Conversion or Commitment? A Reassessment of the Snow and Machalek Approach to
the Study of Conversion
Author(s): Clifford L. Staples and Armand L. Mauss
Source: Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion , Jun., 1987, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Jun.,
1987), pp. 133-147
Published by: Wiley on behalf of Society for the Scientific Study of Religion
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Conversion or Commitment?
A Reassessment of the
Snow and Machalek Approach
to the Study of Conversion*
CLIFFORD L. STAPLESt
ARMAND L. MAUSSt
Snow and Machalek (1983; 1984) have pointed to the importance of language in underst
the conversion process. In particular, they have identified four "rhetorical indicators" chara
of the accounts converts give about their conversion experience. After a brief review o
indicators, and of the Snow and Machalek approach more generally, we offer a critique
alternative interpretation of the part played by language in the conversion process, and by th
indicators in particular. We substantiate our position both theoretically and empirically, wit
gathered from a small sample of Christian evangelicals. We find, happily, that the four indi
characteristic of the Nichiren Shoshu believers studied by Snow and Machalek were to be fou
among our Christians. However, only one of those four indicators, "biographical reconstr
was unique to the Christians who claimed a conversion experience, as such. The rest of the ind
were as common among lifelong Christians as among self-professed converts, indicating that
are probably indicators of religious commitment more generally, rather than of conversion
Of even greater theoretical significance, we believe, is our argument for understanding langu
rhetorical devices as actively chosen tools and methods in converts' own efforts at self-transfo
rather than as indicators of what has already happened to them.
Recently, Snow and Machalek (1983; 1984) have suggested that an analysis of
and reasoning of subjects can provide a fruitful approach to the study of conv
propose that conversion be viewed as a change in one's "universe of discours
certain "rhetorical indicators" in the talk of individuals should identify the co
primarily on Snow's (1976) study of the Nichiren Shoshu Buddhist movement, t
that converts may be identified by: 1) the adoption of a master attribution
biographical reconstruction; 3) the suspension of analogical reasoning;
embracement of a master role (Snow & Machalek, 1983: 266-78).
The turn to a consideration of the talk and reasoning of the religious pe
potentially rich source of data for the study of "everyday religion" has bee
several researchers (see Beckford, 1978; Robertson, 1971; Robertson & Campb
*An earlier version of this paper was presented at the American Sociological Association and
for the Sociology of Religion joint ASA/ASR Session on Issues in Religious Socialization, Wash
August, 1985. We are thankful to Carol A. B. Warren and Ruth Kornfield for comments on an ea
of this paper.
tClifford L. Staples is visiting assistant professor of sociology at the University of Massachus
Massachusetts. Armand L. Mauss is professor of sociology at Washington State Universit
Washington.
© Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 1987, 26 (2): 133-147 133
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JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION
Taylor, 1976; 1978), but Snow and Machalek have been the first to develop th
any extent. As a first attempt to introduce a focus on language to the study of
Snow and Machalek's formulation warrants serious theoretical and empirical a
We agree that a focus on the language and rhetoric of the religious pe
promising approach to the study of conversion; however, we believe that the
Machalek approach, important as it is, stresses the wrong implications of conver
In this paper we develop a theoretically and empirically based critique of the
Machalek approach to the study of conversion. Our purpose is to present an a
theory of conversion, focusing specifically on the role of language in the conversio
We also hope to stimulate further theoretical and empirical work in this area
Snow and Machalek's (1983) approach to the study of conversion grows
constructive critique of much of the contemporary work in the area. They arg
159) that while researchers have explored the "causes and consequences" of co
there has yet to be an extensive analysis of the nature of conversion itself. In f
researchers have proceeded to generate theories of the process of conversion (e.
1977; Lofland, 1978; Lofland & Stark, 1965; Richardson & Stewart, 1978), the
characteristics of the converts themselves are usually either ignored or assumed. They
suggest that "this is a serious oversight, especially since an understanding of the
conversion process presupposes the ability to identify the convert" (1983: 260). With these
concerns in mind, Snow and Machalek (1983) proceed to develop a definition of the "convert
as a social type," based on an analysis of the talk and reasoning of subjects and supported
by their own underlying theory of conversion.
We will argue in this paper that Snow and Machalek's theory of conversion is flawed
because three of the four proposed "rhetorical indicators" of conversion fail to distinguish
religious converts from people who, though not "converted," are religiously committed.
That is, we believe that the Snow and Machalek formulation fails to distinguish between
conversion and commitment as two distinct phenomena (Barker & Currie, 1985). Since
distinguishing the convert from other religious types is the supposed goal of their
framework, we believe that this flaw attenuates considerably the usefulness of the Snow
and Machalek theory. We will provide both theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence
to substantiate this claim.
In the first section of the paper we briefly present the essentials of the Snow and
Machalek (1983; 1984) theory of conversion. In the second section we develop our own
alternative ideas on conversion, present some data derived from interviews with a sample
of evangelical Christians, and attempt to show why we think that the Snow and Machalek
approach to conversion needs to be reconsidered.
A SUMMARY OF THE SNOW AND MACHALEK
APPROACH TO CONVERSION
As Snow and Machalek (1983) observe, despite considerable difference of op
the nature of conversion, there is one underlying assumption upon which most
would seem to agree, and that is that "conversion involves a radical change in
experience" (1983: 264). Whether fast or slow, complete or partial, radica
something is assumed to underlie the experience of conversion. What Snow an
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CONVERSION OR COMMITMENT?
argue (1983: 264) is that it is one's "universe of discourse" which undergoes radical chan
in the conversion experience. While they borrow the term from Mead (1934: 88-90),
idea has been used in a number of different contexts, under a number of different nam
For example, it is quite similar to Wittgenstein's (1958) notion of "language game" an
Kuhn's (1962) concept of paradigm. "Universe of discourse" and related notions refer
the idea that human beings orient themselves to the world from a set of taken-for-gran
assumptions. These sources of "ultimate grounding," or "root reality," in Heirich's (1977
terms, are socially constructed frameworks of meaning imbedded in language and oth
symbols that provide a system, or "sacred canopy" (Berger, 1967) for making sense o
self and world.
This approach postulates a theoretical connection between universe of discourse and
consciousness that is based on language. It is thus a thoroughly cognitive approach to
the study of coinversion, having its origins within the complementary assumptions of
symbolic interactionism (Blumer, 1973) and the sociology of knowledge tradition, best
exemplified by Berger and Luckmann (1967). In short, consciousness is the product of
communication (i.e., symbolic interaction) within a shared universe of discourse. Since
language is the primary "carrier" of meaning, we have access to the elusive entity of
consciousness via language. It follows that if conversion involves a change in one's universe
of discourse then it also involves a change in consciousness, and the evidence of both
changes should be found in the language (i.e., talk and reasoning) of the convert. Or, as
Snow and Machalek put it (1983: 279), "Inasmuch as language is practical consciousness,
it stands to reason that transformations of consciousness necessitate transformations
of language." The question remains, however, as to exactly what sort of rhetoric and
reasoning we should expect to find characteristic of the convert. Snow and Machalek (1983:
266-78) propose four "rhetorical indicators" or "formal properties" of the convert.
Of the four rhetorical indicators of conversion proposed by Snow and Machalek (1983:
266), biographical reconstruction is dearly the one with the most appeal, both theoretically
and empirically. Biographical reconstruction refers to the idea that individuals who undergo
the radical change of conversion reconstruct or reinterpret their past lives from the
perspective of the present. In a very real sense, the past is created anew. This does not
necessarily entail a wholesale fabrication or "distortion" of one's previous life, but rather
a restructuring in which previously important events may be de-emphasized and less
significant ones elevated to greater prominence. The concept of biographical reconstruction
has considerable theoretical and empirical precedent. Perhaps the most cogent formulation
of this notion is to be found in Mead's Philosophy of the Present (1932). For Mead, the
focus of reality is the present, and it is through human action in the present that the
past and future become meaningful. Thus, as argued by Mead, and illustrated by converts,
the past is reconstructed in light of the new meanings which emerge from one's present
status as a convert. Others, including Beckford (1978), Berger and Tuckmlann (1967), James
(1958), Taylor (1976; 1978) and Travisano (1970) have also noted the phenomenon of
biographical reconstruction accompanying conversion. While they have approached the
idea from a number of perspectives, each has recognized the apparent importance of the
phenomenon for an understanding of conversion.
At least one issue, however, remains problematic. If we accept Mead's (1932) approach
to the problem, then biographical reconstruction is actually ubiquitous: we reconstruct
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JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION
our pasts constantly as we confront new experiences, and conversion is not qua
different in this respect. Snow and Machalek (1983: 269) agree that the bi
reconstruction involved in conversion is also present in everyday, non-c
experience, but they suggest that in conversion, biographical reconstruction
amplified and intensified. But if biographical reconstruction in conversi
quantitatively (not qualitatively) different from "normal" identity reconstruct
operationally how can we decide how much reconstruction is beyond "normal
and Machalek (1983) provide no general procedure for making such a decision
they indicate exactly what procedures they employed in deciding to assert that b
reconstruction was quantitatively great enough in the converts they observed
the "convert" identity. We will have more to say on this problem below.
The second indicator of conversion proposed by Snow and Machalek (1983:
the adoption of a master attribution scheme. Based on the assumption that in
employ causal interpretations to make sense of themselves, others, and experien
1958; Kelly, 1967; 1971; Spilka et aL, 1985), attribution is a common and find
cognitive process. What distinguishes the convert from others, though, is th
of a master attribution scheme, one which informs all causal inferences (Snow &
1983: 270). While the average person might utilize a variety of interpretive s
attribute cause (e.g., natural law; human nature; divine intervention; see Apos
1983), converts resort to a singular rhetoric of cause and effect. When asked t
for the state of the world, self, or others and their actions, converts inevitably
one attribution scheme.
The third indicator of conversion proposed by Snow and Machalek (1983: 273) is
perhaps the most original and interesting of the four. They propose that the talk and
reasoning of converts exhibits a suspension of analogical reasoning. Arguing that one
important means through which individuals relate and comprehend inchoate experiences
is through the use of metaphor or analogy, Snow and Machalek suggest that converts
avoid the use of analogy when discussing their beliefs. The reasoning behind this proposal
is persuasive: Since the use of analogy is meant to indicate that "one thing is like another,"
it is contrary to the basic motive of religious belief to suggest that an equivalence exists
between one's own beliefs and those of some other group. In Durkheim's terms (Durkheim,
1965; Snow & Machalek, 1983: 275), the suspension of analogical reasoning can be seen
as a technique for affirming the sacredness of one's own beliefs over the profanity of all
others, thereby insulating and protecting one's own beliefs and self from the contamination
of association with alien world views and individuals.
Finally, Snow and Machalek (1983: 276-78) propose that the convert can be identified
by his embracing of a master role. This property of the convert should be the easiest to
observe. In embracing a master role, the convert comes to see him- or herself almost
totally in terms of the role as convert and member of a particular group. In contrast, modem
life usually imposes role compartmentalization, where individuals are expected to enact
a variety of roles depending upon the context in which they find themselves. In the
embracing of a master role, the convert both subordinates other roles to the master role
(or eliminates them entirely if they are in conflict with the master role), and attempts
to apply the master role in all situations. In the first case, there is a clear prioritization
of roles, or identities. For example, one is a Christian above all else, then a mother, wife,
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CONVERSION OR COMMITMENT?
and teacher. Thus, while other roles may be important to the convert, their impo
derives not from their intrinsic qualities, but from their relation to the master
It might not be unreasonable to say that the master role not only informs all o
subordinate roles, but infuses them with a distinctive meaning. Thus, one becom
"Christian mother," a "Christian wife," a "Christian teacher," and the like. In t
the convert is able to continue to negotiate with the secular world but is able also
the secular roles with a sacredness derived from the master role. Furthermore,
relatedly, the adoption of the master role means that the convert views every
as an opportunity to enact the master status. Despite the compartmentalization
thrust upon the moder convert, there is thus a generalization of the master sta
role to all situations, providing a psychological basis not only for proselyting a
but also for a defense against the self-dividing forces of the modern secular wo
CONVERSION AS A PROCESS OF SELF-TRANSFORMATION
We agree with Snow and Machalek that conceptualizing conversion as fundamen
a process of change is essential, that viewing a shift in universe of discourse as an imp
element of this change process may also be useful. However, in their attempt to
the process of change in some phenomenon "more fundamental than beliefs or ide
..." (1984: 170), Snow and Machalek's theory offers us a rather weak conceptualiz
of the person who experiences conversion. In their scheme, the person is replace
the term "consciousness," and this concept is never well developed.
In contrast, we see conversion as involving primarily a change in self-consciou
or, using the more conventional term, as a change in the self-concept (Mead
Rosenberg, 1979). Thus, conversion is seen to involve a change in the way a person
and feels about his or her self. One advantage of this approach is that it allows a
plausible theoretical link between the individual and the universe of discourse via l
(Mead, 1934; Schwalbe, 1983) than is possible with the concept of "consciousn
addition, it also makes available to us the extensive theoretical and empirical lite
on the self-concept (see Rosenberg & Kaplan, 1982; Gecas, 1982).
To distinguish the self-concept change involved in conversion from other, more r
changes in the self-concept (e.g., role changes, life-cycle changes), we use the term
transformation. Self-transformation, as we define it here, refers to a change in,
creation of, what Turner (1976) has refeiead to as the "real self." In making the dis
between the "real self" and the "spurious self," Turner is acknowledging the fac
not all of our self-conceptions are of equal importance to us and that we are gen
aware of a distinction between who we are really versus who we might be in a par
role, or under a particular set of circumstances. We capitalize on Turner's distin
between the "real self" and the "spurious self" by viewing conversion as
transformation - the creation of a new vision of who we really believe we are w
our social roles and self-presentations are stripped away.
Secondly, we think also that a focus on the language and rhetoric of convert
useful direction to pursue, not so much because it allows us indirect access to consci
but rather because it is through language that individuals transform themselves
is, we take what is referred to as a "functionalist" approach to language (see Sch
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JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION
1983), which leads us to ask: what sort of activity does this rhetorical device a
Thus, where Snow and Machalek view particular kinds of language and r
observable indicators of some underlying change in consciousness, we view parti
of language and rhetoric as methods used by subjects to achieve self-transfor
Though these two uses of language are not mutually exclusive or incompatibl
lead to somewhat different research questions. The central question moti
research is: how do subjects use language and rhetoric to achieve self-transfo
What are the implications of the differences between our approach to conv
the approach developed by Snow and Machalek? In the first place, Snow and M
view conversion in a way that focuses more on what happens to a person, whil
conversion more as a process of self-transformation. That is, we view the su
active participant in this reconstruction of the self (Richardson, 1985). Secon
the issue of identifying the convert. For Snow and Machalek, the subject's selfas
a convert or a non-convert is largely irrelevant to determining whether or not
is a convert. Instead, they propose that the only basis necessary for the iden
of the convert is the presence or absence of their four proposed rhetorical ind
conversion. In effect, from Snow and Machalek's point of view, the researcher
is better qualified to determine who is or is not a convert than are the subjects
Because we view conversion as an inherently subjective phenomenon, we bel
the subject, and only the subject, is qualified to tell us who he or she really is. Con
we determine whether or not someone is a convert by asking the person the
Are you a convert? Though Snow and Machalek (1983: 261-64) are justifiably
in their interpretation of converts' accounts of their conversion experiences, we
it is a mistake to ignore what our subjects tell us - particularly when they ar
us who they are. Indeed, if we are unwilling to believe our subjects when they
they are converts, then why should we believe them when they tell us that
Christians, Jews, or Nichiren Shoshu Buddhists?
Finally, if having the self-concept of a convert is all that is necessary to qu
as a convert, is there any theoretical utility in Snow and Machalek's purported
indicators" of conversion? Based on our "functionalist" approach to langu
rhetorical devices can be theoretically useful only if it can be shown how sub
them as methods in their efforts to achieve self-transformation. Or, alternativ
be possible to show how these rhetorical devices are used to achieve some oth
of religious life, such as religious commitment.
The thoughts expressed above have evolved from thinking about the
conversion, thinking about Snow and Machalek's approach to conversion, and
some data we have gathered from a small sample of evangelical Christians. H
far discussed ideas - theirs and ours - we would now like to present and disc
of the data. If it appears that our data conform nicely to our ideas and not s
the ideas of Snow and Machalek, that is because our ideas have been formed an
with more or less continuous reference to our data. Thus, we do not present th
analysis as any sort of definitive empirical "test" of the Snow and Machalek fo
To do that would be unfair. Instead, we offer the analysis so that the reader
some sense for the empirical evidence that has forced us to question the
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CONVERSION OR COMMITMENT?
Machalek approach and to formulate our own ideas on the role of language in conve
SAMPLE AND METHODS
We had initially become interested in the prospects of assessing the
Machalek approach as a result of auditing taped interviews obtained in the e
from members of a so-called "Jesus Freaks" organization located in the North
& Petersen, 1974; Petersen & Mauss, 1973). Since the interviews with tho
Christians could not have been informed by the much later work of Snow an
we were interested and impressed by the frequency with which those inter
listened to them more than a decade later, yielded the kinds of rhetoric Snow
reported finding among their converts to Nichiren Shoshu. Since many of
Freaks" were undoubtedly converts, it seemed quite possible that Snow and
might be on to something. We decided, therefore, to try to obtain some sort of
of contemporary Christians and subject them to interviews that could be mo
informed by the Snow and Machalek formulation.
Sample
During the 1984-85 school year, we obtained access to a sample of young Christians
who were active in Christian evangelical groups and fellowships on or near the campus
of Washington State University. Our subjects constitute an "opportunity" sample obtained
through a "snowball" method: Subjects referred us to others in their religious network,
or related ones, and these, in turn, referred us to others, etc. Altogether, we were able
to obtain interviews with 15 such subjects. The respondents were about evenly divided
by gender and ranged in age from 19 to 28. They were all from distinctly middle-class
backgrounds, though some had enjoyed more affluent upbringings than others. Many
had been reared in mainline Christian churches, including Roman Catholic.
Methods
The main criterion used in deciding how to stnlcture the interviews was to provide
the subject the opportunity to display the kinds of rhetorical properties Snow and
Machalek suggested should characterize the convert. Consequently, the interviews were
very open-ended; the respondents were asked to discuss themselves and their religious
1. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer who contributed to the evolution of our thinking here by forcing
us to reconsider an earlier form of our critique of Snow and Machalek. At first we had taken the more simplistic
tack that we could partially replicate the Snow and Machalek study of Nichiren Shoshu converts by applying
their four indicators to our own alternative sample of Christian Evangelicals and seeing if those indicators
distinguished "converts" from "lifelong" Christians in our sample. Such a "replication," we reasoned, would
allow us not only to check on the generalizability of the four indicators from one religion to another, but also
to "validate" the indicators against the self-professions of our converts. While we still think that approach has
some merit, we now concur with our anonymous critic that such an approach is not so much a "test" of the
Snow and Machalek indicators as it is an attempt to supplant one definition of "convert" (theirs), which does
not include the self-label criterion, with a different definition (ours) which does include that criterion. This
realization, in turn, forced us to articulate more clearly (we hope), and more thoroughly, our rationale for preferring
our definition, with its emphasis upon what happens to the self.
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JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION
beliefs in interviews that ranged from 45 minutes to 2 hours in length. It was
this approach would provide subjects with the time and the freedom to displ
characteristic ways of talking and thinking about themselves and their beliefs
interviews were conducted by the first author in his academic office on campu
of the respondents also allowed us to make copies (with due protection for pr
diaries that they had kept around the time of their conversion. The interviews
recorded with the subject's consent, and later transcribed in written form for
The first step in our analysis was to attempt to determine whether or no
all of the four rhetorical indicators were present in the talk of our 15 subjects
to do this, it was necessary to operationalize the four rhetorical indicators in so
way. Unfortunately, Snow and Machalek (1983; 1984) do not provide any clues a
they or anyone else might do this. As a practical matter, deciding whether or n
engaged in "biographical reconstruction" or "suspended analogical reason
somewhat difficult, and open to a substantial amount of interpretation. It w
therefore, that each of us would examine the transcripts separately using an
definition of the four rhetorical indicators. By comparing notes, we would the
to see whether or not we agreed on which subjects did or did not exhibit which
Below are listed the explicit definitions that were employed along with two ex
each of the indicators as they were found in the transcripts. (Pseudonyms are,
used throughout for all subjects.)
Biographical Reconstruction: Where the subject actively reinterprets past ex
or self-conceptions from the vantage point of the present in such a way as to
meaning of the past for the subject (especially significant segments are emph
the passages that follow).
Example #1
Gina: So then during high school, I had a lot of friends that I did sports
with, and everything, that were really Christians; and I thought
they were fanatics. They just turned me off. When I look at it
now, I respect them a lot more ...
Example #2
Mark: I grew up in a family with high morals. I always considered
myself to be a "good kid," so to speak. I was very involved in
athletics and what not, but I guess now if I look back, I really
... I can look back on God's little architectural plan for me he
kind of started; I can look all the way back to my sophomore
year in high school and just kind of see how all these things kind
of meld together as he led me towards himself
Adoption of a Master Attribution Scheme: Any evidence that the subject attributes
all outcomes or the reasons for all outcomes to one source (e.g., "God, "Jesus", "the Bible").
Example #1
Jason: How is my life different? I read the Bible today. I pray today.
If I have any question, I'll go to the Bible. All the answers we
have in this world are in that book.
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CONVERSION OR COMMITMENT?
Example #2
Frank: The Bible more or less teaches ... Romans, 13:1, says that all
power and authority is from God and all earthly authorities are
from God, and stuff. And that is how I feel about contemporary
political situations: that power and authority is given to people
on earth by God and what they do with it is a different story.
Suspension of Analogical Reasoning: The willingness of the subject to equate his or
her beliefs or ideas with the beliefs or ideas of other individuals or groups.
Example #1
Interviewer: Is that the only way you can get that love?
Frank: In Christ? Yes. That's the only way you can really find what
true love is. Because true love only rests in God. It is only in
God, and you need to go through Christ to get to God.
Example #2
Pete: I also believe that it's the only true way to be happy on earth:
To feel like you are important, to feel like you mean something.
To feel fulfilled while you're on earth, you have to be a Christian.
Embracing a Master Role: The subject sees a full interpenetration of the Christian
identity with all other identities; the subordination of all other identities to the Christian
identity; or the elimination of other identities incompatible with the Christian identity.
Example #1
Pete:
Example #2
Rod:
... but hopefully in all that I do people can see that maybe I'm
different, not on a superficial level; maybe they can't see from
just being in a class with them, but maybe they can a little bit;
maybe you could see me at a party and I wasn't drinking and
say, "He's a little different; he's got some different beliefs there."
Since my religious life, of course, permeates everything I do, my
behavior is a function of my faith in the living God. And that
includes all my behavior, whether I am edifying myself or not;
all that behavior is a function of what I believe in.
FINDINGS
Both of us agreed that each of our 15 Christian subjects displayed some or a
rhetorical indicators proposed by Snow and Machalek, suggesting that these r
properties are not exclusive to the Nichiren Shoshu Buddhist "universe of disc
We also agreed, however, based on further analysis, that while all 15 of our s
displayed evidence of suspending analogical reasoning, adopting a master attri
scheme, and embracing a master role, four of the 15 subjects failed to engage in
purported indicator of conversion - biographical reconstruction. As it turns o
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JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION
four subjects also denied ever having had a conversion experience and consistent
to refer to themselves as being "born again." In fact, two of these four subject
declined to participate in the study because they had heard it was about "bor
Christians, and they did not feel that they would be appropriate subjects bec
considered themselves to be "lifelong" Christians. These four subjects all claim
religious commitment, but no conversion experience as such. Take, for examp
exchange with Rod, a 21 year old senior:
Interviewer: Okay, we'll start out with the basic stuff, and I already kno
a little bit of this, but it will get us going anyway. When did
you become a Christian?
Rod: It's difficult to say, since growing up in the church I never real
had a conversion experience. I remember it... as early as I think
five years old is when I remember making my first commitment.
Since then, it's very much been a process.
Interviewer: You basically consider yourself a lifelong Christian?
Rod: So far, yes, and I expect that to carry on.
In contrast, consider the exchange with Jonathan, a 26 year old graduate studen
minister, and (we think) convert:
Interviewer: First of all, when did you become a Christian?
Jonathan: November 4, 1978. More of a theological reason, because in th
way I believe and so forth there was a particular instant when
you became a Christian, that you obeyed God's call A lot of othe
people may think, "Well, somewhere along the line Jesus cam
into my life," and stuff. Well I know, because I obeyed, and so
that's how come I can say, "Yes, I know the time and the hour."
The four subjects (including Rod) who denied being converts were the same
who failed to display any propensity to engage in biographical reconstruction
reasonable, therefore, to suspect that biographical reconstruction is unique to
as Snow and Machalek suggest. Yet, where Snow and Machalek would inte
finding primarily as evidence of an underlying change in consciousness among the
we believe that converts exhibit this pattern of language use because it facili
change we call "self-transformation." But why? And how?
Briefly (and relying on Mead [1932]), knowing who we are in the present
concept) is dependent on the knowledge we obtain about ourselves in symbolic
with others. Such knowledge contains not only material for constructing ourse
present, but also material for constructing our past and future selves. That is, on
of the universe of discourse is to provide us with a methodology for the const
our biographies. In self-transformation, we adopt a new universe of discourse
it a new methodology for constructing the self. Consequently, self-transformati
a rhetorical mechanism, or device, to assist people with the task of realignin
biographies in a way that makes sense from the new perspective. We use
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CONVERSION OR COMMITMENT?
"biographical reconstruction" to label the device, but the specific rhetoric used
instance is a feature of the particular universe of discourse in question. For examp
Christian theology and Freudian psychoanalysis provide individuals with a rhet
achieving biographical reconstruction, but the content of each rhetoric, and cons
the meaning of the selves created, are very different.
In the "born again" Christian sub-culture, biographical reconstruction ge
involves the repudiation of a sinful past. Attendant to that repudiation is the c
of a past self that is seen by the convert, from the converted vantage point, as a
self," with his or her "real self" being the person now in communion with Jesus
interviews with these young college students, the past self was often seen not
necessarily as having been sinful, but lost and without direction. Consider the fo
statement by Mark, a 20 year old sophomore:
Mark: I... consider the building of one's character like building a pyramid
I was bringing all these blocks, all these building blocks, and they
were great, but then I couldn't really start building. I couldn't really
go anywhere with these things; and then I was bringing all these
things in and later I found a cornerstone, which was Jesus Christ;
and then I was able to really start building.
Whether or not Mark felt this way about himself before his conversion is almost irr
What is relevant is that only by creating a past "spurious self" through biograp
reconstruction is it possible for Mark to create his "real" Christian self in the
Biographical reconstruction was absent from the rhetoric of our four "lifel
Christians, probably because they saw little or no discontinuity in their "real sel
Christian) over time. In short, no self-transformation is evident. This is not to s
these subjects viewed themselves as unchanging - quite the contrary. But th
more likely to refer to change as "growth," or "a process," and never as a clean
with the past. And the growth they experienced always left fundamentally un
their "real" Christian selves.
While our four "lifelong" Christians failed to engage in biographical reconstruction,
they did display, to varying degrees, the three remaining rhetorical properties argued
by Snow and Machalek to be indicators of conversion. The fact that our four "lifelong"
Christians were equally as likely as our 11 professed converts to suspend analogical
reasoning, adopt a master attribution scheme, and embrace a master role, casts doubt,
at least in our eyes, on Snow and Machalek's contention that these three rhetorical
properties are unique to the convert. With respect to one of these (embracement of a master
role) an alternative explanation more plausible to us, for there is some evidence in our
data to support it, is this: The embracement of a master role was evident in the talk and
reasoning of all 15 Christians because it especially facilitates high levels of religious
commitment, a characteristic shared by all of our subjects.
If "conversion" involves the attempt to change, or create, the "real self," then it seems
reasonable to view "commitment" as the attempt to maintain a consistency in the "real
self." Where biographical reconstruction assists in the creation of a new "real self," the
embracing of a master role appears to assist in the maintenance of the "real self." Highly
committed, "lifelong" Christians are no less likely to display such indicators than are
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JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION
their "converted" comrades because they share with these new Christians the d
necessity of maintaining a consistent image of their "real selves" as Chri
illustrate, consider again the willingness of Rod (a "lifelong" Christian) to em
master role of Christian by infusing all his other roles with his "real self":
Rod: Since my religious life, of course, permeates everything I do, my
behavior is a function of my faith in the living God. And that includ
all my behavior, whether I am edifying myself or not; all that behavi
is a function of what I believe in.
By allowing his "religious life" to "permeate" all his interactions and roles, R
to maintain his true Christian self. In a sense, Rod sustains his "real" Christia
interaction with others by dissolving the distinction between his "real self" an
"spurious selves." By expanding the terrain of interaction to encompass all his
provides himself with ample opportunities to display, affirm, and maintain his
Though we also discovered evidence of the suspension of analogical reasoni
the adoption of a master attribution scheme in the rhetoric of all 15 subjects
not yet formulated a theoretical link connecting these devices in any formal o
way to conversion, commitment, or any other facet of religious life. However,
both self-professed converts and avowed non-converts displayed these characte
the least we do not think that they are directly involved in conversion, as sug
Snow and Machalek. It seems reasonable to us that all three indicators (other than
biographical reconstruction) are likely to be a product of religious socialization, and are
also likely to play some role in the process of maintaining religious commitment. This
seems particularly true of the embracement of a master role, as we have explained
just above.2
Since we are fairly certain that biographical reconstruction plays an important role
in conversion, it is helpful to explore this idea in more detail. If biographical reconstruction
functions as we suggest, then we would expect to find the greatest need for this device
immediately following one's "born again" experience, with a diminishing need for it as
one achieves a more complete self-transformation. To test this hypothesis, we went back
to the interviews with our 11 self-professed converts to see whether or not the frequency
of instances of biographical reconstruction varied with the length of time since their "born
again" experience.
Our converts varied in what we might call their "spiritual age" (i.e., time elapsed
since being "born again") from 8 to 72 months, with a mean of 35 months. Only three
of our subjects had converted within the previous 12 months, however, and none had
done so within the previous 6 months. Consequently, our sample had few newly bornagain
Christians, with most of them having a spiritual age of about 18 months or more.
Despite this skewness in our sample, an examination of the transcripts did reveal a
2. It is difficult for us to think of any theoretical basis on which one would expect these rhetorical indicators
(other than biographical reconstruction) to be products of conversion but not of socialization. Would we not
expect the children of (say) Christian fundamentalists to internalize these traits from their parents and ministers
in growing up Christian? Would they not learn also how to make use of a master role, a master attribution
scheme, and non-analogical reasoning in defense of their faith?
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CONVERSION OR COMMITMENT?
tendency for the newer converts to engage in relatively more biographical reco
than their "older" counterparts. For example, the four converts less than 18 m
averaged seven instances of biographical reconstruction per interview, while th
seven "older" Christians averaged just slightly more than two instances of b
reconstruction per interview. Differences in the length of interview time betw
groups could not account for this difference. This bit of evidence, though cer
conclusive, tends to support our view of the role that biographical reconstru
in conversion.3
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Our research on religious conversion has been inspired by the recent work o
and Machalek (1983; 1984). Their approach has encouraged us to think about con
as involving a change in one's universe of discourse and has focused our attenti
the role of language and rhetoric in conversion. However, based on our own ide
conversion, on the role of language and rhetoric in conversion, and on some da
a small sample of evangelical Christians, we have arrived at an alternative
conversion to that offered by Snow and Machalek.
Our primary difficulty with the Snow and Machalek formulation is that it do
seem to recognize sufficiently the essentially subjective nature of conversion. Wh
and Machalek focus on "universe of discourse" and "consciousness," we focus on t
concept; where Snow and Machalek use rhetorical indicators to identify the con
rely on the person's self-professed status as a convert. Where Snow and Machal
particular kinds of language and rhetoric to be a reflection of some underlying
in consciousness, we view particular kinds of language and rhetoric as tools ind
use to achieve a transformation of the self. Finally, where Snow and Machalek
view conversion as something that "happens to" a person, we view the person as
participant in the creation of a new "real self."
In our attempt to assess the merits of the Snow and Machalek formulat
conducted interviews with 15 evangelical Christians. We found clear evidence of
and Machalek rhetorical indicators of conversion in our sample, suggesting that
indicators are generalizable to groups other than the Nichiren Shoshu Buddhist
by Snow (1976). However, we also found that only one of the four proposed ind
(biographical reconstruction) was capable of differentiating self-professed conver
self-professed non-convert believers. This finding, in our opinion, attenuates the
of the Snow and Machalek formulation as it now stands. We suggest instead tha
biographical reconstruction does seem to be involved in the process of conversi
remaining three indicators do not. We think that these three remaining in
(particularly the adoption of a master role) may facilitate religious commitmen
is why we found evidence of these indicators in the rhetoric of all 15 of our Chr
At this time, however, we have not undertaken to explain exactly how these in
3. A possibly interesting parallel occurs to us here between typical religious evolution at the persona
institutional levels. That is, the declining significance of biographical reconstruction (and perhaps ot
elements) in the convert is in some ways analogous to the declining importance of the charismat
in a new "sect" as it evolves toward a "church."
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JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION
facilitate religious commitment, leaving us uncertain about the exact nature o
relationship.4
It is our view that the study of religious conversion can greatly benefit fr
meshing of two trends we see developing in the literature. On the one hand is t
and Machalek (1983) approach, with its emphasis on language, rhetoric, and un
discourse. On the other hand are studies of conversion, or self-transformation, t
on the self-concept (see Ebaugh, 1984; Gordon, 1974; 1984; Harrison, 1974; Stap
Straus, 1979; 1981; Travisano, 1970). Our own efforts have constituted an atte
capitalize on the benefits of each approach. We propose that conversion be vie
process; that this process is fundamentally one of self-transformation; t
transformation is achieved primarily through language (Mead, 1934; Schwalbe, 1
that the convert plays an active role in his or her own self-transformation. We
viewing the conversion experience in this way is consistent with contemporary
in social psychology and opens up numerous directions for research capable of d
our understanding of conversion.
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