region since 1945, it can be said that the party was not built
from the ground up, but individuals appeared like Pšenička. […] I think there are
131	 ABS, f. A 8/1, inv. j. 412, Arnošt Pšenička, Informace pro s. ministra vnitra, 29. 11. 1956, p. 1.
132	 Ibid., inv. j. 1171, Pavel Fleischer, Zápis o výpovědi, Dolní Smokovec (Pavel Fleischer, record of the
testimony, Dolní Smokovec), 12. 8. 1964, p. 1.
133	 NA, f. 1261/2/5, sv. 88, a. j. 477, Prešov – Předsednictvo 1950/4, Zápisnica napísaná dňa 6. 9. 1950
z 16. zasadnutia predsedníctva krajského výboru KSS (Minutes written down on 6. 9. 1950 from the
16th meeting of the presidium of the Regional Committee of the KSS), p. 9.
134	 Ibid., Zápisnica spísaná na 20. zasadnutí predsedníctva krajského výboru KSS Prešov konanom dňa
5. 10. 1950 (Minutes written down at the 20th meeting of the presidium of the Regional Committee
of the KSS Prešov taking place on 5. 10. 1950), p. 1.
135	 NA, f. 1261/2/33, a. j. 5510, Zápisnica napísaná na pokračovacom zasadnutí pléna KV KSS dňa
4. 1. 1951 v dome ČSA v Prešove (Minutes written down at the continuing meeting of the plenary of
the KV KSS on 4. 1. 1951 in the House of the ČSA in Prešov), p. 4.
136	 NA, f. 1261/2/5, sv. 88, a. j. 478, Prešov – Předsednictvo 1950/5, Zápisnica napísaná na mimoriadnom
zasadnutí predsedníctva krajského výboru KSS v Prešove, ktorá sa konala dňa 11. 12. 1950, p. 5.
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139Securitas Imperii 39/2021
reasons why the comrades did not solve problems for the benefit of the party, but for
the benefit of individuals.137
That is why Pšenička was able to authoritatively admin‑
ister the region for so long, and that is why his overthrow, despite the use of official
terms and interpretations, had the character of personal settlement of accounts.
Investigating the possible causes of the differences
The case studies demonstrate how differently the “cleansing” campaign could take
place in the regions. In Ústí nad Labem, the headquarters prevailed with the rela‑
tive passivity of regional and district officials. On the contrary, in Pilsen, an alliance
of headquarters and localities was set up against the regional elite, which achieved
absolute success. In Olomouc, the centre’s intention met with resistance from re‑
gional and district officials and ended at least halfway. Finally, in Prešov, part of the
regional elite took the initiative and shut down its rival. I would like to reiterate
that the cases of the four regions cannot be generalized to the nineteen regions
into which the Communist Party was territorially divided. And in several regional
organizations at that time there was no “searching for the enemy”.138
However,
each of the four cases has more widely shared features and specifics. For instance,
the removal of the Chief Secretary of the KV KSČ in Ostrava Vítězslav Fuchs and
his colleagues139
as well as the deputy of the Chief Secretary of the KV KSČ in Par‑
dubice Jiří Kotrch and the so­‑called collective140
in many ways was reminiscent of
the course of events in the Pilsen region. There are also strong parallels between
the nature of the campaign in the Ústí nad Labem and Bratislava regions, as well as
in the Olomouc and Karlovy Vary regions.141
It is all the more necessary to ask the
reasons for the differences. Why in some regions the development was dynamic,
a number of actors spoke and the whole “group” was brought down in the end,
while in other regions it was a formal event with minimal response and the culprit
an “individual”.
The role of the central authority comes first. The resolution on Šling’s case, which
largely initiated a cleansing campaign in the regions, has already been discussed
above. It is interesting to follow the ways of acting of the individual highest offi‑
cials of the Communist Party, directly interfering in the regional processes of the
campaign. The procedure of the Minister of Defence Alexej Čepička, who spoke
137	 NA, f. 1261/2/33, a. j. 5510, Zápisnica napísaná na pokračovacom zasadnutí pléna KV KSS dňa
4. 1. 1951 v dome ČSA v Prešove, p. 20.
138	 I have not examined thoroughly every regional organisation. I emphasise that it can be only the
result of my ommission.
139	 HEMZA, Tomáš: Ve jménu boje proti „diktátorům“, „spiklencům“ a „zrádcům“, pp. 138–150.
140	 KABEŠOVÁ, Monika: „Zbaveni škůdců, pevně semknuti kolem ÚV a s. Gottwalda, s vědomím síly
strany rychleji vpřed k socialismu.“ Čistky v KV KSČ Pardubice v letech 1949–1951, pp. 95–103.
141	 See LÓŽI, Marián: Dynamika teroru na lokální úrovni v období pozdního stalinismu (diplomová práce)
(Dynamics of terror at the local level in the period of Late Stalinism /Diploma thesis/). Filozofická
fakulta Univerzity Karlovy, Praha 2014.
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openly against Řezníček in Olomouc at a meeting of the KV KSČ, opposes the
behind­‑the­‑scenes and suspicious practices of the head of the KSČ Central Person‑
nel Department, Bruno Köhler, who apparently cooperated with the StB. However,
this is a difference in method, not intended purpose. Both worked in the direction
of sharpening the campaign and finding the “culprits”. In terms of differences, the
fact that central officials in regional organizations intervened at different times
and with varying degrees of intensity is more important. This happened in Ústí nad
Labem already in November 1950 and very vigorously, while in Olomouc it was not
until February 1951 and initially without sufficient determination. The assumption
that the headquarters did not attach equal importance to each region seems log‑
ical. Five regions were profiled, which were considered essential, either for their
economic potential or political importance – namely Ústí nad Labem, Pilsen, Brno,
Ostrava and Bratislava.142
For example, in the Slánský trial’s protocol, they are di‑
rectly described as “the most important industrial regions” when the defendant
Otto Šling testifies.143
Therefore, an interpretation is offered that the dynamics of
the cleansing campaign in the region was conditioned by whether the headquar‑
ters was particularly interested in it or not. Where its stronger interest was absent,
the campaign took place only formally. However, this is partly contradicted by the
fact that the central actors also paid constant attention to the so­‑called less impor‑
tant industrial regions and, above all, that even between the five “most important”
regions, the course of the campaign differed fundamentally. In the previous text,
this is evident when comparing the case studies of the Ústí nad Labem and Pilsen
regions, in which the situation was different despite the alleged affiliation to the
same category. In any case, the importance of the headquarters is unquestionable,
but it was not the only factor.
Personal relationships are another important factor. It is clear from the case stud‑
ies that previous cooperation or acquaintances with the arrested Otto Šling and lat‑
er Maria Švermová were a major aggravating circumstance for the challenged chief
secretaries. It did not matter if they downplayed it or honestly confessed it; it has
always been an integral part of their indictment. At the same time, personnel ties
could create a domino effect – the relationship with the already revealed so­‑called
dictator questioned the role of his closest collaborators and led to their removal
and punishment. The case of the Pilsen Region is relevant here, where the entire
“Lomský Group” was formed. It was impossible to get rid of the inclusion in it even
by active and deft actions, which the deputy of the Chief Secretary of the KV KSČ in
Pilsen Miroslav Finek convinced us of. This dynamic was characterized by a certain
142	 I intentionally leave Prague aside in the study. As the capital of the republic and the seat of the
central party bodies, it was characterised by specific conditions and different dynamics. The KV KSČ
in Prague had its own case with Deputy Chief Secretary František Vais, but this was overshadowed
by the arrest of Deputy Secretary General Švermová.
143	 Proces s vedením protistátního spikleneckého centra v čele s Rudolfem Slánským (The process led by
an anti­‑state conspiracy center led by Rudolf Slánský). Orbis, Praha 1953, p. 417.
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fatalism – different defence strategies led to the same ends, to guilt by association.
However, even this factor did not always matter. Pšenička was persecuted in Prešov
without knowing Šling or Švermová more intimately; Řezníček’s collaborators in
Olomouc avoided his fate, even though they were willing to defend him against
Čepička’s attacks.
The personality element can be considered more broadly. The previous popularity
or, on the contrary, the unpopularity of the leading regional officials of the Com‑
munist Party among their colleagues and in the party’s ranks could have become
crucial in the given conditions. Řezníček’s popularity in the Olomouc region likely
played a role in the fact that the cleansing campaign did not reach more people
and he himself was not prosecuted; on the contrary, the strong antagonism of
regional actors towards the “Lomský Group” in the Pilsen region accelerated the
intensity of the campaign; Landa’s bad reputation and at the same time the lack
of anchorage in the Ústí nad Labem region certainly contributed to his lonely fall.
The significance of these rebukes for individual phenomena is difficult to assess
and quantify in any way. They show how complex the Stalinist Communist Party of
Czechoslovakia was, in which we will not be able to get by with generalizations and
we must take into account local specifics.
This brings us to the question of what role the regional specifics of a more per‑
manent, structural type played here: How did the social conditions in the regions
affect the degree of involvement of party actors and the outcome of the “cleansing”
campaign? This element was almost absent in the previous text, because it did not
appear directly in the consulted party documents. Nevertheless, it cannot be com‑
pletely ignored. It will stand out especially if we focus on the Prešov region, which
had a unique character within the republic. The economic and political structures
were not very developed and stable due to the historical development, which was
reflected in the level of the most basic material facts – in some districts there
was no railway connection, electrification of municipalities had taken place only
on 27.5% of the territory as of 1949, practically absent industry and barter pre‑
vailed.144
The political organization of the population was low. It is understandable
that the programme of radical social transformation, which the Communist Party
joined after the war and escalated in the late 1940s, had a special course here. Ef‑
forts to mobilize the population clearly reached their limits. In 1950, the regional
organization in Prešov was the smallest in the Czech Republic.145
In addition, al‑
144	SKRIP, Vasil: Zvláštnosti kolektivizácie na východnom Slovensku (The characteristics of
collectivisation in East Slovakia). In: KRATOCHVILOVA, Želmira (ed.): Československé zemědělství
očima historiků. Sympózium pořádané komisí pro agrární a rolnickou otázku v Československu dne
23. a 24. května 1968 v Praze (Czechoslovak agriculture through the eyes of historians. Symposium
organized by the Commission for Agrarian and Peasant Affairs in Czechoslovakia on May 23 and 24,
1968 in Prague). Ústav dějin socialismu, Praha 1969, p. 137.
145	 It had only 27,670 members. See Přehled o stavu krajských organizací ku dni 28. 2. 1950, tabulka
č. 1. (Overview of the state of the regional organisationa as of 28. 2. 1950, Table 1). See MAŇÁK, Jiří:
Proměny strany moci. Studie a dokumenty k vývoji Komunistické strany Československa 1948–1968,
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most half of its members were peasants,146
who could not be very active in the KSS
due to their territorial dispersion, and most of them probably did not even care.
There was a minimum of factory workers in the region, the main social support
of communist politics, which was reflected in the composition of the Regional
Committee - there were fewer of them in numbers and percentages than in any
other KV KSS (or KSČ).147
It therefore seems logical that becuase of a membership
that was low in number and passive, the close personal ties of several local officials
dating from the resistance or, conversely, membership in Hlinka’s clerical fascist
Slovak People’s Party were decisive.148
At the same time the central Czechoslovak
or Slovak instance did not show much interest in the region due to its distance and
backwardness.
Such an interpretation, despite its undoubted validity, is perhaps too orientaliz‑
ing, conceiving of Prešov as a kind of backward exception. At the same time, the
historical experience of the local population was shaped by the experiences of
compatriots from working in the USA and partisan activity during the war,149
which
was several orders more extensive than in the Czech lands. Above all, however,
the personnel networks of influence were a common phenomenon at the regional
and district level of the Communist Party, as was the widespread instrumental ap‑
proach to the cleansing campaign after the arrest of Otto Šling. On the other hand,
it should be added that each of the four selected regions was in a way specific: the
North Bohemian region of Ústí nad Labem was a border region with developed
heavy industry,150
very hard affected by the post­‑war expulsion of the German mi‑
nority;151
the West Bohemian region of Pilsen was characterized by mechanical
production and the Social Democrats were historically prominent in it; the Moravi‑
an region of Olomouc had a strong agricultural and Catholic character, and social
democracy in the interwar period occupied the second place behind the Christian
People’s Party. At the same time, an advanced food industry with malt houses,
sugar factories and distilleries has developed here in connection with agriculture;
1. část (Transformations of the party of power. Studies and documents on the development of the
KSČ 1948–1968, Vol. 1). ÚSD AV ČR, Praha 1995, p. 100.
146	 Precisely 11,215 and 40.5 percent. See Přehled o stavu krajských organizací ku dni 28. 2. 1950,
tabulka č. 6 (Table 6). Ibid., p. 105.
147	Only 9, thus 30 percent. See MAŇÁK, Jiří: Proměny strany moci. Početnost a složení volených
funkcionářských sborů KSČ 1948–1968, 2. část (Transformations of the party of power. Number and
composition of elected function corps of the KSČ 1948–1968, Vol. 2). ÚSD AV ČR, Praha 1998, p. 267.
148	 ZAVACKÁ, Marína: Vidiecki komunisti ako aktéri a obete nútenej kolektivizácie (Village communists
as actors and victims of forced collectivisation). Forum Historiae, 2016, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 58–59.
149	 Ibid., p. 59.
150	 On Ústí nad Labem at that time, see HRADECKÝ, Tomáš: Nejpokrokovější kraj v Československu.
Krajský národní výbor Ústeckého kraje v letech 1949–1960 (The most progressive region in
Czechoslovakia. The Regional National Committee of the Ústí nad Labem Region in 1949–1960).
Nakladatelství Lidové noviny, Praha 2017.
151	 The number of Sudeten Germans is a sensitive topic. Myself, I have relied on the results of the census
of the population in Czechoslovakia from 1930. It is not about the absolute numbers for me but only
the level of representation of Germans in the population.
Uncovering enemies in the regional leadership
143Securitas Imperii 39/2021
there was a modern light industry in Prostějov. All these specifics are very difficult
to evaluate. However, it is interesting that the campaigns in the Prešov and Ústí nad
Labem regions were comparable in terms of the passivity of the wider party ranks.
The overall difference in the dynamics of the search for enemies in the regional
leadership of the Communist Party could be interpreted by different historical de‑
velopments – in the Prešov region long­‑term trends of the East Slovak periphery,
in the Ústí nad Labem region the post­‑war expulsion of the German element is
offered as a possible explanation, which was especially extensive, the new settlers
had not yet become accustomed to the environment and specific conditions dom‑
inated there. Such a generalisation is, however, potentially deceitful. The previous
outline of conditions in the Prešov region shows that they were ambivalent rather
than clearly backward; in Ústí nad Labem there was a large Czech population at
least since the last third of the 19th
century, which maintained continuity with the
previous period. Finally, the regions, or regional organisations of the Communist
Party, were administratively created units. Homogeneity cannot be expected for
them, the composition of the population and the character of the individual parts
of the regions often differed from one other. Nevertheless, historical difference can
be seen as another, albeit latent, factor present. It demonstrates the complexity of
the relationship that existed between the dictatorship of the Communist Party of
the 1950s and the previous historical periods.
Conclusion
In the text, case studies described the course of the “cleansing campaign” after
the arrest of Otto Šling in four regions: In Ústí nad Labem the Chief Secretary of
the KV KSČ Mikuláš Landa was removed by the active involvement of the central
actors under the relative passivity of regional officials. In Pilsen, the coalition of the
centre and the region revealed Hanuš Lomský, the Chief Secretary of the KV KSČ,
and a group of his closest colleagues to be enemies. In Olomouc, regional officials
initially opposed the plans of the headquarters and only the Chief Secretary of the
KV KSČ, František Řezníček, was expelled, without further sanctions. In Prešov,
due to the relative inactivity of the headquarters and regions, a small group of
officials prevailed and removed the chairman of the KV KSS, Arnošt Pšenička. The
intensity and outcome of the campaign varied across the four regions; in some it
lasted a long time and involved a number of actors, in others their approach was
instrumental and passive.
Several causal factors were subsequently postulated in the analytical section.
Undoubtedly, one was the headquarters, which attached different degrees of im‑
portance to the individual regions during the campaign – it paid more attention
to industrial and political centres than the others, from its perspective peripheral
areas. Another factor was the personal relations of the leading regional officials, ei‑
marián lóžistudies
144 Securitas Imperii 39/2021
ther towards the accused Šling and Švermová or directly in the given regional party
organization. The popularity or, conversely, the notorious reputation of the Chief
Secretary could have played a significant role. The course of the campaign was also
defined by specific regional conditions of a structural and historical nature, unique
to the region or of a more general nature.
The case studies and the causal factors described together prove that we will
not be able to make do with the perspective of the Prague headquarters when re‑
searching the Stalinist dictatorship of the Communist Party. The regional perspec‑
tive does not bring a deeper knowledge only about the regions themselves, it also
allows a more balanced view of the overall functioning of the dictatorship. Above
all, the actors themselves are more in the spotlight. The Stalinist period in Czech‑
oslovakia was not only a time of ideologies and regime mechanisms, people also
lived and acted at that time, in this case higher or lower­‑ranking regional officials
of the Communist Party. We should not forget that.
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