Goebbels' Principles of Propaganda
Author(s): Leonard W. Doob
Source: The Public Opinion Quarterly , Autumn, 1950, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Autumn, 1950), pp.
419-442
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Association for
Public Opinion Research
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2745999
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Goebbels' Principles
of Propaganda
BY LEONARD W. DOOB
FOR almost a dozen years German Propaganda major propaganda principles whic
Minister Goebbels was recognized as a master lowed.
of his trade by those who fought and by those The author, who served as Polic
who acclaimed the Nazi state. This article, nator of the Overseas Branch of the
based on both the published and unpublished War Information during World Wa
portions of Goebbels' diary, summarizes the fessor of Psychology at Yale Unive
AMONG the Nazi documents salvaged by American authori
Berlin in I945 are close to 6,800 pages of a manuscript ostens
tated by Propaganda Minister Goebbels as a diary which cove
many gaps, the period from January 21, I942 to December
The material was typed triple-spaced in large German-Goth
and with wide margins upon heavy watermarked paper, w
result that the average page contained less than Ioo words. A
per cent of this manuscript-the most interesting and gener
most important parts-has been very accurately and idioma
translated by Louis P. Lochner.1 The analysis in the present
based upon careful examination of the entire document whic
in the Hoover Institute and Library on War, Peace, and Revo
Stanford University.2
The material undoubtedly was dictated by Goebbels, but
necessarily an intimate or truthful account of his life as an ind
or propagandist. He was too crafty to pour forth his soul to a s
What he said must have been motivated by whatever public
he imagined would eventually see his words; or-as Speier has
out3-the document may possibly represent parts of an authenti
which were selected by him or someone else for some specific p
1 Lochner, Louis P. [Editor]. The Goebbels Diaries. New York: Doubleday & Com
2 The writer wishes to express his gratitude to Mr. Philip T. McLean of the Library
ing arrangements to have the manuscript microfilmed; to the Yale Attitude Change
paying the costs of the microfilm; and to Professor Carl F. Schreiber of Yale Univer
in translating some of the more difficult words and phrases.
a Speier, Hans. Review of Lochner, op. cit., Public Opinion Quarterly, Fall, I948, pP
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420 PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, FALL 1950
A section called "Yesterday--Military Situation," with which each day
entry began and which Lochner has sensibly omitted altogether,
definitely not written by Goebbels: the writing was most object
often the same events mentioned therein were reported again and co
mented upon in other parts of the same day's entry; and infrequentl
a blank page appeared under the same heading with the notation
be inserted later." In the manuscript we have, there are few perso
details. Instead it appears that Goebbels wished to demonstrate an
swerving loyalty to Hitler; to expose the ineptitudes of the Germ
military staffs; to boast about his own accomplishments, his respecta
bility, and his devotion to the Nazi cause; and to place on the rec
criticisms of rival Nazis like Goering and Rosenberg.
The nature of the document would be a problem most germane to
an examination of Goebbels' personality or the history of Nazido
but these topics are not being discussed here. Attention has been focus
only on the principles which appear to underlie the propaganda p
and decisions described in the manuscript. Spot checks suggest but
not prove that the words of the diary actually correspond to the activi
of Goebbels' propaganda machine. One typical example of the cor
spondence must suffice. The entry in the diary for November ii, I94
contained this observation: "There is no longer any talk in the Englis
press of the possibility of a moral collapse of the Reich. On the contra
we are credited with much greater military prowess than we enjoy a
the moment... ." On the same day, the Berliner Illustrierte Nachta
gabe carried an editorial which asserted that the "jubilant illusions" o
the British regarding a German collapse have "suddenly changed
deep pessimism; the enemy's strongest hopes are crushed." Two d
later the headline of the leading article in the Voelkischer Beobach
was "War of Nerves Departs." On November 13 the diary stated t
the English "have been imagining that exactly on this day [Novem
ii] there would be in the Reich a morale breakdown which, howev
has now been pushed by them into the invisible future." A day la
a Nazi official spoke over the domestic radio: "The key-dates chos
by the enemy are now passed: our people have repulsed this gene
attack . . ."
All that is being assumed, in short, is that the manuscript mo
or less faithfully reflects Goebbels' propaganda strategy and tactics: i
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GOEBBELS' PRINCIPLES OF PROPAGANDA
is a convenient guide to his bulky propaganda material
magnified the importance of his work, no doubt to indi
significance. The truth of what he dictated in this respect
vant, inasmuch as the effects of his efforts are not being sc
The analysis which follows, it must constantly be remem
based on a very limited period of Goebbels' stewardship,
which on the whole Germany was suffering military and
feats such as the winter campaigns in Russia, the with
North Africa, and the capitulation of Italy. From time to ti
theless, events such as temporary military advances and the
of Japan in Asia occurred; hence there are also suggestio
Goebbels functioned as a winner. The writer has checked pr
secondary sources from I925 through 1941 and after I943, a
fore at least privately confident that the principles are not
the diary.
In this analysis a principle is adduced-in an admittedly but unavoidably
subjective manner-from the diary when a minimum of six
scattered references therein suggests that Goebbels would have had to
believe, consciously or unconsciously, in that generalization before he
could dictate or behave as he did. To save space, however, only a few
illustrations are given under each principle. Whenever possible, an
illustration has been selected from the portion published by Lochner:
the reader has readier access to that volume than to the manuscript at
Stanford. The same procedure has been employed regarding references.
A quoted phrase or sentence is followed by the number of the page
being cited, either from the Lochner book (in which case a simple number
is given in parentheses), or from the Stanford manuscript (in
which case the number is preceded by the letter "M," and represents
the Library's pagination). The concluding sentence of each paragraph,
moreover, contains the one reference considered to be either the best
or the most typical for the entire paragraph, again preferably from the
Lochner book. The writer will gladly honor written requests for additional
references.
These principles purport to summarize what made Goebbels tick or
fail to tick. They may be thought of as his intellectual legacy. Whether
the legacy has been reliably deduced is a methodological question.
Whether it is valid is a psychological matter. Whether or when parts
42I
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PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, FALL 1950
of it should be utilized in a democratic society are profound and disturbing
problems of a political and ethical nature.
I. PROPAGANDISTS MUST HAVE ACCESS TO INTELLIGENCE
CONCERNING EVENTS AND PUBLIC OPINION
In theory, Goebbels maintained that he and his as
plan and execute propaganda only by constantly referr
intelligence. Otherwise the communication would not be
to the event or the audience. As Germany's situation wor
mitted fewer and fewer officials to have access to all rel
gence. By May of I943 he persuaded Himmler to supply
reports only to himself (373).
The basic intelligence during a war concerns military
day's entry began with a separate description of the cu
situation. There is every indication that Goebbels was
with Germany's own military plans (I62).
Information about Germans was obtained most fre
the reports of the Sicherheits-Dienst (SD) of the secre
dition, Goebbels depended upon his own Reich Propa
German officials, and written or face-to-face contacts w
German civilians or soldiers. As has been shown elsewhere,4 little or
none of this intelligence was ever gathered or analyzed systematically.
Once Goebbels stated that the SD had conducted "a statistical investigation
... in the manner of the Gallup Institute," but he said he did
"not value such investigations because they are always undertaken with
a deliberate purpose in mind" (M827). Goebbels, moreover, tended to
trust his own common sense, intuition, or experience more than formal
reports. He listened to his mother because, he said, "she knows the sentiments
of the people better than most experts who judge from the ivory
tower of scientific inquiry, as in her case the voice of people itself
speaks" (56).
The SD as well as German officials supplied intelligence concerning
occupied countries. Information about enemy, allied, and neutral
nations was gathered from spies, monitored telephone conversations,
and other classified sources; from the interrogation of prisoners as well
as from the letters they received and sent; and from statements in or
4 United States Strategic Bombing Survey. The Efects of Bomb;ng on German Morale. Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947. Vol. I, p. 42.
422
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GOEBBELS' PRINCIPLES OF PROPAGANDA
deductions from those nations' mass media of communi
too, Goebbels often relied upon his own intuitive judgm
seldom hesitated to make far-reaching deductions from
evidence. A direct reply by the enemy, for example, he un
interpreted as a sign of his own effectiveness: "a wild attac
article" by the Russian news agency "shows that our an
propaganda is slowly getting on Soviet nerves" (271).
2. PROPAGANDA MUST BE PLANNED AND EXECUTED
BY ONLY ONE AUTHORITY
This principle was in line with the Nazi theory of cen
thority and with Goebbels' own craving for power.
stressed the efficiency and consistency which could resu
policy (M383). He felt that a single authority-himselfthree
functions:
a. It must issue all the propaganda directives. Every
ganda had to implement policy, and policy was made clea
These directives referred to all phases of the war and to a
ring inside and outside of Germany. They indicated when
ganda campaigns should be begun, augmented, diminis
nated. They suggested how an item should be interpreted
or whether it should be ignored completely. Goebbels wi
his authority for issuing directives only to Hitler, wh
very important matters was always sought. Sometimes g
expressed concerning the ways in which directives were
but often there were complaints concerning how Goebbe
or others were executing a campaign. The Nazi propag
therefore, was constantly being reorganized (34I).
b. It must explain propaganda directives to important
maintain their morale. Unless these officials who either
formally implemented directives were provided with
of propaganda policy, they could not be expected to funct
and willingly. Through his organizational machinery and
personal contact, Goebbels sought to reveal the rationale
ganda to these subordinates and to improve their mor
them, ostensibly, into his confidence. The groups he met
from an intimate gathering in his home to what must h
meeting in the Kroll Opera House in Berlin (484).
423
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PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, FALL I950
c. It must oversee other agencies' activities which have propaganda
consequences. "I believe," Goebbels told Hitler, "that when a propaganda
ministry is created, all matters affecting propaganda, news, and
culture within the Reich and within the occupied areas must be subordinated
to it." Although Hitler allegedly "agreed with me absolutely
and unreservedly," this high degree of unification was not achieved
(476). Conflicts over propaganda plans and materials were recorded
with the following German agencies: Ribbentrop's Foreign Office and
its representatives in various countries; Rosenberg's Ministry for the
Eastern Occupied Areas; the German Army, even including the officers
stationed at Hitler's G.H.Q.; the Ministry of Justice; and Ley's Economic
Ministry. Goebbels considered himself and his ministry troubleshooters:
whenever and wherever German morale seemed poorwhether
among submarine crews or the armies in the East-he attempted
to provide the necessary propaganda boost (204).
Goebbels' failure to achieve the goal of this principle and its corollaries
is noteworthy. Apparently his self-proclaimed competency was
not universally recognized: people whom he considered amateurs believed
they could execute propaganda as effectively as he. In addition,
even a totalitarian regime could not wipe out personal rivalries and
animosities in the interests of efficiency (M3945).
3. THE PROPAGANDA CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACTION MUST BE
CONSIDERED IN PLANNING THAT ACTION
Goebbels demanded that he rather than the German
Justice be placed in charge of a trial in France so that "ev
be seized and executed correctly from a psychologica
(MI747). He persuaded Hitler, he wrote, to conduct
against England . . . according to psychological rather
principles" (313). It was more important for a propag
plan an event than to rationalize one that had occurred
4. PROPAGANDA MUST AFFECT THE ENEMY'S POLICY AND
Propaganda was considered an arm of warfare, altho
never employed the phrase "psychological warfare" or
fare." Besides damaging enemy morale, he believed th
could affect the policies and actions of enemy leaders in
424
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GOEBBELS' PRINCIPLES OF PROPAGANDA 425
a. By suppressing propagandistically desirable material wh
provide the enemy with useful intelligence. Often Goebbels
that he refused to deny or refute enemy claims concerning air
"it is better," he said in April of I942, "for the English to think t
have had great successes in the air war than for them actually t
achieved such victories" (M2057). For similar reasons he regr
censored items concerning the poor quality of Soviet weapon
many's plans to employ secret weapons, and even favorable
news (272).
b. By openly disseminating propaganda whose content or tone
causes the enemy to draw the desired conclusions. "I am also convinced,"
Goebbels stated in the spring of I943, "that a firm attitude on
our part [in propaganda] will somewhat spoil the appetite of the
English for an invasion" (302). As the Battle of Tunisia drew to a
close, therefore, the resistance of German troops there was used as an
illustration of what would happen if the European continent were invaded.
Perhaps, Goebbels must have reasoned, General Eisenhower's
plans might be thus directly affected; British or American public
opinion might exert influence upon SHAEF; or the morale of the
armies in training for the invasion might be crippled (M4638).
c. By goading the enemy into revealing vital information about
himself. At the end of the Battle of the Coral Sea Goebbels believed
that the Japanese had scored a complete victory. The silence of American
and British authorities was then attacked "with very precise questions:
they will not be able to avoid for any length of time the responsibility
of answering these questions" (M2743).
d. By making no reference to a desired enemy activity when any
reference would discredit that activity. Goebbels did not wish to bestow
a "kiss of death" on matters which met his approval. No use was made
of news indicating unfriendly relations between two or more of the
countries opposing Germany because-in Goebbels' own favorite, trite,
and oft repeated words-"controversy between the Allies is a small
plant which thrives best when it is left to its own natural growth"
(M94I). Likewise the Nazi propaganda apparatus was kept aloof from
the Chicago Tribune, from a coal strike in the United States, and from
anti-Communist or pro-fascist groups in England. Quarrels between
Germany's enemies, however, were fully exploited when-as in the case
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PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, FALL I950
of British-American clashes over Darlan-the conflict was both strong
and overt (225).
5. DECLASSIFIED, OPERATIONAL INFORMATION MUST BE AVAILABLE
TO IMPLEMENT A PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN
A propaganda goal, regardless of its importance, require
tional material that did not conflict with security regulations.
terial could not be completely manufactured: it had to have som
tual basis, no matter how slight. It was difficult to begin an ant
campaign after the fall of Tunis because German journalists
failing to collect anti-Jewish literature. Lack of material, h
never seems to have hindered a campaign for any length of tim
evidently some amount of digging could produce the necessary
mentation. Journalists were dispatched to a crucial area to wri
stories; steps were taken to insure a supply of "authentic news f
United States" (92); a change in personnel was contemplate
ject fresh blood into German journalism" and hence bette
(500); or, when necessary, the Protocols of Zions were res
(376).
Like any publicity agent, Goebbels also created "news" through
action. To demonstrate Germany's friendship for Finland, for example,
a group of ailing Finnish children was invited to Germany on a "healthrestoring
vacation" (M9I). The funerals of prominent Nazis were
made into news-worthy pageants; the same technique was applied to
the French and Belgian victims of British air attacks. German and
Nazi anniversaries were celebrated so routinely that the anniversary
of the founding of the Three Power Pact was observed even after the
downfall of the Italian member (M5859).
6. TO BE PERCEIVED, PROPAGANDA MUST EVOKE THE INTEREST
OF AN AUDIENCE AND MUST BE TRANSMITTED THROUGH
AN ATTENTION-GETTING COMMUNICATIONS MEDIUM
Much energy was devoted to establishing and maintain
munications media. Motion picture theaters and newspapers w
trolled or purchased in neutral and occupied countries. "It's a
we cannot reach the people of the Soviet Union by radio p
Goebbels stated, since "the Kremlin has been clever enoug
the Russian people from receiving the great world broadc
426
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GOEBBELS' PRINCIPLES OF PROPAGANDA
limit them to their local stations" (453). The schedule of
man radio programs was adjusted when the British introduc
summer time." A dilemma existed regarding receiving sets
countries: if they were confiscated, people would be cut off
as well as enemy propaganda; if they were not, both bra
heard. Inside the Reich, machinery was created to reopen
ture theaters as quickly as possible after heavy air raids
Some kind of bait was devised to attract and hold an audience.
What Goebbels called "propaganda" over the radio, he believed, tended
after a while to repel an audience. By 1942 he concluded that Germans
wanted their radio to provide "not only instruction but also entertainment
and relaxation" (M383), and that likewise straight news rather
than "talks" were more effective with foreign audiences. Like any
propagandist in war time, he recognized that a radio program could
draw enemy listeners by providing them with the names of war prisoners.
The best form of newspaper propaganda was not "propaganda"
(i.e., editorials and exhortation), but slanted news which appeared to
be straight (M4677).
Goebbels was especially attached to the motion picture. At least
three evenings a week he previewed a feature film or newsreel not only
to seek relaxation and the company of film people but also to offer
what he considered to be expert criticisms. Feature pictures, he stated,
should provide entertaining and absorbing plots which might evoke
and then resolve tension; simultaneously they should subtly affect the
attentive audience not through particular passages but by the general
atmosphere. Evidence for Goebbels' belief in the supreme importance
of newsreels comes from the fact that he immediately provided his
newsreel company with emergency headquarters after one of the heaviest
air raids Berlin experienced toward the end of I943. "It costs much
trouble to assemble the newsreel correctly each week and to make it
into an effective propaganda weapon," he observed on another occasion,
"but the work is worthwhile: millions of people draw from the newsreel
their best insight into the war, its causes, and its effects." He also
believed that newsreels provided "proof" for many of his major propaganda
contentions: visual images-no matter how he himself manipulated
them before they were released-possessed greater credibility than
spoken or written words (M335).
427
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PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, FALL I950
Goebbels never stated explicitly whether or not in his opinion some
media were better suited to present particular propaganda themes than
others. Only stray observations were made, such as that leaflets were
ineffective when "opinions are too rigid and viewpoints too firm"
(M2o65). His one basic assumption appears to have been that all media
must be employed simultaneously, since one never knew what type of
bait would catch the variety of fish who were Nazi targets (M828).
7. CREDIBILITY ALONE MUST DETERMINE WHETHER PROPAGANDA
OUTPUT SHOULD BE TRUE OR FALSE
Goebbels' moral position in the diary was straightforwar
the truth, his enemies told lies. Actually the question for h
of expediency and not morality. Truth, he thought, shou
frequently as possible; otherwise the enemy or the facts
might expose falsehood, and the credibility of his own o
suffer. Germans, he also stated, had grown more sophis
1914: they could "read between the lines" and hence cou
easily deceived (Mi8o8).
Lies, consequently, were useful when they could not be d
To induce Italians to leave the areas occupied by English and
forces and then to shanghai them into Germany as workers
broadcast the claim that "the English and Americans wil
men of draft age to enlist" (462). Even truth, however, mig
credibility. In the first place, some apparently true state
later turn out to be false, such as specific claims concerning
inflicted by planes against enemy targets. Then, secondly, t
might appear untrue. Goebbels was afraid to inform the Ger
General Rommel had not been in Africa during the closing d
campaign there: "everybody thinks he is in Africa; if we no
with the truth when the catastrophe is so near, nobody
us" (352).
Similarly, every feature and device had to maintain its own credibility.
A special communique or bulletin was employed, for example,
to announce important events. Goebbels was afraid to resort to this
device too frequently, lest it lose its unusual character, and hence he
released some significant news through routine channels (M5799).
428
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GOEBBELS' PRINCIPLES OF PROPAGANDA
8. THE PURPOSE, CONTENT, AND EFFECTIVENESS OF ENEMY PROPAG
THE STRENGTH AND EFFECTS OF AN EXPOSE; AND THE NATURE
CURRENT PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGNS DETERMINE WHETHER
ENEMY PROPAGANDA SHOULD BE IGNORED OR REFUTED
Most of the time Goebbels seemed mortally afraid of enem
ganda. Even though he had controlled all the mass media in
since 1933, he must have been convinced that Germans had
completely converted to the Nazi cause, or at least that they m
corrupted by enemy efforts. He admitted in January of 1942
eign broadcasts are again being listened to more extensive
though death could be the penalty for doing so (44). Fourtee
later he noted with dismay that "the English and Americ
greatly expanded their radio broadcasts to the Axis countries a
to step them up even more" (312).
Goebbels' first impulse was to reply to enemy propaga
wrote as though he were a member of a great International
Society and as if silence on his part would mean the loss of
ment and of his own prestige. Actually, however, he judicio
anced a number of factors before he decided to ignore or refu
claims (M2593).
In the first place, he analyzed enemy propaganda. If it seem
the goal of the propaganda was to elicit a reply, he was sile
English," he stated on February 6, 1942, "are now employin
mode of propaganda: they commit General Rommel to o
which at the moment he certainly cannot have, in order to
declare perhaps in eight or fourteen days that he has not reach
goals" (M423). A direct reply would have been equivalent to sell
German armies short. His practice was to expose such traps to
ordinates and then to have them maintain silence in the mass media
(M46o6).
On the other hand, a reply was made if it were felt that the enemy
was transmitting blatant falsehoods. Since almost any enemy statement
was considered false, Goebbels believed that only the blatant ones
should be exposed. In this category he included claims that Germans
had bombed Vatican City, that there had been "disturbances in Berlin"
(M4664), that Stalin was adopting a more lenient policy toward religion,
etc. (M497I).
429
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PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, FALL 1950
Ineffective enemy claims required no reply, since a refutation
would either give them more currency or else be a waste of propaganda
energy. Enemy propaganda was very frequently branded as being ineffective,
judgments which appear to have been either intuitive or
rationalizations of an inability to reply. Effective enemy propaganda,
however, demanded immediate action. The enemy, for example, was
seldom permitted to acquire prestige; thus Goebbels attacked British
boasts concerning a parachute landing at Le Havre, a raid on St.
Nazaire, and the occupation of Madagascar. Sometimes it appears as
though he instituted counter-proceedings not because the enemy was
being successful but simply because he was able to do so. When the
enemy was thought to be employing horoscopes and other occult
propaganda against Germany, a reply in kind was immediately prepared.
If the enemy seemed to be scoring an especially important propaganda
triumph in its "war of nerves"-specifically at the beginning of
the heavy British raids on German cities, after the downfall of Mussolini,
or in the midst of strong pressure on Turkey by Britain in the late
fall of I943-the only really adequate reply was considered to be a
speech by Hitler himself (25I).
Then, secondly, Goebbels examined his own propaganda arsenal
before he assayed a reply. He kept silent if he believed that his case, in
the absence of facts or arguments, would appear too weak. He was so
afraid of the German National Committee which the Russians formed
in Moscow that he carried on no counter-propaganda against this
group. Sometimes an enemy claim was disregarded and a counterclaim
advanced. As Germany was attacked for her treatment of Jews,
the policy of "complete silence" seemed unwise: "it is best to seize the
offensive and to say something about English cruelty in India or the
Near East" (M3o64) and also to "intensify . . . our anti-Bolshevik
propaganda" (M32'25).
Goebbels tried, too, to estimate in advance the effectiveness of a rebuttal.
If his own case as well as the enemy's appeared strong but if the
enemy's might look stronger because of his attempts to refute it, he
withheld his fire. It always seemed better to concentrate on the dissemination
of a Hitler speech rather than to reply to foreign critics. Often,
however, he believed that an expos6 could protect Germans or help
immunize foreigners from an enemy campaign that was either about
43°
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GOEBBELS' PRINCIPLES OF PROPAGANDA
to be or actually had been launched. Peace appeals by the
were therefore anticipated, and his reply to the communiqu
Teheran Conference was "biting and insolent; we empty
irony and derision over the Conference" (545).
In the third place, Goebbels believed that his current
had to be surveyed before enemy propaganda could be ig
futed. He attempted no reply when that reply might divert
away from, or when it ran counter to more important
themes. "There's no point in concerning oneself daily with n
and rumors disseminated by the enemy," he stated, since it w
to concentrate on the "central theme" of anti-Semitism
March of I943 he permitted "Bolshevik reports of victor
into the world unchallenged": he wanted Europe to "get
so that "all the sooner it will become sensible" and coope
the Russians (284).
9. CREDIBILITY, INTELLIGENCE, AND THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS
COMMUNICATING DETERMINE WHETHER PROPAGANDA
MATERIALS SHOULD BE CENSORED
Goebbels had no scruples whatsoever concerning th
sorship. "News policy," he stated, "is a weapon of war; its
wage war and not to give out information" (210). His d
upon three pragmatic considerations (299).
Goebbels recognized, first, that often credibility might
if an item were censored: "in excited and strained times t
news must somehow be satisfied" (40). When the Forei
sored news which he considered important, he compla
that sort of policy we are fairly compelling the German
to foreign and enemy broadcasts" (164). Again and aga
he felt that he had to speak up, although he would have p
silent. Toward the end of 1943, for example, he stated th
of evacuating people from the bombed areas "has beco
that it must be discussed with the clarity it deserves" (M
The usual policy was to suppress material which wa
desirable for German consumption, but simultaneously to
foreign propaganda if it were suited thereto. Tales conc
cannibalism by the Soviets were spread in foreign countr
material was banned inside Germany lest it terrify Ge
43I
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PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, FALL I950
relatives were fighting the Russians. Sometimes, however, undesirable
material was not censored domestically in order to maintain its credibility
abroad (M2699).
Censorship was invoked, in the second place, when intelligence
concerning the outcome of a development was insufficient. Here Goebbels
wished either to preserve credibility or to have more facts before
formulating a directive. Military forecasts he considered especially
risky, but he also avoided comments on political events outside the
Reich until he could fairly definitely anticipate their effects upon Germany
(M5036).
Then, finally, Goebbels estimated the possible effects of communicating
the information. Censorship was pursued when it was thought
that knowledge of the event would produce a reaction which was undesirable
in itself or which, though desirable under some circumstances,
was not in line with a current directive. Judged by the kind of news
he suppressed, Goebbels was afraid that the following might damage
German morale: discussions about religion; statements by officials in
neutral or occupied countries that were hostile to Germany or by enemy
officials that might evoke sympathy for them; enemy warnings that
there would be raids before heavy ones began and-later-the extent
of the damage inflicted by enemy planes; dangerous acts which included
the assassination of officials, sabotage, and desertion; the unfortunate
decisions or deeds of German officials; the belittling of German strength
by an occurrence like the escape of General Giraud from a German
prison; an unnecessarily large increase in Germans' anxiety; and hints
that Germany did not approve completely of her Axis partners (249).
10. MATERIAL FROM ENEMY PROPAGANDA MAY BE UTILIZED IN
OPERATIONS WHEN IT HELPS DIMINISH THAT ENEMY'S PRESTI
OR LENDS SUPPORT TO THE PROPAGANDIST'S OWN OBJECTIVE
Athough his basic attitude toward enemy propaganda w
contempt, Goebbels combed enemy broadcasts, newspapers, an
statements for operational items. Here he was not motivat
somewhat defensive desire to reply to the enemy, but by off
siderations: words of the enemy (Cf. Principle 8) could help h
his propaganda goals. "In the morning we published in
man press a collection of previous Churchill lies and featured
this collection is making a deep impression on the neutral
432
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GOEBBELS' PRINCIPLES OF PROPAGANDA
shows Churchill to be, as it were, the Admiral of Incapability" (
In particular the enemy provided a basis for Goebbels' "str
through-fear" campaign as indicated below in Principle 1
fellow Vansittart is really worth his weight in gold to our prop
(342), he wrote, and likewise he felt that any discussion in E
or Russia concerning reparations or boundary questions after Ge
defeat "contributes significantly to the maintenance and streng
of morale" inside the Reich (M765).
II. BLACK RATHER THAN WHITE PROPAGANDA MUST BE EMPLOYED WHEN
THE LATTER IS LESS CREDIBLE OR PRODUCES UNDESIRABLE EFFECTS
By "black" propaganda is meant material whose source is concea
from the audience. Goebbels disguised his identity when he was
vinced that the association of a white medium with himself or
machine would damage its credibility. At one time, for exampl
wanted to induce the English to stop bombing Berlin by convin
them that they were wasting their bombs. He claimed that he
rumor-mongers to spread the idea there that the city "for all prac
purposes is no longer capable of supporting life, i.e., no longer exis
(M6654). Presumably the tale had a better chance of being believ
German authorities were not connected with it. A most elaborate p
was concocted to try to deceive the Russians regarding the secti
the front at which the Germans in the summer of I942 had pla
their offensive. A German journalist, who had first been sent delib
ately to the Eastern front, was then dispatched to Lisbon where he
to commit, ostensibly under the influence of liquor, what would ap
to be indiscretions but which actually were deceptions. In additi
was planned to plant "a camouflaged article . . . through middle
either in the Turkish or the Portuguese press" (226), and the Frankfu
Zeitung was made to print an "unauthorized" article which was
"officially suppressed and denounced in a press conference" (2
Goebbels sought to increase the number of Soviet deserters by imp
ing the prisoner-of-war camps in which they would be kept-thi
cient psychological warfare device rested on the hope that news of
improvement would reach Soviet soldiers through informal chan
Otherwise, except for a security-conscious hint from time to time
diary made no reference to black operations inside enemy coun
(M4235).
433
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PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, FALL I950
Goebbels also utilized black means to combat undesirable rumors
inside the Reich. An official denial through a white medium, he
thought, might only give currency to the rumors, whereas what he
called "word-of-mouth" propaganda against them could achieve the
desired effects. This method was employed to offset German fears that
"in case more serious raids were to occur, the government would be the
first to run away" from Berlin (421). At all times "citizens who are
faithful to the state must be furnished with the necessary arguments for
combatting defeatism during discussions at their places of work and
on the streets" (401). Sometimes, however, rumors were officially attacked
when, in Goebbels' opinion, all the facts were completely and
unequivocally on his side (5I8).
12. PROPAGANDA MAY BE FACILITATED BY LEADERS WITH PRESTIGE
Such a principle is to be expected from Goebbels, wh
ideology stressed the importance of leadership. Germans, it
would feel submissive toward propaganda containing th
prestigeful leader. Ostensibly Goebbels always anticipated
results from a Hitler statement especially during a cris
routinely that the communication had been received by
with complete enthusiasm or that it "has simply amazed
(506).
Leaders were useful only when they had prestige. Goebbels utilized
propaganda to make heroes out of men like Field Marshal Rommel. In
the privacy of his diary he savagely attacked German leaders whose
public behavior was not exemplary, since they thus disrupted propaganda
which urged ordinary Germans to make greater sacrifices and to
have unswerving faith in their government. An incompetent Nazi official
was not openly dismissed from office, lest his incompetence reflect
upon "the National Socialist regime"; instead it was announced that
he had been temporarily replaced because of illness (224).
13. PROPAGANDA MUST BE CAREFULLY TIMED
Goebbels always faced the tactical problem of timing his propaganda
most effectively. Agility and plasticity were necessary, he
thought, and propagandists must possess at all times the faculty of "calculating
psychological effects in advance" (204). Three principles
seemed to be operating:
434
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GOEBBELS' PRINCIPLES OF PROPAGANDA 435
a. The communication must reach the audience ahead of competin
propaganda. "Whoever speaks the first word to the world is alw
right," Goebbels stated flatly (I83). He sought constantly to speed
the release of news by his own organization. The loss of Kiev wa
mitted as quickly as possible "so that we would not limp behind
enemy announcement" (M6o6I).
b. A propaganda campaign must begin at the optimum mome
Goebbels never indicated explicitly or implicitly how he reached
decision that the time to begin a campaign or make an announcem
was either ripe or right. He made statements like this: "we have
back for a very long time" in using an Indian leader, who as a Germ
puppet committed his country to a war against England, "for the si
reason that things had not advanced far enough as yet in India" (
At one point he stated that counter-propaganda against enemy cl
should not be too long delayed: "one should not let such lying repor
sink in too deeply" (M243o).
c. A propaganda theme must be repeated, but not beyond so
point of diminishing effectiveness. On the one hand, Goebbels believ
that propaganda must be repeated until it was thoroughly learned an
that thereafter more repetition was necessary to reinforce the learn
Such repetition took place over time-the same theme was menti
day after day-as well as in the output of a single day. An anti-Semit
campaign, for example, continued for weeks, during which time "ab
70 to 80 per cent of our broadcasts are devoted to it" (366). On the o
hand, repetition could be unnecessary or even undesirable. It was un
essary when "the material thus far published has completely convinc
the public" (386). It was undesirable when the theme became bor
or unimpressive, as occurred in connection with announcements
cerning German submarine successes. Sometimes, moreover, boom
guns at the start of a campaign, though desirable psychologically, co
make the propaganda too "striking" and consequently result in a
of credibility (M6343).
14. PROPAGANDA MUST LABEL EVENTS AND PEOPLE
WITH DISTINCTIVE PHRASES OR SLOGANS
Again and again Goebbels placed great stress upon phra
slogans to characterize events. At the beginning of 1942, for ex
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PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, FALL I950
he began a campaign whose purpose was to indicate economic, social,
and political unrest in England. He very quickly adopted the phrase
"schleichende Krise"-creeping crisis-to describe this state of affairs
and then employed it "as widely as possible in German propaganda"
both domestically and abroad (M762). His thinking was dominated
by word-hunts: privately-or semi-privately-in his diary he summarized
his own or enemy propaganda with a verbal cliche, even when he
did not intend to employ the phrase in his output. He admitted that the
experiencing of an event was likely to be more effective than a verbal
description of it, but he also recognized that words could stand between
people and events, and that their reaction to the latter could be potently
affected by the former (MI385). To achieve such effects, phrases and
slogans should possess the following characteristics:
a. They must evoke desired responses which the audience previously
possesses. If the words could elicit such responses, then Goebbels'
propaganda task consisted simply of linking those words to the event
which thereafter would acquire their flavor. When the British raid on
St. Nazaire in March of 1942 aborted, Goebbels decided to claim that
it had been made to appease the Russians who had been demanding
that their ally engage in military action. The raid was dubbed the
"Maisky Offensive," after the Soviet envoy in London. Sometimes news
could speak for itself in the sense that it elicited desired responses without
the addition of a verbal label. A military victory was not interpreted
for Germans when Goebbels wished them to feel gratified. Most news,
however, was not self-explanatory: Goebbels had to attach thereto the responses
he desired through the use of verbal symbols. The most regulated
news and commentary, nevertheless, could produce undesirable
and unintended actions; even a speech by Hitler was misinterpreted
(M4677).
b. They must be capable of being easily learned. "It must make use
of painting in black-and-white, since otherwise it cannot be convincing
to people," Goebbels stated with reference to a film he was criticizing
(M27i). This principle of simplification he applied to all media in
order to facilitate learning. The masses were important, not the intellectuals.
All enemy "lies" were not beaten down, rather it was better
to confine the counter-attack to a single "school example" (M2o84).
Propaganda could be aided, moreover, by a will to learn. Cripps' appeal
436
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GOEBBELS' PRINCIPLES OF PROPAGANDA 437
to European workers under German domination to slow down on t
job, for example, was ignored: "it is difficult to pose a counter-slogan
to such a slogan, for the slogan of 'go slow' is always much more effe
tive than that of 'work fast'" (107).
c. They must be utilized again and again, but only in appropria
situations. Here Goebbels wished to exploit learning which had o
curred: the reactions people learned to verbal symbols he wished
transfer easily and efficiently to new events. He criticized Engl
propaganda because "its slogans are changed on every occasion an
hence it lacks real punch" (MI812). The context in which peop
reactions occurred was also important. "I forbid using the wo
'Fuehrer' in the German press when applied to Quisling," Goebb
declared, "I don't consider it right that the term Fuehrer be applied t
any other person than the Fuehrer himself. There are certain terms th
we must absolutely reserve for ourselves, among them also the wo
'Reich"' (66).
d. They must be boomerang-proof. Goebbels became furious when
he thought of the expression "Baedeker raids, which one of our people
so stupidly coined during a foreign press conference" (M2435): it interfered
with his own effort to call British raids wanton attacks on "cultural
monuments and institutions of public welfare" (M230I). "There
are certain words," he added, "from which we should shrink as the
devil does from Holy Water; among these are, for instance, the words
'sabotage' and 'assassination'" (93).
15. PROPAGANDA TO THE HOME FRONT MUST PREVENT THE RAISING
OF FALSE HOPES WHICH CAN BE BLASTED BY FUTURE EVENTS
It was clear to Goebbels that the anticipation of a Germa
along military or political lines could have certain immediate b
effects from his viewpoint. The confidence of Germans and th
of the enemy could be increased. Such tactics, however, were m
risky: if the success turned out to be a failure, then Germans w
deflated and the enemy elated. His own credibility, moreov
suffer. For this reason he was wildly indignant when, after th
army withdrew, the enemy ascribed to him "premature report
tories" at Salerno. Actually, he claimed, the announcements
from German Generals (457).
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PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, FALL I950
Often the false hopes seemed to spring from the Germans themselves,
a form of wishful thinking which occurred spontaneously as they
contemplated the possibility of an offensive by the German armies, as
they received news of a single victory, or as they imagined that the
enemy could be defeated by political events. Goebbels, therefore, frequently
issued warnings about "false illusions" and he prevented particular
victories from being trumpeted too loudly. At other times enemy
propaganda strategy was thought to be committing the German armies
to military goals which they could not be expected to achieve (II8).
i6. PROPAGANDA TO THE HOME FRONT MUST CREATE
AN OPTIMUM ANXIETY LEVEL
For Goebbels, anxiety was a double-edged sword: too m
could produce panic and demoralization, too little cou
placency and inactivity. An attempt was constantly made
achieve a balance between the two extremes. The stra
duced to two principles (M6I62).
a. Propaganda must reinforce anxiety concerning the
of defeat. Enemy war aims were the principal materi
keep German anxiety at a high pitch. "The German p
main convinced-as indeed the facts warrant-that this war strikes at
their very lives and their national possibilities of development, and they
must fight it with their entire strength" (I47). Lest the campaign of
"strength-through-fear" falter, no opportunity was missed to attack
enemy peace terms which might appear mild. Anti-Bolshevik campaigns
attempted not only to stiffen German resistance but also to enlist
the cooperation of all neutral and occupied countries. On the one hand,
Goebbels tried to convince himself in the diary that Germans would
not be misled again-as they had been, according to his view, in World
War I-by enemy peace terms: they "are quite accurately acquainted
with their enemies and know what to expect if they were to give themselves
up" (M6684). On the other hand, he felt very strongly that Germans
were most vulnerable to peace propaganda. He feared, for example,
that American propaganda might be directed "not ... against
the German people but against Nazism" (147) and "we can surely
congratulate ourselves that our enemies have no Wilson Fourteen
Points" (47).
Occasionally it became necessary to increase the anxiety level of
438
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GOEBBELS' PRINCIPLES OF PROPAGANDA
Germans concerning a specific event. On February 24, I9
first disastrous winter campaign in Russia, Goebbels "issu
the German press to handle the sitation in the East favorab
too optimistically." He did not wish to raise false hopes b
more importantly, he did not want Germans to "cease to
about the situation in the East" (99).
b. Propaganda must diminish anxiety (other than that co
the consequences of defeat) which is too high and whic
reduced by people themselves. Air raids obviously raised
iety much too high, but they were a situation over whi
could not exercise propaganda control. In other situation
a demoralizing amount of anxiety he could be more act
things in a realistic light" when the military situation in T
hopeless, German losses were portrayed as being "not of suc
that as a result our chances for [ultimate] victory have been
(M4542). In contrast, he attempted to use the same principle
-the so-called "strategy of terror"-against his enemies. L
dropped on English cities "with pictures of the damage
English in Luebeck and Rostock, and under them the F
nouncement of his Reichstag speech that reprisal raids a
(I93)
17. PROPAGANDA TO THE HOME FRONT MUST DIMINISH
THE IMPACT OF FRUSTRATION
It was most important to prevent Germans from being f
for example, by immunizing them against false hopes. If a f
could not be avoided, Goebbels sought to diminish its impact
ing two principles:
a. Inevitable frustrations must be anticipated. Goebbels
seems to have been that a frustration would be less frustrat
element of surprise or shock were eliminated. A present loss
endured for the sake of a future gain. The German people w
ally given "some intimation that the end is in sight" as the
Tunisia drew to a close (352). They likewise received adv
whenever a reduction in food rations was contemplated; the
nouncement, nevertheless, always disturbed them (MI484)
b. Inevitable frustrations must be placed in perspectiv
considered one of his principal functions to be that of givin
439
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PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, FALL 1950440
mans what he called a Kriegsiiberblick, a general survey of the war.
Otherwise, he felt, they would lose confidence in their regime and in
himself, and they would fail to appreciate why they were being compelled
to make so many sacrifices (M4975).
I8. PROPAGANDA MUST FACILITATE THE DISPLACEMENT OF
AGGRESSION BY SPECIFYING THE TARGETS FOR HATRED
Goebbels had few positive gratifications to offer German
the period of adversity covered by the diary. He featured en
quite naturally, whenever he could and whenever Germa
over-confident. Only once did he praise Germans for withst
enemy as long as they had. By and large, the principal techn
to have been that of displacing German aggression on t
group (M622o).
Favorite hate objects were "Bolsheviks" and Jews. Goebbels was
disturbed by reports which indicated that "the fear of Bolshevism by
the broad masses of European peoples has become somewhat weaker"
(M4572) or that "certain groups of Germans, especially the intellectuals,
express the idea that Bolshevism is not so bad as the Nazis represent it
to be" (335). Anti-Semitic propaganda was usually combined with active
measures against Jews in Germany or the occupied countries. German
aggression was also directed against American and British pilots,
but on the whole the United States and Great Britain did not stir
Goebbels' wrath, at least in the diary (I47).
In enemy countries Goebbels had a strong penchant to engage in
"wedge-driving": he sought to foment suspicion, distrust, and hatred
between his enemies and between groups within a particular country.
He thus assumed that the foundation for hostility between nations or
within a nation already existed for historical reasons or as a result of
the frustrations of war. His task was to direct the aggression along
disruptive channels (46).
19. PROPAGANDA CANNOT IMMEDIATELY AFFECT STRONG COUNTERTENDENCIES;
INSTEAD IT MUST OFFER SOME FORM OF
ACTION OR DIVERSION, OR BOTH
In almost all of his thinking about propaganda strategy and objectives,
Goebbels adopted the distinction between what were called
Haltung (bearing, conduct, observable behavior) and Stimmung (feelThis
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GOEBBELS' PRINCIPLES OF PROPAGANDA
ing, spirit, mood).5 After a heavy raid on a German city, he g
claimed that the Haltung of the people was excellent but t
Stimmung was poor. He wished to have both of these comp
morale as favorable as possible. Stimmung he considered m
volatile: it could easily be affected by propaganda and events;
be improved simply by offering people some form of entertain
relaxation. Haltung had to be maintained at all costs, for other
Nazi regime would lose its support and people would be rea
render. Germans, in short, were compelled to preserve extern
ances and to cooperate with the war effort, regardless of thei
feelings. As more and more defeats and raids were experienced
bels became convinced that Stimmung had to be almost c
ignored (M6452).
Goebbels clearly recognized his own propaganda impoten
situations. The basic drives of sex and hunger were not apprec
fected by propaganda. Air raids brought problems ranging
comfort to death which could not be gainsaid. Propaganda
significantly increase industrial production. The religious im
many Germans could not be altered, at least during the w
opposition by individual Germans and by peoples in the occupi
tries required forceful action, not clever words. Finally, Germ
favorable military situation became an undeniable fact. Wh
ganda and censorship could not be effective, Goebbels advocate
or, in one of his official positions (for example, as Gauleiter o
he himself produced the action. Diversionary propaganda h
ered second-best (M35o8).
Consider his propaganda with reference to military defeats
while he could describe them as "successful evacuations" (
while he could even conceal their implications. Eventually,
they were too apparent, especially after the heavy air raids be
the difficulties of fighting a two-front war increased. Then h
duced not quite to silence but certainly to despair. At the e
fighting in Tunisia he was forced to conclude that the followi
ganda themes were not proving impressive: "our soldiers t
written a hymn of heroism that will be graven eternally on th
5 Lochner has ignored the distinction and has generally translated both as "mor
which Goebbels likewise occasionally employed in an equally ambiguous manner
441
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442 PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, FALL I950
German history; they retarded developments for half a year, th
enabling us to complete the construction of the Atlantic Wal
prepare ourselves all over Europe so that an invasion is out of th
tion" (360). He tried to divert Germans through another anti-Bo
campaign, but this too was insufficient. What Germans really
were "some victories in the East to publicize" (M4433). Germa
in Russia, moreover, plagued Goebbels. Whenever possible,
to offset news of defeat in one section with reports of victories in
but by I943 he simply had no favorable news to employ as a dist
Stimmung was doomed, and even Haltung worried him: "at t
ment we cannot change very much through propaganda; we mus
again gain a big -rictory somewhere" (M3253). Most fortunate
victory and ultimate triumph never came.
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