This broadening has created greater diversity and increased the common cultural radius. But it has also created friction and cultural fragmentation as different cultural groups vie for dominance in local, national, and global settings. The emergence and evolution of global cultures since 1945 thus followed centripetal as well as centrifugal trajectories. Global cultures were marked by homogenization as well as heterogenization in the major urban centers of the world. Cultural interaction produced universal standards of conduct, rights, and values, while at the same time they revealed the particular local interpretations of those values. And finally those engaged in cultural exchange negotiated and continue to negotiate between the demand for conformity and desire for difference. Despite an ever tighter network of global exchange of people, goods, and ideas, the cultural landscape at the turn of the twenty-first century might be more multifaceted than it has ever been.

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The Making of a Transnational World

Akira Iriye

Introduction

IN EARLY June 1940, as war had come to Western Europe, and the people of Paris—those who had not left for other parts of the country—braced themselves for the impending German invasion, the Paris Opera gave its scheduled performance of Jules Massenet's opera *Thaïs* (1894), a story of a religious zealot who tries to convert a profligate courtesan, only to be enticed and ensnared by her. Merely a handful of people—no more than fifty—came to see the opera, among them a young diplomat who worked for the Japanese embassy.[1] He had come from Japan to Paris to study the philosophy of Blaise Pascal at the Sorbonne, but when war broke out in 1939, he was recruited by the embassy to reinforce its staff. He served in the post for four years before leaving for Berlin when the allied powers successfully launched their counterattack in Normandy in 1944 and pushed German forces out of France. Before he left Paris, he visited various parts of France and ran into prison inmates who had been released and forced to march on the Nazis' orders—the phenomenon of what a later historian would call "death marches."[2] The marchers included men and women of many religions and nationalities. The diplomat never forgot his encounter with these people who had hitherto been hidden from public view. In May 1945, when Germany surrendered, the Japanese diplomat, his colleagues, their families, and several other civilians (including a female violinist who had been studying and giving concerts in wartime Europe and was to become world famous after the war) were all detained in Bad Gastein, Austria. But the State Department in Washington decided to move such personnel to the United States, and as a result they were brought over to Bedford Springs, Pennsylvania, in August, where they were confined in a hotel for several months before being sent back to Japan toward the end of the year.[3]

A story like this diplomat's may be understood in a number of contexts. At one level, of course, it is a story of war in which nations try to destroy and defeat one another. International relations inevitably impact on personal lives, and the diplomat's experiences were undoubtedly shaped by the vicissitudes of the Second

World War. But to end here would be unfair, both to the individual and to history. It would amount to defining history on the basis of national and international affairs and to consign such personal experiences, along with those of hundreds of millions of others, to a mere footnote. But what the diplomat saw, did, and thought about gains significance if it is put in other contexts, such as the history of music, the movement of people across borders, or encounters among individuals of different backgrounds. These themes do not always fit into the large story of war or diplomacy, but they may have a legitimacy and an integrity of their own. To trace some of these experiences would be to add another layer to the history of the world.

This chapter seeks to add such a layer, what may be termed a transnational perspective, in our understanding of global developments since the end of the Second World War. Transnational history may be understood to mean a look into the past in terms of phenomena and themes that cut across national boundaries and in which non-national actors (such as nongovernmental organizations and business enterprises) and entities (civilizations, races, for instance) play crucial roles. In such an approach, individuals and groups of people become involved in history not primarily as members of a national community but through other identities (such as migrants, tourists, artists, students, missionaries). Their interactions with one another differ from the usual "international relations" in which states engage with one another in pursuit of some national objectives, and they create their own networks and bridges that are not identical with territorial boundaries defined by nations. Transnational relations, then, are conceptually distinguishable from international relations, and transnational affairs from national affairs.

Transnational history so understood has existed for a long time. A spectacular example is the ancient trade route known as the Silk Road, connecting the Levant with East Asia, in which people of diverse races and religions met and traded.[4] In the modern world, however, particularly since the eighteenth century, the nation became the key unit of human activities, first in Europe and then in other parts of the globe. Individuals and even non-state actors were now enmeshed within territorial states. Nevertheless, global transnational connections were steadily being built throughout the nineteenth century, primarily thanks to technological innovations such as the telephone, the telegraph, the railroad, and other means

of faster communication and transportation. Economically, a global market was emerging. Even so, nation-states retained their predominant roles as definers of history, in that how nations behaved, both internally and toward one another, defined the ways in which people lived. A transnational world was in the making by the beginning of the twentieth century, but its momentum was frequently lost because of the emergence of centralized states and of the rivalries among nations, in particular among those that were called "great powers."

One way to comprehend world history after the Second World War, then, would be to see how nations and international affairs fared and how, parallel to these phenomena, transnational forces developed. Did a transnational world that was making its appearance around 1900 survive the turmoil of national and international crises that dotted world history during the first half of the twentieth century? How would the world of 2000 compare with that a hundred years earlier in that regard? Here we will trace the transnationalization of the world, as it were, by focusing on a few themes—transnational encounters, activities, and thoughts—to see whether and how a more transnational world had developed by the first decade of the twenty-first century.

Transnational encounters—people meeting people across national boundaries—can, of course, take place in war as well as in peace. The young Japanese student who first went to Paris to study French philosophy in 1934 had encountered a wide range of people from other countries, in Japan as well as elsewhere. Once in Paris, he, his new wife (who also came from Japan), his children, and other members of the family daily met and interacted with students and scholars from many countries as well as with neighbors, local store keepers, and even maids. When war came, some foreign acquaintances (from the United States, for instance) steadily disappeared from France, while new ones, especially from Germany, arrived. Through the family albums and letters, it is possible to trace the changing patterns and contents of transnational encounters. After the end of the European war in May 1945, these encounters became much more restricted and, unlike earlier, most of the people the Japanese diplomat and others like him had contact with were Americans, both in Europe and in the United States. Such a story will, of course, have been duplicated millions of times through global transnational encounters before and during the war. It will be impossible to be numerically precise about the phenomenon and to say with certainty how much

larger such circles of cross-border meeting grew after the war, but we can indicate some trends and characteristics in the post-1945 period.

Transnational encounters would be of only statistical interest, however, if they did not produce, or were not part of, transnational activities. Individuals from different countries could run into each other without producing any lasting effect. It is when they decide to participate in some common undertakings—ranging from engaging in a conversation to eating the same food, from enjoying each other's artwork to organizing themselves to promote a cause—that transnational encounters begin to take on significance. Historically, the best-known instances of transnational activities would include efforts to share and spread religions and ideas. To go back to the Japanese diplomat's example, his parents were both Friends (or Quakers) as a result of their encounter with American Quakers who had come to Japan in the early part of the twentieth century. There is, of course, a long history of religious accommodation as well as persecution, stories in which individuals and communities of different religions sometimes come together and develop an ecumenical environment, while in other instances they confront one another, even through violence. We may also add quasi-religious or secular ideological movements in the same category of transnational activities. After the French Revolution, revolutionary and reformist ideas and movements spread across national borders. As R. R. Palmer showed nearly half a century ago in *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, ideas of democracy and freedom knew no national boundaries and became Atlantic, if not yet global, movements, being actively promoted by politicians and intellectuals.[5] From the middle of the nineteenth century, socialism and Marxism grew as transnational ideologies and won millions of converts who organized study groups, cells, and political parties to spread the new "gospel." In the twentieth century, cosmopolitanism, internationalism, and ultimately transnationalism were added to global ideologies that created advocacy networks operating with their own agendas and momentums.

Many of these religious and ideological activities had a political dimension and thus were part of national affairs and international relations. Nations often sought to spread their power and influence abroad through converting others to their faith or ideas. Christian missionary activities were inseparable from the great powers' colonial acquisitions and governance in the nineteenth century. A secular ideology—the notion of civilization and civilizing mission—served as a

core underpinning for imperialism. However, not all religious or quasi-religious ideologies served the interests and objectives of a state. Some religious and secular movements remained outside the perimeters of national authority and at times even sought to influence the policies of individual governments. Adherents of some extreme ideologies, such as anarchism, revealed that transnational thought and action could be explicitly directed against the state. More often than not, however, transnational religious and ideological organizations joined forces with intergovernmental settings such as the United Nations to promote shared objectives. Many of these activities can be comprehended within the traditional frameworks of national history and international relations. The key, however, is to keep in mind the possibility that in a variety of settings and contexts, transnational activities steadily expanded throughout modern history, so that the history of the world after 1945 would be incomprehensible without paying close attention to developments outside the framework of national and international affairs.

Some activities, whether individual or group, would seem to enjoy greater autonomy and flexibility in building transnational bridges. Literary and artistic productions may be good examples. William Shakespeare is read worldwide, not because millions are forced to do so by their governments but because people everywhere enjoy, are inspired by, and share the virtual worlds created by the seventeenth-century English playwright. His plays are performed in many languages, thus making translation one of the most important means for creating transnational networks. For someone who is not a native English speaker to read something in that language is a transnational experience, suggesting that transnational communities are usually created through written and spoken words, in increasing instances through English. Indeed, a Chinese may communicate with a Japanese, not just with an American or a European, in English, which both may find easier to learn than the other's language. The growth of transnational readership and audiences may thus be taken as an important index of the increasing transnationalization of the world. The same will be true of fine arts, architecture, music, and other creative activities. No matter their nationalities, artists, architectural designers, and musicians create works that are meaningful across national boundaries. Not only do viewers of paintings and audiences at musical performances more often than not come from many countries, but increasingly since the last decades of the nineteenth century, art and music have become

products of transnational influences and collaboration. When the French conductor of an American orchestra plays German music, and when the orchestra contains a large number of Chinese, Koreans, Russians, and people of many other nationalities, it is difficult not to see such a phenomenon as anything other than transnational. The same is true of scholarship. The study of history, literature, fine arts, and music grew steadily more transnational since the late nineteenth century, with historians from France publishing influential monographs on English history, and art historians from the United States making scholarly contributions to the study of Renaissance art.

But does a transnational activity reflect, give rise to, strengthen, or do little to enhance a transnational state of mind? This is the third facet of transnational history, what we may call transnational thought or transnational consciousness—the awareness of linkages across borders and, ultimately, a sense of shared humanity, a faith that people can indeed communicate with one another regardless of their diverse identities. To focus on transnational phenomena and themes in reviewing the past is, then, to consider whether the world became more, or less, transnational during a certain period of time.

The development of transnational consciousness may be examined through some personal experiences. For instance, in studying Pascal in Paris during the 1930s, the above-mentioned Japanese diplomat and his advisors exemplified the idea that philosophy, of whatever origin or character, has a meaning that transcends its national origin and that, more broadly put, scholarship knows no national boundary. Actually, some professors at the Sorbonne initially tried to discourage the future diplomat, saying that a quintessentially European thinker like Pascal could never be understood by an outsider. But others were more open-minded. A shared mental universe was created between them and the student, and indeed between the seventeenth-century French philosopher and a twentieth-century Japanese youth. By then, of course, scholarly transnationalism had been well developed in the West. Even though cultural nationalism sometimes stood in the way, the idea that in scholarly and academic undertakings national identity mattered much less than personal qualities (intellectual aptitude, willingness to learn, receptivity to unfamiliar ideas) had provided the basis for scholarly and academic exchange programs across national boundaries. Some of the philanthropic foundations established in the United States—such as the

Rockefeller Foundation (founded in 1909), the Carnegie Corporation (1922), and the Ford Foundation (1936)—explicitly promoted educational and cultural exchanges to foster what may be called transnational awareness. Where politics stood in the way of such transnationalism—as happened when foreigners and Jews were expelled from German universities and research centers after the Nazis came to power—many were able to go elsewhere to find a more receptive environment, as exemplified by universities and colleges in the United States that opened their doors to exiled scholars. Intellectual transnationalism was challenged by, but did not completely succumb to, political anti-transnationalism.

Likewise, the Japanese diplomat who went to see an opera in Paris in 1940 despite the impending crisis that was about to envelop the city may be said to have exemplified transnational consciousness in the field of music. There was a shared universe of music that defied national and international "realities." The Japanese violinist who traveled with him across the Atlantic in 1945 was one of many foreign musicians studying in Europe before and during the war, and in such instances, too, it may be said that both they and their teachers believed in musical transnationalism, as did German musicians, many of them Jewish, who continued to conduct and teach far away from Europe during the 1930s and beyond.[6] They shared the idea that art (in this instance music) was timeless whereas politics was temporary and transient. The view that art is eternally and universally valid would contrast with the narrower idea that each country and each culture had its own musical heritage that could never be transmitted to, let alone understood or shared by, others. Many states, most notoriously Nazi Germany and its ideologues, sought to promote their own music (as well as other art forms such as paintings and cinemas) to enhance national prestige. But such attempts did not stifle a transnational appreciation of culture independently of national policies or nationalistic propaganda. Yan Ni's study of Japanese film in China during the 1930s shows that, despite the obvious foreign policy implications of the making of movies by Japanese directors on the continent, their cooperative Chinese counterparts and the enthusiastic Chinese audiences knew how to separate propaganda from art, how to find room for artistic pursuits even while they were vehemently opposed to Japanese rule. In such instances, too, artistic transnationalism existed side by side with, and ultimately survived, political vicissitudes.[7]

In the case of classical European music, an extremely important realm of transnationalism, it was only around the turn of the twentieth century, as Jessica Gienow-Hecht has shown, that it came to be appreciated very seriously in the United States.[8] There was, as she notes, a shared sensibility, a common emotion, that bound Europe and North America together. What about the rest of the world? Classical music arrived in China in the 1920s when an orchestra was established by European residents of Shanghai, but at first only Westerners went to hear its performances.[9] (The Chinese were not even allowed into the concert hall.) Western melodies were introduced to Japan in the late nineteenth century as part of the school curricula and military training, and Japanese travelers sometimes went to concerts and operas in Western cities. Nagai Kafū, the Japanese novelist, is said to have been one of the first Japanese to attend the Metropolitan Opera's performances in New York in the early years of the century and to write about them. He found it a deeply moving experience and lamented that in his own country there was nothing comparable, appealing to universal audiences.[10] Outside of classical music, it is well known that jazz, whose origins were transcontinental (African and African American), gained its popularity abroad during the 1920s, including in the Soviet Union, which often invited African American musicians to perform.[11] Although the war put obstacles in its path, musical transnationalism never disappeared. For a vivid example, when Moscow was under siege by German forces, musical scores for Dmitri Shostakovich's *Symphony No. 7* were smuggled out of Russia and played all over Europe and North America. Operas like Richard Strauss's *Capriccio* and Benjamin Britten's *Peter Grimes* were composed and performed toward the end of the war and had little or nothing to do with nationalistic emotions but appealed to audiences all over the world with their universal themes—in *Capriccio* the delicate balance between music and literature, and in *Peter Grimes* the problem of alienation and social ostracism. When in *Capriccio* the heroine sings that the arts are for the whole world and that the opera has no ending, it was as if Strauss, despite the fact that politically he never distanced himself from Nazism, was transmitting the message of transnationalism to a world devastated by war, that the military conflict would soon come to an end, as did all temporal affairs, but that art would live on forever.

Transnational consciousness may be fostered by literature even in times of war. While patriotic writing was encouraged, Paul Fussell's study shows that in

the United States many writers spoke the language of universal humanity.[12] In Japan, in contrast, novelists and poets adopted a nationalistic stance and spoke excitedly of the nation's new mission to expel the West from Asia. As Donald Keene has documented, their language was narrowly nationalistic and parochial, and many of them consciously rejected cosmopolitanism, considering it an outdated Western import.[13] It is interesting to note, on the other hand, that many Americans, including Keene himself, gained an appreciation of traditional Japanese literature during the war. Roger Dingman has pointed out that some US naval personnel who interviewed Japanese prisoners of war discovered facets of Japanese culture that intrigued them and decided, then and there, to study the subject further once the war was over.[14] That, too, shows a transnational awareness, the view that certain cultural legacies are of value to the whole world. Somewhat different in setting but no less transnational were literary works published in the United States by Chinese American writers. As Xiao-huang Yin has shown, by the 1930s several generations of Chinese in the United States had been writing stories, both in Chinese and in English, and the writers, while uniformly conscious of their Chinese background, had begun to strive to transcend their alleged Chineseness. They were influenced by the literary styles and experiments of other American writers and were coming to think of their work as both Chinese and American, a worthy addition to world literature, what in our context could be called transnational literature.[15]

Lastly, we may consider transnational memory. When the Japanese diplomat reminisced about the war, his personal memory was as much transnational as national, and he shared it with friends and acquaintances in many parts of the world. The same would be true of virtually everyone throughout the world who was old enough in the early 1940s to retain some memory of the global conflagration. Each individual involved in the conflict, whether directly or indirectly, would retain personal memories of the war, and the bulk of those memories might be framed within national dramas, the stories of being drafted and sent to the battlefield, killing enemies so as not to be killed by them, staying at home and being engaged in arms production, in teaching, and other pursuits to enhance national power, being invaded by enemy forces, seeing their homes destroyed. Such memories, while differing from individual to individual, also constitute national memories.[16] There are memories shared by all Americans, all Chinese, and so

forth, and these national memories are transmitted from generation to generation through history education, books, historical exhibitions, and so forth.

Can there be such a thing as transnational memory? May Americans and Germans, or Chinese and Japanese, be said to have certain wartime memories in common? Or, if not wartime memories, do they have a sense of a shared past, whether going back for centuries or with regard to more recent experiences such as September 11—the terrorist bombings against the United States in 2001? The study of transnational history would have to raise such questions, for, after all, memory constitutes an essential part of history. To ask whether there is such a thing as shared transnational memory, then, requires dealing with fundamental methodological issues in studying transnational history. Here Martin Conway and Kiran Patel have made important suggestions in their edited volume, *Europeanization in the Twentieth Century.*[17] They, and the contributors to the book, argue that there is such a thing as a "community of shared memory" that is transnational, at least in the European context. Europe for them may be defined as such a community. This memory includes what Europeans remember of the past, ranging from calamitous wars to cultural achievements. Both negative and positive records are part of the shared memory, and all Europeans "remember" them as the key to their identity. Can there be other communities of shared memory? How about East Asia, South Asia, the Islamic Middle East, Africa, or South America? Does each of such geographically specific regions also constitute a zone of common legacies? For that matter, can North America and Europe be also said to share historical memory? Is there a Pacific legacy common to all countries and regions that border on the ocean? Or, to get away from geography, can races, religions, or civilizations share memory? If Western civilization, for instance, may be defined as a community of shared memory, how about other civilizations?

Ultimately such questions lead to shared global memory, or common human heritage. Do all people, regardless of where they live or their national, religious, or racial identities, understand themselves as belonging to a community with a shared past? Is there such a thing as global history—or, to be more precise, global world history, the history of the world in which globally shared developments are the focus of inquiry?

It may be suggested that for those old enough to have experienced the Second World War, there is a shared memory across national or other borders. To be

A Macedonian soldier carries an urn with the ashes of Macedonian Jews during the opening of the Holocaust Memorial Center in Skopje in 2011. This and other Holocaust memorial museums in various countries show how a human tragedy is shared worldwide. (AFP/Getty Images)

sure, even today, nearly seventy years after the end of the global conflict, the war tends to be remembered in nation-specific contexts. Personal memories are given meaning as part of national memories. Still, the very fact that the act of remembering the Second World War cuts across national boundaries makes it a transnational experience. More specifically, certain generations in different countries may remember the war in their own specific ways. Those born before 1925 or thereabout were old enough to be directly involved in the war, the male half of them having been combatants, while women experienced the conflict at home. This generation is now in their eighties and nineties, but regardless of where they live, they seem to retain the memory of the wartime experiences as the defining moment of their lives. In contrast, the majority of those who came into the world after 1925 but before 1940 seem to have their own memories of the war years that are somewhat different from their elders'. It may well be that there is such a thing as a globally shared generational memory. Whether or not the postwar generations have also developed transnational memories is a question that will be addressed in

various places in the subsequent sections. Regardless of which generation one belongs to, however, there may be such a thing as transnational memory when individuals, whatever their nationality, age, or other identities, join in a cooperative effort to understand the past. When a teacher in an Illinois middle school asks his students to discuss how President Harry S. Truman made the decision to drop atomic bombs on Japan, and whether he might have chosen not to do so, both teacher and students are engaged in memory sharing, an activity that knows no national or other bounds. When the composer John Adams and the librettist Peter Sellars produce an opera—*Dr. Atomic*—in which the singer playing the role of J. Robert Oppenheimer remarks, seconds before the detonation of the first nuclear device over New Mexico, "There are no more minutes, no more seconds! Time has disappeared; it is Eternity that reigns now," they are inviting people of all countries to ponder the coming of the atomic age.[18] Historical memory is being shared transnationally.

A key framework for this discussion will be how, through such experiences, transnationalism as an idea and an attitude developed after the Second World War. The term *transnationalism* is used here rather than the more traditional *cosmopolitanism* and *internationalism,* concepts that are no less valid but perhaps more appropriate for other, less transnational ages. Internationalism may be seen as an idea of fostering cooperation among nations through inter-state cooperation, and cosmopolitanism usually refers to a state of mind among educated elites that seeks to appreciate different national traditions. Transnationalism as an ideology, in contrast, underlies the efforts by private individuals and non-state actors in various countries to establish bridges toward one another and to engage in common activities. It reflects, and strengthens, attempts at understanding historical as well as current developments as being made up of cross-border phenomena, shared concerns, and global human perspectives.

1. *Postwar Transnationalism*

WE MAY begin our inquiry into postwar transnational history by going back to the question of whether there are memories of the Second World War shared across national boundaries. Books and essays continue to be written on the war; the overwhelming majority of these focus on one belligerent or another. At the same time, however, attempts have been made to consider the experiences of the war as a global, human event in which moral dilemmas and tragic outcomes transcended national boundaries.[19] The development of a transnational perspective on the war constitutes an important aspect of post-1945 history. It is true that in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, in particular during the war crimes trials, separate national memories were pitted against one another. As German and Japanese military and political leaders were brought to trial, sharply contrasting histories of the prewar and war years were presented, prosecutors representing the victorious nations seeking to construct a past in which Germany, Japan, and their allies had engaged in a conspiracy to rule the world, while the defendants argued on the basis of a different historical memory, in Germany's case going back to the injustices of the Versailles peace settlement, and in Japan's even farther back, to the nineteenth century, which was recalled as the time when Western powers began their subjugation of Asia. And there were differing readings of international law. The United States and its wartime allies, for instance, cited the Hague conventions of 1899 and 1907 as well as later agreements such as the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Pact of Paris of 1928 to accuse Germany and Japan of having committed crimes of war (such as the mistreatment of prisoners of war) and against peace; the defendants' lawyers cited the same laws to argue that the prosecuting countries had themselves violated international law in attacking and killing unarmed civilians through their strategic bombing raids. Quite apart from such differences, the two sides represented conflicting memories of the past. Although in the end memories held by one side were rejected and war criminals were punished, these contrasting memories would remain. Even among the allies,

sharply divergent national memories of the war soon came to be constructed, with Americans and Russians, for instance, producing separate accounts of how victory had been achieved. Nation-specific memories have not disappeared and will continue to be preserved through history education, national museums, and other means.

At the same time, however, there were innumerable instances of transnationally shared experiences in the immediate aftermath of the war, experiences that would eventually come to be remembered by people of victorious and defeated countries alike. Take, for instance, the story of Anne Frank, who had been hidden in a house in Amsterdam to protect her, as she faced deportation and certain death because she was Jewish. Her memory became widely shared when her diary was translated shortly after the war and read by hundreds of thousands, not simply by those belonging to the wartime generation but by the younger generation as well. Likewise, Viktor Frankl's account of his internment at a Nazi camp, which he published as a book in the early 1950s, served to arouse a global awareness of what had gone on in the camps. (It is reported that when it was published in Japanese translation in 1956, it immediately became a best seller and went through twelve printings in two months.[20]) Even before the 1960s, when a large number of books on Nazi Germany, in particular its persecution of Jews, began to be published, it may be said that, quite apart from political phenomena like the war crimes trials, something like a transnational memory of the Second World War was already in the making. Concerning the Pacific theater of the war, it would take much longer to develop a transnationally shared memory of the war, which went back to 1931 and lasted for fourteen years. There was no counterpart to Frank's or Frankl's writings to be shared across national boundaries, and even to this day, the failure to generate a shared community of memory militates against the establishment of an Asian counterpart to the European Union, as we will see. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that began the Pacific phase of the Second World War almost instantaneously generated a shared memory for the American people that would continue for generations without evoking its counterpart in Japan, although in time veterans from the two countries would begin meeting together to commemorate the event.[21] About one of the momentous events in the Pacific War, the dropping of atomic bombs, there was at first little information, shared or not, about the secret weapon. Americans and Japanese, as

well as people all over the world, of course wanted to know the impact of the atomic bombs on cities and individuals, but US occupation authorities did not at first allow civilians even to interview the victims. But the situation began to change after John Hersey's *Hiroshima* was published in the United States in 1947. (It had first appeared as an article in *New Yorker* in August 1946.[22]) Hersey was one of the first to visit Hiroshima, and his report almost overnight made nuclear war part of global consciousness, to such an extent that within ten years after the war a powerful transnational movement began to emerge against further uses of such weapons. Such consciousness grew in both sides of the wartime conflict and became a powerful instrument for reestablishing a sense of restored humanity.



The atomic bombing of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. It not only led to Japan's surrender but also signaled the beginning of a nuclear age. (IWM via Getty Images)

Similar observations may be made about the occupation of Germany, Austria, Japan, and other countries by US, USSR, British, French, Chinese, and other forces. At least as far as Western Europe and Japan are concerned, there seems to exist a shared memory of the occupation in which the occupied population came into contact with Americans, British, French, and other occupiers, and in which both sides gained a knowledge of each other more closely than in the past. The same would not be true of Germans and Russians. As Norman Naimark has shown in *Russians in Germany*, the Russian zone of occupation was not conducive to creating a shared memory, certainly not a sense of transnational humanity.[23] Even here, however, the fact remains that, like the war that they had just fought, the Russian occupation of East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and other nations was an experience shared by the same generation in all these countries.

How an occupation experience may have given rise to transnational consciousness may be illustrated by taking a closer look at the American occupation of Japan. Transnational and transcultural encounters through military occupation were particularly revealing in Japan, where most of the occupying forces were US soldiers. Aside from American missionaries in Japan and Japanese immigrants in the United States, there had been little direct encounter between individual Japanese and Americans before the war. This changed literally overnight, however, upon the arrival of US occupation personnel in Japan in August 1945. After the surrender ceremony on the battleship *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay on September 2, American GIs became a common sight all across the country. Their primary task, of course, was to ensure peace and order, but in many other aspects as well the occupiers came into closer contact with the occupied. As in Germany, women often were the conduit between the two groups of people. As Naoko Shibusawa has shown, from the very beginning GIs were involved with Japanese women, initially mostly in prostitution but in time involving other types of association.[24] Of such associations, postwar reforms were of primary significance. The occupation authorities under the command of General Douglas MacArthur were determined to remake Japan, putting away its militaristic and authoritarian past to turn Japan into a modern democracy. MacArthur's staff included a number of officers who had been active in the New Deal era or otherwise involved in social and cultural changes in the United States. They were eager to help transform Japan, and in this process they came into contact with a large number of Japanese,

both men and women, who would join them in the endeavor. It may well be that both occupiers and occupied shared a "memory" of the 1920s, which both saw as having been a promising period for democracy and peace for Japan, before it launched an aggressive war in the following decade.[25] Women's rights were a particularly significant issue inasmuch as Japanese women had not enjoyed the right to vote and had been reared in the traditional ethos of submitting themselves to their husbands and parents-in-law. The new constitution guaranteed gender equality, and soon women became active in Japanese politics as well as popular culture and education. Americans came to know a number of these women, and collectively they transformed their image of Japan, paralleling the developments in Germany.

All these may still be considered aspects of a geopolitical phenomenon, the occupation of Japan by the United States and its allies. The transnational connections in postwar Japan were not exactly between equals. Nevertheless, occupiers and the occupied gained knowledge of each other to an extent never seen before the war, and some of them developed transnational linkages that would in time form a basis for their shared memory of those years. A significant number in the US occupation personnel were attracted to the traditional Japanese theater, the *kabuki* and the *nō*, and became their enthusiastic introducers to Western audiences. Others translated modern Japanese literary works, thus incorporating them into the corpus of world literature. Many army and navy officers would in time go back to the United States and contribute to the inauguration and strengthening of Japanese studies in the West. This was not something that had been anticipated in the official guidelines for the occupation of Japan and may thus be seen as an important feature of transnational connections emerging out of the Second World War.

The same thing can be said of the Japanese reception of American culture. Apart from baseball, a limited number of Hollywood movies, and architectural gems (such as the Imperial Hotel) designed by Frank Lloyd Wright and other Americans, the average Japanese person's knowledge of the United States had been extremely limited before the war. Now, however, schools began to teach something about democracy, English textbooks introduced scenes from American life, scholars belatedly began to study US history and politics, and ordinary citizens came into contact with American food, such as canned corned beef, which was

introduced to the Japanese diet for the first time thanks to MacArthur's determination to prevent a famine that threatened the country after the war. Japanese fondness for American food, just like a similar phenomenon in Germany and Austria, may initially have been a product of occupation policy, but it outlived the occupation and was to grow stronger in the subsequent years. Perhaps even more instrumental in familiarizing the Japanese with American society and culture were the Hollywood movies. As Hiroshi Kitamura shows in *Screening Enlightenment*, there were clearly political objectives behind the choices of films to be screened in postwar Japan, whose leaders also sought to take advantage of Hollywood productions to make their task of reforming the country easier.[26] But one should also note that the viewers who went to see these movies gained an excellent view of American home life, food, clothes, and all other aspects of middle-class living that would in time become a transnationally shared vision of the good life to aspire to.

For the generation from whose ranks the bulk of the US occupation personnel came and who, in Japan, experienced the occupation, there seems to have been generated a memory that is still fresh today, the awareness that their understanding of US-Japanese relations goes back to the immediate postwar years. The formation of such memory is one of the most significant aspects of transnational consciousness. To the extent that those involved in the occupation bequeathed their memories to those who came after them, much of how the postwar generation came to understand contemporary history would hinge on the transmission of these memories. How do the post-1945 generations in both the United States and Japan, and by extension elsewhere, view and react to their elders' transnational experiences? Do they share the memories of the older generation? Or have they developed their own understandings of the recent past? These are extremely important questions that remain to be explored.

Migration as a Shared Experience

Also important to transnational consciousness during the immediate postwar years were the experience and memory of cross-border migrations. The immediate postwar years are recalled by millions of people as having been the time when they crossed borders, often several times, before finally settling down in their

new homes, or going back to their original lands. Such movements by definition create transnational individuals, but whether they share positive memories of the experience varies from people to people, from circumstance to circumstance. Still, the story of postwar migrations seems to constitute an important part of shared global memory.

At the end of the Second World War there were roughly two billion people on the planet, of whom about eleven million, or a little over 0.5 percent, were outside their own countries.[27] Strikingly, the number of such people—migrants, broadly put—did not diminish but increased drastically after 1945. Because the Second World War had involved far more military and civilian casualties than ever before, it left a staggering number of families who had lost someone in the war, and some of these families joined other migrants in search of a new home. Moreover, in many parts of the world the war's end signaled the beginning of conflict within empires where anticolonial forces sought to stop the colonizers from returning to the prewar systems of imperialism. In such areas violence continued unabated, in the process creating large waves of migrants. All in all, several years after 1945 were a period of unusual global migrations. Migrations, of course, did not end then but have continued to this day, but the immediate postwar years were unprecedented in that the bulk of migrants consisted of involuntary refugees, whereas after the 1960s a growing number of them would be associated with global economic opportunities.

The key question in this context would be to what extent migrations were viewed as shared experiences that constituted an important aspect of the postwar world. It would seem that the experiences of Jewish people came to be widely viewed as one such example. Arguably, Jews had been among the most transnational of ethnic communities, and so it was a brutal irony of fate that under the Nazis their transnationality had been confirmed in the concentration camps where they awaited their death. In the process they encountered many nationality groups—German, French, Polish, and others—almost always in an environment of mutual incomprehension and horror. This became even more pronounced in the last months of the war when Jews and other prison inmates were released and forced to march to uncertain destinations. They were not to be liberated by invading enemy forces, so ordered Adolf Hitler, but were to be taken to other (in many instances undetermined) destinations. In the process of their "death

marches," they were taunted, abused, and even attacked by civilian Germans and others who came into contact with them. The fact that a significant minority of the death marchers were non-Jewish made these marches an even more tragically transnational phenomenon.[28] (It should be remembered that the victims of the Holocaust and targets of other exterminations included Roma or "gypsies," as well as communists, homosexuals, and the mentally ill—all of whom could also be considered transnational humans.)

From such tragic circumstances, a sense of common humanity emerged as some of the survivors recounted their experiences, making the whole world aware of them. The term *genocide* came to be used to describe what had been done to them, the underlying assumption being that what the Jews and others had gone through constituted a denial of their humanity, that the crimes committed against them amounted to the refusal to concede human existence to a segment of the world's population. As Bruce Mazlish has noted, the term *crime against humanity* was first used during the First World War to refer to the killing of hundreds of thousands of Armenians in Turkey.[29] The term was adopted at the Nuremberg Trials to indict the Nazi atrocities committed against Jews. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights promulgated by the United Nations was the final step in establishing the transnational concept of humanity. Quite clearly, then, the suffering of Jews and others had generated a new awareness, a transnational memory that went beyond separate national or ethnic memories.

It may also be added that many Jews who had left Germany and other parts of Europe after the Nazis came to power had had their own transnational experiences that, put together, came to constitute an integral part of postwar memory. Some left for Palestine and other destinations as early as 1933, while others stayed until the *Reichsprogromnacht* (which Nazi propaganda called *Reichskristallnacht*) of 1938 forced them to leave. Their destinations ranged from Britain to the United States, from Argentina to Manchuria, but the sum total of their migrations became part of the saga, the experiences of migrants who included many other ethnic and national populations, such as Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians who, having been ruled by Russians, then by Germans, and, once again after the war, by Russians, eventually settled outside Europe. And then there were Germans in Silesia and other provinces that became incorporated into Poland after the war.

Some ten million of them lost their homes in the process, being forced to be repatriated to what now was determined by the allies as the new, postwar Germany. They shared a transnational identity as wartime and postwar migrants, exemplifying a key theme in contemporary world history. Although fewer in number, hundreds of thousands of overseas Japanese, along with about two million soldiers on the Asian continent, were sent back to a Japan homeland that had now shrunk to four principal islands. Many died in the long trek home; some left their children behind, entrusting (or selling) them to Chinese families.[30] Their experiences were not drastically different from those of European migrants.

The construction of shared memory might become more complicated when we focus on waves of human migration that accompanied decolonization and nation building in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. In the European colonies in Southeast Asia, local communities and their leaders organized anticolonial movements to prevent a return to the prewar condition. In French Indochina, the Dutch East Indies, and British Malaya, violent clashes broke out and continued for years between colonizer and colonized, in virtually all cases resulting in the repatriation of Europeans. The overriding ideology of those engaged in colonial independence was nationalism, which on its surface seems like an antithesis of transnationalism. However, as Sugata Bose and others have argued, anticolonial nationalism at least in South Asia could be comprehended within the framework of cosmopolitanism.[31] "If nationalism was the main political project of resistance in the anticolonial era, cosmopolitanism was the main ethical project—and both of these operated together."[32] The leaders of the anticolonial movement, such as Mohandas Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, and Muhammad Ali Jinnah, saw themselves as representing universal principles, so that while they struggled for national independence, their nationalism was not only not incompatible with transnationalism but was very much a part of the world order emerging in the wake of the war.

Ironically, as indigenous populations successfully achieved liberation and set up their own states, they experienced the same problems of governance that the colonial powers had: the demarcation of territorial boundaries and the administration of a complex mix of ethnic communities, including their education and public welfare. As had happened in the wake of the First World War when new states (Turkey, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and many others) had to struggle

with these problems, in the process creating millions of repatriates and stateless persons, after 1945 waves of migrants found themselves removed from their homes and often ending up in refugee camps. Even in the allegedly cosmopolitan South Asia, where three new states (India, Pakistan, and Ceylon) were created in 1947 out of the British Empire, there were no mutually recognizable boundaries and, to make matters worse, India and Pakistan were defined in part by the ethnic groupings within those uncertain boundaries. India saw itself primarily as a country consisting of Hindus and Buddhists, whereas Pakistan was established as an Islamic nation. As a result, millions of Muslims moved from what now became India into areas belonging to Pakistan, while Hindus and Buddhists trekked in the opposite direction. It is estimated that some 17.9 million people moved out of their original homes and that 14.5 million eventually settled in one of the newly established countries, indicating that over 3.4 million died or became missing in the process. Other religious groups, such as Sikhs and Christians, mostly preferred to live in the new India. Reminiscent of the ethnic exchange that took place after the Great War between Turkey and Greece, the South Asia resettlement uprooted people from the homes in which they had lived for generations. But the situation there was even more serious because of the ambiguous frontiers. Furthermore, even among the Muslim majority in Pakistan, those in the Bengal region remained restive, seeking to build their own country, separate from Pakistan. In Ceylon, in the meantime, where the majority were Buddhists, the Tamils, comprising nearly 20 percent of the population and embracing the Hindu faith, likewise sought to follow the principle of national self-determination. Many of those who were unwilling to be ruled by the majority crossed the sea to enter and live in southern India. In such circumstances, it would be difficult to create a community of shared memory in the region. And yet, to the extent that these issues were all aspects of post-1945 history, there was something transnational about their experiences; they were not unique to South Asia but became part of similar developments elsewhere. Nationalistic antagonisms, as it were, were transnationalized. It remained to be seen whether, in such circumstances, some overarching transnational perspective would in time develop.

Even more serious in this regard was the question of memory in Palestine. The birth of Israel and the consequent struggle between Israelis and Palestinian Arabs are, of course, key events in post-1945 international history and in Middle

Eastern history. But we can also put them in the framework of the search for a shared past. Both Jews and Arabs had a long sense of history going back for centuries, but unfortunately there was little that was transnational about their understanding of the recent past. Before the war there were fewer than 400,000 Jews in Palestine; by the time the new nation was proclaimed in 1948, the number had increased to 650,000, one of the most remarkable transnational migrations in modern times. In contrast, there were more than one million Arabs in Palestine in 1945, of whom 600,000 to 700,000 were expelled from their homes during and in the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli war that followed the creation of the State of Israel in 1948. Hundreds of villages were completely depopulated, and abandoned villages bulldozed or settled by Israelis.[33] These broad statistics are not contested, but the two sides had sharply contrasting views of what they meant, views that constituted an integral part of the remembered past. Generations of Palestinians had lived in the area, which had been part of the Ottoman Empire but became a British mandate after the First World War. Most of the Palestinian refugees, then, believed they had the right to expect to return to their lands. Jewish memory was of altogether different character, most crucial of which was the history of their persecution under the Nazis. Those who had moved to Palestine after 1933, now joined by waves of others after the war, believed that if modern history suggested anything, it was the absolute imperative of having a nation that people could call their own, a state that would protect them against internal and external enemies. The Arab refugees shared such a view, but their idea of a new Palestinian state differed sharply from what emerged as Israel that was defined by its founders as a Jewish nation, and it would have been an awkward situation if all the Palestinian refugees had returned to their homes in Palestine, constituting a majority of the population. Jews would have been outnumbered by Arabs, and although the former had a longer life expectancy—within a few decades, Israel would emerge as one of the world's leaders in this regard—the prospect for a Jewish state did not look promising unless the bulk of the Palestinian Arabs were kept out. (And the birth rate among Palestinians would remain extremely high until the final decade of the twentieth century.) The result was that the Palestinians would not have their own state but would continue to live in the refugee camps that were created for them on the west bank of the Jordan River. There would be no sharing of historical memory in such circumstances.

This did not prevent the Israelis or the Palestinians, however, from reinforcing their sense of transnational linkages to the rest of the world. The new state of Israel invited Jews around the world to join the new nation or else to support its existence and well-being. It should be noted, at the same time, that the recent fate of Jewish people became part of global memory. The images of the Holocaust, the Warsaw uprising of 1943 when Jewish residents in the city staged an organized resistance to the Nazi occupiers, and Jews scattered all over the globe both during and after the war quickly became part of shared, transnational history. The Palestinian Arabs, too, had their own transnational links to Muslims elsewhere. The majority of them were citizens of their own states, some old (Iran, Turkey), some new (Pakistan, Malaya, Indonesia). The new Arab states such as Libya, Syria, and Egypt refused to recognize the state of Israel. The series of military conflicts between these two was an important chapter in postwar international affairs, but in the history of transnationalism, at this time the worldwide community of Arabs and Muslims was less successful than the Israelis and Jews in imparting a sense of transnational solidarity. Why this should have been the case is one of the most critical questions in the history of the world in the immediate aftermath of the war that awaits investigation.

Despite all such contrasts, however, refugees, forced migrants, and stateless people were not just statistics but individual humans—living at the very moment when the notion of "human rights" was being enshrined as a basic value in the postwar world. No matter where they lived, they had to be cared for, at least in principle. Their livelihoods, their health, and their education were matters of public concern, not merely private affairs. Although these problems were primarily within the jurisdiction of separate states, and thus belong more in national than in transnational history, the whole conception of "welfare state" was becoming transnational. As Rana Mitter has shown, hundreds of thousands of wartime refugees in China, expelled from their homes during the war with Japan, confronted the Nationalist government with a major task, which it undertook within the framework of the incipient notion of the state's responsibility for society's well-being.[34] From Europe to North America, from the Middle East to East Asia, the immediate postwar years were notable because public welfare, just like human rights, was globally seen as a matter of public policy for all countries. And when governments failed to fulfill their obligations in this regard, international organi-



Unauthorized immigrants crossing the US-Mexican border during the night, April 1951. Migrations, both legal and illegal, have been a major transnational theme in world history since the end of the Second World War. (Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images)

zations such as the UN as well as a host of private nongovernmental bodies, could step in and undertake the task. Because migrations were by definition a transnational phenomenon, it is not surprising that migrants' well-being became the concern of international entities, most notably the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA). Here, too, was another instance where a transnational world was being constructed.

Intellectual and Cultural Exchanges

It is possible to raise the same kinds of questions about the transnational understanding and memory of the Cold War as those discussed in connection with the

Second World War and with postwar migrations. In the aftermath of the Cold War, it became possible for researchers from both sides of the geopolitical divide to explore together the evidence and to seek to construct a comprehensible, shared understanding of the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, with their respective allies and satellites, that defines one facet of post-1945 history. With the opening of the archives in the former Soviet Union and its Eastern allies as well as in the People's Republic of China, the Cold War, too, may now constitute a chapter in the shared memory of all people.[35] At the same time, the Cold War fundamentally entailed international alliances and national security concerns, not global memory sharing. The essence of the Cold War was to divide the globe, and if possible to freeze the status quo on that basis, not to encourage the growth of transnational consciousness. A universal conception of humanity would have been difficult to sustain when the "Soviet" and the "Westerner" seemed to dominate and divide Earth's human population.

Frank Ninkovich, Volker R. Berghahn, Richard Pells, and others have shown that Cold War strategic thinking propelled the United States to engage in a cultural diplomacy in order to produce and preserve pro-American views in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere.[36] The Central Intelligence Agency, in particular, was eager to promote cultural activities abroad that gave people favorable images of the United States and spread negative ones of the Soviet Union. Voice of America (VOA), a foreign broadcaster established and funded by the US government during the war to counter Axis propaganda, became an arm of diplomacy in 1946 when it was transferred to the State Department. The languages that VOA transmitted in included Russian and Arabic. The Soviet Union tried to prevent its citizens from listening to VOA broadcasts by jamming the transmissions. Moscow was engaged in its own transnational cultural strategy, bringing students from Asia and Africa to inculcate in them Marxist orthodoxy and to turn them against Western colonialism and imperialism. Still, these activities should not all be subsumed under the rubric of Cold War history. Often, as will be seen, the very projects that were seeking to produce cultural warriors in the global geopolitical struggle betrayed the sponsors and developed their own agendas. In the West, moreover, governmentally initiated projects were just a part of the large-scale postwar undertaking in cultural and educational exchange aimed at fostering international understanding and transnational thought.

The Rockefeller, Ford, Carnegie, and other foundations in the United States were particularly active promoters of international educational and cultural exchanges in the aftermath of the war. The Rockefeller Foundation inaugurated the Salzburg Seminar in American Studies as early as 1947 in order to reestablish and expand contacts between Americans and Europeans, in particular Germans and Austrians, so as to promote postwar reconciliation. It is not surprising that the task of reconciliation was considered to be a fit arena for private foundations' activities. While official policy might be dictated by geopolitical interests, private, nonprofit organizations were in a position to fund and direct their own agendas. From modest beginnings the Salzburg Seminar grew into one of the longest-lasting and most successful exchange programs across the Atlantic. Cold War perceptions and policies did creep into such activities, but the geopolitical struggle did not define all aspects of exchange programs, which tended to move with their own momentum. Some nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were aware of the danger that their work might be co-opted, even subverted, by calculations of state policy and strategy and were determined to maintain their autonomy as much as possible. There was ample space for private initiatives in their endeavor to promote postwar reconciliation and mutual understanding. As Rowan Gaither, president of the Ford Foundation, noted in 1951, "The ultimate conditions of peace include minimum levels of economic well-being and health, enhanced world understanding, and a world order of law and justice."[37] Of these various objectives, "enhanced world understanding" was particularly important as something that private foundations could undertake. Large and small foundations in the United States brought an increasing number of students, scholars, journalists, artists, and many others from Europe, Asia, and elsewhere, and at the same time provided funding for "international area studies" during the 1950s. (These private initiatives were matched by the federal government under the National Defense Education Act of 1958, which funded foreign language study at US universities, with an initial emphasis on Chinese, Japanese, Arabic, Portuguese, Russian, and Hindi-Urdu.)

These programs were by definition productive of transnational encounters. Statistically, the postwar years saw a spectacular increase in the number of exchange students and other personnel, at first centered in the United States but by the early 1960s in many other countries as well. The Fulbright exchange program, initiated

in the United States in 1947, was the best known of such projects at that time, not least because thousands of German and Japanese students were among its first beneficiaries. Their presence in campuses across the nation did a great deal to bring about postwar reconciliation—and the effort at understanding their recent past better, at sharing historical memory, is a key aspect of such reconciliation.[38] Although a government-funded program, the Fulbright program was largely administered by nongovernmental bodies, both in Washington and at various universities and research centers. There were smaller-scale foundations that also promoted international student exchanges. One, led by the American Friends Service Committee, a Quaker organization, established seminars and work camps in Japan and other parts of Asia to bring Americans, Japanese, and others together to share common experiences and to explore the possibilities for an interdependent world. Their experiences were by no means uniform, but they invariably contributed to creating a sense of cross-border encounter and engagement. To meet students and educated people from other lands was to engage in a transnational experience, out of which developed a sense of common humanity.

In this connection, it is pertinent to note certain scholarly developments and cultural trends, broadly considered, that provided underpinnings for the emerging transnationalism. During the war and in the immediate postwar years, the United States began to emerge as the world center of scholarship, in part because of its principal role in mobilizing global resources for war, and also because it was the haven for many refugee scholars from Europe and (to a lesser extent) elsewhere. Noted scientists and humanities scholars, some but by no means all of whom were of Jewish background, had left their countries, especially Germany, to find refuge elsewhere to continue with their scholarly activities. A significant number of them, such as Erich Auerbach, a distinguished scholar of comparative literature, spent the war years in Turkey and then moved to the United States after the war. Others, such as Enrico Fermi and a large number of other scientists, came to the United States to work on nuclear arms and related projects and stayed after the war to teach and do research at various universities. Several scholars associated with the noted Frankfurt School, which had flourished as a center of learning in the social sciences, also ended up in the United States. Theodor W. Adorno, arguably the most influential of them, was at Princeton in 1938–1941 and at the University of California, Berkeley, for seven years afterward before returning to Germany

in 1949. His writings on "the authoritarian personality," among other subjects, became very influential as they offered a way to understand the development of fascism, Nazism, and other forms of totalitarianism in prewar Europe. A large number of other refugee scholars from Germany were invited by the New School for Social Research in New York, whose graduate program in the social sciences became a new home for their research and teaching.

These exile scholars were exemplars of intellectual transnationalization in that they brought their scholarship to a large number of American colleges, universities, and research institutes and shared their ideas with students and scholars of the host nation. The latter, in turn, incorporated the fresh perspectives coming from Europe and expanded their intellectual horizons. Most of the voluminous writings by the German sociologist and political theorist Max Weber, for instance, became available in English translation for the first time after the war—the only significant exception was his *Protestant Ethic and the Rise of Capitalism,* whose English version had been published in 1930—and made an enormous impact on the study of history, in particular the rise of the modern capitalist West and the contrast between it and the rest of the world. What came to be known as modernization was frequently derived from Weber's thought, which stressed religious and intellectual preconditions for socioeconomic transformation. Such perspectives were welcomed in the West, as they seemed to challenge Marxism's emphasis on material factors and class relations as engines of change. Weberism and Marxism were both transnational perspectives, though, in that they offered theories for understanding social phenomena that cut across national boundaries. At a time when the Cold War was making Marxism, because of its anticapitalist implications, an alien ideology to shun, exiled scholars contributed to keeping it alive. In the meantime, Freudian theory spread to North and South America as well as Australia and other countries after the war and began to influence scholarly writings in history and the social sciences. Both Marxism and Freudianism had obvious ideological and political implications, but those implications transcended specific national limits, the former stressing the possibility of understanding modern world history in a global framework, and the latter the identities of subnational groups such as racial minorities.[39]

In other fields, too, transnational émigré scholars made a significant impact upon the postwar scholarship. The study of comparative literature, for instance,

was given an enormous boost through the infusion of European scholarship brought to the United States by Auerbach, René Jasinzki, Herbert Dieckmann, and others. Although their field was called "comparative" literature, these scholars were promoting the study of literature, not nationally separate literary traditions. In time their ranks would be expanded by those who brought Asian perspectives, either by Chinese, Korean, and Japanese intellectuals who came to the United States after the war or by American and European scholars who applied their recently acquired knowledge of East Asian culture to their study of literature. Likewise, European émigré scholars dominated the field of musicology, the study of musical theory and history. As vividly recalled by one of them, Bruno Nettl, at first the bulk of them were Jewish scholars who had been expelled from their positions in Europe during the 1930s and the war years. As Nettl notes, whereas before the war the study and teaching of musicology hardly existed in the United States, after 1945 American universities came to rival "the grand institutes of Berlin, Vienna, Prague, Leipzig, and Munich, which considered themselves the cradle of musicology."[40] Although initially the focus of research was on Western music, soon the field expanded to include the study of other musical traditions, which came to be known as ethnomusicology, a truly transnational approach to the history of music. Curt Sachs, another émigré musicologist, who left Germany in 1933 and taught in Paris before moving to New York University in 1937, remained the leading scholar in this field until his death in 1958. There is little doubt that thanks to the activities of these and other scholars, the postwar intellectual scene in the United States and elsewhere grew more and more transnational.

The transnational scholarship in such fields as literature and music, of course, was amply supplemented and reinforced by postwar literary and artistic activities throughout the world. Although it would be difficult to be statistically precise, anecdotal evidence suggests that almost as soon as the war ended, transnational cultural activities, ranging from translations of novels and poems to art exhibitions, from musical performances to international film festivals, resumed. Some of these activities, to be sure, were initiated or sponsored by states for foreign policy purposes and were more in the realm of cultural propaganda than transnationalism. The Cold War deeply involved the governments in Washington, Moscow, and elsewhere in international artistic and musical events. During the

height of McCarthyism in the United States, for instance, steps were taken to remove a large number of books from overseas libraries that had been established under the auspices of the State Department. The banned books included Ernest Hemingway's *Across the River and into the Trees* and D. H. Lawrence's *Lady Chatterley's Lover*. The Soviet Union, for its part, established Stalin International Prizes and in 1954 awarded one of the prizes to Paul Robeson, an African American singer who was virtually shunned in his own country because of his opposition to Cold War policies.

Examples can be multiplied, but it would be too easy to comprehend them merely in the geopolitical framework. Even when the state was involved in financing, directing, or dismantling such activities, it could not have controlled or anticipated the impact they would have on individuals across national boundaries. The International Tchaikovsky Competition, in piano, in Moscow, just to take one example, was held under the auspices of the Soviet Academy of Music, a state organ, but its awarding of first prize to an American, Van Cliburn, in 1958 had many transnational consequences, not the least of which was to confirm the view that music knew no national or political boundaries. The Japanese violinist who was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter remained in Japan, to which she returned from Europe via the United States in 1945, and became the principal violinist to reintroduce European music to her country. In the meantime, the revival of the Wagnerian festival in Bayreuth, a quintessentially German cultural event, in 1948—when Herbert von Karajan conducted Wagner's Ring cycle as well as *Meistersinger*—had political implications, but that did not prevent opera lovers from all over Europe and North America (and eventually from other parts of the world as well) to make annual pilgrimages to the city. The renowned orchestra conductor Wilhelm Furtwängler, who had remained in Germany during the Nazi era and was suspected abroad of being a sympathizer, soon resumed his activities, some of which were held overseas. (For instance, he took the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra on a tour of Britain for the first time in 1951.) European soloists were once again a familiar sight in Japan after its occupation by US and other forces ended in 1952. A young musician from Tokyo, Seiji Ozawa—he was born in China in 1935—joined many others from other countries in Tanglewood, Massachusetts, and elsewhere for training. Japan's Kabuki theater troupe toured American cities in the mid-1950s, a first.



Van Cliburn congratulated by the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, upon winning the 1958 International Tchaikovsky Competition in Moscow—a moment of cultural transnationalism at the height of the Cold War. (© Bettmann/CORBIS)

The resumption and growth of transnational cultural activities was undoubtedly facilitated by postwar improvements and innovations in communications technology. For instance, international telephone calls had become less expensive, so that ordinary citizens could discuss and make arrangements for cultural events by telephone. (The cost of a three-minute conversation between New York and London, for instance, decreased from $189 in 1940 to $46 twenty years later, in 1990 dollars.[41]) Even more relevant was the prevalence of the tape recorder, a device for recording sounds by using magnetic tape. Developed initially for military use, it soon became a popular device for recording voices and music, with vast possibilities for circulating them transnationally. And then there was the television, which came to be found in an increasing number of homes in the United States after the war and, by the end of the 1950s, in other parts of the world. These devices made the transmission of cultural products across borders

much easier than before the war and contributed to creating a sense of shared experiences.

These developments, in particular the spread of television sets, had particularly notable implications for the cinema. It was widely believed that the television would soon replace movies as a form of entertainment on the screen. But it did not happen, in part because Hollywood responded with wide screens ("cinerama") and "technicolors," to show what they were capable of doing to keep customers coming back to the theater. Moreover, the industry produced a number of movies that appealed to audiences in many parts of the world. In 1953, to take a single year, Hollywood productions such as *High Noon* with Gary Cooper, Charlie Chaplin's *Limelight,* and Gene Kelly's *Singin' in the Rain* were immediate sensations not just in the United States but also in Europe and parts of Asia. While these products exported Hollywood overseas, others, while also made in Hollywood, may have served to connect the American people to the rest of the world. *Around the World in Eighty Days,* a 1956 movie version of a French novel written in the 1870s, was one of the hits of the season and may have given theatergoers in the United States a taste of transnational experience. Equally important in the context of transnational history was the large number of films made outside the United States that helped connect people across national boundaries in a common visual experience—and a shared consciousness about life. Masterpieces such as the Italian *The Bicycle Thief* and the Japanese *Rashomon* appealed to audiences around the globe because they seemed to speak to universal themes, in these instances having to do with layers of morality and of memory. These and other movies won prizes at international film festivals, which were revived shortly after the war and whose number increased over the years, further contributing to transnationalizing cultural productions.

Lastly, we may consider the study of history as a transnational experience. To what extent may it be said that historical scholarship contributed to fostering an understanding of the past shared across borders? Like other fields of scholarship, the study of history in the United States was affected by immigrants, including émigré historians such as Hajo Holborn and Felix Gilbert, each of whom contributed a great deal to broadening the scope of American history by viewing it in the context of Western history or in some cases of Atlantic history. They all emphasized the critical importance of considering parallel developments in

Europe and North America as heirs to a shared historical heritage. Their influence became apparent in the emergence of comparative history, the study of a number of countries in terms of such themes as feudalism, social structure, and politics. (A book published in 1956 with the title of *Feudalism in History*, comparing European and Japanese feudalism, was a harbinger of what was to come.[42]) To be sure, some historians in the United States continued to stress the exceptional character of the American experience. David Potter's *People of Plenty: Economic Advance and the American Character* (1954), for instance, portrayed the history of the American people against the background of the nation's uniquely rich natural resources, while Louis Hartz, Richard Hofstadter, and others explored the meaning of the "liberal tradition" in the United States as a phenomenon distinct from European political developments.[43] Such works perpetuated the mono-national orientation of historians; even when they compared developments in the United States to those in Europe, there was little sense of how the two had interacted—even worse, no consideration at all of other parts of the globe. Other scholars, however, offered less parochial and more transnational perspectives. For instance, David Riesman's pathbreaking work *The Lonely Crowd* situated the well-known phenomenon of social conformity among middle-class American families in the context of the worldwide development of industrialization and urbanization, while W. W. Rostow's *Stages of Economic Growth* offered a way to read world history comprehensively in the framework of the stages of economic development that the author applied to all countries and societies.[44]

The popularity and the wide impact these works had indicates the growing influence of the social sciences in postwar scholarship in the United States and elsewhere. (Riesman was a sociologist, and Rostow an economist.) Anthropology and sociology had developed in Europe at the end of the nineteenth century, but until the Second World War most work tended to be parochial—both in the tendency to develop generalizations and hypotheses on the basis of European and American models, and in the tendency to "essentialize" the non-West, viewing Asia, Africa, and the Middle East as qualitatively different from the West. During the 1950s, however, various attempts were made to develop a comprehensive framework for understanding all societies. The theory of modernization, made popular by the sociologist Talcott Parsons and others, was a notable example of this new trend. If all societies were comprehensible as moving toward

modernity, usually defined as industrialization, urbanization, and democratization, then it would become possible to establish meaningful comparisons across national boundaries. This sort of methodological transnationalism was characteristic of the postwar work of social scientists, many of whom had experienced military service abroad and postwar occupation duty, both of which contributed to deparochializing their outlook. Physical border-crossing, in other words, had resulted in intellectual and mental border-crossing. Not the least significant implication of such a phenomenon was that it contributed to fostering transnational thinking. Although some of the social sciences, such as political science, tended to dwell on the uniqueness of each country's system of governance and decision-making process, with an inevitable emphasis on national interest and a "realistic" assessment of available choices (this was the heyday of "realism" in international relations theory, popularized in the United States by an émigré scholar from Germany, Hans J. Morgenthau), others, notably economics but also sociology—in particular "historical sociology," which began to make its appearance during the 1950s, promoted by the sociologist Robert Merton, the historian John K. Fairbank, and others—encouraged efforts to establish more common, universalizable generalizations.

In such a situation, it is not surprising that the postwar years gave rise to a renewed interest in world history and world civilizations. Earlier in the twentieth century, Oswald Spengler, H. G. Wells, and several other (mostly European) writers had published books on world history, in the process seeking to present a perspective on history in which themes and chronologies were not all derived from European history.[45] Such pioneering work had not made much impact on the historical scholarship before the Great Depression, and the war brought back a more Western-centric perspective; the efforts to overcome the economic crisis and the fight against totalitarian enemies were conceived as a struggle for the survival of Western civilization. The same ideology would inform much of the Cold War as it was understood in Western Europe and North America. At the same time, in the aftermath of the war there was increased awareness that the fate of humankind knew no national or civilizational boundaries. Civilization as such was on trial, as Arnold J. Toynbee noted in the book he published in 1948 with that title.[46] Toynbee had long been involved in editing the *Survey of International Affairs* series for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, chronicling

international relations on an almost annual basis. But he was also interested in the world's historical development, an interest that went back to his experiences on the European continent, especially in Greece and the Balkans, in the immediate aftermath of the First World War. In 1934 he began publishing *A Study of History,* a twelve-volume work that was not to be completed until 1961.[47] But the bulk of the work was completed shortly after the Second World War. In his approach to history, the units of analysis were civilizations, rather than nations, regions, or religions, although religion was seen to have played a key role in the development of civilizations. In this sense he was a transnational historian whose work was enriched by his extensive global travels, especially in the post-1945 years. In seeing civilizations as the key to the development of world history—he focused on the "challenges" presented to specific civilizations by changing natural and human conditions and on their "responses"—he emphasized spiritual and intellectual, rather than material, foundations of history. One of Toynbee's junior collaborators in editing *Survey of International Affairs,* William H. McNeill, was to carry on the enterprise by developing what proved to be an academically more respected history of the world. Their work undoubtedly reflected the awareness that the West needed to be historicized, that is, it should not be taken as the main definer of the history of humankind, which must be understood as an arena for the interplay of a rich variety of civilizations. In some such fashion, the study of history, too, was beginning to be transnationalized.

Transnationalizing the Third World

The story of decolonization and nation building in the postwar world belongs more in international, imperial, and national history. Even so, it is pertinent to note that efforts were constantly being made, both by leaders and citizens in the new nations and by those in the established countries as well as in international organizations, to link what was emerging as the Third World to the rest of the globe. The idea of the Third World itself reflected this, a transnational awareness that the decolonized and still colonized areas of the world were very much part of a conceptually identifiable world community. The globe would have to be seen, now more than ever, as consisting of all countries, regions, and peoples, and to divide them into those belonging to the "first world" (the principal Cold War

antagonists), to the "second world" (advanced industrial countries, mostly in the West), and to the Third World appeared to reflect the reality better than a bipolar division of the world, whether in the earlier framework of the Axis versus the democracies or in terms of Winston Churchill's 1946 division between the two sides of the Iron Curtain. The Third World would comprise the bulk of humanity and would have its own identity.

During the 1950s much effort was made to conceptualize the Third World, to identify its position in the world community. One way was through what was by then a familiar dichotomy of colonialism and anticolonialism. Both could be transnational ideas, but in the wake of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the decolonization of most countries in Asia and the Middle East, the history of anticolonial struggles would come to constitute a more widely shared memory. Many in the West, such as Albert Camus and George Orwell, continued to publish scathing attacks on colonialism, and their writings were widely read throughout the still remaining colonies as well as formerly colonized areas and suggested a unifying scheme for comprehending the Third World. Anticolonialism came to constitute both a shared memory and a common vocabulary for understanding what had happened, and was happening, in the Third World. For instance, Chinua Achebe, a Nigerian novelist, was inspired by such thinking and in 1958 published *Things Fall Apart,* in which he described the effect that British colonizers and Christian missionaries had had upon the Igbo people.[48] The Third World, in this framework, was comprehensible as an arena of victimization by colonial rule that had fundamentally altered the indigenous ways of life.

Somewhat different was the idea of development through which public leaders and private individuals both in the West and elsewhere sought to integrate the Third World conceptually into the whole globe. "Development," as David Engerman, David Ekbladh, and other historians have pointed out, was a leading ideology of the 1950s that was found on both sides of the Cold War divide.[49] Until after the Second World War, as James William Park has shown, the adjective *underdeveloped* had been rarely used. Instead, those countries and people who had failed to undertake economic transformation had been referred to as "backward" or "retarded," implying that they had stopped growing.[50] To be sure, toward the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, much was said and written about the "awakening" of Asia and other parts of the world,

suggesting that even the "backward" areas that had remained dormant while the West had forged ahead might sooner or later awaken from their long slumber and bring themselves into the modern age. Before the Second World War, however, only a handful of countries, notably Japan and Turkey, could be recognized as having modernized themselves. In the postwar years, in contrast, developmentalism became a widely shared vision, a transnational way of understanding the world in turmoil. This was in part because both sides in the Cold War sought to promote Third World economic development to expand their respective spheres of influence. We should note, however, that the superpowers might not have had to turn their attention to Third World countries unless these latter had themselves been determined to undertake development in the process of nation building. In a sense developmentalism affected the Cold War, not the other way around. In any event, Washington and Moscow shared a commitment to the idea of helping other countries modernize their economies, and the newly independent states as well as older but less developed nations such as those in Latin America were anxious to look in all directions for developmental assistance.

Here was an interesting case of two transnational doctrines of modernization competing for influence. On one side was what historians have called "liberal developmentalism," which argued that economic development could best be promoted under conditions of free-market competition.[51] Although economic planning by the state would be a requirement, the private sector would remain vibrant, as it did in the United States, Western Europe, and other areas. As W. W. Rostow argued in *Stages of Economic Growth*, most societies pursued a standard pattern of economic development, from the hunting to the agrarian stage, and from there to the industrial phase, followed by a postindustrial consumer culture. Such theory itself was not new. In the nineteenth century, the British sociologist Herbert Spencer had already written about human society's steady development through stages. For that matter, Karl Marx had theorized the march of history from the primitive to the feudal to the capitalist phase as an inevitable and universal development. But the Marxists postulated the postcapitalist phase as socialist, in which industrial workers would seize control of the state and carry out a planned development of the economy to benefit all people.

"Liberal developmentalism" and the socialist variety, then, shared much in common and differed only with respect to future prospects. In reality, neither

vision was realistic. Few, if any, postcolonial countries undertook modernization along either the US- or the USSR-prescribed path; indeed, some of them would not be "modernized" for many more decades to come, or not at all. Among the older countries of Latin America, some, such as Argentina, rebelled against modernization theory, which usually implied industrialization through capital accumulation, technological development, and urbanization, and chose a policy of import substitution, through which they would purchase manufactured goods from abroad and pay for them by shipping agricultural products, rather than adopting their own indigenous programs of industrialization. One Caribbean country, Cuba, opted for socialism when Fidel Castro's revolutionary forces seized control of the state in the late 1950s, but the new regime in Havana did not exactly fit the Soviet model of a proletarian dictatorship. Without having entered the stage of industrialization, to speak of the industrial workers seizing control of the state was unrealistic. The same was true of China when it came under the Communist Party's reign in 1949. It called itself a "people's republic," very much like the Eastern European "people's democracies," and it eagerly sought to industrialize through state planning and control. But one major experiment, called "the great leap forward," undertaken in the late 1950s, was a self-consciously Chinese—that is, Maoist—way of industrializing the country. The plan called for establishing people's communes where workers would try to manufacture goods, in explicit rejection of the Soviet model of urban industrialization. But the experiment resulted in the starvation of millions of people as "collectivization" denuded huge areas of the countryside, thereby diminishing food production. And yet the Chinese Communist leadership refused to shift to the liberal developmental model until much later. Despite such differences and gaps, however, by then the idea of development had become well established, providing a framework in which the relationship between the Third World and other, more industrialized countries could be comprehended.

Another way in which the Third World could be conceptually transnationalized was through the dichotomy of "the West and the non-West," "the West and the rest," or, more popularly at that time, "East and West." ("East and West" also referred to the Cold War geopolitical divide, against which the Third World would, in the 1970s, propose a "North and South" dichotomy.) Such a conception would bring the Third World into a transnational scheme of things so that this

latter would represent "the other." The bifurcated view of humanity, divided between East and West, had long existed, going back to the ancient Greek division of the world between "Europe" and "Asia." Around the turn of the twentieth century, too, as Cemil Aydin has shown, the idea of Eastern civilization was powerful enough to bring together thinkers from Turkey and the rest of Asia all the way to Japan.[52] During the 1930s and the early 1940s, however, the East–West dichotomy had been appropriated by Japan to justify its war in Asia as a mission to expel the West from the East and to return the latter to its pristine stage before it had become invaded by Europeans and Americans. Amazingly, despite such misuse of the dichotomy, it survived the war and reemerged as a plausible framework in which to comprehend the emergence of the Third World.

In the new scheme, the Third World represented the East. Whether Japan fitted into the West better than the East was a question that was not settled then (or since, for that matter.) Countries like China, India, and Egypt seemed to represent the East better. Their leaders believed there was an Eastern civilization as the counterpart to Western civilization, and that these were the two halves of humanity. Just as Europeans and Americans were now, in the aftermath of their fratricide, dedicating themselves anew to their Western heritage, Asians were to reawaken themselves to their common identity. Africans were often included in such a conception of the East; if East and West were two halves of humanity, and if Africans were not part of the West, they must be viewed as belonging to the East, or at least they and Asians must work together to confirm what they had in common. In 1955, for instance, when delegates from twenty-nine countries from Asia and Africa—most of them having newly achieved independence—met in Bandung, Indonesia, one of their subcommittees focused on cultural cooperation, emphasizing the need to promote exchange programs within the Asia-African region as part of various global projects being promoted by UNESCO. The delegates were proud that Asia and Africa were where human civilization had originated and therefore that they had an important role to play in promoting global communication and understanding. In the same spirit, also in 1955, India's new leader, Jawaharlal Nehru, proposed that UNESCO initiate a project to promote mutual understanding between "the East" and "the West" through a systematic comparison of the two civilizations. Of course, the definition of "the East" was rather ambiguous, but it was significant that Nehru and those who

participated in the project, which continued for ten years, succeeded in bringing the non-West as exemplified by "the East" to the same level as the West. This was a way of ensuring that henceforth the promotion of international understanding would have to be through such transnational efforts and conceptualizations.

The flourishing of "area studies" in the West may also be put in the context of the transnationalizing of the Third World. This phenomenon had an obviously geopolitical dimension, but it also developed with its own momentum, leading to the steady encroachment of Third World topics in school curricula and libraries in Europe and North America. For educators, scholars, and leaders of foundations, the civilizations and histories of Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America were worthy of study in their own right. Area studies, as these explorations came to be known in the United States, were mostly situated within the larger framework of "international studies," thus revealing the awareness that in order to understand world affairs, it was imperative to probe into the traditions and contemporary developments in non-Western societies. Much of this work may have been "Orientalist" in the sense of viewing these societies as "the other," with the presumption that the West provided the norm to which "the rest" were to be compared and by which their differences were to be explained.[53] A particularly influential approach during the 1950s was to trace the histories of non-Western countries in the framework of "challenge" and "response." Borrowing from Toynbee's earlier framework but applying it to the Third World's relationship with the West, many sought to understand the non-West's history by pointing to its encounter with the "challenge" of the West, to which they would "respond" through a number of ways. Such a conceptualization of world history—as exemplified by the influential documentary collection *China's Response to the West,* edited by two Harvard scholars—at least offered a way of understanding modern history not as consisting of disparate local and national histories but in terms of some globalizing momentum, and in that sense here was another instance of the transnationalization of the intellectual horizon.[54]

As seen in such developments, Third World identities ranged from the experiences of decolonization and nation building to a faith in common civilization. In all such instances, the non-Western areas of the world were developing transnational experiences with one another and with Western nations. The result was to foster further transnational thinking even as nation-specific issues and overall

international affairs were defining the "realities" at one level. The vogue of "realism" in scholarly and nonscholarly quarters during the 1950s tended to obscure these transnational layers—but not for too long.

Transnational Organizations

Transnational encounters and thinking in the immediate postwar years and the 1950s were significantly fostered by an increasing number of organizations that cut across national boundaries. This may be one of the striking differences between the world after 1945 and the one preceding it. Although there had been innumerable and varied instances of cross-border encounters before the war, they now were fast becoming institutionalized; individuals joined together to form transnational organizations, while nations came together to establish international institutions with missions ranging from promoting the well-being of migrants or victims of contagious diseases to providing for the smooth functioning of worldwide economic transactions. Such institutional frameworks ensured that transnational movements and activities would remain more stable and less precarious than earlier. Transnationalism, it may be said, was being fortified with a strong organizational base.

Many of these institutions are more appropriately called intergovernmental organizations, in that they were established through agreement among a number of nations to promote certain shared objectives, such as disarmament or humanitarian relief. The United Nations and its affiliate bodies, such as the World Health Organization and the International Labour Organization, are examples, as are the International Monetary Fund and other constituents of the Bretton Woods system. They belong more properly in the discussion of international affairs rather than of transnational history, but those bodies provided spaces for the coming together of people from all over the world, and not just government officials. Individuals and private associations frequently met at these institutions and established their own networks, sometimes independently of more formal day-to-day affairs conducted by government officials and international civil servants.

Transnational organizations, properly called, refer to non-state actors. By definition, they do not represent any government, although the distinction between public authority and private activity is not always clear-cut in countries with au-

thoritarian systems of governance. To the extent that one may distinguish non-state actors from the state apparatus, they include private, voluntary organizations formed to promote specific objectives, whether humanitarian, religious, or economic. There had always been private associations of people; most had been local or national in scope and membership, some were intentionally transnational from the very beginning, but after 1945 the number of such transnational networks increased. By 1951 the United Nations had officially recognized 188 transnational nongovernmental organizations, of which 64 had been established during and after the war. Among humanitarian transnational bodies, particularly prominent were religious organizations, such as the Catholic International Union for Social Service, the Council of Jewish Organizations, and the Friends' World Committee for Consultation. Among medical societies, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Council of Nurses, the World Federation for Mental Health, and the World Medical Association, among others, worked closely with the World Health Organization to rid the Earth of communicable diseases such as tuberculosis and smallpox.[55]

These organizations provided the opportunity and the space for individuals and associations of various countries to come together, enabling them to confirm their transnational orientation. For instance, telecommunications experts from sixty-six countries met in Moscow in 1946 to establish a transnational body, the International Frequency Registration Board, that served as the clearinghouse of information regarding the radio frequencies used in different countries. Despite the rising tensions in the geopolitical arena, this body continued to function, providing one area in which Americans and Russians met to discuss more mundane but arguably equally critical questions. The pace of establishing nongovernmental organizations did not slow even during the 1950s, the decade of the "high" Cold War. Some transnational bodies were created precisely to lessen Cold War tensions and help reunite the world. Various organizations formed to promote nuclear arms control provide a good example. On both sides of the geopolitical divide there were informal networks of scientists who were committed to cooperation to diminish the danger of nuclear war, and some of them established the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs in 1957 to promote nuclear arms control. They were joined by pacifists and humanitarian organizations of various countries, many of whom had come together in Hiroshima in

the summer of 1955 and pledged themselves to mobilize the world against atomic and hydrogen bombs. As Lawrence Wittner, Matthew Evangelista, and others have shown, these initiatives ultimately led to international agreements to limit nuclear testing and to reduce strategic arms.[56] Transnational awareness and the anti-bomb movement reinforced one another and created a worldwide community consisting of global networks in the interest of peace. When President Dwight D. Eisenhower announced programs for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the way was opened for transnational cooperation in ensuring the safety of nuclear power plants, which were to be built in many areas of the world, and for preventing their conversion into weapons factories. A conference of scientists organized by the UN in 1955 was attended by Soviet and Czech scientists as well as those from the Western allies and paved the ground for the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Commission in 1956. Here was a pivotal transnational moment that proved far more crucial for the future of humankind than Cold War geopolitics.

In a similar vein, several thousand Americans went to the Soviet Union during 1958–1961 to organize various exhibits, and an equal number of Soviet citizens came to the United States for similar purposes. Admittedly, these exchanges were made possible through an official agreement between Washington and Moscow, but it may be argued that such an agreement itself was a product of pressures from private associations to open up national borders for transnational exchanges.[57] In the meantime, some transnational associations became particularly active in helping newly independent countries with economic development and modernization of schools and medical facilities. For instance, in 1954 the Medical Assistance Programs International was established to bring doctors and nurses from Europe and North America for service in newly developing nations. In the following year Japan began sending specialists to countries in the Middle East and Africa to help them overcome tuberculosis. Toward the end of the decade, My Brother's Keeper was founded in the United States as "a volunteer, nonsectarian group dedicated to the purpose of linking America's vast medical resources to global health care needs."[58] In education, too, private groups, notably foundations in the United States, were involved in efforts in the developing countries to make primary schooling available to all children and thereby to increase literacy. These were formidable tasks, as critical as health care for newly independent

countries, many of which lacked the resources and infrastructure to promote public education. Catholic and Protestant missionaries from abroad sought to fill some of the gaps, as did the Rockefeller, Carnegie, Ford, and other foundations. They worked closely with UNESCO, whose constitution declared, "The wide diffusion of culture, and the education of humanity for justice and liberty and peace are indispensable to the dignity of man." Education would remain one of the thorniest issues in the construction of nations, but it would be a vital component of transnationalism, just as transnational encounters would contribute to developing an awareness of shared humanity, certainly a cardinal objective of education.

Besides the issue-oriented transnational organizations, we may also consider those that were essential to the reglobalizing of the world economy. The international economy was not fully global in the 1950s. Although trade and shipping around the globe expanded rapidly—during this decade, the total combined volume of trade by all countries nearly doubled—the rates of growth were much faster for the United States, Western Europe, and Japan than for other countries. The dollar was the only international currency, the medium of exchange among different countries. Its strength was backed up by the huge gold holdings in the US Treasury. (In 1950 the United States possessed more than two-thirds of the total gold reserves in the world.) Moreover, a large portion of the countries' resources was being devoted to military expenditures. Out of the total world GNP of $71 billion in 1950, more than $13 billion, or nearly 20 percent, was spent on arms, including atomic weapons. In such a situation, the global economy was both US-dominated and driven significantly by geopolitical considerations.

Nevertheless, the world economy was buttressed by international and transnational organizations that had not existed earlier. Most obviously, the Bretton Woods system, designed to dismantle protectionist trade and investment policies and to establish a more stable system for promoting worldwide exchanges of goods and capital, was institutionalized by the International Monetary Fund, the key instrument for the smooth functioning of trade and monetary exchanges, as well as the World Bank, which was designed to help developing countries with their economic projects. These were intergovernmental organizations, but like the UN they provided spaces for the establishment of networks among bankers, industrialists, and economists from all parts of the world. More genuinely transnational

were organizations that were created to provide standards of quality and safety for goods produced. One of the earliest such organizations was the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), established in 1947 to define universal standards for products. Each country had its own set of standards, but the ISO was the first to bring different national systems together to facilitate cross-national exchanges.[59] From this time on, ISO and similar bodies continued to add more such transnational rules, which were an important aspect of economic globalization. Together with intergovernmental organizations, such bodies may be considered to have reflected the development of transnational consciousness in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War.

2. *The Transnationalization of Humanity*

A SIGNIFICANTLY transnational moment in humankind's view of itself may be said to have arrived when Neil Armstrong, an American astronaut, first set foot on the moon on July 20, 1969. The episode, in which he and his two colleagues had been launched to the moon in a rocket, was, at one level, clearly a product of US strategy during the Cold War. President John F. Kennedy had made it a cardinal objective of his administration to send a man to the moon before the Soviet Union did, a feat that would enhance national prestige and would also have military implications in terms of the emerging competition in outer space. (The mathematics and technical skills for sending a rocket to the moon were considered equivalent to launching an ICBM to Moscow.) But that was not the only way the moon landing was viewed in various parts of the world. Those with access to television watched Armstrong as he set foot on the moon and declared, "That's one small step for a man, one giant step for mankind." He planted an American flag, but there was no presumption that the United States now claimed its ownership of the moon. Indeed, beside the flag, Armstrong left a plaque with a message in English signed by President Richard Nixon as well as the three astronauts: "Here men from the planet Earth first set foot upon the Moon—July 1969, A.D. We came in peace for all mankind."

The moon landing did indeed belong to all humankind, as hundreds of millions of people in Asia, Europe, Latin America, and elsewhere watched the feat and not only hailed the successful adventure but also came to share a perspective on the Earth as viewed from outer space. "Planet Earth," as it came to be called, was seen as consisting of mountains, rivers, and oceans, not of separate national entities and boundaries. All inhabitants of the globe, now numbering over 3.6 billion, shared the same "spaceship Earth," another term gaining popularity. It was by no means the first time that people realized the silliness of populations subdividing the Earth into arbitrary and mutually hostile units when Earth's inhabitants shared so much in common. Transnational awareness had steadily



The plaque that would soon be placed on the surface of the moon by US astronauts, July 1969. The message combines pride in a national achievement with an eagerness to view it also as humankind's shared experience. (Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images)

grown after the Second World War, but the moon landing further strengthened it, giving legitimacy, as it were, to the questioning of the primacy of territorial states as the key definer of human affairs.

Such questioning had started immediately after the war—indeed, much earlier—but during the 1960s it gained in intensity across the globe. The inspiration for the renewed questioning came from many sources, but at bottom there seems to have been the idea, as Albert Camus had put it eloquently in his 1951 publication, *The Rebel*, that to exist as a human being was to rebel, to question one's circumstances and to consider alternatives. Camus had in mind not only historical movements against slavery, colonialism, and other injustices, but also existing political and social institutions. Such a perspective fit with the protest movement against the Vietnam War in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere, which ultimately led to the questioning of the Cold War itself and the political system that had sustained it.

In the late 1950s the Committee for a SANE Nuclear Policy, founded in the United States to oppose nuclear war, had asserted, "The sovereignty of the human community comes before all others—before the sovereignty of groups, tribes, or nations."[60] This was the language of transnationalism pitting itself against a worldview that divided the globe into allies and enemies, each armed with destructive weapons. At bottom was an impatience with the ongoing Cold War, its definition of world affairs, and its zero-sum game of gains and losses. The Vietnam War seemed to confirm such a mentality. This is not the place to chronicle the antiwar movement of the 1960s, except to note that it was truly global. It began in the mid-1960s across college campuses in the United States where students (including male students, who were liable to the draft) and faculty held "teach-ins" to discuss, and frequently to denounce, the war; it soon spread to many other countries and merged with various other activities to develop as a transnational anti-establishment movement.

It was anti-establishment in the sense that those who protested against the Vietnam War began questioning the wisdom of their respective countries' leaders (allegedly "the best and the brightest"), who had guided their national destinies for a generation, from the 1930s to the 1960s.[61] These leaders were of the wartime generation who had overcome the Great Depression, fought the Second World War, and were now waging the Cold War, in the process establishing around the globe "national security states," where large portions of national budgets were devoted to strengthening military power and where the civilian economy tended to be dominated by manufacturers of weapons, including warships and airplanes. Above all, there reigned a mentality that viewed both world and domestic affairs through the prism of national security. National interest was the unquestioned guide to policy, and nationalism the ideological framework for preparing citizens for waging war, hot or cold.

Such ideological orientation and intellectual premises came to be sharply questioned by those who opposed the ongoing war in Southeast Asia as well as by others who were not directly affected by the conflict but who shared the same skepticism about what the "establishment" had to offer. Thus, from the United States to France, from Britain to Germany, voices of protest grew louder, to culminate in 1968, the year that saw massive demonstrations and strikes in these and other countries.[62] The leaders of such movements, many belonging to the

postwar "baby boomer" generation who reached adolescence during the 1960s, often called themselves "radicals," "revisionists," "the New Left," and spokespersons of "counterculture," indicating their self-consciousness about going against the prevailing culture of the day that had been defined by the older generation.[63] As the movement's leaders asserted, and as later generations recalled, the basic ideology was to stress that "the cultural is the political." In other words, to search for one's identity apart from that defined by the nation's political elites, was a very political act and was destined to reshape national and international affairs. This was transnational self-consciousness both in being directed against state authority and also in beginning to be widely shared across state boundaries.

It is true that the "counterculture" held conflicting views about modernity. On the one hand, its advocates criticized industrialization as a polluter of skies and waters, a shared experience in the 1960s from London to Tokyo. At the same time, many young radicals embraced some products of technology, like automobiles, transistor radios, and electric guitars. But the fundamental key to the 1960s "radicals" was that they typically stressed humanity as against nation, people as against the state, and individuals "doing their own thing" as against following the prescribed paths of education, military service, and career development. Some applied such radicalism to domestic reconstruction, paying particular attention to racial injustice and gender inequality, while others went even further and began questioning the age-old foundations of social order such as marriage and family. Many lived together without marrying, some had abortions, and some gays and lesbians began to partner openly. As they did so, they were aware that theirs was a "cultural revolution" in which old premises were discarded and people's consciousness was being remolded. "Consciousness-raising" indeed became an objective of their movement, to call on people to revolutionize their behavior by transforming their views of themselves and of the world. In such an equation, there was little room for the state—or the state would become an object of assault, political and sometimes even physical.

The "cultural revolution" was thus a mental transformation, a new way of defining oneself and one's relationship with the world and the state. It is not surprising that the transformation was fundamentally transnational, both because it stressed the authenticity of the individual's existence, regardless of his or her national identity, and because leaders of the movement in one country were aware

of what went on in other countries. Many established contact with one another. For instance, as Martin Klimke has shown, student radicals from the United States and Germany visited each other and sometimes coordinated their activities, notably for the promotion of racial equality and justice.[64] Even in Eastern Europe, beyond the Cold War divide, there were echoes of the turmoil in the West. In Czechoslovakia, for instance, anti-establishment forces had steadily developed throughout the decade, culminating in the Prague Spring of 1968, a short-lived democratization of the Prague regime. While that was primarily a national moment, it also indicated that transnational forces—in this particular instance, the popularity of rock music—easily crossed borders. Rock and roll, which had originated in the United States, particularly among African Americans, in the late 1940s and the early 1950s, swept across the globe when British musicians borrowed from it and organized bands such as the Beatles and the Rolling Stones that became extremely popular in the United States and elsewhere. Each country had its own brand of "rock," but there was also direct encounter between musicians and audiences of Western and Eastern Europe, and numerous testimonies since the end of the Cold War indicate the existence of a rather extensive network of popular music lovers across Europe.[65] To those in Eastern Europe, this was music with a message, because even in the West "rock" was considered revolutionary and anti-establishment. Its lyrics often spoke of people's yearning for free lifestyles as well as their solidarity across national and ideological boundaries.

Elsewhere in the world, the penetration of political and cultural revisionism was slower but was nevertheless real, further contributing to the transnationalization of consciousness. China, for one example, had its own Cultural Revolution, lasting for ten years after its inception in 1966. Its origins could not have been more different from cultural revolutions elsewhere; Mao Zedong and other leaders of the Communist Party determined to launch a nationwide campaign to restore the purity of the revolution by encouraging young people to assault established customs and institutions, including the family, schools, bureaucracies, and ultimately even the armed forces. Intellectuals were sent to the country, forced to live as simple farmers in rural villages. This reflected the Maoist perception that commerce, industrialization, and urbanization had corrupted the revolution, which must now regain its essence by driving urban dwellers, in particular intellectuals, back to the people. Higher education and high culture were useless and

harmful in such a context. All that people had to have as a guide to living were some basic principles written down by Mao and described in the "Little Red Book" that everyone was obligated to carry and recite.

In time, China's "return to nature" movement made a profound impact on segments of the contemporary revolutionaries in the West, who began to call themselves Maoists and to assault capitalism and bourgeois culture. Few Americans or Europeans went to China, as formal diplomatic relations did not yet exist between the People's Republic and the United States and some European countries; and even where such relations existed—by 1970, Britain, France, and Italy, among others, had recognized the Beijing regime—Chinese authorities did not easily issue visas, preferring to isolate the country from the rest of the world. There were few concrete transnational moments connecting Chinese and Western revolutionaries. Even so, in its stress on simple lifestyles and its assault upon educational, business, military, and other national institutions, the Chinese Cultural Revolution had an affinity with cultural revolutions in the West. As Richard Wolin has shown, the connection between counterculture revolutionaries was particularly notable between Chinese and French radicals. Such prominent intellectuals as Jean-Paul Sartre and Michel Foucault embraced Maoism—or what they understood to be its essential messages—and, echoing the Chinese students in the throes of their revolution, declared that intellectuals everywhere must identify with "the people," with their struggle to free themselves from outmoded and decadent lifestyles.[66]

The transnational character of these political and mental upheavals was evident in other parts of the world as well. In Japan the 1960s began with a nationwide protest movement against the government, which was dominated by the conservative Liberal Democratic Party, whose leadership included some who had been closely connected with the war—and who now were proposing to revise the 1951 treaty of alliance with the United States to bring Japan's security more explicitly under the US "nuclear umbrella." Although the protest was an issue-specific movement, its leaders often spoke of China as an alternative to the United States and espoused the cause of "democracy," which to them meant people seizing power in their own hands against "conservative and reactionary" politicians, bureaucrats, and capitalists. In the end, the new security pact was ratified by the Japanese Diet (Parliament) and went into effect, but many of the original oppo-

nents as well as those who came of age during the 1960s became aware that theirs was part of a growing worldwide protest movement. Thus, even while they opposed the US alliance, they came to admire the American people who, like their counterparts in Europe, appeared to be trying to bring about a profound transformation of their political and social systems. A minority of Japanese radicals, on the other hand, identified with China's Cultural Revolution and saw it as the wave of the future, while still others, some extremist fringe groups, went their own ways and engaged in violent behavior that proved to be their undoing. (The Japanese diplomat who was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter was by then teaching French philosophy at the University of Tokyo. Along with his colleagues, he witnessed student radicals taking over the campus and forcing classes to be canceled. Such a story was duplicated nationwide through the early 1970s.)

What were the implications of all such events for transnational thought, in particular transnational intellectual collaboration? Empirical evidence suggests that the effects were both affirmative and negative. On one hand, international scholarly exchanges continued unabated, and as the awareness of global interdependence grew through the spread of radical movements, they may have been provided an additional impetus as a venue for bridging generational divides. Representatives both of the older generation and of those too young to have experienced the war could come together from various countries to study the past and to deepen a comparative perspective. One of the most successful instances of this was the "modernization of Japan" project in which historians and social scientists from the United States, Britain, and Japan participated throughout the 1960s, producing a number of books in the process.[67] Another project, located at Columbia University, held monthly meetings among Japan specialists to reexamine the course of Japan's foreign affairs since the nineteenth century.[68] Perhaps the most notable achievement in this connection was a conference held in Japan in 1969 in which historians from the United States and Japan discussed "the road to Pearl Harbor." It was a remarkable scholarly phenomenon that, less than a quarter century after the end of the war, researchers from the erstwhile antagonists came together for a scholarly discussion of US-Japanese relations prior to 1941. The participants were not intent upon defending the decisions made by their respective countries; instead, they jointly explored in a comparative framework how policy makers and the public had steadily paved their ways toward

war.[69] The gathering was marred only by the absence of a small number of scholars who had to cancel their participation because they had to deal with their respective campus crises. At this time there was nothing comparable to bring together Chinese and Japanese, or Chinese and American, scholars. The joint exploration of these bilateral relationships would have to wait until later. For that matter, despite the transnational waves of anti-establishment thought, there was as yet little intellectual engagement across the Cold War divide. That would come only as Russian and Eastern European intellectuals migrated to the West and contributed to enriching the vocabulary of historical and other studies, a development that would begin to take place after the early 1980s.

The picture was even more complicated in the rest of Asia. For most of the 1960s and the 1970s, the pivotal event was the war in Vietnam. Here it may be sufficient to note that both the North Vietnamese (and their allies in the south, the Viet Cong) and the South Vietnamese sought to present their cases in transnational language, not just in the framework of the Cold War competition for power between the two camps. Ho Chi Minh and other leaders in Hanoi sought to appeal to world opinion by speaking of freedom, justice, and self-determination, while the Saigon regime, led by Ngo Dinh Diem until his assassination in 1963, presented the southern half of the peninsula in the language of nation building and economic development.[70] After the north toppled the south and US forces left in 1975, the newly unified Vietnam combined both these approaches and, perhaps for that reason, gave the impression that it was less radical than China under Maoism. In contrast, its neighbor Cambodia embraced the Chinese-style cultural revolution in its extreme form while the Khmer Rouge ruled (1975–1978), arresting, expelling, and killing intellectuals and professional people in the name of returning the country "back to the land." The excesses continued until Vietnam invaded Cambodia and put an end to the regime, a development that in turn triggered a war between China and Vietnam. The story belongs in the history of Asian international relations, but it is pertinent to observe that in the end radical excesses in China and Cambodia led to the rejection of virtually all transnational connections and contact, until the situation gave way to something more acceptable to the rest of the world.

Thus, the global cultural revolution of the 1960s had both positive and negative aspects in terms of transnationalism. While the negative aspects—

anti-intellectualism, for instance, in many lands—deserve to be deplored, we should note that at its most promising moments, the cultural revolution helped deepen an appreciation for common humanity, for a universal vocabulary that brought people of different countries together. It is no accident that around this time Viktor Frankl's influence grew in Japan and other countries. (He visited Japan in 1969.[71]) Frankl's stress on universal humanity even in the face of unspeakable adversity perhaps appealed to those going through the turmoil of the 1960s and the 1970s.

On the surface, it would be difficult to find anything parallel, let alone universal, in the Middle East, where the predominant issue remained the Palestinian question, which resulted in the Arab-Israeli military confrontations in 1967 and 1973. Still, it is possible to detect transnational ideas and movements in the region. One of these is sometimes called "Arabism," the idea of Arab unity that was influential in many countries in the Middle East as they achieved independence. Powerfully promoted by Egypt's leader Gamal Abdel Nasser, it combined Third Worldism, Arab nationalism, and socialism and was a major ideological and political force in the region in the 1960s. But Arabism as a transnational force declined after the 1967 war and was eclipsed by more militant movements like the Muslim Brotherhood and sectarian Islam. These, too, were transnational phenomena but were notable because of their willingness to espouse the use of violence in the name of a "holy war," in particular against Israel and its supporters.

More successful in promoting transnationalism may have been the ideas of Frantz Fanon, Edward W. Said, and others who challenged the intellectual frameworks in which the Middle East, and Asia on the whole, had been understood in the West, and in which the non-West had also seen itself. Frantz Fanon, an Algerian writer, in 1961 published *Les damnés de la terre* (*The Wretched of the Earth*), calling on all people in the former colonies to liberate themselves—even through violence—from the language, ideas, and ways of life that had been imposed on them by the imperialists.[72] A mental revolution was needed to think for oneself in a way that was not a mere regurgitation of Western imports. These ideas strikingly resembled those being presented by the cultural revolutionaries in the West. Together, they were paving the way for the decentering of the West as the hegemonic ideology that defined and explained human activities, the past, present, and future. We shall return to this theme in Section 4.

Edward W. Said's influential book *Orientalism* was released in 1978, seventeen years after Fanon's.[73] Said, an American scholar born in Palestine, argued that the West ("the Occident") had imposed on the non-West ("the Orient") conceptual frameworks through which to view the world, even how to think about itself. The very idea of the "Orient" was a Western import, Said argued; it did not exist in the allegedly "Oriental" countries, and it connoted "the other," namely, the opposite of everything for which the West presumably stood: movement, progress, science, even beauty. The time had come, he implied, echoing Fanon, for "the other" to think for itself, liberating itself from the West's intellectual and ideological domination. Although Fanon's and Said's ideas at one level seemed to discourage the kind of dialogue between East and West that UNESCO, among others, had been carrying on, they also fit into the vocabulary of the global transnationalism of the 1960s and the 1970s that was forcing a reexamination of familiar ideas and assumptions throughout the world.

Edward Albee's 1966 play *A Delicate Balance* may be taken as an apt description of this state of affairs.[74] In this drama, a delicate balance has been maintained by a family whose core members are an aging couple living in a middle-class suburban home. Both the husband, a retired businessman, and his wife try to preserve some sense of order in their life, a task that has become complicated as the wife's sister, an alcoholic, has moved in. The couple have lost their only son, and their daughter, age thirty-two, has been divorced three times and is separating from her fourth husband. Not a very enviable circumstance, and eventually the "delicate balance," maintained by familial norms, certain words, even facial expressions and gestures that they all understand, breaks down when they are visited by another couple, close friends of the husband and wife, who have become frightened for no particular reason and decide to move in with this family. These circumstances are evocative of the breakdown of the familiar political order and mental universe that was experienced during the 1960s. Every established norm and system appeared to be being questioned, if not breaking down completely, with no end in sight.

Eventually, to be sure, the cultural ferment of the decade would run out of steam. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China slowed down and petered out even before Mao's death in 1976, and in the West, too, "the establishment" returned to positions of power.[75] The legacy of "the sixties," however, was not so easily erased—fundamentally because the transnationalization of mentality, which was integral to the global cultural revolution, confirmed the trend that had become evident even before the decade and was strengthened by other, concurrent developments during the 1960s and the 1970s.

A Global Civil Society?

Nowhere were these developments better summed up than by the phrase *global civil society,* which began to be used in the 1970s, first primarily by political scientists and international relations specialists but in time by others as well. There was no standard definition of the term, and even today scholars disagree as to precisely what it designates. From a historical point of view, it is clear that the adjectives *global* and *civil* were neatly combined to indicate what was happening to "society," which in this instance was analogous to "world community," even "humanity," rather than local groupings. Up to this time the phrase *civil society* had designated an existence within a country that was separate from the state. A modern nation was said to consist of the state apparatus and the citizens, existing in a "delicate balance," to go back to Albee's play, each performing its roles so as to ensure the country's survival and well-being. The dichotomy of state and society was not a new idea, but during the 1960s it gained currency because "people" in so many countries appeared to pit themselves against "the establishment." Influential writers such as Jürgen Habermas of Germany and Michel Foucault of France popularized the idea of "civil society" standing autonomously against the state.

During the 1970s the concept of civil society was transposed onto the international arena and came to be viewed as a global existence. The whole world, in other words, came to be seen as consisting of two layers; the layer made up of states and that constituting a "global civil society." In the absence of the world government or its equivalent, of course, the domestic analogy of state and society would not be literally transferrable to the international arena. Nevertheless, the experiences of the 1960s and beyond seemed to suggest that one could never understand the contemporary world if one ignored the emerging and growing movements and phenomena by non-state actors that cut across national boundaries.

Such thinking coalesced into the idea of global civil society, which many—at first political scientists but eventually other scholars as well—dated from the 1970s, making that decade an even more transnational time than earlier.[76]

Who were the global non-state actors? They ranged from cross-border migrants and refugees to tourists, from multinational business enterprises to non-governmental organizations (NGOs). They had long existed, but it was during the 1970s that their significance came to be recognized. They were seen to constitute the world community just as did nations and intergovernmental organizations. This was both because their numbers grew steadily (and in some cases even exponentially) during the decade, and also because many of them promoted transnational interests that were not identical with separate national interests. Here a bare outline of such phenomena as migrations and multinational business corporations will suffice to indicate their relationship to the evolving global civil society.

International migration statistics that are periodically published by the United Nations are quite revealing in this regard. These data cover refugees as well as those who cross borders to find jobs and residence abroad. In 1960, for instance, there were 73 million such people, and by 1980 the number had increased to nearly 100 million. These were still a tiny portion of the total world population, which expanded from 3.023 billion to 5.279 billion during the same period.[77] (Such a phenomenal demographic increase had many causes, in particular the growing life expectancy resulting from improvements in health care in the advanced countries—itself a transnational phenomenon of major significance—which offset the still persistently high rates of infant death in less developed areas, as well as the spreading use of the birth control pill that had the effect of limiting the number of children in richer nations.) But the picture begins to change if we add tourists as well as students, businesspeople, and others who are not included in migration statistics but who were nevertheless border-crossing individuals. They would stay for brief periods of time abroad and have their own transnational experiences.

For instance, in 1960 there were only 69 million international tourists, or slightly over 2 percent of the world's population. Twenty years later, the number was 278 million, or more than 5 percent of the total population. That each year, one out of every nineteen individuals was visiting another country tells a great

deal about the changing conditions of the world. These statistics are provided by each country from its immigration data, so it is possible that some individuals were counted more than once if they visited more than one country. The real number of people who traveled abroad, therefore, was lower. The important thing, nevertheless, is to note the impressive growth of tourism during those decades. (By the early 1980s, it is reported, international tourism was the second largest component of the total world trade.[78]) Moreover, whereas in 1960 Europe and North America were the destinations of the overwhelming majority of international tourists, twenty years later the ratio was down to 86 percent, as Africa, the Middle East, and especially Asia began to attract an increasing number of tourists. Comparable figures for other categories of temporary border-crossing people, notably businesspeople and students, all suggest not only that their numbers increased during this period but that they were now found in all parts of the world. The growing importance of the Middle East as a magnet for foreign investors, merchants, and workers because of its petroleum resources is a good example, but these decades also saw a significant number of Japanese bankers and businessmen arriving in North America and Europe as well as in other lands. They were soon followed by their counterparts from South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, India, and elsewhere in Asia. The upshot of all such activities was the rise of multinational enterprises in which the capital, labor, and markets of many countries, and not just those in the West, came together to produce and sell products—as well as ideas. In the process, world trade expanded phenomenally and the Middle East and East Asia steadily increased their shares of the global market.

All such phenomena were instances of transnational encounters and contributed to the development of global civil society. How they may have furthered transnational thinking may be difficult to generalize, but it would be fair to say that their rapid growth served to alter drastically the traditional perception of the world as consisting of nations, especially the so-called great powers that had defined an international "order" at a given moment in time. Sovereign states and superpowers continued to exist, but their "international" relations operated at one level, whereas non-state actors were adding many layers of "transnational" connections.

One could even say that international refugees were now becoming more transnational, in that more were coming from all corners of the globe. In 1960

there had been just over 2 million refugees, or 2.9 percent of the total migrant population, whereas the number shot up to 9 million by 1980, or 9.1 percent of the nearly 100 million people crossing borders. Some had been refugees for a long time, such as the Palestinians who had been unable to return home because of the continuous tension between Israel and the surrounding Arab states. About 700,000 Palestinians lived in Israel in 1980, but more than a million Palestinian refugees remained in the surrounding Arab-speaking countries, such as Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria. There were more recent refugees in Southeast Asia, who numbered 390,000 by 1980, five years after the Vietnam War ended. Many of them had left South Vietnam when the country was unified by the Hanoi government and found new homes in the United States, Canada, and other countries who would accept them. Cambodia, too, produced its share of refugees when Vietnam invaded the country during 1978–1979 to overthrow the Khmer Rouge regime. Close to half a million Cambodians crossed the border into refugee camps in Thailand. A large number of Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees came to be known as "boat people," as they resorted to navigating the oceans in small vessels, trying to reach Australia, Malaysia, and elsewhere. These countries were also magnets for East Timor's refugees, who fled their homeland when Indonesia challenged its independence and invaded the country, engaging in a brutal war. The picture was just as appalling in Africa, where the Angolan civil war resulted in hundreds of thousands of its people fleeing to neighboring countries such as Zambia and Zaire. The long war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, lasting from the early 1960s to the early 1990s, caused half a million people to seek refuge in Sudan and Yemen.

The impact of such large-scale migrations on national and international affairs is not hard to see. The United Nations, which had from its inception defined one of its objectives as the promotion of human welfare, sought to deal with the problems faced by migrants and refugees—housing, health, education—through the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), but separate countries needed to help in the process. The UN was instrumental in having them agree to accept certain numbers of international refugees each year, and some, mostly in North America and Western Europe, voluntarily admitted them. The emerging global society was in part a product of such measures; nations and international organizations were now more than ever concerned

with dealing with border-crossing, and sometimes even stateless, people. In the process the ethnic composition of sovereign nations began to change as nations admitted into their midst people of vastly different backgrounds. In the United States, the country that accepted the largest number of refugees, some began talking of diversity rather than unity or conformity as a national characteristic, and the same trend could be seen in other countries such as the Netherlands, Sweden, and Australia.

These phenomena clearly had transnational implications. For one thing, ethnic enclaves and communities could now be found all over the world. The Vietnamese population, for instance, was scattered in North America, Australia, and Europe to such an extent that their food became no more "exotic" than Chinese or Japanese cuisine. Vietnam, in other words, was not just a state with territorial borders but also a transnational existence represented by its people around the globe. The same would be true of other countries, notably China and the Chinese, after the country was opened to the outside world in the early 1970s.

What added to the momentum was the growing number of transnational workers, who might not move permanently from their home countries but who nevertheless came to constitute a significant portion of the labor force in the host countries. Wang Gungwu has called such people "sojourners," to distinguish them from immigrants who usually stay in a country of their destination and become permanent residents or citizens.[79] One striking fact about such temporary migrants was that, starting in the 1960s, the bulk of the world's sojourners—including those who eventually settled down in their host countries and thus became immigrants—began to consist of non-Europeans. This was particularly true of laborers in search of job opportunities. Hundreds of thousands of Turks moved to Germany, for instance, to fill job openings as Germany's economy expanded. Similarly, France was home to millions of North Africans, mostly originating in its former colonies, and the Netherlands began to attract former colonials from Indonesia and Surinam and others from Morocco. In these countries, the percentage of the foreign-born in the total population increased steadily, reaching nearly 10 percent by the 1990s. From East Asia, a growing number of Koreans left their homes for the United States as the latter revised its immigration laws in 1965 and eliminated the quota system that had, since the 1920s, favored Europeans over the rest. (People from Latin America had not

been regulated under the quota system, whereas Asians, Africans, Arabs, and others deemed nonwhite had been totally excluded.) Now immigrants from Asia began to outnumber those from Europe. Although during the 1960s and the 1970s the largest numbers originated from South Korea and Taiwan, soon they would be eclipsed by those coming from China as well as South Asia (India and Pakistan). The result was to confirm further ethnic diversity in the United States and in some European countries.

Such phenomena quite clearly added another transnational layer to the world community, but how they might have reinforced transnational thought is more difficult to determine. Did the addition of unprecedented numbers of ethnically diverse populations, producing "hybrid" persons and communities, confirm and strengthen a sense of shared humanity, or did it give rise to narrower, more parochial attitudes? Was "hybridity," a term that scholars began to use to characterize the phenomenon, seen as a healthy development for a country, or did most people prefer to retain their societies' "purity," however that was defined? It is of course impossible to generalize about millions of individuals, but we might at least make note of two developments during these decades that would help explore the question—the "brain drain" and "multiculturalism."

The two reinforced each other. The brain drain consisted of the movement of doctors, scientists, and other scholars and educators from Third World countries to the United States and Europe. It created a very serious problem for the countries of origin, which were just then seeking to modernize their economies, education, and health care, but such waves were also an inevitable aspect of the growing transnational networks that enveloped all types of human pursuits. The same may be said of foreign students. A steadily increasing number of students from Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America sought educational opportunities in Western Europe, North America, and Australia. The United States, which attracted about one-third of all international students to its colleges and universities every year, had just under 50,000 of them in 1960, accounting for roughly 1.3 percent of the total student population in the nation. The number increased sixfold, to over 300,000, by 1980, or 2.6 percent of all students in the United States. No other country's universities had such a high proportion of foreign students, although those in Britain, France, and the Netherlands had sizable

student populations coming from their still-existing or former colonies. Many of these foreign students would stay in the host countries, and eventually became a significant portion of the host country's academic personnel. Most dramatic was the slow but steady growth of students from mainland China who began to appear on European and US campuses during the 1970s, almost as soon as official (or even informal) relationships were opened up between Beijing and Western capitals.

Spurred in part by the brain drain, but also because of the social and cultural changes in the West and elsewhere during the 1960s and the 1970s, there was a growing influence of multiculturalism, or the idea that the nations and the entire world consisted of diverse populations living in close proximity to one another, each with its own traditions and ways of life, but sometimes blending with those of other groups. If formerly the prevalent view had been that the globe was divided into separate ethnic categories and civilizations, the new perspective brought these entities together so that there would be one human grouping, the human species, and one civilization encompassing all people. But humanity and human civilization were not seen as homogeneous or monolithic. Rather, they contained infinite variety. There was unity consisting of, or coexisting with, diversity. (Although precise statistics about "mixed marriages" are hard to come by, it seems possible that interracial households and children of different races became increasingly noticeable during these decades. Barrack Obama, born in 1962, would perhaps prove to be the most famous example. But in the early 1970s, when John Lennon, a former Beatle, said the United States was "the best place to bring up a Eurasian child"—his wife was Japanese—he may have been speaking on behalf of an increasing number of such children not just in the United States but elsewhere as well.[80])

The emerging global civil society, then, embraced the ideas of the unity of humankind and of respect for infinite varieties of ways of life and thought. The coexistence of the two—what Arthur Mann referred to as "the one and the many" in the context of American history—could foster the acceptance of hybridity, the living, working, and blending together of people and institutions of diverse backgrounds. One could see this in global cultural developments and in the phenomenal growth in the number of multinational business enterprises. Here a bare outline will suffice to put these developments in the context of transnationalism.

Global culture meant the sharing of cultural products, both "mainstream" and "peripheral," across national boundaries. The idea of a globally shared cultural product usually conjures up the phenomenal growth in popularity of rock and roll that easily surmounted the Cold War divide and became "hegemonic" in the sense of offering a novel and also universal way of combining words and tunes. Although there were national variations, this musical genre was intended as a new wave, to go beyond jazz, blues, and country music. It would be wrong, however, to focus on rock and roll as the single notable development in the global cultural arena in this period. In the realm of "high culture," too, these decades were notable for transnational exchanges. In classical music, the Cold War divide was frequently breached. Pianists from the United States and elsewhere continued to participate in and win competitions in Moscow, Prague, and other Eastern European cities, and there was movement in the opposite direction. For instance, in 1961 the Kirov Ballet performed in Paris, and a year later the Leningrad Ballet toured North American cities. (Rudolf Nureyev, a twenty-three-year-old soloist of the Kirov company, defected at the Paris airport and became a major force in ballet in Europe and the United States.) The Philadelphia Orchestra lost no time in visiting the People's Republic of China as soon as formal contact was reestablished between Washington and Beijing. The 1960s and the 1970s were the heyday of recorded classical music, made accessible to all people thanks to the spread of tape recorders and, in particular, Sony's Walkman, a device with which one could easily listen to one's favorite music while walking, bicycling, or riding on a train. In the meantime, hitherto peripheral cultural pursuits began to be introduced to wider spaces and intermingle. The Japan Foundation, established in 1972, the British Council, the Goethe Institute, the Alliance Française, and other semiofficial cultural agencies were designed to promote cultural exchanges across borders, and similar foundations were created in South Korea, Taiwan, mainland China, and elsewhere in Asia. Although provided with funding from official sources, these foundations functioned like such private organizations in the United States as the Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations, to promote cross-cultural exchanges.

Even those who did not participate in foundation activities became part of global cultural networks in such other areas as food, fashion, and movies. With expanding waves of migration, it is not surprising that non-Western cuisine

Subway riders in New York City listen to Sony Walkmans, March 1981. The convenient portable audio player, invented and produced in Japan, became a symbol of a mass culture that easily connected people in all parts of the world. (NY Daily News via Getty Images)

spread to Europe, North America, and Oceania. There had always been Chinese restaurants in Western countries, but most of them had been limited to Cantonese food. Now many other varieties were introduced, including Peking and Shanghai cuisines. Anecdotal evidence suggests that more and more Americans and Europeans became adept at using chopsticks, something that was helped by the growing popularity of Japanese, Korean, and Southeast Asian dishes. Businessmen from Japan and South Korea popularized their native cuisine, often cooked by chefs brought over from their countries. Raw fish, the main staple of Japanese food, was no longer looked upon as exotic, tasteless, or unsanitary. Not just Japanese residents but an increasing number of Americans and Europeans began appreciating the taste as well as the health value of raw fish and other items such as tofu. Similarly, the influx of Vietnamese and other Southeast Asians in the wake of the Vietnam War familiarized Westerners with Vietnamese and Thai

food. At the same time, in Asian countries restaurants offering Western food, in particular American, French, and Italian cooking, rapidly increased in number. Hamburgers and hot dogs appealed to Asians as an aspect of American culture; the first McDonald's fast-food restaurants opened their doors in Japan in the early 1970s.

In fashions, blue jeans, popularized in the West after the Levi's brand was marketed aggressively in the United States, came to unify the world's youth and even older people as their favored daily wear. An increasing number of non-Westerners came to attend fashion shows in Paris, New York, and elsewhere, and some outsiders even opened their own boutiques in Europe and North America. One might also note the international popularity of "Barbie dolls," clad in the latest fashions. With the spread of television sets in all parts of the world, people everywhere were able to see what styles were in fashion and to emulate them.

Moviegoing added to the trend. The 1960s were remarkable for such nonconformist and even countercultural movies as *The Graduate* and *A Clockwork Orange,* the former a Hollywood production and the latter made in Britain. *The Graduate* starred Dustin Hoffman, who plays a college student who disrupts his ex-girlfriend's wedding and runs away with her. Earlier in the movie he had an affair with the girl's mother. These and other episodes illustrated the crumbling of traditional family values and moral standards, which were considered out of date and hypocritical. Instead, the principal driving force now would be the determination to be true to one's desires and beliefs. The film was widely acclaimed in the United States and shown in many other countries where the audiences shared vicariously in what the counterculture generation was producing in the United States. Likewise, *Clockwork Orange* (directed by American author Stanley Kubrick) showed British hooligans who disregarded all social norms and resorted to violence against the established order, in the process even indulging in mass rapes. They spoke an argot of cockney English mixed with Slavic words. The movie was an extreme depiction of the countercultural impulses of the younger generation, and resonated with some young men and women elsewhere. It inspired other antiheroes and anti-establishment actors such as Jack Nicholson, Warren Beatty, and Dennis Hopper.

Of course, such extreme expressions provoked resistance and opposition, sometimes just as extreme, among those who saw a threat to traditional order and

national values. Multiculturalism, which its European and American opponents equated with the erosion of traditional values, appeared to doom Western civilization. The breakdown of sexual morals as exemplified by these movies alarmed conservatives and even liberals who felt the countercultural movement had gone too far. Many of them came together around the issues of abortion and homosexuality. The US Supreme Court legalized abortion under certain circumstances in *Roe vs. Wade* (1975), a decision that was denounced by the Catholic Church and others who viewed fetuses as living beings and considered an abortion the equivalent to murder. Certain countries, in particular the Protestant nations of Europe as well as China, Japan, and others, had legalized abortion, but *Roe vs. Wade* became a battle cry for the Vatican and the Catholics in Latin America and elsewhere to renew their commitment to the sanctity of life, which they insisted began at conception. Likewise with homosexuality. Same-sex marriage was still illegal in most countries, but some homosexual couples were more willing now to "come out of the closet." Movies and dramas with explicitly homosexual themes began to attract large audiences. For instance, Michel Tremblay's play *Hosanna*, a story of two gay men in search of sexual identity, was first performed in Quebec in 1973 and was soon staged in Toronto, New York, and other cities. Transnational networks of homosexual organizations grew, which in turn produced hostile reaction in many parts of the world. As AIDS began to appear in the 1970s, first in Africa and then in Southeast Asia, notably among homosexuals, the fear of contagion brought about a global reaction against homosexuality, even as NGOs and the UN began to grapple with the spread of the disease.

In some such fashion, there were now global cultural developments that produced numerous transnational encounters and movements. Vicarious transnational moments were being created everywhere, contributing to the sense that while nation building continued in various parts of the world and the Cold War developed with its own momentum, even more significant phenomena were appearing, impacting upon the consciousness and behavior of people everywhere. Their mentality had been thoroughly affected, even transformed, in the process.

If these were instances of transnational cultural phenomena that provided underpinnings, as it were, for the global civil society, they were reinforced by multinational business activities. In the background was the steady erosion of the hegemonic position enjoyed by the US economy in the immediate postwar

years. This could be most graphically seen in the fact that steadily through the 1960s and into the 1970s, the dollar, the mainstay of the Bretton Woods system, lost its primacy. The pound sterling, the franc, the mark, and the yen, among others, had been increasing their value as the countries in which they were the national currencies had grown economically and expanded their foreign trade, thus obtaining more dollar reserves. Put another way, world trade and financial transactions were becoming more and more multilateral, and the dollar was just one among the major currencies. The value of these currencies would fluctuate from one day to the next, opening the way to currency speculation that would become widespread in the 1980s. Thus, economic transactions would become as much transnational (among individuals and private establishments across borders) as international (among business firms acting within legal and policy frameworks set up by their home countries).

The growth of multinational enterprises was a good indication of the trend. These were transnational business arrangements in which capital, technology, and labor of more than one country would be combined to produce goods and services that would be marketed throughout the world. Financiers, producers, workers, and consumers of several countries became transnational actors, finding the best and most profitable means of production, marketing, and consumption. The number of multinational corporations was less than one hundred in 1970 but grew to over nine hundred by 1980.[81] They were transnational not only in the sense of building bridges across boundaries but also because they were driven more by business than by national considerations. Multinational enterprises were inherently non-national in that sense; they were subject to the rules and guidelines of the countries in which they operated, but they did not necessarily follow or identify with the policies or objectives of particular nations. This contrasted with the situation before World War I, when business enterprises were far more rooted in specific countries and engaged in their own nationalistic competitions with one another. Nations, above all the United States, had sought to safeguard their domestic producers by erecting tariff walls. In the last decades of the twentieth century, in contrast, these businesses operated within a framework set up by various governments supportive of global economic transactions and competed among themselves without regard to where their components came from. Earlier,

it may be said, there existed international economic activities but no global civil society, whereas now the two reinforced each other.

Globalization was a term that had not yet gained currency during the 1960s or the 1970s. Yet it was clearly the direction of world economic affairs during those decades. What was suggested by the "Nixon shock" economic measures of July 1971, which resulted in the devaluation of the dollar, was that economic globalization was now more than ever becoming transnational. That is to say, quite apart from the story of the growth of international trade and investment, the agents of globalization were becoming more and more widely scattered. The Bretton Woods system had operated on the basis of the major countries' intergovernmental cooperation, and this would continue in a limited way even after the devaluation of the dollar starting in 1971. However, increasingly, outside the framework of such state-level transactions, transnational linkages were developing. That may be one reason why world trade did not diminish despite the global economic downturn during the 1970s.

This downturn was caused primarily by the "oil shocks," the tripling and quadrupling of the price of crude oil, the bulk of which was produced in the Middle East. This was a result of a conscious decision adopted by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1973 in retaliation against Israel's attacks on the neighboring countries. Not just Israel but the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and other countries that had seemed to be behind Israel were to be punished by the Arab countries that accounted for a majority of the OPEC membership. They were aware of these other countries' dependence on imported oil, and they aggravated this vulnerability by reducing the output of crude oil and at the same time raising its price. These decisions were repeated again in 1979. As a result, the cost of energy increased tremendously, causing trade deficits in oil-importing countries for the first time in many years. The global energy crisis during the 1970s led various countries to seek alternative sources of power. The United States, the Soviet Union, and other European nations as well as Japan had been building nuclear power plants since the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, but during the 1970s they impressed observers as perhaps the best alternative to imported oil. Still, at that time nuclear energy provided only a fraction of power needed for industrial and individual needs, and so the countries' oil

dependence was not mitigated. The result was a steep inflation coupled with economic stagnation, as goods made in the industrialized nations became more expensive while the consumers' disposable income (after food and energy bills had been paid) declined. Unemployment ensued, and the rates of economic growth of most advanced countries plummeted, some even recording zero or minus growth. Perhaps the most telling symbol of how the oil shocks affected the world's richer economies was the sight of the British government applying for and obtaining a $4 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund in 1976.[82]

Despite such disasters, however, the volume of international trade actually increased, in sharp contrast to the 1930s when the Great Depression went hand in hand with diminished trade. One key reason for this was that during the 1970s, manufacturing firms and businesses began to resort to "offshore" procurement—that is, they sought to reduce costs by looking for cheaper labor abroad. Investment capital, saturated in the domestic economy, also went abroad, to industrialize hitherto underdeveloped economies. A related development was a reorientation of the US, British, and several other advanced economies from industrial production toward the service sector such as finance, insurance, and real estate. A new global division of labor was developing, facilitated by the floating exchange rates that came into existence by the end of the 1970s. Currencies kept moving transnationally; while, for instance, US, British, and Japanese capital would be poured into China and India to hire local labor for manufacturing, the emerging rich in these latter countries would invest their profits in purchasing bonds and securities in New York, London, or Tokyo. Add to such developments the phenomenal growth of "oil dollars," the petroleum-exporting countries' cash receipts that they could invest abroad as well as use to purchase luxury items, it is not surprising that there were many transnational transactions in capital, goods, and labor.

Transnational Justice

No aspect of the emerging global civil society was more dramatic than the explosive growth of international NGOs. Together with individuals (migrants, tourists, and others) and multinational enterprises, these organizations constituted non-state actors and shared the world with separate states and intergovernmental institutions.

Nongovernmental organizations typically were private associations of people who voluntarily came together to pursue certain shared objectives, and as such they were not incorporated into public systems of governance. It would be difficult to apply such a definition rigidly to an organization from an authoritarian state that controls even private activities. Not all private organizations, therefore, could be seen as authentic members of civil society. We may, however, take the listing in the Union of International Associations, itself a non-state actor, as a reliable statistical guide. According to its publications, the number of international NGOs grew from 2,795 in 1972 to 12,688 (79,786 if local branches were also counted) in 1984. This was a spectacular increase, unparalleled in the history of NGOs before or since.[83]

Why this phenomenon? It can best be understood as another aspect of the overall characteristic of the world of the 1960s and the 1970s, namely, that the overwhelming authority and prerogatives of the state that had informed postwar history began to be challenged by the emerging social and cultural forces as seen above. Particularly pertinent was the growing awareness that the existing states were not capable of dealing effectively with issues that were of transnational nature. Many of those issues involve considerations of justice. The concept of justice had long existed in international law and in separate national legal systems, but during the 1960s and the 1970s it was given wider significance as people in various parts of the world sought to protest against violations of human rights and against ecological deterioration. Although the movement for the protection of human rights and for the preservation of the natural environment had different origins, by the 1970s they had become merged as a global agenda for justice. It is no accident that among the rapidly increasing number of NGOs were those concerned with these two issues.

Human rights is a quintessentially transnational concept. When people in different countries lived at great distances from one another, the definition of who constituted the human community was rather limited. Even when one spoke of the rights of men, as the French did during the Revolution, "men" were not necessarily envisaged as people all over the world. Actually, the Revolution combined the rights of men with those of the nation so that they would reinforce each other. The same was true in most other countries. Human rights were to be safeguarded within the framework of a nation-state that would provide law

and order for its citizens. Their rights, in other words, were usually comprehended as civil rights rather than human rights. But the years after 1945 provided greater opportunities than ever before for the encountering and intermingling of people of different nations. It is not surprising, then, that the idea of human rights should emerge as a major principle of people's interactions with one another, and of the behavior of states toward their citizens.

The significance of the 1960s and the 1970s in the history of human rights lies in the fact that in those decades human rights came to refer to people of all backgrounds and circumstances. During the 1960s the UN adopted a series of resolutions declaring that "the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation," "all forms of racial discrimination," and "discrimination against women" were violations of human rights. To ensure that the nations adhered to such principles, a number of NGOs were created, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Amnesty International, established in 1961, became a major transnational force on behalf of "prisoners of conscience," to promote global public awareness of, and protest against, abuses of political prisoners that transcended "national, cultural, religious, and ideological boundaries."[84] Such language shows that to be human was now considered a superior condition of existence, over and above national and other identities. This organization received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1977, reflecting the emerging view that a peaceful world order and the respect for human rights were interdependent. Human Rights Watch, founded at that juncture, particularly played a crucial role in ensuring that the emerging détente between the United States and the Soviet Union would include considerations for human rights on both sides of the Cold War divide. (The Helsinki Accords of 1975, signed by all the states belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact, made an explicit reference to human rights.)

In the 1970s human rights had particular relevance to the protection of women's rights. Not just in individual states but across national boundaries, women's voices were heard more clearly and strongly than ever, especially through the large number of transnational organizations created for the purpose. During the 1960s, women's rights movements were mostly confined to the West, but during the subsequent decade women in Asia, Africa, and elsewhere also became active. The UN declared 1975 "International Women's Year" and designated the years

1975 through 1985 the "Decade for Women." In 1975 the first World Conference on Women was held in Mexico City, and the participants resolved to establish networks of women's organizations throughout the world. In 1976 in Brussells, the International Tribunal on Crimes Against Women brought together two thousand women from forty countries who cited and denounced all forms of violence against women. Clearly, no definition of humankind would ever again exclude females, and transnational women's organizations and gatherings continued to remind men of this simple truth.

Did "being human" include those born with physical and mental disabilities, those unable to take care of themselves, or even to express themselves due to brain damage? The most famous of "handicapped" persons in the world may well have been Helen Keller (1880–1968), a woman who overcame her blindness and deafness through special training and perseverance and led a movement to help the deaf and the blind. Her life's story captured transnational attention through *The Miracle Worker,* a play (1959) and a movie (1962) based on her life. People with physical disabilities had constituted a significant minority in all societies, some of which had developed programs to look after their needs. But the transnational care of such people had been very slow to develop. Apart from several organizations that assisted veterans of war who had been seriously injured, humanitarian relief activities had not involved efforts to have the handicapped be treated as "normal" human beings. The 1960 Rome Olympics was a landmark in this regard in that the regular games were followed by the Paralympics, where men and women with physical disabilities, from various countries, could for perhaps the first time in history challenge one another in sports in significant numbers. The experiment brought such joy to the participants and their supporters that the practice was followed by the Olympics held in Tokyo in 1964, Mexico City in 1968, and in all subsequent events. Among transnational efforts less connected to states was the holding in 1970 of an international competition for physically disabled athletes in Aylesbury, England. Such sporting events soon came to include the blind and those with cerebral palsy.[85]

Notable as these events were, they covered only those with physical disabilities, ignoring the large number of persons with mental, emotional, psychological, or linguistic disabilities. The United Nations belatedly included the rights of the



The Italian team at the Olympic Village before the start of the first International Paralympics, held in Rome immediately following the 1960 Olympic Games. The Paralympics have since been held every four years, demonstrating the world's belated awareness and acceptance of the disabled. (Getty Images)

mentally disabled in its list of human rights in 1971, and four years later the world organization denounced discrimination against all types of disability. Even so, it was only in 1980 that "Special Olympics" were organized to bring together mentally disabled persons. This was surely one area where even expanded definitions of human rights left a large segment of humanity inadequately covered. Nevertheless, soon it was globally recognized that one could not except even the most severely disabled from the definition of humanity. If anything, such people needed a greater measure of "human security"—a term that gained currency at this juncture, indicating the view that as well as, or even more than, the traditional notion of national security, the well-being of humans as humans regardless of who they were must lie at the basis of any conception of justice.[86]

An important component of "human security" was environmental. The decades after 1960 were notable for the worldwide concern with the physical environment, in terms both of the quality of air, water, and food that humans consumed and of the preservation of the ecological system that sustained animals, birds, trees, and all living things. Both were transnational issues whose relevance cut across national borders. At bottom was a growing transnational concern with two phenomena that had characterized the postwar decades: population growth and economic change. With the world's population more than doubling between 1945 and 1980, with larger and larger percentages of people living in urban centers, and with industrialization spreading even to small cities and villages, the skies began to darken, the waters became impure, and the air was sometimes unbreathable. Of course, wars and armaments contributed to some of these phenomena. The atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons sprayed "ashes of death" on all living beings indiscriminately until they were halted in 1963—at least by the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union, which signed a test-ban treaty in 1963. In the war in Vietnam, US forces were spraying the Vietnam countrysides with Agent Orange, an agent containing dioxin that not only destroyed forests and farmlands but also acted as a powerful carcinogen in the human body.[87] Up to three million children and grandchildren of Vietnamese exposed to the chemical were said to bear its effects. Outside of such battlefields, air and water pollution remained and even grew worse because of pollutants such as carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, and sulfur dioxide emitted from factories and automobiles, while rivers, lakes, and oceans were increasingly contaminated by sewage and industrial waste.

One notable moment in demonstrating environmental damage may have come in Minamata, a seaside village in western Japan, where starting in the second half of the 1950s babies began to be born deformed, mentally handicapped, and even unaware of themselves. "Minamata disease" was caused by mercury poisoning; a manufacturer of a substance known as acetaldehyde used mercury in the production process, and dumped it into the ocean. The appearance of these babies was so shocking that civic groups were formed in the 1960s to protest against the company and to call upon the government to do something about the situation, which by then was causing scores of deaths.[88] The news of Minamata disease

spread to other countries, where similar incidents were reported, and in time worldwide concern with mercury poisoning became one of the major sources of transnational environmentalism. The Minamata syndrome seemed to demonstrate the danger of uncontrolled industrial development and thus fed the growing movement across national boundaries to stem the tide. As exemplified by the Club of Rome, a gathering of economists and others in the late 1960s in response to the growing seriousness of the consequences of industrialization, there arose a transnational movement to resist unlimited economic growth.

Theirs was not necessarily a universal voice. From the beginning, the idea of limited growth was opposed by Third World countries, which asserted that the world's environmental problems had been produced by the countries that had already undertaken industrialization, in the process making use of the rich resources of the poorer lands. The poorer lands, they insisted, should not be required to restrain their economic development, which would keep them forever in the state of underdevelopment, increasing the already large gaps between the two groups of nations. The collision between environmentalism and developmentalism was serious, and has remained so to this day. However, all countries, regardless of their degree of industrialization or urbanization, agreed on the necessity to protect endangered species and to improve the quality of air and water. To that degree there was a transnational consensus. The disagreement had to do with specific means of achieving these goals, the poorer countries insisting that the rich nations should do more to improve the natural environment and should help the poorer nations attain "sustainable growth," that is, economic development that was compatible with environmental conservation.

A landmark moment in the development of transnational environmentalism was the Stockholm meeting convened by the United Nations in 1972. This was a major international (rather than transnational) conference, but the road to Stockholm had been paved by many transnational NGOs. One of them, the International Union for the Protection of Nature, had been in existence since 1948 and organized international conferences for the protection of what came to be known as the "biosphere." The word *protection* was replaced with *conservation* in 1956, and similarly named bodies were created during the 1960s and the 1970s. One of the most influential, Friends of the Earth, was founded in the United States in 1969 and soon established branches all over the world. These

organizations—according to a UN survey, at least ten of them were international in scale—dedicated themselves to protecting "planet Earth" from humans, insisting that human lifestyles, ambitions, and avarice no less than human wars played havoc with the ecological system.

The Stockholm meeting was attended by representatives of both industrialized and developing countries, and by government officials as well as spokespersons for NGOs. While the United Nations Environment Programme, established in 1973 to follow up on the conference, was an international institution, it provided the setting for the coming together of representatives of many private organizations with their shared agendas. The number of transnational organizations dedicated to environmentalism grew so rapidly that in 1975 a conference was held in Austria to review their interrelationships as well as their relationships to the United Nations and to independent states.[89] Nowhere was environmental activism inside and outside national and international frameworks more sensationally demonstrated than through the activism of Greenpeace, an organization established in 1970. Greenpeace not only advocated the conservation of the biosphere and the protection of endangered species, notably whales, but it often resorted to direct action. The organization's founders, Canadians and Americans in Canada, from the beginning were assertive in protesting against underwater nuclear testing and against the killing of whales, and they sent ships to disrupt such activities. But Greenpeace was not alone. In its campaign to save whales it was joined by other organizations, such as Friends of the Earth and the World Wildlife Fund, the latter having been established in 1971. As a result of their activities, international agreements came to be negotiated to ban the killing of at least certain kinds of whales. Norway, Japan, and some other countries that still practiced whaling—and ate whale meat—protested against such bans, but they could not silence the transnational voices that grew even louder with each success.

Very broadly put, then, both human rights and environmental concerns were broadening the conception of justice. Going beyond the traditional legal notion, there was a transnational awareness that people and the natural environment needed to be treated justly. Technically, transnational justice was a concept that was formally adopted by the United Nations much later and referred primarily to reconciliation and restitution after violent clashes or dictatorial rule in a

country.[90] But the idea that justice must prevail globally and that transnational efforts must be made to pursue such an objective was quite evident before 1980. It is not surprising, then, that the unprecedented increase in the number and activities of international nongovernmental advocacy groups coincided with the growing awareness that all persons must be protected against abuse, regardless of their differences, and that the planet Earth, with all its living beings, must be treated justly. These were transnational concerns, and NGOs mushroomed because the authority of the state was weakening or because existing governments were incapable of dealing with those problems. Transnational organizations worked with individual governments and with international bodies in seeking to cope with them, but when these others were found to be inadequate, private associations would gladly take their place to exercise the initiative in the name of the whole of humanity.

It was just a step here to the idea that in order to ensure transnational justice, there should be established new legal frameworks, transnational courts of justice. Unlike the international courts of justice that dealt with war crimes committed by one nation or group of nations against another, the transnational courts would represent people everywhere and bring to justice even those who acted in violation of the human rights of their own citizens.

Ironically, precisely at the moment when notions of transnational justice were making headway, a new challenge to the vision appeared in the form of terrorism, which often was couched in the language of justice and was now more transnational than earlier. Acts of terrorism had always existed, but most of them had been national phenomena. During the 1970s, West Germany's Red Army Faction protested against the governing class, which it believed contained too many holdovers from the Nazi era, while the Irish Republican Army led a guerrilla war against British occupation forces in Northern Ireland.[91] The Kurdistan Workers Party worked for a Kurdish homeland in northern Iraq and eastern Turkey, and in northern Spain the separatist group ETA was formed in 1968 to gain a homeland for the Basque people of the Iberian Peninsula. Both these organizations were willing to resort to terrorism, but arguably the most spectacular terrorist incident occurred in 1972 when the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) attacked and killed a number of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics. At the end of the decade, when Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan, Islamic jihadists

known as mujahedin staged guerrilla-style attacks against them. These were politically motivated terrorist acts that were part of national (or nation-making) dramas. In the late 1960s and the early 1970s, however, a more transnationally oriented and organized terrorism made its appearance. Particularly notable were groups of Muslims who came together across national boundaries to target their enemies, who included both Arabs (most notably Egypt's Anwar Sadat, who was assassinated by the Muslim Brotherhood in 1981) and non-Arabs who were considered enemies of Islam. Because Muslims were particularly numerous in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East, networks of clandestine organizations began to be created in these regions, out of which the most famous transnational terrorist group, al-Qaeda, would be created in the early 1990s.

Terrorism, whether local, national, or transnational, clearly violated universal human rights in its assault upon people whom its perpetrators considered their enemy, whether because of the victims' nationality, religion, or way of life. Equally seriously, terrorists disregarded the sanctity of their own lives when they turned themselves into suicide bombers. Like the Japanese kamikaze ("divine wind") pilots who crashed their small aircraft into US ships in what they considered a sacred mission to honor the emperor, Islamic extremists blew themselves up in a "holy war" in the name of the prophet—and in the name of justice. (It was unjust, in their view, for the West to support Israel at the expense of Palestinian Arabs.) But the terrorist acts were criminal deeds in violation of all declarations on universal human rights that the United Nations and other organizations, including religious bodies, had promulgated. They were as serious an offense against humanity as genocides and even more transnational in scope. Transnational, nongovernmental terrorist incidents were, unfortunately, to grow more serious in the following decades. These headline-catching crimes, however, provoked global condemnation that was just as transnational in scope. Whether transnational terrorism could be suppressed only by national or international efforts through the use of military force, and whether, in responding with military power, the states might also be violating human rights, were questions that were to be bequeathed to the subsequent decades.

Religious Revival and the Limits of Transnationalism

There is another way to contextualize the appearance of Islamic terrorism in the 1970s. It was a dramatic demonstration of the fact that religion was noticeably gaining influence among individuals and nations, and in various regions of the world. While it is wrong to equate terrorism with a religious movement, the coincidental phenomenon of transnational violence and religious revival in the decades that saw notable developments in such areas as human rights and environmentalism is deserving of attention. Certain religious developments tended to stress national and parochial concerns. Even if religious faiths had traditionally stressed the unity of humans before God, that did not prevent sectarian, particularistic forces from developing agendas that were clearly against universalism.

In particular, during these decades there grew what Scott Thomas has aptly termed "religious nationalism," or religion in the service of a nation, and vice versa.[92] Iran after the revolution of 1979 is a good example: a nation ruled by a theocracy of ayatollahs, or religious leaders. Of course, one could point to the example of Israel as a Jewish state as an even earlier manifestation of a religion establishing a nation, but Israel was not quite a theocracy, and secular Jews shared power with the more religious. Others, such as Hamas in Palestine's occupied territories, the Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, and the Taliban in Afghanistan (until after the end of Soviet occupation in the 1980s) and Pakistan did not control a national government but were seeking to seize political power. In all these instances, religious revival manifested itself through politicization. "Political Islam" was a good example.

But Islam was not alone. The 1970s also witnessed the revival of fundamentalist tendencies among other religions. As Thomas Borstelmann has shown, in the United States the decade was characterized by both social diversity and religious resurgence.[93] The same phenomenon could be detected elsewhere as well. Christianity, which had mostly remained a personal faith and, within a nation-state, by and large passive and subordinate to secular authority, came to assert itself. Most of its influence, it is true, was in civil society, where church attendance began to grow and evangelical preachers and movements gained influence. But within the Christian church, there were significant new developments among both Catholics and Protestants. Throughout the 1960s and the subsequent decades, the Catholic Church became a major force for nuclear arms control and interracial harmony, while at the

same time adhering to traditional perspectives on such issues as marriage and birth control. Moreover, Catholics, especially in Europe, became deeply involved in developmental and humanitarian activities abroad. In Latin America, where such efforts were particularly notable, there emerged what was called "Liberation Theology"—this came close to fundamentalism, as its followers strictly adhered to the teachings of Jesus as recorded in the Bible, but it also had political implications in that it drove its adherents to involve themselves in opposition to secular state authorities.

The Protestant counterpart to Liberation Theology was revivalism, or evangelicalism as it was sometimes referred to, stressing the impending "second coming" of Christ and the need for ardent prayers for personal salvation. Mainline Protestant churches in Europe and the United States declined in attendance during the 1960s, but nondenominational and charismatic sects surged. They stressed that the Bible was to be understood literally as laws passed down from God through Jesus. In the United States, for instance, a group calling itself "The Moral Majority" increased its influence during the 1970s, joining forces with traditional evangelicals whose roots went back to the Great Awakening of the eighteenth century. Billy Graham exemplified the mid-twentieth-century variety, exhorting all devout believers to bring Christian doctrine into their daily lives. These movements were the Christian counterpart to Islamic fundamentalism, not only doctrinally but also in their attempt to make an impact on political and social affairs. Some fundamentalists became actively engaged in protesting against birth control and abortions, while others resurrected the anti-Darwinian movement that had seen its heyday during the 1920s (especially in the United States) and argued that science, especially as taught at schools, should conform to the Bible. In opposition to Darwinian perspectives on the origins of human species, the adherents of what came to be called "creationism" insisted that the origins of humanity as well as of the world should all be attributed to God's work.

While Islam and Christianity were particularly notable in the renewed emphasis on fundamental doctrines, other religions, too, were affected by the trend and produced groups within them that were oriented toward fundamentalism, even extremism. For instance, in South Asia, where Buddhists and Hindus had existed side by side for centuries—a coexistence complicated by the fact that Buddhists tended to be a major influence among poorer classes—some individuals and groups resorted to violence against one another, or sometimes against other



Transnational religion: temples of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2013.

religions. Such religious activism became serious when it was intertwined with ethnic conflict within national boundaries, as happened in Sri Lanka where the Tamil minority, espousing Hinduism, sought to achieve autonomy, if not complete independence, by struggling against the Buddhist majority. In Tibet, followers of the Dalai Lama accepted his doctrine of passive resistance to the Chinese government, which claimed that Tibet belonged to China, but a minority of radicals did not hesitate to use more direct means of protest. We may also add the example of Afrikaners, the white population in South Africa, the majority of whom professed faith in the Dutch Reformed Church while safeguarding their nation's policy of racial segregation, or apartheid, even as it came to be denounced by the transnational community as a gross violation of human rights. Religion in the service of the state, and vice versa, were in many ways an anomalous development in a period that saw so much evidence that transnational ideas and aspirations were being strengthened.[94]



The Dalai Lama and actor Richard Gere at the New York Lawyers Alliance for World Security's Annual Peace Award, April 1994. Exiled from Tibet when it was incorporated into China in 1949, the Dalai Lama has followers all over the world, symbolizing the spiritual leadership of a transnational individual. (WireImage/Getty Images)

Why such a development? It was clearly a reaction against the tendency of the age that exalted the transnational individual at the expense of the national community and that saw a steady erosion of state authority and the strengthening of non-state actors. Religious nationalism, in a sense, came to the state's rescue. One may see this most clearly in the United States, where religious revival was closely connected to nationalism and political antiradicalism, even antiliberalism. Those who were shocked by the challenges to state authority by the radical movement of the 1960s often sought refuge in religion, in most instances the Christian church. Many religious conservatives, on their part, saw eye to eye with political nationalists. The relentless assault on the government during the Vietnam War, as well as the growth of transnational movements, produced an inevitable backlash, coalescing those who sought to restore respect for the nation as well as the church. In this sense, religion and nation reinforced each other.

Religious revival in this period, however, may also be connected to another notable phenomenon: the self-assertiveness of non-Western countries and people. From the moment they came to power, Iran's ayatollahs did not conceal their disdain for modern Western civilization, in particular its secular lifestyles and democratic governance. Likewise with other Islamic fundamentalists, who castigated the West for its alleged domination of the world. Even less-politicized Muslims began to distance themselves from Western values or to assert that these values were not universally valid, that non-Western parts of the globe adhered to their own belief systems. We have noted the influence of such writers as Fanon and Said, who challenged the political and cultural terms that had been defined in the West and accepted unquestioningly by the non-West. Such thinkers as well as religious leaders were insisting on an equation between the West and the non-West, neither of which was of universal validity. Just at the moment when transnational forces appeared to grow with unprecedented speed, these views were calling for recognition of diversity, even of division of humankind into separate religious and other identities. Politicization of religion may be considered an aspect of such a phenomenon.

In 1963 the historian William H. McNeill published a widely acclaimed book, *The Rise of the West.* The title was misleading, because the book's aim was not to celebrate the triumph of modern Western civilization but rather to put it in the context of the long history of humankind. In McNeill's view, "the rise of the

West" was not foreordained. It was a relatively recent phenomenon, dating from no earlier than the mid-eighteenth century. The West "rose" and came to dominate the world because of its scientific and intellectual achievements during the Enlightenment, but, he argued, this dominance might not last any longer than that of other civilizations had. McNeill was only vaguely aware of the forces of what would come to be called globalization, let alone of transnationalization, but his emphasis, like that of his senior colleague Toynbee, was on connections among civilizations as a major engine of human history. Although McNeill was apparently unaware that these phenomena were even then challenging long-held ideas about the modern West, his insistence on viewing history as a world-embracing development, not just in terms of national or regional units, would, in two or three decades, come to seem commonplace.

In any event, to borrow from the title of McNeill's book, the 1960s and the 1970s did indeed mark the time when the non-West began to rise. We have seen some examples of this already during the 1950s, such as the Bandung Conference and UNESCO's ten-year project on mutual appreciation between East and West. Both challenged the traditional acceptance of the West as the norm and sought to place the West and the non-West on equal terms. We may likewise note the ways in which the idea of "development" became politicized and uncoupled from the West. No idea was more "Western," at least in modern history, than that of "development." And it had immense following among non-Western people. Economic development was a primary objective of the newly independent states during the 1950s and beyond. As more countries joined their ranks—by the 1970s more than two-thirds of the membership of the United Nations consisted of postcolonial states—development became an even more urgent imperative. Already in 1960 the UN General Assembly passed a resolution designating the new decade as the Decade of Development.

The situation began to change in the early 1970s, however, when the developing nations called for a "new international economic order" that would promote their development by giving them preferential treatment vis-à-vis the advanced countries of the West in trade, investment, and other areas. At the same time, reflecting the thinking of Fanon, Said, and others, some in the Third World came to challenge the prevailing thinking on economic development, which had postu-

lated that agrarian societies would undertake industrialization and urbanization through some system of state planning, whether socialist or nonsocialist. The advanced industrialized countries were to provide capital and technology for this purpose. These ideas retained their influence after 1960. Indeed, they gained official recognition in the United States when President John F. Kennedy established an office devoted to foreign assistance (the Agency for International Development) and avidly promoted nation building and economic development in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In addition, he also initiated the Peace Corps, a program for young American men and women to go abroad to serve as engineers, teachers, hospital workers, and in many other capacities to help modernize developing countries. The key theme was again development, which was now more firmly incorporated into official US policy, as exemplified by the appointment of W. W. Rostow, the preeminent theorist of development, as a member of the National Security Council. Even the Vietnam War, which grew in seriousness under Kennedy and was drastically expanded under his successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, was waged in the name of helping South Vietnam's self-determination and economic modernization.

This was the heyday of academic developmentalism. Theories of modernization were promulgated by political scientists and sociologists as well as by economists, and historians, too, avidly absorbed the social science literature on the subject. As noted earlier, modern Japanese history came to be understood in the framework of modernization, and the same conceptualization was applied to Turkey, China, and other countries, and not simply national histories but also international relations were frequently understood in the same framework. Often the Cold War came to be seen as a contest between the superpowers as to which of them was better equipped and more successful in helping Third World countries modernize themselves. But far more than global geopolitics was involved, as can be seen in the struggle between Moscow and Beijing to influence developmental strategies in such countries as North Korea and Vietnam. Recent research reveals that for Pyongyang or Hanoi, the Cold War struggle between the two superpowers was of much less interest to the political leaders than the question of choosing the ideology and methods that were best calculated to ensure their own, as well as their country's, survival.[95]

At this level, then, development was a widely shared, transnational ideology, as well as the basis for understanding national and international affairs. However, Third World doctrines against Western-style development also grew during the 1960s and became even more widespread in the subsequent decade. If we are to name a significant moment to mark the rise of counterdevelopmentalism, there would be no better landmark than the emergence of "dependency theory," first promulgated by Raúl Prebisch, an Argentine economist and statesman. During the 1960s he chaired the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and continued to take the advanced economic powers to task for pursuing their self-interest even when they undertook developmental assistance. Such assistance, he asserted, all had strings attached; the capitalist nations used it for solidifying their hold on less advanced countries, tying them to global trade and investment networks. The upshot was to keep these countries perpetually under the control of the industrial nations by making them dependent on the latter rather than freeing themselves from the chain. Like Fanon's treatises on the Third World's mental dependence on the West, Prebisch's formulation theorized about the same phenomenon in the economic area. Both questioned the prerogative of the West to present its own history as a model for others and sought to liberate the non-West from the advanced countries' seemingly perpetual control of the world's resources and markets. Soon dependency theory became widely shared among developing nations, who came to view themselves as victims of global economic forces.

Counterdevelopmentalism, however, was not confined to the non-West. As noted in the preceding section, an important aspect of the West's "cultural revolution" during the 1960s was the questioning of the premises of modernization and progress. The revolutionaries opposed their vision of a less developed, less urbanized world to the reality of a seemingly perpetually growing industrial world. But many of them also accepted counterdevelopmentalism as a viable concept to tie them and the Third World together. In their transnational universe, men and women from all over the world would work together, not for further promoting the world's economic growth but for combating poverty and inequality in different areas of the world. They would seek to eliminate injustice such as racial inequality and religious intolerance. They would put pressure on governments and corporations to stop doing business with South Africa until the latter gave up its policy of apartheid. For that matter, the transnational radicals would pay close

attention to domestic affairs in all countries to ensure that the rights of women, children, and minorities were protected. It is fitting that, before he was assassinated in 1968, Martin Luther King always conceived of his struggle for equality at home in relation to similar movements abroad, including Gandhi's movement in India. Although the Indian leader had been assassinated twenty years earlier, King believed solid ties connected the two, as well as those struggling for justice in South Africa and elsewhere. They were against economic development for its own sake and gave priority to noneconomic objectives.

Such thinking was part of the story of the rise of the non-West. While modernization and economic development were quintessentially of Western origin, to stress racial equality or the Third World's liberation from dependency was to indicate that the non-West had arrived on the global scene. Their interests and ideas would now have to be taken seriously and their perspective incorporated into any view of the human condition and of humankind's future. As noted earlier, the term *human security* came to be used in this period among some officials and nonofficials to indicate the priority of human as against national interests. In their view, it was not enough to be concerned with national security, something that each country would define to fit its needs. Human security, in contrast, considered the welfare of all people in the entire world. Only when they were ensured a minimum of food, shelter, health, education, and dignity could there be true security for all, including individual states. There is little doubt that when people began couching their ideas this way, humanity was no longer equated with "Westerners," the symbol of modern civilization, but all people everywhere.

Religious revival of the 1970s may be put in some such context. It was not simply that certain religious movements gained influence or that they became ardent forces in support of nationalism. Many of these movements arose in non-Western countries, as if to indicate that the non-West was "rising" to challenge a world economy, a world order, and a world culture that had been part of the phenomenon of the "rise of the West." The resurgence of Islam and other faiths combined with Third World self-consciousness, the rise of China, antidevelopmentalism, and many other concurrent phenomena to challenge the power and influence of the West.

Whether such a situation fostered, altered, or damaged transnational networks is an interesting question to which no simple answer is possible. If the non-West

had turned against the West, it would undoubtedly have led to a divided world, not an interconnected one. But that did not happen. The non-West did not amount to an anti-West coalition. People of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America never stopped migrating to Western countries to seek jobs or to study. There developed transnational connections among countries in those regions, some of which may have been self-consciously parochial in promoting their identity as non-Western, but they were clearly outnumbered by multilateral networks that included countries from all parts of the globe. The incipient rise of the non-West, in other words, was a reality whose significance provided one layer in the evolution of transnational history. Just as non-national entities like religions, business enterprises, NGOs, and races were making their existence known in the world arena, non-Western people, faiths, ideas, and goods were intruding upon Western consciousness, in the process contributing to the making of a more fully global community.

3. *Layers of Transnationalism*

THE FINAL two decades of the twentieth century are usually characterized as having been a period of rapid globalization. It was in the 1980s that the term *globalization* came to be used widely, to refer particularly to a spectacular increase in the number and scope of activities of multinational enterprises. Globalization now more than ever came to embrace most countries of the world.

It is important to keep in mind that, as in the preceding period, the economic layer was just one of several that constituted the evolution of a transnationalizing world. One characteristic of the 1980s and the 1990s may well have been that some contradictions and even conflict among such layers became increasingly more visible.

In the economic sphere, perhaps the most significant development was that the People's Republic of China under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping in 1979 began to modernize the country by opening it up to international trade and investment. This resulted in a massive infusion of foreign capital and technology into the country as well as the establishment of manufacturing firms, combining such capital and technology with cheaper domestic labor.[96] By the end of the century, China was emerging as one of the fastest-growing economies, its rate of growth averaging 9 percent per year during the years 1980–2000. Its products, consisting mostly of agricultural and mineral goods initially but increasingly of manufactured items, began to flood the world market. From virtually nil in 1980, Chinese export trade was already accounting for 1.8 percent of the world's total in 1990 and 4.0 percent in 2000. China's exports as a share of the country's GDP rose from 13 percent in 1980 to 44 percent in 2000. Its foreign currency reserve, a test of how well a country is doing in its international balance of payments, already recorded $30 billion in 1990 and rose to $168 billion in 2000, among the highest in the world. In virtually all countries, the label "Made in China" could be found on a vast number of consumer products, including television sets, radios, air conditioners, and computer parts as well as kitchen utensils and clothes.

However, "Made in China" did not mean that an exported item had been manufactured entirely by Chinese. It may have been designed by Americans or Europeans, and it may have been produced by Indian, Vietnamese, or Indonesian as well as Chinese workers. In other words, China was now being fully integrated into the global economy in which national labels lost their earlier, exclusive connotations. Other countries, for their part, rushed their goods and capital to the partially opened China market, where people began to have the means to enjoy, or at least to aspire to enjoying, Western-style middle-class patterns of living. At the very least, the Chinese were less poor than they had been traditionally. For instance, the rural poverty rate was 42.8 percent in 1990, but it shrank to 24.2 percent by 1997. The percentage of China's population earning less than one US dollar a day fell from around 9 percent to less than 4 percent during the 1990s.[97]

It is true that state planning, rather than market forces, dictated the overall direction, size, and specific contents of the Chinese economy. The Beijing regime, controlled by the Communist Party, annually set goals for economic growth, made plans for industrial and agricultural production, and provided subsidies to export-oriented businesses. Even its population policy, which came to be known as the "one child per family" rule, was part of the state's attempt to increase the nation's productivity. By limiting the overall population, the leaders hoped to educate and train those who were born so that they would become productive members of the country and succeed in the international arena. This was an integral part of China's strategy of modernization, launched in the early 1980s so as to catch up with the more advanced countries and to claim a larger share of the world economy. Even so, the state alone could not have carried on the task of transforming the country without the cooperation of the people, the more so because modernization entailed incorporating the nation into the global setting, which in turn meant providing a profit motive to ambitious and hardworking individuals so that they would compete in both the domestic and external markets. An increasing number of Chinese willingly entered the global market and pursued their opportunities as well as interests, to such an extent that by the end of the century a small minority at the top of the economic ladder were emerging as millionaires, to the envy of the rest of the population. The gap between the successful few and the rest created social unrest and political tension, which would never disappear despite the efforts by the governing elite to maintain domestic order.

The story could be duplicated in many other countries, so that there emerged a globally interconnected community of individuals and non-state actors with agendas that were not identifiable with formal state policies. Countries like India and Brazil were not far behind China, although their rates of economic growth in this period were lower. And in the wake of the ending of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, Eastern European countries now entered the global arena and took advantage of the opportunities being opened up for economic liberalization and growth. Some of the formally socialist states did better than others, however. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic made fairly successful transitions to the market economy, whereas Russia's economy shrank by 3.5 percent between 1990 and 2000 and Ukraine's rate of growth fell by nearly 7 percent per year. The fact remains that there were now far more numerous players in the drama of globalization. As a result, the United States, Japan, and the Western European countries that had dominated the world economy could no longer take their hegemonic position for granted and were forced to pay increasing attention to the newly globalizing states.

Such a nation-by-nation description of accelerating globalization, however, is somewhat misleading. The principal units playing their roles in the world economy were no longer just nations. One significance of globalization at the end of the twentieth century is that states were becoming less the determinants of economic activities and their traditionally central roles were being supplemented, if not supplanted, by non-state actors and individuals. This phenomenon had already become noticeable in the 1970s, but it was accelerated during the 1980s. Instead of focusing on the rise of China or of the entrance of Eastern European states into the global economic arena, therefore, we should pay equal attention to the flow of goods, capital, and labor, which was now much less restrained than earlier. Instead of seeing China as a monolithic economic entity, for instance, we should speak of individual Chinese as well as the country's profit-oriented firms. These were people and organizations that happened to be Chinese, but their roles were not bound by the territorial borders. They went all over the world in search of business opportunities.

Capital, too, was becoming increasingly more stateless, released from various restrictions that had regulated its movement. Perhaps the decisive moment in

the transnationalization of capital came at the end of 1985, when representatives of central banks and finance ministers from the United States, Britain, Germany, France, and Japan met at the Plaza Hotel in New York City to liberalize currency transactions across national borders. The authorities in these countries had since 1971 sought to coordinate their monetary policies in order to sustain the value of the dollar at a certain level, but now they would minimize, if not eliminate altogether, such intervention. The Plaza Accord in effect withheld support for the dollar as the officially sanctioned currency of choice in international transactions and eliminated state-controlled rates of exchange, at least in theory. In reality, the central banks in various countries retained a measure of control over rates of exchange through buying or selling their respective currencies, China being a particularly notable example. Still, currency traders, speculators, and even ordinary citizens all over the world were now much less restrained than in the past to purchase, accumulate, or sell chunks of whatever national monetary units they chose. For the first time in the modern centuries, currencies began to float globally, which complicated business planning but was an inevitable aspect of the transnationalizing of the global economy.

The establishment of the European Union in 1991 and the decision in 1999 by most members of the regional community—Britain was a notable exception—to adopt a common monetary unit, the euro, was further evidence of the transnationalization of the global economy. One could now travel in most countries in Western and Central Europe without changing currencies at each border, while at the same time imports to, and exports from, the regional community waxed and waned as the rates of exchange between the euro and the dollar, as well as between the euro and the pound sterling and other currencies, kept changing.

Despite such developments, observers and academic specialists were slow to recognize them as a significant historical phenomenon. Although the term *globalization* began to be used by economists and social scientists during the 1980s—and its usage steadily spread to journalists, the business community, politicians, bureaucrats, and even foundations (such as the Center for Global Partnership, established within the Japan Foundation in 1991)—historians did not initially catch on. A cursory look at their writings indicates that few of them mentioned, let alone discussed, globalization until toward the end of the century. Even words like *global* and *globalizing* were rarely used by historians before the

1990s. But then, as if driven by some obsessive consensus, historians began writing books in which such words appeared in their titles.[98] Global history almost overnight became an acceptable way, a plausible framework in which to study history, especially of the modern period. World history, too, made a comeback. As noted earlier, McNeill's *The Rise of the West*, published in 1963, had been a path-blazer, but the author's passion for the history of the whole world and its various civilizations had not quite caught on, and historians continued to focus on national histories. This had been how they had studied the past ever since the discipline of history was established in nineteenth-century Europe. History meant the study of a nation's past (and present). Toward the end of the twentieth century, however, world history gained in popularity, making separate national histories less and less palatable, looking parochial. According to periodic surveys undertaken by the American Historical Association, whereas in 1980 only a tiny fraction of history departments in the United States had faculty teaching world history, twenty years later almost 20 percent of them did so.[99] The proportion of faculty and graduate students teaching and studying non-Western history continued to increase, challenging the once overwhelming presence of "Americanists" and "Europeanists." In this context, the term *global history* made its appearance. In most instances it meant the same thing as world history, but an increasing number of scholars came to prefer the term *global* rather than *world* to describe their work and their intentions, especially if they were teaching or writing about the modern period.

Whichever term was used, it is remarkable that in the 1990s more and more colleges began offering courses in world history, the assumption being that it was no longer sufficient just to study a particular country's past but rather that one should recognize the interrelatedness of all national histories. This was because, scholars and teachers now insisted, no country's history was self-contained but was a product as much of interactions with other countries as of internal dynamics. In a sense, then, there was no such thing as national history pure and simple, but only global history. However, because global history was a very awesome concept, assuming that one had to know something about all nations and civilizations, and because the term could give the impression that national borders no longer mattered, some preferred to refer to what they were advocating as "transnational history." Transnational history did not deny the existence and relevance of sepa-

rate nations but emphasized interconnections and mutual influences among them. Nations still mattered, but there were many other players on the stage of history, creating constant flows of goods, people, and ideas across borders. Races, religions, and civilizations interacted with one another on a different plane from nations. Whereas most scholars continued to comprehend these phenomena as themes in international history, the term *international* tended to imply interstate, rather than inter-civil-society and interhuman connections, and so, some argued, it was important to categorize these connections less as international and more as transnational.

Thus emerged the field of transnational history as a way to reconceptualize history, especially modern history. Because the modern period saw the ascendancy of the nation as the key unit of political governance, economic activities, and social order, and because the study and teaching of history were often bound up with the task of nation building, it was important to liberate oneself from such nation-centrism and pay equal attention to what was transnational in a nation's past and present. Thinking along some such lines, scholars increasingly began to refer to transnational themes and developments in the modern and contemporary world. It was no accident that the historians who led the way in this direction included scholars of US history, a subject that for decades had been dominated by writers focusing on domestic political, social, and cultural history, stressing its unique character. Scholars such as Thomas Bender and Ian Tyrrell began to emphasize the need to put US history in the context of world history and of global developments. Tyrell's 1991 article in the *American Historical Review*, "Transnational History," was among the first to use the phrase. The concept was still too underdeveloped to gain immediate currency, and it had to compete with "world history" and "global history" to find acceptance among scholars, teachers, and educated readers. Nevertheless, a transnational moment had arrived in the historical literature.[100] Scholars were willing to take note of the developing transnational consciousness and to seek to reconceptualize the study of the past.

How does one explain the gap between the reality—namely, the steady globalization of the world—and its scholarly perception? Quite clearly the study of history had lagged behind history. For instance, when a group of historians from Europe, the United States, and Japan met in 1983 to review the tumultuous events of the twentieth century up to that point, hardly anyone used the word

globalization, but when the same group of scholars, with the addition of others, met ten years later, virtually every participant used that term and referred to various "global" themes in their understanding of the recent past.[101] It would be too easy to say that this gap was due to the fact that until the early 1990s the overwhelming attention of historians as well as the public had been paid to the vicissitudes in the Cold War. The decade of the 1980s did indeed witness dramatic turns of events in the geopolitical arena, starting with what some called the "second Cold War" in the wake of the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan and the Reagan administration's response of dramatically increasing the US nuclear arsenal, which led to the summit conferences between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet leader. Gorbachev's domestic reforms under the principles of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (reconstruction), in the meantime, steadily undermined the stability and cohesiveness of the Soviet Bloc, which eventually led to political upheavals in Eastern Europe that brought about the fall of the Berlin Wall. All these breathtaking changes took place during the 1980s and were at first interpreted within the framework of the history of the Cold War. That story line has its own validity, but it conceals a great deal of transnational developments that were occurring simultaneously. The fall of the Berlin Wall, for instance, was preceded by the fall of the dollar following the Plaza Accord of 1985. That and many other developments in the transnational economic area may not have directly led to the ending of the Cold War, but this latter phenomenon should be understood in the context of the global transformations that were occurring in all fronts simultaneously, as will be discussed in the next section.

Historians as well as other observers of the contemporary scene were very slow to recognize these parallel themes because of their overriding commitment to, or habit of, viewing world affairs in the framework of the Cold War—or more broadly, comprehending history in geopolitical terms, which betrayed their nation-focused perspective. They missed the growth of transnational consciousness and focused on the US-USSR geopolitical relationship. It is true that an increasing number of observers became fascinated with the democratization movements in various parts of the world. Starting in the mid-1970s, waves of political liberalization spread from Greece, Portugal, and Spain to Argentina, the Philippines, South Korea, South Africa, Eastern Europe, China, and elsewhere. But these phenomena were initially understood as national developments, pro-

High school and university students demonstrating near Tiananmen Square in Beijing to support the pro-democracy protest, May 1989. The event was televised throughout the world and was seen as part of the global movement for democracy. Although this demonstration was brutally suppressed, reform movements have continued in various forms in China. (AFP/Getty Images)

duced by specific domestic circumstances, or else they were seen as by-products of the easing of great power tensions that reached a climax at the end of the 1980s. But it should have been obvious even then that the waves of pro-democracy movements were reflecting a shared concern across the globe with the well-being of all people. It was no accident that the protesters in Tiananmen Square in Beijing in the spring of 1989 built a replica of New York's Statue of Liberty as a universal symbol for the search for freedom. That the protest was brutally suppressed was a Chinese national affair, but its memory was transnational and never went away, so that the "Tiananmen moment" came to mean a betrayal of people's aspirations anywhere in the world.

Transnational Contributions to the Ending of the Cold War

The dramatic ending of the Cold War at the end of the 1980s is usually attributed to geopolitical factors, in particular to the superiority of US military, economic, and technological power. The prevailing narrative postulates a teleology in which the bipolar struggle for power ended in one side's victory because it had greater military and economic power as well as intellectual and cultural resources—what Joseph Nye called "soft power"—which it used effectively against an opponent who may have had huge stockpiles of arms but not much else to counter that superiority.[102] If such a one-sided power equation was all there was to the Cold War, however, it would not have lasted as long as it did. We must remember that the Soviet Union as well as other socialist countries, including the People's Republic of China, had wielded as much influence as they did in the world because they appealed to anticapitalist and anti-Western opinion in various parts of the world, giving the impression that they, the socialist societies, were the wave of the future. It was the challenge posed to the ideological as well as the military underpinnings of the Cold War that contributed to undermining and altering the geopolitical map of the globe. The challenge was fundamentally transnational, ranging from global movements for human rights and for world peace to Islamic fundamentalism opposed both to the Soviet Union and to the West. The Cold War's end contained all such elements, and to single out the geopolitical "realities" would be fundamentally tautological. That is to say, if the Cold War is seen to have been defined by such "realities," to assert that it ended when the "realities" changed is merely stating the obvious. It would be more helpful to note that the arena in which the geopolitical game was played had been significantly transformed so that the game had steadily altered its character. While the nuclear-armed states remained, and while international relations and national rivalries continued to move with their own momentum on one level, transnational forces were steadily intruding upon their spaces.

Transnational contributions to ending the Cold War took many forms, but at bottom was the growth of non-state, non-national actors. NGOs and multinational business enterprises had spectacularly increased in number during the 1970s,

and in the subsequent decade they continued to help promote a sense of global community. Some NGOs specifically aimed at resisting nuclear armament and strategy on the part of the superpowers, especially the introduction of medium-range missiles on European soil. The Catholic Church actively participated in the global call for reduction of tensions, and it joined other international NGOs in organizing protest marches and rallies in Europe, South America, and Asia. There was an atmosphere of transnational solidarity that even began to attract participation by some from the Soviet Bloc. In the meantime, multinational enterprises did their part in the process as well by expanding their business activities in Soviet-Bloc countries and in China. Although of modest scale, such activities created opportunities for contact between Western (and Japanese) businesspeople and their counterparts in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China. Soviet and Chinese leaders, exemplified by Gorbachev and Deng, understood that some personal engagement with capitalists from abroad was a necessary and inevitable aspect of their countries' economic modernization programs. The awareness of the growing business ties must have contributed to generating a sense of community driven by shared interests across what was left of the Cold War divide.

Another transnational factor in the drama of the 1980s was environmentalism. To recapitulate briefly, although the movement for protecting the planet from pollution and waste had begun to gather momentum in the 1970s, during the 1980s there was as yet little to show for it. The most graphic manifestation of this was in the Earth's temperature. It had arisen from the average of 56.5°F (13.6°C) during the first decade of the twentieth century to 57.0°F (13.9°C) seven decades later, but in the 1980s it rose at a more rapid tempo, to 57.4°F (14.1°C), indicating an alarming impact of the "greenhouse effect" caused by carbon dioxide and other gases that trap heat in the atmosphere. In 1980 the world emitted a total of 18,333 million metric tons of carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels such as coal, oil, and natural gas, and by 1990 the amount had risen to 21,426 million.[103] The United States and the Soviet Union were the largest emitters of carbon dioxide, together accounting for 42 percent of the world's total in 1980 and 41 percent in 1990. China added another 8 percent in 1980 and 11 percent in 1990, so that these three large countries were significantly contributing to what came to be known as "global warming."

It would be far-fetched, of course, to argue that the increasingly serious greenhouse effect undermined and ultimately ended the Cold War. It is clear, nevertheless, that within the Soviet bloc no less than in the West, concern with the environment was growing, as was the realization that such concern was shared transnationally. Nowhere was this more dramatically demonstrated than in the horrendous nuclear seepage that took place in a nuclear power plant located in Chernobyl, Ukraine, in 1986. On April 26, reactor number 4 of the facility exploded, and the resulting fire spread contamination into the atmosphere, which winds distributed far and wide. It was a transnational tragedy as the nuclear gases spread beyond the Soviet borders. The elevated and potentially harmful fallout reached Western Europe and as far away as Greenland. (Even as late as 2011, it was reported that sheep-grazing pastures in Wales still recorded low levels of radioactivity.[104]) This was a civilian, not a military, disaster, but its impact was all the greater because the radiation released has been estimated to have been of far greater intensity than that produced by the atomic bombs dropped on two Japanese cities in August 1945, and because it caused the deaths of scores of people and the evacuation of the city's residents, many of whom have not returned there even today. In the United States, many had been traumatized by the depiction of nuclear fallout in the movie *The China Syndrome*, which together with the Chernobyl crisis and the less severe seepage in 1979 at a nuclear factory in Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania, served to confirm the transnational belief that environmental disasters knew no national boundaries. Gorbachev clearly understood this, and he turned to other countries for assistance in clearing up the debris from the Ukrainian nuclear plant. In such circumstances, maintaining a posture of confrontation with the United States and its allies must have seemed to make no sense. The Cold War, whatever meaning it had ever had, lost significance when the nuclear adversaries both contributed to, and suffered from, environmental disasters and global warming.

Human rights were another transnational issue that connected countries on both sides of the Iron Curtain. As Sarah Snyder details in her book *Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War*, since the 1975 Helsinki Accords, which included a provision about human rights, Western activists had been stepping up their efforts to contact similar groups, many of them clandestine, in the

Barbed wire surrounds the deserted town of Prypyat, Ukraine, adjacent to the Chernobyl nuclear plant, May 2003. An accident at the plant caused radioactive material to spread all over Ukraine and many parts of Europe, triggering a worldwide questioning of the wisdom of producing more nuclear energy. (AFP/Getty Images)

socialist countries in order to protect victims of political persecution.[105] Due in part to such efforts, Eastern Europeans increasingly became bolder in challenging their leaders. At first quite modest, steps toward democratization were nevertheless real. In Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, and other countries—even in Romania, which still had a particularly brutal regime—citizens organized themselves in opposition to those in power, and unlike earlier this time the Soviet leadership, under Gorbachev, did not send in tanks and troops to suppress them. After all, the Soviet Union itself was promoting the spirit of "openness." The result was that toward the end of the decade, one communist regime after another fell, and the borders between Eastern and Western Europe were opened up. Particularly dramatic was the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989—a fitting climax to the drama of democratization in Eastern Europe. While this event is often seen in the context of the ending of the Cold War, it would be more fitting to consider it a chapter in the history of human

rights. It was democratization that, added to environmental and other transnational factors, led to the end of the Cold War, and not the other way around. Moreover, it would be too simplistic to assert that Eastern European democratization was a victory for the United States in the geopolitical contest. Human rights had been promoted by many people all over the world who had constructed non-state networks of activism, and the significance of this phenomenon went far beyond the ups and downs of international affairs. Rather, the story belongs in transnational history, and in that sense what happened in the 1980s demonstrated that conventional international relations were making way for transnational relations. What a study like Snyder's shows is that there exist several parallel histories: history of geopolitical affairs, history of human rights, history of environmental disasters and efforts to cope with them, and many others. What the 1970s and the 1980s showed was that human rights, perhaps for the first time in history, asserted its primacy and eclipsed other narratives. That, too, is an important theme in the making of a transnational world.

Transnational Nationalism?

Ironically, just as transnational waves were sweeping through the world, traditional forces of nationalism also appeared to be reviving. Nowhere was this phenomenon more striking than in Eastern and Southeastern Europe, where renewed assertions of national identity frequently led to calls for independent nationhood. During the 1980s, it took the form of Eastern European countries' assertion of greater independence from Soviet control, but in the aftermath of the Cold War, it became an even more extensive phenomenon, with various components of the USSR breaking away from Moscow and, with or without the latter's connivance, establishing (or, in most cases, reestablishing) autonomous nations, such as Lithuania, Estonia, Georgia, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Their separation heralded what would be the final demise of the USSR in 1991. Henceforth, Russia, too, would become a nation among nations, although even within the now smaller country there would be components seeking to achieve their own independence. The Islamic republic of Chechnya was the most notable example, where separatist rebels sought independence from the rest of Russia in 1994 and fought against Russian troops for a number of years, the Russian military

in the process laying to waste the capital city of Grozny. The Chechen-Russian confrontation would continue into the new century.

In the rest of Eastern Europe, Czechoslovakia broke into two, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, but the most extreme case was in the Balkans, where Yugoslavia, which had been created in the aftermath of the First World War and consisted of regions with separate identities and religions, divided into a number of states after the 1980 death of Josip Broz Tito, who had presided over Yugoslavia after the Second World War. Like the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia disappeared from the world map. The Balkans now consisted of the older countries Albania, Bulgaria, and Greece, plus Macedonia, Serbia-Montenegro (whose two constituting republics would be separated in 2006), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, and Kosovo. These were all very small countries, but each had its own distinctive history, religion, and ethnic identity. Inevitably there were problems in determining the precise boundaries and the ethnic composition of the new states. Serious fighting took place, for instance, between Serbia-Montenegro and Croatia. The worst crisis in this regard occurred in Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in 1992, when Serb militants in the city's surrounding hills declared themselves a "Serb republic" and attacked and laid siege to Sarajevo. The siege lasted until NATO aircraft bombed the Serb positions in 1995. In this and other instances, intense fighting among Serbs, Muslims, Croats, and others often led to "ethnic cleansing," as separate ethnic groups fought against one another with intense bitterness.

Elsewhere, too, ethnic nationalism intensified toward the end of the century. The African continent was scourged throughout the 1990s by a series of brutal conflicts. In Somalia, civil war broke out in 1991 between the central state and separatists in the northwest region. Sierra Leone was plagued with fighting to control the country's diamond mining region, recruitment of child soldiers, rape, amputations of limbs, and other cruelties. Central Africa, especially the mineral-rich areas of the Democratic Republic of Congo, was the site of what some have called Africa's "great wars." The fighting involved eight African states, involving dozens of militia groups, and killed at its peak an estimated one thousand people per day. As in West Africa, the Congo wars were characterized by mass rape, child soldiers, and massacres. In Rwanda, Tutsi and Hutu, the two principal ethnic

Protesters in London wave Serbian flags during a demonstration against NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia, April 1999, an instance of ethnic nationalism in conflict with an international police force. (Getty Images)

communities, engaged in fierce fighting, and the 1994 attack by Hutus against Tutsis was considered genocide.

In South Asia, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, Christians, and other religious groups periodically asserted power over the others, and in Sri Lanka, the Tamils, the island's Hindu minority who had opposed the rule by the Buddhist majority, rose in open revolt in 1983 and continued their struggle despite mediation efforts by the neighboring India.

Western European countries and even Canada were also roiled by waves of separatism. Most of these challenges to dominant national regimes were peaceful, but in Northern Ireland the Irish Republican Army periodically engaged in terrorist attacks on Protestants citizens, and the latter responded in kind, until a peace accord was concluded in 1998. In Spain the separatist Basque militants continued to agitate for independence, resorting to bombing raids through the first years of the new century.[106]

How do we interpret such occurrences? Clearly they indicated the depth of ethnic nationalism that went back to the nineteenth century and even earlier. Long suppressed while the Cold War rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States had privileged the status quo over the aspirations of ethnic groups, such groups now felt released from any such constraint and sought to establish new nations to reflect their separate identities. It should be noted, however, that ethnic self-consciousness did not translate into an assertion of separate nationhood in most countries of the world, which after all were mostly multiethnic entities. Russia, even after the Soviet Union was broken up, continued to contain nearly two hundred nationality groups, while the People's Republic of China consisted of some fifty-five ethnicities, of whom nearly 10 percent were non-Chinese. In the United States, virtually all the races and religions of the world were represented. In the last decades of the century, non-African racial groups in the United States, particularly Latinos and Asians, grew rapidly in number, but there was no indication that any of the racial, religious, and other ethnically identifiable groups were seeking to create a separate nation. The United States was perhaps the best example where overall national consciousness had developed to such an extent that the nation's breaking up into fragments along ethnic lines would be unimaginable. Such was also the case with most other "established" countries, where, with the exception of a few like Spain, ethnic self-consciousness

did not threaten the integrity of nationhood, at least in the last decades of the twentieth century.

Even in some of these countries, however, ethnic minorities were never free from a sense of national (or, perhaps more correctly, subnational) identity and did not integrate entirely into the larger community. The Turks in Germany, the Algerians in France, and the Pakistanis in Britain often chose to emphasize their ethnicity over assimilation into the larger national community.[107] Tibetans, Uighurs, Koreans, and other minorities in China remained cohesive and did not identify with the Han (Chinese) majority. These phenomena in turn provoked nationalistic responses from the majority populations, who sometimes organized themselves into ultranationalistic movements. If the second half of the twentieth century was the age of transnationalism, it also seemed to enhance nationalism, of both minority and majority groups. Perhaps the best way to understand these dual phenomena, transnationalism and nationalism, would be to view them as existing simultaneously at different levels or layers, inhabiting separate but not exclusive spaces. It was not so much that transnationalism and nationalism were competing for influence, but rather that they were simultaneous forces. For one thing, nationalism was becoming a transnational phenomenon. Along with everything else, nationalism was one kind of global development. Moreover, unlike the earlier "age of nationalism" that begot world wars and local wars, this time many of the nationalistic forces were oriented domestically, seeking their own separate identities and sometimes their own communities and even daring to break away from an established state. Nationalistic rivalries of the traditional sort remained, involving territorial, trade, and other disputes, but these international dramas were played out even while global forces were shaping another layer of transnational connections. Nationalism, in other words, was just like other "local" identities that grew hand in hand with forces of globalization. In that sense, there was no inherent contradiction or irreconcilable opposition between nationalism and transnationalism.

Not so much nationalism as mono-nationalism may be taken as having been a more serious challenge to transnationalism. Mono-nationalism in the sense of exclusionary loyalty to one's nation and of resistance to considering items beyond borders—be they goods, ideas, or individuals—was incompatible with transnationalism, and it was becoming rather rare. Even so, mono-nationalism

sometimes made its appearance as if to revalidate the nation's sense of being. This can best be seen in historical memory. As suggested in the introductory section, how a nation remembers its past had always been central to its identity, but in a transnational age collective memories across borders could in theory have emerged so that ultimately they would become a shared memory of the whole of humankind. That was a development that was becoming discernible in Europe, as the next section will discuss, but more notable at the end of the century were competing memories that reinforced the mono-nationalism of many countries. China and Japan, for example, clashed over official memories of their modern wars, in particular Japan's invasion of China in the 1930s. Japanese history textbooks, written by nongovernmental writers but subject to official approval before course adoption, began to attract the attention of Chinese as well as Koreans and other Asians in the 1980s and beyond, who blamed the authorities in Tokyo for encouraging a revisionist teaching of the recent past, whitewashing the aggression and atrocities committed by Japan's military forces. Some in Japan, for their part, blamed their critics for distorting the record by publishing their own official histories, which, they said, exaggerated casualty figures and other aspects of the conflict. Japanese nationalists viewed the Asian-Pacific war as having been waged to "liberate" Asia, whereas Chinese nationalists, joined by those from Korea, the Philippines, and elsewhere, asserted that Japan's imperialism had been even worse than that of the European powers.[108] The history of the Second World War also engulfed the United States and Japan in controversy over the Smithsonian Institution's plans in the mid-1990s for an exhibition of the *Enola Gay* at the National Air and Space Museum in Washington. That was the aircraft that dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima in 1945, and the initial design of the exhibit had been to pay as much attention to the destruction caused by the atomic bombing as to the development of the new weapon. But the plans had to be drastically modified so as to present the nuclear attack as having been a completely justifiable means for bringing the war in the Pacific to an end without further casualties.[109] Japanese remembered Hiroshima in a sharply contrasting way, as an unjustifiably inhuman way to destroy a populace, and there could be no easy resolution of the two conflicting memories, indicating that even between allies, transnationalization of historical memory was no easy task. When it came to a nation's

history, mono-nationalism seemed to trump transnationalism. It was as if the more transnational connections across borders grew, the stronger also became a sense of history and memory as constituting individual and group identities.

Transnational Regions

If there was to be a way to reconcile transnational and national layers of consciousness, the European example suggested that the construction of a regional community might be a possible solution. Nationalism and transnationalism—local and global forces—could perhaps be mediated through regional communities. As best exemplified by the European Community, which became the European Union in 1994, various nationalisms could be placed together in a regional framework in which all members would share certain policies, even a common currency. The story of the Union belongs in national and international history, but its transnational implications are obvious. Regarding such cross-border issues as migration, water resources, and environmental protection, the regional community would develop common approaches. By abolishing borders within the Union, citizens of all member states would be free to move across national boundaries, and foreigners would also be able to visit all countries within the regional community once they had been admitted into one of them. The Europeans were particularly concerned with their water resources. There are no arid areas within the European Union, but it is imperative to preserve its rivers and lakes in order to provide sufficient water for industrial, agricultural, and consumer needs. Since the 1960s the member states have cooperated in developing a strategy for controlling water usage.[110] The European states also worked together to protect the natural environment, defining a common approach to reduce carbon emissions and prevent deforestation.

Nowhere was transnational pan-European consciousness more graphically demonstrated than in the founding of the European University Institute in Fiesole, outside Florence, in 1976. There was clear awareness among the institution's founders—who came from all parts of Europe—that no regional community would be enduring without some shared intellectual and cultural experiences, and this would particularly be the case in education. Traditionally education

had been a very national undertaking, as each country sought to create a future citizenship that would be cohesive, literate, and ready to serve its needs. As a consequence, not only primary schools but also institutions of higher learning had tended to be organized nationally. The new European leaders understood the imperative necessity to go beyond such a narrow focus, and, although they would still support national centers of pedagogical and academic excellence, they would also be willing to share their resources for bringing university-level students from all over Europe, and some even from the United States and other countries, to expose them to a more transnational environment of scholarship and research. Initially consisting primarily of programs in economics, law, history, and civilization, and in the political and social sciences, the European University Institute demonstrated Europeans' commitment to shared knowledge and to intra-European cultural exchange. Such a commitment was confirmed by the establishment in 1987 of the European Region Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students, or the Erasmus Program, which enabled students to take classes across national boundaries, and by the Bologna Process of 1999, which established equivalency standards among higher education institutions within the European Higher Education Area. Although it is too early to evaluate the success of such programs, it would not be an exaggeration to say that in some such fashion, transnational lives were being created.

These moves within Europe paralleled the growth of regional communities elsewhere. Although far less systematically or thoroughly developed, the initial steps toward transnational communities were also taken by such transnational entities as the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), bringing Canada, the United States, and Mexico together; the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA); and the Central American Common Market. Unlike Europe, however, it was not easy to go much beyond economic cooperation in bringing neighboring nations together. NAFTA, for instance, sought to establish common policies toward environmental and labor issues, but the three constituting members did not always see eye to eye on these matters. There was as yet no counterpart to the European University Institute. The key reason for this was that the United States continued to attract students from all over the world and was, in a sense, developing a transnational educational environment on its soil. Under the circumstances, less pressure may have been felt for establishing a specifically

North or South American oriented international university. (On the other hand, US and Canadian institutions of higher learning regularly exchanged faculty and students as a matter of course. The two countries' geographical proximity and shared language facilitated such transnationalism.)

Of fundamental importance in the successful launching of the European Union was the development of what some historians call "a community of shared memory."[111] In other words, Europeans had developed a common understanding of their past interactions. Some of the past events had been painful: wars, genocide, intolerance, and the like. At the same time, they shared more constructive pasts: the development of modern science, the Enlightenment, great works of art, literature, and music. European history had to be understood transnationally as having been a mixed record of tragedies and accomplishments, of evil and good deeds. They all took part in these divergent strands, but they were heirs to this often contradictory, both glorious and ignominious, past. The important thing was that they remembered the manifold shapes of the past as their common heritage. In the New World, however, Americans, Canadians, Mexicans, and South Americans had not arrived at a stage where such sharing of the past had become possible. At least between the people of the United States and Canada, there was a legacy of the common language and literary tradition; they could even be said to have a sense, however vague, that they belonged to the same past. (Broadway plays and musicals were brought to Canadian theaters as a matter of course, and audiences did not view them as alien or unfamiliar when they portrayed scenes from the American past.) Between these two peoples and the Mexicans, on the other hand, there was little such common consciousness, as exemplified by the fact that the war of 1846–1848, after which the United States acquired Texas, the Southwest, and California from Mexico, continued to be viewed in sharply divergent ways on opposite sides of the Rio Grande. On the other hand, in the last decades of the century, the regions bordering on the two countries began to develop a self-consciousness as a border community, part of the phenomenon that historians began to call "border history" that included many other regions of the world. In time, a new perspective might become more widespread, giving rise to the awareness that the world consisted as much of borderlands as of territorially marked national communities. This, too, was an instance of a developing transnational identity.

It is also pertinent to note that, because the American continent bordered both on the Atlantic and the Pacific, there was a dual sense of regional identity. Of the two, the idea of an Atlantic community of nations had long existed. Together, the United States and Canada had long defined themselves as part of a wider Atlantic, consisting of the legacy of Western civilization as well as geopolitical arrangements such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The idea of a Pacific community was much slower to develop, but as Walter McDougall was already pointing out in a 1993 book, *Let the Sea Make a Noise*, countries and people of the north Pacific—ranging from Chinese and Russians to Hawaiians, Canadians, and Americans—had been interacting with one another for a long time.[112] As if to take a cue from such a perspective, historians in Australia, Canada, the United States, and elsewhere were beginning to conceptualize a Pacific community whose scale would be even grander than its Atlantic counterpart. However, no blueprint yet existed for a comprehensive Pacific community comparable to the European Union.

For that to develop, Asian countries would first have to establish their regional identities. But the situation in Asia continued to be complex. Several countries of Southeast Asia had already, in the late 1960s, created their own regional community, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which had begun to promote not only economic but also political interdependence among its members. Economically, they suffered a serious financial crisis in the late 1990s as Thailand and some other nations experienced a sudden shortage of foreign exchange, a crisis that had grown out of their increasing consumption of foreign goods. With a sharp increase in these countries' trade deficits, the value of their currencies fell. The worst possible development, like the global exchange crisis of the early 1930s, was averted by a timely intervention by the IMF, which provided temporary relief measures in return for these countries' pledges to reformulate their economic policies. But the experience showed that a regional community that focused almost exclusively on economic cooperation was insufficient. From around that time, ASEAN began to negotiate trade agreements with nonmembers such as China, South Korea, Japan, and the European Union, looking toward a more global engagement. Such undertakings were still within the traditional framework of international relations, but there also grew environmental and cultural regional consciousness transcending national boundaries, an identity

that reflected a self-consciousness of the region's position vis-à-vis China in the north and Australia and New Zealand in the south. Leaders and the public in the region were making an attempt to develop a transnational identity that would enable them to define a common perspective on such issues as human rights and environmentalism. For instance, the seas surrounding the Southeast Asian countries were particularly rich in reefs, containing about one-third of the world's total. But it was reported in 1990 that virtually all these reefs were in danger of extinction because of pollution, and ASEAN provided a framework for transnational cooperation to cope with the critical situation.

However modest, the Southeast Asian countries' regional initiatives were far ahead of any development in East Asia. Consisting primarily of China (including Taiwan), South and North Korea, and Japan, the region remained divided not only because of the uncertain relationship between mainland China and the island of Taiwan, and between the two Koreas, but also because no shared memory comparable to that in Europe had emerged there. Koreans still resented the Japanese invasion of the peninsular kingdom toward the end of the fifteenth century and the rule by Imperial Japan during the first decades of the twentieth, while the Chinese retained bitter memories of their war against Japan. Unlike Europe, which had somehow managed to accommodate wartime German atrocities into a collective memory, in East Asia the Koreans, the Chinese, and the Japanese held on to their separate memories, nationalizing rather than transnationalizing history. North and South Koreans, for their part, dealt with their recent past, notably the Korean War, in sharply contrasting ways. Those in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea attributed the war's origins to South Korea's invasion in collusion with US imperialists, whereas in the Republic of Korea the conflict was remembered as a national tragedy perpetrated by the communist regime to the north that not only initiated the attack in 1950 but also retained a large number of people who were denied a chance to return to their homes in the south. Under these circumstances, it was very difficult to promote a sense of regional (or even of Korean national) identity.

Nevertheless, at least among China, South Korea, and Japan, there slowly developed a consciousness of shared regional concerns and destiny. This was most evident in their economic relations. Japan, the world's third largest trading nation during the 1980s and the 1990s (after the United States and Germany),

increased its exports to China from $5 billion in 1980 to $30 billion twenty years later, and its imports from China from $4 billion to $55 billion in the same period. The United States still remained Japan's principal trading partner, but China was fast catching up. The "newly industrialized countries" of Asia, namely South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, accounted for 8.9 percent of Japan's total export trade and 18.4 percent of its imports in 2000. East Asia on the whole was emerging as a major and rapidly expanding regional market; intraregional trade among East Asian countries as a percentage of their total world trade grew from 35.6 percent in 1980 to 46.8 percent twenty years later. These figures were still lower than those for the European Union or for NAFTA, which reached 73.1 percent and 55.7 percent, respectively, in 2000, but far higher than for ASEAN, whose members traded among themselves for only a quarter of their total trade. There was also much intraregional investment. A steadily increasing number of Japanese firms began to be established in China, where the number of business personnel and factory representatives from Japan jumped from 63,000 in 1990 to 567,000 ten years later. (The comparable figures for Japanese working temporarily in the United States were 479,000 and 661,000, respectively.) Conversely, more and more Chinese visited Japan; some stayed and added to the non-Japanese Asian population in the country, which numbered roughly one million at the end of the century.

There was also a deepening level of popular and elite exchanges among Chinese, South Koreans, and Japanese. Movies made in South Korea gained popularity in Japan, and Japanese television dramas were shown on Chinese television. Historians from the three countries began their initially modest attempts at studying the past together, in the process stressing the importance of transnational regional history. In other words, rather than studying the past in the framework of respective national histories, they explored the region's past as a whole, tracing the three countries' economic, social, and cultural interdependence. It remained to be seen if there would in time emerge an intellectually coherent idea of East Asian regional history, comparable to European history. There was little doubt, though, that the efforts by scholars, journalists, and others to undertake the task jointly were creating transnational moments and spaces that went beyond official relations.

The American Century as a Transnational Century

Toward the end of the twentieth century, especially after the end of the Cold War, many spoke of the United States as the sole superpower, as the new hegemon, or as an empire. All such expressions revealed a habit of mind that continued to see the world as fundamentally defined by sovereign states that maintained some order through their military and economic power. In the age of globalization and transnationalization, however, such traditional measurements of influence were no longer adequate. A nation would be a "winner" only to the extent that it reflected and reinforced global trends and furthered the networking of people and communities. It was perhaps because this key fact was recognized that many recalled Henry Luce's 1941 editorial in *Life* magazine on the "American Century," or that Francis Fukuyama's 2002 book, *The End of History*, gained so much popularity. A group of conservatives in the United States even began a movement called "For a New American Century." That, however, was a mono-nationalistic take on a fundamentally transnational phenomenon, for the writings by Luce, Fukuyama, and others emphasized not so much US geopolitical power as its "soft power," another term that gained currency after Joseph Nye used it in a 1990 book, *Bound to Lead*, pointing to the nation's technology, ideas, and sheer example as the keys to its global influence. And there was little doubt that at the end of the century the United States stood as the embodiment of the ideas and ideals that had transformed the world. That was what Fukuyama meant by the "end of history"—namely, that Enlightenment ideas such as democracy and freedom exemplified by the American example seemed to have been universally embraced so that history had in a sense been fulfilled.

Such optimism was, and has since been, severely criticized, but Nye, Fukuyama, and others were undoubtedly correct to link the destiny of the United States with the modern global transformation. What they could also have stressed is that this transformation had fundamentally entailed transnationalization, so that in contributing to it, the United States, too, had been changed. It had become increasingly more interconnected with the rest of the world, with the result that it was now less unique and shared many traits and phenomena with other countries. In that sense the American century had made the United States less "American" and more interchangeable with others. One could see such a

process, Americanization of the globe and the globalization of America, occurring simultaneously, in population movements, technological developments, and many other areas.

For instance, international tourism was now becoming more and more transnational. Whereas earlier Americans, and then Europeans after they recovered from the war, had dominated the tourist scene, their numbers were being steadily augmented by travelers from other parts of the world. The overall number of international tourists increased from 278 million in 1980 to 687 million in 2000. These figures correspond to roughly one out of fifteen people in the world in 1980, and one out of nine in 2000. (The same individual may be counted more than once in such statistics, because, as we saw earlier, the statistics are compiled by the host countries independently of one another. Still, the trend is unmistakable.) What is equally interesting is the growing diversity both of the national origins of the tourists and of their destinations. In the last two decades of the century, middle-class Japanese and wealthy Arab tourists, and eventually Koreans and Chinese, joined American and European travelers, so that foreign traveling became a truly transnational phenomenon. Stores in New York, London, Paris, and other Western cities began to post signs in Japanese and other non-Western languages and hired native speakers of non-Western languages to cater to the new visitors. Equally significant, international tourists increasingly began visiting areas outside of Western Europe or the American continent. In 1980, for instance, about 23 million travelers visited Asia and the Pacific, accounting for less than 9 percent of the total number of tourists, the remainder visiting mostly Europe and North America. Twenty years later, however, 110 million people visited the Asia-Pacific region, another 28 million went to Africa, and 23 million went to the Middle East. Together, these areas hosted about a quarter of the world's tourists.[113]

The expansion of international tourism was reflected in the phenomenal growth of the money spent by the travelers all over the world. Tourism receipts grew from $104 billion in 1980, to $264 billion ten years later, to $475 billion by 2000.[114] These figures average out to nearly $700 per traveler in 2000—not including the cost of airfare and other transportation. Most long-distance travel was by plane, and the rising price of gasoline made air travel more expensive. Nevertheless, the tourist figures suggest that increasing numbers of people felt they could afford to undertake such trips, perhaps by joining tour groups and

also by staying at less expensive lodgings. Although few people in the developing countries were earning sufficient income to enable them to undertake even the cheapest of foreign travels, international tourism was nevertheless becoming affordable for the majority in the advanced and advancing economies. And although Europe and America took the lion's share of tourism receipts, for countries of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, the billions of dollars spent by visiting tourists were a growing portion of their national revenues.

That roughly one out of nine people in the world in the year 2000 was crossing borders every year as a tourist and spending so much money abroad was an important aspect of the transnationalization, and of the Americanization, of the world. But international tourism was also a major contributor to the growing global environmental crisis. Many travelers crowded big cities and provincial towns, putting pressure on water resources, polluting skies and lakes, damaging trees, even killing endangered species. African safaris, for instance, became so popular that already in the 1980s voices began to be heard, warning of the danger to the survival of elephants, lions, and other animals. The concern with protecting the natural habitat and preserving endangered species developed in tandem with the growth of international tourism. That, too, was something that Americans and people from other countries came to share.

When hundreds of millions go abroad and meet people in other countries, however fleetingly, innumerable transnational moments are created, often resulting in the development of transnationally shared ideas and attitudes. Literary writers were quick to incorporate this emerging phenomenon into their work. David Lodge's *Changing Places* (1975) and *Small World* (1984) perhaps best exemplified the trend. In these and other novels, college students and university faculty were described as basically stateless, engaging in their research, teaching, and social activities in which their national identities were of much less significance than the transnational spaces they created. Readers of these best sellers immediately recognized the settings, what some sociologists were beginning to define as "non-places"—airports, tour buses, shopping centers, and the like that were interchangeable anywhere in the world—where the principal characters intermingled and spoke common languages. Although many such novels were set in academic institutions where students and faculty from many countries mingled and created their transnational communities, the description of how differ-

ent national intellectual landscapes and institutional traditions became merged, transformed, or reaffirmed could have been applied to all international visitors—and those staying home but interacting with them. It is, of course, impossible to generalize about the combined impact of such encounters, some of which were undoubtedly less friendly than others and confirmed existing prejudices and stereotypes about "foreigners." Nevertheless, it would be fair to say that through tourism the world's people were becoming more than ever conscious of human diversity as well as shared humanity. The question was whether such awareness would have a constructive consequence, such as the promotion of the spirit of tolerance, or whether it would do little to overcome traditional prejudices toward the unfamiliar. Most likely, both processes went on at the same time, as Jane Desmond's 1999 study of Waikiki tourism suggests.[115] All the same, tourism may be comprehended as yet another manifestation of one of the key phenomena in the contemporary world, the unceasing intermingling of people of diverse backgrounds and orientations.

Here, too, the United States as a nation remained more truly transnational than most others because of its tolerance for diversity. Global migrations continued unabated in the last two decades of the century, but migrating into the United States, whether as legal or illegal immigrants, on business, or for education, was a particularly striking development The percentage of the foreign-born population in the United States, which was as high as 14 percent at the beginning of the twentieth century, had been steadily declining, hitting the lowest point, or 4.7 percent, in 1970, but the trend began to reverse itself rapidly thereafter, and by the year 2000 more than one-tenth of the population consisted of those born elsewhere. By far the largest body of immigrants in the last decades of the century came from Central and South America. At the end of the century, they numbered over fourteen million, more than one-half of the entire foreign-born population in the country, followed by those from Asia, who now exceeded seven million. Europeans, who as recently as 1960 accounted for more than 50 percent of residents in the United States who had been born abroad, now fell to about 15 percent. Mexico, in particular, sent by far the largest number of people to settle north of the border. Already in 1980 there were over two million of them, or about 15.6 percent of the foreign-born population of the United States, but by 2000 the number had increased to over nine million, or close to 30 percent

of this population. There was also a sizable Cuban population, as many people from that island nation, still under Fidel Castro's socialist regime, tried all means to cross the Gulf of Mexico northward. At one point, in 1980, the Havana government allowed 120,000 Cubans to move to the United States. But their status remained unclear for several years, and many of them were detained in federal prisons.[116] In any event, the number of Mexicans and other "Latinos" was increasing so fast that there were even predictions that within another half century they would be the majority population in the nation, surpassing even European Americans. Among the latter category of newcomers, too, there were significant developments in the aftermath of the opening of the borders dividing Eastern and Western Europe. An increasing number of Eastern Europeans, especially Poles, found their new home and employment in American cities. In the meantime, immigrants from the Philippines, Vietnam, and India joined those from East Asia who had arrived earlier, swelling the ranks of Asians in the United States.

While these remarkable demographic developments inevitably provoked domestic, anti-transnationalist opposition, with many traditionalists calling for more stringent control of immigration and some even arguing for denying schooling and medical services to illegal aliens, it must be noted that these issues were also being raised in other countries, especially in Europe. The fact remains that in the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and some other countries, immigrants, whether legal or clandestine, filled the needs of aging societies. These countries all recognized the problem and sought to cope with serious labor shortages in areas such as hospitals, nursing homes, and domestic services. In any event, the sheer number of recent arrivals, as well as their employment in certain categories of jobs—nurses, janitors, gardeners, apple pickers, house cleaners, babysitters, and so on—served to make the United States an especially transnational nation in the late twentieth century. Naturalization laws automatically conferred US citizenship on babies born in the country, with the result that the younger generations of citizens were more racially heterogeneous than their elders. (According to the US Census Bureau of 1990, the last year when individuals could report only one race, 80.3 percent of the American people considered themselves "white," 12.1 percent "black," and 2.8 percent "Asian." The bulk of people of Hispanic origin reported their race as "white," but considered separately they constituted 9 percent of the total population.) Intermarriages across racial lines were probably more

common among Americans than other people—one reason why the Census Bureau allowed people to report more than one racial identity in 2000—contributing to the transnationalization of the population.[117]

Equally significant was the increasing number of foreign students in the United States. During the academic year 1977–1978 the proportion of foreign students at American colleges and universities for the first time exceeded 2 percent. By the end of the century, the ratio had reached 3.6 percent, or nearly half a million coming from abroad to study in the United States, where total university enrollment had reached fifteen million. What these figures indicate is that while more and more Americans were going to college, they were being joined by an increasing number of foreign students. Just to recall that as late as in 1959–1960 there were fewer than fifty thousand students from abroad is to become aware of the continuing attractiveness of the United States to college-age men and women from all over the world. So many of them would not have come to the United States to study if the quality of US higher education had not been recognized as being superior to that in other nations—and if job opportunities for foreign students, should they decide to stay and work in the country, had not been better. When we speak of the twentieth century as having possibly been an American century, then, we must not forget that it may have been in the area of higher education that the nation achieved undoubted supremacy. No other country could boast such a high ratio of foreign students or such a large number of foreign-born scholars, researchers, and educators.

This situation is well represented by the number of Nobel Prizes that were received by scholars in the United States, whether native or foreign-born. They had internationalized their scholarly work, turning the laboratories and classrooms into arenas for transnationally collaborative activities. Of roughly 120 Nobel Prizes in the sciences (including medicine) awarded during 1980–2000, over 70 went to the United States. Most of the rest of the laureates had spent at least part of their time in the country. Of course, many American winners of the prizes had conducted research and teaching abroad. To break down these scholars into nationality groups makes little sense, itself another indication that in the world of scholarship, border crossing had become routine. Nonetheless, the opportunities that US research institutions provided for transnational collaboration cannot be disputed. The Nobel Prize in Economics, which was established in 1969, was

also dominated by American scholars; 46 were awarded through the year 2000, of which 27 went to economists in the United States. It would be safe to assume that practically all of these laureates had trained a large number of foreign economists. Milton Friedman and other University of Chicago economists, for instance, who were among the early recipients of the prize, were known to be exponents of "monetarism," stressing the critical importance of the free circulation of money as a mechanism for providing for the well-being of society, rather than governmental regulations. Such thinking, which rejected not just socialism but also New Deal–type national planning, made an enormous impact on foreign economists and government officials, who collectively turned the decades of the 1980s and the 1990s into an era of reduced state roles in regulating social and economic affairs. The "Chicago school" was particularly influential in South America, where economists trained at the University of Chicago and elsewhere in the United States set about dismantling edifices of governmental control.

It is also noteworthy, however, that the Nobel Prize in Economics toward the end of the century (in 1998) was awarded to Amartya Sen, a scholar from India who had conducted research in Britain and the United States. In sharp contrast to Friedman, Sen emphasized political and social aspects of all economic phenomena and stressed the need for education to bring impoverished people in all countries out of their predicament. He became a powerful voice for a new cosmopolitanism that would emphasize the interconnectedness of nations and espouse universal values adapted to local conditions. It is not hard to detect the influence both of Indian tradition and of American education on his thought. In that sense he typified the interrelationship between American educational achievements and transnational scholarly developments. One might even say that economists and other scholars worldwide were trying to grapple with the phenomenon of globalization and that, while Friedman and others were arguing for removing what they viewed as political and bureaucratic obstacles standing in the way of the smooth functioning of economic forces, those who thought like Sen were becoming aware of the social and cultural dimensions of the global transformation and sought to change the course of history through active human engagement. Both cases illustrated that the still visible American century was being particularly well demonstrated by transnationalism in education and learning.

In short, the key achievement of the American century was that it had transnationalized the world to an extent never seen earlier. The 1980s and the 1990s were above all an era of a rapidly interconnecting world. People everywhere in the globe were becoming connected to one another to an extent never seen before. Not just through migration, tourism, or education, but even more fundamentally through technological developments and material culture, notably food, they were beginning to share a vast amount of mental and physical products. It may be said that transnational networks were being built on many layers, some through people, others through goods and ideas, and still others through "virtual" connections, those made possible by rapid advances in information and communications technology.

People across the globe were becoming connected, or, as many started saying, "wired." With the Internet system of communication, initially developed for military purposes in the United States, being increasingly made available for civilian use, companies and individuals took to it in droves starting in the mid-1980s. Electronic mail was another remarkable instance of American technology facilitating the establishment of transnational links. It was found to be so easy to use and so quick in making connections that it steadily became a favored means of communication among those who could afford to own a computer. And their number kept expanding. In 1995, for instance, the total population online was 16 million, or 0.4 percent of the globe. By December 2000 the number had already climbed to 361 million, or 5.8 percent of the world's population. Graphically indicative of the new technology's transnational and global character is the fact that as early as in 2000, the largest percentage of Internet users was in Asia (114 million, or 31 percent), compared to 108 million in Europe and about the same number in North America.[118]

More than a novel means of communication, the Internet in time developed as a major transmitter of information. Organizations began to create their own websites, accessible to anyone who would type in the proper address. And it was just a matter of time before a device would be developed that collected all such information and made it available to Internet users. The Google system best exemplified the new phenomenon. Established in the late 1990s by a handful of young engineers in California, it amassed an immense amount of information



Mongolians playing computer games at an Internet café in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, July 2003, an example of a globally shared personal pastime. (Getty Images)

worldwide—on stores, train and air travel schedules, cultural events, weather, and just about every subject—that would be offered free of charge to anyone connected to the Internet. All one had to do was to type in a subject or a question, and Google would provide the answer. At first only a small number of Internet users took advantage of what Google had to offer; barely 100,000 uses were made of Google per day at the end of the 1990s. But already seeds were being sown for a vast expansion of the information network in the coming century.

Such a network confirmed the supremacy of the English language, at least for the time being. Because information technology was most rapidly developed and spread in the United States, what it had to offer necessarily came in English. Computer keys, terminology, and user manuals were written in English, and non-English clients had to get accustomed to them. Email addresses and links were likewise in English. The situation did not change immediately, even after Japan, China, and other non-English-speaking countries began manufacturing computers, although



Percentage of a nation's inhabitants who use the Internet, 2011.

in the twenty-first century the number of websites written in Chinese, Spanish, Japanese, and other languages would increase. In any event, the spread of the Internet implied that the world was becoming interconnected through shared technology and information to an unprecedented degree.

The Internet was not the only way that people in different parts of the world established connections with each other. Another important technical breakthrough at the end of the century was the mobile phone, or the cell phone as it was known in the United States. Worldwide mobile phone subscribers jumped from just 11 million in 1990 to 740 million in 2000. That would mean, in the abstract, that one person out of nine used the new device, perhaps one person in seven if we exclude infants and small children. (Those between the ages of zero and fourteen accounted for about 30 percent of the world's total population in 2000.) The portable phone that one could carry in one's pocket anywhere was not simply a triumph of technology; it also implied greater mobility of people, as they no longer needed to be at home or in their workplaces to receive telephone calls. Added to email, the cell phone connected people in different parts of the globe more easily than ever before. Although some mobile phones would not work across borders, altogether international telephone calls made from traditional as well as cell phones increased from 33 billion minutes in 1990 to 118 billion minutes in 2000.[119] (It may well be that the widespread use of email and mobile phones around the globe resulted in a sharp decline in more traditional forms of correspondence. As fewer people wrote letters to foreign addresses, international postage rates skyrocketed, which may further have discouraged the practice.)

Individuals all around the world, in any event, came to know each other, vicariously if not directly. Their mutual knowledge may not have developed beyond an elementary level, but compared to their forebears, a far greater number of men and women—and even children—in virtually all parts of the globe became aware of each other's existence and shared information and their experiences. This could be seen in the spread of various kinds of cuisine all over the world. During the last decades of the twentieth century, there grew networks of "exotic" restaurants all over the world, to such an extent that in most large cities one had an enormous range of food to choose from: French, Italian, Greek, Ethiopian, Turkish, Indian, Thai, Vietnamese, Cambodian, Indonesian, Chinese, Korean, Japanese, and many others. This was in part a result of migrations; as people moved across borders, they

brought their own cuisine, which was now seen by the local population as less quaint than interesting, something they would try themselves. Ethnic diversity and culinary variety reinforced each other. At the same time, it became more common for city dwellers to dine out. Restaurants and catering businesses seem to have multiplied everywhere in the world, no doubt reflecting the fact that more and more women were now working so that they would have less time than traditionally to devote to cooking at home. The point is that besides the familiar fast food, people were willing to try nontraditional dishes at a restaurant if not at home.

One consequence of such a development was that the major cities of the world began to look more alike. Shanghai and New York imparted similar impressions to visitors, and all cities faced the problem of accommodating their growing populations. Among the advanced countries, already in 1950 about half of their people lived in cities, but by 2000 the ratio had reached 70 percent. In the rest of the world, too, the urban population increased from 25 percent in 1970 to 40 percent in 2000. The kinds of issues that urban centers in Western Europe and North America had faced a century earlier—such as crime, social order, public education, garbage collection, street cleaning—now were all global problems. What is equally significant is that, in coping with such issues, national governments were proving to be inadequate instruments, and the initiative for urban governance was reverting to the cities themselves. Mayors and officials of the world's cities periodically met with one another to share ideas and to develop common strategies. Whether living in what Saskia Sassen has called "global cities" or not, urban residents all over the world were becoming transnational beings.[120]

Nowhere was the phenomenon of transnational interconnectedness more dramatically demonstrated than in worldwide sporting competitions, such as the Olympics and the World Cup for football (soccer). The teams in both events competed in the name of their respective nations, and nationalistic emotions were unabashedly enhanced during the games. But such nationalism was also a transnational phenomenon—it was manifest all over the globe, and nevertheless it was not an exclusionary, antiforeign sentiment that traditionally had exacerbated relations among countries. In World Cup games, while the spectators tended to be segregated by nation in the stands, the franchises were becoming steadily less "national" in their composition. During the 1990s, football leagues in Europe almost completely shed their associations with regional or national entities (except

in name), and much like a prototypical transnational corporation (which they actually were), teams recruited coaching staff and players from around the globe. A glance at the winners of the FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) World Player Award in football since 1991 showed a very weak correlation between the player's nationality and the "nationality" of his team.

Seoul, Barcelona, Atlanta, Sydney—to list the cities where the summer Olympics were held between 1988 and 2000 is to name some of the fastest-growing urban centers in the world. The 1980 and the 1984 games, planned for two other large urban areas, Moscow and Los Angeles, were boycotted by some countries for geopolitical reasons, a striking example of how states overrode the aspirations of the world's athletes to come together for "a festival of peace." Even during the height of the Cold War in the 1950s and 1960s, the games had not been boycotted, so these were rather unusual developments, and in any event they did not prevent the resumption of the games after 1988. (The winter Olympics held in Lake Placid, New York, in 1980 and in Sarajevo, Yugoslavia, in 1984, were attended by athletes of all countries.) Young men and women congregated in urban centers, shared living quarters, and competed with one another, in the process further enriching their transnational experiences. Arguably the most dramatic illustration of the transnational reach of spectator sport came during the opening ceremony of the Nagano (Japan) Winter Olympics, held in early 1998. There Seiji Ozawa, the conductor, led a global chorus in singing from Beethoven's *Ninth Symphony,* the *Ode to Joy.* Groups of singers from Australia, South Africa, Europe, China, the United States, and other countries sang in real time, being coordinated via satellite television by Ozawa's baton in central Japan. It was a fitting illustration of the age of transnationalism.

Transnational Criminals

Unfortunately, not all layers of transnational activities contributed to the making of a more peaceful world. A significant number of individuals and groups, who were transnational in that they did not represent specific states but availed themselves of opportunities provided by cross-border connections, began to engage in criminal acts. International terrorists, drug smugglers, and traffickers in women and minors had always presented a serious threat to world order as well as to do-

mestic well-being, but it was especially in the last two decades of the twentieth century that such criminals came to wreak havoc upon the global community.

It is customary to view the acts of terrorism carried out by Islamic fundamentalists in those decades as having been directed against the United States and against the West in general. Thus, a suicide bomber attacked the US marine headquarters in the Beirut, Lebanon, airport in 1983, and in 1998 the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were bombed, killing more than two hundred people. These were episodes in international affairs, but they did not pit one nation against another. The terrorists did not represent, or seek to promote the interest of, any particular country but were coming together to target the United States because of its support for Israel or its overall presence in the Middle East, or else because in their view the United States exemplified modern capitalism, bourgeois decadence, secularism, materialism, and many related sins. Thus the attack upon the World Trade Center in New York in 1993, carried out by a group of Arab extremists, was viewed as an exemplification of the fundamental conflict between two ways of life, one modern Western and the other traditionalist and anti-Western. Samuel Huntington, one of the most influential writers of the 1990s, presented such a dichotomous scheme in his widely read book *The Clash of Civilizations,* published in 1996. The modern West he viewed as defined by Christian civilization, which he argued was being threatened by other civilizations, especially Islamic and Chinese. That, he argued, would be a more serious problem for the United States and its Western allies than any old-fashioned geopolitical threat. He cited the terrorist attacks by Islamic fundamentalists as evidence that civilizations, not nations, were becoming the crucial determinants of world affairs. But he was also concerned with the rise of Asia, which he saw as a potentially anti-Western development. (Ironically, in the coming struggle that he predicted for the twenty-first century between the West and "the Rest," he was hopeful that India would take the West's side, as would Russia and any other country or civilization that had a modicum of "Western" ingredient.)

Huntington and many others who understood international terrorism in such a framework were correct to note the emergence of transnational challenges to world order, but their tendency to dichotomize between "the West and the Rest" did not go much beyond traditional thought—many of their ideas had been expressed by American and European thinkers at the turn of the twentieth

century—and ignored the fact that East and West, Europeans and Asians, and different races of the world were now, at the end of the twentieth century, fast coming together, in some instances literally intermixing with one another and creating a new, hybrid, global civilization. Transnational connections and exchanges characterized that civilization, so that even the acts by the terrorists were one part of the new global drama, representing one layer of the emerging cross-border consciousness. They were not pitting one civilization against another, one nation against another, or even one religion against another. Rather, the terrorists were like alienated individuals who exist everywhere and choose to marginalize themselves from what they take to be the way things are moving. Instead of finding meaning in social and community affairs, they would seek to retain their sense of purity and to eradicate everything else that stood in the way. They were transnational beings in the sense that they did not identify with, or act on behalf of, a country, but at the same time they were trying to damage other transnational beings lest their efforts to establish bridges across the world's regions and civilizations should succeed.

The Islamic terrorists were also transnational in that few of them remained in their countries of origin. Several key terrorists came from Yemen, others from Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Middle East as well as South Asia. They went back and forth among these countries and regions, and some studied in Europe and North America. It was while spending time in the West that some of them fell under the influence of radical Islam. The reasons are not hard to guess. A sense of alienation living as guests in a country that espoused a different religion and a contrasting way of life, combined with frustrations at not being recognized as respectable members of the host community, frequently drove these foreign residents to despair and in extreme cases to hostility that seemed to justify any act of violence to express their anger. Such anger was provided with the teachings of radical Islamic theologians to generate a sense of mission ostensibly derived from a moral superiority. Such self-righteousness was fueled when would-be terrorists came together in congregations and seminaries where they were taught by those with a rigid faith in their doctrinal purity, correctness, and superiority.

Why some transnational persons embraced antisocial behavior that might (and did) provoke an opposition that could undermine the transnational resources

at their disposal—for instance, through stringent immigration restrictions or a strict surveillance of foreign banking accounts—while the majority embraced or at least chose to live on a more peaceful level of transnationalism, is one of the key questions of contemporary society. Although the idea of jihad, or "holy war," was a fundamental tenet of the Islamic faith, for most of its sects and believers it did not mean a call for collective (and violent) action against all that stood in the way. But it did imply disregarding secular authority, especially any state not based on Islam (or one of its sects), so that Islamic terrorism at one level was an assault upon a world composed of independent nations. But whereas other transnational people challenged the authority of the state by setting up non-state organizations and building bridges among them, the terrorists envisaged a world in which not only secular states but also NGOs not related to Islam would be eliminated. Such, of course, was an impossibility, and the terrorists knew they had to make use of existing institutions. Thus, the distinction between them and the vast majority of people throughout the world consisted in the terrorists' unwillingness to envisage a transnational future other than that of their own apocalyptic vision. They were criminals in the sense that they refused to share the planet with other human beings. It should be noted, at the same time, that many of the terrorists were purists in a world that was increasingly becoming hybrid, and in that sense they shared a psychological oneness with other purists, whether religious, racial, or nationalistic. They preferred doctrinaire (and unrealizable) purity in a world that was becoming more and more ambivalent, as Kenneth Weisbrode has noted.[121]

The terrorists were far from alone, however, in posing a serious threat to the integrity of the global community. Arguably even more sinister challenges to transnationalism were posed by drug smugglers, traffickers in women and children, and other criminals. Drug smuggling took advantage of the global networks of producers and consumers and thus became more successful than ever before. Although opium smoking abated significantly in the twentieth century, the consumption of other narcotic drugs increased. It would be difficult to determine whether there was now more demand for drugs because of their increasing availability, or whether the supply was a response to growing demand, which may have been related to criminal activities in many countries where the selling

of illegal drugs was a lucrative business and a source of income for crime syndicates. Globalization had something to do with the phenomenon, in that demand and supply data could be instantaneously communicated across borders and illicit transactions could take place via the Internet. There was in a sense a transnational brotherhood of drug traffickers against whom law enforcement bodies were often helpless—some in law enforcement even profited by taking bribes. The distinction between illegal and legal action was sometimes hard to make in such regions as the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and the areas adjacent to Myanmar.

Like international terrorism, drug trafficking across borders was difficult to control because it went beyond the jurisdiction of a single state and there was no nonmilitary mechanism sufficiently global in scope to control such abuses. In 1923 the international community established Interpol as a cooperative agency to coordinate policing activities across borders. Initially only a few countries were represented, but Interpol membership grew rapidly after the Second World War, with over one hundred countries participating by the end of the century.[122] But Interpol's effectiveness in controlling drug traffic varied from region to region. (In Europe, Europol was established in 1992 as the policing arm of the European Union, but there was nothing comparable in other areas of the world.) It may well be that because, unlike terrorists, drug smugglers did not espouse any violent ideology to remake the world, perhaps their presence was not considered an equally grave threat, although the problem would grow even more serious in the coming century.

Transnational humanitarian organizations that earlier in the century had been quite active in the movement to control opium traffic now were more concerned with human trafficking, especially of women and children, which grew in scale at the end of the century. (Statistics vary, but according to a UN estimate there were about one million trafficked people in 2000.[123]) Here was another aspect of the fast-globalizing world. With national borders becoming more and more porous, women were taken from Eastern Europe, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere and sent to other parts of the world to serve as "sex slaves." Even teenagers would be lured away from their homes by promises of jobs abroad, only to find themselves confined to tight spaces, with their passports taken away and forced to serve strangers as servants. There was a growing demand for services of such entrapped people, whose movement and activities were controlled by transnational



An Afghan farmer scores opium poppy buds in a field near Habibullah, Afghanistan, April 2011. Drug cultivation, consumption, and trafficking became serious transnational issues of the contemporary era. (AFP/Getty Images)

criminal syndicates that clearly violated all principles promulgated by the international community to protect human rights. It remained to be seen whether Interpol, Europol, and other police agencies as well as the regional communities and transnational organizations would in time succeed in coping with these violations of human rights.

The world at the end of the twentieth century, then, was a kaleidoscope of transnational beings, constituting layers of cross-border activities and emotions. Most of them took advantage of the new opportunities being provided by the lowering of territorial boundaries and the availability of cross-border information and communication to build a better future for themselves and for others, while a minority were a negative presence whose activities would move the world closer to violence and chaos.

What about those who never became transnational? There were, of course, many of them all over the world, some physically cut off from other countries

and societies, others choosing to isolate themselves as a matter of principle, taste, or personality, or for other reasons. Many objected to some aspects of transnationalism but not to others. For instance, the massive demonstrations against the Seattle meeting of the World Trade Organization in 1999 showed that while the demonstrators expressed their opposition to economic globalization, they were united transnationally in pursuit of what they believed would be a less avaricious world order. Such people were part of an evolving global civil society. On the other hand, there were those who remained outside the networks of transnational connections not because they were necessarily anti-transnational but because they were fundamentally mono-national beings in the sense that their primary and overwhelming identity was with their respective countries and they saw no need to change. Even though they might run into foreigners in their midst, enjoy an occasional tasting of exotic food, or even set foot abroad, they would always think in mono-national terms. Their well-being, their education, and their life objectives all were bound up with the power, prestige, and interests of their own country. Probably the bulk of humanity combined transnational experiences with national perspectives. Only a minority may have considered themselves transnational individuals leading "transnational lives," to use a term some historians have begun to use.[124] Put another way, national sentiments and nationalistic attitudes did not disappear even as the world was coming to consist of transnational connections. Layers of transnational consciousness had been added to the traditional national consciousness. How these various layers would be transformed, amalgamated, augmented, or instead violently collide against one another was a question that the end of the twentieth century was bequeathing to the twenty-first.

4. *The Twenty-First Century*

THE YEARS since 2001 are part of contemporary history that began some time during the last decades of the twentieth century. That may explain why there was relatively little attempt at predicting the possible course of the twenty-first century. Compared to the last years of the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth, this time there were few confident depictions of human civilization that would usher in a world without conflict, war, or antipathy among groups of people. There was, to be sure, much concern over the transition from December 31, 1999, to January 1, 2000. Known as the Y2K problem, it involved the fact that all sorts of activities in the world, ranging from nuclear arms development to navigation, were programmed by computer but that computers might not recognize the transition to 2000 (because the number 2000 might be rendered as 100, 1900, and so forth), which might result in catastrophes. It was said that billions of dollars were spent worldwide to fight the "millennium bug." This, however, was less a prediction of the coming century than a pragmatic concern with specific technological questions—more or less in the same category were predictions about the rise of China as the new century's greatest power or of India as the most populous country. These were not particularly profound observations and may have revealed a lack of imagination on the eve of the new millennium.

Many observers assumed that globalization would continue, with all that it implied in people's lives as well as the fortunes of nations. Whether the United States would remain the sole superpower was a favorite subject that intrigued numerous observers, but such geopolitically framed questions were not particularly interesting in the age of globalization. What was more relevant was the view that the continued economic development of China, India, Brazil, and other countries could have dire environmental consequences, or that the unceasing increases in the world's population might create a new scramble for food and raw materials. Unlike a hundred years earlier, there was much less confidence that science would solve all these and many other problems. On the other hand, there

was no widely shared belief that a military collision among some great powers was inevitable, as there had been in the early years of the previous century. Instead, there was some faith that cooperation among nations would continue and that through international organizations the pressing problems of the day might become susceptible of solution. In other words, many of the ideas that had characterized the decades since the 1960s continued to provide the key framework for the new century.

The situation did not change even after the terrorist attacks on key US targets on September 11, 2001, which most people recall even today as having been the key event of the first year of the twenty-first century. On that day, several Islamic terrorists seized two airplanes departing Logan Airport in Boston for the West Coast, took over the planes' cockpits, flew to New York City, and crashed the planes into the twin towers of the World Trade Center, destroying the buildings and causing death to nearly three thousand people, mostly Americans but also including a number of foreigners. Simultaneously, a third hijacked plane, departing from Washington Dulles International Airport, flew into and partially damaged the Pentagon building outside Washington, DC, and yet a fourth flew across the state of Pennsylvania to target another city, possibly Chicago, before the passengers, having become aware of what was happening in New York, assaulted the terrorists and diverted the aircraft to the western part of the state, causing it to crash in a field in Somerset County, destroying the plane and killing all onboard. All these attacks had been planned by al-Qaeda, the terrorist group headquartered in Afghanistan under the leadership of Osama bin Laden.

This heinous, extremely tragic incident traumatized not only the American people but the rest of the world. It was a transnational crime of the kind that some may have imagined possible before it happened, but few would have been able to foresee the sense of horror that it gave rise to across the globe. All over the world, leaders and ordinary citizens—save the minority who sided with the terrorists ideologically and gloated over the humiliation suffered by the mighty United States—expressed their utter disgust with the crime and their heartfelt sympathy with the American people. The victims as well as the culprits were transnational, and so the attacks were viewed by many as a harbinger of what was to come in an increasingly interconnected world. Some of the terrorists had studied in Europe, and others had learned how to fly in the United States. The

perpetrators had exchanged messages with bin Laden, who remained in the remote mountains of Afghanistan. They had received funds from various sources channeled through legitimate bank accounts in the United States and elsewhere.

The terrorists' ideology, on the other hand, was anything but transnational in the sense of bringing people of the world closer together. Islamic fundamentalism divided all people into true believers and the rest, and the latter were considered enemies of the faith that needed to be destroyed. The ideology likewise had little tolerance for the diversity of religious interpretations within Islam itself. The West, in particular the United States, exemplified the enemy because it was materialistic, secular, and committed to the idea of global community consisting of people of all faiths. More specifically, the Islamic terrorists castigated the United States for its unflinching support of Israel and its alleged antagonism toward Islamic countries such as Iraq and Iran.

It would be wrong, however, to view the September 11 attacks as an act of war between the terrorists and the United States. That was President George W. Bush's perception, and he believed the world now consisted of supporters and opponents of terrorists against whom the nation would wage a relentless war. But how would a nation fight a "war" against a non-nation, an entity that existed apart from sovereign states? President Ronald Reagan, it is true, had already in the 1980s spoken of "war on terror," much as his predecessors had popularized notions of "war on poverty," "war on illiteracy," and the like. But traditional international law had made little provision for a nation waging war against an individual or an organization not connected to another state. (That was why the 2011 killing of Osama bin Laden by US forces, which was justified by the White House as an act of war, was not universally considered legitimate.) On the other hand, the world was witnessing increasingly ominous activities not just by terrorists but by drug smugglers, pirates, traffickers of women, and the like, so that some internationally coordinated action to deal with them was becoming a matter of urgency. The problem was how to arrange for such coordination and how to carry out such a "war."

Moreover, the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks were not waging war against a single nation. It would be more correct to say that the criminal acts were targeting the entire human community as it existed in reality and in perception. The whole idea of a transnationally connected global community would

have been repugnant to the radical Islamists, who must not have anticipated the way that community responded in shared horror and outrage, thus in a way confirming the existence of a transnational world. If the terrorists really thought that through their acts they would intimidate or undermine the emerging global community, they were totally mistaken.

Ironically, the nation-centric response to the September 11 attacks by the United States government also tended to undermine the unity of humankind. The global outpouring of sympathy and support for the American people did not prove enduring for various reasons, but one key factor was surely the way the Bush administration handled the crisis. By framing it in a traditional manner, as a surprise attack upon an unsuspecting nation—the Pearl Harbor analogy came easily to the minds of many Americans—the president led the fight to punish the offenders, much as the nation had risen in unison against the instigators of Pearl Harbor. To say, as he did, "You are for us, or you are against us," was to divide the globe into two, but "us" in this case was the United States, and the image of the whole world either engaged in war against the nation or coming to its support was extremely nation-centric and unrealistic as well as insensitive to changing world conditions.

Indeed, it may not have been so much the terrorists as the unilateralist response of the United States that threatened to undermine the emerging transnationalization in the days and months following the September 11 attacks. Whereas the event only confirmed the existence of a global community, the Bush administration's countermeasures tended to revert back to a time when one power could, or believed it could, change the world. Actually, even before 9/11, in the spring of 2001, Washington had withdrawn from the 1998 Kyoto protocol on combating climate change and refused to ratify the convention for the establishment of an international criminal court, insisting that US military personnel be exempted from any such jurisdiction. Neither did the Bush administration ratify the 1997 Ottawa treaty banning antipersonnel land mines. It had been adamant from the start that national interest considerations alone should be the basis of its foreign policy and that any restrictions on the nation's freedom of action would be resisted. These decisions were clearly out of step with worldwide trends and showed that unilateralism was already becoming a mark of the new US government when the September 11 attacks took place. The gap between the United States

and the international community had become so clear that the latter's overwhelmingly empathetic support of the American people in the aftermath of the terrorist assault could have provided an opportunity for the United States and the rest of the world to come together again. That this did not happen was a serious setback for the further growth of an interdependent, transnational world.

Some historians date the end of "the American century" to those attacks, but if they do so because the incident showed that even the mighty United States was vulnerable to transnational terrorism, they would be wrong.[125] It would be more correct to say, as noted in the preceding section, that "the American century" had been losing its meaning in an increasingly transnational world and that if the leaders in Washington now tried to bring it back, they were engaged in an anachronistic task. (A group of neoconservative leaders had organized a short-lived "project for the new American century" in 1997, calling for increases in defense spending, challenging "hostile regimes," promoting the cause of "freedom" abroad, and accepting the nation's "unique" role in keeping and extending the international order.[126] But the construction of such a "new American century" was an unrealizable dream, not because the nation was incapable of using all its military and economic resources to combat terrorism, but because the global community would not have accepted such a mono-national orientation and nation-centric definition of the world for the twenty-first century.)

There was a good deal of cooperation between Washington and other capitals, especially of the liberal democracies with sizable Muslim populations, to seek out and punish the culprits of the terrorist attacks and to prevent their recurrence. Some of these measures were readily concurred in by most other countries as well, including autocratic states and former Cold War adversaries. For instance, they cooperated with the United States in the policy of "rendition," in which terrorist suspects would be "rendered" to the CIA's secret prisons or to locations abroad where criminal suspects faced inhumane conditions and even torture. Most nations tightened border control, seeking to make it less easy for would-be terrorists to cross national boundaries. Many countries began instituting more stringent screening systems at airports, inspecting checked and carry-on luggage with greater care. At first even such items as fingernail clippers and sewing needles were confiscated; later, liquids over 3.4 ounces in quantity were banned unless they were put in checked luggage. When a small explosive was found

inside the shoe of a would-be terrorist, several countries, including the United States, made it mandatory for passengers to take off their shoes when they went through the security check. The United States, Japan, and several other countries began requiring the fingerprinting of all incoming foreigners. Because some of the September 11 culprits had studied in the United States, it became more cumbersome to enter the country with a student visa, and there was a dip in the number of foreign students arriving on American shores. (It fell from some 586,000 during the academic year 2002–2003 to 564,000 three years later.) Many who might otherwise have studied in the United States now went elsewhere, in particular to Canada, Britain, and Australia.

Initially, European allies were willing to accept the US initiative to lead a punitive attack upon Afghanistan, whose Taliban regime was considered an ally of Osama bin Laden and the terrorist organization al-Qaeda. The NATO allies invoked Article 5 of the treaty, stating that an attack on one member was an attack on all. Believing that bin Laden was living in Afghanistan, the US government demanded that the Kabul regime surrender him, and when the latter refused, Washington and London began bombing the Afghan capital and surrounding areas. The result was a quick retreat by the Taliban to the peripheral areas, in particular the mountainous border with Pakistan. The new non-Taliban regime under Hamid Karzai was established by the end of the year 2001 and was recognized by more and more countries in the following years. It remained extremely unstable, however, and civil strife and Taliban attacks never ceased. As the situation continued, international support for the US initiative in Afghanistan began to erode.

This lack of enthusiasm for US policies became particularly clear in 2003, when Washington virtually ignored world opinion in launching a military expedition against Iraq. (It has been estimated that prior to the invasion, six to ten million people worldwide demonstrated their opposition to the coming war.[127]) The ostensible reasons for the attack were that Iraq under Saddam Hussein had harbored terrorists and that it had also developed nuclear and other "weapons of mass destruction." Neither of these allegations was substantiated, but George W. Bush was willing to act alone if necessary. Subsequent revelations were to show that his top aides were willing to ignore information—some provided by US intelligence officials—that contradicted these allegations, and that even the closest ally,

Britain, remained skeptical. It was very difficult to obtain UN concurrence in launching an attack on Iraq, but that did not prevent the United States from doing so, starting the bombing and invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Britain also sent its troops, but some NATO allies, such as Spain and France, openly criticized the war. (France did not allow overflight rights for US military aircraft in the assault on Iraq.) This sort of unilateralism alienated the international community, as well as significant portions of public opinion in the United States. But it seemed as if the more the world criticized Washington, the stiffer the administration's attitude grew. There was clearly a gap between the world, which remained transnationally connected, and the US government, which appeared to alienate itself from it, at least on this issue.

All wars are transnational as well as international. They establish connections among people across borders that might otherwise not have developed. But the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq proved much less so, for different reasons. Afghanistan's transnationalism was more internal than external; the country consisted of tribal groups who fought against one another, militarily as well as politically, and even those who had been opposed to the Taliban were not able to establish a stable system of national governance. Ethnic, tribal loyalties trumped any sentiment of nationhood in a country where the borders with its neighbor, Pakistan, were particularly artificial, even for that part of South Asia. Populations of Pashtuns, Hazaris, and Tajiks paid little attention to which side of the border they belonged to and even less to the dictates of weak central governments in Kabul or Islamabad. Transnational connections, to the extent that they were fostered, were mostly products of humanitarian organizations, both intergovernmental and nongovernmental, that sent aid missions to assist the country's nation-rebuilding efforts. But humanitarian activities were frequently frustrated by violence and instability. These were nothing like the transnational connections that were constructed in Germany, Austria, or Japan after the Second World War.

In Iraq the situation was even less conducive to transnational encounters. Little preparation had been made for the fact that the war would inevitably entail both military and nonmilitary tasks, the latter involving a range of issues from maintaining law and order in occupied areas to ensuring the establishment of a stable government that would replace Saddam's dictatorship. It was much easier to dispose of the regime than to reconstruct the country, in part because Iraq

had been in a state of chaos for over ten years. Intermittent US bombings as well as UN sanctions during the 1990s had destroyed much of the infrastructure in the country as well as social and educational institutions. The restoration of order and social services would require a great deal of transnational cooperation at the civilian level, but much of this had to be established on the spot. There had been little preparation for such tasks—in sharp contrast to the careful planning for the occupation of Germany and Japan that had been made during the Second World War. US military and civilian officials had to shoulder the burden of post-Saddam reconstruction, but few of them had had training in Iraq's languages or culture. Their work was assisted by, and sometimes assigned entirely to, civilian contractors from the United States and elsewhere who also lacked prerequisite backgrounds. The UN did try to help in reconstruction work, but its efforts suffered grievously when, in September 2003, a truck bomb driven by a suicide terrorist exploded outside the UN's headquarters in Baghdad. The explosion killed UN special representative Sérgio Vieira de Mello. After a second bombing in the following month, the UN pulled its personnel from the war-torn country.

Under the circumstances, transnational encounters remained superficial. Although serious attempts were made by a number of NGOs, including the International Red Cross, Doctors Without Borders, and smaller groups committed to helping the people of Iraq, they had to spend much of their time protecting themselves from attacks by extremist groups that disdained any such attempts to promote transnationalism. In danger for their lives, humanitarian organizations and relief workers often had to turn to US and other military forces for protection. The weakness of the country's civil society made it extremely difficult to create and sustain transnational encounters.

Dialogue among Civilizations

Transnationalism was clearly on trial, but the September 11 attacks and the consequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq did not mean that history was reversing the trends that had become evident toward the end of the twentieth century, such as economic and cultural globalization as well as efforts at increased communication and understanding among nations, religions, and civilizations. This latter objective might have been frustrated by the 2001 terrorist attacks on the

United States and the subsequent rise of anti-Islamic sentiment. The incident undoubtedly created fear of Islam in many parts of the world, especially in Europe and North America where there had been less experience with or knowledge of the Islamic religion than elsewhere, such as China and India, whose populations contained a significant minority of Muslims. In the West, many people were unable to distinguish between the extremists and the moderate (or politically uninvolved) majority among the followers of Islam. There was confusion as to who the extremists were, and many, including government officials, were prone to see all Muslims as potential terrorists.

Such fears might have seemed justified to some when the September 11 attacks were followed by similar, if less massive, assaults on civilians, such as the explosion at the resort in Bali in October 2002, the attempt to blow up a transatlantic flight in 2003 by a terrorist with explosives hidden inside his shoe, the subway and bus bombings in London in July 2005, the attack on Mumbai, India's largest city, in 2008, and a failed attempt to blow up a US civilian aircraft on Christmas day 2009 that was in transit between Amsterdam and Detroit. The majority of these attacks were cases of "suicide" assaults in which the terrorists blew themselves up along with their targets. The image of a fanatic blowing himself up in pursuit of an ostensibly higher cause reminded observers of the kamikaze bombings by Japanese pilots toward the end of the Second World War. But the Japanese analogy was not entirely fitting in that the kamikaze pilots were carrying out a military mission and mostly targeted US warships, whereas there was no national command behind the Islamic terrorists, who did not discriminate among their targets. In any event, both Islamic and Japanese suicide attacks were incomprehensible to the bulk of humanity and further confirmed the image of fanatics who were driven by irrational beliefs. It was easy to generalize from these instances and to consider the whole religion of Islam, or the bulk of Muslims worldwide, as abetting such a culture of irrationality. Few enjoyed the stringent system of airport security that became a transnational experience in the wake of these bombings, actual or attempted. Under the circumstances, pessimists might have believed that this was no time to start a dialogue with Islam, even to continue transnational efforts at cross-cultural communication and understanding.

In reality, however, efforts at such communication and understanding never abated after 2001. If anything, because of the very seriousness of the crisis, civilian

organizations as well as international bodies redoubled their efforts at continuing the dialogue among civilizations. The United Nations had adopted a resolution in 1998 that the year 2001 would be called the Year of Dialogue among Civilizations. The UN and various international and national organizations were to sponsor meetings where this theme would be explored. One of the first such gatherings took place in Vilnius, Lithuania, in July 2001. Opening the conference, Kōichirō Matsuura, general secretary of UNESCO, noted that the emerging new global order must be solidly built on communication and dialogue among civilizations. Specifically, he and the conferees agreed on the need to intensify efforts to promote an understanding of the world's diverse cultures and civilizations. This and other gatherings that took place in 2001—for instance, UNESCO sponsored a meeting of scientists in New York to discuss biodiversity—were overshadowed by the much more dramatic events of September 11, but it should be noted that the terrorist attacks did not dampen the enthusiasm for or commitment to the cause of intercivilizational dialogue. During the remainder of the year, meetings similar to the Vilnius gathering were held in different parts of the globe, demonstrating that the terrorists did not succeed in intimidating efforts at promoting transnationalism.

As if to give moral support to such activities, the Nobel Peace Prize Committee in Oslo held a symposium in early December 2001 to commemorate the centenary of the peace award. Kofi Annan, secretary general of the United Nations, who received the prize for that year, as well as many former recipients of the Peace Prize came to the gathering, as did representatives of various organizations that had been so honored, including the American Friends Service Committee, Amnesty International, Doctors Without Borders, and the International Coalition Against Landmines. Coming barely three months after the September 11 attacks, the meeting was notable for its renewed dedication to the cause of world peace and mutual understanding. The overwhelming sentiment of the participants was against the ongoing military involvement in Afghanistan, and they feared that the US government was contemplating similar action against Iraq. Kofi Annan, in accepting the Nobel Peace Prize, reminded those present—and through them the whole world—that the construction of a peaceful world depended on far more than eliminating terrorism. For instance, he pointed out that some seven thousand people—more than twice the number who had been killed

in the World Trade Center attack—were dying of HIV/AIDS every day in Africa. No stable world order would be possible until all such tragedies were coped with and eventually eradicated. (Fortunately, by the start of the second decade of the new century, the UN was able to report significant slowing down in the HIV infection rates among young people, even in sub-Saharan African states that had been the hardest hit by the disease.)

In the meantime, efforts at promoting dialogue among civilizations continued into the second year of the new century and beyond. The UN initiative resulted in additional gatherings to promote the cause. Such efforts proved often frustrating, and they sometimes came under severe criticism from those who insisted that no communication and understanding was possible with Islamic extremists. Islamic extremists also responded in kind, touting their own brand of purism in opposition to reconciling with the "devil." The continued influx of Arab, Pakistani, Afghan, Albanian, and other Islamic migrants into Europe, North America, and Australia frequently created social tensions, especially as the new arrivals tended to live in segregated, poorer sections of large cities. The riots that took place in the suburbs of Paris in the fall of 2005, in which crowds consisting largely of Arab immigrants attacked police vehicles, public buildings, and schools, seemed symbolic of the gaps among communities espousing different faiths and ways of life.

The conflict was often between the ideals of cultural diversity and pluralism, allowing each group of people its own belief system and way of life, and secularism, insisting that certain values, such as respect for women's rights, should be considered universally valid and accepted by all. For instance, in France, a country with a strong tradition of secularism, the government banned the wearing of *hijab* (headscarves, veils, burqas) in public places such as schools, and in Britain a member of Parliament (who was also foreign minister) criticized women constituents who met with him with scarves covering their faces. In 2005 Danish cartoonists' portrayal of the prophet Muhammad's face caused worldwide protest among Muslims. And in 2011 in Norway, an extremist with a rifle shot and killed a large number of young people, including several Muslims, who were among those attending an interracial, interfaith gathering on an island. The appearance of mosques in European cities impressed observers as incongruous, an Islamic intrusion upon Christian civilization, and in the United States plans to construct

an Islamic culture center near "ground zero" in Manhattan seriously split the nation, although in this instance both the idea of cultural pluralism and the secular doctrine of freedom of religion seemed to stand on one side, and the memory of a national tragedy on the other.

Underneath the surface drama of such conflict, however, there continued to be quiet efforts to overcome simplistic notions of civilizational, religious, or ethnic conflict and incompatibility and to develop less extremist, less dogmatic worldviews. What was needed was an image of the world and of humanity as both divergent and united, both local and global. The energetic efforts by American, Canadian, Australian, British, and other European historians to teach themselves and their students to overcome traditional ethnocentrism and nation-centered perspectives on the past may be seen as one important example. During the first decade of the century, many universities added or expanded their programs in world, global, or transnational history. In 2008 Harvard University hosted the first global history conference with historians participating from all continents. The Mandelbaum Verlag book publishers in Vienna opened a new series titled Global History and Development Policy.[128] A number of superb textbooks were written, incorporating a global perspective into the study of the past. For example, Richard Bulliet and his colleagues published *The Earth and Its Peoples* in 1997 and subsequent years, showing how one might move away from the standard Eurocentric narrative. The authors did not just add other parts of the world to the narrative, but sought to keep the whole globe constantly in view so that readers would be able to trace how different peoples and regions had established connections with one another. In the twenty-first century, the book noted, "people increasingly visualize a single global community."[129] Another textbook of modern world history, *Worlds Together, Worlds Apart* (2002), discussed transnational developments such as "the Black Death, the influx of silver from the Americas into the world economy, and the rise of nationalism, that reverberated throughout the world." These phenomena "produced varying reactions in different regions," the authors argued.[130] The emphasis here was on the dialogue between interconnectedness and divergence, a theme that many scholars were adopting as a viable conceptual framework in their studies of world, global, or transnational history. The key was to move away from a focus on nations as units of analysis. Rather, these historians believed that one would arrive at a

more balanced understanding of historical development if one focused on migrations, diseases, the circulation of gold and silver, and many other themes that transcended national boundaries.

Even when dealing with a single nation's history, writers were becoming more and more interested in situating that history in the context of worldwide developments. Thomas Bender's *A Nation among Nations* (2006), for instance, surveyed American history from Columbus to the present but always compared national to global developments so that the nation's politics, society, and culture would not be presented as unique.[131] The author was seeking to counter the "exceptionalist" presentation of the nation's history that had abounded in the literature, arguing instead that mutual influences and parallel developments across national boundaries explained much of what happened in the United States, or indeed in any other country. Likewise, the Australian historian Ian Tyrrell's *Transnational Nation* (2007) sought to place US history squarely in the context of global history, so that US history would be seen as a product as much of external forces (economic, cultural, social) as of domestic factors.[132] These examples show that, almost in proportion as the government of the United States tended to pursue a unilateralist foreign policy, US educators and scholars were seeking to turn the attention of the people to the wider world. It was clearly understood that if their education of the younger generation led to a citizenry more attuned to global issues and sensitive to other people and cultures, that would be one of the most promising developments of the new century.[133]

In Asia also, similar efforts were not lacking. In Malaysia, the Center for Civilizational Dialogue was established at the University of Malaysia, and in Osaka, Japan, Kansai University opened a new center for the study of cultural transmission in East Asia in 2007. Led by a Chinese historian, Tao Demin, the institute aimed at exploring the history of intraregional (as well as interregional) cultural diffusion and intermingling in the early modern times. Around this time, annual symposia began to be held both in Beijing and in Seoul to consider the state of human civilization and its future. While no simple understanding of civilization or even of dialogue among civilizations emerged from such efforts, they indicated that in Asia, too, there was a serious interest in going beyond mono-national frameworks in understanding the past. Along with contemporaneous endeavors by educators elsewhere, these examples were pointing to a transnationally shared

perception that, in the words of the historian Bruce Mazlish, civilization now "encompasses all human beings, everywhere."[134]

The Transnational Reach of the Global Economic Crisis

In the meantime, globalization went apace—although starting in 2007 the world economy began to slow down and entered a period of profound crisis lasting for several years. Whether the world economy moved upward or downward, the vicissitude only confirmed that all parts of the world were tied together more closely now than ever before.

During the first decade of the new century, the world's total population grew from roughly 6.1 billion to about 6.9 billion. It was predicted that if the trend continued, world population could reach 8 billion by 2025 and even 9 billion by 2050. Considering that in 1900 there were just 1.6 billion, and in 1950 only 2.5 billion, people in the world, these were almost unmanageable increases, challenging the human environment, the Earth's resources, and the capacity of governments and communities everywhere to maintain a semblance of order. However, it should be noted that the rate of demographic increase was lower at the beginning of the twenty-first century than in the middle of the twentieth. The rate of natural growth—that is, the rate of birth less that of death as a proportion of the overall population—fell from 17.8 percent during 1950–1955 to 12.3 percent fifty years later.

What these figures indicated was that although the death rate had declined significantly, thanks to the absence of large-scale wars and to medical advances, the birth rate also diminished. It is a remarkable fact that these generalizations applied both to economically advanced countries as well as to developing nations. Although the latter continued to register higher birth rates and accounted for more than 80 percent of the world's people, their populations were increasing less rapidly by the first decade of the twenty-first century. There were many reasons for this, including the spreading use of birth control, a less traditional way of life in which having a large number of children was no longer considered appropriate, and governmental policies that encouraged, even mandated, small households. China was the primary example of this last phenomenon. The Beijing government only slightly modified the earlier policy of "one child per family" that had been proclaimed in the 1970s, and as a result the population increased by only 0.58 percent during 2005–2010, far below the world average of 1.17 percent. The population grew much faster in the United States (0.97 percent), Mexico (1.12 percent), Brazil (1.26 percent), and virtually all other countries of South America.

A novel development after the turn of the century was the striking longevity of people in such countries as China, Singapore, and South Korea. An aging population had become a problem in some European countries and in Japan toward the end of the twentieth century, but now the same phenomenon was detected in these other countries as well. In the United States, although the influx of immigrants tended to keep the average age of the population down, 3.1 percent of Americans were over the age of seventy-five in 2004. Comparable figures for Russia, Italy, Sweden, and Britain were 2.5, 4.5, 4.4, and 3.8 percent, respectively. Even in China, where the average life expectancy was already seventy-two years in 2005, more than 2 percent of the population was over seventy. In Russia, on the other hand, the average life expectancy for males was only 58.5 years (and 71.8 for females) in 2004, an exception that proves the rule (caused primarily by the economic collapse of the early 1990s). What such statistics indicated was not only that the world's population was increasing as a whole, albeit more slowly than earlier, but also that its composition was rapidly changing. The aging of the population was a social as well as an economic problem, because senior citizens, in their seventies, eighties, and beyond, would not be working regularly and needed various kinds of assistance, which would require health-care workers and funds to pay for seniors' medical care. In richer countries, public and private retirement homes looked after the needs of old persons, and increasingly citizens were organizing self-help communities through which they would assist each other without having to move into an old-age facility. In the rest of the world, however, few such institutions or programs were available, and families, clans, and villages had to cope as best as they could with the new situation.

The fact remains that in the first decade of the new century there were more people inhabiting the Earth, and that the same needs that had propelled people in the past to migrate in search of food, jobs, and stability remained. In the history of cross-border migrations, the first decade of the twenty-first century continued the trend set toward the end of the twentieth, but the large number of

migrants from the Caribbean and South America to North America was now increasingly joined by those escaping Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia for safer havens. Some of them were refugees, driven from their countries of origin by internal chaos produced by civil strife, sectarian violence, and terrorism. In 2008, Iraq and Afghanistan produced the largest number of refugees, over 1.8 million each, most of whom were absorbed by Pakistan and Iran, adding to these countries' population problems.[135] A relatively novel phenomenon was that of "internally displaced persons," those driven out of their homes and villages and placed in refugee camps within national borders. Such refugees were said to exceed seventeen million in 2004.[136] They were not transnational beings in the strict sense, but most were aided by transnational relief workers as well as by international organizations, notably the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Were there sufficient resources to meet the minimum requirements of the world's increasing population? Observers had grappled with this question for decades, but at the beginning of the twenty-first century the theme of climate change became of urgent relevance because of the critical importance not only of food safety but also of food availability. That was one of the concerns that had produced the 1998 Kyoto Protocol for reducing the greenhouse effect, but in addition to the refusal of the United States to join Europe and Japan in ratifying the agreement, China, India, and other developing countries also had not signed on. In the twenty-first century, however, such abstention, indicating a divided globe on this most global of crises, was no longer acceptable. People in some of those countries that were steadily improving their lifestyles were increasingly demanding the use of air conditioners, refrigerators, and the like, adding to the average heat level blanketing the Earth. Al Gore, former vice president of the United States, spread the alarm over these developments in his widely screened film *An Inconvenient Truth*. The message was simple and clear: as depicted graphically in this and many other educational programs, average temperatures were rising and huge chunks of ice in the North Pole were melting away. There were pictures of polar bears that, no longer able to take thick layers of ice for granted, were being forced to swim hundreds of miles in open ocean in search of it. One consequence of global warming appeared to be increasing rainfalls, and indeed the first years of the century witnessed a number of life-threatening hurricanes and typhoons.

These, as well as earthquakes, heat waves, flooding, and volcanic eruptions, were often considered related to, if not caused by, global climate change.

Although a minority of scientists as well as some politicians doubted that climate change was induced by human behavior—they believed the changes were part of a natural cycle—the fact remains that humans were consuming an increasing amount of energy. Statistics with regard to "primary energy"—including coal, water, natural gas, and electricity—show that between 1980 and 2004 the total consumption of such power sources increased by nearly 50 percent, from 6.5 billion tons (as converted to oil fuel) to 9.7 billion tons. This roughly corresponds to the rate of increase of the world's population. However, many countries were consuming much more energy than they produced. The United States, for instance, in 2004 produced 1,425 million tons of energy but consumed 2,052 million tons. The figures for China were 1,242 million and 1,260 million tons, respectively. These two countries combined were making use of about 36 percent of the world's energy resources, while accounting for 27 percent of its production. Such gaps between consumption and production of energy characterized North America, Europe, and Asia, and the deficits were being made up by importing excess fuels from other regions of the world: South America, Africa, the Middle East, and Oceania. But if these latter areas industrialized and urbanized themselves at the same pace as the others, it was clear that a severe shortage of energy resources would arise. For the time being, importing energy material was the only way the countries of North America, Europe, and most of Asia could satisfy their requirements.[137] The future of nuclear power, which provided about 15 percent of electricity worldwide at this time, began to look less promising in the wake of the disasters that hit the generators at the Fukushima Daiichi plant in northern Japan in March 2011.[138]

The same sort of imbalances between production and consumption characterized food items. Here the United States was one of the few countries that were self-sufficient in basic staples such as corn and wheat and exported what was not consumed at home. The nation accounted for 38.5 percent of the world production of corn and 9.5 percent of wheat in 2006. Many of these items were shipped abroad, the US sale of corn accounting for more than one-half of the total world export of that commodity. Japan and South Korea, neither of which produced much corn, together imported more than a quarter of the entire quantity

of this item traded in the world market. In terms of grains as a whole, Japan was only 28 percent self-sufficient, requiring the nation to import the other 72 percent. Japanese fishermen caught 4.4 percent of the global catch of fish in 2005, but the Japanese people ate so much fish that the country had to import about the same amount from other countries. Similar conditions held in Britain, Spain, and the Netherlands. They paid for their food imports by exporting other items, in particular manufactured goods. (In 2004, 20.7 percent of Japanese exports consisted of automobiles, and another 17.3 percent was machine tools. In Britain's export trade, the ratios for these items were 9.8 and 13.3 percent, respectively.)

The smooth functioning of international trade, then, would be of critical importance in ensuring access to the world's food resources. Fortunately, most countries, as members of the World Trade Organization, adhered to the basic principle of free trade, although import restrictions did remain, most of which were within WTO guidelines. But for some poorer countries in Africa and Asia, export trade would not be sufficient to ensure an adequate supply of the basic requirements of life, and for them assistance from other countries as well as international agencies would be of critical importance. The picture would become complicated, however, if the prices of basic foodstuffs such as wheat and rice fluctuated drastically, as they did just before the onset of the global economic crisis in 2007. The overall price of hard red winter wheat, to take just one example, had been declining for over a century, but then in 2005 its price, along with those of corn, rice, soy, and oats, shot up. The cause was not an external shock to the food production system, such as a drought or plague, but a speculative "bubble" in commodities markets.[139] The higher prices led to riots and violence across the developing world, and resulted in hundreds of thousands of additional people being without enough food to eat. The shortages could be felt even in the United States, where some wholesalers restricted customers' purchases of certain items, such as rice.[140]

A key aspect of the global system of production, consumption, trade, and aid was the financial setup in which most currencies were freely converted to each other. Since the 1985 Plaza Accord, which liberalized currency exchanges, global monetary transactions had become more transnational, although most foreign trade and investment activities were still conducted in US dollars and, increasingly, in euros. Each country's foreign exchange still tended to be measured in

terms of the US currency. Still, other currencies were gaining the status of semi-international units of transaction. With the participation of China, India, Brazil, and other countries as major players in the arena, there was now a virtual free-for-all with regard to foreign exchange. In theory, anyone anywhere could buy and sell foreign currencies as well as securities, and the speculative game in which people all over the world took part resulted in constantly fluctuating rates of exchange and returns on investment. Central banks in various countries tried from time to time to prop up, or keep down, the value of a currency vis-à-vis that of others. The Chinese authorities, to take perhaps the most conspicuous example, were able to keep the value of renminbi (the key Chinese currency unit) low so as to expand export trade. This policy irritated other countries, especially the United States, which had huge trade deficits with China, but the Chinese were now purchasing bonds and equities in the American markets, and their value would depend in part on a stable rate of exchange between the two currencies. This was an age of finance capitalism, but unlike its manifestation a hundred years earlier, in which a small number of bankers, industrialists, and stockholders virtually monopolized the game, now the entire world, indeed everyone, in theory at least, was involved both as a market and as an investor.

The overheating of the global financial market reached its peak in 2007, when more goods, money, and stocks changed hands on a global scale than ever before. Inevitably, the situation produced a reaction; stock values plummeted, currency values fell, and many people lost their jobs and homes. In one respect the crisis could be summed up in a phrase: "Capitalism without capital." In other words, individuals with little or no savings (which especially was the case in the United States) purchased goods on credit far beyond their means to repay and remortgaged their houses to obtain huge amounts of money in the expectation that the value of their homes would continue to rise and so enable them to pay back the loan. Moreover, a large number of senior citizens borrowed money in order to move into retirement communities, most of which were privately operated and entailed large entry fees as well as monthly payments. Banks, credit companies, stockbrokers, and others promoted all such consumer borrowing in the expectation that they would receive sizable returns. These paper credits were viewed as assets, so their holders could lend even more money. Such a system was not destined to last long, and the inevitable occurred in 2007 when the so-called

subprime lending fiasco in the United States punctured the bubble. The banks and mortgage companies that had made risky loans to homebuyers found it increasingly difficult to receive loan repayments and in the process lost huge amounts of their assets. In the meantime, many hedge funds and various schemes for investing in banks, insurance companies, and foreign securities and currencies suddenly found that the easy profits for which they had aimed had evaporated. Many investment companies and financial institutions collapsed. Because all such transactions had been carried on across national borders, the consequences were truly global. Individuals and organizations had been so dependent on currency and stock markets of distant lands that there was a chain reaction linking all parts of the world.

Remarkably, however, unlike the Great Depression of the 1930s, world trade did not shrink substantially, nor did foreign investment. Both categories of transnational activities virtually held their own because demand did not diminish precipitously. For certain commodities, notably automobiles, the worldwide market did shrink, resulting in layoffs for large numbers of workers from assembly lines and auxiliary factories making auto parts. In one extreme case, General Motors, the world's largest auto manufacturer until Toyota outsold GM in 2008, went bankrupt, and the US government had to provide it with billions of dollars of bailout money, in the process becoming its owner. Because the money came from public funds, this meant the taxpayers were now in control of the company. The governments of the United States, Germany, and several other "advanced" countries that belonged to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) likewise intervened in the banking crisis by providing funds to prevent the collapse of certain financial institutions. Despite these and other examples, there was no drastic reduction in cross-border trade or investment. This was partly because demand for food and energy resources did not abate, and partly because, unlike the United States and Europe, such countries as China and India did not suffer a domestic economic crisis and were able in a way to temporarily take over the role of the United States and Europe in the world economy by continuing to purchase foreign products and to invest in offshore business enterprises. China, in particular, was holding a huge quantity of foreign exchange, in dollars and euros, and by making use of such funds carefully, rather than selling them off, it helped prevent these other currencies from falling precipitously in value, which would have aggravated the global economic crisis by further increasing the public debts of the United States and European countries.

The global economic crisis of the early twenty-first century was far more transnational in scope than the Great Depression of the early 1930s, but mercifully, responses to the crisis were also more coordinated across national boundaries. That China, which together with Taiwan and Hong Kong was fast becoming the second wealthiest nation (in terms of gross national product) behind the United States, was in a position to contribute significantly to alleviating the crisis was symbolic of the transnational nature of global economic affairs. The growing importance of China as well as of India, Russia, and Brazil—they were collectively known as BRICs—and many other countries was nowhere more graphically revealed than in the international meetings held in the wake of the financial meltdown of 2009, in which the twenty wealthiest countries participated. Known as the G-20 meetings, the countries present accounted for 90 percent of the world's total income. In contrast to the international monetary crisis of the 1970s that resulted in the institution of G-7 gatherings, which later became G-8 with the addition of Russia, there was recognition that these richest seven or eight would no longer be able to cope with global economic questions without the participation of others that represented not only huge markets but also agricultural, mineral, and factory production. The G-20 gathering of September 2009 adopted common agendas calling for mutual consultation and surveillance, lest some countries should consume or save excessively, and to ensure that banks and investment funds should not again indulge in undisciplined practices at the expense of ordinary citizens. The interconnectedness of the world's farms, factories, and finances and the willingness of their top producers and consumers to discuss their common problems were the ultimate causes of the economic recovery that began in late 2009 and was confirmed by the end of 2010.

In some such way, in sharp contrast to the 1930s when the economic crisis splintered the world, deglobalizing it as it were, the disarray at the beginning of the twenty-first century only confirmed the interconnectedness of the world. Transnational ties and networks were not disrupted but were confirmed and strengthened. For example, Internet use continued to expand during the crisis of 2008–2010, and some of the major companies in the world sought to pool their resources across borders so as to emerge as transnational giants. This was the

path chosen by two automobile manufacturers, Volkswagen of Germany and Suzuki of Japan, toward the end of 2009—to join together to share their capital, technology, and market strategies. Their smaller vehicles had already dominated some of the key markets in the world, such as China, India, and Africa, so that their combined market share would be quite formidable. Likewise, Japan Airlines, suffering from huge deficits, entered into an alliance with American Airlines, which provided the Japanese airline with fresh capital in the hope that combined they would have a larger share of the increasingly lucrative air travel market in the Asia Pacific region. The number of international travelers and exchange students also did not significantly abate. People continued to cross borders. To be sure, millions did so in search of job opportunities; despite restrictive measures instituted by some countries to protect domestic laborers, migrants kept on coming, as did smugglers of illicit drugs. All this attested to the unchanging relevance of transnational movements in the early twenty-first century.

Toward a Transnational Partnership

Would there in time emerge a solid transnational world? It is not a historian's task to predict the future, but we might consider two themes that might contribute to our understanding of the first years of the twenty-first century in the context of history of the world since the Second World War. First is the development of a Pacific community and possibly other regional communities, and the second is what may be termed the "Obama phenomenon" that transcended US politics and reflected the increasingly relevant theme of "hybridity." These examples seem to point to the further growth of transnational linkages and ideas.

Trade, financial, and other ties continued to bring East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Antipodes (Australia and New Zealand), the Pacific islands, and North and South America closer together. In trade, East Asia was serving as a key link to the rest of the world. US trade with China more than doubled between 2000 and 2004, and by 2004 China already accounted for 6.9 percent of the total volume of world exports. Only Germany (10.6 percent) and the United States (12.7 percent) exceeded China's volume. Other Asian countries, in particular Japan and South Korea, continued to be among the top exporting countries in the world. A striking development at the beginning of the century was that

East Asian countries tended to trade with one another quite intensively. Nearly one-half of Japan's exports in 2003 went to other Asian countries, as did 37 percent of China's. The figures for imports from Asia were 58.0 percent for Japan and 42.1 percent for China. As is evidenced in such statistics, Asia was growing as a huge trading zone in which the countries in the region were selling and buying more and more quantities of goods. Even in the absence of a formal regional community, East Asia was clearly emerging as one.

Financial ties between East Asia and Southeast Asia were strengthened after the foreign exchange crisis of the late 1990s, when Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, and other countries in Asia saw the value of their currencies drop precipitously against the dollar, which caused havoc in their monetary and banking systems and triggered unemployment and falling stock market prices. Neither the IMF nor the United States did much to help, because they assumed, following the "Washington consensus," that the market mechanism would in time rectify the situation. Although it was undoubtedly true that the globalization of foreign exchange since the 1980s had brought about profound fluctuations in the values of national currencies, the Washington consensus in effect adopted a hands-off policy even as some Asian currencies lost as much as 80 percent of their value in terms of the dollar. That was entirely unacceptable to the affected nations, and they took steps to do something in the region. At a meeting of ASEAN held in December 1997, the leaders of China, Japan, and South Korea were invited, and what emerged as ASEAN + 3 proved a viable framework for undertaking collective regional action.[141] The group continued to meet annually into the new century and became a solid basis for working toward creating an Asian regional community. In the context of the 1997 crisis, Japan initially made available a temporary loan of $30 billion, and subsequently ASEAN + 3 established a system of "currency swaps," whereby a country whose currency is experiencing exchange difficulties would be provided with an emergency infusion of other currencies.

In time these efforts by ASEAN and East Asian countries came to be expanded to other spheres, such as the environment and climate change, cultural exchange, economic development, and even political and military security. Additional arrangements served to strengthen such regional ties. The most successful were the free trade agreements, or FTA, which were negotiated with increasing frequency after 2000: for instance, between Singapore and New Zealand,

ASEAN and China, Thailand and India, Singapore and South Korea, Japan and Malaysia, and Thailand and Australia. Such agreements encouraged intraregional trade to such an extent that in 2008 it was reported that the volume of trade among FTA signatories accounted for nearly 50 percent of the total regional trade.

The inclusion of Australia, New Zealand, and India in the FTA arrangements suggests that the definition of "Asia" in the context of regional development was becoming broader. Trade agreements, at least, were now embracing most countries from India to New Zealand, a wide swath embracing twenty or more countries. The "Asian" regional community that was emerging was really an "Asian and Pacific" community. The United States was from the beginning a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), a regional setting established in 1989 for economic cooperation and assistance. In time other American nations such as Mexico and Peru joined APEC, so that the geographical boundaries of the regional organizations remained loose. These various and overlapping networks indicated that an Asian regional community, should it become a reality, would not be an exclusionary entity. It should also be noted that China, Japan, and South Korea invested heavily in resource-rich but economically less developed areas of the world, especially South America and Africa. In sub-Saharan Africa, the Chinese presence, both diplomatic and economic, was becoming nearly ubiquitous. China's position in Africa, which continued to grow during these years, held advantages over the Western nations' in that its relations with the continent were largely untainted by the historical memory of colonial exploitation and also because Beijing was more willing than the United States or European countries to expand trade relations with countries that had been accused of human rights violations, including Sudan.

There was little doubt that by the first decade of the twenty-first century there had in fact emerged an Asian-Pacific economic community. China (including Hong Kong), Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and the principal ASEAN countries accounted for over 20 percent of the total world trade in 2005. The EU's share was 29 percent, and that of the United States 28 percent. Together, these three economic centers were carrying on nearly four-fifths of all international transactions in goods. Whether such a community of trade would in time develop a common currency, comparable to the euro (adopted in 1999) remained to be seen. As of 2010, most Asian countries were still using the US dollar as the currency of

exchange. Only Japan was carrying out as much as 20 percent of its transactions in nondollar currencies. All Asian countries, as well as most of the rest of the world, held on to their dollar reserves and had a stake in the stability of the dollar.

The idea of a Trans-Pacific Partnership perfectly fitted into these ongoing developments. In view of the close economic ties among the countries in or bordering on the Pacific, it seemed to make sense to establish a "partnership" that would bind them even closer together, ultimately looking forward to something akin to the European Union. That would entail not just freer trade among the member countries but also the opening of borders to all their people, whether as workers, tourists, or students. That would truly be a colossal undertaking, bringing about a Pacific century for the first time in history. Whether the twenty-first century would be such a century, of course, was far from clear, but the very idea of a Trans-Pacific Partnership indicated that the region had come a long way from the first half of the twentieth century when the Pacific Ocean had been anything but "pacific."

It would, of course, take much time and effort for Pacific countries to establish a solid political and cultural basis for their partnership. The first step in that direction might well be to come to a shared understanding of the past, a task that had proven to be extremely difficult even among the countries of East Asia. Unlike Germany and France, Japan and China still had not succeeded in overcoming the past. Neither had Japan and Korea, its former colony, reached sufficiently common understanding of that unfortunate experience. The "history problem," as it was called, continued to prevent the coming closer together of the three countries politically and psychologically, despite their undoubted economic interdependence. Although teachers and scholars from the three countries had started seeking each other out to start a cooperative project to write books together, such efforts were often frustrated by new, undesirable developments such as the publication of a history textbook in Japan in 2001 written by several nationalistic authors that was mono-nationalistic and viewed the past almost entirely from their own country's perspective. The publication of the textbook, which won approval by the Ministry of Education, immediately provoked a negative response in China and Korea, inflaming their nationalism. Fortunately, transnationally minded historians were also becoming more visible by the turn of the century and were willing to meet together to do something

about these unfortunate developments. They held annual gatherings in Beijing, Tokyo, and Seoul, and in 2005 one such group published a jointly authored book that discussed the modern history of East Asia, focusing on the period since the nineteenth century. The writers noted in their preface that they wrote the book in order to learn from the past and to prepare for a future East Asia that, they hoped, would be characterized by peace, democracy, and human rights. The book did not hesitate to castigate Japan for its past subjugation of the Korean people and its aggression against the Chinese, but it also spoke of the coming together of the people of the three countries, especially of the younger generations, to promote their mutual understanding. The book was deficient in not mentioning serious blemishes in China under Communist rule, such as the disastrous Great Leap Forward or the Cultural Revolution, both of which caused millions of people to die from starvation and dislocation. Nevertheless, here was an important indication that beginnings were being made to develop a cooperative approach to the study of East Asian history.

Such modest developments might in time help construct a regional community of shared memory analogous to that of the European Union and reinforce the already solid economic networks. Transnational encounters, in other words, were becoming much more than incidental to economic transactions, and it could be expected that in time there would develop some transnational consciousness among Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese if enough of them overcame their mononationalistic proclivities.

An interesting question in this connection was whether such modest beginnings might be followed by similar efforts in other parts of Asia and the Pacific. Historically and culturally, much of Southeast Asia and South Asia, not to mention the Antipodes and the American continents, were closer to Europe than to Asia. As noted earlier, however, serious efforts were being made in Australia, Canada, and the United States to comprehend their national histories in the context of the interactions and interconnections with other countries in the wider Pacific. Asian migrations to and populations in these countries, as well as the white majorities' prejudices against them, were now seen as having been an integral part of their respective developments.[142] All these countries, in such a perspective, shared a past. The same would be true of the countries in East, Southeast, and South Asia, where the mingling of diverse populations had been a

central historical fact. As best exemplified in the city-state of Singapore, the coming together of different races and ethnicities had created, and was creating, "hybrid" communities, and the rather belated awareness of this past could be expected in time to generate a sense of shared memory.

A big question in the early twenty-first century was whether other regions of the world, such as Africa, the Middle East, and South America, would also succeed in constructing regional communities. All independent countries of Africa, numbering more than forty, established an African Union in 2004, but it failed to move either in the direction of an economic or cultural community. Many countries suffered from continuing civil strife, and hundreds of thousands fled the continent for jobs and opportunities in Europe. Nevertheless, there were some glimpses of hope. South Africa, as well as the rest of the continent, celebrated the successful hosting of the 2010 World Cup. And more effective medical treatments and preventive technologies for the scourges of malaria and HIV appeared within reach. While some areas of Central Africa seemed mired in the legacy of genocidal conflict, despotism, economic stagnation, corruption, and warfare, war-torn regions of Western Africa made strides toward bringing war criminals to justice, using the International Criminal Court—the first sentencing of an African alleged war criminal took place in early 2012—and healing the wounds of civil conflict. In the Middle East, the fact that most countries in the area are Islamic did not prevent factious and fraternal struggles from undermining a sense of order and community. It may well be, as the "Arab spring" of 2011 indicated, that democratization is a key, if not the only, requirement for developing some coherent and cohesive order, whether within nations or among them. Certainly, the downfall of dictatorial regimes and the emergence of more open, democratic societies in several Islamic countries of the Middle East and North Africa suggested that whatever regional community emerges will ultimately have to hinge on the will of the people. This is not surprising in view of the fact that regional communities are by definition transnational and that the search for freedom and human rights is among the most crucial of transnational ideals.

Latin America, in the meantime, appeared increasingly confident of its future greatness. Already in 2000, Brazil was emerging as a potential economic power, and all of South America cheered when, in 2009, the International Olympic Committee picked Rio de Janeiro as the site of the 2016 summer games. Sharing

much of their culture, including the common language of Spanish (save for Brazil), people in South America had always viewed their continent in regional terms, although they had not been free from nationalistic rivalries and even wars. What the twenty-first century promised was the rise of the region in the global economic and political picture. Whereas in 2000 the world's production and trade appeared to be dominated by Europe, North America, and East Asia, it could be expected that by the 2020s Latin America would come to account for a substantial portion of the world's wealth and possibly share with other regions of the globe the task of building a transnational partnership.

The Obama Moment

No single individual better seemed to exemplify the transnational trends of world history, as well as the transnational hopes of humankind, at the beginning of the twenty-first century than Barack Obama, the forty-fourth president of the United States. His personal background, education, ideas about his country and about the world, and accomplishments (as well as failed attempts) while in office, all bespoke a conjunction of forces that were shaping the contemporary world.

Obama's background was as transnational as one could get. Like an increasing proportion of the world's people, he was a child of a racially mixed marriage, a "hybrid" at a time when "hybridity" was clearly on the ascendance in an interconnected globe in which people of diverse backgrounds not only encountered one another but also began to blend, to amalgamate. Obama was only forty-seven years old when he became president, a product of the post-1960s world. His father was a student from Kenya at the University of Hawaii. He met an American student whose maternal forebears came from Ireland. They married, had one son (Barack), and then divorced. Barack's father went back to Kenya, and Barack moved with his mother to Indonesia, where he attended high school, learning the language. He returned to Hawaii a few years afterward, went to Punahou School, a multiracial academy in Honolulu, then entered Occidental College in California. After a year he transferred to Columbia University, then went to Chicago as a community organizer and married a graduate of Princeton University. Obama then decided to seek a law degree, went to Harvard, and became editor of its *Law Review*. Returning to Chicago, he taught law at the University of Chicago Law School but decided to enter politics and was elected to the Illinois state senate. His racially mixed parents, schooling abroad, education at elite universities, and service to the local community caught in the throes of a globalizing economy all contributed to making Obama a transnational person. That the United States should produce such an individual was no accident, given the nation's transnational character. By the same token his emergence as a rising star in national politics indicated where the source of the nation's power and influence lay. (It also needs to be mentioned that the opposition to Obama in the United States made much of his allegedly "foreign" birth as a reason for questioning his qualifications, indicating the still considerable mono-nationalistic, even racist, resistance to transnationalism.)

Obama's moment in national politics came in 2004, when he ran for a seat in the US Senate and was elected. His keynote speech at the Democratic Party Convention, held in Boston, catapulted him to fame, but it contained much more than the line that became famous: "We are not a black nation or a white nation; we are a United States of America." In the rest of the speech, he referred to world conditions, criticized the Republican administration for waging a reckless war in Iraq and ignoring international opinion, and eloquently argued for a world order of peace, justice, and equality. He was a passionate spokesman for justice in the local community and in the nation, but he was not mono-national. He believed that national and international aspirations and values were interchangeable as well as interdependent. The cause of constructive transnationalism could not have had a more powerful spokesman.

That would explain why the world waited breathlessly for the outcome of the 2008 presidential election in the United States. Viewed from elsewhere, the nation appeared split into two, between those remaining mono-national, believing the United States should pursue its affairs unilaterally, and those who were eager to maintain and strengthen ties with the rest of the world. Even while opinion within the United States was divided between supporters of Obama and supporters of his Republican opponent, Senator John McCain—who, incidentally, was born outside the United States, in the Panama Canal Zone—elsewhere Obama's popularity was entirely clear. When he visited Berlin in May and spoke at the Victory Column, he had an enthusiastic audience of three hundred thousand. Obama's speech was unabashedly internationalist. He pictured himself as a citizen



Residents of Kisumu, Kenya, celebrate Barack Obama's victory in the US presidential election, November 2008, an example of a nation's politics transcending its borders. (AFP/Getty Images)

of the world, a potential leader of the whole of humanity, and spoke of the future of humankind in a way no politician anywhere had done. He exemplified the transnational spirit that accepted the simple truth that the Earth was to be shared by and preserved for all people, that world peace and prosperity were within their reach if they cooperated in the pursuit of their shared objectives.

World public opinion, which had appeared discouraged and disillusioned by the United States during the first years of the century, was virtually united in expressing joy at Obama's election in November. From Britain to Germany, Kenya to India, Australia to Japan, there were spontaneous gatherings of people expressing their elation, which was not only at Obama personally but also at an America that had dared to choose a person of his background to the highest office, in all likelihood the most important position in the world. He would be a world leader as well as the president of the United States, and almost overnight international opinion of the nation reversed itself. People elsewhere once again saw the United States as humanity's hope, as a land of justice and freedom. There

was a transnational involvement in the celebration of a transnational nation and of a transnational leader. The Obama moment was literally everyone's moment worldwide.

This is not the place to record in detail or to evaluate Barack Obama's presidency, but there seems little doubt that he envisaged himself as a powerful spokesman for transnationalism because he himself was a transnational being. Although as the nation's leader he frequently spoke the language of national interests and domestic concerns, when given an opportunity he reiterated his commitment to a peaceful, interdependent, diverse world. The Obama administration, for instance, stressed the importance of nonmilitary measures—economic, social, cultural—that would build bridges to Iran, North Korea, and even to some terrorists so that they might become more receptive to working together across borders in pursuit of common interests. Specifically, the Obama administration encouraged its citizens as well as those of other nations to organize aid missions so as to promote economic programs in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere where high rates of unemployment remained, providing an opportunity for terrorists to recruit additional members. Humanitarian and educational groups responded by expanding their activities in those countries. Reconstruction of educational institutions was of particularly critical importance, especially with regard to the education of children and women. Humanitarian organizations stepped up their efforts to ensure the rights of women, ethnic minorities, and political dissidents. These were extremely sensitive tasks, as authoritarian regimes were determined to control education and the press, but the Obama administration continued to insist on the right of everyone to all possible educational and economic opportunities and for this reason to push vigorously for unrestricted access to the Internet throughout the world.

It was because of the global community's awareness that President Obama, even as he adopted a military strategy and a conventional international approach to cope with some issues, had something much more ambitious and transnational in mind that the Nobel Peace Prize Committee in Norway decided to award him the Nobel Peace Prize in 2009. The award was more in recognition of his aspirations than his achievements. But it was in line with the spirit of the Peace Prize that had been given to such other organizations as Amnesty International, Doctors Without Borders, and the American Friends Service Committee, all of which had

been private associations of individuals devoted to building transnational bridges and to reaching out to all people, irrespective of national policies or strategies.

Nowhere did Obama's transnational leadership manifest itself more clearly than in his promotion of a joint strategy toward the problem of climate change. Whereas his predecessor had been lukewarm, if not hostile, to the idea of any international agreement to control carbon dioxide and other chemicals so as to reduce global warming, Obama was eager to take the initiative to prompt all nations, including his own, to take vigorous steps in that direction. He personally attended the Copenhagen conference on climate change in December 2009 and was instrumental in having the participants adopt a specific program for reversing global warming. His subsequent policy on the climate issue tended to disappoint those who thought he should have vigorously pushed what he described as an agenda for whole humanity, not just for individual nations. There is little doubt, though, that if the disastrous path toward further global warming would ever come to be checked, however partially, the achievement would be another exemplification of the transnational spirit of the age.

Perhaps the deepest meaning of Obama's presidency was that it demonstrated the possibility that transnationalism could be promoted in a world still consisting of nations. Indeed, major events that shook the world in the year 2011 indicated that the transnational framework was the only way in which to understand contemporary history. Throughout the year, citizens in North Africa and the Middle East engaged in movements to democratize their countries' political institutions. Long suppressed by oligarchs and dictators, private individuals and organizations sensed that they would have the support of the international community if they demanded more rights and freedoms. Tyrannies fell in some countries, such as Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, but remained obdurate in others, notably Syria, but these developments were not viewed as separate national phenomena but as part of a worldwide development. The "Arab spring," as they were collectively called, was not entirely nation-specific. The world community, through the UN and other organizations, expressed their support. Some nations, it is true, remained indifferent, at least on the surface. Countries such as Russia and China opposed any kind of intervention in the affairs of those countries in turmoil and maintained tight control over what happened within their own borders. But a nation-by-nation response was anachronistic. Even the decision by some NATO

countries as well as the United States to send military aircraft to help pro-democracy rebels was a conventional, international approach. Private organizations that became involved in supporting and helping the rebels were likely to be more productive of results simply because they were transnational, not separate national, efforts.

The meaning of transnational involvement also became abundantly clear during the series of crises that hit Japan in 2011: the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear power failures. The international community's response was as quick as it was extensive. Individuals and organizations in more than one hundred countries expressed their sympathy and sent their support to the victims of the natural disasters, and various governments dispatched military personnel, doctors, and rescue workers to the scenes of devastation. When the nuclear power plants failed and began their meltdown, spreading nuclear radioactive materials into the air, land, and waters (including the Pacific Ocean), not only the International Atomic Energy Agency but also leaders of France, Germany, the United States, China, South Korea, and many other countries visited Japan to offer advice and to share information. Because all these countries made use of nuclear energy, the Japanese fiasco was seen as a transnational crisis that could be coped with only through cross-border cooperation.

If nothing else, the democracy movements in the Middle East and the nuclear meltdown in Japan demonstrated that there was really only one, interconnected world. All countries, people, religions, and cultures were interconnected. The transnationalization of humankind was in clear evidence, a product of all the forces that had moved history after the Second World War. Separate national interests remained, but they had to be placed in the context of transnational, human interests. It would be the task of all people, leaders as well as citizens, scholars as well as others, to identify with the direction of history, to combat the still influential mono-nationalistic thinking, and to bequeath a precious gift to the generations who would inherit the Earth and be entrusted with the task of the world's further transnationalization.