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© Institute for Research in Social Communication, Slovak Academy of Sciences
THE STUDY OF RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY
IN THE CZECH LANDS—DIVERSITY IN ACADEMIC
STUDIES OF RELIGIONS
DUŠAN LUŽNÝ
Abstract: This article attempts to summarize some of the experiences and methodological insights
gained from research on non-traditional religious groups that the author has conducted over the last twenty
years, primarily in Czech society. The starting point for these studies is respect for the principle that it is not
possible to approach the study of religious pluralism and diversity from a single predetermined conceptual
framework—religious diversity requires diverse approaches. However, within the diversity approach there
exist some common principles such as respect for the religious beliefs of respondents and the elimination of
personal stereotypes and ethnocentrism.
Key words: Religious diversity; religious pluralism; qualitative research; religious minorities; reflexivity
in research
Introduction
Modernity has several important constitutional elements, which include openness (openmindedness,
the tendency to change) and plurality. In other words, in its current phase
modern society (which can be described as postmodern society or reflexive society) emerges
from the principle of the radical recognition of diversity, the collapse of the power monopoly
on the legitimacy of “grand narratives” and the assertion of the right to be different.
In the context of “Western society,” this trend is particularly evident in the realm of
religious life, where there has been a breach in the legitimacy of the “mono-myth” connected
with the power and discursive domination of one form of religion, and the emergence of a
relatively free religious marketplace, and where a large number of religious organizations
compete with one another. The very existence of religious pluralism has many consequences,
such as changes in the behaviour of individual religious bodies (the growing emphasis
on including marketing practices and strategies, the necessity of religious tolerance and
interfaith dialogue on one hand and increasing fundamentalism on the other, etc.), as well as
a change in the cognitive disposition of individual believers (religious pluralism leads to a
weakening of faith in “one truth,” a strengthening of religious, ontological uncertainty and a
disruption of individual and group religious identity).
HUMAN AFFAIRS 22, 558–568, 2012
DOI: 10.2478/s13374-012-0044-x
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The existence of religious plurality and diversity (or the legitimacy of religious
difference) also has implications for the academic study of religion. This article attempts
to summarize experiences from research on religious diversity and indicate some principles
which researchers in the field of (qualitative) research on religion should take into account.
These principles, however, concern most areas of qualitative research (religions are “simply”
specific areas of research).
From the very beginning, every researcher (not only the researcher in the field of
religion) who enters the complicated field of social research encounters the issue of values
and the value orientation of the researcher him/herself. In fact, this issue consists of three
areas. The first is the particular value orientation of the researcher as an individual who has
undergone a particular type of socialization and enculturation in which he/she has adopted
a particular world view, which includes the personal value orientation which he/she more
or less holds to (or does not hold to) in his/her daily life. The second area is the ethical
requirements of academic work itself acquired by the individual during his/her studies and
subsequent scientific career and which is common to all academic disciplines (such as
correctly citing other authors and not presenting other people’s ideas as their own). The third
area is a set of specific values or principles inherent in specific academic disciplines, which
researchers from other disciplines do not have to deal with.
This article deals with the third and first of these areas, which are closely related to and
directly connected to the quality of so-called qualitative research in the social sciences. In
this type of research, unlike research on “inanimate” nature, the attitudes and life experiences
of the individual researcher are in fact quite sharply manifest. I am deeply convinced that
the quality of qualitative social science research directly depends on the life experiences
and value orientation of the individual researchers, and that at the same time, it is true that
life experiences and a deep (theoretical and practical) knowledge of the methodology and
theory can contribute positively to the reflexive creation of this value orientation (including
transformation occurring during the process of primary socialization).
The following article is an attempt to reflect on experiences up to the present day from
field research conducted among religious minorities and to convey these experiences to
both professionals and the wider public. The author began researching religious minorities
in 1990, when it became possible to research various forms of religious life freely without
ideological bias. At that time a large number of religious groups from a large number
of religious traditions began to operate in the Czech lands, and it became necessary to
describe this situation in a professional way. The author of the current article began to
empirically research non-traditional religions and to varying degrees over the subsequent
twenty years has spent time with members of the Hare Krishna movement, Czech Buddhists,
Scientologists, followers of the Reverend Moon, UFO devotees and followers of the Universe
People, and healers, but also with Buddhists and shamans in Siberia as well as Hindus,
Buddhists, Sikhs and Muslims in India.
This list is provided for a single reason: during all of these twenty years spent in the
company of a wide variety of religious groups from different religious traditions, as a
researcher I have dealt with (and still deal with) the same problem, which is connected
with the values in social scientific research and the choice of research strategies (which
are, however, derived from particular basic values). Moreover, unlike other social groups,
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religious minorities or non-traditional religious groups have certain specific features which
highlight the importance of values and their reflexivity. I therefore believe that the following
list of problem areas may be inspiring and beneficial to those who are not directly engaged in
research on religion.
Problem 1: Religiosity of actors/respondents versus the non-religious character
of science
Science and religion are different discourses with different principles and goals; thanks
to their historical development and some contemporary conflicts they are, however, often
seen as competitors. A classic example is the open conflict over different images of the world
in the debate on creationism (currently in the form of so-called intelligent design) on one
side and evolution on the other. The conflict between religion (in its various forms, which
combine the idea of superhuman powers which are worthy of active human worship) and
science (in its various forms, which combine the notion of a rational interpretation of the
empirical world in which there is no place for non-empirical existence) is always present and
in various parts of the world and cultures still takes on various forms. It always, however,
takes on the character of an ontological “dispute about truth.”
In field research this tension manifests itself for example in the “misunderstanding”
over the meaning of scientific research and particular empirical investigations on the part of
the respondents/actors. Actors are often deeply convinced that science (the academic study
of religions) cannot study religion, or, if it can, then it can study only secondary themes
and human affairs. In their view, religion deals with “divine revelation,” “God” or “higher
transcendental principles” and this is what all human effort should strive for. Academic study
of religions (science, or sociology and anthropology) however, does not contribute to the
understanding of God or transcendence, and therefore, from the perspective of believers, its
activities are not important and are not of much value. Specifically, then, this attitude shows
up in their unwillingness to participate in research, or in attempts to preach to and “lecture”
the investigator about the “real value” of things, or in limiting the respondent to providing
unimportant information.
Understanding these barriers relates to the researcher’s ability to respect the worldview
of respondents and to be aware of the seriousness of the topic for the respondents. If we
understand that religion is based on the concept of universal order (as opposed to chaos)
which acts as a “model of the world” and as a “model for the world,” that it creates strong
and lasting emotions, provides a strong powerful basis for personal and group identity and
offers the world as a whole as well as the individual a meaningful life (Geertz 2000), then it
is possible to “understand” the perspective of the respondents and “understand” their distrust
of the importance of social-scientific research on religion. “Understanding,” however, does
not mean abandoning the autonomy of science in the formulation of research questions and
research objectives.
In the Czech context, this problem is connected with the generally secular environment
(Lužný, Navrátilová 2001),which on one hand detracts from the topic of religion in the
eyes of the majority of the Czech population and on the other hand strengthens the feeling
of threat among believers regardless of denomination (both majority and minority) (Lužný
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2008; Váně 2012). The result of this is that a large proportion of the population does not want
to answer questions about their religious convictions at all or responds with great dismay and
distrust when asked about their religious life.
Problem 2: Emic versus etic approach, theoretical and conceptually unanchored
research
Although a large portion of the Czech population consists of “non-believers,” there is
respect for the topic of religion in general and for believers among social science researchers.
While researchers do not have any great problem asking questions about respondents’
intimate sex lives (such as the number of times a respondent has had sex with his wife in
the last month, the number of times he had sex with his mistress in the last week or his
personal attitude to masturbation), the issue of religious life evokes far greater shyness in
the researcher. Due to a wide range of circumstances, religion has become an issue which
is considered far more personal than sex. Although a researcher can easily ask about the
frequency with which a respondent attends religious services, about issues of religious
substance (what one believes, how someone obtained their faith, what religion means to
them, how a person’s faith affects his/her life, etc.), researchers are far more cautious and
are satisfied with very general answers which would not be considered satisfactory if offered
in relation to other areas of the respondent’s life. For example, answers of the type “religion
is absolutely vital and essential to my life” would satisfy a researcher, while answers of the
type “sex is absolutely vital and essential to my life” would more likely invoke curiosity in
the interviewer and lead him or her to ask further questions.
This respect and shyness thus leads to a preference for the emic perspective, which
is further enhanced by insufficient theoretical and conceptual equipment. This applies
particularly to qualitative research on religion, where a number of novice researchers feel that
they are entering totally unexamined terrain and that they are interested in issues that are very
intimate, which current science(the academic study of religions) has been unable to express
due to its narrowness. Often they have the feeling that they are “pioneers” for whom on one
hand everything is possible (in terms of traditional research on religion, which in their eyes
does not yet exist) and are obliged to respect the world of their respondents. The excessive
emphasis on the emic perspective may be not a consequence of respect for respondents and
the subject of our research, but much more a result of our inadequacy in terms of theory, the
conceptualization of theme and in the history of research up to the present.
On the other hand, it is clear that the emic perspective is inherent in social-scientific
research on religion; but that cannot mean abandoning the etic perspective. Limiting
oneself to the emic perspective would in reality result in only a partial reproduction of the
respondent’s world. The goal of science is to build a theory or theories; these, however,
cannot be built completely using an emic perspective, but must be constructed by means of
their own scientific terminology and according to their own scientific structures. These, quite
understandably, need not coincide with the perspectives of the respondents.
Although this question is far more complicated, I will try to demonstrate this problem by
using the example of scientific writing about the activities of the Hare Krishna. Would the
reader understand this article (as a member of a broad social-scientific community) if I wrote
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that the devotees dedicate a large portion of their days to “japaing” or singing “bhadjan.” Or,
in the case of Shinto, should I diligently use the term “kami” (for example for designating
Mount Fuji) or the word “god” even though the western meaning of the word “god” does not
have the same meaning as the Japanese word “kami” (cf. e.g. Havlíček 2011)? Examples of
research on cultures other than one’s own clearly illustrate the problem of succumbing to the
emic perspective. If we conduct research into lesbians or workers at orphanages, there is not
a significant problem with using the emic perspective, because we are still moving in more or
less the same cultural and linguistic environment.
On the other hand, accepting an etic perspective cannot mean simply reproducing
the cultural colonial imperialism of (western) science, which, with its demand for the
formulation of general theories and a generalizing categorical apparatus, takes part in the
discursive (and subsequently also political and economic) domination over the “Others” or
“others”(cf. e.g. Said 1978).
Problem 3: Encounters with the unexpected
Research on religion offers an extraordinary adventure consisting of encounters with an
entirely unexpected world of people who may even be our immediate neighbours. Meetings
with these “different” people (the “Others”) lead the researcher to attempt to reveal their
world and understand it, or rather to understand the behaviour of these people. In this way
research on religious minorities in our own society is reminiscent of the adventures of the
first cultural anthropologists.
In researching religious ideas and the lives of our neighbours who at first glance are no
different from our other neighbours (they go to work, spend money, drive cars, have children,
their clothes may not be any different, etc.) we may learn that in many respects they live in
a different world, or rather that they see the world around us in a very different way. For
example, in doing research we may be surprised that our neighbours (Krishna devotees) are
entirely convinced that people have never walked on the Moon, or in fact that walking on the
Moon is impossible because the Moon is a spiritual planet which is farther away than the sun,
d would be impossible to reach in a mere physical spaceship. These believers simply have a
completely different image of the order of the universe (cosmology) than the society around
them and assert that so-called space exploration is just a scam.
Another neighbour has no need to argue with the image of outer space as described in
modern science (and as it is taught to children in school), but is convinced that a giant war
is raging in space between the forces of Evil (or the “forces of darkness”) and Good or Light
(which incidentally is a common religious belief) and that the planet Earth is important in
this battle and is now in grave danger because it is ruled by “black t-shirts” or “reptilians.”
Fortunately, an evacuation fleet is orbiting the planet, and is ready to intervene and save a small
portion of the human race. Of course, the only ones to be saved will be those who believe this
prophecy and change their lives in accordance with this message from space and thus begin to
break down the “Pseudo-Energy-Dark Forces Information System” (cf. Lužný 2004a, 51-60).
The researcher learns about yet another form of religiosity from another neighbour
who tries to convince the researcher that even he/she is a reservoir of limitless energy and
recommends daily repetition of the prayer:
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Money is dear to my heart. I love it. I use it for wise and good purposes. I am glad to give it
away generously, and it magically returns to me in great quantities from all directions. With its
help, I will be able to learn many good and useful things, and, therefore, I am also grateful for
my material and spiritual treasures.
Upon parting, the respondent gave the researcher this good advice (for free):
Repeat this assertion every day and write it in gold letters: ‘I am in union with the infinite
wealth of my subconscious. I have true prosperity, luck and success. Money flows to me in
abundance from inexhaustible sources. Every moment I realize my true value. With all I can
and all I have, I will gladly serve my neighbor. I have received rich blessings in the form of
material goods. Life is great’ (Murphy 1993, 119-123).
Thus positively inclined, the researcher sets off to other respondents and discovers
that he/she is in essence a spiritual being (a so-called Thetan) and should try to rid his
reactive mind of the “engrams” that block the development of all his/her abilities and
cause psychosomatic problems. Regular “auditing” may help in this, as may a certain way
of life which includes avoiding all kinds of drugs. Thus he/she is able to acquire abilities
which currently seem extraordinary to him/her and also live happily and harmoniously (e.g.
Hubbart 1997; cf. Lužný 2004a, 30-36).
At the end of the day the researcher heads for his/her last respondents only to learn from
them that neither Adam (the first man) nor Jesus (the second Adam) was able to complete the
task which God sent them into the world to do. Their goal was to create the perfect family
as the basis for the kingdom of heaven on earth. But Eve was seduced by the fallen angel
Lucifer and Jesus was unable to find a wife. Nevertheless, currently there is a Third Adam on
earth who will fulfil God’s will (Boží princip 1998; cf. Lužný 2004a, 36-41).
If during his/her work the researcher encounters such different religious beliefs and
believers who are firmly convinced about the uniqueness and correctness of their faith, he/
she finds him/herself in an awkward situation. On one hand, the researcher should maintain
respect for the respondents, but on the other hand he/she may be uncomfortably confronted
with ideas which might seem bizarre and incomprehensible. In this situation the researcher
should be grateful and use these ideas properly, because they offer an exceptional opportunity
for the researcher to reflect on his/her own ethnocentrism. One of the questions one can ask
is: Why are we (as researchers) willing to respect some ideas from some groups and not
others.
Problem 4: Who is right?
These problem areas are related to the question every researcher comes across sooner or
later while doing fieldwork. If one stays in the field long enough and obtains the trust of the
respondents, the researcher begins to be perceived as an expert in that particular field and
will be asked for his/her expert opinion in the context of the respondents’ religious beliefs.
Here again we meet with two different worlds and perspectives—religious faith and the
science (academic study) of religions. It is obvious that respondents do not expect an expert
opinion which would question their faith. Rather, they expect scientific support for their own
beliefs.
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These may not concern “minor matters,” such as whether or not man walked on the
moon. From the perspective of the researcher, however, the matter being discussed might
not be particularly important (e.g. regarding the religious identity of the respondent). As
an illustrative example, let us consider the question of the authenticity and origin of the
Hare Krishna movement. The researcher who examines the history of this movement in the
Czech lands (and in the West in general) and the reasons why Czechs join this group need
not deal with this question, and considering the theme of the research it is entirely irrelevant;
nonetheless, even Czech Krishna devotees take pride in the uniqueness and authenticity of
their tradition. Should a researcher really say that in his/her opinion this movement did not
emerge until the end of the 19th
century and that the movement is not the “original” religion
of India, but a consequence of the modernization of India bearing elements of the Anglican
morality of colonial officials and carrying distinctive features of Protestantism? (See e.g.
Fujda, Lužný 2010).
Here, of course, it is true that the researcher is not in the field in order to instruct the
respondents and interfere excessively with “reality” or “the terrain.” But if asked should
he/she remain silent, prevaricate, refuse to answer or respond according to his/her best
professional opinion? Those who are firmly convinced of the need for fundamental openness
and “fairness” in field research have a clear answer. Personally, however, I am not convinced
of the necessity of such an ethical fundamentalism and attempt from the very beginning to
establish the kind of relationship with the respondents where they do not ask this type of
question.
Problem 5: The world view of the researcher
It is not possible here to discuss the significance of the value orientation of the researcher
and the influence his/her world view has on the design and process of research. We might
perhaps just recommend a classic piece of writing by Max Weber (1998a) and suggest that
the reader pay close attention to the fact that in many places Weber uses quotation marks
when he writes about “value neutrality,” just as he does in another work (Weber 1998b) when
writing about “objectivity.”
Peter Berger briefly and clearly described this problem when he explained the required
“unencumbered value” of sociology:
this statement certainly does not mean that the sociologist has or should have no values. In
any case, it is just about impossible for a human being to exist with no values at all .... The
sociologist will normally have many values as a citizen, a private person, a member of a
religious group or as an adherent of some other association of people. But within the limits of
his activities as a sociologist there is one fundamental value—only that of scientific integrity.
Even there, of course, the sociologist, being human, will have to reckon with his convictions,
emotions and prejudices. But it is a part of his intellectual training that he tries to understand
and control these as bias that ought to be eliminated, as far as possible, from his work (Berger
2003, 13).
In today’s age of intellectual laziness Weber’s and Berger’s challenge often goes unheard.
At the same time, it expresses the most basic principle of scientific work, which is critical
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reflexivity. A part of this is the critical reflexive analysis of one’s own values and world view
and the analysis of these positions in one’s own thinking on the topic under investigation.
The researcher cannot dispense with this obligation simply by acknowledging this at the
beginning of the work (e.g. “I am a Catholic,” I am a Buddhist,” “I am a lesbian,” etc.)
and thus have the feeling that he/she can write almost anything without the need for critical
reflection on his/her own value orientation.
In addition, I am convinced that the requirements of critical reflexivity are essentially part
of a particular world view, and these lie at the very foundations of social scientific research
on culture (including religion). On this basis we have respect for cultural diversity and the
value of cultural plurality. In this way, social-scientific research is part of the postmodern
situation. Put differently (and more openly): the ideological basis for the academic study of
religion is the liberal principle of religious freedom, and this respect for religious pluralism.
If we see the ways of looking at non-traditional religions from this perspective, then from
the liberal position these religions are seen as “minority religions” and as a component of
plurality diversity and socio-cultural change. Clearly human rights and the emphasis on the
right to be different reveals itself in this context. In contrast, from the conservative position
new religions will be seen as threats to current traditions, an expression of postmodern
disorder and loss of “values.” Religious minorities thus become an example of general
danger and a threat to human culture.
Problem 6: “Favoritism” of the weaker
The consequence of this position is that there are various forms of (primarily discursive)
preferences and “favoritism.” Religious minorities (like all minorities) are then examined
as groups who do not have equal access to certain rights and opportunities, and are
therefore constrained in comparison with other similar (in many cases religious) groups.
The minority character of these groups can manifest itself in many ways, but the most
significant “restrictions” in the current religious environment in the Czech Republic are
evident in two areas. The first is the legal status of their operations, i.e. the unequal approach
of the state in the area of state registration and financing—current legislation means that
religious minorities cannot obtain the same rights as groups which have already been
registered (Lužný 2004b). The second is then the dominant social discourse that defines
the “normal” perception of these groups, the “normal” attitudes towards these groups and
the “normal” information about them. Put simply: in the dominant social discourse the vast
majority of non-traditional religious groups are perceived as “dangerous sects” from which
it is necessary to protect both individuals and the society as a whole (Lužný 2004b). The
most dangerous “sects” were perceived to be members of the Hare Krishna society and
the followers of Reverend Moon, followed by Scientologists. Recently, this stereotype has
focused primarily on Muslims (see, e.g. Topinka 2010; Lužný 2011).
If, however, the basic starting point for examining religious groups is liberal tolerance and
the value of religious plurality, then an awareness of inequality and the minority character
of non-traditional religious groups leads the researcher to reflective or non-reflective
“favoritism of the weak” or “heuristic siding with the weaker.” The sociology of religion is
then depicted as a “defense of sects,” which it certainly is not (Lužný 2010).
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The question remains, however, as to the nature and degree to which the researcher
“sides with the weaker.” If we are aware of this siding and it is based on openly expressed
values and methodological principles which are acceptable to the scientific community,
then the “balancing” perspective is defensible within the context of this discourse of the
particular community. This, however, is a reflexive position in which it is true that, unlike in
the situation of the dominant discourse, this position leads to the researcher “siding with the
weaker.”
Problem 7: Entering public space
If the researcher examines religious minorities, that is groups that the society around
them perceives as incomprehensible and bizarre, he/she will sooner or later encounter media
interest. Here it is necessary to realize that the media are not interested in the scholar’s
objective view, but need the researcher only as a provider of “expert knowledge” which
might legitimize the preconceived notions of the journalists, editors, or publishers. The
expert is not in the media in order to provide his/her professional opinion and reveal the
results of scientific analysis, but to add legitimacy to the article, TV report or other media
presentation in question. He/she is a tool of the media and thus becomes part of the dominant
discourse.
The question then is whether the researcher can say he/she really thinks at all. Should
the researcher discuss findings about which the journalist has no idea, and which would
cause a scandal if they were to become public, since every group (including religious ones)
has its excesses conflicts, failures and abuses? Openness and honesty in the media do not
pay. Moreover, research findings are primarily intended for the academic community, which
knows how to deal with this information, and in addition to this the honesty of the researcher
can lead to an irreversible loss of trust with the respondents.
In my opinion, the only possible way to work with the media is to adopt their strategies
and approaches and to use the media as an instrument for influencing the dominant discourse
and popularizing the scientific field. The danger of this position is the possibility that the
media will lose interest; it is also, however, always possible that the media will find a more
willing expert who, with the joy of self-centred emotion, will allow the media to manoeuvre
him/her in the direction they want.
Problem 8: Level of cooperation
Qualitative field research most often (but not always) requires the establishment of mutual
trust, which in the case of religion, due to its intimate character, is often more difficult. If it is
possible to establish mutual trust (which can sometimes take several years), another problem
arises because mutual trust can take on the form of mutual obligation. Mutual trust in its
ideal form means a relationship of equality, but that can never occur. However, a relationship
can be more or less open, in which case the researcher and respondent become somewhat
closer and an attempt at mutual understanding emerges on both sides.
This new situation may include certain expectations held by the researcher, such as
an expectation of mutual assistance. This may manifest itself in the expectation of a more
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positive interpretation of the group or even the expectation of an open public defence. One
such requirement may be a demand for the right to approve the publication of the researcher’s
opinions on the website belonging to the group of active participation (in the form of a
lecture) at one of the group’s events.
Even here, as in the previous cases, it is appropriate to question the degree of cooperation,
because exceeding a certain threshold may lead to the researcher’s loss of independence.
But where is the border between cooperation and independence? The researcher must
resolve this question him/herself; for example, being invited on a free trip to an attractive
tourist destination on the other side of the world (including accommodation in a luxury
hotel) may enable the researcher to obtain first-hand knowledge of the cultural context and
representatives of the religious group, but on the other hand it may mean the beginning of
self-censorship or the loss of critical reflexivity.
Conclusion
This list of problem areas in empirical research on religion is, of course, not complete.
The academic study of religions opens up a number of other methodological problems
associated with the value orientation and world view of the researcher’s perspective. Among
the most serious is the hidden and unsuspected ethnocentrism which is intrinsic in the
conceptual and categorical terminological foundation of the discipline. Often we think (we
recognize and interpret) in categories and schemes of thought which are deeply culturally
(and religiously) determined.
There is no clear solution to the above-mentioned problem areas and resulting
conclusions. Specific solutions always depend on particular situations and these change, not
only over time and according to socio-cultural context, but also in the context of individual
religious groups. If we examine religious groups as different as western devotees of Krishna,
western Buddhists or followers of superior space civilizations, it is clear that in relation to
each of these groups (in any specific religious environment), the researcher must behave in
a different way and must adapt his/her research strategy to the environment. In a situation
where there is religious diversity it is therefore not possible to create and adopt a single
scheme which would be universally applicable, but it is necessary to create and adapt
individual methodological approaches over the course of research. Moreover, the situation
is even more complicated by the fact that the researcher rarely examines one religious group
exclusively over an extended period of time, since parallel research on several groups allows
interfaith (intergroup) comparison as well as continuous modification of research strategies.
Parallel research by different groups of researchers actually mirrors real religious
diversity and provides direct experience (unlike that of most believers) of religious pluralism
and the resulting cognitive dissonance and ontological uncertainty.
Individual researchers must come to their own various “solutions” to the problems
mentioned above and then make their own choice of research strategy; the journey is long
and difficult. Nevertheless, on this journey, in the context of religious and methodological
diversity, it is good to keep to two interconnected principles: critical reflexivity and
intellectual honesty.
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Department of Sociology and Andragogy
Philosophical Faculty,
Palacký University Olomouc,
Třída svobody 26,
772 00 Olomouc,
Czech Republic
E-mail: dusan.luzny@upol.cz