International Journal of Communication 17(2023), 72–91 1932–8036/20230005
Copyright © 2023 (Ji Hoon Park, Kristin April Kim, and Yongsuk Lee). Licensed under the Creative Commons
Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives (by-nc-nd). Available at http://ijoc.org.
Netflix and Platform Imperialism:
How Netflix Alters the Ecology of the Korean TV Drama Industry
JI HOON PARK1
KRISTIN APRIL KIM
YONGSUK LEE
Korea University, South Korea
Applying the concept of platform imperialism, we investigate how Netflix has altered the
practices of Korean drama production and the theoretical implications of this influence in
the study of the Korean Wave. Despite Netflix’s positive contributions to increasing the
reputation of Korean dramas, Netflix’s aggressive international content strategies pose a
significant challenge to the Korean media industry. Because Netflix acquires all IP rights
to Netflix Korean originals and the global streaming rights to numerous Korean dramas,
neither production companies nor Korean television stations gain profits commensurate
with the global popularity of Korean dramas. Netflix’s strategic use of the Korean Wave
and the aggressive acquisition of the streaming rights of Korean dramas may ultimately
work to consolidate platform imperialism.
Keywords: platform imperialism, Netflix, Korean drama, IP rights
The global, over-the-top (OTT) platform Netflix announced that it would spend approximately 500
million USD on Korean films and TV shows in 2021 (Brzeski, 2021). On February 24, 2021, Minyoung Kim,
VP of Content for Korea, Southeast Asia, Australia, and New Zealand, posted an article titled “Riding the KWave,
Netflix Spotlights Stories Made in Korea and Watched by the World” on the company’s website. M.
Kim (2021) stated, “The K-Wave, or Hallyu as we call it here in Korea, is a huge moment of national pride
and we’re proud to be part of it” (para. 2). Netflix’s collaboration with the Korean drama industry has begun
a new chapter in the history of the Korean Wave. As M. Kim (2021) notes, the largest OTT platform, with
more than 200 million subscribers across over 190 countries, gives unprecedented levels of access to its
“members around the world to fall in love with these Korean dramas” (para. 5).
Ji Hoon Park (corresponding author): winterof93@korea.ac.kr
Kristin April Kim: kristinaprilkim@korea.ac.kr
Yongsuk Lee: dragrock@gmail.com
Date submitted: 08-10-2021
1
This research was supported by the School of Media and Communication, Korea University [grant number
K2108121]. This research was also supported by the 2021 Korean Studies Grant Program of the Academy
of Korean Studies (AKS-2021-C-009) and by the MSIT (Ministry of Science and ICT), Korea, under the ITRC
(Information Technology Research Center) support program (IITP-2020-0-01749-001).
International Journal of Communication 17(2023) Netflix and Platform Imperialism 73
As part of its strategy to acquire international content, Netflix paid Korean production
companies to make original series, such as Kingdom (S. Lee, 2019) and Extracurricular (Yoon, 2020).
From 2015 to 2020, Netflix spent approximately 700 million USD on over 80 Korean originals (B. Kim,
2021). Furthermore, Netflix paid 2.4 million USD per episode for Sweet Home (Y. Kim, 2020), making
the series the most expensive Korean drama in per-episode productions. In 2021, Netflix plans to release
several originals, including dramas, films, sitcoms, and variety shows. In addition, two production
facilities signed their leases in 2021 with Netflix Korea, marking Netflix’s commitment to expanding
original Korean content.
Netflix has a reputation for providing a generous production budget and unparalleled creative
freedom to producers. These provisions have resulted in numerous critically acclaimed award-winning
shows. In addition, Netflix has increased the content diversity of Korean dramas by investing in story ideas
and genres deemed unacceptable by Korean TV stations. By reducing export processes, Netflix has boosted
the global consumption of Korean dramas by making them easily accessible to foreign viewers (H. Kim,
2020). For instance, shortly after its release on Netflix, It’s Okay to Not Be Okay (So, 2020) topped the
most-viewed list of Netflix shows in Vietnam, Thailand, Taiwan, the Philippines, Singapore, and Japan.
Critics are hopeful about the future of the Korean Wave bolstered by the power of Netflix. The Asahi
Shimbun ran a headline, “Fresh Korean Wave Sweeping World, Powered by Netflix Hits” (Edogawa & Ito,
2020). In the study of the Korean Wave, global platforms, such as YouTube, are driving forces behind the
worldwide popularity of K-pop (Oh & Park, 2012). Thus, we ask: Can the Korean drama industry’s
collaboration with the streaming giant Netflix also serve as positive momentum, pushing the industry further
and helping it gain a greater foothold in foreign markets? How does Netflix’s extensive investment in Korean
drama production impact how the Korean drama industry operates at both the macro and micro levels (e.g.,
financing, ownership of intellectual property [IP] rights, and production processes)?
While there is no shortage of academic literature on Netflix, few studies have empirically identified
the impact of Netflix’s ever-growing influence on Korean drama production. Applying the concept of platform
imperialism, we investigate how Netflix has altered the practices of Korean drama production and the
theoretical implications of this influence in the study of the Korean Wave.
Revisiting Cultural Imperialism
Studies of cultural imperialism surfaced in the 1960s to understand the unequal international
relations of the post-World War II era (Moody, 2017). Among the many scholars (Boyd-Barrett, 1977;
Tunstall, 1977) who investigated how states exerted and extended governmental power by intervening in
cultural affairs, Schiller’s views had a lasting influence. Schiller (1976) defined cultural imperialism as
the sum of processes by which a society is brought into the modern world-system and
how its dominating stratum is attracted, pressured, forced, and sometimes bribed into
shaping social institutions to correspond to, or even promote, the values and structures
of the dominant center of the system. (pp. 9–10)
74 Ji Hoon Park et al. International Journal of Communication 17(2023)
Presenting the United States as the world’s most preeminent influence, Schiller proposed two core
concepts of cultural imperialism: First, that U.S. media and cultural products dominate international media
trade, and second, that “the continual consumption of this U.S.-made material is effective propaganda for
the ideas and values of the United States” (Sparks, 2012, p. 284).
Within media studies, the discussion of cultural imperialism culminated in the late 1970s and early
1980s when developing nations came together in UNESCO to form the New World Information and
Communication Order (NWICO). The NWICO demanded a stop to Western-centric development and
requested an examination of imbalances in the production and distribution of information, particularly in
news espousing Western values (Mosco, 1996). The NWICO debate represented a critical moment of
resistance and political intervention. Developing countries demanded an end to the one-way flow of
information and media content on an international scale, challenging Western hegemony and its corrosive
influence on local cultures.
However, the concept of cultural imperialism has since been “thoroughly discredited and more or
less fallen out of mainstream usage” (Sparks, 2012, p. 281). Instead, some scholars have proposed
alternative theories that place more emphasis on global-local relations rather than the roles of the state
(Appadurai, 1996; Straubhaar, 1991). Recognizing the complexity of media flows in the global media
environment, Straubhaar (1991) argued that countries defend their own cultures and share their cultural
products globally. Morley (2005) outlined the limitations of cultural imperialism theories and their
application, claiming that cultural imperialism cannot fully capture the influence of active audiences, complex
international communication flows, glocalization strategies, and cultural protectionism effects adopted by
various countries. Lu (2013) claimed that in addition to the widespread use of satellite and cable television,
the rising popularity of communication online has “enabled the flows of international culture in a multinational,
multi-media, and multi-directional movement instead of a one-way model” (p. 53). Scholars use
Latin American telenovelas, Bollywood films, and the Korean Wave as examples illustrating the potential of
cultural industries as sources of contraflow.
Recent scholarship has characterized the Korean Wave as a significant contraflow to Westerndominant
transnational pop culture (Ju, 2018; Shim, 2006). The Korean Wave, or Hallyu, is a term
describing the global dispersion of South Korean cultural products, including, but not limited to, television
programs, pop music, films, online games, and fashions. Although the wave first emerged as a transnational
cultural phenomenon in East and Southeast Asian regions with megahit K-dramas Autumn in My Heart
(Yoon, 2000), Winter Sonata (Kim & Kim, 2002), and Dae Jang Geum (Jin & Yoon, 2016; Jo, 2003–2004),
the rise of Korean content has since spread to a global level. Since its international debut, the Korean Wave
has profited from the increasing number of North American audiences of Hallyu content and the global rise
of K-pop culture fandom (Lansky, 2012).
Despite contraflow’s challenge to the dominant flow of media content produced by Western media
organizations, Lu (2013) argues that the West’s dominant position endures because the space non-Western
content occupies in the global market share remains relatively small. Fuchs (2010) recognizes the continuing
significance of imperialism as a useful theoretical framework for understanding unequal information flow in
the digital era, given that the U.S. dominance of information and communication technology (ICT) further
International Journal of Communication 17(2023) Netflix and Platform Imperialism 75
perpetuates U.S. hegemony. Jin (2013, 2015, 2017) coined the term “platform imperialism” to discuss the
rise of a new form of imperialism.
The Rise of Platform Imperialism
Platforms operate in various ways: They serve as a “software framework running on the World
Wide Web or Internet” (Hands, 2013, p. 3), act as “online services of content intermediaries” (Gillespie,
2010, p. 348), and also function as mediators that shape “the performance of social acts instead of merely
facilitating them” (van Dijck, 2013, p. 29). Digital platforms, such as social networking sites, search engines,
and on-demand streaming media, have permeated every corner of society in the 21st century and have had
a tremendous impact on content containment, distribution, and management. The influence of platform
media has various implications in technological, cultural, and economic dimensions.
Scholars have expressed different views on Netflix’s status as a platform. Lobato (2019) regards
Netflix as a portal rather than a platform because its operation is not based on user interaction and
user-generated content. For Jin (2021), however, Netflix is “the most significant AI-supported OTT
service platform” (p. 76) because it uses considerable data, algorithms, and AI to generate commercial
profits, which is the defining characteristic of digital media platforms. As the acronym FAANG (Facebook,
Amazon, Apple, Netflix, and Google) represents American platform corporations, Davis (2021) also views
Netflix as a platform because it relies on user data to sustain its business model and build
recommendation algorithms to facilitate user engagement. Despite their different views, scholars all
assert the need to focus on Netflix’s unique characteristic as “a hybrid TV-cinema-digital media
distribution system” (Lobato, 2019, p. 44) or “as a mediator to control the vicious chain of cultural
spheres, starting in the field of distribution, but now also including production and exhibition” (Jin, 2021,
p. 77).
Platform technologies provide tremendous advantages from a commercial perspective, affording
owners and designers the ability to sell platforms, content, and users as commodities. They accumulate
massive capital gains for their owners—mainly U.S. media mega giants—and further the unequal
accumulation of capital in the hands of a few (Jin, 2017). Investigating how U.S.-based platforms have
dominated local markets, Jin (2013) defines platform imperialism as “an asymmetrical relationship of
interdependence between the West, primarily the United States, and many developing powers” (p. 154) in
platform technologies and political culture. The growth of mega-platforms and their crucial role in the global
flow of capitalism and information has been met with criticism; critics question the implications of a platform
that “suggests a progressive and egalitarian arrangement, promising to support those who stand upon it”
(Gillespie, 2010, p. 350).
Although technological and cultural flows have been characterized as asymmetrical in the past,
platform imperialism is distinctly different from previous discussions of imperialism. While the
exportation of goods previously maintained unequal power relations in culture and hardware, platform
imperialism hides and embeds commercial value in the platform itself as IP and consequently provides
substantial tools to expand power and capital accumulation (Jin, 2013). In fact, the economic product
of the United States in the early 21st century was predominantly conceptual: Intangible assets
76 Ji Hoon Park et al. International Journal of Communication 17(2023)
comprised three-quarters of the value of publicly traded U.S. companies, marking a 40% increase
compared to the early 1980s (The Economist, 2005). Additionally, IP-intensive industries accounted for
38.3% of the total GDP and 6.6 trillion USD in value added in 2014 for the United States (Antonipillai &
Lee, 2016). Because the most prominent digital platforms, such as Google, Facebook, YouTube, and
Twitter, are U.S. platforms, this centralization of media power could lead to “an increasing tension
between developed countries as IP owners and developing countries as IP users” (Jin, 2015, p. 110). As
IP plays a crucial role in accumulating capital for Western-based platform owners, non-Western countries
cannot significantly expand their global market share.
Inspired by the Canadian Netflix imperialism debate, in which the President of the Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) accused Netflix of engaging in cultural imperialism in 2019, Davis
(2021) coined the term “Netflix imperialism” to refer to Netflix’s transnational, monopolistic position as
the world’s largest television network. As Netflix’s transnational production scales up its production
budgets, local TV stations or platforms cannot afford to compete. Benefitting from economies of scale,
Netflix lures top-tier local creators who wish to collaborate with it. The stable supply of multilingual,
multicultural, original international content helps Netflix’s capital accumulation and solidifies its
transnational monopoly.
Steinberg (2019), who studied the rise of the platform economy, suggested that scholars should
investigate platform and platform imperialism at three levels: (1) interface, (2) content generation, and (3)
distribution. This study analyzes not only how Netflix has become a major interface/mediator of TV dramas
but also its substantial role in Korean drama production and global circulation.
Netflix’s International Content Strategy
Operating in more than 190 countries, Netflix has more worldwide subscribers than all other
streaming services combined, and its international streaming revenues exceed domestic gains (Brennan,
2018). Netflix broke new ground by creating original international content to stay relevant and attract a
steady influx of new customers (Skinner, 2020). Localization is still vital in determining the chances of
success for transnational television services, and Netflix has demonstrated the “fundamentally local nature
of global taste” by committing to localization strategies and geographically diverse original productions
(Lobato, 2019, p. 182). Moreover, content is delivered to global audiences with localization techniques, such
as dubbing, translations, and subtitling, allowing for further integration and heightened appeal in
international markets (Barra, 2013; Jenner, 2018).
Because of the structural changes following its internationalization, Netflix has been
recharacterized by scholars as a collection of national media services rather than one homogenous global
service (Wayne & Castro, 2020). Brennan (2018) argued that Netflix’s success was due to a three-stage
expansion process into new markets. First, Netflix refrained from entering all markets at once; instead,
it started its 2010 global expansion slowly in countries that were similar to the U.S. home market, such
as Canada. A second faster and more extensive growth phase occurred in 50 other countries, which
were selected based on shared similarities, availability of broadband Internet, and affluent consumers.
During this phase, Netflix adapted to local cultures and preferences, focusing on partnerships formed
International Journal of Communication 17(2023) Netflix and Platform Imperialism 77
with local stakeholders. In the third and accelerated phase, Netflix combined what it had learned from
the first two phases and entered more than 190 countries. Armed with the knowledge of people’s content
preferences and marketing tactics, they responded by adding more languages, optimizing the
personalization algorithms of global content, and improving the mobile experience.
Netflix produces country-specific, localized original content to cater to local tastes and save costs.
One advantage of creating content abroad is savings: shooting films and TV series outside the United States
while keeping production within the United States is significantly more costly (Skinner, 2020). Moreover,
Netflix’s loss of costly TV shows to other platforms freed up the company’s budget, allowing for more
investment into original content (Whitten, 2019). In response to Netflix’s plans to invest 50 million USD in
Korean content production this year, Huh (2021) notes:
[Global OTT companies] have no choice but to like Korean content and the Korean market
. . . (because) in Hollywood, a film that costs hundreds of millions of dollars can be made
for tens of millions of dollars in Korea. It is predicted that the strength of Korean video
content based on K-stories will continue for the time being, because profits are high due
to good cost performance. (p. 98)
Methods
To examine how Netflix has altered the ecology of Korean drama production, we asked the following
three questions: What is the industrial context in which Korean production companies increasingly depend
on Netflix’s investments? What are the significant changes that Netflix has brought to the practice of Korean
drama production? In terms of Korean Wave studies, what are the theoretical implications of Netflix’s
aggressive acquisition of Korean dramas’ IP rights and global streaming rights?
Production studies that explore the cultural implications of production contexts, conventions,
and industrial practices (Caldwell, 2008; Levine, 2001) serve as a framework for our study. We
conducted semi-structured interviews with 15 individuals working in the Korean drama industry between
October 2020 and May 2021. The interviewees included writers, directors, producers, a terrestrial TV
station producer, and a marketing manager whose experience in the field ranged from 9 to over 25
years, whom we believed best provided us with information about the significant changes that had
happened in the K-drama industry after Netflix’s involvement in Korean drama production. In addition,
several interviewees worked closely with Netflix. As one of us (the main interviewer) had been working
as a drama director for more than 25 years and knew most interviewees on a personal level, we were
received as TV industry insiders, and the interviewees seemed comfortable sharing their views and
experiences with us. The interviews were conducted either in a coffee shop, a restaurant, or in the
interviewees’ office. Each interview lasted between one and two hours and was recorded and transcribed
for thorough analysis (see Table 1). We also used information from newspapers, industry magazines,
and Netflix’s website for supplementary data.
78 Ji Hoon Park et al. International Journal of Communication 17(2023)
Table 1. Interviewee Information.
Interviewee Occupation
A Production company CEO
B Production company CEO
C Production company CEO
D Production company CEO
E Production company producer
F Director
G Director
H Director, writer
I Writer
J Writer
K Writer
L Writer
M Writer
N Terrestrial TV station producer
O Terrestrial TV marketing manager
Results
The Korean Drama Industry’s Increasing Dependence on Netflix’s Investment
The Korean TV industry has always faced low production budgets because of its limited market
size. The typical funding structure for drama production is as follows: TV stations supply about a third of
the production budget to production companies. In addition, another third of the production budget comes
from corporate sponsorships, such as product placement. After Winter Sonata (Kim & Kim, 2002) paved the
way for the Korean Wave in the early 2000s, the presale of broadcast rights to Japanese TV stations provided
a third or more of the production budget for Korean dramas. However, the deep chill in the diplomatic
relationship between Korea and Japan during the Lee Myung-Bak administration (2008–2013) jeopardized
Korean drama exports to Japan. Anti-Korean sentiments peaked in 2012 when Lee visited Dokdo, an islet
at the center of the feud between the two countries, culminating in the halt of Korean drama sales in Japan.
The critical loss of the Japanese market led to the bankruptcy of numerous production companies in Korea
(Interviewee E).
In 2013, China began to replace Japan as a major financier of Korean dramas. The enormous
success of the Chinese streaming platform iQiyi motivated Chinese TV stations, streaming platforms, and
corporations to use Korean dramas as inexpensive, yet profitable content for a rapidly growing Chinese
market (Park, Lee, & Seo, 2019). iQiyi acquired the broadcast license of a Korean hit drama series, My Love
from the Star (Jang, 2013–2014), for approximately 600,000 USD but gained more than 100 million USD
in revenue. Having observed iQiyi’s profitable business model in using Korean dramas, Chinese investors
rushed to Korea and willingly provided a substantial portion of production costs to acquire the distribution
rights of Korean dramas in China. In addition, they bought an aggressive stake in leading production
International Journal of Communication 17(2023) Netflix and Platform Imperialism 79
companies to become majority shareholders in companies like Chorokbaem Media and Kim Jong-Hak
Production, thereby sharing the revenues generated by Korean dramas’ domestic and global sales (Special
Reporting Team, 2016).
The U.S.-Korean alliance’s decision to deploy Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in
Korea in July 2016 cast a shadow on the hopeful future of Korean creativity fueled by Chinese capital. While
the deployment of THAAD was a security strategy to protect Korea from imminent North Korean missile
threats, China saw the strategy as an extension of U.S. military interests and a threat to its national security
(Reals, 2017). When the Korean government refused to withdraw THAAD upon China’s request, China
imposed various restrictions to hurt the Korean economy, banning Chinese citizens from traveling to Korea,
canceling K-pop tours, and suspending the airing or streaming of Korean TV shows in China (Taylor, 2017).
The THAAD controversy immediately ended the sales of Korean dramas to China and Chinese investments
in the Korean drama industry (Park et al., 2019).
The post-THAAD Korean drama industry was left with several predicaments. Despite the withdrawal
of Chinese investment, overall drama production costs remained high because Chinese corporations’
generous supply of production budgets resulted in a salary surge for top writers, directors, and
actors/actresses. Moreover, the 52-hour workweek system implemented by the Korean government further
increased production costs (S. Kim, 2019). In July 2019, drama production companies had to comply with
the government requirement of reducing the maximum number of weekly working hours from 68 to 52
hours for companies with more than 300 employees. Exacerbating this situation, COVID-19 plagued Korean
drama production by increasing the average production cost by 10% or more because of additional expenses
for disinfection and potential delays in production schedules (S. Kim, 2020). The production of dramas such
as The Penthouse: War in Life (Cho, 2020–2021), The Spies Who Loved Me (Hwang, 2020), River Where
the Moon Rises (Kang & Kim, 2021), and Sisyphus: The Myth (Jung, 2021) came to a halt when actors and
staff tested positive for coronavirus (Lim, 2020).
Most importantly, the decline in advertising revenues and the increased competition between TV
channels and streaming platforms (both domestic and global) reduced slots for drama series on TV channels.
As drama was the most capital-intensive genre, terrestrial TV stations could reduce financial deficits by
reducing the number of new drama series to air on their channels. Three major terrestrial stations, the
largest outlet of dramas, cut the number of new drama series released in 2021 by 25%–30%. KBS went
from 16 slots to 6–10 slots, MBC went from 11 slots to 7–8 slots, and SBS went from 13 to 10 slots (Yoo,
2020). The producers we interviewed stated that the cut severely hit production companies because of
increased competition for limited time slots.
Launching its Korean service in 2015, Netflix emerged as the savior of Korean drama when a
heightened sense of crisis was pervasive in the industry. Netflix’s involvement in the Korean drama industry
was part of its global content strategy. When the Korean industry was afflicted with a lack of investment
and reduced slots for dramas on TV channels, Netflix financed Korean drama production and offered a
distribution platform for Korean dramas. Thus, the producers, writers, and directors we interviewed
unanimously welcomed Netflix’s participation in the Korean drama industry.
80 Ji Hoon Park et al. International Journal of Communication 17(2023)
Netflix intervenes in the Korean drama industry in three main ways. First, Netflix pays
approximately 110% of the production budget to Korean production companies for original content (H. Lee,
2020). In exchange for supplying the entire production cost, Netflix obtains all IP rights to the Korean
original series. Netflix then exclusively streams the original Korean series to Korean and global audiences.
Korean original series include Kingdom (S. Lee, 2009) and Squid Game (Hwang, 2021–present). Netflix
increased the number of original Korean series in 2021 and 2022 (“Category,” n.d.).
Second, Netflix has established content creation partnerships with two leading drama studios,
Studio Dragon (a drama production studio of CJ ENM’s tvN) and JTBC Studio (formerly Drama House, a
drama production studio of JTBC), in 2017, to boost its international content portfolio. As a result, Netflix
invests approximately 50%–70% of the production costs in the Korean drama series that the two studios
produce. For instance, Netflix invested 30 billion won out of the 43 billion won production budget for tvN’s
Mr. Sunshine (H. Lee, 2020). In return, Netflix acquired its exclusive global streaming rights (except in
China) and nonexclusive streaming rights in Korea. In November 2019, Netflix renewed its partnership with
JTBC Studio and Studio Dragon and is expected to receive about 20 drama series from each studio from
2020 to 2023 (M. Lee, 2019). Examples of the two studios’ collaboration with Netflix include Mr. Sunshine
(Kim & Yoon, 2018), Crash Landing on You (Um, Jang, Lee, & Kang, 2019–2020), It’s Okay to Not Be Okay
(So, 2020), Itaewon Class (Jo, 2020), and Run On (J. Lee, 2020–2021).
Third, Netflix invests in drama series that air on three terrestrial TV stations (KBS, MBC, and SBS),
acquiring exclusive global streaming rights (except in China) and nonexclusive streaming rights in Korea.
However, terrestrial stations provide only a few dramas to Netflix each year due to the concern that Netflix’s
inroads can hurt the competitive edge of WAVVE, the OTT platform established and operated by the three
terrestrial stations and SK Telecom. Moreover, terrestrial stations are reluctant to share domestic streaming
rights because Netflix’s simultaneous streaming of the same show can lower the show’s ratings on TV and
reduce advertising revenues. Examples of terrestrial TV dramas on Netflix include When the Camellia Blooms
(H. Kim, 2019), Vagabond (Y. Lee, 2019), Rookie Historian Goo Hae-ryung (Kim & Cho, 2019), and The
King’s Affection (Yoon, Han, Song, & Park, 2021).
Changes Netflix Has Brought to the Korean Drama Industry
All the interviewees regarded the rise of OTT platforms as the most significant change in the TV
landscape in recent years. Among domestic and global OTT platforms, Netflix was seen as a game changer
in Korean drama production; now, the platform stands as a major financier and distributor of Korean dramas
on both domestic and global levels. On an individual level, directors, writers, and producers welcome Netflix
because they can instantly earn international recognition if their shows become popular on Netflix
(Interviewees F, G, H, and I). The producers we interviewed all commented that every production company’s
dream now is to work with Netflix. Interviewee I said, “If you get an opportunity to work with Netflix, it’s
just like the glory of the family or hitting the jackpot!” According to Interviewee B, numerous production
companies lined up for miles in front of Netflix to solicit investment.
Netflix brought significant changes to the Korean drama industry on a structural level. Most
noticeably, the platform giant facilitated the production of big-budget Korean dramas and enhanced their
International Journal of Communication 17(2023) Netflix and Platform Imperialism 81
overall production values. The average per episode production cost for Korean drama series starts at
approximately 500,000 USD. Netflix’s first Korean original series Kingdom (S. Lee, 2019) had a per-episode
cost of approximately 1.7 million USD, making the series the most expensive non-U.S. original series (Baek,
2019). Surpassing its record for Korean drama production costs, Netflix invested 2.4 million USD per episode
in the original series Sweet Home (Y. Kim, 2020; Chui, 2020). Netflix’s generous investment resulted in the
production of big-budget drama series.
All interviewees agreed that Netflix had increased the content diversity of Korean dramas.
Because creative ideas face a few limitations because of budget constraints, writers, producers, and
directors are free to work with a diverse range of stories. In addition, as far as the original content is
concerned, Netflix is known to prefer unconventional genres (e.g., horror and thriller) and innovative
approaches to storytelling—risks that Korean TV stations are reluctant to take, given their interest in
appealing to broader audiences. Interviewees mentioned that original series such as Kingdom (S. Lee,
2019) and Sweet Home (Y. Kim, 2020) could not have been made in Korea without Netflix’s keen interest
in unconventional genres and stories. With the support of Netflix, writers, producers, and directors feel
less pressure to compromise their creativity because of the constraints set by the platform. Instead,
they aggressively search for and develop unconventional, innovative story ideas to pitch to Netflix,
thereby contributing to the content diversity of Korean dramas. Interviewee J recently met many writers
working on horror and thriller drama scripts.
The flexibility of Netflix’s drama formats motivates Korean production companies to change the
“conventional grammar” of storytelling in Korean dramas. TV dramas are structured and scheduled based
on advertising time slots because commercial advertising is a primary source of income. A typical Korean
drama series has at least 16 episodes, with a runtime of 90 minutes per episode. Conversely, Netflix offers
flexibility in terms of the number of episodes per drama and the runtime of each episode because it is a
streaming platform that relies on paid subscriptions rather than commercial revenues. For example, the
Korean Netflix original series Sweet Home (Y. Kim, 2020) has 10 episodes, and each episode runs 46–59
minutes. The writer of House of Cards, Netflix’s first original series, commented on the advantages of the
platform’s flexibility, stating that “it allows the director to make editing choices that are the best thing
artistically, not necessarily hewing toward a particular running time standard” (Volpe, 2017, para. 9).
Producers and writers we interviewed seemed excited to develop story ideas without the time restrictions
of conventional TV slots and schedules. Some argued that they must unlearn familiar narrative techniques
and practices (Interviewees M and F) and that the Korean Television and Radio Writers Association Academy
must change the scriptwriting curriculum to produce a new generation of writers who understand the new
storytelling methods for OTT platforms (Interviewee B).
Interviewees stated that Netflix encourages producers to exert uncompromised, creative
potential in drama production. They frequently compared Korean TV stations with Netflix, claiming that
the latter gives unparalleled creative freedom to Korean production companies, whereas the former
applies gapjil to producers, a term that describes the “abusive conduct by people in positions of power
toward those under their influence” (Garikipati & Newswires, 2019, para. 7). A hierarchical relationship
has existed between TV stations and production companies in Korea because TV stations select the
dramas to air on their channels. As production companies must compete for limited drama slots on TV
82 Ji Hoon Park et al. International Journal of Communication 17(2023)
channels, TV stations have exerted power over production companies. According to interviewees, unlike
Korean TV stations, which meticulously oversee the details of production processes, Netflix provides
partner production companies with substantial creative autonomy, which leads to increased creativity.
Recalling his experience working with Netflix, Interviewee H commented, “Unlike TV stations in Korea
that do all sorts of gapjil to us, Netflix never sticks its oar into casting or other important decisions.”
After Netflix entered Korea, production companies began to prioritize the TV development
process of drama production. The interviews suggest that production companies were motivated by the
success of Astory and Studio 329, production companies that made critically acclaimed Netflix originals
Kingdom (S. Lee, 2019) and Extracurricular (Yoon, 2020), respectively. While they were companies with
low profiles, both Astory and Studio 329 demonstrated their creative ability and potential via Netflix’s
original format: their stock prices skyrocketed consequently. Approximately five months after
Extracurricular was released on Netflix, Studio 329 was sold to the Korean department store franchise
Shinsegae, which recently entered the content business with big ambition. Before Netflix, TV stations in
Korea preferred to work with production companies that could hire top-tier creators (e.g., writers,
directors, and acting talent)—under this setup, only big production companies dominated. Now, Netflix
provides second-tier production companies that cannot afford to hire top-tier creators with an
unprecedented opportunity to compete against top-tier rivals as long as they have well-developed solid
story ideas (Interviewees C and D). In 2020, the terrestrial station SBS established Studio S, a
production company that focuses on TV development. Many production companies now have TV
development teams specializing in finding scripts with potential, developing core ideas that fit the needs
of different platforms, and getting the dramas into production. Interviewee B characterized Netflix’s
involvement in Korean drama as the “new normal” because production companies do not need to rely
solely on top-tier creators to sell their shows. The prioritization of the development process can arguably
improve the overall quality of Korean dramas.
In summary, Netflix’s extensive investment in the Korean drama industry has changed the
paradigm of drama production by facilitating the production of big-budget dramas, promoting content
diversity, and maximizing creators’ uncompromised creativity—all of which could bring Korean drama to the
next level. Despite the positive views on Netflix’s involvement in the Korean drama industry, a few
interviewees raised concerns about the dependence on Netflix and Netflix’s acquisition of many Korean
drama rights.
Netflix’s Acquisition of Korean Dramas’ IP Rights
All the interviewees understood the critical importance of IP rights in the age of global streaming
wars because TV stations or production companies would not thrive without securing IP rights. The best
scenario for Korean TV stations and production companies is to possess the IP rights of their drama series
and sell the distribution rights to each country, just as they did before Netflix joined the Korean drama
industry. However, because of the lack of domestic investment, Korean TV stations and production
companies are in positions to transfer many of their rights to Netflix (see Table 2).
International Journal of Communication 17(2023) Netflix and Platform Imperialism 83
Table 2. Netflix’s Investment Types and Acquisition of IP Rights.
Investment Type Partners The Rights Netflix Acquires
Financing original series:
Approximately 110% of production
budgets
Production
companies
All IP rights, including exclusive streaming
rights in Korea and globally
Establishing content creation
partnerships: Approximately 50%–
70% of production budgets
Studio Dragon,
JTBC Studio
Nonexclusive streaming rights in Korea.
Exclusive global streaming rights (except
for China)
Acquiring finished dramas license
from the content owners
License Holders
(TV stations and
production
companies)
Nonexclusive streaming rights in Korea.
Nonexclusive global streaming rights
Having experienced pre-THAAD Chinese investment in Korean dramas, interviewees were keenly
aware that foreign investors with an extensive distribution network ultimately earn astoundingly more profits
than Korean production companies. Not only does Netflix have a global distribution network, but it also
possesses IP rights to Korean original drama content and exclusive global streaming rights to numerous
Korean dramas. While the interviewees often used the word “lamentable” in describing Netflix’s acquisition
of Korean drama rights, they all agreed that there was nothing they could do about it.
Two factors underlie the structural conditions in which Netflix continues to acquire exclusive
rights to Korean original series and global streaming rights to many Korean dramas with little resistance
from Korean companies or TV stations. First, domestic OTT platforms, TV stations, and other
corporations must invest in Korean drama production if they wish to own the IP rights of the content.
Domestic streaming platforms such as TVING and WAVVE have begun to produce original drama series.
However, because of the high risks resulting from the small market size, neither domestic streaming
platforms, TV stations, nor production companies can invest in a large production budget commensurate
with what Netflix can offer. Interviewee D stated, “I would rather transfer the IP rights to Netflix instead
of my company taking risks.” Conversely, Netflix can manage large investments and spread risks by
diversifying its content portfolio at the global level. Because of shrinking domestic investment in the
drama industry, there is little room for production companies to negotiate with Netflix, so they end up
accepting the terms and conditions of the agreement.
Second, with its global distribution capacity, Netflix benefits from economies of scale. Netflix can
lower the per-unit production cost of its content because it reaches more than 200 million subscribers
worldwide. Although there is an American streaming service operated by three Korean terrestrial stations
called KOCOWA, which streams Korean TV programs, it is barely comparable to Netflix. Because Korean TV
stations and streaming platforms do not have global streaming platforms and offer only to domestic markets
and limited foreign markets, they cannot compete with the massive production budget that Netflix can
provide to Korean production companies. Thus, Korean TV stations, streaming platforms, and production
companies have become dependent on Netflix’s investment, resulting in disadvantages to the competitive
acquisition of rights to new Korean dramas.
84 Ji Hoon Park et al. International Journal of Communication 17(2023)
Netflix is likely to monopolize the global streaming rights to most big-budget Korean drama series
because their production is now unfeasible without Netflix’s investment. Netflix’s participation in the Korean
drama industry has further increased the already high salaries of top writers, directors, actors, and actresses
of international reputes. Production companies themselves often inflate top creators’ salaries to receive
more production budgets from Netflix. When Netflix invests in a drama series, it typically provides 50%–
70% of the total production costs; consequently, production companies inflate the salaries of top writers
and acting talents to receive as much investment as possible from Netflix. A vicious cycle of dependency
occurs. Without Netflix’s investment, Korean production companies find it difficult to hire top creators. To
pay astonishingly high salaries to top writers, directors, and stars, production companies depend on Netflix’s
investment and transfer global streaming rights to Netflix. In short, Netflix monopolizes its access to top
human resources in the Korean TV industry.
Despite its positive contributions to Korean dramas, Netflix poses a serious threat to the Korean
drama industry. As discussed earlier, production companies and people working in the Korean drama
industry welcome Netflix’s participation in Korean drama production because it has opened new
opportunities for Korean creators. However, Netflix’s accelerated spending on Korean drama productions
can further increase the Korean industry’s dependence on Netflix’s investment; additionally, handing over
production rights to Netflix ultimately becomes a fundamental basis for revenue generation. It is Netflix that
benefits most from the global reputation of Korean dramas in financial terms.
Netflix’s aggressive investment in Korean TV productions may lead to the weakening of Korean
domestic TV stations and platforms. TV stations, particularly terrestrial TV stations, have a hard time
supplying their audiences with quality TV dramas because Netflix has become the preferred platform for top
creators. Two interviewees working at terrestrial stations (N and O) expressed their concern that terrestrial
TV stations would end up with mediocre, if not poor, quality dramas that Korean audiences would not find
attractive. Lamenting the weakening popularity of terrestrial TV dramas, Interviewee O commented, “No
doubt that Netflix has become the most preferred platform for top-tier writers and even acting talent. They
even express their reluctance to work for the drama series to air on my station’s channel.” According to
Interviewee N, “It is no coincidence that almost all terrestrial TV dramas suffer from lowest viewership
because quality dramas have already been picked up by Netflix.” As Netflix has become the preferred
platform for Korean dramas for both creative workers in the TV industry and Korean audiences, two
interviewees expressed a strong concern that Netflix would ultimately monopolize Korean dramas with high
production values.
Conclusion
The global consumption of Korean popular culture, widely known as the Korean Wave, has been
considered a contraflow that challenges the cultural imperialism thesis (Jin & Yoon, 2016; Y. Kim, 2007).
With more than 200 million paid subscribers worldwide, the U.S.-based OTT platform Netflix facilitates the
international audience’s access to Korean dramas. Additionally, Netflix’s preference for originality in
storytelling and its generous supply of a vast production budget for Korean drama can arguably bring Korean
drama to the next level by enhancing its overall quality and content diversity. As seen in the unprecedented
International Journal of Communication 17(2023) Netflix and Platform Imperialism 85
global success of Squid Game (Hwang, 2020–present), both the Korean drama industry and Netflix appear
to benefit each other mutually and gain competitive edges.
Despite Netflix’s positive contributions to the growing reputation of Korean dramas, it is premature
to claim that Netflix’s involvement in the Korean drama industry leads to the further advancement of the
Korean Wave. On the contrary, Netflix’s aggressive international content strategies pose a significant
challenge to the Korean media industry. Because Netflix acquires all IP rights to Netflix Korean originals and
the global streaming rights to numerous Korean dramas, neither production companies nor Korean television
stations gain profits commensurate with the global popularity of Korean dramas. Squid Game (Hwang,
2020–present), which topped 111 million views globally, is worth almost 900 million USD and has helped
boost Netflix stock’s market value by 19 billion USD (Adinarayan, 2021). As Korean production companies
continue to be swayed by Netflix’s financial clout and Netflix financially benefits from the global success of
Korean dramas, the Korean drama industry may ultimately be relegated to a subcontractor role and
alienated from its own shows’ overseas profits.
With the global distribution of Korean dramas on Netflix, the Korean Wave has taken a new turn.
As Jin (2013) noted, IP is central to the capital accumulation and power expansion of platforms. Before the
rise of global OTT platforms, the export of Korean dramas to foreign markets led to a virtuous cycle, with
the influx of foreign sales revenues nurturing the industry’s growth. In IP battlegrounds where media
corporations and platforms strive to obtain IP rights to gain competitive edges, Netflix’s strategic use of the
Korean Wave and the aggressive acquisition of global streaming rights of Korean dramas may work to
consolidate platform imperialism.
Both cultural imperialism in the 1970s–1990s and platform imperialism today benefit U.S. media
corporations, albeit in different ways. Cultural imperialism functioned to promote U.S. media content while
annihilating local media content. Platform imperialism, on the other hand, promotes local content production
while acquiring exclusive global streaming rights. While the popularity of Korean dramas may challenge U.S.
hegemony in the cultural realm, Netflix’s takeover of Korean dramas’ IP rights can further strengthen the
U.S. platform’s hegemony in the economic realm. As a major conduit for high-quality Korean dramas, Netflix
is expected to accumulate capital. As Jin (2021) accurately notes, “Netflix is purposely riding the Korean
Wave” (p. 85).
Instead of offering an optimistic picture of Netflix’s contribution to increasing the accessibility of
Korean dramas in foreign markets, we stress the importance of utilizing a political-economic framework and
platform imperialism in theorizing the ongoing development of the Korean Wave under Netflix’s
monopolizing influence. More scholarly attention should be given to how IP-based content economics alters
the dynamics of transnational media content flows and the ecology of the local media industry. Finally, given
the scarcity of industry-based research on the Korean Wave, we suggest that further studies continue to
incorporate production studies perspectives to critically identify the impact of Netflix and other global OTT
platforms’ participation in the Korean drama production industry’s ecology.
86 Ji Hoon Park et al. International Journal of Communication 17(2023)
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