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Global Cultures

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Introduction

AT the turn of the twenty-first century the major metropolitan centers of the world had much in common. Visitors to New York, Paris, Tokyo, Dubai, Mumbai, or Nairobi could find the same clothing brands, eat the same foods, stay in the same hotel chains, and sip the same beverages. Yet as people found more of the same in each of these places, they also encountered more diversity within a single locale. Urban populations, culinary habits, and cultural offerings, including music, film, theater, and literature, became multiethnic and multicultural. In these places homogenization moved in tandem with heterogenization, creating creolized global cultures.[1] Scholars have attributed these cultural transformations to the forces of globalization. Globalization, in turn, has remained an elusive concept, used at times to describe the more recent developments that have connected disparate parts of the world into ever more intricate webs of goods, people, and ideas; and at other times to describe the much longer history of premodern trade routes, migrations, military campaigns, and explorations.[2] To be sure, local cultures have always evolved in response to internal and external impulses through the production of knowledge and contact with other cultures. At the turn of the twentieth century, cultural anthropologists began to study more systematically the mechanisms of cultural evolution and change.[3] While they focused primarily on explaining patterns of cultural difference, the globalization literature of recent decades increasingly emphasized patterns of cultural assimilation and adaptation. Yet a close examination of the global transformations of cultures since 1945 reveals how assimilation and difference interacted with and complemented each other.

Debates about cultural globalization after World War II cannot be separated from debates about economic globalization. In fact, the term *globalization* emerged first in the 1970s among economists who described the effects of the increasing integration of business ventures worldwide.[4] Both critics and supporters saw cultural globalization as a consequence of economic globalization. Supporters argued

that creative adaptation as well as wholesale adoption of superior economic and cultural practices would create more wealth and power for all who participated. They celebrated economic globalization at annual meetings of the World Trade Organization and the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, where government and corporate leaders discussed ways to foster and manage global economic cooperation. They lobbied national legislatures to lower trade barriers and supported international business ventures, promising economic growth in industrial countries as well as modernization in the developing world.

Skeptics warned that corporate greed and economic exploitation would destroy local self-determination. In their estimation, globalization created more wealth and power for those in control of the global marketplace, dependency for those on the margins, and greater inequality for all. Globalization, to these critics, meant little more than Western, primarily American, economic and cultural imperialism. It crushed indigenous economic development and local self-sufficiency, creating new postcolonial dependencies in its wake.[5] Businesses run by local merchants folded as larger and more cost-effective corporations moved in. Indigenous producers could not compete against the lower prices of these giants and thus faced either elimination or absorption into large impersonal corporate structures. George Ritzer has termed this process "McDonaldization," likening the greater rationalization, efficiency, and standardization in production and service industries to the techniques employed by the world's most successful fast-food chain.[6] Associating economic self-sufficiency with cultural distinctiveness, critics also predicted the loss of local cultural identity as a consequence of economic imperialism. They demanded the protection of indigenous cultures against the onslaught of what they identified as the cultural imperialism of corporate powers. In an effort to counterbalance the World Economic Forum, and to foster instead an alternative globalization that championed global causes like human rights and social justice, some globalization critics founded the World Social Forum (WSF). Since 2001 the forum has met annually, around the same time as the World Economic Forum in Davos, to discuss ways of strengthening global democracy, equality, and human rights.[7]

A parallel disagreement about the effects of globalization emerged in the political sphere. On the one hand were those who credited political globalization with fostering democratization and local empowerment. They usually pointed to international organizations such as the United Nations, which since its inception in 1945 has attempted to create and safeguard certain fundamental rules of global engagement among states and individuals. One of its first and most decisive acts was the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which member states signed in December 1948; this declaration asserted that "the inherent dignity and . . . the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice, and peace in the world."[8] The United Nations and other international organizations were built on assumptions of universal laws and rights governing the interactions among people and nations, regardless of their cultural heritage and political ideology.

Even though international institutions embodying the ideals of universal rights and laws proliferated after 1945, they did not have the mandate to interfere in local governance.[9] Nonetheless, supporters voiced optimism about these institutions' ability to advance the process of political liberalization by making available to a growing number of people the tools with which to achieve both greater visibility and greater political and economic autonomy.[10] Those tools included new means of communication through radio, television, and, more recently, the Internet, as well as new opportunities for social and geographical mobility. Supporters hoped that advances in communication technology would lead to greater awareness of world affairs on the periphery as well as greater awareness in the metropole of the fate of those at the margins. They likewise hoped that mobility would allow people to escape oppressive regimes. International organizations, according to their supporters, were both a reflection of and motors for greater global connectivity.

Critics, on the other hand, blamed political globalization for the disenfranchisement of local communities. They claimed that multinational organizations such as the United Nations did not represent the interests of the world's poor nations. Instead the wealthiest nations and international economic and political conglomerates reached farther into the provinces, transforming local economic, political, and cultural power relations. The loss of political autonomy was often a direct result of the loss of economic autonomy, they argued. Thus, instead of greater self-determination and democratization, as supporters hailed, opponents of political globalization saw the opposite: a marked decrease in democracy and autonomy, as political centralization proceeded apace with economic centralization.

This chapter traces the emergence and evolution of the world's cultures since the end of the Second World War as they responded to the contradictory as well

as complementary forces of homogenization and heterogenization. It does not attempt to provide a comprehensive overview of the cultures of the world since 1945. Instead it focuses on cultural transformations that transcended local and national boundaries to leave a global imprint. Cultural globalization after 1945 proceeded in three distinct phases. The first phase, from the end of the Second World War to the 1960s, was dominated by the competing cultural visions of the Soviet Union and the United States. This period saw the most heavy-handed state-sponsored attempts at achieving global cultural conformity according to the respective ideological premises of the two superpowers and their allies. However, the period also saw the most serious challenges to that conformity in the Soviet and American spheres of influence. Dissident countercultures challenged and ultimately undermined the power of state-sanctioned cultural conformity on both sides of the Iron Curtain and in the nonaligned world. The term *counterculture* as used here refers not only to the specific phenomenon in the Western industrialized world in the 1960s but more broadly to the proliferation of alternative, oppositional, dissident, anticolonial, and subaltern cultures that emerged throughout the Cold War world. The second phase, from the 1960s to the end of the Cold War, saw an increase in cultural diversification as newly independent former colonies asserted their cultural independence while residents in the metropole explored alternative cultural forms as never before. As travel, economic networks, and migration proliferated, so did the level of cultural transfer, creating greater exposure to foreign cultures and bringing more people of different cultural backgrounds into contact with one another. The third phase began with the end of the Cold War, when the movement of people, goods, and information accelerated exponentially. The political transformations brought about by the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe provide only part of the explanation. Technological changes in the communication industry, above all the inauguration of the Internet in the early 1990s, as well as an increase in global migration and travel, connected the most remote areas of the world and diversified urban areas. The pace of urbanization itself increased dramatically in the last two decades of the twentieth century, especially in Africa and Asia. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) announced in 2007 that more than half of the world's citizens now lived in urban areas.[11] Newly emerging as well as old urban centers reflected the complex interplay between local idiosyncrasies and international practices,

blending the local with the global and creating hybrid cultures that were both distinct and internationally recognizable.

Three central premises guide this chapter. First, although the process of cultural homogenization undoubtedly accelerated after 1945, the world at the beginning of the twenty-first century was still characterized by cultural diversity rather than uniformity. Second, a cultural history of the world, even if it covers only the relatively short span of sixty-plus years, inevitably has to paint with a broad brush. Thus, the objective of this chapter is to show the global convergences of the world's cultures rather than the persistent idiosyncrasies (of which there are, fortunately, still too many to do adequate justice here). For that reason this chapter focuses on broad transformations over the past decades. It will focus on clusters of cultural change that have expanded to global significance. Those include the cultural sources and consequences of global political developments, above all the Cold War and decolonization; the movement of goods, people, and ideas; and the cultural effects of economic globalization, particularly through the medium of consumerism. Third, increased local diversity forms an integral part of cultural globalization. Therefore this chapter will show how the continual emergence and proliferation of dissident forces and countercultures resisted pressures toward cultural conformity; how universalism and particularism remained constant cultural forces drawing the world's populations both closer together and pushing them farther apart; and finally how global homogenization and local heterogenization were mutually reinforcing processes. These took hold in remote places hitherto isolated from the global marketplace as well as in the metropolitan areas of the industrialized world.

To better understand the interplay among these three sets of forces—conformity/dissidence, universalism/particularism, and homogeneity/heterogeneity—the chapter will concentrate on particular cultural transformations in their global context since 1945. Some transformations occurred early in the Cold War period, others emerged only after the end of the Cold War, and still others are woven into the fabric of the entire period. The symbiotic relationship between homogeneity and heterogeneity, between universal and particular human experiences, and between conformism and dissidence will be a persistent theme throughout. The challenge of the twenty-first century will be to understand the centripetal and centrifugal forces of cultural change and to embed local distinctiveness within the network of cultural globalization in a meaningful way.

1. *Cold War Cultures*

FROM the end of World War II to the 1960s, Cold War politics dominated the international exchange of people, goods, and ideas. Both the Soviet Union and the United States, followed by their allies and client states, invested heavily in cultural diplomacy in an effort to win the political allegiance of nonaligned nations and to contain further advances—ideological as well as territorial—by their counterpart. Trying to overcome the cultural legacy left by the former colonial powers, these new nations were understandably reluctant to enter into any new international arrangement with either Cold War power. Between 1945 and 1970, sixty-four countries gained independence, some through the peaceful transition of power, others through violent uprisings.[12] Even before colonial empires crumbled after World War II, they had sought to redefine their cultural identity independent of the culture of the metropole.[13] These large-scale political transformations had a lasting impact on the evolution of cultural globalization since 1945.

The cultural aspects of the Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union and the process of decolonization have to be understood in relation to the transformations generated by the Second World War. With an estimated death toll of fifty to seventy million, including six million Jews, the total human cost of the war was monumental and the level of destruction unprecedented in modern history.[14] The war also brought the world's populations into closer contact, as millions of civilians, forced from their homes by advancing armies, moved across Europe, North Africa, and Asia. On the European continent, authorities in Germany and in areas under German control deported into concentration camps Jews and other groups they deemed undesirable. In addition they pressed thousands of forced laborers into service at German factories. In Asia, the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 led to a massive exodus of Chinese nationals. In the United States, the government forced Japanese immigrants and their children from the West Coast into internment camps.[15]

Furthermore, the postwar redrawing of borders in Central Europe forced out Poles from the eastern part of their country ceded to Russia, Germans from territories ceded to Poland, and Germans from the Czech Sudetenland. Most Holocaust survivors left Europe after the war, looking for new homes in the United States, Israel, and Latin America. Eastern German refugees and expellees relocated in the central and western parts of the country, often encountering mistrust and outright hostility from local populations. Japanese nationals, in turn, were expelled from or fled Asian territories liberated from Japanese control.[16] Most of these postwar migrants tried to strike a balance between preserving their cultural heritage and adapting to the local customs of their new homes.[17] They did so within the context of renewed international tension, pitting the communist sphere of influence around the Soviet Union against the capitalist West, and demanding an unprecedented level of cultural and political conformity on both sides.

Within its own sphere of influence the Soviet Union showed little tolerance for political and cultural diversity. It surrounded itself with a cordon of buffer states in Eastern Europe and controlled their political, economic, and military affairs. It actively supported a communist coup in Czechoslovakia in 1947 and crushed uprisings and reform movements in East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968. It curtailed free speech, incarcerated dissidents, and exercised direct control over cultural institutions in Eastern Europe through an extensive domestic police apparatus.[18] The infringements on free expression led to a vibrant underground market in art and literature, some of which was smuggled to the West. Known as samizdat, the genre included world-class literature, such as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag Archipelago*.[19] Outside its sphere of influence, the Soviet Union tried to project an image as the guarantor of international peace, protector of the underprivileged classes of the world, and advocate for those suffering under the yoke of colonialism and imperialism.

By contrast, the United States in the postwar period emphasized its international role as the protector of freedom and justice and as a model of modern consumer capitalism, promising prosperity to all who adhered to a democratic-capitalist ideology. At the same time, however, it supported authoritarian regimes in the name of anticommunism, particularly in Latin America. It repeatedly interfered in the affairs of other countries, both overtly and covertly, at times actively

disposing of democratically elected leaders, as in Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954, all in the name of national security.[20] Americans refrained from exercising direct control over foreign cultural institutions and instead actively engaged in cultural diplomacy. They also turned a blind eye to the censorship and persecution of political dissidents in countries governed by authoritarian dictatorships, as long as they were anticommunist. Even though the United States did not interfere directly and as deeply as the Soviet Union into the domestic political affairs of its client states, it aided local elites in their consolidation of power and suppression of opposition in exchange for a US-friendly policy.[21]

Decolonization complicated this bipolar rivalry, both in the political arena of the Cold War and in the cultural realm of identity formation. Intellectual and political elites in the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa often viewed the Cold War as the latest manifestation of European imperial rivalries. They were reluctant to accept the cultural offensive from either of the two opposing camps, but sometimes utilized their own leverage in this global competition. They had to weigh this newfound leverage against their efforts to re-create for themselves an independent postcolonial cultural identity that was both locally distinct and able to connect to other postcolonial identities. This negotiation between local particularism and universal postcolonialism played out in international forums throughout the 1950s and 1960s and significantly shaped the evolution of the Cold War system.

Spreading the American Dream

The United States at the end of the war was in a position to shape the future of world affairs more than any other country in the world. Unlike its European and Asian allies, its cities and industries had suffered little physical damage and its population was economically better off at the end of the war than at the beginning.[22] More importantly, Americans were willing to take on a leadership role in world affairs, in marked contrast to the aftermath of World War I, when congressional leaders and the public rejected President Woodrow Wilson's grand vision of a new world order.[23]

Prior to America's entry into the war, a small but influential segment of the American public advocated for a more activist involvement in foreign affairs.

Representative of this position was Henry Luce, owner and editor in chief of *Life* magazine. In an article ambitiously entitled "The American Century," he claimed that the United States had not only the capacity but the duty to "now become the powerhouse from which the ideals spread throughout the world and do their mysterious work of lifting the lid of mankind from the level of the beasts to what the Psalmist called a little lower than the angels."[24] He identified four areas in which America had to shape world affairs: enterprise, technical expertise, charity, and the defense of the ideals of freedom and justice. In all of these areas, he argued, the United States had to play a leading role in the second half of the century.

Luce saw America's cultural influence in the world as a foundation for its political influence. "American jazz, Hollywood movies, American slang, American machines and patented products," he determined, "are in fact the only things that every community in the world, from Zanzibar to Hamburg, recognizes in common." He concluded that "blindly, unintentionally, accidentally and really in spite of ourselves we are already a world power in all the trivial ways—in very human ways."[25] What America had left to do in the second half of the century, he surmised, was to channel its "human" influence into the political arena.

By the time Luce published his visionary blueprint, President Roosevelt had already laid the groundwork for pressing America's cultural influence into political service. In 1938 he created within the State Department the Division of Cultural Relations to coordinate and foster the spread of American culture abroad. The motive for the creation of the division emerged from a growing concern regarding Axis propaganda in Latin America and elsewhere.[26] After the United States entered the Second World War, the Roosevelt administrations established other propaganda agencies, among them the Office of Facts and Figures (OFF), later renamed the Office of War Information (OWI). In July 1942, the Voice of America (VOA), an American propaganda radio station, began broadcasting in Europe and Asia. OWI and VOA were dismantled after the war, only to be resurrected with the onset of the Cold War in 1947. A year later Congress provided funding through the Smith-Mundt Act, with the objective "to promote the better understanding of the United States among the peoples of the world and to strengthen cooperative international relations."[27] VOA resumed broadcasting into Russia a month after passage of the Act. By 1953 it had two

thousand employees, a quarter of them foreign nationals who broadcast in forty-six languages. Most of its budget went toward transmitting into communist countries.[28]

In 1953 the Eisenhower administration established the United States Information Agency (USIA), which operated independently from the State Department and reported directly to the National Security Council and the president. Over the next four and a half decades, the agency funded educational and cultural missions abroad, distributed information material in foreign countries, and supported foreign information centers. The agency also took over the broadcasting of the Voice of America. Because USIA's main objective had been to combat communism in Eastern Europe and the nonaligned world, it had outlived its mission with the end of the Cold War. The Clinton administration finally dismantled it in 1999 and folded its remnants back into the State Department.

For much of the 1950s and 1960s the US government also engaged in covert funding of anticommunist organizations, most prominently the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF). One of the founders of the CCF was Sidney Hook, a professor of philosophy at New York University and one of the leading anticommunist intellectuals of the early Cold War. In the span of a decade Hook had made a complete intellectual turnabout from Marxist to anticommunist. Like other former leftist intellectuals, including George Orwell and Arthur Koestler, Hook had become disillusioned with the Stalinist version of repressive and authoritarian communism. After the war he watched with alarm as Soviet and communist intellectuals created international networks to advocate for world peace and against the atomic bomb. When internationalist communist and leftist peace advocates met in April 1949 at the Waldorf Astoria for the "Cultural and Scientific Conference for World Peace," he resolved to counter what he perceived as a Soviet propaganda campaign by organizing a protest meeting nearby. Out of this countermeeting emerged the CCF, which Hook, Karl Jaspers, Melvin Lasky, Tennessee Williams, Raymond Aron, Bertrand Russell, and others founded in Berlin a year later. The official mission of the CCF was to sponsor art and cultural endeavors that celebrated liberal democracy and countered Soviet efforts to portray communism as the champion of peace and civilization. But unofficially the CCF became part of America's cultural containment strategy. In

the 1960s the American magazine *Ramparts* revealed that the CIA had funded the CCF since its inception, exposing the covert operations of the US government in liberal intellectual circles.[29]

For much of the Cold War, American initiatives, such as the sponsorship of the CCF, were designed not only to foster understanding of American culture and society abroad but also to loosen the ideological grip of communist-led countries on their populations. Those efforts ranged from open propaganda early in the Cold War, such as the Truman administration's resurrection of the World War II–era Psychological Warfare Division (now called the Psychological Strategy Board, or PSB) during the Korean War, to more subtle forms of cultural "infiltration" under USIA auspices.[30] Increasingly aware of the power of American popular culture, including jazz and Hollywood movies, American cultural diplomats shifted the program's emphasis to the export of music, films, and consumer goods. By the end of the decade the most popular program on VOA was Willis Conover's "Music USA," which played jazz for audiences in Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia.[31] In addition, the USIA sponsored international jazz tours and made a special effort to recruit black musicians. Initially African Americans were reluctant to participate, because they suspected they were being used to deliver a far rosier picture of American race relations abroad than existed in reality. Ultimately, however, as the historian Penny von Eschen has shown, those who went, among them Duke Ellington and Louis Armstrong, used these tours to connect with new audiences (particularly in Africa) and to deliver independent and at times subversive messages at home and abroad. One of those subversive moments occurred in 1961 when Dave and Iola Brubeck teamed up with Louis Armstrong to write the musical *The Real Ambassadors*, which satirized the State Department tours and featured some blunt critiques of race relations within the United States.[32]

A principal weapon in the American arsenal of cultural diplomacy was consumerism. In the aftermath of World War II, the American economy shifted production from war machinery to consumer goods, unleashing an avalanche of spending among Americans who had suffered through a dozen years of Depression-era deprivations and war-era rationing. In the postwar period shopping became a patriotic duty, as policy makers linked consumer spending to national security.[33] Moreover, Americans used consumerism as a Cold War



Louis Armstrong plays the trumpet at a concert broadcast by the Voice of America, around 1965. VOA operated under the auspices of the United States Information Agency and featured popular jazz programs such as Willis Conover's *Music USA,* directed at audiences in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa. Armstrong's music featured prominently on those programs. (Getty Images)

propaganda tool. The July 1959 exhibition of American industrial products in Moscow, for instance, featured lavish displays of consumer products and household appliances, including a fully furnished American ranch house. The exhibition stood in glaring contrast to a Soviet exhibit in New York the previous month, which had featured primarily displays of heavy industry and space technology.[34] Americans found that kitchen gadgets, nylon stockings, Pepsi-Cola, jazz, and the latest women's fashion were far easier to sell to communist audiences than elusive promises of democracy and freedom.

Cultures of Anti-Imperialism

As Americans worked diligently toward the cultural infiltration of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union struggled to maintain control over its sphere. After Sta-

lin's death in 1953, the Soviet leadership under Nikita Khrushchev inaugurated a period of cautious liberalization, in which politicians and intellectuals were able to express themselves more freely. Aware of the growing gap between East and West, Khrushchev tried particularly hard to accelerate the production of consumer goods. However, these efforts were punctuated by moments of coercion and repression at home as well as military interventions abroad, particularly in East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968. The Soviet Union's violent suppression of dissident movements damaged its reputation even within the communist world.[35]

During Khrushchev's tenure, Soviet cultural propaganda focused increasingly on areas outside its direct sphere of control, above all in Southeast Asia and Africa. In its international campaigns, the Soviet Union capitalized on two essential weaknesses in the Western capitalist world: its close affiliation with colonialism and its history of racism. Many of the countries that advocated freedom and democracy in the postwar era had been at the forefront of colonization in the nineteenth century. In fact, most colonial powers, including France, Belgium, and Great Britain, were reluctant even after World War II to give up their colonial possessions. The West's rhetorical support for freedom and self-determination thus rang hollow in many parts of the world. Suspicion of Western imperialist ambitions continued to linger even after colonies gained independence, thus providing an opening for the Soviet message of anti-imperialism.

The Soviet Union was also able to point to the West's dismal record of racial discrimination. Colonialism was based on a sociocultural system of racial hierarchy, which Western powers had used to legitimize their dominance over nonwhite peoples. The Second World War exposed the gruesome consequences of a philosophy of racial hierarchies taken to its extreme. While the United States condemned in the strongest terms Hitler's policy of racial annihilation of the Jews, it supplemented its military campaign against Japan with a propaganda campaign of racial denigration.[36] In addition, America's domestic system of racial discrimination undermined propaganda messages postulating the links between democracy, freedom, and equality. Throughout the war black and white troops remained segregated within the US armed forces. Drawing on Lenin's 1917 treatise on the connection between imperialism and capitalism, the Soviet Union condemned both colonialism and imperialism, ignoring its own domination of

neighboring states in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Lenin's ideas had inspired many of the anticolonial activists of the interwar and postwar period.[37] Soviet propagandists' message of anti-imperialism coupled with the legacy of Western abuses of power in Asia and Africa sufficed to raise doubts about the American message of freedom and democracy.

The Soviet Union showed particular ingenuity in linking the postwar rhetoric of internationalism to the message of world peace. As Cold War tensions increased in the summer of 1947, the Soviets, through organizations like the Women's International Democratic Federation, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, and the World Peace Council, sponsored international gatherings designed to celebrate and foster the idea of world peace. One of the first such gatherings was a World Youth Festival in Prague in 1947, which convened under the banner "Youth United, Forward for Lasting Peace," and drew some seventeen thousand participants, mostly from Europe and the Americas.[38] Subsequent youth festivals continued with various combinations of the themes of internationalism, peace, and anti-imperialism. Most of the participants were young people from nonaligned and communist countries, but some noncommunist Western peace groups also attended.

The World Peace Council (WPC), in turn, attracted Western intellectuals with leftist political leanings, many of them communists. Emerging out of the "first World Congress of the Partisans of Peace" in Paris in 1949, the organization operated independently of the Soviet Union in name only and became increasingly partisan during the 1950s.[39] Because of its prolific utilization of the term *peace,* the Soviet Union succeeded in linking communism to the idea of peace in world opinion. For that very reason, Western political officials and pundits relentlessly condemned the World Peace Council and many other peace organizations as communist front organizations and their members as "fellow travelers." In 1951 Henry Luce called the World Peace Council "a coldly calculated master plan to sabotage the West's efforts to restore the world's free economies and to defend itself."[40] Others derided peace advocates and pacifists as subversive communists or naive victims of a communist propaganda plot.

Soviet officials significantly expanded international propaganda efforts in the non-Western world through the printed press and Soviet news services. By the 1970s the Soviet news agency Novosti regularly published abroad; these pub-

lications included weeklies and monthlies such as the English-language *New Times, The Soviet Weekly,* and *The Soviet Union.* In addition, propaganda officials blanketed the globe with a rich array of radio broadcasts. The area of broadcasts, the languages in which the broadcasts were read, and the number of hours of broadcasts increased steadily over the course of the 1950s and 1960s. Propagandists were determined to utilize all available means of communication to win over the nonaligned world. This included foreign translations of carefully selected ideologically acceptable Soviet literature, which rose from 28 million Russian books in eleven foreign languages in 1956 to 55.5 million books in thirty-six languages by 1970.[41] The Soviet efforts at foreign information dissemination mirrored those of the USIA in many ways, even if they were more unabashedly propagandistic than the USIA's. The Soviet Union, like the United States, recognized that the battles of the Cold War had shifted to the nonaligned world and that these battles were fought with not only military but also cultural weapons.

As Asian and African countries struggled to gain independence from the former colonial powers, they were receptive to the Soviet message of anti-imperialism, anti-racism, and peace, especially if that message was bolstered by offers of economic and financial aid. Yet as the case of Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser in the 1950s proved, the gains were often more elusive than real. Nasser was quite willing to turn to the Soviet Union to finance his Aswan Dam project after the United States exerted pressure on him to conform to US demands, yet he never subscribed to communist ideals. To the contrary: in 1958, two years after the Suez crisis, he actively cracked down on communists within his own country.[42]

The Soviet Union's twin rhetoric of peaceful coexistence and anti-imperialism sounded appealing to other newly independent countries as well. In India, the Soviet Union bolstered its claims of peace with offers of technical and financial aid as well as increased trade relations "free from any political or military obligations."[43] India and other former colonies remained acutely aware of the military might of the former colonial powers, and the potential for renewed economic dependency if they accepted aid from the West. Even though the Soviet Union was able to build temporary alliances with several newly independent countries, it rarely succeeded in establishing full-fledged communist regimes in any of them.

Cultures of Postcolonialism

Though decolonization shaped and in turn was shaped by the Cold War, its cultural impact can be understood only in relation to historical processes that long preceded the Cold War. The global system of colonial rule altered forever the cultural identity of people living within it. The economic-political processes of exploiting natural resources, consolidating power, and creating dependencies in the colonies were inextricably linked to the cultural processes of subjugation, assimilation, and resistance. European powers had long rationalized the economic exploitation of colonial possessions by claiming a cultural mission to civilize and raise the living standards of the nonwhite peoples of the world. Cultural conversion was never the primary objective of colonialism, but it nonetheless became an integral part of colonial politics in many parts of the world. Europeans set up schools and other educational institutions in the colonies to educate and train the indigenous elite for leadership positions in the local colonial bureaucracy. Some of these students moved to the metropole to continue their education at European universities, among them the Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh, the Martinique-born Algerian activist Frantz Fanon, both of whom studied in France, and Indian anticolonial leaders Jawaharlal Nehru and Mohandas Gandhi, who studied in Britain.[44] Western thought and values, not least of all the idea of nationalism, thus influenced the ways in which many indigenous leaders approached their political fight for independence. However, it would be misleading to assume that their political activism emerged only through exposure to Western thought. Rather, knowledge of those ideas allowed anticolonialists to develop effective strategies in their struggle against the overwhelming power of the metropole.

Politically, most newly formed states adopted the territorial boundaries set by the colonial powers, even though those boundaries did not necessarily overlap with cultural, tribal, or even ethnic boundaries. They also followed the European model of the nation-state in an effort to impose order and establish centralized control.[45] Indigenous elites struggled to forge independent national identities out of sometimes arbitrary conglomerates of tribes and ethnicities within the territorial confines of the new state, often clashing violently with competing ethnic groups for dominance. The French colony of Indochina, for instance,

broke into three states: Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. After the disengagement of the French in 1954, the Geneva Accords split Vietnam into two zones, the communist-controlled Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the North and the Western-allied State of Vietnam in the South. In India, ethnic and religious divisions prompted the British to promote the partition of the Indian subcontinent into two separate states: Hindu-dominated India and Muslim-ruled Pakistan. East Pakistan, a territory disconnected from West Pakistan in the northeast corner of the Indian subcontinent, fought a bloody war for independence with support from India, becoming Bangladesh after independence from Pakistan in 1971. Likewise, tensions between Jews and Arabs in the Middle East permanently scarred the region after the creation of the state of Israel in 1948.

Ethnic conflict erupted in Rwanda and Burundi even before the two countries achieved independence from Belgium in 1962, exposing the political, social, and cultural rivalry between Hutus and Tutsis. In 1959 in Rwanda Hutus massacred Tutsis, who then sought refuge in Burundi and other neighboring countries. The monarchies in both countries were of Tutsi heritage and Tutsis enjoyed a higher social standing under Belgian rule. In fact, according to Mahmood Mamdani, the political rivalry between Hutus and Tutsis was a product of Belgian colonial rulers, who had designated Tutsis as cattle herders and given them privileged positions within the colonial regime.[46] In many colonies a centralized colonial bureaucracy had allied itself with one ethnic group or another and had suppressed cultural and ethnic tensions with an iron fist. The transfer of political control to indigenous groups therefore occasioned an internal power struggle among several competing political or ethnic groups, sometimes leading to violent clashes and even civil war.[47]

In areas with a significant white settler population, as in Algeria, Namibia, and Rhodesia, decolonization led to bitter, often violent racial confrontations. White settlers in these communities followed the model of South Africa, which had established a white-controlled centralized state in 1909 and had maintained close ties to the British mother country. Left without the military protection of the European colonial power after independence, whites often took drastic measures to preserve their privileged positions over a black indigenous majority. The white South African ruling class instituted a rigid system of apartheid and political repression in order to preserve its power vis-à-vis the increasingly well-organized

African National Congress.[48] Like South Africa, Algeria's white settler population retained close ties to the French mainland, and a significant portion of Algerians lobbied for inclusion in the French nation after World War II. Yet by the 1950s Algerian nationalists gained strength and organized the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), a powerful and violent movement in opposition to French rule. The struggle for independence lasted from 1954 to 1962, when the French government gave up claims to the Algerian territory. Millions of European Algerians, known as the *pieds-noirs,* fled Algeria and settled in France.[49]

As former African colonies sought political independence, they struggled to redefine their cultural identity. Colonial rulers had introduced Western rituals, customs, and culture into these areas and often suppressed indigenous practices, setting up a false dichotomy between European modernity and colonial backwardness.[50] Though the anticolonial struggle had unified indigenous populations against their oppressors, the postcolonial era revealed new fissures among indigenous interest groups with competing visions of independence. Political leaders' success often depended on how well they were able to overcome this artificial juxtaposition between local tradition and cosmopolitan modernity, and how well they were able to transcend ethnic, tribal, and cultural differences among their own constituents.

In newly independent states in Africa, one way to reclaim cultural autonomy was to draw on the Afro-Caribbean *négritude* movement that had emerged in the 1930s. Its founders, among them Léopold Sédar Senghor, a Senegalese poet and essayist who in 1960 became Senegal's first president, and poet Aimé Césaire, from the Caribbean island of Martinique, provided the cultural rationale for the political drive for independence. Both drew inspiration from African and African American writers, particularly those of the Harlem Renaissance, including Langston Hughes and Richard Wright, who had celebrated black pride and black culture since the 1920s. Both also drew on historical precedents of struggle against white colonial rule, such as Toussaint Louverture, who in the 1790s had led a revolt against the French in Haiti.[51]

Each of them, however, developed their own practical application of the concept of *négritude*. For Senghor, *négritude* was "the whole complex of civilized values—cultural, economic, social, and political—which characterize the black peoples, or more precisely, the Negro-African world. . . . In other words, the



Léopold Sédar Senghor, a poet and linguist from Senegal, who became the country's first president after independence from France in 1960. Together with Aimé Césaire and Léon Damas, he developed the concept of *négritude*, which sought to reclaim Africa's cultural independence in opposition to the cultural repression of the colonial system. (Getty Images)

sense of communion, the gift of mythmaking, the gift of rhythm, such are the essential elements of négritude which you will find indelibly stamped on all the works and activities of the black man."[52] Senghor's *négritude* became a unifying force in the postwar Afro-Caribbean struggle for political independence. Césaire's idea of *négritude* relied on a less rigid notion of black cultural independence.

Like Senghor he called into question the validity of Western cultural dominance, yet he did so without denying the utility of Western texts to make the case for cultural independence. For instance, he appropriated the Shakespearian play *The Tempest* as a vehicle to assert the colonials' cultural emancipation, arguing for the adaptation of the 1610 play for black theater.[53] Césaire saw in the protagonist Prospero "a complete totalitarian," "the man of cold reason, the man of methodical conquest—in other words, a portrait of the enlightened European." His counterpart, the native Caliban, on the other hand, is "still close to his beginnings, whose link with the natural world has not yet been broken." Césaire equated Prospero, and by extension, enlightened Europe, with totalitarianism, Caliban with cultural authenticity.[54] More importantly, though, Caliban is able to traverse the world of the colonized and the colonizer. He speaks a European language, knows the Western ways, and thus has a cultural advantage over his master, Prospero. Like Caliban, Césaire turned his cultural knowledge of the West into a weapon for cultural liberation by reinscribing indigenous meaning into Western texts.

The concept of *négritude* encountered powerful critics. Frantz Fanon argued in *The Wretched of the Earth* that African and Caribbean intellectuals, including Césaire, whose call for *négritude* rested on the reinterpretation of European Enlightenment texts, were complicit in reinforcing the power of colonial culture. Rather than reviving indigenous national cultures, Fanon charged, they accepted the European label of all African and Caribbean cultures in monolithic terms. "The concept of négritude," he stated, "was the emotional if not the logical antithesis of that insult which the white man flung at humanity."[55] This insult was to lump all Africans, regardless of their national origins or cultural identity, together, to deny them the existence of an indigenous culture and to instill in them the values of Western culture. The fallacy of native intellectuals steeped in Western culture was, in Fanon's view, their attempt to prove that there was an African culture, rather than an Angolan, Kenyan, or Ghanaian culture. Fanon condemned the process as essentially an inversion of the colonial system of cultural oppression. *Négritude,* which emerged as much in the Americas as in Africa, signaled to Fanon the racialization of cultural identity.[56]

Fanon's critique revealed a crucial aspect of the process of cultural change and the idea of cultural identity. Contact with foreign cultures, whether by force or by choice, invariably altered the native population's own cultural matrix. It

would have been a futile undertaking for native intellectuals to reverse the process of cultural transformation and to erase the impact of colonial domination. Even advocates of *négritude* did not propose a complete reversal. Instead they sought to integrate the Western colonial cultural canon in a way that met their own indigenous political and cultural needs. By the early 1990s, cultural anthropologists and sociologists labeled this process cultural hybridization or creolization.[57]

Though there existed no Asian counterpart to the African *négritude* movement, colonial engagement in Asia created in Europe a particular notion of Asia as the "oriental" other. In his 1978 book *Orientalism,* the Palestinian-American literary theorist Edward Said argued that notions of inferiority of Middle Eastern colonial subjects were deeply ingrained in the Western world's cultural and literary texts. He was interested primarily in showing orientalism as fundamentally a Western concept rather than exploring the ways in which ideas of orientalism might have become deeply embedded in the postcolonial identities of non-Western peoples.[58] Said's critique of orientalism sparked a new wave of scholarship, exploring the influence of Western notions of the East in popular culture and political relations, interrogating ethnic and national identity formation, and analyzing the ideological foundations of the Orient/Occident dichotomy.[59] Embraced by many, his writings also drew criticism from some academic scholars, who challenged his definition of orientalism, questioned the existence of a single orientalism, or accused him of polemicizing an academic problem.[60]

Said continued to develop his interpretation of the cultural consequences of imperialism, arguing in his later work that empire had created not just cultural subjugation but integration, hybridization, and heterogenization. This reading of the mutual reshaping of imperial and colonial cultures allowed him to claim writers like William Shakespeare for the decolonizing project as Césaire had done before him. Shakespeare's plays would thus lose their particular European identity and become global repertoires of human experience. Drawing on Césaire's version of *The Tempest,* Said laid out alternative readings of the play's main colonial characters Caliban, the rebellious slave, and Ariel, the assimilated and accommodationist spirit (in Shakespeare's version) turned mulatto (in Césaire's version). According to Said, the play offered answers to a central question for independence activists: "How does a culture seeking to become independent of

imperialism imagine its own past?" The Ariel-Caliban dichotomy in *The Tempest* offered three distinct options, he suggested. The first was to take Ariel as the model and to accept one's subservient status as long as the colonialist rules and afterward resume the native self. The second option was to follow Caliban's example, which was to integrate the "Mongrel past" into an independent future. The third option was to view Caliban as fighting to shed the past oppression and return to a "precolonial" self. Said identified this last option as the radical nationalism that produced the ideology of *négritude*. Like Fanon, he expressed deep reservations about this form of colonial emancipation, because it could easily deteriorate into a simple form of "chauvinism and xenophobia" that mirrored the European colonial rationale for colonization in the first place.[61]

By the mid-1960s, leaders in many newly independent nations disagreed over whether there existed a common African or Asian identity and what the nature of that identity might be. Language, religion, and tribal customs significantly impeded the process of cultural unification. In addition, at least in Africa, the colonial legacy divided the former colonies into Francophone and Anglophone countries. Many prominent writers and poets expressed their search for a common African identity not in their native language but in the language of their former oppressors, among them Senghor, who wrote in French, and the Nigerian writer Chinua Achebe, who wrote in English.[62] Achebe, author of the internationally acclaimed novel *Things Fall Apart*, defended his choice by pointing to the importance of communicating across language barriers with other victims of colonization and with the colonizers.[63] But he also acknowledged that particular local experiences could not be expressed adequately in the English language and advocated extending the limits of English to accommodate those African ideas and experiences.[64]

These debates exemplified not only the scars left by more than a century of colonial domination but also the diversity of postcolonial experiences. Africans more than Asians had to renegotiate their identity within an increasingly heterogeneous environment where the recovery of a lost tribal culture held both great promise but also the threat of continuous conflict and war, which might create living conditions no better and sometimes worse than those experienced under colonialism. Cultural creolization was as much part of the process of decolonization as were ethnic strife, violence, and war.

The cultural debates accompanying the process of decolonization formed part of a broader challenge to the rigid structures of the Cold War cultural consensus in East and West and exposed the cultural diversity that had been suppressed by the Cold War rivalry. Others included the increasing movement of people and goods, the emergence of an international protest culture, and an international language of rights that transcended the East–West divide. Those challenges led to broad cultural transformations over the course of the 1960s, permanently changing the political, economic, and cultural relations among peoples and nations. Even though the Cold War heated up again in the late 1970s with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the two superpowers no longer dictated the cultural terms of their exchange. These transformations represented, not so much a linear development from cultural conformity to cultural diversity, as a renegotiation of the relationship between the two.

2. *People and Goods on the Move*

THE transnational movement of people and goods accelerated after World War II, as national boundaries shifted, colonies gained independence, and means of transportation improved. Migrants, including refugees, tourists, and guest workers, played key roles in the global process of cultural heterogenization. As they moved, they brought with them cultural, religious, and material traditions that altered the cultural landscape of their new environment. They established restaurants, houses of worship, and cultural centers, which initially served the immigrant population, yet over time transformed neighborhoods into multiethnic patchworks of cultural diversity.[65] Wherever they went, these migrants created both greater tolerance of cultural difference and new fissures, bringing cultural conflict into every part of the world. As people moved, so did goods, creating a global marketplace of consumption. The material aspects of this global migration have often been associated with the rise of the multinational corporations, and thus the charge of cultural homogenization. But although there is some evidence to support this charge, not the least of which is the rapid proliferation of global brands, other evidence points toward greater material diversity within a single locale, such as the proliferation of ethnic restaurants in major urban centers. As the transnational movement of people and goods accelerated, so did the process of cultural hybridization, making places at once more familiar and more alien.

Migrants

The patterns of migration in the second half of the twentieth century were more diverse and multidirectional than before. North America remained a primary destination for people from all parts of the world, though the postwar level of immigration was never as high as the level at the turn of the twentieth century, when the immigration rate to the United States had been over 11 immigrants per

thousand US population. It fell to 0.4 immigrants per thousand in the 1940s and reached its postwar peak of about 4 per thousand in the 1990s.[66] The ethnic composition of migrants changed dramatically as well. Most of the immigrants to the United States in the earlier wave had come from Europe; in the second half of the twentieth century they came primarily from Latin America, Africa, and Asia. The reasons for migration, however, remained the same: economic hardship, population increase, and violence.

Decolonization accounted for part of world migration since World War II. Sometimes called reverse colonization, the influx of former colonial subjects diversified the cities of the industrialized world as Africans and Asians migrated to England, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands; Filipinos moved to North America, the Middle East, and Japan; and Latin Americans, Asians, and Africans migrated to the United States and Canada. To be sure, the colonial world had intruded upon the metropole ever since the time of contact, largely through the import of raw materials, artisan goods, and foreign foods, including spices, grains, coffee, and tea.[67] As colonial peoples followed their products, they changed not only the metropole's ethnic composition but its cultures as well.

Decolonization generated three successive waves of migration. The first was the return of white settlers and administrators to the homeland. These returnees, some of whom had intermarried with the indigenous population, provided the incentive for a second wave of migrants: indigenous relatives and members of the colonial elites who had lost their positions of power and privilege in the newly formed independent state. A third wave of migration was internal as indigenous populations moved from rural to urban areas, from impoverished to prosperous land, from regions with low demand for labor to those with high demand, within or across national boundaries. An example of the latter was the large-scale seasonal migration within Africa of almost a million laborers to South Africa from areas to the north.[68]

Europe's migration patterns shifted considerably as well in the postwar period, beginning with the massive movement of people displaced by war and persecution. Between 1965 and 2000, the foreign-born population in Western Europe rose from 2.2 percent to 10.3 percent. Western Europe thus shifted from being a point of departure (mostly to the Americas) to becoming a destination for immigrants both from other European countries as well as from Asia and Africa.

Immigration to countries within the European Union reached an all-time high—over one million annually—between 1989 and 1993, largely as a result of the breakup of the Soviet Union. It had been around 200,000 for much of the 1980s and leveled off to a little over 600,000 annually after 1993.[69]

Intra-European migration shifted from political migration, during and immediately after World War II as populations were expelled from or fled the newly emerging socialist regimes, to economic migration, as labor shortages in Northern and Western Europe in the 1950s and 1960s drew workers from Southern Europe. For instance, between 1955 and 1968 Germany signed agreements with Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, Turkey, Tunisia, Morocco, and Yugoslavia to contract more than 2.5 million people for temporary work in Germany. By the time the government terminated the program in 1973, many of those workers had brought their families and established permanent homes within the major industrial cities, especially in the Ruhr area, home of Germany's coal and steel industry. Their children and grandchildren grew up in a cultural environment that was neither fully integrated into German culture nor closely tied to their parents' homeland. As Germany's economy went into recession in the 1970s and 1980s, xenophobia increased and violence escalated against foreigners, directed at both longtime immigrants from Southern Europe and more recent immigrants from Africa and Asia. Rising unemployment after Germany's unification led to fierce debates over immigration policy, integration of foreigners into German society, and Germany's own cultural identity.

The integration of a North African, largely Muslim population into French society after the end of the French-Algerian war proved difficult as well. Most immigrants lived in segregated neighborhoods on the outskirts of major cities and faced poor economic prospects and other forms of discrimination. Great Britain absorbed immigrants from Europe and the Commonwealth nations until the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962 severely restricted the entry of nationals from the former colonies. The Act, which set an annual quota for immigration of British Commonwealth Asians of a mere fifteen hundred, was aimed primarily at reducing the influx of citizens from Asia and Africa, even though they made up a far smaller percentage of Britain's immigrant population than European and Caucasian immigrants from white-dominated commonwealth countries, such as Australia, New Zealand, and Canada.[70]

Latin America also saw a shift in migration patterns: once a destination for Europeans and Asians, it became a region of emigrants in the postwar period. Between 1960 and 1980, 1.8 million people left the region, most of them for the United States and Canada. Mexicans and Caribbean Islanders in particular took advantage of a 1965 liberalization of US immigration laws to move north. Most of them worked seasonally for the large fruit and vegetable conglomerates in California or as domestic workers in the urban areas along the East and West Coasts.[71] New ethnic neighborhoods emerged in all major North American cities. A large Cuban community settled in Florida after Fidel Castro's successful 1959 revolution. Over the next few decades the Cuban-American population not only transformed local Floridian culture, but also exercised considerable political influence in Washington, largely fueled by the anticommunist climate of the Cold War.[72]

In the Middle East, the oil boom attracted a large foreign labor force, primarily from Asia and Africa. Most of these workers were male and single, and they stayed for short periods of time only. Their social and familial ties remained in their homelands, and their wages, too, flowed mostly into the local economies of their home communities.[73] In the United Arab Emirates alone, the foreign population outnumbered the native population by a margin of nine to one in the 1990s.[74] The overwhelming presence of foreigners was both cause and consequence of the commercial boom in the country. At the same time it gave rise to concerns among Emirati political and intellectual leaders about their ability to preserve their Bedouin heritage.[75] As they sent their children to elite schools and colleges in Great Britain and North America, they found it even harder to preserve traditional customs.

Temporary migration was not a new phenomenon of the postwar period. At the turn of the twentieth century, about 30 percent of US immigrants returned to their homeland. Indeed, millions of workers in the early twentieth century migrated seasonally between harvesting work in southern Europe or Latin America and factory work in Northern Europe or the United States.[76] By the end of the twentieth century, migration, rather than a once-in-a-lifetime event with a remote possibility of a once-in-a-lifetime return, became for a sizable proportion of the world's population a lifelong process. Some of these transnational commuters belonged to a highly educated and fairly wealthy class of professionals

who could afford to maintain more than one household on more than one continent, whose work was often in international business, and whose jobs demanded a high level of mobility.[77] Most had little opportunity and equally little desire to interact with the native-born population. They often preserved their national traditions through diasporic associations and set up international schools for their children.[78] Particularly Western business elites in the Middle East, Latin America, Asia, and Africa built transnational enclaves, provided housing, schooling, shopping, and other recreational amenities, which were financially out of reach for the indigenous population. They thus created a new social class of expatriates who felt more at ease with other business globetrotters than with the local communities of their host countries.

Less wealthy immigrants also began to take return trips to their homeland as air travel became more affordable. In addition, new developments in media and electronic communications allowed expatriates to stay personally and culturally connected to their homeland. By the late 1990s, for instance, Indian immigrants in New York and London watched Indian television via satellite and stayed in touch with friends and family on a regular basis. Brazilians, too, as Maxine S. Margolis noted, saw their time in New York as a sojourn rather than permanent immigration. They had become, in her words, "transnational migrants who sustain familial, cultural, and economic ties that ignore international borders and span the home and the host societies."[79] Telephone communication and the Internet became both more widespread and cheaper, even in the global South. Spatial distance no longer entailed cultural distance for late twentieth-century migrants. Their sense of belonging to a particular cultural community had become deterritorialized.[80] Diasporic groups in many parts of the world no longer faced the same pressures as their nineteenth-century predecessors to assimilate into a putatively homogeneous national culture. They often found cultural diversity if they moved to major urban areas, allowing them a choice between finding their particular cultural niche and liberating themselves from the cultural constraints of their homelands. For some, at least, cultural identity became as much a matter of choice as one of inheritance or locality.

Internal migration from rural to urban areas affected cultural diversity as well. Throughout the twentieth century the world population became increasingly urban, finally tipping the balance in favor of urbanites in 2008, even though,

according to the 2005 *United Nations Demographic Yearbook,* definitions of "urban" varied greatly by country, making it a somewhat imprecise milestone.[81] Some countries measured population density, others the level of administrative government, and still others the total agglomeration of inhabitants in a particular locality.[82] Nonetheless, the figures show a clear and constant trend toward urbanization. In 1950 the UN identified only two cities with populations above ten million, New York and Tokyo. By 2005 there were twenty such cities, and only seven of them were in the industrialized world.[83] Most of the recent growth in urban populations occurred in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. According to a 2001 UN population report, the two cities with the largest growth rate between 1950 and 1975 were Mexico City, and São Paulo, Brazil. Their populations grew fourfold in this period, from 2.9 million and 2.6 million, respectively, to over 10 million by 1975. The highest average annual growth rate in that period—7.6 percent—occurred in Seoul, South Korea. Seoul grew from fewer than 1 million inhabitants in 1950 to 6.8 million in 1975. In the last quarter of the twentieth century, Riyadh and Jeddah in Saudi Arabia, Dhaka in Bangladesh, Lagos in Nigeria, and Guatemala City experienced average annual growth rates of over 6 percent.

Urban migration grew in tandem with population growth overall. Since 1950, Asia and Africa experienced higher growth rates than Europe and North America. Urban areas promised better health care and better education for their citizens. However, when cities grew rapidly in a short period of time, public sanitation, housing, and social services could not keep pace with the dramatic influx of people. For instance, the annual growth rate of Lagos, Nigeria's capital—over 14 percent in the 1970s and 1980s—was so large that municipal services could not keep up. There were regular shortfalls in the supply of electricity, water, and sanitation, as well as a lack of basic social services, including schools.[84] More than half of Mumbai's population, which grew from three million in 1950 to over sixteen million in 2000, lived in slums at the turn of the twenty-first century. The city was a model in contrasts. While the urban center provided about 20 percent of India's industrial output and showcased modern, cosmopolitan high-rise buildings, the majority of Mumbai's population lived in preindustrial, low-grade dwellings. While the highly educated professional minority of the city was engaged in the production of international capital as well as the production

for India's cultural and movie industry, the urban poor on the city's geographic and social fringes sank deeper into poverty, making Mumbai a showcase for the polarizing consequences of globalization.[85] The stark divisions between wealth and poverty were no longer primarily visible along the North–South spectrum, but manifested themselves within the narrow geographic confines of single cities.

Economics accounted for part of the total migration in the second half of the twentieth century. War, natural disaster, and political and ethnic persecution accounted for the rest. World War II dislocated millions throughout Europe, via the deportation and killing of millions of Jews, gypsies, political dissidents, and the disabled across Germany and German-occupied territory; the importation of forced laborers from Eastern and Southern Europe to Germany and from Southeast Asia to Japan; and the expulsion of millions of citizens in Eastern and Central Europe as national boundaries were redrawn in the aftermath of the war. In addition, millions of people tried to leave war-ravaged Europe during and after the war in search of better living conditions and greater political freedoms.

Among those fleeing Europe were millions of Jews who managed to escape before their deportation or had survived the concentration camps. Their primary destinations were the United States and Palestine.[86] The influx of large numbers of Jewish refugees into Palestine—the immigrant population in Israel stood at 26 percent in 1949—dramatically shifted the demographics of the region and produced another refugee crisis, that of Arab Palestinians. Since the British Balfour Declaration of 1917, Jewish Zionists had sought to create a Jewish state in the British colony. The Declaration stated that the British government was in favor of creating a homeland for the Jewish people in Palestine, provided that the rights of the non-Jewish communities within Palestine were preserved.[87] After the British ended their mandate in Palestine in 1947, the United Nations stepped in to divide the area into separate Jewish and Arab states. The proclamation of the State of Israel in May 1948 immediately prompted the first of several Arab-Israeli wars, which led to the expansion of Israeli territory and the flight of roughly 330,000 Arabs to neighboring countries.[88] Many Palestinian refugees settled in camps that became hotbeds of political radicalism for decades to come. Israel, meanwhile, maintained a high level of immigration. In 1972 the vast majority of Israel's population, 91.5 percent, had been born abroad. The source

Palestinian refugees in Jordan, June 25, 1949. The proclamation of the State of Israel in May 1948 prompted the first of several Arab-Israeli wars, which led to the expansion of Israeli territory and the flight of roughly 726,000 Arabs to neighboring countries, including Jordan. Many Palestinian refugees settled in camps that became hotbeds of political radicalism for decades to come. (Getty Images)

of immigration to Israel shifted from Europe in the immediate aftermath of the Holocaust to Asia and Africa in the 1960s and Russia in the 1990s.[89] The Israeli-Palestinian conflict provided a stark reminder that closer proximity among members of different, cultural, ethnic, and religious groups did not automatically lead to greater understanding, but could also lead to greater tension, open hostility, and violence.

Africa also became the site of involuntary migrations as civil wars ravaged newly independent African nations, forcing people to seek shelter and food in temporary camps. Refugee crises occurred repeatedly after independence in places such as Rwanda, Burundi, Ethiopia, Sudan, the Congo, and Angola.[90] Located in the poorest regions of the world, these displacements often resulted in large-scale famines: Ethiopia experienced repeated famines from the 1960s to the 1980s, Nigeria (Biafra) in 1968–1970, and the Sudan intermittently since the 1980s.[91]

Some of those refugees sought asylum in Northern Europe and North America, unleashing spirited debates in those countries about the intersection of human rights mandates and immigration regulations. Countries with historically high immigration rates, such as the United States, Canada, and Australia, seemed less unsettled by the influx of new immigrants and asylum seekers than those with more homogeneous populations, among them Western and Northern Europe. In all of these countries, immigration remained a subject of continuous political debate, particularly when the immigrants came from the global South. The measure of success of integration often depended on the political will of the governing parties in each country.

Sojourners

While economic migrants and refugees often made a permanent home in an alien environment, travel for leisure, business, or education provided additional opportunities for cultural exchange, albeit of a rather fleeting nature. International travel rose in tandem with an increasingly prosperous and globalized economy after World War II. Members of national elites had traveled for leisure since the nineteenth century. In the second half of the twentieth century, international travel increased manifold, thanks to improved modes of transportation and affordability. This transformation resulted in a higher proportion of the world's population gaining greater than ever exposure to foreign peoples, languages, customs, and foods. Only recently have anthropologists, sociologists, and historians begun to explore in more depth the cultural impact of global tourism on travelers and indigenous cultures.[92]

In the early decades after World War II, American soldiers, tourists, and business managers dominated international travel. Wartime military deployment in Europe, North Africa, and Asia afforded most soldiers their first opportunity to explore foreign places.[93] At the end of the war the American military occupied Germany, Austria, and Japan and established permanent military bases in the Pacific, Asia, and Europe. The experience of overseas deployment altered their attitudes toward foreign cultures, but also brought America closer to the people living in the vicinity of the bases. GIs became major exporters of American popular culture.[94] They became Europe's first tourists during and immediately

after World War II. As soldiers moved across France in the spring and summer of 1944, their curiosity about all things French often accompanied and at times interfered with their duties as combat soldiers. One soldier remarked that as he arrived in Normandy, his "thoughts were not so much of liberating, fighting, or helping to chase out the Germans as the thought of stepping foot upon the land of France, of saying one French word to someone French in France."[95] When combat duties transitioned into occupation duties in Europe and Asia in the aftermath of the war, soldiers increasingly took time to explore the region as regular tourists.

Mass tourism became an integral part of the postwar global economic recovery. As American, and later European and Asian, international travel increased, so did tourist spending on consumer goods, hotels, and transportation. International travel became so extensive that the US government created a travel branch under the auspices of the Marshall Plan in 1948. Known as the Travel Development Section (TDS), the branch set up shop in Paris with an initial staff of three, but soon expanded to seventeen with a representative in every Marshall Plan country in Europe. The task of the TDS was to facilitate international travel in Europe and encourage the local travel industry to improve standards. In addition, it developed a program to facilitate American investment in Europe's travel industry. American policy makers further tried to encourage travel and spending abroad by raising the duty-free import level from $100 to $500.[96] One of the first initiatives on a global scale was the United Nations' establishment of the International Union of Official Travel Organizations (IUOTO) in The Hague in 1947. The organization sought to ease travel restrictions and standardize passport and visa requirements across the world. Prompted by the IUOTO, the United Nations declared 1967 International Tourist Year (ITY), using the slogan "Tourism, Passport to Peace." The organization's mission lay at the intersection of promoting international understanding through easing the flow of people across national boundaries and promoting economic development and modernization through the increase in global consumption.[97]

As international travel became more affordable and Western European and Asian countries recovered from the wartime ravages, the social and ethnic profile of tourism changed. By the 1970s, international travel was no longer the exclusive domain of the upper classes. It brought a broader cross section of the world's

population into contact with one another. According to the United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO), established in 1974, international travel rose from 25 million in 1950 to 806 million in 2005. Global income generated through international travel stood at an estimated $680 billion in 2005, reflecting an average annual increase of 11.2 percent since 1950. As the number of travelers increased, so did their destinations. While in the early postwar period fifteen top destinations, most of them in Europe and North America, made up 88 percent of all travel, their share fell to 75 percent by 1970 and to 57 percent in 2005. Many of the new travel destinations were in Africa and Southeast Asia, indicating the global reach of international tourism.[98]

The tourism industry, according to Marc Augé, also created "non-places," places of transit exclusively designed for and frequented by tourists. These airport terminals, hotel lobbies, highway service stations, and so on were devoid of local cultural significance but nonetheless functioned as important cultural sites, signifying the culture of tourism rather than the tourists' experience of culture. They were the essential localities of cultural and geographic transiency, and as such were embodiments of cultural change as well as cultural diversity. According to Augé, travelers often reported a sense of being in a non-space even as they entered their local airports. In line at an airline counter, they already had mentally left their place of origin. The non-spaces of the traveling world were strangely unmoored from their actual physical locale. The local population rarely frequented these places. By the same token, those who moved through them rarely experienced the culture of the local environment.[99]

The cultural impact of the rise in international tourism is harder to measure than its economic impact. Although the United Nations and other international organizations promoted tourism as a path toward greater understanding and peace, tourism created new sources of friction as differences in standards of living and social customs among various cultures became visible. By the early 1960s, American government officials became increasingly concerned that some American tourists' rowdy behavior and conspicuous display of wealth abroad would damage America's image in the world. A 1960 *Parade* magazine article on tourism warned American readers: "Don't be an Ugly American."[100] The article's author, Frances Knight, was the director of the US Passport Office, and thus familiar with complaints from foreign law enforcement agencies about American

tourists' delinquent behavior. Knight's rendering of the "Ugly American" as a spoiled and insensitive tourist inverted the meaning first put forward in the 1958 novel with the same title by Eugene Burdick and William J. Lederer. They portrayed the ugly American, a less-than-handsome American engineer named Homer Atkins, as the embodiment of the American spirit of grassroots entrepreneurship and benevolence. Burdick and Lederer's Ugly American helped the local population in a fictional Southeast Asian nation more effectively than any of the foreign service officials in the sheltered consulates of the capital.[101] Soon, however, Knight's version of the ugly American came to dominate the global public image: an image of Americans as loud, overprivileged, and demanding.

The rising tide of international tourism proved a mixed blessing for popular destinations. Local communities greatly benefited from the influx of foreign currency and the boost to their infrastructure, but they often chafed under the massive buildup of expensive hotels, restaurants, bars, and tourist attractions, most of which were beyond the means of local residents. In addition, many feared that these transformations undermined indigenous cultures. The problem became more prevalent in the 1970s when middle- and upper-middle-class Europeans and Asians joined Americans in their passion for travel, further internationalizing the world's prime resorts but also adding new sources of friction with local populations. In response, some communities began to regulate the expansion of the tourism business. Others were unable to counter the power of international hoteliers and travel agents. They stood by as their local communities turned into "non-places," tourist destinations without a cultural identity.

International travel was closely tied to international politics as well. The outbreak of domestic unrest or armed conflict in any region effectively shut down an area's tourist industry. In addition, for much of the Cold War, leisure travel between East and West was subject to tight control. Eastern Europeans who wanted to travel to the West were often in a catch-22. If their own country was willing to issue an exit visa, Western customs officials usually denied them an entry visa on the rationale that if their home country was willing to let them go, they must be at minimum ardent communists and possibly spies. Western Europeans and Americans also restricted their own citizens' travel into the Soviet Bloc, particularly those with known ties to the Communist Party. In the 1950s the United States confiscated the passports of leading communists and leftists, among them

Paul Robeson, W. E. B. Du Bois, the writer Albert E. Kahn, and Communist Party functionaries.[102] In 1958 the US Supreme Court ruled against the practice and reinstated the right of American citizens, communist and noncommunist, to travel abroad.[103] As Cold War tensions declined in the era of détente in the 1970s, both sides eased travel restrictions across the East–West divide.

Robeson and others on the political left, of course, were not tourists in search of places of leisure, but part of an increasingly active cohort of international political travelers. Their travel motives were twofold: to explore the political and social conditions in countries other than their own, and to transmit information abroad about social and political conditions in the United States. While the American government prevented leftists such as Robeson and Du Bois from engaging in this mission for much of the 1950s, it encouraged and promoted others who could transmit a benevolent image of the United States. In fact, the US government actively recruited artists, entertainers, and intellectuals to deliver America's message of freedom and democracy abroad. Bob Hope and the Harlem Globetrotters performed in front of mass audiences in the Soviet Union in 1959. Dizzy Gillespie, Louis Armstrong, Benny Goodman, and others played jazz in Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe in the late 1950s and 1960s. US policy makers pursued two related objectives with these international tours. First, they sought to capitalize on the growing international popularity of American mass culture, and second, by including African American entertainers they sought to counter the damaging image of the United States as a place of racial discrimination. Seeing itself in a fierce competition with the Soviet Union for the allegiance of nonwhite peoples in Africa and Asia, the United States was acutely aware of its own shortcomings in advancing racial equality and tried to overcome those by sending its black artists on tours abroad.[104]

Those who participated in these goodwill tours often gained a new and sometimes more critical perspective on American foreign policy. Among them were young Americans who since the early 1960s had joined the Peace Corps. Inspired by Kennedy's message about public service, these young idealists—around seventy thousand of them in the first decade since the inception of the Peace Corps in 1961—embarked on two-year sojourns into areas the US government deemed threatened by communist agitation.[105] When they returned, they brought with them a new appreciation for the hardships in underdeveloped ar-

eas, and sometimes a new appreciation for leftist and egalitarian political values.[106] Within the charged atmosphere of 1960s student protests, many Peace Corps volunteers became vocal advocates for the rights of the countries in which they had served.

Students and academics made up another group of transnational sojourners. Since the end of World War II the number of official exchange programs grew exponentially, as individuals and governments sought better educational opportunities for their youth abroad. In the 1950s the United States became a major destination for foreign students and academics, because the top US universities, many of them private, invested heavily in research and development. This was a remarkable reversal—only a few decades earlier the flow of students and academics had gone the other way, when well-heeled American students flocked to prestigious European universities for advanced academic training.[107]

The US government fostered educational exchange as another weapon in the arsenal of the cultural Cold War battles, both to attract brain power from abroad and to influence the future elites of foreign countries. A cultural agreement reached between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1958 included a provision for the exchange of students between the two nations. However, during the first year of the agreement only twenty students from the Soviet Union and the United States participated in the exchange, well short of American expectations. The Soviets remained cautious about the program, fearing possible recruitment of their own students for US intelligence. Even though Eisenhower dismissed their suspicions as unfounded, he must have been aware that the CIA at that very moment was infiltrating the National Students' Association, a strong lobbyist for increased US-Soviet student exchange. Despite well-founded Soviet concerns, the exchange program expanded to over fifteen hundred students from either side within the next two years.[108]

Soviets and Eastern Europeans also made an effort to recruit students from nonaligned countries in Africa and Asia. The education of the political and social elites at the major schools and universities of the industrialized world had been an integral part of colonial regimes, which is why decolonization left many citizens in the newly independent states suspicious of the educational mission in those countries. Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union thus offered a welcome alternative to the former centers of imperial power.[109] However, funding for

higher education in the Soviet Bloc lagged far behind the West, making it harder to recruit highly qualified students from the former colonies. The Soviet Union had to compete with the highly successful American Fulbright program, which brought thousands of students, academics, and professionals to the United States and sent thousands of American students and academics abroad. Established in 1946 through the efforts of Senator J. William Fulbright, Democratic senator from Arkansas, the program grew into a major government-funded organization with exchange programs in 144 countries. Throughout the Cold War, however, the Fulbright exchange program never transcended the Iron Curtain into Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.[110]

The global movement of people since World War II both exposed a great number of them to foreign cultures and in the process altered their understanding of their own cultural identity in relation to others. Cultural traditionalists often tried to stem the tide of cultural hybridization through demands for restrictions on immigration as well as more stringent requirements for the assimilation of outsiders into the dominant culture of the homeland. Others, particularly those who themselves had traveled to foreign places, were more likely to accept and welcome the increase in cultural diversity around the world as a permanent and irreversible fixture of the modern world. In fact, by the end of the twentieth century the ability to live, work, and communicate in more than one cultural orbit became an important asset for personal advancement. International studies, business, and language programs proliferated in all major universities, accelerating the pace of economic and cultural globalization. Those very changes further illustrated globalization's simultaneous drive toward homogenization and heterogenization.

Global Consumption

Ethnic diversity in urban areas manifested itself in material ways through the accelerated flow of goods across national boundaries after 1945. In fact, the emergence of a global marketplace for consumer goods might be globalization's most visible feature. The global marketplace reached a symbolic pinnacle on November 4, 2008, when the residents of Dubai celebrated the opening of what was then hailed as the world's largest indoor mall. The mall boasted a record number

of retail spaces (twelve hundred, of which only six hundred were occupied at the time of the opening), a record number of square feet (12 million), an indoor aquarium, a skating rink, a children's entertainment center, movie theaters, as well as restaurant and hotel facilities. The developers' promotional video dubbed the mall as the "new center of the earth."[111] Its opening came at a time when a global economic downturn and the precipitous drop in oil prices after an all-time high seriously jeopardized the financial viability of such grand-scale projects. Its location in the Middle East served as a manifestation of the shifting center of gravity of global capitalism, away from the old industrial powers of Europe and North America toward new areas of economic power.

The mall differed in scale but not in content from countless other retail malls in urban areas all over the world. The convergence of retailers from Europe, North America, and East Asia in a single space symbolized the globalization of consumption as well as the centrality of consumption in the evolution of a global culture. The mall represented not quite the world in a nutshell but the world on the equivalent of fifty soccer fields. The merchandise in the mall was as global as its clientele, because the majority of the mall's visitors were not native Emiratis. The array of stores within the mall—every major international retailer had moved in or reserved space—mirrored the array of international residents and tourists in Dubai. The mall epitomized the expansion of places of consumption beyond the industrialized North and West.[112] More significantly it seemed to confirm the worst fears of globalization's opponents, who had predicted that the overwhelming economic power of a generic Western consumer culture would crush indigenous cultures on the periphery.

Critics associate the rise of a global consumer culture with the rise of the United States to world hegemony and thus with the global spread of American consumer goods. But as the historian Kristin Hoganson has noted, the process of global consumption began before America's ascent to world power, at a time when the United States consumed more foreign products than it produced for foreign markets.[113] Americans had become avid consumers of imported goods already in the eighteenth century—so much so that some items, such as tea, became rallying points for political independence from Britain.[114]

Still earlier, Euro-Asian trade routes created a lively exchange of goods between the two worlds. Spices and tea brought from India and China transformed

European cooking and drinking. Coffee, a staple of Western society by the twentieth century, originated in Ethiopia and made its way through Turkey in the sixteenth century to Southern and Central Europe in the seventeenth century.[115] Travelers along the Silk Road, which stretched between Southeast Asia and the Mediterranean, transported fabrics, food, plants, earthenware, production techniques, and ideas. This exchange of goods and ideas established the patterns of cultural and material hybridization over three thousand years ago.[116] Consumption and the cultural transformations associated with it long preceded the rise of capitalism. Nonetheless, international trade expanded rapidly into Africa and the Americas during the age of exploration, and particularly since the emergence of mercantilism and capitalism.

The import of foreign goods into American households, which continued and even increased over time, has been overshadowed by the more dramatic rise in the export of American consumer goods worldwide in the twentieth century.[117] Selling America to the world became an integral part of US foreign policy by the end of World War II. Consuming America turned into a major pursuit in Western Europe in the early postwar period and across the globe by the 1970s. Yet while it is relatively easy to trace the spread of Coca-Cola or McDonald's branches abroad or to quantify the international proliferation of American movies and Starbucks coffeehouses, it has been far more difficult to determine the cultural and political impact of this proliferation.

Global consumption, more than any other development since 1945, has invited the charge of homogenization.[118] The sociologist Douglas Goodman postulated in 2007 that "to the extent that there is a global culture it will be a consumer culture."[119] If Goodman's premise is correct, then America as the leading producer and exporter of consumer goods in the world became the template for global culture. However, goods and cultural products such as music and film do not carry a fixed, normative meaning that is closely tied to their place of origin. Eating a McDonald's hamburger carries different cultural meaning for Taiwanese, Dutch, and American consumers. Sociologists, anthropologists, and cultural historians have only recently begun to explore in more depth the multiple meanings of objects in different cultural contexts, even though the global dissemination of goods began a long time ago.[120]

The German philosopher Walter Benjamin was one of the first scholars to ask about an object's relation to time and space. In a 1936 essay about the effects of mass production on the cultural meaning of art, he argued that through the new techniques of mechanical reproduction, art was losing its "aura," which he identified as its "presence in time and space, its unique existence at the place it happens to be." Through the process of mechanical reproduction, a work of art could be transferred in time and place and thus become "reactivated" in a vastly different context. This transfer, Benjamin concluded, represented a "tremendous shattering of tradition," commodifying but at the same time democratizing art by making it accessible to a broader audience.[121] From this critical perspective, the transfer of products of popular culture, especially film, from their place of original production in the United States to places of consumption anywhere in the world, stripped them of their "authenticity," their uniqueness in time and space. They became symbols of the generic nature of modern consumer culture. Benjamin was right about the epistemological unmooring of artifacts, whether art or consumer products, when removed from a specific time and place. But the loss of "aura" should not be confused with a loss of meaning. Consumers of art and artifacts reassembled the cultural meaning in ways specific to their own place and time.

Benjamin's analysis sheds light on European intellectual disputes over mass consumption and modernization since the beginning of the twentieth century. On one side were those who saw it as a tale of progress. Since industrialization, they argued, people had produced and consumed more, knew more, and lived longer and in greater comfort. In cultural terms, advocates associated modernization with a better-informed public, greater political participation (Benjamin's democratization), and greater equality of the sexes.[122] On the other side were those concerned about the loss of what Benjamin had called "aura" or authenticity. They saw in modernization the depersonalization of production, the loss of individualism in an increasingly technocratic and bureaucratic society, and the predominance of materialism and consumerism in people's lives. Spearheaded by the Frankfurt School in the 1920s and 1930s, this view became a major critique of Western industrial society in the period after World War II and helped spark the protest movements of the 1960s. Adherents of this view warned that

the forces of materialism and the overwhelming power of the capitalist system would replace indigenous cultures with generic ones stripped of any authentic meaning.[123]

Once scholars looked closely at the reception of global, mostly American, products abroad, they found more diversity than critics had predicted. McDonald's became a favorite object of investigation for anthropologists and sociologists, perhaps because its rapid global proliferation made it a prime target for attacks by cultural traditionalists. Founded by two brothers in suburban Los Angeles in 1937, the chain expanded nationally in the 1950s under the management and later ownership of Ray Kroc. Kroc applied the methods of Fordism and Taylorism to the preparation of food. The burgers and fries were "assembled" along a line of production much like Ford's Model T automobiles earlier in the century. The process made the product more uniform, cheaper, and thus accessible to a new set of consumers with limited means. Aided by the changes in American demographics and infrastructure—suburbanization and the baby boom—McDonald's thrived as an affordable restaurant choice for lower- and middle-class families in the United States. In the 1960s McDonald's began its international expansion, reaching 120 countries by the end of the century.[124] More than any other international brand, McDonald's came to symbolize the globalization of American culture. Apart from burgers and fries, the company sold a way of life associated with America: cosmopolitanism to some, generic blandness to others. Critics charged that McDonald's represented the worst of global culture, devoid of local authenticity. They saw Max Weber's dire prediction realized, that rationalization would restrict "the importance of charisma and of individually differentiated conduct."[125]

Rationalization and modernization became McDonald's greatest asset. In Asia, for instance, customers frequently cited high sanitary standards, the predictability of food choices, reliable quality, and the professional courtesy of the staff as major benefits of the restaurant chain. While customers associated eating at McDonald's with American culture, researchers found little indication that the presence of these restaurants threatened local customs. Instead, they found that the restaurant chain itself engaged in a process of indigenization and hybridization. Franchises adapted to local culinary and service preferences, while nearby businesses emulated some of McDonald's innovations.[126]

McDonald's represented only the tip of the iceberg of a rapidly expanding network of global retail chains. These businesses became part of what George Ritzer has termed McDonaldization, a process that has moved beyond fast food and retail into areas as diverse as education, child care, health care, travel, and leisure. The essential elements of McDonaldization, according to Ritzer, were efficiency, calculability (the emphasis on quantifiable aspects of products sold), predictability (service and product are the same everywhere), and control through technology.[127] Together these elements created a powerful formula with which to catapult local businesses onto a global market. McDonaldization appeared to have become the economic vehicle for the cultural homogenization of the world.

Ritzer belonged to a group of scholars concerned about the leveling effects of global capitalism. Others, such as the political scientist Benjamin Barber, emphasized the resilience of local cultures as well as the process of hybridization that gave rise to new cultural forms.[128] Barber saw both universalizing and particularizing forces at work and found each of them equally alarming. He called the leveling forces "McWorld" (much like Ritzer) and the particularizing forces "Jihad," which he defined as an exclusionary system of religious and ethnic separatism. In his estimation, both were anarchic and ultimately destructive social instruments, undermining democratic liberalism.[129] The sociologist Roland Robertson coined the term *glocalization* for the competing, at times contradictory effects of global consumption. He emphasized the locally specific adaptation of global products, including the possibility of a reverse flow of influence, in which local mutations of products influence the way they are consumed in the metropole.[130] However, critics, among them Ritzer, charged that the concept of glocalization ignored the realities of the overwhelming economic imbalance between multinational corporations and local producers, and the cultural consequences of that economic imbalance.[131]

The Politics of Consumption

Considering its long history, why did consumption become a central focus of the historiography of globalization only in the second half of the twentieth century? One answer might be the politicization of consumption in the early part of the

Cold War. The United States made the freedom to consume a central part of its ideological battle with the Soviet Union. A promotional segment in an American newsreel in the early 1950s juxtaposed the "sparkling assortment" of goods in American supermarkets and strip malls with the dreary and empty shelves in Soviet stores, establishing a direct connection between American consumerism and democracy. The freedom to buy appeared as critical to Western democracy as the freedom to vote.[132]

Postwar Germany and Japan became laboratories for America's brand of consumer democracy. US occupation officials stressed the need for material security and economic recovery as prerequisites for the democratization of these wartime enemies. In Germany the contrast between the consumer-oriented economy of the capitalist West and the collectivized planned economy favored by the Soviet Union became visible in dramatic fashion during the 1948 Berlin crisis, when the Soviets blocked all traffic to Berlin and the Western allies supplied the western part of the city through an airlift of food, fuel, and other vital goods. The airlift symbolically linked consumption to the Western democratic system by delivering planeloads of material goods into the heart of the Soviet occupation zone. When the blockade ended almost a year later and Germany split into two separate states, West Berlin, like West Germany, was enjoying the fruits of consumerism along with the Western system of democratic capitalism. Indicative of the prevalence of consumption in the West German understanding of democracy was a 1949 campaign poster for West Germany's leading conservative party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), which bore the slogan "Finally we can buy again."[133] The West German political establishment built its state on the promise of consumption. It fulfilled that promise beyond all expectations during the 1950s, known as the economic miracle years.

In Japan, American GIs delivered the message of the close links between democracy and consumer culture primarily through the distribution of scarce foods and goods to the local population. As in Germany, American cigarettes, nylon stockings, chewing gum, and PX rations circulated on the black market, and served as payment for sexual favors or as gifts. The Japanese national economy began its transformation toward a consumer economy in the early 1950s during its first postwar economic boom, much like Germany.[134] Over the next three decades its economy expanded dramatically, becoming a leading producer

A campaign poster of the Christian Democratic Union in the German state of North Rhine-Westphalia, 1948: "Finally, we can buy again." West Germany built its state on the promise of prosperity and consumption. It fulfilled that promise beyond all expectations during the 1950s, known as the years of the "economic miracle." (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung)

of consumer goods, particularly cars and consumer electronics. Consumption became an integral part of Japanese postwar political culture.

As the Cold War intensified, Americans pushed their products into political service, often with the help of private corporations interested in the global distribution of their goods. Coca-Cola, for instance, launched international advertising campaigns that linked the consumption of its signature beverage with the pursuit of freedom and democracy. During World War II it shipped its product everywhere American GIs went and in domestic advertising campaigns drew a close connection between the consumption of Coca-Cola and patriotism, freedom, and support for American troops. During the Cold War, James Farley, the chairman of the board of the Coca-Cola Export Corporation and an ardent anticommunist, infused advertisements with anticommunist messages. For the 1952 Olympic games in Helsinki he shipped thirty thousand cases of Coca-Cola in a rebuilt World War II landing craft to arrive in spectacular fashion on Finnish shores. Farley's amphibious invasion of a country on the fault line between capitalism and communism, even if armed only with a soft drink, suggested the close association between military and cultural weapons in the Cold War.[135] It also mirrored the global proliferation of American consumer culture.

The Cold War politics of consumption moved center stage during the famous "kitchen debate" between US vice president Richard Nixon and Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev at the American National Exhibition in Moscow in July 1959. A year earlier the United States and the Soviet Union had struck an agreement to mount national exhibitions in each other's country. The Soviet Union held its exhibition in New York in June and July 1959, while the Americans followed suit in Moscow the next month. The Soviets put on display samples of heavy machinery and space technology, including a model of the 1957 Russian satellite *Sputnik*.[136] By contrast, American exhibitors chose to present not heavy industry and high technology but ordinary consumer goods. Financed in large part by American corporations—the US Congress contributed only $3.6 million in federal funds—the exhibition included Sears sewing machines, Hoover vacuum cleaners, and the entire contents of a model ranch house, complete with a fully equipped kitchen, which became the backdrop for a spirited debate between Khrushchev and Nixon about the benefits of communism over capitalism: "Your American houses are built to last only 20 years so builders



Three Wayuu women wait for a bus at a gas station in Venezuela underneath an advertisement for Coca-Cola, ca. 1955. The brand symbolized the global proliferation of American consumer culture. The head of Coca-Cola's export division, James Farley, sought to put his product to work in the service of containing communism worldwide. (Getty Images)

could sell new houses at the end," the Russian premier charged. "We build firmly. We build for our children and grandchildren." Nixon retorted with a telling hint toward the primacy of consumption: "American houses last for more than 20 years, but, even so, after twenty years, many Americans want a new house or a new kitchen. Their kitchen is obsolete by that time. . . . The American system is designed to take advantage of new inventions and new techniques."[137] Nixon emphasized Americans' desire for new consumer products whereas Khrushchev emphasized Soviet production skills.

The debate symbolized the paradoxes of Soviet attitudes toward consumption during the 1950s. On the one hand, Khrushchev seemed to reject the conspicuous consumption on display in the US high-tech kitchen model. On the other hand, he claimed for the Soviet Union success in the area of mass consumption, thus validating mass consumption as a national goal.[138] For Nixon and the exhibition's organizers, the higher quality of American consumer goods and the superior living standard of ordinary Americans became the major argument for the superiority of the Western capitalist system. The exhibition also included a display of an American voting booth, but that symbol of democracy was overshadowed by the dazzling array of American consumer gadgets. The American company PepsiCo, one of the sponsors of the exhibit, distributed free soft drinks to visitors, further driving home the message of material abundance in the United States. The Moscow exhibit suggested that in the United States life was far more comfortable than in the Soviet Union, and that this comfort was grounded in the material goods available to ordinary citizens rather than the abstract freedoms and democratic privileges they enjoyed.

The American exhibition in Moscow put into sharper relief Soviet and Eastern European shortcomings in the development of consumer goods, despite Khrushchev's effort to conceal them. He had been aware of the potential political fallout from the widening material gap between East and West and had already delivered a promise at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 to increase living standards in the Soviet Union. Following his famous denunciation of Stalinism, he declared, "We are setting ourselves the task of overtaking and surpassing the richest capitalist countries in the matter of per capita consumption, of achieving a complete abundance in our country of every type of consumers' goods."[139]

The thaw that followed, however, did not produce the desired prosperity but instead accelerated disaffection in several Eastern European countries, culminating in strikes and riots in Poland in the summer of 1956, followed by a popular uprising in Hungary in October and November. Soviet troops intervened and crushed the revolt, demonstrating the limits of the post-Stalinist liberalization. Stalinist methods thus prevailed in the political realm, even though changes were under way in the cultural realm, particularly in the creative arts, where modernism took hold in industrial design and architecture.[140]

The push for consumer goods occurred in other socialist states as well. East Germany's ruling party, the Socialist Unity Party, announced at its Fifth Party Congress in July 1958 that by 1961 the GDR would not only reach, but surpass, the per capita consumption of its West German rival. The objective, declared party leader Walter Ulbricht, was to show the superiority of the socialist social order over the imperialist forces of the Bonn regime.[141] Manufacturers increasingly turned from housing to furniture, household goods, and fashion design in the 1960s. East Germany became the Eastern Bloc's leading manufacturer of plastics and other synthetic goods, relying on a well-developed chemical industry dating back to the prewar years.[142]

East Germans used thermoplastics in the manufacturing of a wide variety of products, from household goods to cars. These cars were meant to showcase East Germany's progress toward a consumer society. Instead they became symbols of socialism's failures in consumer manufacturing and marketing. East Germans had to wait an average of fifteen years for the delivery of a Trabant model. The design of the car and its sister model, the Wartburg, changed little over the years. East German officials hailed the longevity of the design as a sign of the superiority of the socialist over the capitalist system. "In the USA," one Socialist design analyst postulated in the late 1950s, "large amounts of plastics are produced. But they are made in the main into worthless, cheap and shockingly kitschy mass wares, into Woolworth products. Owing to their mania for ornamentation, these in turn tend to be rendered quickly obsolete by something new and more fashionable." Socialist production, by contrast, the statement continued, focused on long-term practicality, thus implicitly condemning America's wasteful consumption.[143]

Eastern European government officials proved only marginally more amenable to shifting tastes in clothing during the 1950s. Long production cycles and the five-year economic plan made it virtually impossible to keep up with the fast pace of changing designs offered in the West. By the end of the decade, however, officials were confronted with the increasing popularity of American-style casual clothing. Blue jeans and T-shirts became prized commodities in an underground market of Western consumer goods. Jeans in particular served as a symbol of youthful rebellion against the strict norms of traditional European society, in both East and West. While Western European conservatives ultimately accepted the commodification of youth culture, their Eastern European counterparts continued to deride it as evidence of capitalist materialism and decadence, and, worse still, as an incentive to juvenile delinquency and a threat to communist ideology.

Soviet officials uncoupled their disdain for Western materialism from their own push toward increased consumption and modernization. Khrushchev packaged higher living standards as a socialist goal. He acknowledged that shortages in consumer goods were a major source of dissatisfaction for Soviet and Eastern European citizens and resolved to build a consumer economy within the ideological parameters of the Soviet system.[144] This meant accelerating the production of domestic versions of Western consumer icons, including passenger vehicles and American-style jeans.[145]

The Soviet effort to create consumer socialism without ideological reform ultimately failed. Consumption championed individualism and private ownership. Ownership of automobiles and homes gave citizens more freedoms, more privacy, and more mobility, thus limiting the possibility of state surveillance and control. By endorsing consumption, communist states allowed limited free expression in material terms while still curtailing it in word and image. However, they soon discovered that objects could symbolize political rebellion against the state. Appearing in public in authentic American jeans, for instance, could symbolize political dissent in the context of the Cold War. Consumption in the communist bloc remained a highly politicized and contested arena throughout the duration of the Cold War.

More importantly, however, Eastern European governments could not deliver the goods. Despite public promises to outdo the West in the production of

consumer goods, Eastern European manufacturers lacked the material resources to launch large-scale production of their new designs, whether jeans, household goods, or cars. Design and propaganda consistently outperformed real existing production in Eastern Europe. East Germans, in particular, became acutely aware of their own material shortcomings as they compared their own postwar living standard to that in West Germany.[146]

Even though political barriers kept Western consumer goods out of the communist bloc, advances in transportation technology facilitated their spread everywhere else. They allowed local products to reach a global market and respond to consumer demands faster than ever. International brands such as Coca-Cola relied on cheap production, an international distribution network, and global marketing. Advances in communication technology provided another vehicle for the globalization of consumer products, primarily through new means to advertise products to a global clientele. Advertising evolved as an industry in the United States in the 1920s and expanded rapidly in all major industrial countries in the postwar period. Advertising agents became major interpreters of popular culture and producers of popular desires. They fine-tuned their messages to local, national, and international markets, and tweaked a product's image to match the cultural, social, and economic environment of their target audiences. Advertisers proliferated their messages through print, audio, and, by the 1950s, television media. As new communications technologies reached larger audiences, advertising became increasingly profitable. The advent of television in particular offered the opportunity to broadcast visual messages to millions of people simultaneously, thus greatly accelerating a product's national and international recognition.

Although the webs of consumption drew an increasingly larger number of people from different parts of the world closer together, it is important to recognize that many of the world's poor remained outside of that globalized consumer society. Consumption signified and reinforced inequality and thus, by extension, difference. Most of the poor in the industrialized and the developing world had access to the images of luxury consumer goods through billboards, newspapers, and television screens, yet they did not necessarily have access to the goods themselves. The inequalities remained largely tied to the North–South differential, yet not exclusively so. In many places, particularly in the global South, abject poverty and conspicuous wealth existed side by side within a single locale. As

urban elites became linked to a universal community of global consumers, they were separated from their impoverished neighbors by the inequalities of class.

Like other areas of globalization, consumption fostered both homogenization and heterogenization as consumers made individually, economically, and culturally determined choices in the marketplace. Middle- and upper-class consumers in major population centers enjoyed a greater choice of products, but that same diversity replicated itself in every other metropolitan area of the world. Whether consumers entered the Dubai Mall in the United Arab Emirates or the Mall of America in suburban Minnesota, they could count on finding a core group of global brands. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, class more than nationality seemed to separate people's experience as consumers.

3. *Challenging Cultural Norms*

AS the pace and volume of transnational exchanges of goods and people accelerated, challenges to dominant cultural norms and practices multiplied. Beginning in the late 1950s these cultural challenges burst onto the political stage, undermining the power of cultural and political elites everywhere. Civil rights advocates in the United States demanded racial equality before the law. Youth in Europe, the Americas, and East Asia demanded greater cultural and political freedoms, undermining the Cold War consensus in East and West. Women challenged gender and sexual norms and demanded equal rights. And religious groups demanded both greater tolerance of different belief systems and a return to fundamental religious values in an increasingly secular world. These transformations raised important questions about the effects of the greater connectivity of the world's cultures across vast distances. Did they create a better understanding of and higher tolerance for cultural difference, or did they instead cause increasing cultural fragmentation and the potential for cultural conflict?

Transnational Youth Cultures

Young people more than any other population group drove the postwar movement toward cultural globalization. Emerging first in Western industrialized countries, but eventually spreading globally, young people began to identify increasingly with a deterritorialized culture of shared tastes in music, fashion, language, and behavior across national boundaries. They sought connections to a transnational youth community independent of, and often in opposition to, dominant regional and national cultures, provoking intergenerational conflict within their own communities. They played a vital role in resisting and ultimately undermining the pressures toward conformity within their home societies. Their search for alternatives began in the cultural realm with the creation of cultural niches within existing structures. By the 1960s the search turned into a

TABLE 4.1

Crude birth rates (number of births per 1,000 people per year): Germany, Japan, and United States

Year	Germany	Japan	USA
1945	16.1	30.9*	20.4
1950	16.3	28.1	24.1
1955	15.8	19.4	25.0
1960	17.4	17.2	23.7
1965	17.4	18.6	19.4

Sources: Statistiches Bundesamt Deutschland, Genesis, table 12612-0016: "Lebendgeborene je 1000 Einwohner: Deutschland, Jahre," www.genesis.destatis.de/genesis/online; Japan, Statistics Bureau, *Historical Statistics of Japan*, chap. 2, "Population and Households," table 2-24, "Live Births by Sex and Sex Ration of Live Birth, 91872-2004," www.stat.go.jp/english/data/chouki/02.htm;Michael R. Haines, "Crude Birth Rate and General Fertility Rate, by Race: 1800–1998," table Ab40-51, in *Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the Present: Millennial Edition*, edited by Susan B. Carter, Scott Sigmund Gartner, Michael R. Haines, Alan L. Olmstead, Richard Sutch, and Gavin Wright (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ISBN-9780511132971.Ab40-643.

* Data from 1943.

political challenge to those very structures, leading to political and cultural fragmentation.

The concept of a separate youth culture became identified primarily with American popular culture in the early postwar period. The reasons for the American predominance lay in the historical role of the United States in the production and dissemination of mass entertainment, dating back to the interwar period, but also in key postwar economic and demographic developments in the United States. Economically Americans emerged from the Great Depression and war with unprecedented productive capacity. The manufacturing of consumer goods coupled with the social and economic consequences of the baby boom (see Table 4.1) fueled America's postwar economic prosperity and ensured the dominance of American products on the world market well into the 1960s.

Demographic changes influenced the evolution of a separate youth culture in the United States. Birth rates rose from 2.4 children per family during the Depression to 3.2 in the 1950s.[147] Suburbs around New York, Cleveland, Chicago,

and Los Angeles expanded rapidly, where a growing middle class raised the baby-boom generation. Suburban life revolved around the needs and desires of these baby boomers. As these children grew into teenagers in the 1950s, they became a major force in the development of a separate youth culture as their tastes in fashion, music, and entertainment began to diverge significantly from those of their elders and their purchasing power helped shape the national and international market in consumer products.

The postwar children confronted in their parents a generation that came of age during the Depression and war and retreated to the suburbs in search of security, financial stability, and middle-class status. The sociologist David Riesman presented a psychological profile of the Depression generation in his study *The Lonely Crowd* (1950). He identified the other-directed individual as the dominant social type of the postwar generation, a type that sought to fulfill the expectations of those around him or her, to fit into a social environment prescribed by others. Riesman's stinging critique of postwar society would resonate with youthful rebels over the next two decades.[148]

By the mid-1950s, Riesman's diagnosis had become embedded in fiction and nonfiction works. Sloan Wilson's 1955 novel, *The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit*, illustrated the struggles of middle management employees who needed to come to terms with work, home life, rising material expectations, and their wartime traumas.[149] The novel addresses two key social expectations of men: as successful breadwinners and caring fathers. Both were supposed to define the successful man in the postwar era, and both at times stood in direct conflict with each other. The 1959 book *The Status Seekers* by Vance Packard exposed the social constraints faced by an expanding middle class. Packard produced a meticulous analysis of the social stratification of American society, concluding that the rise of big corporations in the United States made the American ideal of social mobility and individual creativity ever harder to achieve.[150] The monotony and conformity of the workplace seemed to undermine some of the core values of the American dream.

America's postwar youth culture emerged in opposition to these social pressures toward conformity and rising expectations. The first to mount the challenge were working-class youth who felt excluded from the rising living standards and better employment opportunities afforded their middle-class peers. In the early

postwar years they developed a distinct style of dress, language, and musical taste that drew on African American music and culture, and rejected middle-class conventions and codes of conduct. The look and language of working-class youth culture received national attention through the 1953 movie *The Wild One*, starring Marlon Brando as Johnny, the leader of a working-class motorcycle club. Johnny and his fellow motorcyclists wear blue jeans and black leather jackets, making them oddly conformist in their nonconformity. The plot was loosely based on a real-life incident in July 1947 when about four thousand motorcyclists terrorized the small town of Hollister in central California for several days.[151] Even though the movie was highly critical of the disrespectful and destructive behavior of the club members, it tried to provide a psychological and sociological explanation for their behavior. Johnny's rebellion seems random and unfocused at first. When one of the patrons in the local bar asks him what he is rebelling against, he answers: "What have you got?" But as he develops a close bond with Kathie, a waitress and daughter of the local police chief, he reveals his emotional scars, brought on by the physical abuse suffered at the hands of his father. He bonds with Kathie because she too has a difficult relationship with her father, who shows no backbone as a law enforcement official and is pushed around by both the townspeople and the motorcycle youth. The movie makes a statement as much about fatherhood as about youthful delinquency. It suggests that both abusive and spineless fathers are to blame for the troubled youth.

Two other films consolidated youth rebellion as a blockbuster genre in Hollywood. In *Blackboard Jungle,* a young Sidney Poitier plays an inner-city high school student who with his classmates challenges the authority of one of his teachers. *Blackboard Jungle* adds a layer of racial conflict to the theme of delinquent working-class youth who both rebel against and crave parental authority. *Blackboard Jungle*, like *The Wild One*, critiques as well as humanizes youth behavior and blames broken families and insufficient parental supervision.[152] That same year, the emerging youth icon James Dean played the role of a disillusioned high school student in search of love and parental guidance in *Rebel without a Cause*. Dean made youth culture attractive to white middle-class adolescents. The three protagonists in the film, Jim (James Dean), Plato (Sal Mineo), and Judy (Natalie Wood) all feel alienated from their parents—Jim because his father is not standing up to his overbearing and controlling mother; Judy because she

Marlon Brando leans on a motorcycle in a scene from *The Wild One*, 1953. The movie showcased American youth culture in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Brando became an international icon of youthful rebellion. (Getty Images)

feels rejected by her father, who seems emotionally cold and fails to relate to her since she has become an adolescent; and Plato because his father left him when he was a little boy and his mother is largely absent, leaving him in the care of a housekeeper. The three of them create an imaginary nuclear family with Jim and Judy assuming parental roles toward Plato. They search for authenticity, emotional support, and moral guidance, yet receive only material comforts and emotional rejection from their parents.[153] The movie's critique of the shallowness of the parents' lives foreshadowed the political and cultural critique of American materialism launched by the New Left in the 1960s.

The spiritual rift between the generations was amplified by the emergence of a new genre in music: rock and roll. In the postwar period, young Americans, many of them white, experimented with new forms of rhythm that drew on jazz, blues, and other black musical traditions. Bill Haley, Buddy Holly, Elvis Presley, and others drew on African American music to create their distinctive rhythm and sound.[154] The established industry at first rejected Elvis's music until he found fame through a little-known label, Sun Records. Still, because of the African American influence, white radio hosts in the South refused to play his songs. Some black radio stations also rejected his music because they knew he was white and felt he had pirated songs from black musicians.[155] After his breakthrough in the mid-1950s, conservative critics, mostly whites, were appalled not only by the sound of his music, but also by his sexually suggestive dance moves. They accused him of being both oversexed and effeminate. Because his public performances often generated uncontrollable screams and even riots among his fans, law enforcement officials saw him as a threat to public order. Despite the negative reactions, or maybe because of them, Presley's popularity quickly rose to phenomenal heights in the United States and abroad. Young people copied his dance moves, his hair (which Elvis dyed black to look like the actor Tony Curtis), and his way of dressing. His music as well as his public appearance had no precedent and therefore became easily recognizable when copied, and his style became a vehicle for challenging established cultural norms and social conventions.

Urban youth in Europe and Japan adopted the dress styles, music preferences, and even some linguistic terms from their American counterparts, and they did so for much the same reasons: to challenge the deeply conservative and conform-

ist culture of their parents' generation.[156] Jazz, rock, blue jeans, cigarettes, and chewing gum became universal symbols of postwar youth rebellion. In the United Kingdom, the "Mods" embraced modern consumerism and stylish clothes, rode around on Italian scooters, and listened to rhythm and blues. Their model was not so much the American rocker as the American version of the Italian mafioso. They listened to jazz and congregated in urban coffee bars.[157] In Germany these youth became known as *Halbstarke*. They rode around on motorcycles, sported Elvis-like hairstyles, and wore jeans and leather jackets, emulating Marlon Brando and James Dean. More worrisome to their parents was the sudden spike in juvenile rioting and crime in the mid-1950s.[158] Rather than searching for indigenous causes, West German officials identified the riots as a problem imported from America, reviving the interwar debates about the evils of Americanization. They thus turned a domestic generational conflict into an imported cultural one.

America's youth culture seeped into Eastern Europe as well, where young people followed closely the trends of their peers in the West. East Germans had access to the latest trends in American popular culture through Western radio stations, such as West Berlin's Rundfunk im amerikanischen Sektor (RIAS) and the Voice of America. They also frequently crossed over into West Berlin to watch newly released American movies. East Berlin authorities estimated that in 1956 and 1957 around twenty-six thousand East Berliners attended West Berlin movie theaters every day.[159] American-style motorcycle gangs proliferated in the East as well. East German government officials condemned these youth trends in much the same ways as the West did: as a threat to public order and a foreign import. For East German authorities, however, ideological concerns were at stake as well. They interpreted the behavior and dress styles of the *Halbstarken* as a mindless adoption of the materialist culture of the capitalist West and therefore a threat not only to German traditions but also to the ideology of socialism.[160] By the late 1950s the East German state stepped up its assault on rock and roll. Party leader Walter Ulbricht and defense minister Willi Stoph declared that rock and roll was an anarchistic and capitalist invasion and a threat to East Germany's national security. Law enforcement officials meted out harsh punishments for fans who dared to advocate or listen to the music in public. In one typical incident in the fall of 1959, the courts sentenced fifteen Leipzig youth

demonstrators to jail because they had marched through the streets demanding rock and roll rather than a watered-down domestic version called the Lipsi, and booing the Socialist leadership.[161]

In postwar Poland, American youth culture seeped into the domestic scene through a group called the *Bikiniarze* (Bikini Boys), named for the American atomic test site on the Bikini Atoll in the South Pacific. The *Bikiniarze*, primarily located in Warsaw, were easily identifiable in public by their Western clothes and public mannerisms. They listened to jazz, smoked American cigarettes, and called each other by American names. Polish authorities derided them as hooligans *(chuligani)* and accused them of sexually promiscuous behavior.[162] In Czechoslovakia, fans of American pop culture called themselves *pásek*; in Hungary they were the *jampec*.[163] Across Europe, socialist as well as capitalist, state authorities shared similar concerns about American materialism, cultural imperialism, and social disintegration.

For European youth Americanization meant something entirely different, however. It stood for emancipation, modernization, and in some cases democratization. They perceived their embrace of American pop culture not as cultural imperialism but as rebellion against the cultural conformity and authoritarianism of their parents' generation and the state. America thus became an integral part of the domestic intergenerational conflicts between cultural homogeneity and heterogeneity.[164] Local youth utilized the foreign as a way to challenge what they perceived as conformism at home. From their perspective American popular culture offered diversity rather than imposed conformity.

Not even the Soviet Union could prevent the spread of American pop culture among its youth, despite state officials' concerted efforts in the first decade after the war to keep Americanization at bay. In 1946 Stalin appointed General Andrei Zhdanov to oversee the propaganda campaign against Westernization. Zhdanov was a highly accomplished veteran of the Second World War, having led the defense of Leningrad during the German assault. By the early 1950s, after Zhdanov's death, the anti-American campaign zeroed in on a group called the *stilyagi*, or "style hunters," which had emerged in the late 1940s in Soviet cities. They dressed in stylish suits with long, broad-shouldered jackets and narrow trousers, reminiscent of the Zoot-suiters of Depression-era Los Angeles. *Stilyagis* wore their hair long, listened to jazz, and adopted American names. They took

their stylistic cues from American movie actors whose films had made it past the censorship office, among them Johnny Weissmuller, whose masculine primitivism displayed in *Tarzan* appealed to the young, and James Cagney, whose underworld slang in *The Roaring Twenties* they soon adopted. Terms like *dudes, chicks,* and *groovy* became standard elements of the *stilyagis*' language. These youths were not only challenging the cultural conformity of the Stalinist system, they were also calling into question the traditional values of hard work and folk traditions of their parents' generation. Much like American psychologists and youth specialists, Soviet officials blamed parents for providing insufficient guidance to the youngsters who were "hanging around doing nothing."[165] They also frequently harassed the *stilyagi* by rounding them up for misdemeanors and petty crimes.

During Khrushchev's post-Stalinist thaw, attitudes toward Western music and Western-influenced youth groups gradually softened. Perhaps in an effort to co-opt Western music for Soviet political objectives, the Soviet government invited Eastern and Western jazz bands to the sixth World Festival of Youth in Moscow in 1957, thus effectively ending the ban on jazz. Along with jazz musicians came rock and roll aficionados who popularized hits like Bill Haley's "Rock around the Clock." By linking the popular music of the capitalist West to the ideological precepts of international communism and the youth festival's theme of Peace and Friendship, Soviet officials hoped to turn communism into a political doctrine acceptable to and even popular with youth. The festival might not have succeeded on the ideological front, but it did succeed in giving both jazz and American rock music their popular breakthrough in the Eastern Bloc.[166]

The Moscow festival was by far the biggest in a series of gatherings organized by the World Federation of Democratic Youth since 1947. It marked the first time that the Soviet Union had invited large numbers of foreigners into the Soviet heartland. According to official Soviet statistics, a record thirty-four thousand guests from 131 countries attended. Together with domestic participants, estimates of attendance at the opening ceremony alone reached as high as two million.[167] Western governments, including the United States, actively discouraged their youth organizations from attending the festival, portraying it as a giant political indoctrination camp. Those who ignored the warnings encountered in Moscow an openness that shattered their preconceptions about life in

the Soviet system. American reporters who covered the festival noted the critical impact of the 160 American participants, who frequently engaged Eastern European and Soviet youth in debates about US and Soviet policies, including the recent invasion of Hungary.[168]

Throughout the duration of the festival, Soviet authorities and police exercised remarkable restraint, tolerating open access to Western popular culture, political debate, and the forging of personal relations. A surprising number of those personal contacts morphed into romantic relationships, as contemporary observers noted with a mixture of wonder and alarm.[169] Many young Soviets would later credit the youth festival with transforming their views about Western culture and politics and with leading them into political opposition in the 1960s and 1970s.[170] Although this and subsequent youth festivals had far less of an impact on Western youth, they nonetheless helped lay the foundation for a transnational cultural and political dialogue. Moscow strengthened the determination of an entire generation to overcome the Cold War divide, fleeting and illusionary as it may have been.

Political Rebellion

The politicization of international youth culture occurred at different moments in East and West in response to local as well as global concerns. In the United States, the civil rights movement became a major catalyst for galvanizing youth activism in the late 1950s. Organizations like the NAACP had fought racial discrimination since the early twentieth century, primarily in the courts and without significant grassroots participation. This changed in the 1950s when African Americans began to stage large-scale popular campaigns, such as the Montgomery bus boycott in 1956, the Greensboro lunch counter sit-ins in 1960, and the 1963 effort to desegregate the commercial district in downtown Birmingham, Alabama. These campaigns drew international attention and led to significant pressure on the federal government to address the problem of racial discrimination in the United States.[171] By the 1960s, America's civil rights struggle became deeply enmeshed in the decolonization movements in Africa and Asia, Cold War politics, and the American war in Vietnam.

Young activists not only played a critical role in the struggle for racial equality in the United States; they also began to challenge the international Cold War order. In the late 1950s they joined long-established groups of pacifists, leftist intellectuals, and concerned scientists in Japan, Western Europe, and the United States, calling for an end to the nuclear arms race, which had escalated since the Soviet Union acquired the atomic bomb in 1949.[172] By 1960 the antinuclear campaign had grown into a mass movement of young activists on college campuses across the industrialized North and West who questioned the ideological divisions of the Cold War and demanded the abolition of nuclear weapons. They advocated peaceful coexistence, borrowing vocabulary cultivated by the Soviet Union since the 1940s, but at the same time they rejected the ideological precepts of the Soviet system just as they rejected the Western system of unfettered capitalism. Their unique political position outside the traditional parameters of the ideological spectrum of the Cold War converged in the transnational movement of the New Left.[173]

Ideologically the origins of the New Left lay with the neo-Marxist theories of the Frankfurt School, led by Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and Herbert Marcuse. In the United States, students also drew on the sociologists David Riesman and C. Wright Mills and the French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre. Sartre's existentialism admonished its adherents to rely on their inner consciousness to give meaning to their own existence rather than conform to outside expectations, much like Riesman's idealization of the inner-directed personality. Adorno and Horkheimer, in turn, critiqued the mindlessness of modern materialism, which, in their view, crushed cultural originality and rendered humanity susceptible to totalitarian indoctrination. They regarded the Soviet implementation of Marxist ideology as well as the materialist impulses of Western consumer society as failures, leading to the loss of political and cultural autonomy. Modern mass media collaborated by culturally indoctrinating and depoliticizing citizens.[174]

The philosophical and cultural critique of mass culture and Western democracy found expression in the 1962 Port Huron Statement, the founding statement of the American New Left organization Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). Its main author, Tom Hayden, had become involved in student politics at

the University of Michigan. The Port Huron Statement advocated "participatory democracy," the return to direct citizens' engagement with the political process. Drawing on Horkheimer, Adorno, Sartre, and Mills, the statement observed the growing alienation among students and citizens, the increasing bureaucratization of everyday life, and the lack of autonomy of workers, managers, and students. It shifted the locus of radical political activism from the traditional base of the Left—the industrial workplace—to the university and the corporate office complex.[175] The statement reflected the generational transformation from the traditional political assumptions of the old Marxist Left to the grassroots activism of the New Left.

Racial equality, the prevention of nuclear war, and national liberation movements in the Third World emerged as core elements of the New Left agenda in the United States and Western Europe over the course of the 1960s. Some of the more radical groups began to conceive of their opposition against government restrictions in their own country as part of a global struggle against colonialism and imperialism. Militant activists were particularly inspired by Frantz Fanon, who argued in *The Wretched of the Earth* that violence was an inevitable part of the liberation of the colonized from the colonizer.[176] His writings offered a pragmatic rationale for their romantic notion of the militant Third World revolutionary, exemplified by figures such as Ho Chi Minh, Che Guevara, and Mao Zedong. Che Guevara in particular achieved iconic status among Western youth by the mid-1960s as he moved from one guerrilla campaign to the next. After helping Fidel Castro oust the Cuban leader Fulgencio Batista on New Year's Day 1959, he continued his revolutionary struggle first in the Congo and later in Bolivia, both without success. Che was captured in the Bolivian mountains on October 8, 1967, and executed two days later.[177] His death cemented his mythical status as a hero of the militant struggle for national liberation, a myth that endures to this day.[178]

It would be wrong to conclude, however, that violence was a foreign import into the Western world through revolutionary fighters like Che Guevara or radical writers like Fanon. Violence had been an integral aspect of the 1960s youth protests worldwide. In the United States, violence occurred among angry mobs of white segregationists who assaulted peaceful protesters at lunch counter sit-ins across the South. Police beat civil rights protesters or sent dogs to attack

them at marches, as they did in Birmingham, Alabama, in May 1963. Militant segregationists bombed churches, lynched African Americans, and assassinated civil rights leaders, including Medgar Evers and Martin Luther King. By the mid-1960s, violence erupted frequently in American cities as frustration with police injustice and the slow pace of civil rights reform mounted. Some riots were sparked by instances of police brutality, others occurred in response to street violence and murder. In the aftermath of Martin Luther King's assassination in April 1968, riots occurred in cities across the country, including Chicago, Baltimore, and Washington, DC.[179] A few months later at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago, police chased and beat protesters in what an official report later called a "police riot."[180] The state thus both initiated and became the target of violence throughout the 1960s.

In Europe, too, state violence begat popular violence in a vicious cycle that escalated in the late 1960s. When German students took to the streets of Berlin in June 1967 to protest the visit of the shah of Iran, a police officer shot and killed a demonstrator, Benno Ohnesorg. The killing of an innocent protestor—Ohnesorg had been shot in the back of the head and thus could not have posed an imminent threat to the police as initially claimed—galvanized the student population across Germany.[181] It also catapulted Rudi Dutschke, leader of the Berlin branch of the German SDS (Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund) to national prominence. Dutschke himself became the victim of violence a year later when a young radical rightist shot him in the head on April 11, 1968, apparently inspired by the hateful anti-Dutschke reporting in the sensationalist conservative German newspaper *Bild* and the assassination a week earlier of Martin Luther King. Dutschke narrowly survived the attack, but died a decade later from related health problems.[182] Already radicalized after the Ohnesorg killing, students turned their anger against the media and the government. The most radical among them joined or supported militant organizations, such as the June 2 Movement, the Baader-Meinhof Group, and the Red Army Faction (RAF). From the 1970s to the 1990s the RAF engaged in bombing attacks, kidnappings, and murders of leading industrial and political figures.[183]

Violence also erupted on the streets of Paris in May 1968, as student protesters clashed with police in what became known as the "night of the barricades." The clashes represented the culmination of months of unrest that had begun earlier

that year at one of the city's suburban campuses in Nanterre. The initial protests were directed at university regulations, chief among them strict rules prohibiting men from entering women's dormitories. When administrators showed no sign of relenting, the protests intensified and the catalog of grievances expanded.[184] It ultimately encompassed a broad critique of the conservative social and political course of the de Gaulle government, a demand for greater democratic participation of students in the governance of the university and the state, and outrage over the increasingly aggressive measures of the local police in quashing student protests. By early May the protests had spread beyond Nanterre to the Sorbonne in the heart of Paris. The more the conflict escalated, the more support the protesters received from moderates who had become convinced of the authorities' abuse of power. During the night of the barricades on May 10–11, prompted by the arrest of more than two hundred students who were held without recourse to legal representation, several thousand students set up roadblocks and engaged in street battles with the police in the Latin Quarter of Paris. Several hundred suffered injuries and more activists were arrested.[185]

Building on the momentum of the student protests, French labor unions announced a general strike on May 13 that almost brought down the national government. Notably absent in this struggle were the French Communist Party and the Communist-dominated labor union, the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT). They supported neither the students nor the workers' demand for autogestion (self-management). The French communists saw the rise of the New Left student movements as a threat to their dominance on the political left, and they were not altogether wrong. The students and workers challenged the regimented and hierarchical authority of the Communist Party elite. Daniel Cohn-Bendit, leader of the *enragés,* as the student protesters became known, often attacked the communists as authoritarian "Stalinist slobs."[186] The student-worker coalition in France challenged both state authority and the predominance of the Old Left in French politics. However, despite the pressure from below, little changed permanently in the French political system. The next French national election in June produced a decisive victory for conservatives under President de Gaulle.

State authorities on the other side of the Iron Curtain viewed the Western protest movements with increasing unease. They shared the French communists' concerns regarding the loss of control over the leftist political agenda. Rather

than interpreting these protests as an encouraging sign of the imminent collapse of the capitalist system, Eastern European government officials feared that the spirit of protest could incite Eastern European youth against their own governments. Thus, when reform movements emerged in Poland and Czechoslovakia in the mid-1960s, Soviet and other Eastern European leaders reacted with alarm. The Prague Spring of 1968 became the Cold War era's biggest social, cultural, and political challenge to the Soviet Bloc system until its collapse in 1989. The Soviet response to this challenge—a joint military invasion by most of the Warsaw Pact countries—effectively crushed any hope for a reform of the system for the next twenty years.[187]

The initial impetus for reform in Czechoslovakia came not from students, as in the West, but from the country's literary elites. However, their critique of Czech socialism resonated with the nation's students, intellectuals, and professionals, who transformed the critique into a broader reform movement. Participants at the Fourth Writers' Congress of Czechoslovakia, June 27–29, 1967, openly criticized the Czech Communist Party's policies, particularly those concerning restrictions on free speech. One of the speakers, the poet Pavel Kohout, told listeners that it was "the duty of our congress, the congress of a union to which the great majority of writers and commentators belong, to demand an amendment to the press law so that each author should have the right to defend the freedom of their speech within the framework—I stress, within the framework—of the constitution."[188]

Czech leader and first secretary of the Communist Party Antonín Novotný roundly condemned the writers for their oppositional rhetoric and threatened a campaign against the liberalizing forces. However, Alexander Dubček, the first party secretary of Slovakia, adopted a more supportive position. At the Central Committee Plenum held at the end of October 1967, he called on the party leadership to "deepen intra-party democracy" and to loosen up the hierarchical top-down power structure.[189] Novotný, who held the nation's top military, governmental, and party functions, became increasingly isolated within the Communist Party structure. By January the party had decided on a fundamental restructuring that separated the party from the government. Novotný retained the title of president, a largely ceremonial post, while Dubček became first secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz). This bureaucratic and personnel

reform opened the path toward sweeping changes in the country. It brought to power the progressive wing of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, which had been pushing for more openness within the social and political structures of the state since the early 1960s.

In April 1968 the new party leadership under Dubček officially approved the "Action Program," a series of measures to allow for more political diversity and greater freedom of expression.[190] The Action Program officially sanctioned developments already under way within the country. Since March, newspapers had been printing an increasingly broad spectrum of political views, including commentaries critical of socialism. Noncommunist political parties reemerged from internal exile and publicized their own blueprints for reform. In June 1968 leading Czechoslovak writers and intellectuals published the "Two Thousand Words" Manifesto, which laid out the grassroots hopes and expectations of the reform movement and the ideas behind the concept of "socialism with a human face." It called on workers, students, and intellectuals to continue to push for reform in their immediate environments.[191] The Manifesto shared some common ground with the Port Huron Statement composed by the American New Left six years earlier. Like the American statement, it called for a coalition between workers and intellectuals and for mass participation of all citizens in the democratic process regardless of their political ideology.

Despite Dubček's assurances, hard-liners in both Czechoslovakia and neighboring countries expressed grave concerns about the reforms. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev pressured Dubček to rein in the popular wave of liberalism. East Germany's leader, Walter Ulbricht, was especially adamant about curbing the reform course, fearing that reform momentum from both the West German and the Czech sides might inspire youth in his country. Among the Eastern European socialist states, only Romania and Yugoslavia seemed unfazed by the Prague Spring. Both had followed an independent course toward socialism since the end of World War II and rejected foreign interference in what they regarded as the internal affairs of a sovereign brother state. Albania, already estranged from the Soviets, feared infringement on its own sovereignty more than a possible spillover of the Czech spirit of reform.[192]

The invasion of Czechoslovakia by five Warsaw pact states—Poland, East Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary, and the Soviet Union—on August 20, 1968,

brought a sudden end to the reform spirit in Eastern Europe. Politically, the party leadership returned to a conservative interpretation of socialism that followed closely the ideological line of the Soviet Union. Thus, much like in France in the summer of 1968 and in the United States, challenges to the Cold War order appeared to have failed. Nonetheless, they left a cultural legacy that was nurtured in alternative communes in the West and in underground dissident groups in the East.[193]

Cultural Fragmentation

Even though politically the Prague Spring failed, culturally it brought about a vibrant underground culture of nonconformism in the 1970s and 1980s that gradually eroded the power of the communist regime. American bands like the Velvet Underground and Frank Zappa became a strong inspiration for Czech youth. Besides listening to foreign recordings of rock music, as early as the 1950s Czech musicians created their own rock groups, among them the Akord Club, which performed at the Raduta Club in central Prague, and The Plastic People of the Universe, who took their name from a 1967 Zappa song. While most of these groups were allowed to play in any number of prominent Prague nightclubs in the late 1950s and 1960s, they faced restrictions after the failure of the Prague Spring. The party leadership banned bands like The Plastic People, forcing them underground where they continued to nurture a dynamic collection of music groups called "the second culture." This "second culture" movement staged rock concerts in small Czech and Slovak towns away from the close scrutiny of the party bureaucrats, and thus succeeded in keeping rock music alive behind the Iron Curtain.[194] Vaclav Havel, one of the leading activists in the Czechoslovak dissident movement and the first democratically elected postcommunist Czech president, stressed the tremendous influence of Western music and youth culture on his own political and cultural growth.[195]

Even though youths' infatuation with rock music was not a political form of protest, state authorities interpreted it as such. Violent confrontations between police and rock fans erupted at several underground rock concerts in the mid-1970s. On one occasion young fans rioted in the small Bohemian town of Kdyně after organizers had canceled a concert for fear of rowdy behavior. Angry youth

went on a rampage through the town, smashed car windows, and battled police at the local train station. The riot left more than one hundred people injured.[196] Moderate voices within the party hierarchy warned that the party's hard line against rock music was turning apolitical music fans into opponents of the regime. Undeterred by these cautionary detractors, the party leadership continued its campaign against the second-culture rock bands, thereby ensuring the repoliticization of a cultural opposition movement.

Youth in the West in the 1970s channeled their political activism into causes related more directly to their personal lives. This transformation reflected not so much a coming to terms with their own inability to change the political system as an effort to find local and personal solutions to global problems. The movements that emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s—among them the environmental, women's, and gay and lesbian movements—expressed greater concern with the well-being of individuals regardless of nationality, gender, or race. In their universal applicability, they were at once local and global. Young Americans and Europeans experimented with alternative ways of organizing partnerships, families, and communities. Some created alternative work environments for adults and alternative learning environments for children.[197] This fragmentation diffused the power of the 1960s movements. At the same time it gradually transformed the social and cultural landscape of Western Europe and the United States.

The idea of personal fulfillment and cultural diversity manifested itself in education reform in many Western countries. Daniel Cohn-Bendit's post-1968 biography illustrates one aspect of this transformation. After being expelled from France for his role in the 1968 upheavals, he worked as a teacher in an experimental nursery school in Frankfurt. Together with other educators he followed the concept of anti-authoritarian education, developed in the 1960s and adopted by New Left activists as a rejection of the strict authoritarian parenting and teaching many of them had received as children and adolescents. Despite some controversial aspects, including the idea of permitting young children to explore their own sexuality as well as that of their peers and elders, the anti-authoritarian movement contributed to the establishment of a more cooperative learning environment in modern pedagogy. School curricula reduced rote memorization and encouraged more questioning, debate, and experiential learning.[198] Universities, too, gradually transformed their curricula as a result of the civil

rights, ethnic, and women's movements, even though the pace of change was uneven across Europe and North America. North American universities led the way by establishing African American studies, women's studies, and ethnic studies programs in the 1970s.

The environmental movement had a far-reaching impact on late twentieth-century culture and society. The environmentalists of the late 1960s were very much a product of postwar consumer culture. Clean air, clean water, and unpolluted parks were consumer amenities for middle-class suburbanites.[199] But environmentalism also shared the antimaterialist philosophy of the New Left, and the antinuclear demands of the peace activists. The detrimental effects of consumption were revealed in *Silent Spring,* Rachel Carson's exposé on the dangers of pesticides and other harmful chemicals, published in the United States in 1962. The book galvanized opposition to chemical and industrial pollution of the global ecosystem and led to tighter environmental regulation.[200] It connected the local to the global environment, because contamination of land, air, and water in one part of the world had environmental consequences in other parts of the world. Pollution knows no national borders.

The publication of Carson's book came on the heels of heightened concern about nuclear war and nuclear waste. The antinuclear movements of the 1950s had already begun to conjoin their political message with an environmental one. Nuclear scientists had warned from the beginning about the long-term damage of nuclear war to the environment.[201] Yet the dangers of nuclear contamination did not enter the public consciousness in a major way until the mid-1950s, when fallout from a US nuclear test site in the Pacific reached populated islands and international fishing grounds. A Japanese tuna trawler, the *Lucky Dragon*, was fishing in the path of the radioactive cloud, and its crew and catch received high doses of radiation. The incident created worldwide public concern, boosted the antinuclear movement, and led to international campaigns to stop nuclear testing.[202] In 1963 the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain signed the Partial Test Ban treaty, which abolished surface testing of nuclear weapons. Underground tests continued unabated.[203]

Fear of nuclear, chemical, and industrial pollution helped catapult the environmental movement to global prominence. In the 1960s and early 1970s Americans were at the forefront of the movement. In 1970 they designated April 22 as

annual Earth Day in order to boost environmental awareness among citizens and encourage efforts to preserve the Earth's natural resources. Between the passage of the Wilderness Act in 1964 and the Superfund Act in 1980, American environmentalists achieved a number of important legislative successes in environmental protection.[204] Europeans, on the other hand, succeeded in creating enduring political parties focused on environmental issues, which gained moderate legislative success and helped pass stringent regulations against pollution. In West Germany, the Green Party entered into its first governing coalition with the Social Democrats in the state of Hesse in 1985 and joined a federal coalition government between 1998 and 2005. The emergence of environmental parties on the European political scene forced mainstream political parties to embrace at least some environmental policies, such as curbing pollution, subsidizing renewable energies, and limiting the use of nuclear power.

Nongovernmental environmental organizations also proliferated since the 1970s, reflecting a broad spectrum of environmental concerns and channeling the grassroots youth activism of the 1960s into a more focused vehicle of political advocacy. Most organizations operated on a regional and national level, yet several developed an international base, among them Greenpeace and Earth First.[205] Greenpeace in particular garnered international attention and support through its orchestration of spectacular and widely publicized protests. Founded in British Columbia in the early 1970s, the organization combined antinuclear with environmental protests. Its first action was a protest against nuclear testing on the island of Amchitka in southwestern Alaska. Further campaigns included protests against the French testing site on Moruroa Atoll in the South Pacific, leading the French government to order the secret bombing of the Greenpeace ship *Rainbow Warrior*. A photographer, unable to evacuate the vessel in time, was killed in the blast. In the late 1970s, after it had evolved into the leading activist environmental organization, Greenpeace moved its international headquarters to Amsterdam. This move symbolized the increasing strength of environmental activism in Europe. Since its emergence as an antinuclear activist group, the organization has taken on a broad range of issues, including whaling, global warming, and deforestation.[206]

The antinuclear movement reconnected with the international peace movement in the early 1980s in opposition to the 1979 NATO double-track decision,

in which NATO countries proposed a mutual reduction of medium-range missiles while at the same time threatening to increase nuclear missiles in Western Europe should the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact partners turn down the proposal. As the deployment of those missiles in Western Europe neared, massive demonstrations and peace marches erupted in all major cities across Western Europe. The protesters charged that the doctrine of "mutually assured destruction" rendered additional nuclear weapons futile, because Europe already had enough nuclear warheads on its soil to destroy the Soviet Bloc multiple times. Even though most Europeans shared the protesters' concerns that adding more nuclear weapons to the arsenal would accomplish nothing, their governments proceeded with the deployment.

The youth cultures of the 1970s and 1980s proliferated into a myriad of political and nonpolitical subgroups, connected across vast distances through new technological means of communication. They epitomized the complex interplay between the forces of homogenization and heterogenization. Transnational youth movements and youth cultures challenged dominant cultures and became major producers of local and global countercultures. The result was, depending on one's viewpoint, either cultural fragmentation or cultural pluralism. Fragmentation meant loss, pluralism signified gain. Those who had been part of the dominant culture saw this diversification as a loss of cultural traditions and cultural unity. Others, however, saw diversification as an opportunity for greater choice. Most in the younger generation were at ease with the idea of multiculturalism, yet they also developed an acute sense of globalization's potential for crushing the very diversity it helped to create.

Challenging Gender Norms

One of the most far-reaching global challenges to cultural norms came from the revitalization and expansion of the international women's rights movement in the 1960s and 1970s. Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, women's rights advocates struggled to make women's lives visible in the public realm and to make their rights explicit in the political realm. They received a significant boost from the civil rights movement in the United States, and more broadly from the expansion of the human rights agenda in the early 1970s.

Women helped shape and were shaped by the cultural transformations of the postwar period. Since 1945 more women than ever before worked outside the home, participated in political processes, and became vocal advocates for their rights. Economic and cultural globalization, in turn, affected the ways in which societies defined women's roles and women's status. There remained huge differences, however, in the social and political spaces women occupied and the advances they achieved, depending on the prevailing gender norms in their respective societies. The debates about women's place in society rested on cultural assumptions about gender relations and thus formed an integral part of the discussion about global cultural change in the twentieth century. As women worked to overcome the inequalities within their own environments, they also struggled to define a universal understanding of the rights of women.

Ethnicity, class, and cultural customs shaped women's experiences in ways similar to men's, making them part of the global transformations brought about by the Cold War, decolonization, and migration. Nonetheless, conceptions of gender shaped women's engagement with these transformations in particular ways and thus warrant separate treatment. When exploring cultural change through the lens of gender, the competing forces of homogenization versus heterogenization, on the one hand, and universalism versus particularism, on the other, become visible. Women's lives became at once more alike in disparate parts of the world and more diverse in each particular local setting. Their roles and their rights were embedded both in the local traditions of their home communities and in the global debates over human rights.

Women's status within society became one of the battlegrounds in the emerging Cold War of the late 1940s and 1950s. Communists and capitalists each put forward an idealized image of women's roles in their respective societies, highlighting the benefits afforded women in their own society and denouncing the conditions in the other. Americans, and to a lesser extent Western Europeans, propagated the rising living standards in the West, which afforded women greater comforts in increasingly mechanized households that included washing machines, vacuum cleaners, and other modern amenities. The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, in contrast, advertised the accomplishments of their women in production and research. What emerged in these idealized portrayals were two

competing visions of women's lives and women's roles; one stressing women's role as consumers the other their role as producers.

In the United States women played a central role in the postwar creation of what Lizabeth Cohen has termed a "Consumers' Republic," which elevated consumption to a patriotic act that confirmed America's democratic ideals.[207] The ideological underpinning of the "consumers' republic" was that mass consumption fueled the postwar economy, which in turn strengthened the nation's security vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. In addition, higher living standards and an abundance of goods, consumer patriots hoped, showed the benefits of the capitalist system over socialism and communism in the international arena. The democratic consumer ideal went hand in hand with reconstructing women's place within the home. Though American women had joined the ranks of producers in factories during the war, they were now encouraged to return to their traditional roles as mothers, homemakers, and consumers. Shopping became a way to enjoy the benefits of the modern liberal-capitalist state and strengthen America's national security at the same time.

The gendering of consumer democracy was not confined to the United States. In postwar West Germany the private home became the source of the nation's postwar economic recovery and the housewife as rational consumer became the guarantor of postwar freedom and democracy. Through their conscious choices in the marketplace (weighing cost, benefits, and quality of products), women were seen as active shapers of the national economy, and thus fully vested participants in the civic project of nation building. The 1948 Christian Democratic campaign poster of a mother with a shopping basket served as a conscious reminder of women's patriotic duties as consumers.[208] By contrast, the Soviet-controlled socialist eastern part of the country, where economic recovery progressed at a much slower rate, measured women's participation in nation building by their level of participation in the workforce.[209]

The public emphasis in the Western world on women as consumers did not mean that they did not also contribute to society as producers. During the war women's participation in the workforce and public life was largely a result of necessity. Female employment outside the home, including military service, rose significantly in all countries affected by the war. In the United States, government

propaganda portrayed women's employment as an extension of their duties as wives, mothers, and daughters of fighting men. In Germany, too, Nazi propagandists encouraged women's work outside the home as a service to the nation, yet with far less success than their American counterparts.[210] Most of those who did work outside the home regarded their jobs as a temporary arrangement to help the war effort and support their family through supplemental income in the absence of the male breadwinner. Some, however, saw new opportunities to branch out into occupations previously barred to them. Most of the women in traditionally male occupations such as welding and construction lost their jobs even if no male candidates came forward to take their place.[211] Despite these setbacks women's employment rose steadily in Western industrialized countries over the next decades, indicating changing attitudes among women about work outside the home and changing social attitudes toward working women. In the United States the percentage of women in the workforce stood at 34 percent in 1965, an increase of 9 percent since 1940.[212]

The communist regime in the Soviet Union took a dramatically different approach to women's participation in the workforce. Since the 1920s it had encouraged female employment outside the home. During the 1930s, when Soviet authorities actively began recruiting women for their push toward industrial expansion, female participation in the workforce reached 42 percent. Even though women's employment included traditionally male occupations, it did not necessarily translate into greater equality within Soviet society. [213] Men were often hostile to women in their workplace and subjected them to discrimination and harassment.[214] Nonetheless, the labor shortages of the war years pushed women into all areas of the labor force, including agricultural work in the countryside, where some acquired leading positions on large collective farms. Most of these women lost their positions of leadership after the war, much as American women did, yet the overall number of women in the workforce continued to rise, albeit at a slower pace.[215] By the end of the Khrushchev era, women's participation in the industrial workforce had reached 45 percent.[216] Other Eastern European states followed a similar trajectory. In East Germany, the percentage of women in the workforce was 45 percent in 1960 and rose to 48 percent in 1970.[217]

In public displays of art and culture, the Soviets propagated an image of the communist woman as producer. The Polish artist Wojciech Fangor's painting

Postaci (Form/figure) in the Socialist-realist tradition used gender to illustrate the contrast between capitalism and communism. The painting shows a robust couple, dressed in simple work clothes, on one side of the picture, and a fragile woman, wearing a white dress, pearl necklace, yellow sunglasses, and heavy makeup, on the other. The facial features of the working woman are muscular, serious, and similar to those of the man behind her. Her rolled-up sleeves reveal strong arms; one hand rests on her hip, the other on a shovel. In sharp contrast the Western woman's delicate hands with painted fingernails clutch a dainty purse. Her dress is printed with commercial advertisements, including for Coca-Cola and Wall Street. The contrast between the figures is amplified by the painting's background, a tall white building under a blue sky behind the working couple, a grey, possibly polluted sky and a brown landscape of ruins behind the capitalist woman.[218] The superficial, painted beauty of capitalism appears barely able to hide the decay and pollution in the background, whereas the clear, honest and hardworking face of socialism shines before an equally clear, modern, and productive urban landscape.

A 1959 picture by the Latvian painter Michails Korneckis celebrates both women's work and their femininity. It shows three female masonry workers on the scaffolding of a building. Two of the women wear overalls, the third a skirt; all wear headscarves. The women appear completely at ease with this traditionally male occupation.[219] These celebrations of gender equality in the workplace hide the reality of continued discrimination. Despite women's greater advances in the labor force under socialism, inequalities in pay and job placement persisted. In addition there was little willingness among men to take on traditionally female tasks such as housekeeping and child rearing, leaving women to balance wage labor, housekeeping, and child care on their own.[220]

The gendering of the consumer and producer ethos among the Cold War rivals became obvious in the 1959 Nixon–Khrushchev kitchen debate. Nixon invoked women's central position as beneficiaries of America's consumer culture. Showcasing the abundance of kitchen gadgets, Nixon declared: "In America, we like to make life easier for women." Khrushchev retorted: "Your capitalistic attitude toward women does not occur under Communism." Though Khrushchev did not elaborate further at the time, he alluded to the ethos of equality concerning gender relations. In his view, under communism things were not done *for* women,

but women *and* men did things for the greater welfare of the community. In Khrushchev's communist society women produced *and* consumed goods.

In an ingenious publicity stunt, the Soviets showcased their idea of gender equality with the introduction of the world's first female cosmonaut in June 1963. The move added another level of humiliation to an already bruised NASA confidence and unleashed a transnational debate about gender and science. Valentina Vladimirovna Tereshkova's launch into space on June 16, 1963, was the latest in a long line of Soviet firsts. Six years earlier, on October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union had launched *Sputnik I,* the first satellite, into space. A month later, Laika, the dog, followed on board *Sputnik II.* Instead of acknowledging the launching of a living being into space as a great achievement, Americans highlighted the cruelty of the experiment: the Russians had not yet developed a mechanism for reentry into the atmosphere, leaving Laika to perish in space.[221] By 1961 the Soviets had solved that problem as well, launching the first man, Yuri Gagarin, into space and returning him safely to Earth.

The way the Soviet Union publicized Tereshkova's accomplishment and the way the Western world received the news illustrate how much gender relations were entangled in the Cold War conflict. Tereshkova was born in a small town in the Yaroslavl region in central Russia in 1937 and worked in a textile factory when Soviet officials selected her for the cosmonaut program in 1962. Her only qualification until then had been a training program in parachuting, which she had begun in the late 1950s at a local facility.[222] Khrushchev and the Soviet press immediately turned her into a symbol of women's equal status in communist society.[223] The successful launch of a male colleague two days earlier in a separate flight that would break the record for rotations around Earth was almost forgotten in the publicity surrounding Tereshkova. Soviets celebrated her return with pomp and circumstance in Moscow's Red Square. Khrushchev called her flight the pinnacle of Soviet achievement. "That's the weaker sex for you," he triumphantly declared. "The name of Valentina Vladimirovna will go down in world history. She has demonstrated once again that women raised under socialism walk alongside men in all the people's concerns, both in self-sacrificing labor and in heroic feats, which amaze the world."[224] She became a national heroine in the Soviet Union.

Tereshkova's space flight generated much publicity in the Western world as well. The initial reports, though overall positive, showed an undercurrent of sexism that would only increase over time. Because Tereshkova's flight coincided with that of her fellow cosmonaut Valery Bykovsky, American newspaper reports speculated on whether the two would attempt a "rendezvous in space." They also repeatedly commented on her physical appearance. One article described her as a "blonde" in space (though elsewhere she is described as having brown hair), another announced that she "loves spiked heels and long-haired music," a third called her a "space girl."[225] *Life* magazine subtitled its article "Blue-Eyed Blonde with a New Hairdo Stars in a Russian Space Spectacular."[226] Soviet propaganda agencies actually promoted the disproportionate attention to Tereshkova's looks by releasing pictures of her at a beauty parlor prior to the space flight.[227] Soviet officials clearly aimed at countering American portrayals of Russia's working women as lacking in femininity.

For American women who aspired to go into space, news of Tereshkova's launch was bittersweet. It proved what they had argued for some time, that women were as capable as men to join the space mission. But it also magnified the discriminatory treatment they received within their own program, because NASA officials continued to bar women from the astronaut training program. NASA pilot Jerrie Cobb expressed regret that "since we eventually are going to put a woman into space, we didn't go ahead and do it first." She had earlier joined nineteen other women in a privately funded test regimen equal to that of male candidates for the program. Even though thirteen of them had passed the tests, they were still excluded from the program. With the test results in hand, she had been lobbying Congress for two years to allow women into the astronaut training program

Cobb received support from Jane Hart, wife of the Democratic senator from Michigan, Philip A. Hart, and herself a pilot, who expressed her hope that NASA would soon change its policy.[228] Another outspoken supporter was Clare Boothe Luce, prominent Republican and wife of publisher Henry Luce, who wrote a spirited editorial in *Life* magazine the week after Tereshkova's flight. She took particular issue with the male establishment's insistence that women were inherently less qualified for the space program than men and that the Soviet

move was little more than a publicity stunt. In a bold conclusion, considering her association with the Republican Party and its strong anticommunist ideology, she declared, "Soviet Russia put a woman into space because communism preaches and, since the Revolution of 1917, has tried to practice the inherent equality of men and women." After inundating the reader with a barrage of figures showing Russian women's advances in the technical and medical professions, occupations still overwhelmingly male-dominated in the United States, she declared that "the flight of Valentina Tereshkova is consequently symbolic of the emancipation of the Communist woman. It symbolizes to Russian women that they actively share (not passively bask, like American women) in the glory of conquering space."[229]

Efforts to rationalize the American decision to exclude women from the space program ranged from the scientific-technical to the cultural chauvinistic. Some American editorials called into question Tereshkova's qualifications—her aerial experience was limited to parachuting, and her technical training was limited.[230] Others dismissed the flight as a publicity stunt aimed at upstaging the Americans in the space race, because it did not produce any tangible scientific benefit.[231] A German article quoted a NASA official's facetious comment that in the future American space capsules would have more room and could therefore accommodate an additional 125 pounds of "recreational equipment."[232] Still others portrayed Tereshkova's and other women's successes in male-dominated fields as a loss. They argued that Russian women's multiple duties as mothers, housekeepers, and workers left them overworked and, worse still, deprived of their femininity. "For a generation and a half since the Revolution," Audrey Topping, the wife of the New York Times bureau chief in Moscow, wrote in an article, "Russian women have been torn between a drive for equality with men, a compulsion to prove their worth in building the glory of the state and a desire to be feminine." After women were initially told to reject Western-style femininity as "bourgeois," the article continued, they were now again interested in fashion and beauty. However, "the average Soviet woman has a long way to go before she reaches the standard in America and Europe." Topping's conclusion was reminiscent of the Nixon-Khrushchev debate four years earlier: "No number of space flights can free the average Soviet woman from household drudgery as could the good old clothes dryer, dishwasher or efficient diaper service. These things are

not available in the Soviet Union."[233] Topping turned the advances of Russian women in the male-dominated fields of space exploration and technology into a deficiency in the areas women allegedly really cared about: fashion, beauty, home management, and consumption.

Though Luce and Topping belonged to roughly the same generation, they advocated diametrically opposed roles for women in postwar society. Topping held on to a traditional definition of women's roles. Luce's commentary expressed the growing frustrations of countless college-educated women who continued to encounter barriers to professional advancement—women who were the vanguard of the second-wave feminist movement that would emerge with full force by the mid-1960s.

The French existentialist writer Simone de Beauvoir, five years Luce's junior, provided the philosophical underpinnings for the new feminism. In *The Second Sex* she argued that modern society had defined women only in relation to men. Man was seen as the scientific objective self, woman as the subjective "other." Drawing on existentialist philosophy, de Beauvoir declared that women were not born as women but became women through a gradual process of social conditioning. By separating sex from gender and identifying the latter as a social construct rather than a biological fact, she provided the basis for a feminist critique of modern society. By altering the social construction of gender, women could make themselves into "subjective" selves.[234] Her writings energized the women's rights movement in Western Europe and the United States in the 1960s.

The American journalist and writer Betty Friedan built on de Beauvoir's articulation of the second sex with her 1963 book *The Feminine Mystique*. Published only months before Tereshkova's flight, the book documented women's frustrations with being relegated to the role of mothers and wives when their intellect would allow them to be so much more in public life.[235] The articulation of "the problem that has no name," as Friedan called it, played a critical role in sparking the second-wave feminist movement in the United States. However, critics blamed Friedan for focusing too narrowly on the plight of middle-class women and overstating the pressures toward female domesticity.[236] Nonetheless, her impact on the women's movement of the 1960s and 1970s was unequivocal.

The concerns raised in Friedan's book emerged at a time when more American women were entering college than ever before and when many of them

participated in the civil rights and New Left movements. These women activists had not yet experienced the constraints of motherhood and domesticity of their elders, nor did they regard themselves as the "second sex." Nonetheless, as they fought for racial equality, they confronted gender inequality on a daily basis. During the day-to-day operations within their organizations, male colleagues often relegated them to menial positions, including secretarial work and household duties, such as cleaning and cooking. In 1965, Casey Hayden and Mary King, two white activists in the American Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), articulated their frustrations in a pamphlet called "Sex and Caste: A Kind of Memo," in which they drew parallels between the discrimination faced by African Americans within a society dominated by whites and the discrimination faced by women in a society dominated by men.[237] Theirs was an expanded, updated, and in many ways more radical articulation of Friedan's "problem that has no name" and Beauvoir's "second sex." It created a male backlash within the civil rights movement and helped fuel women's resolve to form separate organizations dedicated to achieving equal rights for themselves. African American women shared many of those experiences but faced a crucial dilemma: would articulating, much less fighting, sexual discrimination derail the fight against racial discrimination?[238]

As in the United States, feminist movements in Europe grew out of the student protests of the 1960s. Young women began to demand greater participation within the power structures of their organizations and created advocacy groups to address gender inequality. In Great Britain the London Women's Liberation Workshop functioned much along the lines of the American consciousness-raising groups. At the same time, the Women's National Coordinating Committee organized conferences, formed consciousness-raising groups, and fought publicly for women's equality in the workplace as well as abortion rights.[239] In 1968, West German student activist Helke Sander, member of the newly minted Aktionsrat zur Befreiung der Frau (Action Committee for Woman's Liberation), articulated women's frustrations at a meeting of the German Socialist Student Association (Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund, or SDS).[240]

In France the women's movement expanded significantly in the aftermath of the student protests of May 1968. A diverse conglomerate of organizations merged into the Mouvement de Libération des Femmes (MLF) around 1970.

One of the organizations within the MLF—Psychoanalyse et Politique, founded by the psychoanalyst Antoinette Fouque—soon charted its own path, in part by openly rejecting the label "feminist" as pejorative. Fouque rejected the struggle for equality, which she felt denied the feminine, and instead sought the empowerment of women by embracing difference. Much better organized than the other groups within the MLF, and much more vocal through periodical publications, among them *Le Quotidien des Femmes* and *Des Femmes en Mouvements Hebdo,* or *Psych et Po*, as it became known, soon overshadowed other feminist groups within France. Fouque's publicity campaign created the impression in France that *Psych et Po* was, in fact, the voice of the feminist movement in the country. Fouque herself fostered that misconception by officially changing her organization's name to MLF in 1979, thus effectively silencing other feminist voices within France.[241]

Women activists everywhere publicized their demands for equality through periodicals dedicated to the feminist cause. In the United States Gloria Steinem founded *Ms.* magazine; in West Germany, Alice Schwarzer founded *Emma;* British feminists founded *Spare Rib*.[242] As circulation grew and reached a wider audience, women's rights assumed a larger role in public and academic discourse. Universities gradually developed courses that dealt with women's issues, some blossoming into full-fledged women's studies programs.

As the movements matured in the West, they proliferated into a myriad of special interest groups that reflected the diversity of women's lives and political objectives. The fragmentation occurred along the lines of class, race, political conviction, professional affiliation, and sexual orientation. Gay and lesbian groups multiplied in the 1970s, creating their own political organizations to lobby for the elimination of discriminatory laws that criminalized homosexuality. Using many of the same strategies as the civil rights movement, gay and lesbian activists in the United States and Western Europe staged sit-ins, organized marches, and challenged the law through deliberate acts of defiance. The Mattachine Society, an American gay rights organization, staged a "sip-in" in New York in 1966 to challenge a New York State Law that prohibited serving alcohol to gays in bars. A year later Great Britain decriminalized male homosexuality through the Sexual Offenses Act.[243] By the 1980s most Western European countries had eased or eliminated laws banning homosexuality, though cultural reservations about

homosexuality endured. In some countries, criminalization persisted into the twenty-first century.[244]

Key concerns among women activists in the Western world centered on sexual and reproductive rights. The emergence of the contraceptive pill in 1960 ushered in a sexual revolution in the industrialized world that gave women much greater control over the reproductive process. It effectively eliminated the threat of pregnancy as a result of casual sexual encounters. However, it did not protect women from continued sexual exploitation. To the contrary, some radical feminists argued that birth control increased male sexual exploitation of women, because men no longer had to fear becoming fathers.[245] The Canadian-born Shulamith Firestone, activist and founder of the New York–based radical group Redstockings, argued that women's biological reproductive function made them vulnerable to male exploitation. The sexual act was an expression of male domination over women and thus a root cause of female dependency.[246] While sexual violence was a major concern for all feminists, most preferred a less extreme assessment of sexual relations. They demanded for women the same right to sexual liberation as men, as well as an understanding of heterosexual sexual relations premised on the principle of equality. The phrase "the personal is political," popularized by second-wave feminists in the 1970s, captured the tremendous shift from the collective to the individual that had occurred in the rights movements of the 1960s.

Another major concern of Western women's organizations in the early 1970s was the right to an abortion. Most countries at the time prohibited or restricted the right of women to carry out an abortion. In the United States in 1973, the Supreme Court declared abortion a fundamental right under the US Constitution, after intense lobbying by women activists, including Gloria Steinem, who by the early 1970s had risen to national prominence.[247] Over the next three decades social conservatives and the Catholic Church in particular lobbied hard to overturn *Roe v. Wade* in the United States and prevent similar legislation elsewhere. The fight against abortion turned deadly as militant fringe groups attacked physicians who performed abortions. In 1993 Dr. David Gunn of Pensacola, Florida, became the first of several victims of deadly anti-abortion violence in the United States: an anti-abortion activist gunned him down outside his clinic.[248]

In Germany, abortion rights became a rallying point for feminists as well. The criminalization of abortion was enshrined in Clause 218 of the German Criminal Code. In 1971, prominent German feminists publicly claimed in a leading German political weekly to have had an abortion and challenged the courts to prosecute them.[249] The controversy generated by the article led to a public debate in Germany and in 1974 resulted in the legalization of abortion during the first trimester. A year later, however, Germany's Supreme Court declared the law unconstitutional, forcing legislators to restrict abortion rights to a narrowly defined set of conditions, such as medical and criminal grounds. The struggle over abortion continued in the courts until the 1990s, when German unification prompted the consolidation of the East and West German laws into a single code. East Germany had legalized abortion in 1972.[250] The new law permitted abortions in the first trimester after mandatory counseling and a three-day waiting period, but limited later procedures to those for medical reasons.

Beginning in 1971 feminists in France also demanded unrestricted abortion rights. They garnered publicity through the support of several prominent figures, including Simone de Beauvoir. In addition they staged public protests and formulated an abortion rights manifesto. With the 1975 Veil law (named after Minister of Health Simone Veil), abortion in the first trimester became legal.[251] Over the course of the 1970s, most other Western European countries followed suit, either legalizing or loosening restrictions on abortions.

Women's rights activists in the global South set different priorities. They had to contend not only with discrimination against women but also with a lack of economic and social rights that transcended gender differences. Particularly in Asia and Africa, the feminist cause was intimately connected to the project of decolonization and national self-determination. In India, women's organizations formed in the 1920s in tandem with the movement to gain independence from Britain. They were less concerned than their Western peers with issues of personal or sexual liberation, and often worked in concert with other organizations toward national liberation.[252] In Egypt, too, women had been active in feminist causes since the 1920s, and, after gaining the vote in 1956, they increasingly participated in public and political debates. One of Egypt's leading feminists, the physician Nawal El Saadawi, caused a national uproar with her publication of *Women and Sex* in 1972. The book addressed various forms of violence

committed against women in Egyptian society, including the ritual of female genital mutilation. Saadawi's rights campaign was indicative of broader strategies among Third World feminists, namely, to focus on local conditions in their fight for equality.[253] Those included religious, social, and political contexts that required a locally specific feminist approach.[254] For women in Kenya, that meant organizing in rural communities to address specific problems concerning women and the poor, including child care, health, and economic development. For women's groups in Latin America, local causes often involved issues of labor, prompting women to collaborate closely with male labor activists. Their objectives were to gain better wages, better social services, and greater participation in the political process for both women and men.[255]

Non-Western women's struggles for equality have always been negotiated through the filter of racial and class domination. What separated Third World feminism from its Western counterpart, according to Indian-born sociologist Chandra Mohanty, was "the contrast between a singular focus on gender as a basis for equal rights, and a focus on gender in relation to race and/or class as part of a broader liberation struggle."[256] Because of the vast differences in women's experiences in the global South and the complexity of local social and political relations, women in Asia, Africa, and Latin America developed women's movements and organizations that articulated local concerns, which could not necessarily be transferred onto a continental, much less global, level. As women's groups began to converge on the global stage through the United Nations and other international venues, these differences became exposed.

Feminist Internationalism

For much of the twentieth century, feminist internationalism confined itself largely to the Western industrialized world. The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), founded in 1915 in the United States, became the first transnational women's organization, but its initial focus was the struggle for world peace rather than women's equality. The WILPF gradually expanded its platform to include racial and economic equality, issues of concern to non-Western women's rights advocates, even though its membership base remained largely in Europe and the United States.[257] In 1945 the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF) emerged as an alternative venue to the WILPF. Even though it drew members primarily from communist countries, it made a concerted effort to reach out to women's organizations in the Western and nonaligned worlds.[258] WIDF's self-proclaimed mission was to "win and defend national independence and democratic freedoms, eliminate apartheid, racial discrimination and fascism." Even though the WIDF's mission appealed to women's organizations in the global South, its close political affiliation with the Soviet Union prevented many from joining.[259]

State-centered international organizations like the United Nations were slow to establish subdivisions devoted to women's issues. This changed in the 1970s when, riding the wave of feminist grassroots activism, the United Nations designated 1975 as an International Women's Year (IWY). It then hastily convened an International Women's Conference in Mexico City in June, because the WIDF threatened to upstage the UN with an international women's conference in honor of the IWY in East Berlin.[260] The UN conference consisted of a formal venue attended by about one thousand official delegates from UN member nations (about a third of them men) and an informal venue across town of more than five thousand delegates, including women's organizations, NGOs, and individual activists. The official delegates included only one female head of state, the prime minister of Sri Lanka, Sirimavo Bandaranaike. The two other female heads of state in the world, Indira Gandhi of India and Maria Estela Peron of Argentina, declined attendance because of domestic unrest in their own countries. The Soviet Union sent Valentina Tereshkova as its official delegate. Other countries sent wives or female relatives of heads of states, including Leah Rabin of Israel, Jehan Sadat of Egypt, and Princess Ashraf Pahlavi, the twin sister of the shah of Iran.[261] The unofficial NGO tribunal included several prominent international feminists, among them Gloria Steinem and Betty Friedan from the United States, Australian feminist Germaine Greer, and Bolivian labor activist Domitila Barrios de Chúngara.

Even though the Mexico meeting was supposed to create the basis for a common global agenda, and was hailed, somewhat prematurely "the world's greatest consciousness raising event," it exposed as many differences as it found common concerns. The biggest and most open confrontations occurred at the site of the NGO tribunal. Ethel L. Payne, in attendance for the *Chicago Defender*, described



Delegates to the UN World Conference on Women in Mexico City listen to the speech of Mexican president Luis Echeverría, June 19, 1975. At center is Leah Rabin, head of the Israeli delegation. More than a thousand official delegates—about a third of them men—attended the conference, while more than five thousand other activists and representatives of women's and nongovernmental organizations met at an unofficial forum on the other side of the city. The meeting exposed as many differences as common concerns. (© Bettmann/CORBIS)

the spectacle as "a comic opera of female fury venting itself in the halls of the Centro Medico, where the rag taggle dissidents of all beliefs met in combat."[262] Delegates vented their disagreements openly at the tribunal, because its setting was less formal and delegates were not bound by their governments to represent a particular position.

The fiercest disagreements occurred between Western and non-Western feminists over a global agenda. While the majority of feminists in the industrialized world wanted to prioritize issues of social equality and sexual liberation, including abortion rights and rights of lesbians, their counterparts in the global South demanded a focus on economic development and redistribution of wealth.[263] Divisions occurred along class lines as well. In one of those altercations Domitila

Barrios de Chúngara confronted upper-middle-class Latin American delegates about their false sense of commonality with working-class women. She remembered exclaiming in exasperation: "Now tell me: Is your situation at all similar to mine? Is my situation at all similar to yours? So what equality are we going to speak of between the two of us? If you and I aren't alike, if you and I are so different? We can't, at this moment, be equal, even as women, don't you think?"[264] To Barrios de Chúngara, the problem of women's inequality was inseparable from the problem of poverty and economic inequality. She felt that her fight for women's rights had to connect to her fight for economic equality, a fight she shared with the men in her community.

Another division occurred along political lines. Tribunal and official delegates from communist countries declared confidently that their societies had already achieved gender equality. Thus, they reasoned, once women focused on achieving a new economic world order, gender equality would follow automatically. Vilma Espín, wife of Cuba's defense minister Raul Castro and sister-in-law of Fidel, declared at the official UN meeting where she served as Cuba's delegate: "We have already obtained for our women everything that the conference is asking for. What we can do here is tell other women of our own experiences and help them that way." For Western feminists, among them the French delegate Françoise Giroud, the emphasis on economic solutions to gender inequality amounted to a "diversion" tactic.[265] For Third World tribunal delegates, such as Chúngara, however, Cuba's success sounded a hopeful note, because the economic conditions in her home country were similar to Cuba's before the revolution.

The official conference's final declaration, the "World Plan of Action," reaffirmed the interconnectedness of the three objectives of the conference: equality, development, and peace. It called on governments to establish regulations that would ensure women's full equality and participation in public life and to allocate funds for economic development. Toward that end the UN set up the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW) and the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM).[266] The results of the conference and the tribunal disappointed everyone. Non-Western women's rights advocates criticized the lack of attention to economic inequality, and Western observers argued that the plan offered primarily

solutions to problems that had already been solved in the West. "Feminism means little to the poor countries that dominate the United Nations," one Western commentator lamented. "The feminists come from rich countries that have little say at such meetings."[267] Tribunal participants were equally frustrated with the results. Germaine Greer, the Australian feminist made famous by her controversial 1971 book *The Female Eunuch*, called the meeting a "shadow play" of political posturing that obscured issues of common concern to all women.[268] The criticisms were at least partially justified. The concerns of women in Western and non-Western societies, as well as in communist and liberal-democratic societies, differed too much to consolidate them in a single document. In addition, political strategy influenced the agenda of official delegates as well as many unofficial tribunal attendees. Nonetheless, even if issues of development were pushed by a male-dominated contingent of representatives, or by women representatives who functioned as stand-ins for the male leadership of their countries, as some critics contended, the exchanges that took place in Mexico City gave rise to a transnational dialogue over what mattered most to women in different parts of the world and how universal equality could be achieved. The exposure of these differences marked the beginning of a process that would bring all sides closer together.

As the transnational debate evolved during the UN Women's Decade and beyond, the level of confrontation and mutual misunderstanding decreased. Subsequent UN women's conferences—Copenhagen 1980, Nairobi 1985, Beijing 1995—paid increasing attention to issues of economic development, thus giving Third World feminists a broader platform than in Mexico City. Reviewing the history of the international conferences since 1975, the Indian economist Bina Agarwal noted steady progress toward recognizing economic equality as a central feature toward women's equality. She called the Beijing "Platform for Action" a significant advance over previous ones. "The gender gaps in economic power, property rights, and poverty occupy centre stage [in the Beijing Platform]. It also clearly connects women's poverty and gender inequality." She highlighted a section of the platform that stated, "Women's power is directly related to the absence of economic opportunities and autonomy, lack of access to economic resources, including credit, land ownership and inheritance, . . . education, and support services, and minimal participation in the decision-making process." Agarwal

thought of the transformation between Mexico City and Beijing as "romantic sisterhood" giving way to "strategic sisterhood."[269] In other words, if the idealism of Mexico had been crushed by the realization of the vast gulf among feminists from different parts of the world, the pragmatism of the Beijing conference produced the foundation for concrete solutions to specific forms of inequality in the world. The transformation occurred not so much in the overall agenda but in the shifting power distribution between Western and non-Western women's rights activists.[270] The latter had called for a greater emphasis on economic development since 1975, and over time they convinced at least some in the Western contingent.

Efforts to create a network of international women's rights advocates took root outside the UN institutional framework as well. In 1984 the American feminist journalist and co-editor of *Ms.*, Robin Morgan, founded the Sisterhood Is Global Institute (SIGI) to provide a permanent forum of intellectual exchange for international feminists. Morgan founded the institute after publishing *Sisterhood Is Global,* an 800-page anthology of writings by feminists from all over the world.[271] The contributors became SIGI's first fellows. Over time SIGI grew into a major organization for international feminists. It cooperated closely with the UN and with other transnational organizations, among them Women Living under Muslim Law (WLUML), founded two years later in Paris by Marie Aimée Hélie-Lucas.[272]

Third World feminists, whose voices became increasingly powerful in transnational women's organizations in the 1970s through the 1990s, significantly complicated Western feminists' understanding of "universal sisterhood." Many of the Third World feminists involved in the debate were Western-educated or had lived and worked for part of their lives in the Western world, leaving working-class women such as Barrios de Chúngara marginalized.[273] Nonetheless, these women used the language of Western feminism to articulate the perspective of non-Western women. Chandra Mohanty, who received her PhD in sociology at the University of Illinois, criticized her Western peers for constructing " 'Third World women' as a homogenous 'powerless' group often located as implicit victims of particular socio-economic systems." In this rendering of otherness, women in the global South were usually portrayed as victims and dependents without agency or individuality in their own right.[274]

Mohanty identified a central paradox embedded not only in the feminist discourse but also in the uses of gender as a category of analysis. If gender is the social construction of biological differences, as Joan Wallach Scott had postulated in 1985, then different social and cultural contexts produce different conceptualizations of gender.[275] While difference is common to gender relations in all cultures, the nature and definition of those differences are contingent upon the social and cultural context. Mohanty and others have charged that Western feminists' representations of women's inequalities in the Third World mirrored the representation of the colonial "other" in imperialist writing.[276] Western feminists claimed for themselves the right to define the social construction of gender and presented it as a fixed category. They measured progress toward women's rights according to this fixed Western standard. Simone de Beauvoir's "second sex" was thus replicated in the relationship between Western and non-Western women. The latter had become the "other" to the former "self." Third World women became "second" to the "second sex."

Third World feminists well-versed in the language of Western feminism also began interrogating their own assumptions of difference in relation to women within their own society. The upper-class Indian literary scholar Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak warned her colleagues (both Western and non-Western) that "in order to learn enough about Third World women and to develop a different readership, the immense heterogeneity of the field must be appreciated, and the First World feminist must learn to stop feeling privileged *as a woman*."[277]

Two cases illustrate this heterogeneity as well as the consequences for the attainment of a universal feminist consciousness. The first is the international campaign against female genital mutilation (FGM). The practice of female circumcision, prevalent in parts of Africa and the Middle East, and to a lesser extent in Muslim Asia, became a major cause for Western feminists beginning in the late 1970s. Brought to national attention in the United States by the American journalist and activist Fran Hosken, who in 1979 published the *Hosken Report*, which documented and condemned the practice, FGM generated outrage and concern in the West.[278] Few women and medical experts defended the ritual, but many criticized Hosken's confrontational and at times paternalistic approach. In a 1980 article in *Ms.* magazine, editors Gloria Steinem and Robin Morgan tried to strike a different tone. They condemned the practice, but did so

by letting the victims speak for themselves.[279] They included the testimony of Saadawi, who had been an outspoken critic of female circumcision in her own country since the early 1970s. Saadawi, already a powerful spokesperson for the anticlitorectomy campaign in her own country, described her procedure at the age of six and that of her younger sister, which ultimately led her on a path toward feminist rebellion.[280]

Considering their fundamental agreement on the barbarity of the practice, it seems surprising that at the 1980 UN conference in Copenhagen, Saadawi and other Muslim feminists clashed with Western women over the issue of FGM.[281] Yet when analyzing the dispute more closely and within the context of the global feminist agenda, it becomes understandable. Even though they were as outraged by the practice as their Western colleagues, Muslim women objected to the debate in this forum for two reasons. First, they felt that the issue detracted from the problems of economic exploitation and imperialism.[282] And second, Saadawi and others objected to the way in which the primary focus on FGM branded African and Arab cultures as backward and savage.[283] Third World women thus still found themselves battling First World women over the right agenda for their struggle and the particulars by which women's advances should be measured.

A second issue that illustrated the heterogeneity of women's experiences but also rifts within feminist circles was the controversy over the Muslim veil. Most women in the Western world interpreted the wearing of the veil in Islamic countries as evidence of female degradation. Feminists from countries in which the practice was common found themselves in a difficult position. Even if they did not support the custom, most felt compelled to either defend it or at least demand that it should be placed in the right context. For some Muslim women the veil became a way to resist pressure toward cultural assimilation in Western countries. The case of three students at a suburban high school outside Paris in 1989 is illustrative. School administrators banned the three girls, ages thirteen and fourteen, from attending classes because they violated a school rule against wearing headscarves.[284] When faced with vocal public protests from the Muslim immigrant community in France and from prominent liberals who favored cultural tolerance, the Socialist government backed down. In the ensuing debates the different types of head and face coverings—headscarf, veil, hijab, chador—were often

used interchangeably, even though there were significant differences among them, ranging from covering only the hair to covering the entire face.[285]

More importantly, though, these debates exposed the different meanings people attached to the practice. In a poignant editorial in 1994, Germaine Greer, the Australian-born feminist, pointed out the multiple symbolic functions of the veil within modern society: "It [the veil] can be identified with oppression or liberation, with privilege or disability, with impotence or empowerment. One thing is certain, if the right to wear it is denied, it becomes a symbol of freedom. If the right to wear it is denied by authorities known to discriminate against the group that seeks to wear it, the veil becomes a symbol of rebellion, even a weapon of war."[286] The veil controversy thus grew from a battle over cultural norms and cultural integration to a battle over asserting individual rights, whether they were women's rights or minority rights. Greer recognized the multiple dimensions of the controversy and opted for the primacy of free choice.

The controversy in France addressed a larger conflict concerning both women's equality and cultural diversity. According to historian Joan W. Scott, "The head scarf is a tangible sign of intolerable difference. It defies the long-standing requirement that only when immigrants assimilate (practicing their beliefs in private) do they become fully 'French.'"[287] The headscarf was seen both as a symbol for an immigrant population's refusal to integrate into French society and a sign of women's degradation within Muslim society, and hence incompatible with French norms of gender equality. However, while for some it meant women's debasement, for others it meant women's empowerment. By insisting on their right to wear the headscarf, Muslim girls and women asserted their right to a cultural identity, and thus participated in a political debate about cultural diversity.[288]

The wide spectrum of symbolic meanings of the veil, and the disagreement even among feminists about how to approach the controversy, demonstrates that the dividing line between cultural universality and particularities did not run neatly between Western and non-Western feminists, or even between feminists and nonfeminists. It would be wrong, however, to assume that the diversity of women's experiences precluded a consensus on minimum standards of women's rights in the global arena. Rather, according to Chandra Mohanty, one needs to find an alternative universality that is not premised exclusively on Western

conceptions of gender relations and women's equality, but takes into account differences in experiences and social contexts. "The challenge is to see how differences allow us to explain the connections and border crossings better and more accurately, how specifying difference allows us to theorize universal concerns more fully."[289] Difference and universality have to work in tandem, not only, and maybe not even most importantly, to create a new global feminist consciousness. They need to capture the diversity of women's experiences within a universal rights framework. Only by moving beyond the universalist-particularist dichotomy can the full spectrum of women's needs and objectives be addressed.

Continuity and Challenge in Religious Cultures

The headscarf controversy in France also ignited a debate about the role of religion in the public sphere. France had long embraced the principle of *laicité,* which demanded the preservation of a secularized public space. However, despite its embrace of secularism, France was a religiously and culturally homogeneous nation, whose Catholic heritage lay deeply embedded in its social, cultural, and political identity. The veil controversy arose in the context of far-reaching social transformations in France, as nonwhite, non-Christian migrants settled in France in greater numbers than ever before. Their different social, cultural, and religious practices stood in opposition to the secularism within French society, which was constructed on the basis of a single dominant religion and an abstract idea of civic unity.[290] The existence of different religions in close proximity to each other—a new phenomenon in Europe and North America in the postwar period—posed particular cultural challenges and tested the limits of religious tolerance. In the global arena, religion became a force for both cultural homogenization and heterogenization.

Despite the codification of religious pluralism in all modern democratic constitutions and the guarantee of religious freedom in civil law, most states in Europe and the Americas remained deeply rooted in Judeo-Christian practices and rhetoric. Two of Europe's largest postwar conservative parties were explicitly Christian in their political mission, the Democrazia Cristiana in Italy and the Christlich Demokratische Union (CDU) in West Germany. The US Congress, at the height of the Cold War in 1954, reinserted the words "under God" into

the national Pledge of Allegiance and ordered the addition of "In God we trust" to all US paper money. Thus, although state and religious power had certainly separated, religious values and religious imagery remained integral to the business of state and the business of international relations.[291] Sociologists, who had regarded the process of secularization as an inevitable consequence of political, economic, and social modernization since the nineteenth century, began to reconsider their assumptions in the 1980s. The secularization thesis could not explain the resurgence of religious fundamentalism and the proliferation of diverse religious sects across the globe. As they began to explore the role of religion in modern societies in more depth, they discovered that the assumed secularization of earlier decades had been superficial at best.[292]

Throughout the Cold War, religious rhetoric played a central role in the rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States, prompting one scholar to call it "one of history's great religious wars."[293] On the American side, notions of providentialism had been integral to the idea of American exceptionalism, which saw in the republic the realization of God's promised land.[294] By the early twentieth century Wilson infused his foreign policy with religious references to America's missionary obligations toward the world.[295] After World War II, the rhetoric intensified: political and religious leaders portrayed the fight against communism increasingly as a struggle for the defense of Judeo-Christian values against the atheist convictions of the communist state.[296] Leading American Cold War strategists, among them Dean Acheson and John Foster Dulles, both sons of protestant ministers, frequently resorted to religious imagery in their political statements.[297]

For the United States and its Western allies, religious symbolism became a major trope with which to transform the geopolitical conflict into an ideological-cultural one. It allowed politicians to cast the conflict in simple binaries of good versus evil and to mobilize their own people against communism. The distinction between democratic liberalism and Judeo-Christian values all but disappeared in the political rhetoric of the time. President Eisenhower was unabashed about the insertion of religion into politics. He mandated that all cabinet meetings began with a communal prayer, regularly consulted with the Protestant evangelical Billy Graham (who would go on to serve as spiritual consultant to every president, including Barack Obama), and declared in 1955 that

"recognition of the Supreme Being is the first, the most basic, expression of Americanism. Without God, there could be no American form of government, nor an American way of life."[298] His secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, shared Eisenhower's deep religious conviction, making it a prominent factor in all policy decisions.

The widespread assumption in the West was that the communist state system was not only atheist but outright hostile to religious worship. According to the scholar Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, this was a misconception. She argued that the Soviet state had adopted a laicist model of secularism, which meant that its political system was devoid of religious references and that the practice of religion was confined to the private realm.[299] Even though Marx had called religion "the opiate of the masses," the Soviet system under Lenin did not ban religious practice. In fact, Lenin had in 1905 specifically sanctioned the private practice of religion as a right of every citizen. He did not, however, believe that religion should have a place in the public or political sphere.[300] In this respect his views were not all that different from those of his Western liberal adversaries. Both were heavily influenced by Enlightenment approaches to the role of religion in public life and the separation of church and state. Stalin initially took a much harder line toward religious groups. In the interwar period he persecuted religious leaders and restricted their ability to operate freely and independently. During the Second World War, however, he made concessions to the Orthodox Church in the interest of greater national unity. He sought to fuse the people's emotional attachment to the church with an equally emotional attachment to the nation. A similar accommodation occurred later in the socialist German Democratic Republic in the 1970s. In an effort to link the socialist present of the GDR with Germany's intellectual past, the political leadership launched a public rehabilitation of the sixteenth-century Protestant theologian Martin Luther, who had spent his life in several East German cities. Linking religious and national identity could inspire greater loyalty to the state, officials hoped.[301] Despite these accommodations, state officials in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union maintained an uneasy relationship with the churches throughout the Cold War, alternating between repression and integration.[302]

The prevalence of religion in the Cold War discourse undermined core assumptions about the secularization of the modern world. Building on Enlightenment

thinking, advocates of the secularization thesis had argued that modernization led to the decline of religion in politics and society. The logic was often reversed as well, with secularization of society and politics being seen as signs of modernization. The assumed nexus between modernization and secularization has been so deeply embedded in modern thought that progressive forces within societies have insisted on the secularization of public and political life, while religious leaders have at times resisted modernization because of the fear of religious decline.[303] These two positions were exemplified on one end of the spectrum by the efforts of Turkish leader Kemal Ataturk to modernize and secularize his country in the 1920s, and on the other by the efforts of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in the 1990s to reverse the trend toward modernization in society and politics through the reinstitution of a strict religious code in public life.

Supporters of the secularization thesis can point to Western Europe, where religious affiliation and church memberships have steadily declined since the 1950s. Grace Davie argued, however, that decline in church membership in these countries did not necessarily mean a decline in religious belief. Rather she detected alternative forms of religious practice, focused on private noninstitutional worship, including a turn toward alternative religions and the practical application of religious beliefs in charitable institutions.[304] In addition, there existed wide variations in the practice of religion throughout Western Europe. In northern, predominantly Protestant countries, religious practice declined more than in southern Catholic and Orthodox parts. Ireland was a unique case, because religious affiliation was caught up in the political conflict between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland. Furthermore, non-Western religious minorities expanded in most European countries, largely as a result of migration from former colonies. By the late twentieth century Muslims made up about 3 percent of Europe's population. France was home to about 3 to 4 million Muslims. Germany's Muslim population was estimated to be 1.6 million in the late 1980s, increasing to 3.2 million in 2008.[305] Britain had a Hindu/Sikh population of a little over a million.[306]

However, as the headscarf controversy in France illustrated, increasing secularization did not necessarily lead to a higher level of religious tolerance in Western Europe. Rather, it revealed a deep-seated secularized-religious foundation for everyday practices and customs in public life. The public display of religiosity

through the wearing of headscarves upset both the appearance of cultural homogeneity and insistence on secularity. Some opponents of headscarves conflated homogeneity and equality. Homogeneity in dress and appearance, school officials argued, allowed for a more egalitarian learning environment that would not single out pupils for their different cultural, religious, or ethnic background. These officials failed to realize that their idea of cultural egalitarianism was also a prescription for a particularly French, Western, and Christian form of homogeneity, one that demanded public assimilation into the dominant Judeo-Christian cultural system.

Just as religion could encourage, even demand, cultural conformity, so it could fuel cultural and political rebellion. Religious activism became one of the key sites of opposition to the communist system in Eastern Europe. When the Polish cardinal Karol Wojtyła became Pope John Paul II in 1978, he inspired a religious revival in Poland that aligned itself with the labor organization Solidarity in 1980 to form a broad-based dissident movement against the communist state. Leading members of the Solidarity movement, above all Lech Walesa, acknowledged the decisive influence of the pope on the movement. Even though the Polish president, Wojciech Jaruzelski, declared a state of emergency and banned Solidarity in 1981, he was unable to crush the powerful church apparatus in this predominantly Catholic country. Throughout the next decade the Catholic Church provided a protective shield for the Polish dissident movement.

In neighboring East Germany the Protestant church came to play a key role in galvanizing opposition against the authoritarian state. Church leaders and the church buildings themselves offered refuge for dissidents in the 1980s. As antigovernment protests intensified in Leipzig in the fall of 1989, the St. Nikolai Church in the city center became a gathering point for weekly candlelight demonstrations. The crowds at the Leipzig prayers and demonstrations grew from around one thousand in September to more than five hundred thousand on November 6, just three days before the fall of the Berlin wall.[307] If religion had functioned as an ideological weapon of the West in the early Cold War, it had become a locus for political opposition movements in Eastern Europe by the end.

Religion played a role in anticolonial and civil rights struggles as well. In India in the 1940s Mohandas Gandhi developed his philosophy of nonviolent resistance based on the precepts of his Hindu faith. His philosophy, in turn,

inspired Martin Luther King, a Baptist minister, in his civil rights campaign. King's public speeches in favor of equal rights for African Americans were heavily infused with religious rhetoric, and southern churches became centers of resistance against the system of racial segregation.[308] Malcolm X's calls for racial justice were inspired by his conversion to Islam and his membership in the African American organization Nation of Islam. Though he eventually distanced himself from the Nation and its leader, Elijah Mohamed, he remained a Muslim until his assassination at the hands of members of the Nation of Islam in February 1965.[309] Strengthened by their respective religious beliefs, King and Malcolm X shared a belief in the righteousness of their cause against the legal and political inequalities embedded in American society.

In Latin America, opposition movements drew on the spiritual precepts of liberation theology to protest the increasing social and economic dislocation of the poor in many parts of the continent. Since 1945, rapid economic growth and urbanization had dramatically increased the gulf between rich and poor in Central and South America. Prominent Latin American Catholic theologians, among them the El Salvadoran cardinal Óscar Romero, who was assassinated in 1980, the Peruvian theologian Gustavo Gutiérrez, and the Brazilian theologians Leonardo and Clodovis Boff, began advocating publicly for a new understanding of Christianity that reemphasized its obligation toward reducing the suffering of the poor.[310] Rather than engaging exclusively in charitable work, as had been traditional within the Catholic Church, these theologians openly criticized the political system that combined unfettered capitalism with repressive political authority. They demanded instead a system premised on the redistribution of wealth according to Christian morals, and on preserving human dignity through a minimum standard of living. Politically on the left, they also demanded better labor standards, regulation of industry, and the reduction of the power of foreign, primarily American, investors. Their campaign for more equity earned them censorship from the Vatican and persecution—in Romero's case fatal—in their own countries.[311]

Evangelical Protestantism provided an alternative to those disillusioned with the Catholic Church's dogmatism and deterred by liberation theology's leftist politics. Beginning in the 1950s, thousands of evangelical missionaries moved from the core areas of Europe and North America into Asia, Africa, and Latin America and converted local populations with spectacular success.[312] Evangelicals



Óscar Romero at his home in El Salvador, November 20, 1979. In the late 1970s he came to support the liberation theology espoused by Latin American theologians, which advocated publicly for Christianity's obligation to reduce the suffering of the poor. Romero also became an outspoken critic of the human rights violations and social injustices perpetrated by the military regime in his country. He was assassinated less than a year later. (Getty Images)

soon became the world's fastest-growing religious group, challenging the traditional predominance of the Catholic Church in many areas, particularly Latin America.[313] By 2000, evangelical Christians were 27 percent of Africa's population, 17 percent of Latin America's, and 5 percent of Asia's. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the average in those regions had been less than 2 percent.[314]

The proliferation of this particular brand of populist Christianity in the global South could be read both as a form of rebellion against the local establishment and a co-optation of the local population by wealthy, conservative, cultural imperialists. Liberation theologians themselves became the harshest critics of the movement, claiming—not altogether wrongly—that the missionary activities of North American evangelical churches in Central and South America reflected American business and foreign policy interests.[315] The failure of the Catholic establishment to support liberation theology's basic premises might have contributed to the tremendous success of Evangelicals and Pentecostals in the region. Unburdened by centralized control, these modern-day missionaries were able to adapt quickly to the needs and desires of local communities. They created a spiritual message that was deeply personal and focused on individual salvation. Yet at the same time they were connected to a global network of influential Evangelicals with vast financial resources and political clout in the industrial metropole.

Fundamentalisms and Pluralism

The fundamentalist version of Protestant evangelicalism emerged in the 1920s in the United States as a rural rebellion against modern industrial society and scientific-technological advances that shook the faith of many. The postwar revival of that movement, by contrast, embraced aspects of modernization, above all the latest advances in communication technology to spread the message of social and cultural conservatism.[316] By the 1970s evangelical preachers in the United States, among them televangelists Oral Roberts, Jerry Falwell, Jimmy Swaggart, and Jim Bakker, created actual and virtual communities of faithful and encouraged them to organize their personal and professional lives around the institutions of the church. Jerry Falwell built the Thomas Street Baptist Church in Lynchburg, Virginia, one of the first "megachurches" in the United States. Falwell utilized modern advertising techniques to rapidly enlarge his following, solicit donations, and create the Lynchburg Christian Academy in 1967 and Liberty University in 1971.[317] By 2010, Liberty University enrolled over 73,000 students, more than 60,000 of them in online degree programs. This and other megachurches functioned as religious enclaves for fundamentalist Christians who sought refuge from secular society.

It would be wrong to assume, however, that Falwell's goal was isolation from the secular world. Instead he sought to make the outside world more like his own. For that reason, in the late 1970s he founded a political lobbying group called the "Moral Majority," which openly supported conservative Christian candidates for public office.[318] The group gave rise to a host of politically conservative organizations collectively known as the New Christian Right. They made substantial financial contributions to Ronald Reagan's presidential campaign in 1980 as well as to the campaigns of countless other Christian conservatives running for state and national office. Thanks to the New Christian Right's lobbying efforts, religious conservatives began to assert real political influence in the United States by the 1980s. They shaped much of the debates about sensitive social issues, including abortion rights, homosexuality, and the teaching of evolution at public schools.

Fundamentalism took root in other major religions as well, particularly Islam. These religious movements have to be understood both as a critique against more liberal strands within their religious denominations and, as sociologist and religious scholar Peter L. Berger calls them, "populist" movements against a "secular elite."[319] Not all fundamentalists ventured into the realm of political protest, and even fewer turned to violence. But many of those who did belonged to the most disillusioned and disoriented segments of a population at odds with the processes of economic and cultural globalization. At the same time, though, as Peter Beyer and Lori Beaman have argued, "religion and the religious is an integral aspect of globalization and not an 'outside' respondent or victim."[320]

The term *fundamentalist* has been infused with heavy political baggage as well as pejorative connotations since the 1920s. The concept gained wide usage in the last quarter of the twentieth century as a label for a number of religious groups, including Muslim, Hindu, and Jewish denominations, and on occasion even for nonreligious movements. Its occasional polemical usage and its application to several quite distinct religions made a clear definition increasingly difficult. In an effort to gain clarity, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in

1987 commissioned the Protestant religious scholar Martin E. Marty and the historian R. Scott Appleby to study and define religious fundamentalist movements. Over the next eight years, two hundred scholars participated in the production of a five-volume series on the subject.[321] When Marty attempted a first definition of fundamentalism in 1988, he began with what fundamentalism was not: it was not synonymous with conservatism or traditionalism; it was not antimodern, or antiscientific; and therefore it was not a movement seeking a return to some static ahistorical ideal of religious practice. Fundamentalists were also not always activists, militants, or terrorists; and they were not necessarily poor or uneducated.[322] Instead, fundamentalism, Marty continued, was always reactive or reactionary; it drew on "selective retrieval," focused on certain aspects of its religion and ignored others; it was "exclusive or separatist." Marty even called adherents to fundamentalism "oppositional," "absolutist," and "authoritarian," unable to forge any form of compromise with those who think differently. As a result, fundamentalism was also "anti-evolutionary, anti-hermeneutical, and anti-permissive."[323]

Though comprehensive, Marty's definition of fundamentalisms (he later preferred the plural form) remained contested. Some scholars, particularly specialists of non-Christian religions, rightly argued that the religious and doctrinal elements within each of these movements were so different that it was impossible to compare them, much less to determine common sources or outcomes. Others believed with Marty that despite their differences fundamentalist religions had something in common, but provided a much more general definition. According to Peter Berger, they "suggest a combination of several features—great religious passion, a defiance of what others have defined as the *Zeitgeist*, and a return to traditional sources of religious authority."[324] The anthropologist Richard Antoun argued that fundamentalists of different religious denominations were united in their belief in the absolute authority of the sacred over every aspect of their private and public life, and that their strict adherence to a religiously inspired worldview determined their code of conduct.[325]

Religious absolutism was on the rise in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Explanations as to why diverged. Some analyzed it in primarily religious terms (as a disaffection of particularly faithful believers with the liberalization of religious practice within their faith); others in social or political

terms, as a religio-political response to the experience of social and economic decline, including unfulfilled promises of decolonization, persistent poverty, an increasing gap between rich and poor, negative social consequences of urbanization, lack of opportunities for a young generation with rising expectations, and encounters with a secularized, homogenized, increasingly material global culture.[326]

The phenomenon of fusing religious and political identity emerged most prominently in the Middle East in the postwar period. The legal scholar Abdullahi A. An-Na'im defined political Islam as "the mobilization of Islamic identity in pursuit of particular objectives of public policy, both within an Islamic society and in its relations with other societies."[327] The association of modernizing leaders with both secularism and the former colonial powers provided a niche for religious fundamentalists to fuse the ideology and practice of Islam with the political causes of anti-imperialism and anti-Westernism.[328] The Iranian revolution in 1979 reflected this conflation of political and religious ideologies. It deposed the secularist and repressive regime of Shah Reza Pahlavi, who ended democratic rule after a CIA-backed coup against the populist democratically elected leader Mohammad Mosaddegh in 1953. After a coalition of liberal intellectuals and Islamic fundamentalists succeeded in ousting the shah in 1979, Islamic fundamentalists turned against the liberal wing and established a theocracy under Ayatollah Khomeini. The new regime limited freedom of expression, political rights, and women's rights. Moreover it turned decisively against Western cultural and political influence. Iran became a model state of political Islamism.[329]

Religion and politics also overlapped in the Arab-Israeli conflict after 1948. Arab neighbors saw Israel as a "colonial implant" protected by the former imperial powers of the West. Radical political Islamists made the eradication of the state of Israel a religious jihad. Begun as a nationalist movement under the leadership of Yasser Arafat, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its political wing increasingly merged religion with political identity. On the Israeli side, too, the more radical political parties expressed their struggle against Arab neighbors in religious terms. The extreme religio-political voices often undermined efforts by more moderate and secularized politicians to forge a compromise. The conflict was exacerbated by the economic and social dislocation of populations left in



Ayatollah Khomeini, January 17, 1979. He became Supreme Leader of Iran after the successful revolution that deposed Shah Reza Pahlavi. The revolution conflated political and religious ideologies, leading to the establishment of an Islamist theocracy. (Getty Images)

poverty and without a political voice. For Palestinians, the dislocation was not just economic but spatial, because they had to settle in what started as temporary and then turned into permanent refugee camps in Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank.[330] The stakes in the conflict became, in Marty's words, "absolutist," and thus made compromise impossible.

Despite the polarization of religious identity in the Middle East, efforts were under way to increase cross-denominational dialogue. In 1948, shortly after World War II, the major Christian churches, with the notable exception of the Catholic Church, formed the World Council of Churches (WCC) in an effort to improve cooperation and communication on doctrinal, practical, and social issues. The Roman Catholic Church sent observers to the WCC meetings and gradually increased its dialogue with non-Christian religions over the next decades. The Second Vatican Council made some progress with its declaration, *Nostra Aetate*, which redefined the Church's relationship with non-Christian religions. Issued in 1965 under Pope Paul VI, the document promoted both dialogue and understanding for non-Christian religions, particularly Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, and Judaism.[331] Ecumenical and interfaith organizations proliferated in the postwar period in response to the increasing geographic proximity of different religious faiths in many parts of the world. They sought to contain the potential for conflict and hatred that came with this close proximity and to promote among them a greater understanding and acceptance of religious difference.

The rise in interfaith movements was related to the general increase in popularity of non-Western religions among people in the industrial world. Beginning in the 1950s, interest in Zen Buddhism rose significantly in the United States and Western Europe.[332] By the 1960s Hinduism and Zen Buddhism became for many adherents of the counterculture a spiritual retreat from the technocratic and materialist realities of modern society. According to a 1970 US survey, 3 percent of the population of San Francisco claimed to have tried Buddhist meditation and 5 percent had tried Transcendental Meditation. Nationwide the figure was similarly high, with 4 percent having tried Transcendental Meditation, suggesting that the practice had found supporters beyond the core areas of the counterculture. Transcendental Meditation, or TM, as its practitioners called it, was a method of meditation popularized by the Hindu spiritualist Maharishi Mahesh Yogi. Traditional Hindu spiritual leaders looked with suspicion on the Maharishi's version of meditation because it was much shorter and less rigorous than the traditional process of Hindu religious meditation, which required weeks or months of discipleship and ascetic rituals. The Maharishi's method gained international fame when the Beatles went on a three-month retreat to his

meditation center in Rishikesh, India, in 1968. They were joined by other celebrities, among them Mia Farrow and Shirley MacLaine. The Maharishi's appeal reached far beyond the celebrity level, however. He regularly toured Western Europe and the American West, where interest in non-Western religions was strong. TM met the needs of Western professionals in search of spiritual renewal.[333]

The search for alternative spirituality in the Western world continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s with the proliferation of experimental religious communities, many of them inspired by Hinduism. Among the more controversial groups was the Rajneeshpuram, which followed the leadership of Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh, an Indian professor of philosophy. In the 1970s he established an ashram in the Indian town of Puna, where he conducted meditations and lectured on spiritual matters. His liberal attitude toward sexuality and his criticism of Gandhi earned him powerful enemies in India and prompted him to relocate to the United States in the early 1980s. By then most of his followers were American. Within a year of taking up residence in the small town of Antelope in rural Oregon, the members of his group clashed with the local community and each other.[334] In addition, the Rajneesh himself came under scrutiny from federal authorities for tax evasion and immigration violations. In a 1985 plea bargain he agreed to leave the United States. After extensive travels in Europe and Asia, in 1987 he returned to India, where he died three years later at the age of fifty-eight.[335] His meditation center in Puna continued to attract international visitors in search of spiritual renewal, meditation, and stress management.

Interest in Hinduism, Zen Buddhism, and other Eastern religions became part of the New Age movement, which spread throughout the Western world in the last quarter of the twentieth century. The addition of "movement" to the term *New Age* might be somewhat misleading, because no central group or even cluster of groups existed to define or coordinate the practice of "New Age." Nonetheless, the phenomenon became significant enough to produce a large body of literature and an equally large number of workshops, commercial enterprises, and a health industry. New Age ranged from interest in the occult and astrology to psychotherapy, self-help, alternative medicine, and ecology. According to one definition, "the New Age movement is characterized by a popular Western culture criticism expressed in terms of a secularized esotericism."[336] Its

adherents were predominantly middle-class and white, unified in their unease about materialism and their attempts to seek spiritual, esoteric alternatives. Yet rather than rejecting modern consumer society altogether, New Age adherents developed an alternative consumer culture. By the late 1980s, New Age had become a major global enterprise with particularly strong followings in Germany, New Zealand, Israel, Great Britain, and the United States, with a lucrative industry to sustain it.[337] At the same time, critics began to call into question some New Age practices, including interest in the occult, tarot cards, and efforts to communicate with spirits. Others began to see New Age less as a social or religious movement and more as a path toward personal fulfillment and spiritual improvement.

For New Age followers in the West who were in search of spiritual renewal, a major destination became India—including Puna, where the Rajneesh had set up a resort; Adyar, Madras, where the Theosophical Society, an early twentieth-century precursor of the New Age movement had its headquarters; and Puduchcerry, where the spiritual leader Sri Aurobindo and his collaborator Mirra Richards, known as "the Mother," had set up an ashram in the 1920s. Aurobindo's ashram attracted global attention when Richards, who became instrumental in sustaining and expanding it after Aurobindo's death in 1950, set up an experimental township called Auroville in 1968. The community, which won an official endorsement from UNESCO, included members from dozens of countries who sought to translate the spiritual precepts of Aurobindo's philosophy into practical living arrangements. Initially a Western adaptation of Indian religious ideas and practices, Auroville and other New Age communities gained new adherents among middle- and upper-class Indians, thus reconnecting the Westernized version of Hindu spiritualism with its indigenous Indian roots.[338]

Embrace of non-Western religious practices also merged with environmental concerns to create a new understanding of the relationship between the human body and its natural environment.[339] Homeopathy, yoga, holistic medicine, aromatherapy, and the Chinese practice of acupuncture gained popularity among middle-class intellectuals in Europe and North America beginning in the 1970s.[340] Practitioners increasingly stressed the links between physical and spiritual health. Western psychologists, psychiatrists, and medical scientists, too, began to study more systematically the relationship between the two. As a result,

TABLE 4.2

Number of adherents of major religions, as a percentage of the global population

Religion	1900	1970	2000	2010
Agnostic	0.19%	14.68%	10.70%	9.81%
Buddhist	7.84%	6.36%	7.32%	7.16%
Chinese Traditional	23.46%	6.16%	6.99%	6.30%
Christian	34.46%	33.24%	32.43%	32.81%
Hindu	12.53%	12.53%	13.47%	13.76%
Muslim	12.34%	15.62%	21.08%	22.51%

Data source: World Religion Database.

medical experts gradually began to integrate non-Western methods into their approaches to healing, including the use of ancient herbs and other natural remedies.

In many ways New Age was a response to the increasing dependence of humans on technology, but it was by no means an antimodern movement. Rather, it tried to channel the advances made in science and technology into projects toward the personal betterment of humanity. The objectives were distinctly personal rather than collective. The regeneration of body and soul was to be achieved through the attainment of harmony between modernism and tradition as well as between mind and matter. The global interest in this new spirituality was distinctly born from a life of affluence and comfort. As such it stood in marked contrast to the spread of other religious movements, among them liberation theology and Islamic fundamentalism.

As the concurrent rise of religious fundamentalism and religious pluralism shows, the world's religions were not static entities immune to cultural or even doctrinal change. Religious beliefs and religious practices evolved in tandem with and in reaction to larger social, cultural, and political forces. By the same token, evolving religious identities, practices, and belief systems contributed to the cultural transformations of the second half of the twentieth century. Two factors in particular defined religion's role in these cultural transformations. The

first was religion's relationship to modernism. By the beginning of the twenty-first century it had become increasingly clear that the traditional assumptions about the secularizing power of modernism no longer held true. In other words, economic, social, and political modernization did not inevitably lead to a decline in religiosity. To be sure, certain functions traditionally fulfilled by religious belief systems and religious institutions had been taken over by other agencies—for instance, the spiritual function of explaining the mysteries of the natural world and the origin of life was increasingly taken over by science, and religion's practical function of creating communities and engaging in charity was increasingly taken over, at least in the Western world, by government agencies and secular humanitarian organizations. However, rather than rendering religious affiliation obsolete, both worshippers and religious organizations adapted to the changing functions of religion in the modern world. The more flexible religious organizations were in their adaptation to the changing spiritual and emotional needs of congregations, the better they survived or even prospered. Modernism thus affected religion in unanticipated ways. It encouraged a system of religious beliefs and religious practice that became more flexible, more fragmented, and more diverse. Within all major religions, above all within Christianity, Hinduism, Judaism, and Islam, a broad spectrum of subgroups emerged, ranging from liberal-progressive to fundamentalist-conservative.

Religion's second major contribution to the cultural transformations of the past sixty years was the consolidation of the idea of religious pluralism. Since 1945 religious boundaries had at once multiplied and become more diffuse. They had multiplied because many religious subgroups erected spiritual, if not territorial, barriers to the secular world. The process of creating religious enclaves occurred primarily within fundamentalist and conservative subgroups. However, boundaries also became more diffuse as fewer of them cohered with political or state boundaries. Conservative and liberal variants of a single faith coexisted within a single locale, often sharing the same urban space when recruiting worshippers. In all major metropolitan areas of the world, one can find representatives of every major faith, often subgroups within each faith as well.

Religious pluralism, as defined by Thomas Banchoff, is "the interaction among religious groups in society and politics." It emerged in the period after 1945, Banchoff argued, as a result of increased international migration, urbanization,

and cultural globalization. "In the context of globalization and modernity, individuals constitute and reconstitute religious groups on a more fluid basis."[341] However, the idea of religious pluralism, in which individuals choose or "consume" religion, like they would other products offered in a pluralistic society, does not translate easily into reality. Even in the United States, which has a long tradition of religious tolerance, tensions arose between majority and minority religious groups over the inscription of oppositional values into state and national laws. Those include questions of public religious display, abortion rights, homosexuality, and same-sex marriage. In Europe religious pluralism created deep divisions, less about religious beliefs than about the outwardly visible cultural signs associated with religious practice. Other divisions have included the treatment of women within Muslim cultures or the practice of Sharia, which could bring Muslims in direct conflict with Euro-American law.

Even though pluralism is one of the core elements of any democratic system, religious pluralism has at times been seen as a threat to democracy. The root of this argument lies in the confrontation of Western religions, primarily Christianity and Judaism, with non-Western religions. How should a political system based on values forged in large part out of a Judeo-Christian heritage absorb and accommodate groups and individuals steeped in a religion and culture that in many ways contradict that heritage? Or as the legal theorist and philosopher Martha Nussbaum asked: "How can a respectful pluralistic society shore up its fragile bases of toleration, especially in a time of increased domestic religious pluralism and in a world in which we need to cultivate toleration not only internally, but also between peoples and states?" According to Nussbaum, a secularized civil religion, as first postulated by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, offered a flawed solution, because its consequence was intolerance toward those who did not adhere to the fundamental precepts of that civil religion, which in turn created even bigger problems in international relations. In fact, in 1762 Rousseau had declared, "It is impossible to live in peace with those one believes to be damned."[342] Nussbaum suggested another option, based on John Stuart Mill's nineteenth-century elaboration on the idea of a "religion of humanity," first suggested by Auguste Comte.[343] This religion embraced "compassion as a moral sentiment that can be cultivated by public institutions and public education." This new form of patriotism, as she called it, would contain within itself the idea of tolerance

and compassion toward others and thus create pride in universal humanity. She argued that "a liberal society, without offending against respect for pluralism, can still employ a moral ideal of this sort [compassion] and promote a moral education aimed at underwriting it. This ideal would serve as a basis for public political culture, in connection with public norms of equality and respect."[344] Thus, rather than banning religious identity from public life, the tolerant state could embrace religious pluralism and tolerance as part of its national identity.

Nussbaum's proposal returns us to the idea of embedding particularism within a larger framework of universality. By incorporating religious pluralism and the diversity of values within a larger project of public education and ultimately national identity, the state places diversity at the core of its unification process. This unification process, whether at the state, regional, or global level, presupposes an agreement on certain basic human values and morals that might ultimately be difficult to achieve. It requires religious leaders and their followers to focus their doctrines on the fundamentals of human dignity and well-being rather than on more specific doctrines and practices. Ironically, it was often the fundamentalist branches of the world's major religions that lost sight of these fundamental values, and created instead an elaborate system of doctrines, rules, and social practices that made them incompatible with others.[345] At the turn of the twenty-first century the challenge remained of how to curb the power of those who wanted to abolish pluralism without resorting to coercive measures such as curtailing free speech and free expression of religious and cultural difference.

4. *Human Rights and Globalization*

IN many ways the postwar rise of human rights in the international arena became a secular religion of sorts for rational Enlightenment thinkers across the world. International legal experts, humanitarians, diplomats, and religious leaders could rally behind the idea of establishing a new world order in which the rights of individuals and states were guaranteed by a common set of laws. Begun as an idealistic vision of universal values applicable to all of humanity, the debates about the definition and scope of human rights since World War II showcased the major cultural dichotomies between particularism and universalism, and between homogenization and heterogenization.

Debates about rights had been part of state formation for centuries, focusing initially on concerns about citizenship and the rule of law within the state. However, as the world community suffered through two devastating wars in the first half of the twentieth century, the debate regarding rights shifted from the domestic to the international realm. The core question became whether human beings, despite cultural and political differences, could agree on a universal code of conduct that would guide their interactions and prevent future wars. Determining the substance of these values became part of an international discourse on rights: civil rights, women's rights, economic rights, minority rights. While participation in this discourse expanded, agreement on the nature and extent of these values remained elusive. The debates themselves illustrate the political constraints of reaching a global consensus on fundamental rights accorded all human beings and the practical constraints of enforcing a universal rights code around the globe.

The United Nations helped define the international rights debate at its first conference in San Francisco in 1945. Emerging from a devastating conflict that had claimed fifty to seventy million lives, most of them civilians, the delegates rallied around the core principles of international peace and justice. They agreed on a fundamental set of rules to guide relations among its member states, including, enshrined in the preamble to the UN Charter, "faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small."[346] The Charter deliberately neglected to define the meaning and extent of those rights, leaving states, individuals, and human rights advocates to argue over those issues for the next six decades. It also deliberately neglected to provide mechanisms of enforcement, leaving states free to determine the reach of individual rights within their own jurisdiction.

Even though scholars trace human rights discourses to early Enlightenment thinkers, concrete transnational manifestations of the realization of a human rights agenda remained rare.[347] Rights campaigns surfaced in different political and social contexts throughout the nineteenth century, among them the campaign against slavery, the women's rights movement, and the fight for workers' rights. The first Geneva Convention, ratified by twelve nations in 1864, established an international set of rules for the treatment of captured and wounded enemy soldiers.[348] The brutal colonial regimes of the late nineteenth century and the genocides and wars of the first half of the twentieth century, however, dispelled any illusion that these rights discourses led to a more just and humane world.[349] In the aftermath of World War I, Woodrow Wilson advocated a system of international laws to regulate relations among nations without recourse to war but he refrained from adding human rights to his Fourteen Points. Nongovernmental human rights advocacy groups, such as the Ligue des Droits de l'Homme, which was founded in the aftermath of the anti-Semitic Dreyfus affair in France in 1898, and which pledged to protect minorities, struggled to gain political attention.[350]

A global human rights agenda emerged gradually between 1941 and 1948 under US and UN auspices. In January 1941, Franklin Delano Roosevelt included the defense of human rights in his State of the Union address and repeated the pledge as part of the Allied Powers' statement of war aims on New Year's Day 1942, shortly after America's entry into the war.[351] Though human rights were not included in the Atlantic Charter of August 1941, six months later the declaration of the United Nations, consisting of the countries at war with the Axis powers, pledged to "preserve human rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other lands." There was no further elaboration on what these rights were or how they should be enforced.[352]

Because the UN Charter's definition of human rights was so vague, international human rights advocates pushed for a separate Universal Bill of Rights. The UN subsequently set up a human rights commission to draw up such a document under the leadership of the United States' former first lady Eleanor Roosevelt. The final product of the committee, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), included individual civil and political rights and collective economic and social rights. The preamble laid out the general principles of dignity, liberty, equality, and brotherhood, and the reasons for the declaration. Then followed articles relating to individual rights (Articles 3–11); rights of individuals in relation to groups (Articles 12–17); spiritual, public, and political rights (Articles 18–21); and economic, social, and cultural rights (Articles 22–27). Articles 28–30 placed the rights within the broader context of limits, duties, and order.[353] Clean and orderly as the organization of the Declaration was, it could not mask the ambiguities in the wording, which led almost immediately to contestations over the meaning of such concepts as freedom, the proper relationship among individual, community, and states' rights, and the obvious and most glaring gap in provisions for the enforcement of these rights. The document thus reflected idealistic aspiration rather than practical political application. The UN General Assembly approved the Declaration on December 10, 1948, by a vote of forty-eight states in favor, none opposed, and eight abstentions. The abstentions came from the Soviet Union and its satellite states Byelorussia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Ukraine; from independent socialist Yugoslavia; and from Saudi Arabia and South Africa. They reflected a fundamental unease about the potential infringement on the sovereignty of individual states, even though the declaration included no provisions for the enforcement of the human rights agenda.

Cold War Human Rights

Despite its claim of universality, the UDHR would be at the center of all the major global political and cultural divisions over the next half-century, beginning with the Cold War struggle between East and West. In fact, at the very moment of the adoption of the declaration in New York, the United States brought accusations of human rights violations against the Soviet Union before the United

Nations. Five months earlier, the Soviets had blocked all traffic between the Western-controlled parts of Berlin and the Western zones of Germany in protest over the currency reform implemented by the Western Allies. The Soviets feared that the introduction of a new currency in the Western sectors of the city would destroy the old currency still in existence in the Soviet-controlled sector as well as the Soviet occupation zone surrounding Berlin. The US deputy representative to the United Nations, Philip C. Jessup, charged that the Soviet Union was depriving the citizens of Berlin of access to food, fuel, and health care, basic rights inscribed in Article 25 of the UDHR: the right to a "standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family."[354] Ultimately the two parties resolved the crisis outside the venue of the United Nations, but not until the following May. Berlin marked the first of many Cold War clashes in which opposing definitions of human rights played a key role.

Anticommunists in the United States and Western Europe were determined to press the human rights agenda into service for their ideological battle against the Soviet Union. They charged that communism itself violated human rights, because it deprived those under its rule of the fundamental rights of freedom of expression, freedom of movement, and religious and political freedoms. They drew selectively on the Universal Declaration to hail the Western liberal democratic system as its champion and vilify the Soviet-dominated system as its direct nemesis. They could draw on some hard facts in support of their claims, including the persecution of political dissidents under Stalin. However, human rights remained marginal to their rhetorical campaign against the Soviet system, because they did not want to open themselves up to potential charges, particularly during the ideologically repressive era of McCarthyism in the United States. Led by Republican senator Joseph McCarthy from Wisconsin, policy makers and law enforcement officials launched a fierce campaign against political leftists in public life, destroying careers and incarcerating many suspected of subversive activities, including spying for the Soviet Union. The government's obsession with anticommunism led to substantial violations of individuals' rights to free speech and due process, in the interest and under cover of national security.[355]

The Soviet Union, in turn, focused on America's dismal human rights record regarding its African American population. It provided active support to African Americans who brought cases of systematic racial discrimination to the attention

of the United Nations General Assembly. At a meeting of the UN subcommission for minority rights in Geneva in the fall of 1947, the Soviet delegates used a petition brought to the UN by W. E. B. Du Bois to charge that US support for international minority rights was undermined by US treatment of its own minorities. Du Bois and the African American civil rights association NAACP were at that time publicly lobbying for the inclusion of African American equality in the UDHR. Du Bois had presented to the General Assembly his "Appeal to the World: A Statement on the Denial of Human Rights to Minorities in the Case of Citizens of Negro Descent in the United States of America and an Appeal to the United Nations for Redress." His act met with strong disapproval from white liberal civil rights supporters, including Eleanor Roosevelt.[356]

US political leaders initially sought to deflect those criticisms by pointing to the advances, albeit elusive, made in the United States since the end of World War II. Yet soon they took a more calculated approach that sought to associate with communism the calls for some human rights, including the right to equal pay for equal work and the rights to housing and health care. The historian Carol Anderson has argued that the Cold War "blacklisting" of these human rights objectives seriously undermined African Americans' struggle for equality in the United States and forced them to settle for a much narrower fight for political and legal equality. Even liberal supporters of black equality, Anderson showed, refrained from championing social and economic rights on a national and global scale. By refusing to ensure the international enforcement of those two key rights enshrined in Articles 25 and 26, US human rights advocates severely compromised the declaration's potential to achieve universal equality.[357]

Divisions over the human rights agenda were also at the center of the struggle for decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s. European powers went to great length in the 1940s to exclude the populations in their colonies from the reach of universal human rights, particularly in the realm of civil and political rights.[358] Belgium, Great Britain, France, and other colonial powers, eager to hold on to their overseas possessions, argued for an exemption clause for colonial territories. They justified this exemption in terms of cultural difference, yet these justifications were little more than thinly veiled expressions of racial discrimination. Giving colonial subjects the same rights, advocates of the exemption clause argued, would endanger the public order in those territories.[359]

Conversely, anticolonial activists saw in the human rights agenda a vital tool for their struggle for independence. At the 1955 Bandung Conference of Non-Aligned Nations, where African and Asian nations—some of them newly independent—sought closer economic and political cooperation and a common strategy to fight colonialism and imperialism, participants defined self-determination as the "first right." Though human rights scholars later contested whether self-determination was in fact a human right, the delegates at Bandung clearly identified it as such and gave it a privileged position.[360] Self-determination, while not explicitly stated in the UDHR, clearly related to the collective rights of individuals to freely choose their form of government and to participate in the process of political governance.

The Bandung delegates debated individual human rights as well. For instance, the Egyptian journalist and publisher Mahmoud Aboul Fath, who had been forced into exile for his open criticism of Gamal Abdel Nasser, admonished delegates not to lose sight of individual human rights, among them the right to free speech. In an open letter to conference participants he implored delegates to adhere to the standards laid out in the UDHR. "The violation of human rights," he warned, "is certainly bad and intolerable when committed by imperialists against peoples on whom they force their authority, but it is also worse and more obnoxious [when] committed by a few nationals against their own people."[361] Fath's statement put into sharp relief the tension between individual and collective rights. The right to self-determination applied primarily to states, not to individuals. It harked back to the post–World War I focus on minority rights, rather than the United Nations formulation of the rights of individuals.[362] Fath warned against establishing a hierarchy of human rights that replaced one category of rights with another, arguing instead that adherence to both collective and individual rights was a necessary prerequisite for the creation of a just postcolonial world.

The universal language of human rights served Asian and African political demands for independence in the 1950s and 1960s. They claimed for themselves the same rights afforded the original signers of the Declaration. At the Bandung Conference, African and Asian states rejected not only the traditional political regime of colonial governance, but also the cultural system of human rights relativism. Their understanding of the interconnection between universal human

rights and the anticolonial struggle found expression in declarations of independence across Asia and Africa. The African National Congress, for instance, that same year drew heavily on the language of human rights in its formulation of the Freedom Charter.[363] Individual rights, the Freedom Charter argued, long the prerogative of the white minority population in South Africa, should be extended to all citizens of South Africa, regardless of skin color.

Some of the debates over the meaning and scope of human rights were expressed in the language of cultural difference. In fact, cultural differences had already been a source of contention during the drafting of the declaration. Yet the mostly white Euro-American commission quickly dispensed with any argument in favor of interpreting or enforcing human rights differently in different parts of the world. The commission did, in fact, solicit the views of a few prominent non-Western intellectuals before it finalized the wording of the Declaration. Gandhi, who at the time was leading India's struggle for independence, declared that he preferred an emphasis on duties rather than rights. He explained that "the very right to live accrues to us only when we do the duty of citizenship of the world." Instead of a universal declaration of rights, he proposed "to define the duties of Man and Woman and correlate every right to some corresponding duty to be first performed. Every other right can be shown to be a usurpation hardly worth fighting for." The Chinese philosopher Chung-Shu Lo concurred: in Chinese social and political discourse, rights were enshrined within the language of duties to one's neighbor.[364] These critiques did not amount to a rejection of the concept of human rights, but instead challenged the way in which these rights were framed. Most importantly, however, they affirmed the universality of rights and duties across cultural divides.

In the 1960s the parameters of the human rights debates shifted from the international arena of intergovernmental agencies to grassroots activism on the local and transnational level. As student protesters in the industrial world challenged the Cold War order and charged their own governments with violating the principles of democratic governance, new organizations emerged that made the defense of human rights on a global scale their main objective. Most prominent among them was Amnesty International, founded in 1961 by the British lawyer and labor activist Peter Benenson.[365] Amnesty International's mission

was to draw public attention to individuals who were incarcerated for political reasons. Benenson encouraged letter-writing campaigns to put public pressure on law enforcement agencies and governments to release political prisoners. Though its record was sketchy over the next decade, the organization grew rapidly into an international network and expanded its advocacy to women's rights, children's rights, and rights of refugees and torture victims. Its significance in the 1960s and 1970s lay in expanding human rights advocacy from a high-level intergovernmental diplomatic endeavor to a grassroots-level transnational movement. In the atmosphere of mass political activism of the 1960s, the organization's idealistic objectives appealed to many who had grown frustrated with the level of complacency among their own political leaders.[366]

Amnesty International focused on the plight of individuals. It tried to remain politically neutral in the public sphere, much to the dismay of those who felt that the human rights abuses in some regimes could not and should not be separated from their political context.[367] The organization went so far as to advise local branches to "adopt" political prisoners in equal proportion from Western countries, the communist world, and the Third World.[368] Furthermore it showed a marked preference for cases with sensationalist potential, in order to raise public awareness about Amnesty International's work. Critics charged that this method privileged publicity over the actual cases and possibly detracted from human rights violations that deserved equal or more attention.

Amnesty International's work epitomized the shift toward individual rights in the global human rights agenda of the 1970s. Their radius of operation also extended into the global South, where, despite Fath's earlier warnings, human rights violations mounted. Many postcolonial leaders resorted to political oppression and physical violence to consolidate their power. Throughout much of the Cold War these regimes justified political repression as a legitimate means to ensure public order and political stability, often receiving political cover from one or the other superpower. Even when US president Jimmy Carter pledged in 1977 to make human rights one of the core policy principles of his administration, geopolitical considerations interfered.[369] Carter put pressure on Chile and used human rights as political leverage in his dealings with the Soviet Union, yet he failed to follow through with countries that were important economic and

political allies, including South Africa, whose apartheid regime was a flagrant violation of human rights but whose anticommunist policies made it a crucial Cold War ally of the United States.[370]

Even though the Carter administration's human rights policies remained burdened by Cold War considerations, progress occurred on the European stage with the multiyear Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), attended by Western and Eastern European states as well as Canada and the United States. Eastern Europeans had convened the conference in an effort to gain Western acceptance of the existing system of postwar state boundaries. Western European states signaled their willingness to agree to the permanence of those boundaries, with the proviso that a series of human rights clauses be added to the final accords.[371] Those clauses included "respect [for] human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion," but also a section on "equal rights and self-determination of peoples."[372] The Helsinki Accords of 1975 led to the creation of the Helsinki Watch group, a nongovernmental organization that monitored compliance with the accords in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.[373] The Accords also encouraged Eastern European dissidents, among them prominent Russian physicist Andrei Sakharov, Russian writer Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, and Czech playwright Vaclav Havel, to create movements that challenged their own governments and ultimately helped bring down the communist regimes in 1989.[374] The signing of the Accords established, at least on paper, a common understanding of the inviolability of human rights across the Cold War divide. Despite those efforts, repression in Eastern Europe persisted, demonstrating that the human rights regime would remain an ideal rather than a reality for years to come.

Defining Human Rights after the Cold War

The year 1989 offered new hope for the triumph of human rights in international relations. As communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union fell, the United Nations seemed poised to take a much more active role in guaranteeing peace, justice, and universal rights around the world. Funding for repressive leaders in the world dried up. South Africa released its most prominent political

prisoner, Nelson Mandela, within two months of the fall of the Berlin Wall; Latin American insurgents and dictators lost financial backing. Nicaragua held multiparty democratic elections in 1990, which deposed the Soviet-backed Sandinistas. The end of the Cold War also coincided with the emergence and expansion of global communication networks, including the advent of the Internet and the launching of new communication satellites into space. Together, these developments filled people with optimism that the post–Cold War years could break down cultural barriers and foster a new era of global peace.

The global surge in optimism dissipated soon after 1989. The end of the Cold War did as much to expose ethnic, cultural, and political divisions as it did to forge new connections across ideological and cultural divides. An example of the former was the ethnic conflict emerging in Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, and Albanians, who had kept in check their historic animosities as long as they lived under communist control, now lashed out against one another with brutal force unseen on the European continent since World War II. Serbia's ethnic cleansing campaign in Bosnia in the early 1990s was a painful reminder of past atrocities in the region and revealed the inability or unwillingness of the international community to act on behalf of victims of human rights abuses. Around 2.2 million civilians in the region were displaced, some of them to refugee camps within the former Yugoslavia, others to European Union countries and North America. Only about half of them returned, according to a 2006 UN report.[375]

European Union countries, which absorbed many of the Balkan refugees as well as migrants from other Eastern European countries, struggled socially, economically, and culturally to integrate the newcomers. In Germany, France, Austria, the Netherlands, and elsewhere, ultraconservative political parties garnered votes through anti-immigrant and ultranationalist positions. For a while it seemed that the opening of the borders to the former communist bloc created a nationalist backlash rather than a rush to global integration. Western Europeans debated questions of citizenship, responsibility for language education, tolerance of nonindigenous cultural practices, women's rights, and access to social services like health care. Most of the governments developed a dual approach: they tightened restrictions on immigration and political asylum while simultaneously redoubling efforts to integrate and provide basic services for those they



In 1987, protesters in Johannesburg marched for the release of Nelson Mandela, who had been imprisoned by the South African apartheid regime since 1964. International pressure on South Africa to end its human rights abuses and discriminatory practices against black citizens increased in the 1980s. In 1994, four years after his release from prison, Mandela became the country's first democratically elected post-apartheid leader. (Getty Images)

permitted to enter. Even if international migration did not always translate into greater cultural understanding, it nonetheless led to greater cultural and ethnic diversity in all major European countries by the beginning of the twenty-first century.

Ethnic tension erupted into mass murder in Rwanda in 1994. The killing of the Rwandan and Burundi presidents in an attack on their airplane as it approached the Rwandan capital, Kigali, unleashed the genocide. Both men belonged to the Hutu ethnic group, which had for years agitated against the Tutsi minority in Rwanda. Over the course of three months Hutus murdered between five hundred thousand and one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus, while UN troops, who had been deployed to the region in a peacekeeping mission in 1993, stood idly by. As they explained later, they had no official UN mandate to intervene and thus were powerless to prevent the massacres.[376]

Tensions also continued regarding the integration of Muslim populations into Western, primarily Christian societies. In France the controversy over the wearing of the veil in schools and public venues intensified, creating a strange coalition between conservative anti-immigration advocates, who wanted to force cultural and social assimilation within the immigrant population, and liberal, leftist, and feminist politicians who saw the veil as an infringement on the secular traditions of the French state and an expression of women's degradation in the public sphere. The long-standing controversy resulted in a 2004 national law prohibiting the wearing of "ostentatious signs of religious affiliation in public schools," followed in 2010 by a parliamentary vote to ban veils "designed to hide the face."[377] The ban took effect in April 2011. Belgium followed suit with a similar ban that went into effect three months later.

Concern over the integration of Muslim populations were magnified after the end of the Cold War by the rise of political Islamism in the Middle East and more specifically the creation of informal regional and transnational groups of varying militant persuasions. These groups established bases in states with sizable Muslim populations—tolerated and supported by some, such as Sudan and Pakistan for much of the 1990s, and opposed by others, including Iraq, whose secular dictator, Saddam Hussein, saw political Islamists as a threat to his authority. The groups' militant wings engaged in acts of terrorism in the Middle East and beyond. Islam experts warned against conflating the religious practice of



Grim evidence of genocide: three hundred skulls sit outside a chapel in Rwanda on November 6, 1994, as authorities determine the extent of the killings. Over the course of three months in 1994, Hutus murdered between five hundred thousand and one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus. (Getty Images)

Islam and fundamentalist political tenets. They also warned against conflating religious fundamentalist Islam with militant-political Islam.[378] Those nuances, however, escaped most Western popular commentators, who fueled anti-Muslim sentiment, particularly in the United States.

Samuel Huntington's controversial 1993 thesis of a "clash of civilizations" articulated a new kind of cultural pessimism.[379] Huntington argued that "the great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural." He divided the world into seven or eight civilizations and saw evidence that current and future violent conflicts occurred primarily among different civilizations. He defined civilizations as cultural entities sharing a common "history, language, culture, tradition and, most important, religion. The people of different civilizations have their own particular views on the relations between God and man, the individual and the group, the citizen and the state, parents

and children, husband and wife, as well as differing views of the relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy."[380] Not only did he deem religion as the most important foundation of those entities, but more importantly he predicted that religio-cultural differences were too deeply ingrained in each of these civilizations to allow for an accommodation across boundaries. Conflict, in his estimation, was inevitable.

Huntington rejected warnings about the homogenizing effects of cultural globalization. He acknowledged that there were more interactions among peoples from different religious and cultural backgrounds. But instead of producing greater understanding and tolerance for difference, Huntington argued, they produced the opposite: a higher potential for conflict, at times violent in nature. "As people define their identity in ethnic and religious terms, they are likely to see an 'us' versus 'them' relation existing between themselves and people of different ethnicity or religion."[381] Huntington could indeed point to several conflicts in the second half of the twentieth century in which religion became the focal point of what essentially were ethnic conflicts—Protestants versus Catholics in Northern Ireland, Orthodox Christians versus Muslims in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia, and Arabs versus Israelis in the Middle East.[382] According to Steve Bruce, religious identity "can acquire a new significance and call forth a new loyalty" when two cultures of different religion are in conflict or if a culture of one religion dominates another.

Critics accused Huntington of exhibiting a kind of cultural determinism reminiscent of the economic determinism advanced by Marxists in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.[383] They also charged him with creating a stereotypically negative image of Islam and conversely an equally stereotypically positive image of the "West."[384] Particularly worrisome in their eyes was his idea that the political manifestation of Islam was incompatible with democracy, a belief he shared with several leading conservative intellectuals, among them Bernard Lewis and Daniel Pipes.[385] Huntington's monocausal religio-cultural explanation for global relations and global conflict left little room to explore in earnest the extent and limits of cultural influence on relations between peoples and among people. It also demonstrated that despite international pronouncements of an increasingly connected and unified global society, evidence of cultural differences and cultural conflict remained strong.

Huntington's thesis gained new momentum in the aftermath of the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC, on September 11, 2001. Planned and executed by the Islamist terrorist organization al-Qaeda under the leadership of Osama bin Laden, the attacks claimed almost three thousand lives. Vowing to hunt down bin Laden anywhere in the world, the US government launched a military campaign against Afghanistan, the country believed to be harboring leading al-Qaeda operatives. It followed with an invasion of Iraq in 2003, even though Saddam Hussein was a known enemy of al-Qaeda. The administration of US president George W. Bush justified its pursuit of Islamist terrorists in Afghanistan and Iraq in part by pointing to the Taliban's and Saddam Hussein's human rights violations. But with revelations of torture and physical abuse of prisoners in American custody at the Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq in 2004, the United States itself came under fire for human rights abuses.[386] Legal advisers' attempts to justify abusive interrogation techniques such as water-boarding caused a domestic and international uproar. The incident gravely damaged the reputation of the United States as a champion of universal human rights and undermined hopes for enforcing global standards of human rights.[387] If the United States reserved for itself the right to define torture in contradiction to international conventions, it effectively undermined any efforts to arrive at an internationally recognized system of human rights enforcement.

Those efforts had been under way since the founding of the United Nations in 1945, but had stalled largely because of the ideological conflicts of the Cold War. Yet new opportunities for international cooperation in enforcing human rights on a global scale emerged in 1990. The United States had been a staunch supporter of the creation of international tribunals to bring to justice perpetrators of war crimes. The UN Security Council established the first of these in 1993 to deal with human rights violations in the former Yugoslavia. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) tried individuals accused of human rights violations in that territory since 1991. The most prominent defendants to stand trial were the former Serbian prime minister Slobodan Milošević; former president of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Radovan Karadžić; and former Serbian military commander Ratko Mladić.[388]

A year later the Security Council set up a second tribunal to deal with the 1994 mass killings of Tutsis in Rwanda, again with support from the United

States. The new spirit of post–Cold War cooperation in the UN allowed the Security Council to pass a resolution condemning the violence and set up the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). As in the former Yugoslavia, the international community failed to prevent the massacre. Yet it acted quickly to bring the perpetrators to justice. Beginning in 1996 the ICTR heard several dozen cases. Among its most prominent defendants were Rwanda's interim prime minister, Jean Kambanda, and Jean-Paul Akayesu, who at the time of the killings was mayor of the town of Taba, where Tutsis were systematically rounded up and killed. Both Kambanda and Akayesu received life sentences.[389] The Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals showed that although the United Nations did not have the power to intervene directly in regional conflicts to prevent or stop human rights violations on a massive scale, it was gradually developing the mechanisms to bring to justice those who had committed crimes against humanity.

In 2002, UN member states went a step further toward an international criminal justice system by establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC). However, the United States under the presidency of George W. Bush refused to ratify the Statute and withdrew its support for the ICC. Despite US rejection the court thrived and gained new signatories. By the end of 2011 there were 119 state members of the ICC. The Court's jurisdiction, while broad in geographical scope, remained limited to the prosecution of nationals whose governments belonged to the Court and in cases where "the investigating or prosecuting state is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution." Most of the cases brought before the Court in its first decade of operation involved nationals from African states.[390]

The tribunals as well as the ICC operated on the assumption that a single set of laws should govern the national and international conduct of states and individuals. The success of these legal institutions rested on the willingness of member states to subscribe to and enforce those laws.[391] However, in the last decade of the twentieth century the global community was still far from united on what constituted human rights and which laws should be applicable to all of humanity. In fact, the very idea of the universality of rights was challenged anew at the United Nations in the early 1990s when the heirs of those who had fought for self-determination at the Bandung Conference thirty-five years earlier claimed for themselves a particularist interpretation of human rights.

The controversy emerged in 1991 in response to the publication of the United Nations Development Program's second annual report ranking countries according to a newly developed Human Freedom Index. The index took forty criteria of human freedom and ranked countries accordingly. UN ambassador Kofi Awoonor of Ghana, spokesperson for the Group of 77, objected to the list of criteria. "Freedom is a value-laden concept that finds expression in different shapes and forms from society to society," he protested. "To take the work of a particular scholar representing a particular culture seen by many in recent history as linked to the oppression and exploitation of a vast part of our world and develop an index that should be applicable to all societies and cultures, is to show a lack of sensitivity hardly acceptable in a universal body like the UNDP."[392] The Group of 77 objected in particular to the inclusion in the index of the freedom accorded to homosexuals. In several of the seventy-seven member states, including much of Africa and the Middle East, homosexuality continued to be punishable by law. Even in countries that no longer criminalized homosexuality, there was still spirited debate over issues concerning sexual and women's rights—including the right of homosexuals to serve in the military or to marry, as well as a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy.

A challenge of broader import emerged at the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993, as several non-Western countries, including China, Iran, Syria, Singapore, Malaysia, and Cuba, questioned the universal applicability of the UDHR, dismissing it as an instrument of Western imperialism and demanding instead the primacy of the right to national sovereignty over universal claims of human rights.[393] Those spearheading the critique, among them Singapore and Indonesia, faced charges of human rights violations and therefore had a vested interest in redefining the parameters of the human rights agenda.[394]

The battle over cultural relativism had taken shape three months earlier in Bangkok, Thailand, where Asian countries had convened in preparation for the Vienna conference.[395] At the Bangkok conference, Asian countries stressed the culturally specific regional application of individual rights. Article 8 of the Bangkok Declaration stated that "while human rights are universal in nature, they must be considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds."[396]

This line of argument represented a significant departure from the Bandung Conference four decades earlier, which had endorsed the universal applicability of human rights to claim for Asians and Africans the right to self-determination. At Bangkok, in contrast, the particulars of cultural differences trumped the universality of human rights.

Asian human rights organizations and leading intellectuals immediately challenged the official Bangkok position. Meeting at the same time as their governments, they rejected the cultural relativism argument and reaffirmed their commitment to the universality, inalienability, and indivisibility of human rights in Asia. The NGO meeting concluded with a counterdeclaration stating that "universal human rights are rooted in many cultures," and that because "human rights are of universal concern and are universal in value, the advocacy of human rights cannot be considered to be an encroachment upon national sovereignty."[397] Asian human rights organizations were very much aware of the ways in which their governments were exploiting the debates over cultural relativism to justify human rights violations. While they acknowledged that cultural differences existed, they argued that universal human rights as defined in the 1948 UDHR applied to all cultures. Their view ultimately prevailed in Vienna. Not only did the conference conclude with a strong statement in favor of the universal applicability of human rights, it also succeeded in creating the office of the UN Commissioner for Human Rights, a move opposed by the government delegates and supported by Asian NGOs.[398]

Human rights advocates had to reconcile their belief in the universal applicability of human rights based on shared cultural values with an equally strong support for the preservation of cultural diversity. The Indian economist Amartya Sen provided the most articulate argument for the integration of particularism and universalism. He charged that the idea that all of Asia shared a particular value system different from "the West" repeated and reinforced an old Eurocentric vision. He embraced the existence of cultural diversity, because diversity existed within Asia as on every other continent. That diversity, Sen continued, did not preclude the existence of shared values. He particularly dismissed the argument made by Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew and China's Li Peng that Asian cultures had more appreciation for authoritarian rule and less appreciation for individual freedoms and civil rights and that Asia owed its economic

success to that embrace of authoritarianism.[399] Because the regimes had been authoritarian long before economic progress occurred, Sen countered, the reasons for their success had to lie elsewhere. In addition, he pointed to specific Asian religious and cultural ideas, including Buddhism, that promoted civic and personal independence over blind obedience to authority. Conversely, he pointed to Western philosophical and intellectual traditions that showed a deep appreciation and valorization of order and authority. Diversity, he concluded, did not preclude the existence of common ground.

Debates about the universality of human rights were both locally distinct and globally recognizable. Rather than being mutually exclusive and in competition with each other, the particularist and universalist claims of human rights were mutually constitutive. In the era of post–Cold War globalization, these debates called into question the primacy of the nation-state, though they by no means abandoned the state as a locus of power and action. They fragmented national and international communities by linking the local to the global. They elevated to prominence the importance of new means of communication and information technology. Though imperfect and uneven, global networks of human rights activists broadcast testimony and visual images of human rights abuses, thus engaging a global audience in their campaigns against perpetrators.[400] These campaigns did not create an international consensus on the meaning and extent of the human rights regime. To the contrary, multiple groups and political constituencies continued to battle over how to define human rights, and these groups often operated in the interest of political expediency rather than moral principle. A decade into the twenty-first century our understanding of human rights might be more fragmented than ever before.

Cultures of Globalization

The post–Cold War period also generated heated debates over the meaning and consequences of cultural globalization. What most people agreed upon was that the world had shrunk significantly and that globalization was a real phenomenon that touched the lives of almost every human being on Earth. Depending on their political, economic, and ideological convictions, participants in the debate saw around them either homogenization or heterogenization, unification or

fragmentation, particularism or universalism, and they had mixed feelings about both the forces that pushed them closer together and those that pulled them farther apart. The advocates on both sides battled each other in public demonstrations, in political forums, and on the pages of newspapers and journals. However, the battle lines were not drawn neatly along geographic, class, or even generational lines. At times the same people could embrace cultural globalization in one context and reject it adamantly in another.

As a demographic group, young people were most comfortable with the new opportunities offered by cultural globalization. They particularly embraced the Internet as a vehicle for communication across vast geographic distances and an amplifier for popular trends across disparate parts of the world. They became most adept at enjoying the fruits of cultural globalization through access to a broad spectrum of cultural and material offerings allowing them to transcend the confines of their physical environment. They were also less concerned than their elders about a loss of cultural tradition in their local environment. Through television, Internet, and other means of modern communication, they were able to connect to a virtual community of people with shared tastes, beliefs, and interests. They were thus able to find their very particular cultural niche independent of their geographical location.

The Internet democratized information and communication for those with access to the technology. But this universal access to information did not lead to cultural homogenization, as critics feared. And while it had the potential to lead to greater understanding of cultural diversity, and greater tolerance of cultural difference, this did not always occur either. As the virtual marketplace of ideas and communication expanded, it fostered all kinds of ideas indiscriminately. It enabled Islamist jihadists to spread their message of hate as well as helped organize the peaceful protests for democracy in Tunisia and Egypt during the Arab Spring of 2011. In both cases people utilized new technology to spread their messages instantly to a national and international audience.

Young people's easy embrace of new communication technologies did not turn them into fervent advocates of globalization, either. To the contrary, many of them joined protests against economic globalization at the annual meetings of the World Trade Organization, the World Economic Forum, and other economic summits in the late 1990s and early 2000s.[401] The international media

were quick to label these activists antiglobalization protesters, though the activists' opposition focused on the particular neoliberal aspects of economic globalization embedded in the policies of the World Bank, the IMF, and the world's leading economic powers. Protesters charged that the policies advocated by these economic powers, particularly free trade and economic deregulation, gave an unfair advantage to the world's richest economies. They pointed to a series of international agreements in the early 1990s designed to facilitate international trade, which instead threatened local businesses who could not compete in the international marketplace. Those agreements included the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the latest General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which took effect in 1994.

The free trade agreements did indeed produce uneven results for national economies. They helped make the international exchange of goods cheaper, easier, and faster in the last decade of the twentieth century. Together with technological advances in international shipping, the pace of trade accelerated and the cost of moving goods from their point of production to the point of consumption decreased, a development that also enabled communist China to become a leading producer of consumer goods for the American market. More importantly, the production process itself became globalized, with parts manufactured in several countries and assembled in places far removed from the design and marketing centers. The multinational production process cut down on the cost of consumer goods in the international market.

But there were also negative effects, among them an overall decrease in wages in the manufacturing sector, as producers moved from high-cost labor markets, such as the United States, Western Europe, and Japan, to low-cost labor markets in Southeast Asia and Latin America.[402] According to the economist Jeff Faux, the winners and losers of this process were now separated not by nationality but rather by class. The worldwide decline in wages reduced workers' share in international wealth, whereas multinational corporate elites benefited disproportionately. It also pitted consumers against labor in the industrialized world. Consumers benefited by having better access to lower-priced goods, including everyday items like clothes and shoes, while workers suffered from stagnant or declining wages, or worse, lost their jobs altogether. Because they were also consumers, workers found themselves at once on the winning and losing sides of the equation.

The conflicts over NAFTA and GATT not only divided workers, consumers, and producers in each of the participating countries, they also created new solidarities across national and cultural divides. The protests led to the formation of transnational social movements such as the World Social Forum, whose goal it was to make globalization work toward global justice instead of economic stratification.

As globalization magnified difference in the economic realm through increasing social and economic stratification, it appeared to accomplish the exact opposite in the cultural realm, namely, the leveling of cultural difference. But evidence to the contrary can be found in the increasing multiculturalism in most major urban areas of the world, in the proliferation of international food everywhere, and particularly in the increase in travel to areas outside of Europe and North America. In fact, the experience of difference became a major selling point in the post–Cold War expansion of global tourism, as rich Western investors sought new opportunities for development in the global South and Far East. Many former political hot spots in Africa and East Asia, including Vietnam and Indonesia, became prime targets for tourist developments. Particularly in the 1990s there emerged a new wave of ecotourism, which required the controlled "cultivation" of areas previously inaccessible to outside visitors. The somewhat contradictory goal of ecotourism was to leave those newly cultivated areas as pristine as possible while at the same time introducing Western travelers to the region.

Ecotourism became so popular in the 1990s that the United Nations declared the year 2002 the International Year of Ecotourism.[403] At a World Ecotourism summit in Quebec that same year, the participants issued a declaration, known as the "Quebec Declaration on Ecotourism," in which they pledged their commitment to preserving the "natural and cultural heritage" of tourist destinations, as well as a host of other commitments designed to achieve what the participants called "sustainable tourism." The summit, as well as the International Year of Ecotourism, signified new post–Cold War environmental concerns as well as concerns over sustainable development. The summit organizers recognized that global travel provided a major source of income for parts of the world that had seen very little economic development. More importantly, however, the meeting exposed the deep paradox of tourism at the turn of the twenty-first century. Ecotourists were both rejecting and driving cultural and economic globalization.

They sought authentic cultural experiences in ever more remote areas of the world, but their expanding collective desires coupled with economic power invariably altered the cultural and economic dynamics of their destinations. In their search for difference, ecotourists linked the local to the global. They created hybridity at the very moment they celebrated authenticity.

Even though ecotourism was primarily a commercial phenomenon, it expressed a deep-seated desire to incorporate cultural difference into one's own life experience. The embrace of difference combined with a sense of interconnectedness across cultural and geographical divides found expression in the late twentieth-century philosophy of cosmopolitanism. One of its primary advocates was the philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah, who thought it a useful alternative to the overused and ill-defined concept of globalization, "a term" he argued, "that once referred to a marketing strategy, and then came to designate a macroeconomic thesis, and now can seem to encompass everything, and nothing."[404] Appiah borrowed his idea of cosmopolitanism from Immanuel Kant's 1795 essay *Toward Perpetual Peace*, which expressed not so much the material interconnectedness of the world but "the idea we have obligations to others, obligations that stretch beyond those to whom we are related by the ties of kith and kind, or even more formal ties of shared citizenship." In addition, cosmopolitanism fostered an engagement with human existences beyond one's own cultural orbit, to "learn from our differences."[405] Cosmopolitans, according to Appiah, believe both in universally shared values that bind them to strangers outside their own familiar environment, and in the idea of cultural pluralism. In his own writing Appiah often stresses his own multicultural roots, which sensitized him to both cultural universalism and pluralism. His English mother and Ghanaian father raised their family in Kumasi, the provincial capital of the Ashanti region of Ghana, but Appiah felt equally at home in British and Ghanaian culture and eventually moved to the United States.

Cosmopolitanism, just like globalization, was not without controversy as a philosophical concept. The political theorist Seyla Benhabib identified three strands of thinking about the concept: as an "attitude of enlightened morality that does not place 'love of country' ahead of 'love of mankind' "; as a signifier of "hybridity, fluidity, and recognizing the fractured and internally riven character of human selves and citizens, whose complex aspirations" move beyond the national community; and thirdly as a "normative philosophy for carrying the universalistic norms of discourse ethics beyond the confines of the nation-state."[406] Benhabib associated herself most closely with the third variant. Her interest in cosmopolitanism lay in the concrete and normative manifestations of the concept in international laws and institutions. Those included definitions of human rights, humanitarian aid, refugee and asylum status, transnational definitions of citizenship, international criminal courts, tribunals, transnational human rights organizations, and, of course, the United Nations. Cosmopolitanism, in her view, provided the moral and ethical foundation for the ordering of the state's relationship with its people (the rights of individuals vis-à-vis the state) and the ordering of the relationship among people across state boundaries. Despite their different approaches, Appiah and Benhabib ultimately came to similar conclusions about the importance of cosmopolitanism in the globalized environment of the twenty-first century. While their variants of cosmopolitanism do not offer a solution to the continued struggle between the forces of universalism and particularism, they offer a clear idea of the challenges ahead.

Universalizing Difference

Difference provides the key to understanding the cultural conflicts at the turn of the twenty-first century. Difference also provides the key to a possible resolution to those conflicts. Integrating cultural difference into the process of nation building has become the biggest challenge of the post–Cold War period. It might be the project of nation building itself that will become a casualty of the inexorable advance of cultural globalization. Transnational economic conglomerates, political organizations, and cultural institutions are challenging the primacy of the nation-state. To be sure, sovereign states are nowhere near to relinquishing power to higher political institutions. But those same states are recognizing the increasing dependence of national economies and societies on global networks. While they are willing to facilitate the transfer of goods, people, and information across national boundaries, they remain uneasy about accepting the cultural consequences of that transfer.

The uneasiness stems from a peculiar understanding of cultural identity as fixed in time and place that is itself a product of early nineteenth-century

Enlightenment thinking about the centrality of the nation-state. Print culture, capitalism, and imperialism contributed to the emergence and strengthening of a national consciousness in Europe and the United States.[407] The more prescriptive and explicitly defined nationalism became, the more it relied on a linear myth of historical continuity. The past was reinvented to fit the identity of the present state. And the more the state relied on a linear myth, the more intolerant of difference it became. Two world wars in the first half of the twentieth century showed the terrible consequences of an ideology of extremist nationalism that defined itself in opposition to other cultures and, in the case of Nazi Germany, insisted on the eradication of entire segments of its population deemed as "other." The second half of the twentieth century was characterized, at least in the cultural realm, by the negotiation between the forces of nationalism and transnationalism. Embracing difference was as much part of the process as finding commonalities. "Difference is reproduced locally," the historians Michael Geyer and Charles Bright postulated in 2002, "not as an assertion of traditional meanings or practices, but as a product of engagement with the global processes of change that are played out in everyday life."[408] This does not render the idea of nationalism or national identity obsolete in the twenty-first century, but it assumes a new understanding of that identity as being forged and reproduced in continual interaction with—and not in opposition to—transnational impulses.

Even though cultural globalization is seen as a consequence of economic and political globalization, producers of culture—artists, writers, musicians—have been at the forefront of cultural hybridization. Some of these are well known, like Picasso and his works of art during his "African period." Others have only recently gained international attention, among them the conceptual artist Yinka Shonibare, whose installations epitomize both postcolonial and post–Cold War cultural hybridization. As an artist and an individual he defies easy categorization. His art installations build on cultural stereotypes in ways that demonstrate their absurdity. His preferred medium has been African batik print fabric, which, he discovered, was not really African in origin but imported from the Netherlands. The Dutch, in turn, had made these fabrics based on batiks they themselves had imported from Java, colonized by the Dutch in the seventeenth century. What whites, and many Africans for that matter, regarded as "authentically African" thus turned out to be a product of multiple layers of colonial conquest and interaction within the Dutch imperial system.

The story of how Shonibare came to these hybrid "African" fabrics illustrates the complex processes of postcolonial and ultimately post–Cold War cultural globalization. It also helps give practical meaning to what Appiah understands as cosmopolitanism. Shonibare was born in 1962 in England, where his Nigerian father was studying law. The family returned to Nigeria three years later, but Shonibare continued to spend summers in England, growing up in two worlds, bilingual and bicultural. At age eighteen he fell ill with transverse myelitis, which left him partially paralyzed. He later reflected on the peculiar circumstances of his evolution as an artist: "All of the things that are supposed to be wrong with me have actually become a huge asset. I'm talking about race and disability. They're meant to be negatives within our society, but they have liberated me."[409] His disability led him to depart from more conventional artistic expressions and focus instead on conceptual art, which allowed him to explore new media. The racial aspect of his liberation emerged from an exchange with one of his white tutors at the Byam Shaw School of Art in London, where he had enrolled in the mid-1980s. At the time he was interested in making "art about perestroika," but struggled to find the right approach. His tutor challenged the wisdom of his project and suggested instead that as an African he should focus on making "authentic African art." Once he overcame the affront not only of being racially stereotyped, but also having thrust upon him the artistic expression of an entire continent, Shonibare began to explore the question of what white imperialists (as well as postimperialists) might consider as "authentic African Art." That led him to the discovery of the Javanese-Dutch origins of the African fabrics and eventually the realization of the superficiality of the notion of authenticity in art and culture in general. "My tutor wanted me to be pure African," Shonibare later reflected. "I wanted to show I live in a world which is vast and take in other influences, in the way that any white artist has been able to do for centuries."[410] Through his art Shonibare refused to accept Euro-American projections of African identity or to engage in ethnic self-identification. Instead he inserted colonial themes into the repertoire of European representations of ethnic identity.[411]

His art plays with common stereotypes by turning them on their head. In one photographic installation with the title "Diary of a Victorian Dandy," he is lying in a comfortable bed in a Victorian-style room, surrounded by four white maids and a white butler, all of them apparently tending to his every whim. The scene is complete with classic landscape paintings of the English countryside on the walls. He has also created elaborate Victorian dresses out of his Dutch-Javanese-African fabrics, integrating the themes of colonialism, race, and class. The dresses are often worn by headless mannequins whose skin color defies easy racial categorization, located somewhere on the spectrum between white and black. With his installations, Shonibare interrogates cultural stereotypes, but also the concept of cultural authenticity. His artistic creations mix and at times invert cultural identities. This practice allows him to create a new cultural space that is authentic in its own right, by not adhering to any established national or continental "authenticity." He produces difference locally, in Bright and Geyer's words, by engaging "with the global processes of change that are played out in everyday life."[412]

Shonibare belongs to a group of artists from non-Western countries who have rejected the role, given to them by the international white art establishment, as representatives of an imagined ethnic art. Others include the Zairian artist Chéri Samba, Ghanaian Godfried Donkor, and Georges Adéagbo from Benin.[413] These artists provide a window through which to explore the possibilities and challenges of cultural globalization in the postcolonial and post–Cold War period. Their art exemplifies the lived experience of cultural hybridization by showing that it is more than a theoretical concept. It reflects, in concrete ways, the lives of those who have migrated between places and come in contact with more than one culture or draw on the cultural heritage of more than one country or region. According to the Dutch-born anthropologist Jan Nederveen Pieterse, that experience is "quite common: one way or another, we are all migrants."[414] Pieterse himself was born in the Netherlands after World War II, eleven days after his family arrived there from Java, where his ancestors had settled in the early seventeenth century as part of the Dutch East Indies Company. He described his heritage as mixed with "Javanese, Portuguese, French, Germans, and others, and steeped in Indo-Dutch mestizo-culture."[415]

Pieterse's own transnational biography was not as unusual by the end of the twentieth century as it would have been a few decades earlier. Nonetheless the

vast majority of the world's population during their lifetime did not venture far from where they were born. The multinational experience had always been much more common among those engaged in cultural production and cultural analysis: intellectuals, scientists, missionaries, artists, musicians, writers, and even politicians. More importantly, the number of individuals combining Western with non-Western biographies has increased at a faster rate than at any time before. Their voices have grown in tandem with non-Western voices within international organizations, politics, art, and literature.

One indicator of the cultural shift toward greater inclusion of non-Western voices in the production of global cultures lies in a survey of the Nobel laureates in literature in recent decades. Between 1980 and 2012, the Nobel Institute awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature to writers from Asia, Africa, and South America twelve times. In the first eighty years of its existence, it had done so only five times. Moreover, in recent years the committee was more likely to choose authors who wrote about intercultural and interracial themes. Those included apartheid in South Africa (Nadine Gordimer, 1991), race relations in the United States (Toni Morrison, 1993), and colonialism and postcolonialism (Derek Walcott, 1992; V. S. Naipaul, 2001).[416] These authors reflect a broader transformation in the international literary landscape that included best-selling authors such as Salman Rushdie, Anita Desai, and Jhumpa Lahiri. The Indian-born Rushdie received his education in England and has since resided there. Desai was born in India to a German mother and a Bengali father. She was educated in India and has worked both in India and the United States. Lahiri, the 2000 winner of the American Pulitzer Prize in Literature for her collection of short stories, *Interpreter of Maladies*, was born in London to Bengali parents and moved to the United States when she was three.[417] The increasing presence on the international literary stage of writers with non-Western or transnational personal histories, as well as works that address multicultural themes, is a barometer of the growing intercultural networks. They have become part of a cosmopolitan cohort communicating in a common global language.

This language is not only multicultural but multilocal. It is by no means a new language, because cultural exchange and cultural borrowing have existed for centuries, if not millennia. However, since the 1990s its radius has extended from the elites to the middle classes and from the global North to the South.

This broadening has created greater diversity and increased the common cultural radius. But it has also created friction and cultural fragmentation as different cultural groups vie for dominance in local, national, and global settings. The emergence and evolution of global cultures since 1945 thus followed centripetal as well as centrifugal trajectories. Global cultures were marked by homogenization as well as heterogenization in the major urban centers of the world. Cultural interaction produced universal standards of conduct, rights, and values, while at the same time they revealed the particular local interpretations of those values. And finally those engaged in cultural exchange negotiated and continue to negotiate between the demand for conformity and desire for difference. Despite an ever tighter network of global exchange of people, goods, and ideas, the cultural landscape at the turn of the twenty-first century might be more multifaceted than it has ever been.

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The Making of a Transnational World

Akira Iriye