Foreign Policies of the Great Powers From Sadowa to Sarajevo The Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary, 1866-1914 F. R. Bridge Andrassy, iS/i-p League was unable to cope - although it cost Andrassy some wasted months of effort before he was convinced of this. But he made a good recovery at the Congress of Berlin, and the final settlement undoubtedly strengthened the position of Austria-Hungary. Even the occupation of Bosnia can fairly be described as a creditable defensive success. Although relations with London and Berlin were perhaps slightly closer after the Congress, Andrassy's original idea of a defensive bloc consisting of the Central Powers and Britain still seemed an idle dream. Yet already great changes were occurring on the European diplomatic scene. Even now, after his resignation had been accepted, it was to be vouchsafed to Andrassy to realize, at least in part, the project which for the past eight years had eluded him. The Making of the Alliances, 1879-8 51 The developments of the past twenty years pushed Austria-Hungary back from her old historic position... We have only the East . . . We cannot allow the completion of the Russian ring from Silesia to Dalmatia. A Slav conformation of the Balkan peninsula under Russian material or moral protection would cut our vital arteries. Chapter 4 Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office memorandum, August 1884s The news of Andrassy's impending resignation caused the greatest consternation in Berlin. Bismarck's neurotic fear of anti-German coalitions reached a new intensity as the prospect presented itself to him that the Taaffe government in Austria, once freed from Andrassy's influence, might complement its 1 The following works are of particular relevance to this chapter: W. N. Medlicott, Bismarck, Gladstone and the Concert of Europe, London, 1956; W. N. Medlicott, 'British Foreign Policy in the Near East, from the Congress of Berlin to the accession of Ferdinand of Coburg', M.A. thesis, London, 1926; Agatha Ramm, European Alliances and Ententes 1879-85, a study of contemporary 'British information', M.A. thesis, London; E. R. v. Rutkowski, 'Gustav Graf Kälnoky von Koröspatak, Oesterreich-Ungarns Aussen-politik von 1881-1885', Doctoral dissertation, Vienna, 1952; A. F. Pribram, The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary (2 vols), Cambridge, Mass., 1921; L. Salvatorelli, La trip/ice allean^a, storia diplomatica, 1877-1912, Milan, 1939; E. R. v. Rutkowski, 'Oesterreich-Ungarn und Rumänien 1880-83, die Proklamierung des Königreiches und die rumänischen Irredenta', Südost-Forschungen, Vol. 25, 1966, pp. 150-284; E. R. v. Rutkowski, 'General Skobelev, die Krise des Jahres 1882 und die Anfänge der militärischen Vereinbarungen zwischen Oesterreich-Ungarn und Deutschland', Ostdeutsche Wissenschaft, Vol. 10, 1963, pp. 81-151; A. F. Pribram, 'Milan IV von Serbien und die Gehe im vertrage Oesterreich-Ungarns mit Serbien 1881-9', Historische Blätter, 1911, pp. 464-94; the works by H. Benedikt, G. Drage, F. Klein (ed.), and C. A. Macartney cited in Chapter i, note 1; W. Wagner, Chapter 2, note 1; and E. v. Glaise-Horstenau, Chapter 3, note 1. 2 E. R. v. Rutkowski, 'Kälnoky . . .', pp. 645-6. 102 103 an The Making of the Alliances, 1879-8j pro-Slav domestic policy by persuading the emperor to mak alliance with the tsar. Worse still, the clericals might brii^ 7 Catholic France as well, to create that combination most d ^Hl" to Prussia, a 'Kaunitz' coalition. This was all the more worrv to Bismarck because he was, for the first time, by the summer" f 1879, beginning to feel unsure of Russia, even threatened by he Her constant complaints about relatively trivial incidents aris'61' from the enforcement of the Berlin settlement, her endi"^ armaments, and the hostile language of the Russian press, which since January 1879 had been blaming Germany for all Russia' humiliations, had combined to produce (for a few gloomy months in the summer of 1879 at least) a radical change in Bismarck's attitude towards Russia. Andrassy's idea of an Austro-German alliance, which Bismarck had for years rejected as likely to cause hostility between Russia and Germany, now appeared to him as a possible remedy for a hostility that seemed already to have developed. When, on 15 August, the tsar sent a further list of grievances to his imperial uncle in Berlin, Bismarck took the opportunity to declare that Russia could no longer be relied on' and to familiarize the emperor with the idea of an alliance with Austria-Hungary (both as a source of assistance in the event of war with Russia, and as a means of ensuring that the Dual Monarchy would not join the ranks of Germany's enemies). Already, on 13 August, he had asked Andrassy to meet him at Gastein. Although at Gastein, on 28 August, Andrassy was not above playing on Bismarck's fears with an astute reference to Austria-Hungary's ties with Britain and France in the Eastern question, Bismarck soon saw that his apprehensions as to a pro-Slav orientation of Austro-Hungarian policy following Andrassy's departure were groundless. Nevertheless, he still wanted some firm guarantee for the future. So he came straight to the point and proposed an Austro-German alliance. What Andrassy had for so long sought in vain was now being offered for the taking; and he was quick to make the most of the psychological advantage he enjoyed over the anxious Bismarck. On the one hand, he welcomed the idea of an alliance: there was now nobody in the Monarchy, he declared, with any desire for revenge for 1866. Even Archduke Albrecht was now no exception - the eyes of the military party had been opened to the danger from Russia in 1878. 104 The Making of the Alliances, 1879-8; h ps was an exaggeration. Of the sincerity of Andrassy's ^ for an alliance, however, there can be no doubt. Russia's &eSite regai;d to the practical application of the Treaty din, and the news that in February 1879 she had sounded ° 1 6 to her attitude in the event of an Austro-Russian war, Italy as - d clearly enough where the chief external threat to the M°narchy lay- On ^ otner band, Andrassy was determined that ° alliance must be on his own terms: it must be directed solely ^ainst Russia, and should not in the slightest jeopardize or ^strict Austria-Hungary's relations with the Western Powers. Indeed he hoped, as in 1871, that Britain would eventually join the combination. He made it clear to Bismarck, therefore, that the alliance must not be a general one: any suspicion that Austria-Hungary was abetting Germany against France would offend France's friends in London. Bismarck was slightly disappointed at this but the two statesmen agreed to pursue further the idea of an alliance after consulting their respective sovereigns. Andrassy promised to defer his resignation until the negotiations were completed, and left Gastein 'very contented'3 to report to the emperor at the Bruck manoeuvres. He found Franz Joseph entirely in agreement with the idea of an alliance against Russia; and the emperor congratulated him and authorized him to pursue the negotiations further with Bismarck in Vienna. The Emperor William, however, was of a very different frame of mind, his faith in Russia having been but little shaken by Bismarck's gloomy talk. He went off to meet his Russian nephew at Aiexandrovo (3 September) and forbade Bismarck to go to Vienna at all. It needed a threat of resignation from Bismarck to get him to change his mind; and even then he refused to consider anything so offensive to Russia as an alliance directed solely and explicitly against her. He authorized Bismarck to conclude an alliance only in general terms. This was in fact the central point of the Vienna discussions between Bismarck and Andrassy (23-24 September). Andrassy would still not hear of a general alliance: the existing Waddington government in Paris was eminently peaceful, conservative, and Anglophile; but it might not survive the shock of an Austro-German alliance directed apparently against France. The danger might then arise of a revolutionary alliance between France, 3 E. v. Wertheimer, Vol. 3, p. 244. 105 The Making of the Alliances, 1879-8j Italy, and a Russia already thoroughly riddled with PansI revolutionary ideas. Nor, he warned, would he have anythin ^ do with an agreement a trois with Russia. Again, such a monarch? cal league would appear to be directed against France. Austria" Hungary, he emphasized, must be free to say to Britain that she had no commitments whatever against France, provided the latter did not join a coalition against the Central Powers. The alliance therefore, must be clearly directed against Russia. Apart from this reservation, the two sides were already in broad agreement The Austrians particularly liked the idea of a strictly defensive alliance, considering that the Monarchy had nothing whatever to gain from an aggressive war against Russia, and might only risk being used as a battering ram by the Western Powers. They raised no objections either when Bismarck suggested a declaration to the Powers (and to Russia in particular) emphasizing the conciliatory spirit of the alliance and making its defensive purpose perfectly clear. In the end, Bismarck gave way. 'Accept my draft,' he said to Andrassy, rising from his seat and drawing himself to his full height, '. . . or I shall have to accept yours.'* On 24 September the draft was duly agreed, and after a further tussle Bismarck managed to extract the consent of the German emperor. The alliance was signed at Vienna on 7 October (Document 8), and Andrassy resigned on the following day. He could be well content with his work. The alliance pledged the two Powers to mutual support if either were attacked by Russia; if either were attacked by another Power, the other was obliged to observe benevolent neutrality only; but if the attacker were supported by Russia, the casus foederis again arose. These terms suited the Austrians exactly. Yet this was - for both parties - no ad hoc war alliance, like the alliances of the 1850s and 1860s. However strictly limited its terms, it might always have broader implications for the general policy of the contracting parties. Such implications had been in Andrassy's mind throughout the 1870s; and perhaps in Bismarck's in the summer of 1879. Franz Joseph too was aware of them, and was pleased at last to have realized his ideal of a conservative alliance of the two German Powers, which he had vainly sought from a hostile Bismarck in the early 'sixties and from an indifferent Bismarck in the early 'seventies. The question remained, however - what were these broader implications? 4 E. v. Wcrtheimer, Vol. 3, p. 284. I06 The Making of the Alliances, 1879-8/ n snite the unanimity over the terms of the alliance, there was vi-ide divergence of view between Vienna and Berlin as to its V'mate purpose. True, for the immediate present, both parties Id feel more secure against Russia; and Bismarck had dispelled ^threat °f a 'K^tirrk2' coalition - if that threat had ever existed tside his own mind. On the long-term purpose of the alliance, however there was no agreement. Indeed, even before the alliance was actually signed, Bismarck had begun to think that onflict with Russia was perhaps not too likely after all. He had been encouraged in this not only by the Emperor William, who refused to contemplate such a possibility, but by the Russians themselves, who, at the news of the impending alliance, had at once become more amenable. The prospect of a war with both German Powers at once confirmed the tsar in his fundamentally pacific intentions. He decided that he would do well to seek a rapprochement with his German neighbours - possibly in the hope of dividing them; and hinted to Bismarck that he would welcome a restoration of the Three Emperors' League. This, of course, had always remained Bismarck's ideal. It was also the implication of his boast to the Russian ambassador that in concluding the alliance he had succeeded in digging a ditch between Austria-Hungary and the Western Powers. Nothing could have been further from the truth. Andrassy had been scrupulously careful in the negotiations to avoid anything that might cast a cloud over his relations with London and Paris; and Salisbury, in particular, had welcomed press reports of the alliance as 'glad tidings of great joy'.5 For Andrassy, the alliance was to be a step towards the realization of his old ideal of a grand alliance against Russia. For him, in contrast to Bismarck, suspicion of Russia was no passing mood. 'A warmed-up Three Emperors' League', he declared, would meet with great opposition from public opinion; Russia was 'full of perfidy';8 and after his recent experiences he would hesitate 'not only as a minister but as a gentleman' to recommend an agreement with her on the Eastern question.7 Whereas the Dual Alliance was for Bismarck a stepping-stone towards a new Three Emperors' League, it was for Andrassy the tombstone of the Three Emperors' League. 5 The Times, p. 10, 18 October 1879. * E. v. Werthcimer, Vol. 3, p. 297. 7 P.A. 1/469, Aehrenthal memorandum, 1895. 107 The Making of the Alliances, 1879-8} Franz Joseph, for whom the construction of a conservative bloc in Central Europe was the essential idea, was more flexible as to whether this could best be reinforced from the west or from the east. It remained an open question, therefore, whether those who came after Andrassy would realize his great objective, or whether they would accept Bismarck's. There could be no doubt about the personal inclinations of Andrassy's successor, Heinrich, Baron Haymerle. This cautious, unadventurous career diplomat, who had served at Constantinople, Athens, and Rome, and as Andrassy's aide at the Congress of Berlin, was well versed in the details of the Eastern question. The British were hopeful that 'his intimate knowledge of Turkish affairs'8 would prove a serious obstacle to Russia's supposed designs. 'This,' Beaconsfield confidently declared, 'is an anti-Russian appointment.'9 By the same token, St Petersburg, where most of Russia's recent humiliations were ascribed to 'expressions insidiously inserted into the Treaty [of Berlin] by Baron Hay-merle', was 'very little pleased'.10 And it was not so much Hay-merle's woebegone appearance or nervous manner as his unwillingness to venture into any agreement with Russia that lay behind Bismarck's deprecatory comments on him: 'he is timid, he is not accustomed to high politics, he fears responsibilities'; and behind the notorious jibe attributed to Bismarck, that Hay-merle always 'uttered an emphatic "No" three times on waking up in the morning for fear of having undertaken some commitment in his sleep'.11 From the start, he was determined to continue Andrassy's anti-Russian policy: to stand firm by the Treaty of Berlin, and if possible to enlist British support in forcing Russia to observe it. The treaty of Berlin had provided Austria-Hungary with a good basis for a strong Balkan policy. Of course, this policy would not be one of territorial expansion - the annexation of more Slav areas could fatally upset the balance of races within the Monarchy - but one of exercising a preponderant influence over the Balkan states. The prospects were inviting. Even in Bulgaria, where Russia temporarily enjoyed by virtue of the Treaty of Berlin a measure of political control over the government and 8 Agatha Ramm, p. 6.1. 9 Ibid., p. 86. 10 Ibid., p. 85. 11 L. Ritter v. Przibram, Erinnerungen eines alien Oesterrehhers, Stuttgart, 1912, Vol. 2, p. it4. 108 The Making of the Alliances, 1879-8} army that the Austrians felt it wise not to challenge, Austria-Hungary had preserved a strong foothold in the fields of commerce and communications. By Article VIII of the Treaty of Berlin the Great Powers had subjected Bulgaria to the 'unequal' trade treaties of 1860-2, which were designed to hold Turkey down as a ready market and source of cheap raw materials. Customs duties, for example, were fixed at 10 per cent, and according to the Capitulations could not be increased without the consent of the Powers. Even without these measures, of course, the sheer weight of economic imperialism would in any case have served to hold the Balkan economy in fee to the Great Powers. Austria-Hungary was the chief beneficiary of this system. Over the Western Powers she had enormous geographical advantages. Proximity and the Danube - which provided cheap transport -meant that Austro-Hungarian exports (chiefly light industrial goods) could easily command the Bulgarian market by virtue of their cheapness; and this despite British competition and the efforts of the Bulgarians to develop their own light industries. Links with Vienna were also fostered by the Austrophile inclinations of the Bulgarian bourgeoisie (whose nationalist susceptibilities were in any case offended by Russian bullying), and by the dominant role of Austro-Hungarian capital in Bulgarian railway construction. In 1879 the Orient Railway Company, which controlled the Bulgarian section of the line to Constantinople, had passed from French to Austro-Hungarian control, and had transferred its headquarters to Vienna. In this situation, Russia found herself completely outmanoeuvred. Such capital as her own very primitive economy could spare generally went to easier markets in Asia; and Russian government intervention in Sofia to compel the Bulgarians to accept loans only roused opposition and undermined Russia's political position in the principality. Both Vienna and St Petersburg recognized the great importance of commercial channels as the conductors of political influence; and although it is true that Bulgaria only accounted for about 6 per cent of the total trade of the Monarchy, this 6 per cent was a huge amount for a state the size of Bulgaria. In fact the Monarchy was able to impose successive renewals of the 'unequal' trade treaty, and to maintain its position as Bulgaria's chief trading partner right down to 1914. In the other Balkan states the Monarchy was in an even stronger 109 The Making oj the Alliances, 1879-8; position, in that it did not have a Russian-controlled government to contend with - although it should be said that sometimes, by virtue of its political predominance, it came up against the hostility of that very nationalism that in Bulgaria worked in its favour. The coldly-calculating governments, however, in Turkey, Serbia, Roumania and Greece were still very much haunted by the shadow of the Big Bulgaria created by Russia at San Stefano. They had no doubts as to where their chief enemy lay. Turkey, for example, was already looking to the Central Powers to supply the financial and military-technical aid no longer forthcoming from Britain. Even in Serbia, the government of the Liberal Ristic, pro-Russian by instinct, was now faced with the task of bringing to fulfilment that rapprochement with Austria-Hungary over commercial and communications questions on which Serbia, deserted by Russia, had been forced to embark at the Congress of Berlin, In the event, Ristic dragged his feet. He well knew that Serbian opinion had not forgiven the Monarchy for the occupation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina; and that the taxes required to pay for the projected railway links would be deeply resented by his peasant supporters. His resistance was encouraged by Russian agents, and, to some extent, by Britain, who still provided Serbia with one-third of her imports, and who strengthened her negotiating position with a commercial treaty in January 1880. By the summer, however, the Monarchy had forced Serbia to agree to construct the railway line to Hungary before that to Salonica (which would only have furthered British trade). In June Prince Milan, fanatically Austrophile by temperament, paid a visit of homage to Franz Joseph in Vienna; and when Ristic, greatly incensed by this, at last resigned in October, Serbia seemed to be moving completely into Austria-Hungary's orbit. Roumania presented a similar picture, with fairly strong Austro-Hungarian political influence and nationalist and irredentist counter-currents. On the one hand, Austria-Hungary had been the first Great Power to recognize the independence of Roumania in 1878 (while Germany and the Western Powers were still haggling over the treatment of German bondholders and Roumanian Jews). Both Vienna and Bucharest recognized a common interest in ensuring that Roumania, situated 'entre les deux Russies' as Bratianu remarked,12 should not become a mere 12 E. R. v. Rutkowski, 'Oesterreich-Ungarn und Rumänien', p. 151. ho The Making oj the Alliances, 1879-8; highway from Russia to Bulgaria. A visit by Archduke Albrecht to Bucharest in the autumn of 1879 ^a<^ produced a general understanding about mutual military assistance in the event of a Russian attack; and Haymerle agreed with Andrassy and Prince Carol that the two states, which together formed a major barrier to the Slavicization of south-east Europe, might some day even make a formal alliance. On the other hand, Haymerle was as resolutely opposed as Andrassy had been to Roumania's hopes of elevation to the rank of kingdom. Such a grandiose gesture could only foster irredentist designs on Transylvania and Bukovina, and encourage similar ambitions in Serbia. More serious, the two governments themselves became estranged over the question of the control of shipping on the lower Danube, which the Congress of Berlin had entrusted to a commission to be established by the Great Powers. For Austria-Hungary, the Danube was still the main commercial route to the Balkans; the Austrian Danube Steamship Company held a virtual monopoly of Danubian shipping; and Haymerle was determined not to permit the subjection of these important interests to control by any Balkan state. In January 1880, therefore, with German and Italian support, he began to seek for Austria-Hungary a controlling influence on the new commission. The Roumanians, with Russian support, were equally determined to prevent this, and by the summer relations between Vienna and Bucharest were seriously strained. Austria-Hungary's Balkan position in 1879-80 was, therefore, strong but not unchallenged. And behind the threats to it, Vienna discerned everywhere the hand of Russia. Indeed, while Austro-Hungarian policy might be seen objectively, and especially by Russia, as aiming at predominance, it was regarded in Vienna as defensive, as an attempt to prevent Russia from establishing her own predominance. True, Kalnoky reported from St Petersburg, the Russian government, confronted with the Dual Alliance, might well have decided to abandon its blatant opposition to the Treaty of Berlin. This, however, by lulling the other Powers into a false sense of security, only made it all the more difficult for the Monarchy to thwart the now more underhand designs of Russia, which were still being busily furthered by Russian agents and the Russian press. It was to be Haymerle's task to sound the alarm. With Bismarck, Haymerle made no headway at all. His suggestions in the autumn of 1879 that the Central Powers enlist the hi The Making of the Alliances, iS/p-Sj support of Britain, as Andrassy had desired, only drew the crushing retort that the alliance was strictly for defence purposes, and was not designed to support any particular policy in the Balkans whatever. In January 1880, following an irredentist demonstration in Italy,13 Haymerle tried another approach. It seems, according to a memorandum of Beck's of March 18 80,14 that the Austro-Hungarian government was at this time seriously worried about the possibility of a 'revolutionary' alliance between Italy, France, and a potentially nihilist Russia. At any rate, on 7 February, Haymerle sent Kalnoky to see Bismarck and to convince him of the need to treat Italy kindly.15 The Monarchy could gain nothing by war with Italy - indeed, this might only present Russia with the opportunity to resume an adventurous policy. Perhaps Britain could be persuaded to restrain Italy, Flaymerle suggested, and even to join the Central Powers in a bloc so formidable that Russia would never dare to challenge it. A Roumanian alliance would also be useful. Bismarck would have none of this. True, he wished to maintain the alliance with Austria-Hungary; but at the same time he was immensely concerned to hold on to Russia. The latter, he told Vienna, was now suffering from a nightmare of coalitions, and should be comforted and reassured. Ramshackle Italy could be kept in order by threatening language; and as for Britain, who was gratuitously provoking Russia, her isolation was the price to be paid for Russian friendship. The Austrians, for their part, were unmoved by Bismarck's arguments. They might be prepared to discuss the occasional specific issue, such as Bulgaria, with Russia; but there was no basis for any habitual tete-a-tete or general agreement. This would be tantamount to a revival of the Three Emperors' League, which, Haymerle maintained, nobody in the Monarchy desired, and which Hungarian opinion would never permit. The emperor agreed. When the military attache at St Petersburg reported on 21 April that the Russian press was full of talk of Russia's Slav mission; that official assurances were worthless in the face of such mighty currents of opinion; and that 'the sooner people admit this and stop deceiving themselves' about Russia the better, Franz Joseph minuted 'very sound assessment' [Sehr richtige Auffas- 13 See below, p. 130-1. 11 E. v. Glaise-Horstenau, p. 247. 15 Kab. 18, Haymerle, report to Franz Joseph, 7 February 1880. 112 The Making of the Alliances, iS/p-Sj sung).16 Besides, Bismarck's startling change of front with regard to Russia since the summer was in itself enough to make Vienna mistrustful. Haymerle decided, therefore, that 'so long as our interests in the Near East are so closely parallel with those of the English, we should be unwise to abandon England.'17 Nor did Haymerle allow personal factors to weaken his determination to follow the path dictated by Austro-Hungarian state interests. For example, Gladstone's return to office in Britain in April 1880 might have been a serious obstacle. In January, Franz Joseph had remarked to the British ambassador that 'it would be difficult to feel confidence in the maintenance of the present relations if he returned to power';18 and during the British election campaign a similar remark was attributed to the emperor by the Viennese press. Gladstone retorted on 17 March with a public denunciation of Austrian interference in British internal affairs, took the opportunity of demanding an end to Beacons-field's 'Austrian foreign policy', and went on to make a very famous statement: 'there is not an instance, there is not a spot upon the whole map where you can lay your finger and say, "There Austria did good".'19 At this the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in London, Karolyi, talked of resigning if Gladstone came to power. In the event, however, tactful handling of the incident by diplomats in Vienna and London smoothed matters over, and even created what Haymerle was pleased to call 'an entirely satisfactory starting point for our new relations'.20 He turned a deaf ear to Bismarck who, secretly afraid that Gladstone's anti-Turkish views might tempt Russia and weaken her desire to restore the Three Emperors' League, tried naively to convince Vienna that Gladstone was a dangerous revolutionary. Indeed, in April, he rejected yet another German proposal for an agreement with Russia precisely because - by enforcing the closure of the Straits to protect Russia from the British fleet, for example - it would alienate Britain. Haymerle remained determined to co-operate with Gladstone in executing the Treaty of Berlin. 1« w. Wagner, p. 123. l' W. N. Medlicott, Bismarck, Gladstone and the Concert of Europe, p, 52. 18 Agatha Ramm, p. 145. 19 W. E. Gladstone, Political Speeches in Scotland (1880), Vol. 2, p. 41. 20 W. N. Medlicott, Bismarck, Gladstone . . ., p. 62. II} The Making of the Alliances, 1879-8; He was to be disappointed. The settlement of the outstanding issues inherited from the Congress of Berlin - the delimitation of the Greek and Montenegrin frontiers - was in itself a tedious and exasperating problem which was to put the solidarity of the Great Powers to a severe test. For on both questions the Powers were faced with stubborn Turkish opposition; and in the Montenegrin case with local Albanian armed resistance. Not only this, Haymerle soon began to doubt whether Austro-Hungarian interests were best served by abetting Britain in what was tending to become an increasingly anti-Turkish policy, and one which Russian backing made even more suspect. For example, on a practical level, he disliked the readiness of the other Powers to subject still more Albanians to Montenegrin rule. Already in 1878 the Austrians had seen in the spirited Albanian protests to the Congress evidence of a potentially useful barrier against the complete slavicization of the Balkans. At the same time, they wondered whether the pro-Christian Gladstone would show an equal devotion to international law if it came to maintaining the sultan's rights in Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia against a Russian attempt to unite the principality and the province. More generally, and more serious, Haymerle had grave misgivings about the whole policy of coercion, to which the Powers, having exhausted their repertoire of paper condemnations of Turkey, were being steered by Britain and Russia in the summer of 1880. Not only might naval and military action bring British, and even Russian, forces to the shores of the Adriatic (which Vienna regarded as an Austto-Hungarian preserve); it might well provoke serious disturbances in Turkey, even her total collapse, with all the attendant risks of war. This the Austro-Hungarian press was not slow to point out; and by October Haymerle was wondering whether the moment had not come 'to administer a clear and effective diplomatic rebuff (Schlappe) to Mr Gladstone'31 by coming out openly in opposition to further coercion. Since the late summer he had been coming to the conclusion that his pro-British policy had been a dangerous mistake; and that there was perhaps something to be said for a cautious approach to Russia. It was in this frame of mind that Haymerle sought out Bismarck at Friedrichsruh (4-5 September). Of course, he still wished to base his policy on the maintenance of the Treaty of 21 Kab. 18, Haymerle, report to Franz Joseph, 4 October 1880. r The Making of'the Alliances, 1879-8; 114 Berlin; but at the same time he recognized that certain developments - for example the union of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia - might occur of their own momentum, and Austria-Hungary would be powerless to prevent them. To this extent, therefore, he recognized 'the advantages of standing well with Russia, particularly since England is so actively trying to undermine Turkey and can no longer be counted on'.2a From St Petersburg, Kal-noky gave him strong support: Russia had probably already squared Britain on the Bulgarian question; Austria-Hungary, therefore, might do well to come to some agreement with St Petersburg to secure her own interests, especially her supremacy in Serbia, so necessary for the security of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The latter, Kälnoky thought, might well be formally annexed. At Friedrichsruh Haymerle found Bismarck enthusiastic: indeed, he had already sounded the Russians, and he now suggested to Haymerle immediate tripartite negotiations with the Russian ambassador Saburov, for an agreement to give Russia security at the Straits (by maintaining their closure against Britain) and, in return for the union of the two Bulgarias, offering the Monarchy a free hand to annex Bosnia and the Herzegovina. Haymerle thought such a definite proposal premature, and fobbed Bismarck off with the excuse that he would first have to seek Franz Joseph's instructions. Nevertheless, the Friedrichsruh meeting marked a decisive development in Austro-Hungarian policy in so far as Haymerle now agreed in principle to look into the possibilities of agreement with Russia. As he explained to the emperor,23 it was a question of safeguarding Austro-Hungarian interests in view of Britain's unreliability and the Monarchy's consequent inability to prevent the union of the two Bulgarias. He did not wish to make an approach to Russia himself at this stage: the Delegations were about to meet in Hungary, and he wished to say that he had his hands free. Perhaps rather naively, therefore, he entrusted Bismarck with the task of sounding the terrain at St Petersburg and preparing a draft agreement. At the same time, however, he was careful to spell out to Bismarck the 22 W. N. Medlicott, Bismarck, Gladstone . . ., p. 180. a3 Kab. 18, Haymerle, report to Franz Joseph, 9 September 1880. The full text of Hay merle's reports to Franz Joseph on the Friedrichsruh meeting is in W. N. Medlicott, 'Bismarck und Haymerle: Ein Gespräch über Russland', Berliner Monatshefte, November 1940, pp. 719-29. II? The Making of the Alliances, iS/y-Sj particular Austro-Hungarian interests which any agreement must safeguard. The union of the two Bulgarias must come about naturally, and not at Russia's instigation or behest; nor must it lead to further Bulgarian expansion into Macedonia, where the Monarchy had interests of its own; nor must it be seen as a condition of Austria-Hungary's annexing Bosnia and the Herzegovina - Russia had already agreed to that in 1877. The Dual Alliance must be in no sense weakened. Indeed, it should be strengthened - there should be some guarantee of Roumanian security against a Russian attack. Finally, Russia must cease to oppose Austro-Hungarian influence in Serbia. What Haymerle was in fact demanding - and his elaboration of Austro-Hungarian interests in his letters to Kalnoky in December make this clear24 -was the predominance of Austro-Hungarian influence in Rou-mania and the Western Balkans (by forcing Russia to recognize the intangible advantages gained by the Monarchy at the Congress of Berlin) and also a fair measure of influence in Bulgaria. For example, a union of the two Bulgarias was not to impinge on Austria-Hungary's interests in railways and commerce there: these were to be guaranteed. It was indeed sanguine of Haymerle to suppose that Bismarck would seriously press thispolicyat StPetersburg. Of course Bismarck, for whom the negotiations were primarily a means of making sure of Russia, did no such thing - as the Austrians were dismayed to discover when they received the Russo-German draft treaty on 23 January 1881. True, William I tried to sugar the pill, pointing to the desirability of cultivating the conservative elements in St Petersburg; and Franz Joseph was in fact impressed by his argument that a treaty would demonstrate to anarchical elements in Europe that monarchical solidarity could survive political differences. Nevertheless, the Russo-German draft caused the gravest misgivings in Vienna. First, it provided for the mediation of the third contracting party in the event of a dispute between the other two. This the Austrians feared might some day be used by Bismarck to escape from his obligations under the Dual Alliance - if, for example, Austria-Hungary felt obliged to reject the decision of mediators in Berlin. Worse still, on the point of Bosnia, Russia promised merely to accept the status quo as defined in the Austro-Turkish convention of 1879, i.e. considerably less than the eventual annexation she had agreed W. N. Medlicott, Bismarck, Gladstone . . ., pp. 254-7. 116 The Making of the Alliances, 1879-8? to in 1877. Franz Joseph and Haymerle were quick to object to this; and they again emphasized that the Dual Alliance must in no circumstances be weakened or watered down by the admission of a third party (as the mediation clause implied). They even went on to demand (and Beck was most emphatic on this point) that Austria-Hungary should have an absolute veto on the entry of Russian troops into Roumania, a state of vital strategic importance to the Monarchy; and that the Dual Alliance be extended to cover the case of a threat not only to Austria-Hungary's territory, but to her military capacity (Kriegsmacht) - such as would arise from a Russian occupation of Roumania. Bismarck, however, would not consider extending the casus foederis to Roumania; and his counterproposal of a blanket clause making the military occupation of any Balkan state dependent on the consent of the other two partners in the alliance was rejected out of hand by Haymerle: Austria-Hungary could never sign such a clause, which would completely bind her hands in her dealings with her south Slav neighbours. Throughout February the deadlock continued. The Austro-Hungarian counter-draft of 3 March omitted both the mediation clause and a clause on the closure of the Straits; and demanded a free hand in Bosnia, the Herzegovina, and also in the Sanjak. At the same time, the Roumanian point was now abandoned, and on the whole the reply went a considerable way towards meeting the Russo-German draft. The Austrians were certainly beginning to retreat from their extreme position of December. In the first place, the diplomatic situation had shown no sign of any change in their favour: the deadlock between Greece and Turkey, with its attendant risks that Britain might drag Russia along the path of violent coercion, was not resolved until the Turks suddenly surrendered in March. Second, Bismarck, while with one hand offering Vienna the sop of a formal statement that the Dual Alliance retained its full force, wielded the big stick with the other: on 1 March he informed Vienna that if the negotiations failed, it would be his painful duty to tell St Petersburg who was to blame. Third, the role of Kalnoky, since January promoted to permanent ambassador at St Petersburg, must be emphasized. According to a later account of Aehrenthal, who knew Kalnoky intimately, this was of the greatest importance, and undoubtedly influenced Haymerle's decisions.28 2S P.A. I/469, Aehrenthal memorandum, 1895. "7 The Making of'the Alliances, 1879-8; The emperor too was a great admirer of the ambassador's dispatches. The case for co-existence with Russia was strongly urged in a dispatch from Kalnoky on 18 February:26 the Monarchy was simply too weak to implement the only feasible alternative policy of hurling Russia back into Asia for ever; and perhaps the present moment was the least unfavourable and should not be allowed to slip. For Russia was temporarily reasonable (having been weakened by a disastrous harvest in 1880); and whereas negotiations a deux would be dangerous for Austria-Hungary as the weaker party, she might do well to negotiate at a time when she could count on the backing of Germany by virtue of the Dual Alliance (Document 9). If the Austrians really set any store by this latter consideration, they were greatly in error. The subsequent negotiations saw one Austro-Hungarian retreat after another, and all accomplished under brutal pressure from Bismarck himself. The Russians were determined to secure a formal reaffirmation of the principle of the closure of the Straits, but at the same time refused to give Austria-Hungary a free hand in the Sanjak (after all they had in 1878 consented only to its eventual occupation, not annexation). They played their cards well. The assassination of Alexander II on 13 March presented them with an admirable opportunity to delay the negotiations; and they kept the Central Powers on tenterhooks for three silent weeks. They rightly calculated that Bismarck would lose his nerve and put pressure on Vienna. True, the new tsar professed his devotion to his father's policy; but this also included a filial devotion to the original Russo-German draft. Moreover, the situation in St Petersburg was genuinely uncertain: the appointment of Ignatiev as minister of the interior was an ominous sign; and Kalnoky began to wonder how long the conservative Giers would retain any influence at the foreign office. In this situation, Bismarck bullied the Austrians mercilessly, threatening in April to conclude a treaty with Russia without them. During May Haymerle gradually gave way on all points except the right to annex Bosnia, the Herzegovina, and the Sanjak. This should not only be recognized, but recognized in the body of the treaty, as a quid pro quo for the Straits clause. Bismarck, surprised at the extent of Haymerle's concessions, promised his support; but when the Russians still held out, he again 26 Ibid. 118 The Making of the Alliances, 1879-8; abandoned Austria-Hungary. After another appeal from Kalnoky, pointing to the uncertainty of the situation in Russia - the relatively well-disposed Alexander III might at any moment suffer the fate of his father - and another formal summons to surrender from Bismarck, the exasperated Haymerle again gave way. The eventual annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina ended up in an annexe, and as for the Sanjak, Russia merely reaffirmed her promise of 13 July 1878 to countenance an Austro-Hungarian occupation. Nevertheless, considering the diplomatic isolation of Austria-Hungary, and the extent to which her expectations of German support had even turned against her, the Three Emperors' Alliance, signed in Vienna on 18 June (Document 10), was by no means an unmitigated defeat. The reinforcement of monarchical solidarity and of peace between the three empires expressed in the preamble was more than mere phrases. True, Austro-Hungarian and German support for a Russian circular of 31 March proposing an international conference on revolutionary plots, made little headway against the opposition of Britain, France, and Italy. But if the treaty gave the Russian government a breathing space to re-establish itself after the assassination of the tsar, it was also designed to give the new order of things in Bosnia and the Herzegovina time to consolidate itself. Indeed, it may well have been a contributory factor to the firm stand taken by the Austro-Hungarian government against anti-monarchical elements generally in the early 1880s. For example, a spate of assassinations of officials between 1882 and 1884 was met with great severity: anarchists in the Monarchy saw their newspapers suppressed and their societies dissolved; and they lost their right to trial by jury. Even from a purely diplomatic point of view, the Austrians had not done too badly. The Dual Alliance had been formally declared to have survived unimpaired (18 May); and the obnoxious mediation clause had disappeared without trace. The main clauses of the treaty actually brought some positive advantages. True, Article HI, endorsing the principle of the closure of the Straits was a pure gain for Russia; but the sense of Article I at least gave Austria-Hungary rear cover against Italy in exchange for her promise of benevolent neutrality in the event of Franco-German or Anglo-Russian wars. Article II, concerning the principles of action in the Balkans (spelt out in more concrete terms in an annexed protocol) "9 The Making of the Alliances, 1879-8/ really only dealt with developments that were in any case regarded as inevitable. And if the Austrians had had to rest content with a mere reaffirmation of existing Russian pledges regarding Bosnia, the Herzegovina, and the Sanjak, they had at least brought Russia to recognize Austro-Hungarian interests in Bulgaria: the union was not to be hastened, nor was it to be extended into Macedonia. Haymerle had been careful to exclude the slightest hint of a division of the Balkans into Austro-Hungarian and Russian spheres of interest, such as would have abandoned Bulgaria to Russia (not that the latter would have been prepared to hand over Serbia and Montenegro to exclusive Austro-Hungarian control either). Thus, if the Austrians had perhaps achieved little in the way of positive gains, they had also given virtually nothing away. Indeed, the very fact that the treaty said in effect so little, and placed no restriction whatever on the development of Austro-Hungarian influence, particularly economic influence, was a major advantage in Austro-Hungarian eyes; and one which the Monarchy intended to exploit. More than this, though Russia might not have pledged herself not to invade Roumania, Austria-Hungary had retained an equally free hand to coerce Serbia or Montenegro. Further, whereas the renunciation by the three contracting parties of their freedom of military action against Turkey (and Bulgaria was technically still part of Turkey) was an important sacrifice for Russia to make, it cost Austria-Hungary, who had no designs on Turkey or Bulgaria anyway, very little. The Monarchy's Balkan position was therefore at least no weaker after the Three Emperors' Alliance Treaty than before. Indeed, by the joint instructions to Russian and Austro-Hungarian representatives in the Balkans, drawn up supplementary to the treaty in the course of the summer, and ordering them to co-operate and refrain from intriguing against each other, impecunious Russia had renounced what was perhaps her only effective weapon to counter the extension of Austro-Hungarian influence by means of trade. How far Russian diplomats on the spot would in fact obey the joint instructions and abstain from fanning the flames of local nationalism against Austria-Hungary, particularly in Serbia and Roumania, was of course a moot point which no treaty could settle. Nevertheless, in some respects, the prospects for Austria-Hungary had undoubtedly improved. 120 The Making of the Alliances, 1879-8/ So confident were the Austrians in fact that they even connived at a slight increase in Russia's political influence in Bulgaria in the summer of 1881. True, they hoped to see even Bulgaria in the Austro-Hungarian camp in the long run, and took good care to cultivate the Prince, Alexander of Battenberg. But for the present they busied themselves with their railway projects and did not attempt to challenge Russia's political supremacy at Sofia. This, they tended to regard as something of a necessary evil, if Alexander were to survive in the turbulent domestic politics of the principality. In July, therefore, Austria-Hungary became the spokesman of the Three Emperors' Alliance in bringing a reluctant Gladstone to accept a Russian-inspired authoritarian constitution to replace the unworkable liberal one granted to Bulgaria in 1879. True, the Austrians here formally abandoned the policy pursued since 1878 of co-operation with Britain to check Russian influence in Bulgaria. Yet Haymerle was perhaps only renouncing a policy inherited from Beaconsfield and Andrassy, which Gladstone was highly unlikely to enforce. (Much the same may be said of Haymerle's conversion to the principle of the closure of the Straits.) Indeed, the one thing on which all members of the Three Emperors' Alliance were agreed was the exclusion of Gladstone's influence from the Near East. This applied not only to the sultan's Christian dominions in Europe, where all three sought only to preserve peace, if not quiet; and to Egypt, where, in the face of British and French meddling in 1881 and 1882, all three paraded their scrupulous regard for the sultan's rights in an effort to ingratiate themselves at Constantinople; but also to Bulgaria and Serbia, where Austria-Hungary in particular was irritated by British commercial competition. In the latter principality, Haymerle had just brought off something of a coup. The replacement of Ristic and the Liberals by the Progressives -the party of Prince Milan - in October 1880, had provided no immediate solution to the issues pending between Serbia and the Monarchy - the construction of the railway links agreed with Andrassy at the Congress of Berlin, and the negotiation of a commercial treaty. The first was delayed partly by the Austrian government, which until the autumn of 1880 refused to pay anything towards the cost of a line which would be built entirely in Hungary; and partly by the Serbs, who in the spring of 1881 were 121 The Making of the Alliances, i8j^-8) still toying with the idea of entrusting their section of the line to Constantinople to a British firm. As for the commercial treaty, when negotiations began in November 1880, even the Progressive government jibbed at what the British minister - admittedly an interested observer - described as Austria-Hungary's 'monstrous pretensions'.27 By the early summer, however, these issues had been settled: the Serbian government placed the railway contract with the Union Generale, a French Catholic-monarchist bank with Austro-Hungarian affiliations; and further agreed to standardize Serbian railway rates with those of the Monarchy (to prevent under-selling by British and French wares corning through Turkey from Salonica). The Austrians for their part had already agreed not to ask Serbia for any money towards the clearance works they were undertaking on the Danube. Finally, on 6 June 1881 a commercial treaty was signed admitting Serbian livestock and agricultural produce into the Monarchy on favourable terms and securing the Serbian market for Austrian light industry. The commercial treaty was followed by a secret political treaty, negotiated by Prince Milan in person during a visit to Vienna in June (Document 11). As Milan saw the situation, Serbia, deserted by Russia at San Stefano, and estranged from her fellow Balkan states by the vexed question of the eventual partition of Macedonia, needed the support of Austria-Hungary; just as Milan needed it to free himself from the pro-Russian Liberal and Radical parties. The treaty of 28 June 1881 provided for Austro-Hungarian diplomatic support, should Serbia declare herself a kingdom, and should she seek territory in the south in the event of the collapse of Turkish rule in Macedonia. Serbia, for her part, was to abandon hope of gaining the Sanjak or the occupied provinces. Indeed, she was obliged not to tolerate on Serbian soil any intrigues against the Monarchy, Bosnia, or the Herzegovina. More than this, by Article IV - which Haymerle regarded as 'our greatest achievement'38 - Milan bound himself to conclude no further treaties whatever without prior agreement with Vienna. This last was too much even for the Progressive government in Belgrade, who foretold their own ruin and the return of the Russophiles to power if ever the treaty leaked out. In the end, the 27 Agatha Ramm, p. 371. M A. F. Pribram, 'Milan IV von Serbien . . .', p. 471. 122 The Making of the Alliances, iSyp-8j article was watered down; but Milan gave the Austrians a personal assurance which in effect maintained it in its original vigour. The difficulty was that the treaty, and indeed the whole position of Austria-Hungary in Serbia, stood and fell with Prince Milan. The treaty had no roots in the wishes of the Serbian population; and Austro-Hungarian propaganda could never hope seriously to compete with that of Russia, which could harp on the enslavement of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. The best hope for the Austrians was to emphasize mutually beneficial commercial links (if agrarian Hungary could be persuaded to take a benevolent view of Serbian competition in the internal markets of the Monarchy), and to keep the population of Bosnia and the Herzegovina happy. Even this - admittedly a forlorn hope against such an inherently irrational phenomenon as nationalism - was in the long run to prove beyond the capacity of Vienna and Budapest. For the present, however, given that Milan was still in control in Belgrade, the Austrians had managed to reinforce their Balkan position with a guarantee that Serbia would neither go over to Russia, nor revive the plans of Prince Michael for a Balkan League. Only in Roumania did the Austrians make no progress. When, in February 1881, the Roumanians sounded the Central Powers about the possibility of declaring the principality a kingdom, Haymerle maintained his opposition. But he could see that no other Power would help to restrain Bucharest; and so he prepared to make Austro-Hungarian recognition dependent on Roumania's giving way in the Danube question and binding herself in general terms to the Monarchy. The Roumanians, however, got wind of his plans and decided - especially in view of rumours of an impending Three Emperors' Alliance which might freeze the Balkan situation - to rush the proclamation through in March. (It had originally been planned for May.) Haymerle had been made to look rather silly; and in the end he had to join the Russians and Germans in recognizing the new kingdom unconditionally. Worse still, as he and Andrassy had feared, the proclamation did indeed give a boost to Roumanian irredentism. A wave of demonstrations and spectacular excursions to and from Transylvania resulted by August in a veritable press war between Hungary and Roumania. To complete Playmerle's "3 The Making of the Alliances, 1879-8j discomfiture, the other Powers had rejected his project for the Danube Commission, and it was left to the French to prepare another. Yet despite this setback in Roumania, Haymerle had managed to build fairly successfully on the foundations laid by Andrassy at Berlin. And he had surpassed Andrassy by establishing tolerable relations with Russia at the same time. The German ambassador had reported on 14 June that the negotiations over the Three Emperors' Alliance had 'not increased Austria's love for Russia. I am speaking not only of Haymerle, but also of the emperor and Andrdssy, who will not easily forget that the Russians would have preferred to leave Bosnia and the Herzegovina out of the treaty altogether' {herauseskamotiert).™ But in fact, for the rest of 1881 the new Alliance enjoyed a honeymoon. Personal relations between the emperors improved. Franz Joseph saw William I every summer after this; and he warmly approved of the Russo-German Danzig meeting, where the socialist menace was discussed. In an affectionate exchange of telegrams with Alexander III he spoke of his unity with the tsar in the struggle 'contre les dangers qui menacent Pordre social et qui sapent la civilisation chretienne'.30 Changes of personnel in Vienna reinforced this conservative trinity. On 11 June Beck was appointed chief of the Austro-Hungarian general staff. This was partly because he had found favour with the emperor in fourteen years of personal service as head of the military chancellery; also because it was hoped that he would carry out effectively the reforms of army organization he had so often recommended - and this in fact he did, reorganizing the general staff along more efficient Prussian lines. It was also a political appointment, however, for Beck had long urged that the chief of the general staff be responsible, not to the war minister and the Delegations, but directly to the emperor -another Prussian idea. His wish was now granted, and the lamentations of the liberal press about the 'reactionary' nature of the appointment, and the whittling away of parliamentary control over a major element in the state, were loud. They were not without foundation. For Beck was certainly a staunch conserva- 2» W. Windelband, Bismarck und die europäischen Grassmächte i#7j to spare a man from the French front in the event; the logistic difficulties were enormous; and Crispi was obviously only trying to strengthen Italy's foothold in the Balkans. Indeed, Archduke Albrecht thought it positively dangerous to foster any links between two irredentist states with claims on the Monarchy. Nevertheless, Kalnoky decided that closer co-operation between the two Latin races against the Slav flood could only help to weld the alliances together. From the spring of 1888 he worked hard at Rome and Bucharest and managed by August to secure the accession of Italy to the Austro-Roumanian alliance. This was pure gain from the Monarchy's point of view, in that, like Germany's accession in 1883 it bound an ally (albeit in this case a feeble one) to help Austria-Hungary out in the event (albeit an unlikely one by this time) of a Russian invasion of Roumania. Yet although the alliances would clearly be militarily invaluable in the event of actual war, that was a contingency which Austro-Hungarian policy was very much concerned to avoid. Indeed the outbreak of war would in itself indicate a failure of the very important deterrent function of the alliances, at this period still operating with a fairly comfortable preponderance of strength against the 'restless' Powers, France and Russia. Moreover - and this was to assume greater importance in Austrian minds in the decade after 1888, when there were no major confrontations between the continental Powers - the Monarchy also looked to the alliances to serve its interests in the humdrum but hardly less essential diplomacy of peace, and to ensure good relations with its neighbours. In this respect, the alliances were proving sadly deficient. Strange behaviour on the part of the unstable governments in Belgrade and Bucharest was by now coming to be accepted in Vienna as a fact of life; but in the summer of 1888 even the Dual and Triple Alliances were severely plagued with mistrust. Indeed, Germany and Italy seemed almost to be conspiring together against the Monarchy. For example, when William II succeeded to the German throne in June, he not only chose demonstratively to honour St Petersburg with his first state visit, but followed this up with a visit to the king of Italy at Rome. If the papal protests he provoked were not embarrassing enough for his allies in Vienna, William spent much of his time discussing the internal affairs of Austria with Crispi, who 177 The Decline of the Alliances, i88f-y; joined him in condemning the pro-Slav and clerical policies of the Taaffe government. On the whole Kalnoky had come to the conclusion that the papal and irredentist questions were insoluble, and that Vienna and Rome would do best to resign themselves quietly to living with this unfortunate fact. For example, in the autumn of 1887 he refused to adopt an anti-papal policy at Italy's request, but justified himself with the remarkably frank argument that it would be like asking Crispi 'to state publicly in the Chamber that Italy finally and for ever renounced Trentino and Trieste'.57 But he drew the line at Germany's supporting Italian claims to Austrian territory, even if only in minor frontier disputes; and in July 1888 he asked bitterly whether Germany would consider ceding Lorraine to France 'in the interests of general European peace'.58 Irredentism was at this time threatening to become quite a serious problem in Austro-Italian relations. In January 1889 Kalnoky took the gravest umbrage at an Italian law enfranchising Italian-speakers outside the kingdom. In November it was only under pressure from Rome and Berlin - and with perhaps understandable bad grace - that Franz Joseph intervened to stop the trial for sedition of the editor of the Trieste Independents; and in July 1890 the closing down of Pro Patria, the leading national association for Italian Austrians, was interpreted in Italy as another wicked plot by Taaffe and the clericals to undermine the Triple Alliance. Italy still needed the Alliance of course, and it was under this banner that in the autumn of 1890 Crispi at last launched a great onslaught on the irredentists after closing down all the societies dedicated to Oberdank. Kalnoky was much gratified; but the ensuing Italian elections showed that the irredentists were still as numerous as ever. The Dual Alliance too was at something of a discount in 1888. When William II, returning from Rome, at last appeared in Vienna in October, his visit was a disaster in every respect. He quarrelled with Crown Prince Rudolph, and infuriated the emperor with gestures that were nothing less than blatant intrusions into the domestic affairs of the Monarchy. For example, he presented Tisza with the Black Eagle - the highest German order - but 67 A. Sandona, U irredentismo nelk lotte polithbe e näh contese diphmatiche italo-austriache, Vol. 3, p. 146. 68 Ibid., p. 151. 178 The Decline of the Alliances, i88j-$j ostentatiously refrained from giving Taaffe any decoration at all. Franz Joseph and Kalnoky thought this behaviour monstrous. Nor were they impressed when Herbert Bismarck took the opportunity to preach the doctrine of spheres of influence in the Balkans. 'I know this is your father's idea,' Franz Joseph told him; 'but I could never accept it in the past; and I must also reject it today.'59 The strange behaviour of the Germans - particularly their attempts to ingratiate themselves at St Petersburg, alarmed Vienna. For Austro-Russian relations had not improved at all. 'How we are supposed to get out of this without a war is not clear to me,' Franz Joseph told Waldersee in June 1888.60 It was just as well, therefore, that the Monarchy should look to its own defences. In the summer, the troop concentrations in Galicia were strengthened; and the Delegations voted 100m. Gulden without a murmur. In April 1889 an Army Bill, envisaging the eventual doubling in size of the Common Army was voted by both parliaments. True, this was not achieved without a struggle. There were people in Budapest who thought even the Ausgleich of 1867 a needless sacrifice of Hungary's liberty; and who regarded the creeping growth of the Common institutions as an even graver menace than the power of Russia. Thanks partly to the support of the German ambassador, Tisza eventually prevailed in parliament against what Kilnoky termed the 'radical rabble';61 but he had to buy them off. To Beck's dismay the title of the Imperial General Staff was altered to 'Imperial and Royal' - a minor change but another ominous sign of things to come. For the struggle over the Army Bill in Hungary marked the beginning of an instability in Hungarian politics that was seriously to weaken the Monarchy as a Great Power in the next decade. And it was to be the last Army Bill the government could extract from Budapest until 1912. For the present, however, the new law offered proof enough that the Monarchy was firmly determined, as the German military attache rather patronizingly put it 'to become a real Great Power' {ebenbürtig %u werden).62 Thus strengthened, the Monarchy was in fact about to embark 68 W. Wagner, p. 166. 60 E. v, Glaise-Horstenau, p. 324. 81 Aehrenthal MSS., Karton 6, Kilnoky to Aehrenthal, 4 June 1888. 63 E. v. Glaise-Horstenau, p. 330. T79 The Decline of the Alliances, i88j-pj on a period of relative security which lasted for about four years. The year 1889 saw a remarkable improvement in the international situation and the Monarchy, perhaps for the last time in its history, was able to maintain successfully a firm posture against Russia with a fair amount of support from its friends and allies. On the one hand, William II, whose effusive gestures had been rebuffed by the dour tsar, now fell into an anti-Russian mood. He also became increasingly unwilling to listen to Bismarck. On the other hand, with France paralysed by the aftermath of the Bou-langer affair, and with the Balkans relatively calm, it was Russia's military efforts in Poland that now began to absorb the German military mind. By the summer of 1889 the Austrians felt they had good reason to hope that Germany would after all be prepared to pay as much attention to the eastern front as to the western. And with William I dead and Bismarck's influence in decline, Kalnoky thought it might be time to raise certain thorny questions at Berlin. Franz Joseph's forthcoming return visit to William II would provide a good opportunity. It might be possible, he speculated in July,63 to persuade Germany to become at least neutral in the Bulgarian question - her continued support of Russia at Constantinople was still paralysing Austrian efforts to reconcile the sultan and Prince Ferdinand. And reverting to his ideas of 1887-8, he determined to make yet another effort to settle the question of the compatibility of a military offensive with a defensive alliance. Franz Joseph's visit to Berlin in July 1889 was a tremendous success, surpassing even the Austrians' wildest hopes. True, Bismarck was not particularly forthcoming, refusing to lift the ban on pig imports from the Monarchy, and making tactless remarks about the growth of Slav influence in Austrian politics. But the Austrians could afford to ignore Bismarck, for the military conversations could not have gone better. Waldersee declared that Russia was definitely the chief enemy of Germany, who would evacuate Lorraine if necessary to finish the war in the east with all speed. Beck was so pleased at this that he at once abandoned a plan he had been working on for a defensive mobilization behind the Carpathians. More important still, the Germans now suddenly and enthusiastically adopted the Austrian view on the Alliance. The words of the war minister, Verdy du Vernois, to 83 P.A. I/469, Kalnoky, memorandum, secret, July 1889. 180 The Decline of the Alliances, i88j-pj Beck - 'Your mobilization will be for us the signal to come in with all we have got' (mit Allem ein^iiset^en)6i - were perhaps nothing unusual from a military quarter. But now the Emperor William himself declared: 'whatever reason you may have for mobilizing, whether Bulgaria or anything else, the day of your mobilization will be the day of mobilization for my army, whatever the chancellors {die Kan^ler) may say.'65 The Austrians could hardly have wished for a more explicit assurance. Their only doubt was to its real value, coming from one so volatile as William II and at a time of growing political instability in Berlin. (Within a matter of months, for example, Verdy had been removed from the war ministry.) These misgivings account for the mixed feelings with which the news of the fall of the Bismarcks, in March 1890, was received at Vienna. The military, of course, were jubilant: 'Thank God we are rid of the whole family,' Archduke Albrecht wrote to Beck.66 Franz Joseph hoped that Austria-Hungary might now be able to speak with more weight in the Alliance; and he lost no time in reminding William II that the two German Powers must stand up to Russia, 'because then she always retreats'67 - a dangerous lesson to have drawn from the recent Balkan crisis. Even he, however, in some ways preferred Bismarck's firmness to the emperor's wobbling; and Bismarck was certainly more sound on the socialist question. Kalnoky, too, might henceforth feel able to speak with more authority in the counsels of Europe. He had always been discouraged by the thought that the Bismarcks were really more Russian than Austrian in sympathy: now there was nobody with 'Russian feelings' in office at Berlin.68 Yet even he had doubts about William II's stability, and hoped he might be kept fully occupied with domestic affairs. For a time William II continued on an Austrophile course. At the Rohnstock manoeuvres in September 1890 the Austrian visitors received his strong backing - but again only verbal - in the Near East. He agreed that a solution of the Straits question along the lines desired by Russia (i.e. that Russia alone should gain a right of passage to and from the Mediterranean) was 'impossible'; and he endorsed the Austrian view that the question was one for 64 E. v. Glaise-Horstenau, p. 337. 66 Ibid., p. 338. 56 Ibid., p. 342. 87 W. Wagner, p. 175. 88 Aehrenthal MSS., Karton 2, Kalnoky to Aehrenthal, 12 April 1890. 181 The Decline of the Alliances, i88j-pj Europe to handle. The Austrians for their part seem to have accepted William's story that, until Bismarck's fall, he had been entirely ignorant of the Reinsurance Treaty (which he revealed to them on this occasion, with a display of feigned indignation at Bismarck's perfidy).69 In the new year William seemed to wobble again: his sudden and brutal dismissal of their old friend Walder-see was a great blow to the Austrians; and Archduke Albrecht had qualms about the new chief-of-staff, the taciturn Schlieffen: 'I fear he is a slippery eel.'70 At Moltke's funeral in April, however, Schlieffen himself assured Beck that he was not thinking of departing from Waldersee's plans, and that Russia remained Germany's chief enemy. Altogether, therefore, although the whims of William II were hardly the best guarantee, the Dual Alliance seemed to have gained considerably in effectiveness and importance. The Triple Alliance experienced no such revival. True, Kalnoky recognized that for Germany the alliance had acquired increased importance since the revival of France in the middle 'eighties. Bismarck's 'gross flattery'71 of Crispi was paying dividends, and King Humbert's visit to Berlin in May 1889 was a spectacular demonstration of German-Italian solidarity. Austria-Hungary, however, was very much a third partner in this alliance. The papal question still ensured that there would be no Austro-Hungarian state visits to Rome. And after all, Italy could only be of positive value to the Monarchy by giving diplomatic support at Constantinople in accordance with the Mediterranean agreements. The Balkan clause in the Triple Alliance was only a nuisance from the Austro-Hungarian point of view. Indeed, in a memorandum of July 1889 Kalnoky admitted that all Vienna asked of the Italian ally was that she should refrain from harassing the Monarchy in a war with Russia. Indeed, whereas Germany, seeking effective military aid from Italy, wished to see an end to the internal chaos that prevailed in the kingdom, the Austrians decided that 'the more uncomfortable Italy's domestic position is . . . the more secure we can feel.'72 Above all, Kalnoky was determined not to 66 P.A. I/476, Liasse XXXIIIg, Szogyeny to Goluchowski, very secret, 31 October 1896. 70 E. v. Glaise-Horstenau, p. 342. 71 P.A. I/469, Kalnoky, memorandum, secret, July 1889. 78 Ibid. 182 The Decline of the Alliances, 188J-9J be drawn by Italy into a war with France. In the spring and summer of 1889, therefore, he rejected an Italian proposal (which enjoyed the support of Berlin) to reinforce the Triple Alliance by military and naval agreements. As regards the former, he thought neither Italy nor Austria-FIungary would have a man to spare from the French and Russian fronts respectively. A naval agreement he feared might increase the chances of the Monarchy's coming to blows with France. In any case the naval interests of Italy and Austria-Hungary lay in quite different parts of the Mediterranean; and the Austro-Hungarian fleet, though trim, was really only designed for coastal defence in the Adriatic. Fortunately, the Balkan situation did not seem to call for any drastic remedies in these years. As Zwiedenek, head of the Eastern Department at the Ballhausplatz, observed in March 1889, Kalnoky's policy of supporting the independent development of the Balkan states against Russia's attempts to establish her tutelage was meeting with success. The completion of the railway network to Constantinople in 1888 had strengthened Austria-Hungary's connexions with the Balkan states and her influence was growing. Altogether, the 'advancing development of the Balkan states forms an important obstacle to Russia's power-drive towards the west, and that is decidedly a success for our recent policy'.73 This success was hardly attributable to Austria-Hungary's Balkan alliances, which remained precarious. Indeed, as Serbia slipped into chaos, the Austrians gradually shifted the basis of their Balkan position from the Serbian and Roumanian alliances to a Bulgarian-Roumanian axis. As Kalnoky observed in February 1891,74 Roumania and Bulgaria were destined to be the most important elements in the Balkan situation - provided they realized their interest in staying on the side of western civilization and the Central Powers. If they were agreed on maintaining the status quo, they could form a most effective territorial barrier to the spread of Russian influence in Serbia, and the internal disorders there need then give no cause for concern. The strange and desperate behaviour of King Milan was now quite beyond the control of Vienna. His feud with the queen raged unabated; and in 1888, without consulting the Austrians at 73 Aehrenthal MSS., Karton 4, Zwiedenek to Aehrenthal, 28 March 1889. 74 P.A. 1/471, Liasse XXXa, Kalnoky to Goluchowski, secret, 9 February 1891. 183 The Decline of the Alliances, i88j-$j all, he embarked on a short-lived experiment with a Radical ministry, and then arbitrarily altered the constitution. By November he had had enough of Serbia, and suddenly informed Vienna that he had decided to abdicate. This was serious news; for Kalnoky was determined that the dynasty must at all costs be maintained. If it disappeared, leaving the way clear for a government openly hostile to the Monarchy, the latter would have to intervene in Serbia by force. All the same, the general Balkan situation was reassuring - particularly in view of the growing independence of Bulgaria - and when Franz Joseph and William II failed to move Milan to a sense of his monarchical duties, the Austrians decided that they would be satisfied if the regency that would rule for Milan's thirteen-year-old son, Alexander, were well-disposed towards Austria-Hungary and strong enough to prevent Serbia from falling into complete anarchy. This they managed to secure. The abdication went off calmly enough in March 1889 (although Kalnoky complained of the indignant ravings of some Hungarian newspapers). Ristic himself was one of the regents, and the influence of the queen-mother added a slightly Russian flavour to the government; but the Austrians soon established tolerable relations with it. Ristic had his work cut out to produce any kind of order out of the economic and political chaos bequeathed to him by Milan, and had no desire to burden Serbia with a quarrel with her powerful northern neighbour. He had agreed, as part of the abdication arrangements to accept the prolongation of the Austro-Serbian treaty to 1895; and the Austrians in turn were content to forget about the domestic chaos of the ramshackle Serbian state. One worrying aspect of the Serbian constitutional crisis had been the possibility of repercussions in Roumania, where King Carol was under attack from the Russophile Conservative party. In the event, however, the abdication of Milan, and especially the gloating of the Russian press, had a salutary effect in reviving Roumanian fears of Russia. And when the Conservatives came to power briefly in the spring of 1889, Kalnoky's fears that they might look to St Petersburg proved unfounded. The chief difficulty was that the king was too frightened to initiate the Conservative government - or even the short-lived Liberal government of General Mano that followed it - into the Austro-Roumanian alliance, which now existed only by grace of the king, and had no 184 The Decline of the Alliances, i88j-p/ foothold at all in the government. Throughout 1891 Kalnoky desperately urged Carol to make the alliance known to the leaders of both political parties, and to make the general drift of his policy clear to his people. He also pressed the king hard to renew the alliance. For the Monarchy, of course, its chief value lay not so much in the prospect of any military aid, as in binding Germany to defend Roumania. The present moment was a good one, he urged on Bucharest in the spring; for even Britain and Italy were collaborating with Austria-Hungary. Besides, if Germany once escaped, the allies might never get her back. Moreover, if Roumania aligned herself with Russia, this would bring down the anti-Russian government of Stamboulov in Bulgaria; and with Bulgaria in Russian hands, Roumania herself would not long survive.75 The return to power of the Conservatives in 1892 caused further delays before the long could screw up his courage to initiate the government into the alliance. It was not renewed until July. (Germany and Italy acceded in November.) In one respect there was some improvement, for Kalnoky had had enough of battiing with the timid king, and the alliance was this time renewed for four years, after which it would renew itself automatically for a further three unless actually denounced. In the following year it was strengthened by an Austro-Roumanian commercial treaty, which at last put an end to the long tariff war. The Monarchy gradually recovered its commercial position in Roumania after this, although Germany, who had meanwhile established her position there, always remained a strong rival. On the irredentist front there was no improvement. On the contrary, a 'Liga Culturale', founded in 1891, was organizing hatred of Hungary; and was helped in its task by a sensational trial of Roumanian nationalists in Transylvania in 1894. Kalnoky did his best to keep the temperature low, refusing to countenance Roumanian complaints about Magyarization, and equally ignoring Hungarian demands to bring Bucharest to book for tolerating irredentist activities within the kingdom. Fie only succeeded in displeasing both parties. Austria-Hungary's chief Balkan success in these years was achieved in Bulgaria, a state with which she had no alliance at all. It was still 'of the greatest importance', Zwiedenek declared in 75 P.A. I/471, Liasse XXXa, Kalnoky to Goluchowski, private and secret, 6 March, 12 April 1891. 185 The Decline of the Alliances, i88j-pj August 1889, to thwart Russian attempts to hinder Bulgaria's autonomous development; for a Bulgaria independent of Russia was 'the best guarantee against the success of Panslav and Great-Serbian designs'.76 Not that the Monarchy was completely successful in advancing Bulgaria's interests: Russia, with German backing, had managed to convince the sultan that Ferdinand was an enemy, who even coveted Turkish territory. In 1890, however, the diplomatic situation changed. Although the Mediterranean Entente Powers were still not strong enough to bring the sultan to grant Ferdinand formal recognition, they at last secured German support on minor Bulgarian questions; and in July together persuaded the sultan to give Ferdinand some satisfaction by appointing more Bulgarian bishops in Macedonia, to fortify the Bulgarian inhabitants against Greek propaganda. Of course, the association of the Mediterranean Entente with Ferdinand's cause played into Russia's hands at Constantinople to some extent, for the Turks were haunted by rumours of an international conspiracy based on Bulgaria to drive them out of Europe altogether. But in fact, Kalnoky was as content as anybody to see the territorial status quo in the Balkans maintained; and Russia's frantic opposition to anything that smacked of Bulgarian expansion into Macedonia suited him quite well. Similarly, Russia's persistent, and futile, efforts to embarrass the Bulgarian government internally - her fomenting of plots, her refusal in February 1892 to extradite the assassins of Ferdinand's representative at Constantinople - were only grist to the Austro-Hungarian mill. In 1891 Franz Joseph graciously received the Bulgarian ruler in Vienna; and Kalnoky blandly explained to the complaining Russians that 'little Ferdinand'77 had been since his childhood a personal friend of the emperor. By the end of 1892 Stamboulov felt strong enough to abolish the stipulation in the constitution imposing the Orthodox religion on all rulers of Bulgaria after the first; and in January 1893 Ferdinand married the Catholic Marie Louise of Parma, who had Habsburg blood in her veins. By this time the Russians were ready to wash their hands of Bulgaria. On the other hand, Kalnoky's assumption "Aehrenthal MSS., Karton 4, Zwiedenck to Aehrenthal, 15 August 1889. "Aehrenthal MSS., Karton 2, Kalnoky to Aehrenthal, 15 July 1891. 186 The Decline of the Alliances, i88j-pj that, saving some catastrophe such as the assassination of Stamboulov, Russia would never be able to recover her influence in Bulgaria, was perhaps unduly sanguine. True, Austria-Hungary retained her commercial predominance, but her ruthless exploitation of what the Bulgarians regarded as an unequal treaty was resented at Sofia. Politically she had certainly succeeded in saving Bulgaria from Russian domination; but she had been unable to secure what her protege Ferdinand most craved - international recognition. That, only a change of heart in St Petersburg could secure. This fact was the Achilles' heel of the Austro-Hungarian position in Bulgaria. That was a problem for the future. In 1891 the Monarchy still enjoyed the security of its alliances and ententes. In the spring the Triple Alliance was renewed without too much trouble. True, Kalnoky had been alarmed when Crispi suggested amalgamating the three treaties of 1887, as he still had no intention of giving Italy anything more than diplomatic support in the western Mediterranean; and for the same reason he refused to consider bringing Spain into the Alliance. But he rightly calculated that Crispi would not be able to devise a formula to accommodate the diverse geographical interests of Austria-Hungary and Italy in the Mediterranean; and when Crispi's successor, Rudini, in a weak position at home, and gaining no laurels from an abortive attempt to improve commercial relations with France, declared himself ready to renew the Alliance practically unchanged, Kalnoky seized the opportunity. On 6 May the Alliance was renewed and the three treaties were inserted into one document (Document 19). But they still remained separate, and the Monarchy had thereby assumed only the most tenuous moral connexion (being technically a signatory) with the Italo-German clauses concerning North Africa. It was to avoid assuming any further real commitments against France that in the summer Kalnoky again turned down an Italian suggestion for naval and military talks. It was to Britain that Italy should look for support in the Mediterranean, he said. He was therefore delighted when in June the British parliamentary under-secretary, Fergusson, acknowledged in the Commons that Britain had a common interest with Italy in maintaining the status quo in the Mediterranean. And he was even more encouraged by the resultant chorus of approval in the British press, regarding this open support from British public opinion as 187 The Decline of the Alliances, itfSj-pj being worth far more than the secret declarations of a prime minister.78 In fact, the summer of 1891 saw something of a festival of the Triple Alliance and the Mediterranean Entente. Following on Fergusson's declaration came a flamboyant speech by Rudini (29 June) proclaiming the renewal of the Triple Alliance and boasting of Italy's ties with Britain. Kalnoky thought this unduly sensational; but Franz Joseph himself had already caused a stir by going to Fiume to welcome a British squadron visiting the Adriatic; and King Humbert followed his example at Venice on 3 July. On the next day - two days after the conclusion of the Anglo-German Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty - William II left for a ten-day visit to England. Nor was the western Mediterranean forgotten. The same month saw the settlement of an Anglo-Portuguese east African dispute, which Kalnoky, exercising his good offices at Salisbury's request, had been trying to smooth over. True, he had refused to enter into the merits of the question; and there was little he felt he could do about the Portuguese government, which he considered deplorably lenient towards the noisy republican opposition. In fact, his good offices had consisted largely of urging the British to let Portugal down lightly. For if she were humiliated and the monarchy fell, the monarchies of Spain and Italy would soon follow, and the international revolutionary parties (Umstur^parteien)1* would be correspondingly heartened to proceed against the great Germanic and Slav monarchies. In April Italy and Spain had extended the agreement of 1887 to include diplomatic co-operation to maintain the status quo against France in Morocco; and to this Kalnoky, ever keen to reinforce the influence of the Triple Alliance at Madrid, made haste to accede. Not unnaturally France and Russia, where the press had been predicting the approaching end of the Triple Alliance, were greatly disconcerted by its spectacular renewal, and the prospect of Britain's joining it. Within a month they had made a secret military agreement. But their public counter-demonstration of solidarity (the visit of a French squadron to Cronstadt at the end of July) was not nearly enough to shake Kalnoky's confidence; 78 P.A. I/461, Liasse XXIV/2, Kalnoky to Bruck, No. 1, secret, 22 June 1891. 79 P.A. VIII/172, Kalnoky to Deym, private, 21 March 1891. 188 The Decline of the Alliances, i88j-$j and he calculated that when the smoke from the Cronstadt 'firework' had cleared, things would remain much the same.80 After all, Russia had no reason to tie her hands vis-a-vis 2. France which could always be had for the asking; and the approaching famine in Russia should at least give food for thought to any warmongers in St Petersburg. Indeed, Kalnoky advised a council of ministers at this time that it would be safe to reduce armaments expenditure to help balance the budget.81 And he was at some pains to calm the nervous anxiety that any gesture of Franco-Russian collaboration always aroused in Berlin. He rejected a German suggestion that the sultan be initiated into the Mediterranean agreements: the Turks would only leak the agreements to France and Russia, who would then be spurred to even greater efforts at Constantinople. And they had influence enough there already. Russia's new Black Sea fleet impressed the Turks; and despite Anglo-Austrian diplomatic opposition, she was making pretty free with the rule of the Straits, sending armed ships in and out more or less at will. (It was now the British who were anxious to maintain the closure of the Straits.) Kalnoky was quite content with the Mediterranean agreements as they stood - 'certain fundamental and general theoretical promises' - and he did not wish to enquire too closely into their binding character.82 (This might move the British to reduce it to a minimum.) Although Rosebery, who succeeded Salisbury in March 1892, refused to read the agreements or put them to the Cabinet, the Austrians were still sanguine enough about their general diplomatic position to be satisfied with his rather less definite statement that 'Anglo-Austrian relations must rest exclusively on reciprocal confidence'.88 Kalnoky's confidence was further increased when it at last proved possible in these years to bring the commercial policies of the allied Powers into line with their diplomatic commitments. This was, of course, only attainable once Bismarck with his narrow diplomatic view of the alliances was out of the way; and when Germany, Austria-Hungary's most important and most powerful trading partner, and still virtually the arbiter of her commercial policy, had a change of heart. Caprivi's policy was designed partly to win the masses from socialism at home - by 80 Aehrcnthal MSS., Karton 2, Kalnoky to Aehrenthal, 28 July 1891. 81 Ibid., Kalnoky to Aehrenthal, 19 October 1891. 82 Margaret M. Jefferson, p. 87. 83 Ibid., p. 88. 189 The Decline of the Alliances, i88j-#j importing cheap foreign food to lower the cost of living; and partly to reinforce the alliances by economic ties, with the ultimate objective of a central European customs union under German leadership. In a sense it was also a counterblast directed at France and Russia, who since 1887 had been engaged in tariff wars with Italy and Germany respectively. Caprivi lost no time in ending the commercial estrangement of Austria-Hungary, and between August 1890 andMay 1891 negotiated a commercial treaty which from 1892 gave Austro-Hungarian agrarian exports increased access to the German market in return for a lowering of Austro-Flungarian tariffs on German industrial exports. The Monarchy then concluded treaties with Italy, Switzerland, Serbia, and Belgium (1892); Roumania (1894); and Japan (1896); and in 1897 forced Bulgaria to renew the 'unequal treaty' yet again. This plethora of treaties did not really mean a return to an era of free trade - many duties still remained high. But it was an improvement on the protectionist chaos of the autonomous tariff policy of the 1880s, and marked the start of a commercial armistice which lasted for the next ten years. Of course, for Austria-Hungary, political considerations were an important motive. The Roumanian and Italian treaties were notable examples of sacrificing economic interests in order to strengthen the alliances. In the first case, Hungarian agriculture was subjected to severe competition, and in the second, the Austrian wine industry. (Imports of Italian wine soared from 20,000 to 150,000 quintals per annum.) Nor was that all, France, unable to secure the Italian tariff for her own wines, retaliated with higher tariffs on Austro-Hungarian exports. For the political advantages of the treaties, therefore, the Monarchy had to pay a certain economic price. Although trade -particularly with Germany - increased, there was no spectacular boom in Austria-Hungary in the 1890s. Indeed, Austrian industry, already struggling to be competitive under the burden of what the founder of the Social Democratic party described in 1891 as 'the best industrial worker legislation in the world'84 (a burden from which the rival Hungarian industry was almost entirely free), now had to face German competition as well. Hungarian agriculture, too, suffered from increased Serbian and Roumanian competition - especially from the latter when Hungary at last completed the navigation works on the Danube (1888-96). On 84 H. Benedikt, p. iji. 190 The Decline of the Alliances, i88j-?j the other hand, the completion of the railway network to Constantinople in 1888 furthered the Monarchy's Balkan trade, which managed to maintain its proportionate share - still only about 6 per cent - of the Monarchy's increased total trade. The building of the Arlberg railway in 1896 gave a boost to Hungarian corn exports to Switzerland and, until the dispute with Paris over the wine tariff, to France. Some industries enjoyed great prosperity -the Bohemian beet sugar industry, for example, was by the 1890s producing one fifth of the world supply, and attained a particularly strong hold over the Roumanian market. Even years of crisis and tension, such as 1887 and 1888, were not without consolations for the iron and armaments industries. Besides, as general prosperity increased, government finance could be stabilized. The year 1888 saw the last of the long series of budget deficits; and after 1892 the government undertook a much-needed currency reform and started buying up the remaining privately owned railways. In the 1890s Austrian government stock gradually became one of the most stable - though indeed hardly the most lucrative - commodities on the European exchange. The Monarchy was thus in a relatively strong position in the years 1888-92; and it is hardly surprising that these years saw no attempt to catch a rather questionable bird in the bush in the form of a rapprochement with Russia. True, there might have been a chance of success. Russia was becoming noticeably less menacing: the tsar and Giers certainly desired peace; and Russia's economic weakness (especially the great famine of 1891-2) left her with little enough to spare to buy influence or undertake adventures in the Balkans. Even Russian public opinion, tiring of perpetual humiliations in Bulgaria, was beginning to concern itself with Russia's narrower national interests: Panrussianism was replacing Panslavism. Better still, many of these Russian interests lay in Asia, whither the Trans-Siberian railway, started in 1891, began to divert Russian attention. Kalnoky was cautious. Russia's apparent retreat might not be permanent, he observed in June 1888. For developments might arise - for example, a military dictatorship in France, the fall of the dynasties in Serbia and Roumania, or even of Stamboulov's regime in Bulgaria - which might tempt Russia to try her luck in war, especially if she could revolutionize the Serbs against the Monarchy. Hence, Austria-Hungary must look to her armaments. 191 The Decline of the Alliances, i88j-pj Kalnoky's former private secretary, Aehrenthal, isolated and alarmed in the remote outpost of Bucharest, urged him to seek a rapprochement with Russia, and to beware of German intrigues to foment ill will between Vienna and St Petersburg. But Aehrenfhal's views were not those of the Ballhausplatz, and he was sternly informed that there was simply no basis for a rapprochement with Russia, the ultimate aims of that Power in Bulgaria being completely opposed to those of Austria-Hungary. This was also the emperor's view. When, in September 1890 a Russian diplomat was reported as saying that Russia would await an Austrian approach benevolently but 'with proud reserve', he commented, 'then they can wait a long time'.85 The official visit of the tsare-vich to Vienna in October, and Archduke Franz Ferdinand's return visit to St Petersburg in February 1891 perhaps improved personal relations between the two courts. But when the Russian press professed to discern signs that Austro-Hungarian policy was becoming more conciliatory towards Russia the emperor was emphatic: 'I know absolutely nothing about a change in our policy.'86 The general brandishing of diplomatic instruments in the summer of 1891 actually deepened the Austro-Russian estrangement; but Kalnoky trusted to the impending famine - 'may God continue to help!'87 - to keep Russia in order. God did not help for much longer. The year 1893 was a bad one for Austria-Hungary, and was marked by a severe deterioration in the political situation in both halves of the Monarchy. In Hungary, where calm had never been really re-established since the crisis over the Army Bill, the government was facing increasing opposition from magnates, clericals and a motley collection of radical elements, over such contentious issues as a civil marriage law. And this was personally embarrassing for Kalnoky himself, a notable clerical and already in some ill favour at Budapest on account of his allegedly pro-Roumanian attitude. In Austria, the Taaffe government made a disastrous attempt to abolish the curial voting system, which protected the bourgeois national parties who would find themselves swamped by Christian Social and Social Democrat votes under any system of general suffrage. But Taaffe's conservative and clerical supporters took 86 W. Wagner, p. 186. 8« Ibid. 87 Aehrenthal MSS., Karton 2, Kalnoky to Aehrenthal, 15 July 1891. 192 The Decline of the Alliances, i88j-?j fright. Kalnoky too was firmly opposed to anything that would strengthen Social Democracy; and his intervention - in the form of a complaint to Franz Joseph - was very probably a major factor in bringing Taaffe down. Nevertheless, Kalnoky was sorry to see Taaffe go - his government had represented 'an unusual stability': 'they were capable experts with whom one could work well. If Taaffe had only kept to his old system and muddled on, he would still be prime minister today.'88 As it was, Taaffe was followed by a succession of weak governments which for the rest of the 'nineties strove in vain to compose the increasingly violent quarrels of German, Czech, and south Slav. This internal weakening of the Monarchy was accompanied by serious deterioration of its international position after the end of 1892. The previous four years had been nothing more than an Indian summer. It was in the military field that the Austrians felt the first tremors of the instability prevailing in Berlin. They had never found either Caprivi or Schlieffen particularly communicative -the Waldersee era was well and truly over. The chancellor kept an almost Bismarckian control over the military; and Schlieffen, who had little faith in the military capacity of Austria-Hungary, did not wish German planning to depend too closely on that Power. In August 1892 he began to shift the centre of gravity of German planning towards the western front. He had decided, as Russia steadily built up her armaments, that it would be impossible to defeat her in a quick war. Therefore, the only hope of salvation lay in a lightning strike against France. Consequently the war in the east would become for Germany - at least in the opening stages - very much a side-show; and the Austrians would have to cope as best they could. This bombshell burst in Vienna at the end of 1892. But Beck kept his nerve, and decided not to change his plans, but to make the best of the situation. After all, the Germans were still planning to launch some kind of offensive into northern Poland; and this would still be useful, even if now only as a diversion. The Galician railways had been extended by 50 per cent in the past few years; and Beck still hoped by the 21st day of mobilization to have two armies ready near Lemberg for an offensive towards the east.89 88 Aehrenthal MSS., Karton 2, Kalnoky to his brother, 7 November 1893. !s E. v. Glaise-Horstenau, pp. 343ff.; G. Ritter, p. 530. *93 The Decline of the Alliances, iSSj-pj Kalnoky did his best to help, reminding a conference of ministers on 2 February 189390 that although the political situation might be calmer and all governments pacific, the military situation was becoming very threatening. For the Western Powers, who needed time to mobilize their civilian conscript armies, lived daily under the menace of Russia's huge professional army standing ready to strike at any moment. Moreover, with Germany so heavily involved on the Rhine, Austria-Hungary would now have to do more in the east. Beck's figures showed that, despite the Army Bill, the Monarchy was not in fact keeping pace with the other Powers. More should be done; and not only for the Common Army: the Austrian Landwehr was in a dreadful state; and the Hungarian Honveds existed only on paper. In these circumstances, there was nothing to spare for the navy, which would have to continue to confine itself to coastal defence. But even these modest demands were ill received by the cheese-paring Austrian and - particularly - Hungarian governments. In the summer of 1893 came another surprise from Berlin. Schlieffen now declared that the river Narev was an impassable obstacle to any German thrust eastwards in north Poland; and that the Germans would therefore march south to meet the Austro-Hungarian army. The Austrians did not like this idea. Co-operation with the Germans in south or west Poland might well reduce the chances of an effective break-through towards the east (the Austrians were still hoping to carry out their part of the original Austro-German pincer movement). And it was not as if the Germans would agree to put their forces - depleted though they would now be - under Austro-Hungarian command. Worst of all, the German plan would draw the whole weight of Russia's forces southwards on to Austria-Hungary. But Beck accepted even this; and he and Kalnoky took comfort from the fine performance of the Common Army at the Guns manoeuvres in September. In the spring of 1895, however, Schlieffen changed his plans for a third time. Deciding that East Prussia could not just be left undefended, he discovered that the river Narev was not impassable after all. In May 1895 he informed the bewildered Beck that the Germans would not now move south, but would make a small eastward thrust into north Poland; and he suggested that the Austrians take on virtually the whole Russian army by so P.A. XL/296, Ministerratsprotokoll, 2 February 1893. 194 The Decline of the Alliances, iSSj-pj means of a three-pronged offensive which would extend their left flank as far as Prussian Silesia. Beck was aghast, and insisted that such a hazardous dividing of the Monarchy's forces just did not bear contemplation. He pleaded with Schlieffen to stand at least by the plan of 1893; but he made no impression.91 These highly unsatisfactory developments were accompanied by a sudden deterioration in the diplomatic situation, which caused a crisis of confidence in both the Triple Alliance and the Mediterranean Entente. In October 1893 Franco-Russian solidarity was startlingly demonstrated to the world in a spectacular visit by the Russian fleet to Toulon; and this was followed by the news that Russia intended to establish a permanent squadron in the Mediterranean under Admiral Avellan. The sultan was tremendously impressed; and by November Calice was reporting that France and Russia had once more gained the upper hand at Constantinople. To make matters worse Germany, dismayed by the growing solidarity of France and Russia and anxious not to provoke them, had for some time been more lukewarm in support of the Mediterranean Entente at Constantinople. Kalnoky now began to fear that Russia might be tempted to establish her supremacy there once and for all, either by forcing the Straits, or by means of a bilateral agreement with the sultan to give her control. In Kal-noky's view the whole balance of power in the Mediterranean was now at stake. For Britain, confronted with such an imposing display of French and Russian power, might abandon the Mediterranean. This would be all the more disastrous for Austria-Hungary, in that the Italians had been in a state of 'collapse' ever since the Toulon visit.93 A huge economic crisis in Italy (caused largely by her inordinately swollen armaments budget and exacerbated by French economic pressure) had combined with a rising in Sicily in December to cause Kalnoky grave concern. For he knew France and Russia to be busy also at Lisbon and Madrid. He decided that there was a serious danger that Italy might despair and submit to the threats and blandishments of France - who could after all help her a good deal towards an economic recovery. With Britain and Italy gone, and Germany lukewarm, Austria-Hungary would be virtually isolated in the Near East. 111 E. v. Glaise-Horstenau, pp. 347-50, 377-9; G. Ritter, pp. 531-4. 2 P.A. VIII/174, Kalnoky to Szogyeny, private and secret, 10 December 1893. *95 The Decline of the Alliances, i88j-$) In January 1894, therefore, Kalnoky instructed Deym83 in London to find out whether Britain would stand firm against Russia in the Mediterranean (Document 20). Of recent years, he explained, Russia had shifted her pressure from Bulgaria to the Straits; and now it was Britain who was in the first line. Referring to his letter of 25 October 1887, he repeated that although Austria-Hungary would still prefer to join Britain and Italy in resisting Russia, yet if Britain were to allow Russia to have the Straits, Austria-Hungary would be forced to retreat and secure her own immediate interests in the Balkan peninsula. Rosebery was not unforthcoming and said that if Constantinople were at stake, Britain would certainly not shrink from war with Russia. However, she could not cope alone with both Russia and France, and he therefore asked for an assurance that the Triple Alliance would keep France neutral. For this, Kalnoky had to appeal to Berlin - which he did with some apprehension. His misgivings were justified. The Germans were not only anxious to humour Russia, but almost obsessed with the fear that Britain, once the war started against France and Russia, would retreat to her island, leaving the Triple Alliance in the lurch. They therefore refused to give the required assurance: Britain must first show her seriousness of purpose by striking the first blow. They talked of allowing Russia to have Constantinople, and advised Kalnoky to secure compensation in the Balkans by means of a deal with St Petersburg. This, of course, Kalnoky was only prepared to consider as a last ditch contingency if Britain actually defaulted, and he angrily rejected the German advice. As he told Szogyeny on 21 March,94 he was bound in loyalty to Rosebery not to settle the Straits question without Britain: it was a European question. And the Monarchy was not interested in compensation or material gains: it was a question of preventing a general displacement of the European balance of power. It was only in this context after all that issues such as the Straits - and Alsace-Lorraine, and Bosnia and Herzegovina as well - acquired any importance. Worse was to come. In June the Germans tried to humour France too, and joined her in forcing the British to abandon a Congo treaty they had just concluded with King Leopold. This moved Rosebery to utter a chilling warning to Deym: Tf Germany 93 P.A. VIII/174, Kalnoky to Deym, No. 1, secret, 25 January 1894. 94 Ibid., Kalnoky to Szogyeny, very confidential, 21 March 1894. 196 The Decline of the Alliances, i88j-p; continues to show herself so hostile to the Cabinet of St. James, I shall feel obliged to take back the assurances which I have given on the subject of Constantinople.'95 In the event, he did not take them back; and all in all Kalnoky's soundings had evoked at least a promise of armed resistance to Russia, and of diplomatic support if France and Russia attempted to raise the Straits question with the sultan. After all, as Rosebery told Deym on 12 July, Britain could hardly make any concessions to Russia at the Straits without hurting her own interests. Kalnoky's policy remained the same: diplomatic co-operation with Britain. And at Constantinople Anglo-Austrian co-operation was in fact becoming more effective since the appointment of the energetic Currie to the British embassy there. In the Armenian question, which Britain was trying to settle in harness with suspicious France and Russia (the two other Powers most interested by tradition and geography in the unfortunate Christians of that part of Asia), Currie always kept Calice well informed, and in turn found him sympathetic and helpful. The crisis of 1893-4 had shown that the entente with Britain, despite its limitations, could still serve Austro-Hungarian interests well enough. It had also shown, that as far as Austro-Hungarian interests in the Near East were concerned, the alliances with Germany and Italy were, at the most favourable estimate, useless. Since the end of 1893 Kalnoky had been seriously worried about Germany's Near Eastern policy. Her single-minded pursuit of commercial concessions in Turkey had brought her no political influence there at all; and now she seemed to be going back to Bismarck's policy of leaving the defence of Constantinople and the Straits to others. On 29 December he lamented96 the general aimlessness (Zerfabrenheit) that prevailed in the Wilhelmstrasse: Caprivi had no understanding of foreign affairs, and Marschall no experience; and as a result 'the Neue Kurs has no policy at all', especially not in the Eastern Question. Yet at the same time people in Berlin would become nervous - out of timidity or jealousy - when Austria-Hungary tried to take the lead and suggest a clear policy for the Triple Alliance. In February 1894 the 85 H. W. V. Temperley and Lillian M. Penson, Foundations of British Foreign Policy 1792-1902, London, 1938, p. 492. " P.A. VIII/174, Kalnoky to Szogyeny, private and secret, 29 December 1893. *97 The Decline of the Alliances, i88j~pr failure of his approach to Berlin produced another round of complaints, and he described Germany's attitude as 'the worst feature' of the whole situation.97 With the Neue Kurs, Vienna had managed to interest Germany in the Eastern question; but now, he feared, she had gone back to Bismarck's policy. Of course, he understood Germany's great fear of a war with France and Russia; but if Russia were allowed to establish herself in the Mediterranean, that could only make matters even worse. Reports that Schlieffen, and William II himself, had said that Germany would not object if Russia seized Constantinople filled him with dismay; and he bitterly observed that this was in flagrant contradiction to the promises the Germans had made at the Rohnstock manoeuvres in i8c)o.8S Indeed, Kalnoky lamented, German policy was now even more disastrous than it had been under Bismarck.99 Although Bismarck had given Austria-Hungary no support in Bulgaria, he had at least helped her to win British support; and he had had too much sense actually to promote the preponderance of Russia in the Mediterranean. Now, the Germans seemed to be trying to frustrate Austria-FIungary's efforts at London. This was dangerous: whereas Austria-Hungary had been compelled by her own vital interests to stand guard in the Balkans, whatever Germany did, Britain was by no means compelled to stay in the Mediterranean (and there were enough radicals in Britain urging a rapprochement with Russia and peace at any price). Moreover, if Britain abandoned the Mediterranean, it would not be long before Italy would be forced to come into line with France. The emperor's interview with William II at Abbazia in March, therefore, when Franz Joseph emphasized the threat to the balance of power without any success whatever, was completely unsatisfactory. William IPs vague and effusive professions of loyalty as a 'true ally' only exasperated Kalnoky: 'such general phrases do not really have any place in a serious discussion of great political questions.'100 Italy was equally useless. Crispi, who had returned to power in December 1893 was becoming increasingly absorbed in a search for prestige in east Africa, and was seeking German support. He 97 Ibid., Kalnoky to Deym, No. 3, secret, 19 February 1894. 98 P.A. I/468, Kalnoky to Szögyeny, No. 3, secret, 27 February 1894 99 Ibid. io° P.A. VIII/174, Kalnoky to Szögyeny, No. i, 20 April 1894. 198 The Decline of the Alliances, i88j-pj even joined the Germans against Britain in the disastrous campaign against the Congo treaty. Relations between Vienna and Berlin were also plagued with suspicion on the point of relations with Russia generally. Although the Germans might seek temporary relief from the Mediterranean dilemma by recommending Austria-Hungary to reach agreement with Russia, they had no desire to see those two Powers on such good terms that Germany would be their mere appendage, or even left out in the cold. Indeed, in December 1893 the German ambassador made so bold as to warn the Austrians not to make any agreements with Russia without informing Germany, drawing from Kalnoky the crushing retort - albeit delivered 'in a joking tone' - that Austria-Hungary certainly had no intention of signing any Reinsurance treaty behind the back of her ally.101 Kalnoky, for his part, was fully alive to the danger of a Russo-German rapprochement that might injure Austro-Hungarian interests - a danger that seemed to become more real when Germany and Russia at last reached agreement on a commercial treaty in the unhappy winter of 1893-4, His alarm can be seen in his handling of the commercial negotiations which had been progressing, or, rather, failing to progress, between Russia and Austro-Hungary. At the end of 1893, these had still not got beyond the stage of the rejection by the Austrian and Hungarian governments - es-specially by the latter - of Russia's demands for a reduction in the rye duty, and for Russia's admission to the favourable Serbian tariff, or failing that, at least a general freezing of tariffs. True, Austrian industry stood to gain something from a commercial treaty; but Hungary clung desperately to the heavy rye duty - it was only since its imposition in 1887 that her trade deficit had disappeared. At last, in March 1894, Kalnoky intervened in the negotiations and summoned a special conference of the Austrian and Hungarian ministers to impress on them the need for agreement with Russia. Not only would it be generally desirable in the interests of peace, he argued,102 to establish reasonable commercial relations with Russia for a decade or so; the developing Russo-German rapprochement meant that there was actual danger in delay. For Germany now had no quarrel with Russia; whereas 101 Ibid., Kalnoky to Szogyeny, private and secret, 29 December 1893. 102 P.A. XL/296, Ministerratsprotokoll, 4 March 1894. 199 The Decline of the Alliances, i88/-pj the conflicting interests of Russia and Austria-Hungary could lend serious dimensions to any incident that might crop up - say in Bulgaria. 'Without expressing any lack of confidence in Germany's loyalty as an ally,' he wryly observed, 'a state of cordiality between Germany and Russia on the one hand, and a state of bitterness resulting from a tariff war between Russia and ourselves on the other would put us in a very unfavourable, if not dangerous position.' A failure to conclude a treaty would therefore be very bad for 'the most vital interests of Austria-Hungary'. He reminded the obstinate Hungarians that the Monarchy was now facing Russia's final terms, and could not afford to prevaricate; for a tariff war would be a far greater disaster than a reduction of the rye duty. He insisted on a more flexible attitude; and thanks partly to the personal intervention of Alexander III,103 for once in a benign frame of mind, the treaty was finally concluded by 9 March. Kalnoky could congratulate himself on having staved off the danger of isolation in the face of threatening Russo-German alignment; and he calculated that, good commercial relations having been established for ten years, tension would be reduced and a generally more friendly atmosphere created. But, as he observed on 21 March, he did not expect this to lead to any real change in Russia's policy. In other words, a detente, not an entente, had occurred. Even a detente was welcome enough, in view of the open desertion of the Monarchy by Germany, and the limited nature of Britain's support. In fact, relations with Russia continued to improve throughout 1894. In the first place, the Mediterranean crisis faded away during the summer, and Russia continued to display an almost ostentatious restraint in the Balkans. Dynastic relations had begun to improve as early as the end of 1892, when the tsarevich paid a successful visit to Vienna - which even the Pester Lloyd, to Kalnoky's pleasant surprise,104 reported with unusual decorum. The betrothal of the tsarevich to a grand-daughter of Queen Victoria in the summer of 1894 was taken in Vienna as a sign that Russia still valued her ties with Britain and Germany as much as those with France.105 More important, one of the greatest 103 P.A. I/469, Aehrenthal memorandum, 1895. 104 Aehrenthal MSS„ Karton 2, Kálnoky to Aehrenthal, 14 November 1892. 105 P.A. VIII/174, Kálnoky to Szógyény, No. 1, 8 June 1894. 200 The Decline of the Alliances, i88j-(?j obstacles to any rapprochement with Russia, Hungarian public opinion, was undergoing a change in the early 1890s.106 Not only were the Magyars becoming increasingly and passionately preoccupied with domestic politics, but the generation that remembered 1849 was passing away (Andrdssy had died in 1890). True, Hungarian opinion was still very much on the defensive; but Russia seemed to have stopped inciting the Balkan states against the Monarchy - and even Andrdssy had held that the Slavs could only be a serious threat if Russia supported them. By the summer of 1894, therefore, there was generally more willingness in Vienna and Budapest to consider at least an accommodation with Russia. It was at this time that Russia made a positive step towards a rapprochement. At the beginning of 1894 a major crisis had occurred in Serbia, where, faced with a total collapse of the economy, the regents had suspended the constitution. Kalnoky had been careful to abstain from all intervention or advice, lest the Monarchy be blamed for disasters which appeared to him inevitable. Giers nevertheless seems to have feared that Vienna might be tempted to intervene; and on 5 May he appealed to Kalnoky to co-operate with Russia in localizing the deepening chaos in Serbia. Austria-Hungary and Russia, he proposed, should agree on a policy of non-intervention; and should not let the Serbian crisis trouble their 'relations de confiance et d'amitie'.107 In return, Russia would abstain from interfering in Bulgaria. This suited Kalnoky well enough - after all, he was being asked to say nothing that he had not said before. He assured Giers,108 therefore, that he would certainly not depart from the principle of nonintervention (with the usual rider, 'sans y etre forces dans 1' interet de notre security'); and he too expressed the hope that Austro-Russian relations would continue to improve. The Austrians were in fact much gratified, and decided that Russia had at last accepted their own principles of non-intervention and the maintenance of the status quo. Summing up a year later, Aehrenthal stated that it was at this point that Russia and Austria-Hungary had 'found their way back to an agreement in principle 1061. Dioszegi, 'Einige Bemerkungen zur Frage der österreichischungarischen Aussenpolitik' in F. Klein (ed.), pp. 240fr. 107 P.A. I/469, Aehrenthal memorandum, 1895. 109 Ibid. 201 The Decline of the Alliances, iSSj-pj to treat the maintenance of peace, a vital interest, as more important than their own rivalries or the teething-troubles {Kinderkrankheiten) of the Balkan peoples'.109 It should nevertheless be noted that all that had been achieved so far was a statement of intent: no formal agreement had been made; and the bare principle of non-intervention was strictly negative. There had been no return to Reichstadt, or even to the Three Emperors' Alliance, which had envisaged certain changes in the status quo. Nevertheless, the Austro-Russian entente which is usually associated with the name of Goluchowski could already be discerned on the horizon - at least as a possibility - in Kälnoky's last year of office. The detente had nevertheless not developed so far that the Austrians could feel completely secure. Indeed, even the death, in November, of their old opponent Alexander III was not an unmixed blessing: the new tsar was an unknown quantity, and for Kalnoky, 'what is incalculable is always most unwelcome to a foreign minister'.110 The military, with a duty of course to prepare for the worst, were always inclined to look on the dark side, as Beck's memorandum of 18 December 1894111 bears witness: Italy had recently grown weaker; Bulgaria, freed from Russian bullying, was now less reliable; and there was uncertainty in St Petersburg. Although the forces of the Central Powers were superior in quality to those of Russia, the latter had a superiority of numbers. In war, therefore, it would be a question of somehow dividing Russia's forces without dividing those of the Monarchy. Other Powers, such as Britain, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Sweden, might be of some assistance here. (It is notable that none of the Monarchy's allies figured in Beck's calculations.) Russia must at all costs be prevented from taking Constantinople and the Straits - the realization of the dream of Catherine II would have a tremendous and disastrous effect among the Balkan states. For the same reason, it was imperative that Austria-Hungary should not suffer an early humiliation in Bosnia. Serbia was too weak and disordered to make much trouble there, and in any case, Bulgaria might keep her in check. Against Montenegro, the Albanians might be enlisted; but the Monarchy could cope with that state 109 Ibid. 110 Aehrenthal MSS., Karton z, Kalnoky to Aehrenthal, 31 August 1894. 111 P.A. I/466, Beck, memorandum on the general military situation, 18 December 1894. 202 The Decline of the Alliances, i88j-$j provided the Adriatic fleet could maintain supplies of troops to the coastal provinces (there was no adequate railway communication with the interior of the Monarchy). The German Baltic fleet might create a diversion, and Sweden and Turkey might be roused to turn the Russian flank; but Britain would have to help Turkey out in the Black Sea. For Roumania could not be relied on - according to Beck's information, the Russians even expected Roumanian support. As for German and Italian rear cover, Beck was resigned to the prospect that this 'will become less and less effective'. Indeed, the whole memorandum is a remarkable comment on the insignificant role of the Monarchy's allies, Germany, Italy, Roumania, and Serbia, in Austro-Hungarian military plans. Of course, Beck was trying to convince the Austrian and Hungarian governments that the only sure guarantee was the Monarchy's own strength, and that there was a need for a new Army Bill. But in view of the increasingly difficult parliamentary situation in both halves of the Monarchy there was virtually no hope of this. The civilian authorities took an equally sceptical view of the value of the alliances in the autumn of 1894. On 30 November112 Kalnoky emphasized to the German ambassador that although a new era had dawned in which peaceful rivalry would be the keynote of international relations, it would be no less important for success to keep alliances and friendships in good repair. Germany's policy, therefore, was disturbing: there seemed to be no guiding hand in Berlin; and junior officials could not make high policy, no matter how clever they might be. Caprivi had fallen at the end of October: 'the latest surprise from Berlin is regrettable', the emperor had commented, wondering what was coming next.113 Worse, thanks to Germany's display of hostility to Britain in colonial questions, the Monarchy's relations with the latter Power were in jeopardy; and this, given Italy's dependence on Britain, weakened the whole Triple Alliance. Kalnoky had therefore decided to speak plainly to Eulenburg:114 Germany should not underestimate the danger of estranging Britain - some people in the Liberal party there wanted peace at any price, and would even 118 P.A. VIII/174, Kalnoky to Szogyeny, No. 1, 30 November 1894. 113 W. Wagner, p. 188. 114 PA. VIII/174, Kalnoky to Szogyeny, Nos 1 and 2, 30 November 1894. 203 The Decline of the Alliances, r88;-$j come to terms with France and Russia to get it. He went on to complain of the spiteful tone of the German press towards Britain - making fun of her abortive efforts to mediate in the Sino-Japanese War, for example - and pointed out with some acuity that the worst aspect of all this was the disastrous and long-lasting effect it must have on British public opinion. Kalnoky's arguments may of course have been devised for German ears; but he was nevertheless more percipient than those who, like Szogyeny in Berlin and Aehrenthal in Bucharest,115 shared the German view that Britain's differences with France and Russia were too vast ever to admit of a settlement. There were already signs of an Anglo-Russian rapprochement in the liquidation of the Pamirs affair; and as Kalnoky shrewdly observed, it was highly dangerous for Germany to think that she could isolate Britain 'and force her to recognize Germany as a colonial equal'.116 The winter passed off without incident, and Kalnoky gradually came to take a calmer view. But this was due less to any renewal of confidence in the alliances than to an improvement in the general situation and the continuance of the detente with Russia. In April 1895 the appointment of Lobanov, the long-standing Russian ambassador at Vienna, to succeed Giers at the foreign office, was a blessing the Austrians had hardly dared to hope for.11' On 17 April Kalnoky went so far as to tell a conference of ministers118 that the foreign situation was now so satisfactory that he would even recommend a reduction in the armaments budget. Tension had been reduced by several factors, he explained: the determination of all monarchs to avoid war and the shocks it would bring to the social order; the inexperience of the new tsar (which he now decided - turning the worrying signs of the previous autumn to suit a different argument - would cause Russia to shrink from adventures); and the preoccupation of the other European Powers with Asian and African questions. (He even suggested that Austria-Hungary might increase its navy, in view of the growing importance of colonial questions; and that some 115 Aehrenthal MSS., Karton 4, Szogyeny to Aehrenthal, 8 December 1894. 116 P.A. VIII/I74, Kalnoky to Szogydny, No. 4, 30 November 1894. 117 Aehrenthal MSS., Karton 3, Liechtenstein to Aehrenthal, 14 February 1895. 118 P.A. XL/297, Ministerratsprotokoll, 17 April 1895. 204 The Decline of the Alliances, i88j-?j bigger ships might be sent to show the flag in the Far East. But it seems that this was just speculative musing: at any rate it did not lead to much. It was difficult enough to get money for the army, let alone for the navy in a country most of the inhabitants of which had never seen the sea.) True, Russia was steadily increasing her armaments; but the Monarchy should try to counteract this by improving the quality rather than the quantity of its forces. He took an equally assured view of the foreign political scene. The Balkan situation, he told the conference of ministers,119 had much improved. Serbia was completely rotten, but she was isolated and hardly able to harm the Monarchy (the detente with Russia helped here). Roumania too was a harmless neighbour, even if, owing to irredentism, an uncomfortable one. But after all, he explained (probably for the benefit of his Hungarian listeners) no Roumanian government could do much about a nationalist current like that: the Monarchy should be thankful that the Bucharest government was at least outwardly correct. After all, the Liga Culturale was now short of funds and a prey to corruption and faction. So he still thought it best to go on smoothing over any incidents that might crop up. Nor did the domestic troubles of Turkey present any major problems: the Great Powers were determined not to be misled by Christian propaganda into interfering in Macedonia; and the Monarchy could be well content to leave the Armenian question to the three Powers most concerned. True, the Italian ally was in exceedingly poor shape - commercially and financially ruined, and politically shattered - but this need not disturb Austro-Italian relations. And the Monarchy enjoyed excellent relations with Germany, Britain, Russia, and even - despite the continuing dispute about the wine tariff - with France. The state of the alliances was in fact a good deal less happy than Kalnoky was prepared to admit openly. In the first place, the Informal agreement of 1887 between the Triple Alliance Powers and Spain, renewed in 1891, was on the verge of collapse; and this was having a generally bad effect on the Mediterranean Entente. Since the end of 1894 Italy had been trying to bully the Spaniards, on pain of non-renewal, into openly declaring their position by publishing the agreement. In this she was supported by Germany, who was seeking to bring Spain to heel in a commercial dispute. 119 Ibid. 205 The Decline of the Alliances, i8Sj-pj Kalnoky disapproved entirely.120 Spain was not like Roumania, he pointed out. The Triple Alliance could be of no material assistance to her; and hence she simply could not come out openly against her powerful French neighbour. Whereas the Triple Alliance should be trying to make friends in Spain, and to strengthen the hand of the monarchists and the Habsburg queen regent, all this bullying could only play into the hands of the French ambassador at Madrid. He urged Rome and Berlin to be satisfied with the secret agreement as it stood: it was quite enough to have secured Spain's diplomatic support in north African questions, and to have bolstered up the Spanish monarchy. No wonder, he complained on 23 March 1895, that Britain was becoming reserved when she saw Germany and Italy treating Spain in this way. He was exasperated to see that the allies - between whom he said there was nothing to choose - had only succeeded in bringing a less conciliatory government to power in Madrid. But his warnings made scant impression in either Rome or Berlin; and this was a problem he bequeathed to his successor. The atmosphere within the Triple Alliance was altogether deplorable. In the spring of 1895 Italy, embarrassed in east Africa, where France and Russia were supporting the Emperor Menelik against her, tried to extend the Alliance to bind her allies to more positive support of her designs in Tripoli. This the Central Powers turned down fiat. The Alliance was an insurance company, Berlin declared, not a joint stock venture.121 Indeed, for Kalnoky, above all anxious lest Italy's ambitions drag the Monarchy into war with France, it was hardly even that. He was intensely irritated122 by a whining list of complaints from the Italian foreign minister Blanc, according to which all the Powers of Europe were abetting France against Italy; and when the Germans tried to put in a word for Italy he finally lost patience. In an indignant private letter to Szogyeny in Berlin,123 he now rejected even the German argument that the Alliance was valuable to the Monarchy as a guarantee against the irredentist threat. True, the rear cover Italy 120 P.A. I/463, Liasse XXVI, Kalnoky to Bruck, secret, 11 January 1895; to Szogyeny, No. 57, secret, 23 March 1895 ; to Dubsky, No. 62, secret, 26 March 1895. lsl A. F. Pribram, Secret Treaties, Vol. 2, p. 104, n. 228. 122 P.A. I/470, Kalnoky to Szogyeny, No. 55, secret, 23 March 1895. 123 Ibid., Kalnoky to Szogyeny, No. 70, private and very confidential, 4 April 1895. 206 I The Decline of the Alliances, i88j-pj offered was of some use; and the Alliance had a certain moral value. But Italy could present no serious threat to the Monarchy. She was far too weak, and would herself be lost without the Alliance. One had only to look at her - her internal collapse and her total lack of able statesmen. Indeed, he concluded, Italy's defection would not be all that much of a disaster for the Monarchy. Nor had the Roumanian alliance much to offer. The Germans had decided that it would never be of much practical value in war unless it were supplemented in advance by a military convention. People in the Ballhausplatz were inclined to agree, but had to admit in December 1894 that feeling in Roumania was now running so high against Hungary that there was for the present not the slightest hope of persuading Bucharest to strengthen the alliance in this way. The Austro-Hungarian legation there was by the spring of 1895 seriously alarmed at the ill-feeling aroused by the Magyarization of Transylvania: unless Vienna intervened to restrain the Hungarian nationalists - who, with their separatist demands directed against the very heart of the constitutional structure of the Monarchy, were a far greater menace than a few Roumanian irredentists - 'there will be a serious row here sooner or later'.124 Hungarian nationalists, however, insisted that irre-dentism spreading from Roumania was the cause, not the symptom of the disease, and that the remedy lay in Kalnoky's taking a stern line with the government of Bucharest. Already in 1893 this attitude had driven Goluchowski to resign his post in despair; and it was to be a contributory factor in Kalnoky's sudden fall from power. Roumanian irredentism had been the subject of a guerilla campaign against Kalnoky in the Hungarian press since 1894. But already for some years he had been increasingly disheartened by the deepening domestic confusion in the Monarchy. It was the old problem, and the one which had at first made him shrink from taking office in 1881, namely, that it was intolerable for a foreign minister to see his policies obstructed by domestic problems over which the constitution of 1867 denied him any control. Since the early 'nineties he had been dismayed by the growth of more intransigent varieties of Hungarian and Czech nationalism. The 184 Aehrenthal MSS., Karton 5, Welsersheimb to Aehrenthal, 28 February 1895. 207 The Decline of the Alliances, meetings of the Delegations tended to drag on endlessly while these parties ranted and raged about matters which, in Kdlnokys view were not the fault of the Common Ministers at all.125 (It himself a staunch defender the fault of the Common Ministers at all.125 (It should however be noted that he was himself a staunch defender of the Dualism which was in a sense the root cause of the nationalist fury - in so far as it ratified the supremacy of the Magyars in Hungary and of the cosmopolitan aristocracy and (socially at least) the Germans, in Austria.) In 1895, however, Kalnoky came under attack from even the relatively moderate governing faction in Hungary, when a quarrel blew up between Budapest and the con-/•«<-, Anrliarrli -arhri had launched a campaign tumacious .UdLlia. J AAA A vy y , aav w . - the relatively moderate governing faction in wiicii a quarrel blew up between Budapest and the con-jua papal nuncio, Agliardi, who had launched a campaign against the Hungarian government's civil marriage bill. A few tactless remarks soon served to bring Kalnoky, a notorious clerical, into deep disgrace at Budapest; and when the prime minister, Banffy attacked him openly he suddenly resigned (15 May). As he wrote later, it would have been possible for him to defend himself in the Delegations; but, a strict conservative to the last, he felt that the sight of the minister for foreign affairs standing up and contradicting the Hungarian prime minister in open debate would have been nothing less than a scandal. He thought it especially unfortunate that there was no strong government in Austria to keep the Hungarian politicians in order: 'the gang needs watching.'126 And perhaps in a sense, as Lobanov in St Petersburg feared, he had fallen victim to a Hungarian bid for greater influence over foreign policy - not that the Magyars, increasingly preoccupied with domestic wrangles, made much of an effort to exercise such influence after his departure. Certainly, he had fallen victim to the growing intensity of national feeling in Hungary - even the government had to play to the gallery. And after all, as was to be demonstrated again eleven years later, Hungary's position under the dual constitution was so strong that no foreign minister could long survive once Budapest was really determined to get rid of him. Kalnoky, for his part, was glad to be out of the fray; and he retired to live as a country squire on his estate at Prodlitz in Bohemia. 'There is such a fin de siecle air about politics, I can » his friend Aehrenthal in May [ to live as a country »4011c u±i------- iia 'There is such a fin de siecle air about politics, I can hardly bear to watch,' he wrote to his friend Aehrenthal in Mav • Aehrenthal MSS., Karton 2, Kálnoky to his brother, 21 May 1893, i A.Wnthsl MSS.. Karton 2, Kálnoky to Aehrenthal, 11 June i»95 ---^i^ixjuťiiLiif" "y---~-----—w * 12« Aehrenthal MSS., Karton 2, Kálnoky to 208 The Decline of the Alliances, iSSj-^j 1896.127 And although Franz Joseph appointed him to the house of peers in 1897, he thought this a bore, and said he would attend as little as possible.138 Still, after years of hard work at the Ball-hausplatz (unlike Andrassy, he wrote most of his own dispatches, in a painstaking, cramped hand) he found it difficult to adjust to life at Prodlitz, and his last years were spent in melancholy loneliness. The great ones he had served for so long soon forgot about him - his sister was extremely bitter about this, and asked Aehrenthal to put on record 'the shameful way in which he was treated after his retirement . . . The thanks of the House of Austria should go down as a fearful warning for future generations.'129 On 11 February 1898, although suffering from a chill, he went out to saw wood - almost his only pastime; but this brought on some sharp pains in the heart. Two days later he was dead.180 The House of Austria certainly owed something of a debt to Kalnoky even if, as usual in the case of servants it had once discarded, it did not pay it. He had steered the Monarchy through fourteen anxious years and seemed in the end to have dispelled the most dangerous of the threats to it - encirclement from the south by a ring of Russian satellites. And this result was due, at least in part, to his own determination, hard work and patient diplomacy. On assuming office he had been prepared to work through the alliance system he had inherited, in which - in matters of day-to-day diplomacy at least, and failing the catastrophe of a general war - the Dual Alliance was subordinated to the Three Emperors' Alliance. When, at the time of the Skobelev affair, the latter seemed to be failing, he had strengthened the Monarchy's position by securing rear cover from Italy, through the Triple Alliance, and from Roumania; and had reinforced the Dual Alliance with a military understanding. But he still preferred to seek a diplomatic solution to the problem of encirclement by working within the Three Emperors' Alliance - as was proved at Skiernewice and in the Bulgarian crises of 1885 and 1886. By 1887 this policy had failed. The Three Emperors' Alliance lay in ruins; 117 Aehrenthal MSS., Karton 2, Kalnoky to Aehrenthal, 3 May 1896. 128 Ibid., Kalnoky to Aehrenthal, 27 May 1897. 129 Ibid., Karton 4, Christina Thun to Aehrenthal, 28 December 1898. 130 Ibid., Karton 2, Duchess of Sabran-Pontevecs to Aehrenthal, February 209 The Decline of the Alliances, and the glaring inadequacy in diplomacy of the other alliances, designed for use in war, seemed to leave the Monarchy in a position of some danger. This was hardly Kalnoky's fault. The Dual Alliance could never be of much service in defending the Monarchy's Near Eastern interests by diplomacy so long as Bismarck held to his narrow interpretation of it and preached the facile and unrealistic doctrine of spheres of influence in the Balkans. And the decline of the Monarchy's Balkan alliances was perhaps inevitable, given the underlying economic and political conflict between Magyar chauvinism and Serbian and Roumanian irredentism. In the event, Kalnoky was resourceful enough to devise other means of safeguarding the Monarchy's position. The Mediterranean Entente of 1887 served Austria-Hungary well, and with the menace of a Russian-controlled Bulgaria apparently dispelled, she could face the future with more assurance after 1888 -all the more so as it at last proved possible to reinvigorate the Dual Alliance and to reinforce it with economic and military agreements. But the year 1893 showed that the Monarchy was not Atlas, but Sisyphus. Germany slipped away again, and a worsening international situation was complemented by the start of a long period of political instability inside the Monarchy. Again, Kalnoky was resilient enough to meet the situation. He struck the right note of informal co-operation in cultivating Britain (although he found his partners in the Triple Alliance an obstacle rather than a help in this); and at the same time he made an important contribution, by his handling of commercial and Balkan questions, to establishing a modus vivendi with Russia. For more than ten years after his fall the continental Powers were not confronted with any great crisis threatening an actual outbreak of war such as might have resuscitated the Monarchy's alliances; and the latter continued their decline. However, Kalnoky had bequeathed to his successor two other diplomatic instruments, rudimentary as yet, it is true, and ultimately incompatible, but either of which might be developed into an effective means of safeguarding the Monarchy's interests - the entente with Britain and the detente with Russia. It remained to be seen, to which of the two his successor would turn. 210 Chapter 6 The Austro-Russian Entente, 1895-19081 A situation in which we were solely concerned to avoid clashing anywhere, and adopted the role of a passive spectator, while Russia systematically pursued her policy of advance unhindered would be quite unacceptable, as it would put us in a worse position than that that existed before 1897. Goluchowski to Aehrenthal, 29 December 19012 The end of the Mediterranean Entente, iSp j-j As Kalnoky's successor, Franz Joseph chose Agenor Count Goluchowski the younger, a rich Polish aristocrat and son of the author of the shortlived conservative-federalist constitution of October i860. After serving for some seven years as a popular Austro-Hungarian minister at Bucharest, but finding his admonitions about the handling of Roumania ignored at Budapest, Goluchowski had retired from the diplomatic service in 1893 to live the life of a great provincial nobleman on his Galician estates. He was always sensitive where his vanity was concerned. No pushing career diplomat he: indeed, he was if anything nonchalant to a fault, as his methods of work, or rather, lack of them, at the Ballhausplatz were to show. Nevertheless, some of his colleagues3 found his bonhomie, tact, sincerity, and charm a pleasing contrast to the 'frosty aristocratic manner' of his predecessor, and to the 'dry bureaucratic tone' of his successor. His geniality 1 The following works are of particular relevance to this chapter: W. M. Carlgren, Iswohky und Aehrenthal vor der bosnischen Annexionskrise, Uppsala, 1955; D. Dakin, The Greek Struggle in Macedonia, Salonica, 1969; H. Hantsch, Leopold Graf Berchtold (2 vols), Graz, 1963 ; and the works by H. Benedikt, G. Drage, F. Klein, C. A. Macartney, and F. R. Bridge cited in Chapter 1, note 1; W. Wagner, Chapter z, note 1; E. v. Glaise-Horstenau, Chapter 3, note 1; and Margaret M. Jefferson, Chapter 5, note 1. 2 P.A. I/47;, Liasse XXXII/h. 3 P. Hohenbalken (ed.), Lui^pv, p. 76. 211