160
Introduction
Many young people have been involved with
new religious movements (NRMs) – sometimes
pejoratively called “cults” – over the past
several decades in American and other Western
societies. These young people have often been
among the most affluent and better educated
of youth in their societies, which has contributed
to controversies erupting about
the meaning of such participation. Parents,
friends, and political and opinion leaders have
attempted to understand the phenomenon,
and develop methods to control activities of
such groups (Beckford 1985; Barker 1984).
Joining NRMs, which may appear quite
strange in their beliefs and organizational patterns,
is interpreted by some as an act of ultimate
rejection of Western cultural values and
institutions – including religious, economic,
and familial ones. This “culture-rejecting”
explanation has been difficult for many to
accept, prompting a search for other explanations
for involvement, a search raising serious
ethical issues.
An appealing alternative explanation
has been so-called “brainwashing” theories
(Bromley and Richardson 1983; Fort 1983).
According to those espousing these ideas,
youth have not joined NRMs volitionally,
but have been manipulated or forced into participating
by groups using powerful psychotechnology
practiced first by communist,
anti-Western societies. This psychotechnology
allegedly traps or encapsulates young people in
NRMs, allowing subsequent control of their
behavior by leaders of the groups, through
“mind control.”
These techniques were originally developed,
according to these claims, in Russian
purge trials of the 1930s, and later refined
by the Chinese communists after their
assumption of power in China in 1949, and
then used by them with POWs during the
Korean War of the early 1950s (Solomon
1983). Now these techniques are allegedly
being used by NRM leaders against young
people in Western countries, who are supposedly
virtually helpless before such sophisticated
methods (Richardson and Kilbourne
1983).
When questioned about obvious logical and
ethical problems of applying these theories to
situations without physical coercion (such as
participation in NRMs), proponents have a
ready answer. They claim that physical
coercion has been replaced by “psychological
coercion,” which is supposedly more effective
than simple physical coercion (Singer 1979).
These ideas are referred to as “second generation”
brainwashing theories, which take
into account new insights about manipulation
of individuals. Supposedly, physical coercion
is unnecessary if recruits can be manipulated
by affection, guilt, or other psychological
influences.
CHAPTER TEN
A Critique of “Brainwashing”
Claims About New
Religious Movements
JAMES T. RICHARDSON
THE “BRAINWASHING” CONTROVERSY
These theories can be considered ideas
developed for functional reasons by those who
have a vested interest in their being accepted,
such as parents of members, therapists, and
leaders of competing religious groups. The
ideas plainly are a special type of “account”
which “explains” why people join the groups
and why they stay in them (Beckford 1978).
Whatever the origin, and no matter that the
veracity of such accounts is questionable, these
ideas about NRM participation have become
commonly accepted.
For instance, De Witt (1991) reports
that 78 percent of a random sample of 383
individuals from Nevada said they believed in
brainwashing, and 30 percent agreed that
“brainwashing is required to make someone
join a religious cult.” A similar question asked
of a random sample of 1,000 residents in New
York prior to the tax evasion trial of Reverend
Moon (Richardson 1992) revealed that 43
percent agreed “brainwashing is required to
make someone change from organized religion
to a cult.” Latkin (1991) reported that 69
percent of a random sample of Oregon residents
who were asked about the controversial
Rajneesh group centered in eastern Oregon
agreed that members of the group were
brainwashed.
These notions about “brainwashing” and
“mind control” have pervaded institutional
structures in our society as well, even if they
are problematic. Such views have influenced
actions by governmental entities and the
media (Van Driel and Richardson 1988;
Bromley and Robbins 1992). The legal
system has seen a number of efforts to apply
brainwashing theories as explanations of why
people might participate in new religions.
Several civil actions have resulted in multimillion
dollar judgments against NRMs allegedly
using brainwashing techniques on recruits
(Anthony 1990; Richardson 1991, 1995).
Thus it appears that ideas about brainwashing
of recruits to new religions have developed
a momentum of their own in several Western
societies. These notions are impacting society
in many ways, including limitations on religious
freedom (Richardson 1991). Thus, we
need to examine the brainwashing thesis more
closely, in order to see if it is an adequate
explanation of the process whereby people
join and participate in NRMs, and to examine
the underlying ethics of offering such explanations
of religious participation.
Critique of “Brainwashing” Theories
Brainwashing theories serve the interests of
those espousing them, which is a major reason
they are so readily accepted. Parents can blame
the groups and their leaders for what were
probably volitional decisions to participate by
their sons and daughters. Former members
can blame the techniques for a decision to
participate which the participant later regrets.
Deprogrammers can use brainwashing theories
as a justification for their new “profession” and
as a quasi-legal defense if they are apprehended
by legal authorities during attempted deprogrammings,
which often have involved physical
force and kidnapping. Societal leaders can
blame the techniques for seducing society’s
“brightest and best” away from traditional
cultural values and institutions. Competitive
religious leaders as well as some psychological
and psychiatric clinicians attack the groups with
brainwashing theories, to bolster what are basically
unfair competition arguments (Kilbourne
and Richardson 1984).
Thus it is in the interest of many different
entities to negotiate an account of “what
happened” that makes use of brainwashing
notions. Only the NRM membership, which is
usually politically weak, is left culpable after
these negotiated explanations about how and
why a person joined an NRM. All other
parties are, to varying degrees, absolved of
responsibility (Richardson, van der Lans, and
Derks 1986).
The claim that NRMs engage in brainwashing
thus becomes a powerful “social weapon”
for many partisans in the “cult controversy.”
Such ideas are used to “label” the exotic religious
groups as deviant or even evil (Robbins
and Anthony 1982). However, the new
“second generation” brainwashing theories
have a number of logical and evidentiary problems,
and their continued use raises profound
ethical issues.
161
THE “BRAINWASHING” CONTROVERSY
Misrepresentation of classical tradition
Modern brainwashing theories sometimes
misrepresent earlier scholarly work on the
processes developed in Russia, China, and
the Korean POW situation (Anthony 1990).
These misrepresentations are as follows. First,
the early classical research by Schein et al.
(1961) and Lifton (1963) revealed that,
contrary to some recent claims, the techniques
were generally ineffective at doing more than
modifying behavior (obtaining compliance)
even for the short term. Such theories would
seem less useful to explain long-term changes
of behavior and belief allegedly occurring with
NRM participation.
Second, the degree of determinism associated
with contemporary brainwashing applications
usually far exceeds that found in the
foundational work of Lifton and of Schein.
Anthony and Robbins (1992) contrast the
“soft determinism” of the work of Lifton and
of Schein with the “hard determinism” of contemporary
proponents of brainwashing theories
such as Singer and Ofshe (1990). The
“hard determinism” approach assumes that
humans can be turned into robots through
application of sophisticated brainwashing techniques,
easily becoming deployable “Manchurian
Candidates.” Classical scholars Lifton
and Schein seemed more willing to recognize
human beings as more complex entities than do
some contemporary brainwashing theorists.
Third, another problem is that classical
scholars Lifton and Schein may not be comfortable
with their work being applied to noncoercive
situations. Lifton (1985: 69) explicitly
disclaims use of ideas concerning brainwashing
in legal attacks against so-called cults, and
earlier (1963: 4) had stated: “. . . the term
(brainwashing) has a far from precise and questionable
usefulness; one may even be tempted
to forget about the whole subject and return
to more constructive pursuits.” The work of
Schein and of Lifton both evidence difficulty in
“drawing the line” between acceptable and
unacceptable behaviors on the part of those
involved in influencing potential subjects for
change (Anthony and Robbins 1992). Group
influence processes operate in all areas of life,
which makes singling out one area like NRMs
for special negative attention quite problematic.
Such a focus cannot be adopted on strictly
logical, scientific, or ethical grounds.
Ideological biases of brainwashing theorists
Contemporary applications of brainwashing
theories share an ideological bias in opposition
to collectivistic solutions to problems of
group organization (Richardson and Kilbourne
1983). In the 1950s many Westerners
opposed collectivistic communism; in the
1970s and 1980s many share a concern about
communally oriented new religions. Another
ideological element of contemporary applications
concerns the ethnocentrism and even
racism which may be related to their use. The
fact that a number of new religions are from
outside Western culture and were founded
and led by foreigners should not be ignored
in understanding the propensity to apply
simplistic brainwashing theories to explain participation
and justify efforts at social control.
Limited research base of classical work
Research on which the classical models
are based is quite limited (Richardson and
Kilbourne 1983; Anthony 1990). Small nonrepresentative
samples were used by both
Lifton and Shein, and those in the samples
were presented using an anecdotal reporting
style, derived from clinical settings, especially
with Lifton’s work. As Biderman (1962)
pointed out, Lifton only studied 40 subjects
in all, and gave detailed information on only
11 of those. Shein’s original work was based
on a sample of only 15 American civilians who
returned after imprisonment in China. This
work may be insightful, but it does not meet
normal scientific standards in terms of sample
size and representativeness.
Predisposing characteristics and
volition ignored
Contemporary applications of brainwashing
theories to NRM recruitment tactics typically
ignores important work on predisposing characteristics
of NRM participants (Anthony and
162
THE “BRAINWASHING” CONTROVERSY
Robbins 1992). The techniques of brainwashing
supposedly are so successful that they can
transform a person’s basic beliefs into sharply
contrasting beliefs, even against their will. This
aspect of brainwashing theory is appealing
to proponents who have difficulty recognizing
that an individual might have been attracted
to a new and exotic religion perceived by the
recruit as offering something positive for
themselves.
Sizable numbers of participants are from
higher social class origins in terms of education
level and relative affluence, a finding
raising questions about application of brainwashing
theories as adequate explanations
of participation. Both Barker (1984) and
Kilbourne (1986) have found that there are
predisposing characteristics for participation in
the Unification Church – such as youthful
idealism. Thus, the brainwashing argument
would seem to be refuted, even if such data
are often ignored.
Brainwashing proponents also conveniently
ignore volitional aspects of recruitment to
new religions. Brainwashing theorists such
as Delgado (1982) turn predispositions and
interest in exotic religions into susceptibilities
and vulnerabilities, adopting an orientation
toward recruitment which defines the potential
convert in completely passive terms, a
philosophical posture that itself raises serious
ethical problems. Most participants
are “seekers”, taking an active interest in
changing themselves, and they are often
using the NRMs to accomplish planned
personal change (Straus 1976, 1979). There is
growing use of an “active” paradigm in conversion/recruitment
research which stresses
the predispositional and volitional character of
participation. This view is derived from
research findings that many participants
actually seek out NRMs to accomplish personal
goals (Richardson 1985a). This nonvolitional
view ignores an important aspect of classical
work in the brainwashing tradition. For
instance, Lifton’s (1963) work clearly shows
the voluntaristic character of much of the
thought reform which went on in China
(his last chapter discusses voluntaristic
personal change).
Therapeutic effects of participation ignored
Brainwashing theorists usually claim that participation
in NRMs is a negative experience,
claims countered by many lines of research.
Participation seems to have a generally
positive impact on most participants, an
often-replicated finding which undercuts
brainwashing arguments, but is usually
ignored by proponents of such theories.
Robbins and Anthony (1982) summarized
positive effects which have been found, listing
ten different therapeutic effects, including
reduced neurotic distress, termination of illicit
drug use, and increased social compassion.
One review of a large literature concerning
personality assessment of participants concluded
(Richardson 1985b: 221): “Personality
assessments of these group members reveal
that life in the new religions is often therapeutic
instead of harmful.” Kilbourne (1986)
drew similar conclusions in his assessment of
outcomes from participation, after finding,
for instance, that members of the Unification
Church felt they were getting more from their
participation than did matched samples of
young Presbyterians and Catholics.
Psychiatrist Marc Galanter, who has done
considerable assessment research on participants
in some of the more prominent NRMs,
has even posited a general “relief effect”
brought about by participation (Galanter
1978). He wanted to find out what about
participation leads to such consistent positive
effects, in order that therapists can use
the techniques themselves. McGuire (1988)
found that many ordinary people participate
in exotic religious groups in a search of alternatives
to modern medicine, and many think
themselves the better for the experience. To
ignore such scholarly conclusions seems ethically
quite questionable.
Large research tradition and “normal”
explanations ignored
There has been a huge amount of research
done on recruitment to and participation in the
new religious groups and movements, research
almost totally ignored by brainwashing theo-
163
THE “BRAINWASHING” CONTROVERSY
rists. This work, which is summarized in such
reviews as Greil and Rudy (1984), Richardson
(1985a), and Robbins (1985), applies standard
theories from sociology, social psychology, and
psychology to explain why youths join such
groups. These explanations seem quite adequate
to explain participation, without any
“black box” of mystical psychotechnology such
as offered by brainwashing theorists.
Examples of such “normalizing” research
include Heirich’s (1977) study of the Charismatic
Renewal Movement, Pilarzyk’s (1978)
comparison of conversion in the Divine Light
Mission and the Hare Krishna, Straus’s (1981)
“naturalistic social psychological” explanation
of seeking religious experiences, Solomon’s
(1983) work on the social psychology of participation
in the Unification Church, and the
examination of process models of conversion
to the Jesus Movement (Richardson, et al.
1979). The ethics of ignoring such work,
while propounding empirically weak notions
such as brainwashing and mind control, seem
questionable.
Lack of “success” of new
religions disregarded
Another obvious problem with brainwashing
explanations concerns assuming (and misinforming
the public about) the efficacy of
the powerful recruitment techniques allegedly
used by the new religious groups. Most
NRMs are actually quite small: the Unification
Church probably never had over 10,000
American members, and can now boast only
2,000 to 3,000 members in the US; the
American Hare Krishna may not have achieved
even the size of the Unification Church . . .
Most other NRMs have had similar problems
recruiting large numbers of participants.
A related problem concerns attrition rates
for the new religions. As a number of scholars
have noted, most participants in the new
groups remain for only a short time, and
most of those proselytized simply ignore or
rebuff recruiters and go on with their normal
lives (Bird and Reimer 1982; Barker 1984;
Galanter 1980). Many people leave the groups
after being in them relatively short periods
(Wright 1987; Skonovd 1983; Richardson et
al. 1986).
An example of one well publicized group
. . . is The Family (formerly the Children of
God) which has had over 57,000 young
people worldwide join it over the group’s 25
year history. However, the group has only
about 3,000 adult members worldwide at this
time, which could be construed to mean they
have a serious attrition problem!
These histories of meager growth and/or
rapid decline raise serious questions about
the efficacy of brainwashing explanations of
participation. Such powerful techniques
should have resulted in much larger groups, a
fact conveniently ignored by brainwashing
proponents, who seem intent on raising the
level of hysteria about NRMs, through
misleading the public about their size and
efficiency in keeping members.
“Brainwashing” as its own explanation
A last critique of brainwashing theories is that
they are self-perpetuating, through “therapy”
offered those who leave, especially those
forcibly deprogrammed. As Solomon (1981)
has concluded, those who are deprogrammed
often accept the views which deprogrammers
use to justify their actions, and which are
promoted to the deprogramee as reasons for
cooperating with the deprogramming. These
views usually include a belief in brainwashing
theories. One could say that a successful
deprogramming is one in which the deprogrammee
comes to accept the view that they
were brainwashed, and are now being rescued.
Solomon’s finding has been collaborated by
other research on those who leave, including
by Lewis (1986), Lewis and Bromley (1987),
and Wright (1987). The social psychological
truth that such ideas are learned interpretations
or accounts undercuts truth claims by
brainwashing theorists.
Conclusions
The preceding critique indicates that brainwashing
theories of participation in new reli-
164
THE “BRAINWASHING” CONTROVERSY
gions fail to take into account considerable
data about participation in such groups.
However, many people still accept such theories,
and high levels of concern about the “cult
menace” exist, in part because of the promotion
of ideologically based brainwashing theories
of participation. Serious attention should
be paid to alternative explanations which
demystify the process of recruitment to and
participation in the new religions.
Motivations for accepting such empirically
weak theories as “brainwashing” should be
examined. Also, those who propound brainwashing
theories of participation need to
examine the ethics of promoting such
powerful “social weapons” against minority
religions. When such theories are used to limit
people’s religious freedom and personal
growth, then the society itself may suffer.
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