What Have We Learned From Process Models Of Conversion? An Examination Of Ten Case
Studies
Author(s): ARTHUR L. GREIL and DAVID R. RUDY
Source: Sociological Focus, Vol. 17, No. 4 (October 1984), pp. 305-323
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
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Sociological Focus
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What Have We Learned
From Process Models
Of Conversion? An
Examination Of Ten
Case Studies*
ARTHUR L. GREIL SOCIOLOGICAL FOCUS
Alfred University VoL 17 No. 4
October 1984
DAVID R. RUDY
Morehead State Univerity
Many attempts to understand the conversion process have been guided by Lofland and Stark's
(1965) "process-model. " We examine ten case studies of the conversion process in diverse groups in
order to specify the conditions under which the Lofland-Stark model applies. Several components
of the model are rejected for conceptual reasons. Other components are to be found in some types
of groups but not in others. Only "formation of affective bonds with group members" and "intensive
interaction with group members" seem to be indispensible prerequisites for conversion. Thus, any
group which is to successfully convert people must be structured so as to foster interaction among
group members. Because there is no one process-model that can accurately account for all cases of
conversion, the process-model approach should be abandoned in favor of "subjective'" and
"organizational" approaches to understanding conversion.
INTRODUCTION
^)ver the past ten years, the sociological study of religion has been characterized by
a dramatic increase in the amount of attention paid to the analysis of the so-called "new
religions" (Long and Hadden, 1979:280). This increased concern with religious innovation
has, in turn, given rise to increased interest among sociologists in the phenomenon of
religious conversion. Because the "new religions" are often faced with the need to recruit
new members from a population whose world views are often quite different from their
own, the desire to understand these new religious movements has almost inevitably led
to an interest in understanding the processes by which they recruit prospective members
and by which they encourage them to renounce old beliefs and embrace new ones.
Many attempts to comprehend the conversion process have been guided explicitly
or implicitly by the "process model" used by Lofland and Stark (1965) in their case study
of the Unification Church when it was a relatively unknown sect struggling for survival
This is an extensively revised version of a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society for the Scientific
Study of Religion held in Baltimore in October, 1981. We are indebted to James T. Richardson, Robert Balch and
Melinda Bollar Wagner for their helpful suggestions.
305
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306 SOCIOLOGICAL FOCUS
on the West Coast. Based on their analysis of Ufe histories of various early Unification
Church members, Lofland and Stark formulated a "value-added model" delineating seven
logicaUy ordered stages through which people must pass if they are to become converts.
According to these authors,
For conversion, a person must (1) experience enduring, acutely felt tensions, (2) within a religious
problem solving perspective, (3) which leads him to define himself as a religious seeker, (4) encountering
the (cult) at a turning point in his life, (5) wherein an affective bond is formed (or preexists) with one
or more converts, (6) where extra-cult attachments are absent or neutralized, and (7) where if he is to
become a d?ployable agent, he is exposed to intensive interaction (1965:874).
When Lofland and Stark pubUshed their process-model in 1965, they were exploring
virgin territory, but today there exist a number of case studies of the conversion process,
many of which have directly addressed the issue of the vaUdity of the Lofland-Stark model.
In the decade and a half that have passed since the formulation of the Lofland-Stark model,
a number of researchers have addressed the question of the model's empirical adequacy
by studying the conversion process as it takes place in such diverse groups as Hare Krishna
(Judah, 1974), Divine Light Mission (Downton, 1980), Nichiren Shoshu Buddhism (Snow
and PhilUps, 1980) a UFO cult (Balch and Taylor, 1978), a metaphysical church given
the pseudonym, "Church of the Sun" (Lynch, 1978), a fundamentaUst Christian group
caUed "Crusade House" (Austin, 1977), a group of Jesus People known as "Christ
Communal Organization" (Richardson et a , 1978, 1979), Mormons (Seggar and Kunz,
1972), and a Mormon schismatic group called the L?vites (Bear, 1978). Some of these
researchers have conceived of their studies expUcitly as tests of the Lofland-Stark model;
others have appUed the model in a post-hoc fashion as a means of ?luminating their data.
It should be noted here that Lofland and Stark never made any claims for their model
as a general model of conversion appUcable to aU groups. In fact, Lofland has complained
(1978:21) that too many researchers have tried to apply his model to the conversion setting
they were studying rather than develop their own quaUtative process-models of conversion.
In spite of such disclaimers, the Lofland-Stark model has often been treated as if it were
intended to be a general model of the conversion process.
One of the more recent ? and more thoughtful ? attempts to assess the general
vaUdity of the Lofland-Stark model has been provided by Snow and PhilUps (1980). Based
on their observations of adherents of Nichiren Shoshu Buddhism, Snow and Phillips argue
that the Lofland-Stark model is not generaUy appUcable. Of the seven proposed
prerequisites for conversion, Snow and PhilUps found that only one, intensive interaction
with other converts, seemed essential to the conversion process as it took place among
adherents to Nichiren Shoshu. They go on to argue that the conversion process may weU
be different in different kinds of groups and caU for further study of the extent to which
conversion "varies across groups differing in ideology, organization and pub?c reaction"
(1980:444). Baer (1978:293) and Richardson (1978:320) have suggested that the conversion
process w?l be different in different organizational settings. Pilarzyk (1978) has contrasted
the process of "conversion" in ISKON to the process "alternation" in Divine Light Mission
and has pointed out the relationship between these differences and differences in the
structure of the two groups.
Perhaps, then, instead of asking whether the Lofland-Stark model is appUcable, we
should be asking about when it is appUcable. Enough case studies in different group
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PROCESS MODELS OF CONVERSION 307
settings have now been conducted ^ 3nable us to draw some conclusions about the kinds
of organizational contexts that seem to fit the model and the kinds of organizational
contexts in which the model does not seem appropriate. Such an analysis of the
organizational context of the conversion process should supply us with fresh insight about
the dynamics of the conversion process.
To engage in the kind of analysis we are calling for, comparative data on conversion
are necessary. Several researchers (Gordon, 1978; Pilarzyk, 1978; Gerlach and Hine, 1970)
have tried to obtain such information by conducting research in several different group
settings. Here we employ a different strategy for obtaining comparative data. In this
paper we compare the results of ten case studies in the process-model tradition (including
the orginal Unification Church study) in an attempt to see what conclusions we can draw
about the nature of the conversion process as it occurs in different types of religious groups.
We begin by outlining the most salient differences among the groups described in the
case studies we examine. Second, we discuss some of the theoretical and methodological
weaknesses of the process-model approach as it is applied in these case studies. Third,
we exainine the case studies to see to what extent and under what conditions the seven
prerequisites to conversion proposed by Lofland and Stark seem to be valid. Fourth, we
review the results of our analysis in the light of theoretical and empirical work stemming
from other traditions of conversion research, Finally, we sketch some conclusions about,
the dynamics of the conversion process and about the directions that future conversion
research might profitably take.
THE CASES
The ten cases we compare represent the total population of case studies of the
conversion process of which we are aware that report enough information relevant to all
seven tenets of the Lofland-Stark model to allow us to pass judgment on the extent to
which the case in question fits the model.1 We make no assumptions about the extent
to which the movements studied in these ten case studies are representative of the total
population of new religious movements in the United States. Given our purpose here,
it is less important to have a representative sample than it is to have sufficient variation
within the sample to allow us to observe the conditions under which the model being
examined does and does not hold true (See Zetterberg, 1954:55-58).
As it turns out, there is quite a bit of variation to be found among the ten religious
groups considered here. Three of ten cases studied deal with conversion to "Eastern
religions" (Hare Krishna, Nichiren Shoshu and the Divine Light Mission); five deal with
groups that derive from the Christian tradition (Christ Communal Organization, Crusade
House, Mormons, L?vites and Unification Church); the remaining studies deal with groups
whose ideology could perhaps best be described as "occult" (The Church of the Sun and
UFO cult).
The groups considered here vary along several other dimensions as well. Some of the
groups advocate for their members a communal lifestyle in which most if not all member
activities are conducted within the confines of the group, while others are considerably
less "greedy," allowing members more unsupervised contact with non-members and greater
access to participation in roles not sponsored by the group in question. Related to this
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308 SOCIOLOGICAL FOCUS
"communal vs. non-communal" dimension is another dimension along which these groups
vary: the degree to which affiliation with, a group tends to involve a radical discontinuity
in social roles. Some groups (Hare Krishna, for example) encourage recruits to leave their
families, jobs, educational institutions, etc., to take on a new round of life which is centered
around the goals of the organizaion, while other groups, such as Nichiren Shoshu, do not
see their goals as being inherently in conflict with the performance of other roles. Groups
which encourage discontinuity of social roles are often, but not always, the same groups
which sponsor communal life styles among their members.
The groups also vary with regard to the way they are perceived by the general public.
Membership in certain of these groups, involving as it does a deviant lifestyle, often carries
with it a certain amount of stigma, while membership in others does not bring with it
any diminishing of "respectability." A distinction must be made here between deviant
lifestyles and deviant world views.2 Members of the Church of the Sun, for example, often
espouse beliefs which resemble an "occult smorgasbord" (Lynch, 1978:96), but they live
in middle-class families, hold down middle-class jobs and continue to be respectable
members of the "establishment." It is interesting to note here that the groups that are
relatively more stigmatized are the same groups which advocate radical discontinuity
in social roles. It may be that it is the tendency for members of these groups to eschew
traditional social roles that leads them to be stigmatized, or it may be that stigmatization
(as labelling theorists might have it) reinforces tendencies to abandon accepted social roles.
Finally, the groups discussed here seem to differ with regard to the degree to which
the ideology of the group is at odds with the world view members espoused before contact
with the groups. Travisano (1970:600) distinguishes between two types of identity change.
"Conversion" involves a "radical" reorganization of identity, meaning, and life, while
"alternation" involves a less drastic change of world-view or identity, a variation on a
theme as opposed to the substitution of a new melody. Recruitment to some of the groups
in which we are interested (the Mormons for example) seems to involve for most recruits
a change that Travisano would call "alternation," while recruitment to other groups, such
as the Divine Precepts cult, seems to more often involve "conversion." Of the several
variables we are working with, "degree of identity change" has presented us with the
greatest difficulties in classification. Many of the cases do not present sufficient evidence
for us to have a great deal of confidence in the way we have treated them here. And even
if the researchers on whose work we depend had paid more attention to this variable,
the problem of operationalizing it would still be formidable.
Table 1 displays our classification of the groups discussed here with regard to the
several dimensions discussed above. In all cases, we have relied on published ethnographic
information supplied by the authors of the case studies we are examining as the primary
basis for our classifications. Note that we have treated all the variables discussed above
as dichotomous. This almost certainly involves some degree of distortion and
oversimplification. Clearly, a variable like "degree of identity change" is better represented
as a continuum than as a dichotomy, and much the same could be said for the other
variables as well. We have persisted in treating these variables as dichotomous for two
reasons. First, the small number of cases with which we must work does not allow us
to make use of finer distinctions. Second, our classifications in some cases are based on
such limited information that to attempt to draw finer distinctions would be foolhardy.
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PROCESS MODELS OF CONVERSION
Table 1: Variation Among the Conversion Cases
309
1,1 Does the group in question advocate for its members a communal lifestyle?
Communal on-Communal
Christ Communal Organization3 Church of th
Hare Krishna Crusade House
UFO Cult Divine Light Mission
L?vites6
Nichiren Shoshu
1.2 Does membership in the group in question involve a radical discontinuity in
social roles?
Radical Discontinuity More Moderate Change
Christ Communal Organization Church of the Sun
Divine Light Mission Crusade^HouseHare Krishna L?vites
UFO Cult Mormons
Unification Church Nichiren Shoshu
1,3 Are members of the group in question regarded as "deviant" by
Stigmatized Non-Stigmatized
Christ Communal Organization8 Church of the^Sun
Divine Light Mission Crusade House
Hare Krishna L?vites
UFO Cult Mormons
Unification Church Nichiren Shoshu
1.4 Do members of the group in question see themselves as having m
universe of discourse to another?
Conversion Alternation
Church of the Sun Christ Com
Divine Light Mission Crusade House
Hare Krishna L?vites
Nichiren Shoshu Mormons
Unification Church UFO Cult
a. At the time of the fieldwork conducted by Richardson e_t al., 1979, Christ
Communal Organization lived communally; today most members have apparentl
abandoned the communal lifestyle.
b. Although the lifestyle here would not usually be described as "communal,"
members' daily round of life is devoted to group activities and group goal
(Balch and Taylor, 1978).
c. Members live in a common residence, but the lifestyle here seems better d
as co-operative than communal (Austin, 1977:283).
d. About 25% of the members of Divine Light Mission live communally.
e. Some members live in a communal setting but most do not (Baer, 1978:280)
f. For those who live communally the change in lifestyle can be assumed to h
greater than for those who do not live communally (Baer, 1978:280).
g. Here one gets the impression that it is members' lifestyles rather than the
beliefs which are regarded as deviant (Richardson, et al., 1978, 1979).
h. Austin (1977:283) refers to the group as "deviant," but our reading of
evidence suggests that he is being a little over-dramatic here.
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310 SOCIOLOGICAL FOCUS
i. Members seem to view their conversions as a radical change, but for many this
"radical change" represents a return to fundamentalist Christian beliefs
(Richardson e_t al. , 1978) .
j. For approximately half the members included in Austin's (1977) sample, perceived
change appears to have been quite minimal. For the other half, the degree of
perceived change seems to have been somewhat greater.
Table 1 may give the reader the impression that the organization of the groups we
discuss is static. This is clearly not the case. Religious organizations ? like other
organizations ? evolve over time, but this evolution is impossible to capture in the type
of classificatory project in which we are engaged here. To take only one example, Christ
Communal Organization was clearly a communal organization when Richardson et al,
(1978, 1979) did their fieldwork. Today, however, most members of the CCO do not live
communally. In order to classify groups in such circumstances we have treated them as
if they were frozen in the ethnographic present. In other words, our classificatory scheme
treats each group as if it has not changed since the research on the basis of which we
have classified it was conducted.
Table 1 may also give the impression that the groups we discuss here are monolithic
in structure. Again, this is not the case. For example, some members of the L?vites live
communally but most do not (Baer, 1978:280). In such cases, we have tried to place the
group in question in the category that best describes the experience of most group members
at the time the research on that particular group was conducted.
The small number of cases with which we are working here makes any kind of
sophisticated quantitative analysis of our data unfeasable. All we will be able to do is
examine each stage of the Lofland-Stark model, indicate how many of the cases in question
conform to the model's prediction and make a few broad descriptive statements about
any characteristics of the groups which conform to the model's predictions that seem
to distinguish them from those which do not conform.
The small number of cases with which we must deal is not the only methodological
problem that confronts us. Another major difficulty is that we are attempting to compare
studies which were not conducted with an eye to facilitating comparison. Each author
has used his own operational definitions and his own measures for the various variables
singled out for examination by Lofland and Stark. We are often forced to accept an author's
assessment of whether or not the case he is examining conforms to what would be predicted
by the model at face value, since we are not always provided with enough empirical data
to enable us to evaluate the author's assessment.
PROBLEMS WITH PROCESS-MODELS
Other problems with the approach we have employed in our analysis here stem from
methodological shortcomings endemic to the process-model tradition. One of these has
to do with the question of level of analysis. Conversion is usually conceived of theoretically
as an individual phenomenon. The Lofland-Stark model explains conversion in terms of
the background characteristics of individuals and in terms of situational factors that
impinge upon the lives of individuals. In spite of this, our study involves the religious
group as the unit of analysis. It is clearly not quite kosher to test a model predicting
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PROCESS MODELS OF CONVERSION 311
the behavior of individuals by examining data collected about the groups with which the
individuals may have affiliated themselves.
Our reason for proceeding in this manner is, of course, that we have no choice. From
Lofland and Stark on, researchers on conversion to new religions have tended to focus
on the group as the unit of analysis, on the apparent assumption that all individuals who
join a particular group being with the same background characteristics, join for the same
reasons and go through the same changes. There is good reason to doubt that this is
always so. Austin's study of Crusade House (1977:284-85) makes it clear that for only
about half of the "converts" studied did involvement with Crusade House actually involve
a drastic change in behavior (see also Richardson, 1978). Gordon (1974) has provided us
with a cogent exposition on the varieties of identity transformation that take place among
the "Jesus People." Lofland and Skonovd (1981) have recently argued for the existence
of six "conversion motifs," several of which could easily characterize converts participating
in the same group. Wallis' (1977) discussion of recruitment in the Scientology movement
shows a special sensitivity to the differences in motivations, experiences and movement
career patterns among recruits. Pilarzyk (1978), in his account of conversion in ISKON
and Divine Light Mission also is careful to point out the differences that characterize
the experiences of recruits to the same group. Balch (1980) has advised us on the basis
of his study of a UFO cult not to be too quick to jump to the conclusion that all those
who publically perform the role of convert have totally embraced that role. It is our
contention that the implicit assumption that all members of a given group have all
undergone the same essential transformation process and can therefore be regarded as
a single unit for the purposes of analysis constitutes one of the major weaknesses of the
typical case study of the conversion process.
Furthermore, focusing on the group rather than the individual as the unit of analysis
implies that conversion is a one-event phenomenon. Richardson and his associates
(Richardson, 1977, 1980, 1981, 1982; Richardson and Stewart, 1978; Richardson, et aL,
1979) have argued that conversion is often a multi-event phenomenon and that, for a solid
understanding of the conversion process, we must pay attention to "conversion
trajectories." If we focus on the group as the unit of analysis we eliminate the possibility
of tracing the individual from one group to another as he or she pursues a "conversion
career."
Related to the level of analysis problem is the failure on the part of many researchers
to attempt to actually measure in any way the extent to which a change in identity has
actually taken place. In most cases it is simply assumed that affiliation with a group
necessarily entails identity transformation. Recruitment is understood to imply conversion.
Therefore, what purport to be studies of converts to religious ideologies are actually studies
of recruits to religious groups. But as Zygmunt (1972) has forcefully argued, recruitment
and conversion are two separate processes. Judah (1974:169) has suggested that individuals
may become committed to participation in the Hare Krishna movement long before they
really comprehend or embrace the group's ideology. Balch (1980) has shown that active
participants in the UFO cult harbored persistent doubts about the validity of the world
view espoused by its leaders. Strauss (1976,1979) has also shown that people who have
chosen to play the role of convert are not necessarily the "true believers" that outsiders
take them to be.
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312 SOCIOLOGICAL FOCUS
This puts the researcher in the peculiar position of trying to account for something
which may not have taken place. Seggar and Kunz's (1972) study of "conversion" to
Mormonism, for example presents no evidence that could convince the reader that the
outlooks of their respondents have changed. Is it, then, newsworthy when they find that
the Lofland-Stark process-model, designed to account for conversion, does not seem to
have much heuristic value in explaining a change in organizational affiliation?
Another methodological weakness of conversion studies has been alluded to by such
researchers as Snow and Phillips (1980), Beckford (1978), Taylor (1976), Berger and
Luckmann (1967) and by Lofland himself (1978). Most conversion studies rely for their
evidence of the factors conditioning the conversion process on accounts collected from
converts after the fact. The problem with this is that, since conversion is generally
conceptualized as a radical reorganization of experience, the converts' accounts of their
past experiences may be best seen as products of their new identity-transformation process
rather than as objective reports on the antecedents of the conversion process. Converts,
in an attempt to reinterpret to themselves, to one another, and to outsiders the content
of life before conversion, often construct testimonials of the "I once was lost, but now
I'm found" variety. Beckford (1978:260) has argued that conversion accounts should be
understood as creative constructions on the part of the individuals within a collectivity
to present their experiences in a manner that will be appealing and convincing to others.
If accounts are to be seen as constructions in the present rather than as recollections
of the past, we must be skeptical of studies which take such accounts at face value as
statements of the motives and events which actually led to conversion.
This does not necessarily mean however that we should be equally skeptical of all
aspects of accounts. Respondents' recollections can often be corroborated by other
methods. It strikes us that we might be able to place somewhat more credence in converts'
recollections of actual events in their Uves than in their recollections of motives or feeling
states. Thus we would be inclined to make more of a statement that a convert came into
contact with a group shortly after moving to San Francisco that we would make of the
statement that this marked a period of great tension in the converts' life.
Because of the above mentioned weaknesses in the studies we examine and because
of difficulties we faced in comparing the studies, any findings drawn from them must
be interpreted with extreme caution. Nevertheless, we proceed in our analysis with the
conviction that conclusions drawn from an analysis of imperfect studies will still be useful,
to scholars trying to devise ways to improve our state of knowledge in this area.
TESTING THE LOFLAND-STARK MODEL
Table 2 presents in schematic form our findings about the extent to which the cases
we have examined at second hand seem to conform to the Lofland-Stark model.
TENSIONS
Most of the studies inspected reveal that converts admit to experiencing high levels of
tension, but there are good reasons for refusing to accept this evidence at face value. The
main problem here is that we have no way of knowing whether experiencing tensions
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PROCESS MODELS OF CONVERSION
Table 2: Do the Cases Fit the Lofland Stark Model?'
313
Neutralized
Previous Turning Affective Extra-Cult Intensive
Tensions Dispositions Seekership Point Bonds Attachments Interaction
Church of
the Sun Yes Yes Yes H Yes Yes Yes
Christ
Communal no evi
Organization Yes Yes Yes dence Yes Yes Yes
Crusade House h h No h Yes No Yes
Divine Light
Mission Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Unification Churchb Yes h Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hare Krishna Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
L?vites Yes Yes No no evi- Yes No Yesdence
Mormons No No No No No No no evi dence
Nichiren Shoshu Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes
UFO Cult No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
a. Classifying the cases has involved so many "judgement calls," that these can not be noted here. Readers are
referred to the original studies, from which they may draw their own conclusions.
b. Lofland (1978) reevaluated his original process model on the basis of changes which had occurred in the recruit
ment practices of the Unification Church. Our classification here is based on the 1978 r??valuation.
distinguishes converts from non-converts. Although Heirich (1977:664-65) found that many
of his respondents who had become involved in the Catholic Pentecostal movement did
report high levels of tension, this did not differentiate them in any significant way from
a matched sample of non-Pentacostals. Similarly, Richardson et al, (1978:49) report that
many recruits to Christ Communal Organization experienced tension but add that this
was probably true of all youth in the sixties. Even Lofland and Stark admit in their original
study that the problems experienced by their converts may not be qualitatively different
from those experienced by other people (1965:867). All they assert is that converts
experience these problems more severely and over longer time spans. Picking up on this,
Snow and Phillips (1980:435) argue that what distinguishes converts from non-converts
is not that they experience a higher level of tension but that they have a greater tendency
to reexamine their biographies in order to find evidence of discontent prior to conversion.
In other words, Snow and Phillips are suggesting that reports of tension may be better
treated as evidence of retrospective reinterpretation of converts' histories than as actual
evidence of converts' feeling-states prior to conversion. It should perhaps be noted in
passing that there is a tradition of conversion studies (which we refer to later in this essay
as the "organizational approach") which does not assume the importance of felt tension
in the conversion process (see, for example, Gerlach and Hine, 1968).
It is interesting to note in this context that three cases where evidence of tension
prior to recruitment was absent are the three cases where we seem the least justified in
talking about conversion. Seggar and Kunz, are, in their study of Mormons, really talking
about recruitment rather than identity change and present no evidence that any type
of attitude change or identity change has, in fact, taken place among their "converts."
Balch and Taylor (1978:60) report that the phenomenon they observed in the UFO cult
should not be thought of as conversion since they found no evidence of drastic change
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314 SOCIOLOGICAL FOCUS
among recruits who were already familiar with the "cultic inilieu." Austin (1977:284-85)
found that not all people who became residents of Crusade House experienced this as
a drastic change in behavior and that it was only among those that did experience it as
such that high levels of tension were reported. While one might argue that this proves
that tension is a precondition for a radical change in identity, one might equally well argue
that it merely proves that a feeling of radical change is a precondition to the perception
of tension.
We are not suggesting here that converts to these groups did not experience tension.
We assert only that evidence of tension based on retrospective accounts is not very
convincing. It should be pointed out that the one study of which we are aware that actually
measured tension during the conversion process (Galanter, 1980:1579) did find that
participants in a Unification Church workshop scored lower on a well-being scale than
a matched population of non-members.
RELIGIOUS PROBLEM-SOLVING PERSPECTIVE
When Lofland and Stark argue that a religious problem-solving perspective is a
precondition to conversion, they are trying to make the point that the converts' previous
cognitive orientations will make them more or less likely to accept the ideology of a
particular group. A number of students of religious conversion have argued that this is
the case (Gordon, 1974; Greil, 1977; Harrison, 1974; Richardson, 1978; Richardson et al,
1978, 1979). The work of Richardson and his associates (1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981)
on conversion trajectories also implies that predispositions are an important factor to
consider in attempting to understand the conversion process. All but one of the case studies
examined here report some degree of disposition to accepts a group's ideology prior to
coming into contact with the group. For example, Lynch (1978:100) reports that two-thirds
of the members of the Church of the Sun had read at least one book on the occult before
coming in contact with the group. Baer (1978:291) reports that over 95 percent of his
Levite respondents had had a religious problem-solving perspective prior to contact with
the group. Snow and Phillips' (1980) study of Nichiren Shoshu offers us the best example
of a group whose members do not seem to have espoused a religious problem-solving
perspective prior to conversion, and even here, one might argue, the evidence is less than
conclusive, since the measures Snow and Phillips chose made it unlikely that they would
find evidence of the existence of a disposition to find Nichiren Shoshu ideology appealing.
But perhaps we should not make too much of this finding that converts seem to be
predisposed to joining the movements that they join. First of all, the finding is not all
that surprising; what we are saying, in effect, is that people join religious movements
whose ideologies make sense to them, and, after all, who could really expect otherwise?
Second, one might well argue that there are few world-views in existence which do not
share some elements with one another. If this is the case, then, finding some kind of
match-up between old world-view and new is just a question of looking hard enough. Third,
in cases of "alternation," the proposition that individuals will espouse ideologies compatible
with their previous dispositions is true by definition. If people have changed from one
system of belief s to another which is not radically different, then it is tautological to say
that there must be similarities between old beliefs and new.
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PROCESS MODELS OF CONVERSION 315
We are aware of several studies of new religious movements which compare the
world-views, attitudes and psychological states of people who join a particular group to
those of people who do not. Galanter (1980:1578) found that individuals who joined the
"Moonies" had stronger affiliative needs than individuals who attended a workshop, but
did not join. In a different study of "Moonies", Barker (1981) finds a number of cognitive
and emotional variables which distinguish converts both from people who attended a
workshop and from a control group which was not connected to the Unification Church.
Barker's data suggests that the role of previous dispositions may vary according to the
recruitment strategies and structure of the group with which the potential convert has
come in contact. More studies of this type will have to be conducted before we may
accurately assess the importance of previous dispositions to the conversion process.
SEEKERSHIP
We find evidence in six out of ten cases of some pattern of religious seekership and
it is possible that in some of the other cases (e.g., Snow and Phillips, 1980), the reason
that no evidence of seekership was found is that the researchers did not look very hard
for it.
A pattern of seekership seems more likely to precede conversion when the group
involved advocates a communal lifestyle, when the group involved is stigmatized by the
community at large and when conversion involves a radical discontinuity of social roles.
The majority of the groups in which no pattern of seekership was found are those in which
the process of change found within the groups is better described as "alternation" than
as "conversion."
It should be noted that the patterns of seekership described in the case studies we
examined do not always support our "true believer" stereotype of the religious seeker.
The "seekers" described in the case studies are not anomic fanatics frantically chasing
after meaning, but rather people who seem curious about religious and/or occult matters.
Richardson et al, (1978:48) report members of the Christ Communal Organization had
been "looking for something" prior to conversion, but they do not say that they were
looking frantically or desperately. Before joining the UFO cult, (Balch and Taylor, 1978:51,
57), "converts" viewed themselves as "metaphysical seekers," but seekership seems to
have been a role with which they were quite comfortable. Downton (1980) in his study
of Divine Light Mission emphasizes the casualness of the seekership phase as well as
the gradualness of the conversion process as whole.
TURNING POINT
Most of the individuals described by the case studies we examined report that contact
with the group with which they affiliated came at a turning point in their lives. The one
case where we find no evidence of people experiencing a "turning point" is the case (Seggar
and Kunz, 1972) where we seem least justified in talking about "conversion." But as Snow
and Phillips (1980:439) point out, we must be cautious about accepting such evidence at
face value. All of the factors which make us unwilling to accept "a state of accutely-felt
tension" as a prerequisite to conversion make us equally unwilling to incorporate the idea
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316 SOCIOLOGICAL FOCUS
of the necessity of a social or psychological turning point. The problem of how to interpret
people's accounts of their conversions is again relevant here. When people tell us that
their conversions came at turning points in their lives, are they giving us factual accounts
of events as they occurred, or are they reconstructing their biographies in such a way
as to justify their conversions? After all, if conversion is experienced as a radical
transformation of identity, behavior and life, then it follows logically that it must have
come at a turning point in one's life. In the convert's eyes, it is the fact of the experience
of conversion that defines the turning point as a turning point.
AFFECTIVE BONDS
The formation of affective bonds within the group seems to be an important part
of the conversion process in eight out of the ten cases we have been examining. Seggar
and Kunz (1972:182) report that the formation of affective bonds does not seem to be
an important feature in affiliation to Mormonism among their sample of "converts," but
it is doubtful that we are really dealing with conversion in this case anyway. Balch and
Taylor (1978) do not find either the pr?existence or formation of affective bonds among
converts to the UFO cult, but there were specific features of the structure and ideology
of the group that discouraged the formation of such ties.
NEUTRALIZATION OF EXTRA-CULT ATTACHMENTS
In six of our ten cases we find that conversion is associated with the absence or
neutralization of affective bonds outside the group. Neutralization of extra-cult
attachments seems most important in groups where conversion involves a radical
transformation of social roles and where conversion involves the sacrifice of social
respectability. The only "respectable" group in which we find an absence of affective bonds
is the Church of Sun (Lynch, 1978:105). We find here little pressure on converts from
either within the group or outside it to give up attachments with non-members; rather,
it seems that we are dealing here with a group whose members never had very many
close personal ties to begin with.
Our data support Snow and Phillips' (1980:442) contention that neutralization of
extra-cult attachments will be an important part of the conversion process primarily in
the context of "deviant" groups. Our data also support the argument of Richardson and
Stewart (1978) that severing of extra-cult ties will be important only in those cases where
significant others are not likely to support the convert's new perspective. They suggest
that if significant others do support the convert's new perspective, then the presence of
extra-cult ties will facilitate conversion. Presumably, converts to groups which are
stigmatized and which involve a radical discontinuity in social roles will be less likely
to find support for their new perspective among significant others.
INTENSIVE INTERACTION
Intensive interaction with other members of the group seems to be an important part
of the conversion process in all ten cases. The one apparent exception to this generalization
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PROCESS MODELS OF CONVERSION 317
is the UFO cult (Balch and Taylor, 1978) where a high degree of interpersonal interaction
was not encouraged, but even here an extremely high level of commitment was demanded
and members were required to make the group the central focus of all action. Thus, a
building up of personal commitment through the creation of a high level of involvement
with group goals was found in all ten cases.
CONCLUSIONS
Conceptual weaknesses with the formulation of three of Lofland and Stark's seven
prerequisites for conversion (e.g., "tensions," "religious problem-solving perspective/' and
"turning point") make us unwilling to place too much credence in data from our case studies
which speak to these aspects of the model. We turn then to an examination of the
circumstances under which the remaining four proposed elements in the model
("seekership," "affective bonds," "neutralization of extra-cult attachments," and "intensive
interaction") will be present.
Lofland and Stark's original process model was based on observations of a group
which was regarded as deviant by society at large and which demanded of new members
a radical change in social roles. Those studies which have found the Lofland-Stark model
most adequate have been those which have addressed themselves to movements which
share these features. Thus, the Lofland and Stark model seems to describe accurately
the religious conversion process as it occurs in one organizational context. Where it has
not proven to be an adequate description, this may not be because the model is a bad
one but because the organizational context has been different from which Lofland and
Stark observed.
It may prove profitable to over-simplify the differences among the groups examined
here into two ideal-types. Type One includes groups which, like the Unification Church,
are stigmatized and involve a radical discontinuity of social roles. (In addition to the
Unification Church, the "purest" examples of this type are Hare Krishna and Divine Light
Mission). Type Two includes groups, like Crusade House, the L?vites and Nichiren Shoshu,
which are not stigmatized and which do not sponsor a drastic transformation of social
roles. Seekership and the neutralization of extra-cult attachments seem to be prerequisites
for conversion in the context of Type One groups but not in the context of Type Two
groups. The reasons for these differences are not hard to understand. Groups which allow
or encourage members to continue to pursue activities in the "outside world" are capable
of recruiting new members via pre-existing social networks (Snow et ai, 1980; Rockford,
1982; Greil and Rudy, 1984). In such groups, new recruits may make contact with the
group through friends, relatives, and acquaintances who are already members. It stands
to reason that in such cases, seekership is less likely to be a prerequisite to conversion
than in situations where the activities of group members tend to be focused within the
confines of the group. In Type Two groups, it is quite easy for potential recruits to happen
upon a group even if they are not actively involved in the seekership role; in Type One
groups, it seems less likely that individuals will encounter the group unless they have
defined themselves as being "in the market" for conversion.
There are two possible reasons why the neutralization of extra-cult attachments seems
important to the conversion process in the context of Type One groups but not in the
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318 SOCIOLOGICAL FOCUS
context of Type Two groups. First, since Type One groups involve a radical discontinuity
of social roles, joining a group of this type almost by definition entails breaking off contacts
with individuals with whom one associated in previous roles. The second reason has been
alluded to earlier in this essay. Type One groups expouse world-views and/or lifestyles
which are seen as deviant by the society at large. If members are to hold fast to deviant
world-views or lifestyles, it may be necessary to insulate them from contact with former
significant others who might discredit them. Since the world-views and lifestyes of Type
Two groups are less likely to be seen as deviant by the "outside world" it may be less
necessary for these groups to try to sever affective bonds between new converts and non
members. Galanter (1980:1578) found that a crucial difference between people who joined
the Unification Church and those who toyed with the idea of membership but did not
join was that the latter group had more "outside affiliations" than the former group. Long
and Hadden (1983) have attributed problems experienced by the Unification Church in
retaining members to short mings in the group's socialization techniques; we would argue
that these problems may be due rather to the difficulties inherent in the trying to maintain
the boundary between members and non-members (Greil and Rudy, 1984).
Regardless of organization context, two elements of the Lofland-Stark model seem
to be crucial to the conversion process; these are affective bonds and intensive interation
with group members. Snow and Phillips (1980:444) have asserted that "the interactive
process holds the key to understanding conversion." Our findings lead us to support this
conclusion. Our evidence suggests to us that the crucial dynamic in the conversion process
is the process of coming to see oneself as one's reference group sees one, of coming to
see that reality is what one's friends say it is. (Lofland and Stark, 1965:871; Stark and
Bainbridge, 1980). The formation of affective ties and intensive interaction within the
group became all-important because it is through becoming commited to an organization
and the people in it that an individual becomes converted to the organization's perspective.
Organizations which seek to foster the conversion process all seek to create an
atmosphere in which potential converts are encouraged to interact with those who may
be expected to support their new world-view and discouraged from interacting with those
who might be expected to challenge that world-view. Because they are perceived as deviant,
Type One groups may find it neccessary to regulate contact between members and
non-members to a greater extent than do Type Two Groups. Nonetheless, in our view,
the essential dynamic of the conversion process remains the same: conversion is a process
whereby one comes eventually to see the world from the perspective of one's new reference
group. Any religious group which is to be successful in facilitating the conversion of recruits
will need to be structured in such a way as to foster intensive interaction among group
members.
It should be noted here that there is nothing specifically "religious" about this process;
any group which intends to encourage identity change among its members will be likely
to be structured along similar lines. Elsewhere (Greil and Rudy, 1983, 1984), we have
discussed at greater length the common features which we believe are to be found in all
"Identity Transforming Organizations."
Because conversion takes place in different organizational contexts, it is foolhardy
to expect that a process model like the one proposed by Lofland and Stark will accurately
describe the conversion process. There is no such thing as the conversion process; rather,
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PROCESS MODELS OF CONVERSION 319
there are as many conversion processes as there are organizational contexts in which
conversion takes place. As stated earlier, Lofland himself has encouraged researchers to
develop their own qualitative process-models of conversion instead of slavishly applying
his (1978:21). In a more recent piece Lofland and Skonovd (1981) have outlined six different
"conversion motifs." In our opinion, there is little to be gained from such a proliferation
of process-models. Nor are we sympathetic to attempts to save the Lofland-Stark Model
by making it more general (Austin, 1977; Bankston et al, 1981). The problem with the
Lofland-Stark model is not that it is not general enough; the problem with it is that it
is a process-model. Process-models are descriptive models which attempt to describe ideal
type sequences in which given phenomena generally develop. If the interactive process
is indeed the key to understanding conversion, then, it would seem advisable to abandon
the search for the sequence or set of sequences that best descubes the conversion process
in favor of an attempt to grasp the dynamics of the social interaction that is the essence
of conversion.
We conclude this essay by noting briefly the relationship between the approach to
conversion which we are espousing and others currently being done in this field.
We may have given the impression in this essay that all studies of the process of
recruitment and conversion to new religious groups have employed a process-model
approach. This is not the case. At least three other approaches can be discerned among
the relatively large number of conversion studies that have appeared in recent years. The
approach with which our concluding remarks are most compatible is one which Balch
(1979) refers to as the "structural-functional" approach but which we prefer to call the
organizational approach. This approach emphasizes the way in which organizational
patterns of interaction are structured so as to encourage the acceptance of a new world
view (Kanter, 1968,1972; Gerlach and Hine, 1968; Hine, 1970; Bomley and Shupe, 1979b;
Harrison, 1974; Lofland, 1978; Richardson et al, 1979; Greil and Rudy, 1983,1984; Balch,
1979). The second approach, which Strauss (1976, 1979) has called the "subjectivist''
approach and which Long and Hadden (1983) have called the "drift" approach,3
concentrates on the way social actors go about constructing for themselves the role of
convert (Lofland, 1978; Lofland and Skonovd, 1981; Strauss, 1976, 1979; Balch, 1979;
Bromley and Shupe, 1979a; Taylor, 1976; Richardson, 1982). The third approach is the
brainwashing approach (Clark, 1979; Conway and Siegelman, 1978; Enroth, 1977; Patrick
and Dulack, 1976; Singer, 1979; Stoner and Parke, 1977). This approach argues that the
explanation for conversion is to be found in the unorthodox psychological techniques
employed by "cults." Sociologists, expecially those writing from within the subjectivist
tradition (Robbins and Anthony, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1982; Richardson, 1982; Shupe and
Bromley, 1979) have criticized the bramwashing approach to conversion, charging that
it is better understood as an ideological justification for opposition to new religious
movements than as a social scientific tool for understanding them. This is not the place
for a detailed evaluation of the brainwashing approach to conversion. Suffice it to say
that the brainwashing approach's insistance that there is something psychologically unique
about the process of conversion to deviant religious groups stands in direct contrast to
the organizational approach we have advocated here. Our analysis suggests that conversion
is to be explained by the same concepts that sociologists employ to illuminate any
socialization process; the difference between conversion and other kinds of socialization
lies not in psychological processes involved but in the organizational context in which
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320 SOCIOLOGICAL FOCUS
it takes place. We agree with the assertion of Long and Hadden (1983:13) that conversion
ought to be studied as one type of socialization activity.
Long and Hadden (1983) have suggested that the apparent contradiction between
the "drift" approach to conversion and the brainwashing approach may be resolved. The
brainwashing approach, in their view, emphasizes the organizational pr?sures placed upon
potential converts while the drift approach emphasizes the voluntaristic nature of
conversion and the precariousness of commitment. They argue that there is no logical
contradiction between an approach that emphasizes the importance of the individual and
an approach that emphasizes organizational pressures on the individual. Long and
Hadden are right to assert that there is no inherent incompatibility between these
two approaches, but they are wrong to equate the brainwashing approach with the
organizational approach. The bramwashing approach posits a radical discontinuity between
conversion and other socialization processes; it is the organizational approach that
emphasizes the social context of conversion.
We agree with Long and Hadden that an emphasis on the situational context of
identity transformation is not incompatible with the recognition that people creatively
work out their own identities. To see identity transformation as the willful act of individuals
trying to solve problems of living is not necessarily to deny that social situations pose
the problems that must be solved and help to channel the directions that people take
in trying to solve them.
In our opinion both the organizational approach and the subjectivist approach promise
to enhance our understanding of the conversion process. Future research must focus on
the ways in which individuals construct new identities in different types of organizational
settings. And, if future research is to be directed toward understanding the conversion
process in different social settings, then it is imperative that researchers begin to develop
data collection and classification procedures amenable to the kind of cross-group
comparisons that we have attempted in this essay.
FOOTNOTES
1. If any readers are aware of other cases that fit our criteria for inclusion in this study, the authors would
appreciate it if they would bring these to our attention.
2. We are indebted to Melinda Bollar Wagner for pointing out to us in personal conversation the importance
of this distinction.
3. The approach Long and Hadden call "drift" seems to incorporate both the process-model approach and the
subjectivist approach.
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