European Journal of Population 19: 375­412, 2003.
 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
375
Demographic and Sociological Indicators of
Privatisation of Marriage in the 19th
Century
in Flanders
KOEN MATTHIJS
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Department of Sociology, Centre for Population and Family
Research, Van Evenstraat 2B, 3000 Leuven, Belgium (E-mail: Koen.Matthijs@soc.kuleuven.ac.be)
Received 2 October 2002; accepted in final form 24 February 2003
Matthijs, K., 2003. Demographic and Sociological Indicators of Privatisation of Marriage in the 19th
Century in Flanders, European Journal of Population, 19: 375­412.
Abstract. Relying on the assumption that privatisation of family life intensified in the 19th
century and that women were the pioneers in this process, we formulate nine hypotheses concerning
indicators on family and marriage. The hypotheses are tested using data for three municipalities in
Flanders (roughly the northern part of Belgium) covering the period 1800­1913, taken from about
17,000 marriage certificates. Special emphasis is on gender and social status distinctions. Most of
the hypotheses, particularly those relating to first marriage, are confirmed. The various developments
point to an underlying process which we refer to here as the privatisation of marriage, which can be
explained by the changed social position and gender identity of women. The hypothesis put forward
is that 19th-century economic and political marginalisation encouraged women to develop their
dyadic power in primary relationships. Marrying young and creating an identity around expressive
family and motherhood tasks was, for many women, a reaction to and a remedy for their public
exclusion and economic subordination.
Key words: illegitimacy, marriage patterns, privatisation, remarriage, 19th century
Matthijs, K., 2003. Indicateurs socio-démographiques de la privatisation du mariage en Flandre au
19e sicle, Revue Européenne de Démographie, 19: 375­412.
Résumé. Reprenant ľidée selon laquelle la privatisation de la vie familiale s'est intensifiée
au 19e sicle et que les femmes ont été des pionnires dans ce processus, nous émettons 9
hypothses sur les indicateurs du mariage et de la famille. Ces hypothses sont confrontées aux
données de 17000 certificats de mariage provenant de 3 communes des Flandres (partie nord
de la Belgique) sur la période 1800­1913. Une attention particulire est portée aux facteurs de
genre et aux facteurs sociaux. La plupart des hypothses, et notamment celles relatives au premier
mariage, sont confirmées. Les différentes évolutions peuvent tre rapportées  un mme processus
sous-jacent, dénommée ici privatisation du mariage, qui peut s'expliquer par le changement de la
situation sociale des femmes et par la montée ďune identité féminine. Ainsi la marginalisation
économique et politique des femmes au 19e sicle les a encouragées  développer un double pouvoir
dans les relations familiales. Un mariage précoce et la construction ďune identité  travers la
376 KOEN MATTHIJS
reconnaissance des tâches familiales et maternelles ont permis  beaucoup de femmes de réagir et
de compenser leur exclusion de la sphre publique et leur dépendance économique.
Mots clés: illégitimité, privatisation, remariage, types de mariage, 19e sicle
1. Introduction
It is generally acknowledged that 19th
-century private life in Western Europe was
characterised by emotionalisation, domesticisation and privatisation. These developments
had been underway for some time, but they broadened and deepened
in all directions over the course of the 19th
century (Aris, 1962; Demos, 1970;
Shorter, 1977; Stone, 1977; Hareven, 1978; Mitterauer and Sieder, 1983; Gillis,
1996). Within the family, this involved the partner system as well as the parent and
sibling system. A great body of historical sociological and historical demographic
research is available on the characteristics and background of this. These studies
are mainly based on qualitative materials, such as diaries, sermons or advice books.
The present study is an extension of these studies, and deals with the evolution
of demographic and sociological characteristics of people entering into marriage
during the `long' 19th
century (1800­1913) in Flanders.1
Specifically, we examine
the evolution of the following indicators: (1) first marriage intensity, (2) age at
first marriage, (3) remarriage intensity, (4) the interval between being widowed
and remarriage, (5) the number and proportion of witnessing family members, (6)
the number and proportion of witnessing family members in the male or female
line, (7) the proportion of first-married women working outside the home, (8) the
proportion of illegitimate births and, (9) the proportion of children legitimised by
marriage.2
The development of each of these indicators is determined by various social
and cultural factors. However, rather than looking any further into this aspect, our
intention is to present an overall picture of the indicators together: if all different
types of demographic and sociological features of marriage and the marriage ceremony
point in the same direction, this can indicate an underlying social process.
In our opinion, this process might be characterised as the privatisation of marriage.
For some indicators, e.g., the proportion of witnessing family members, this characterisation
is rather `evidenť, for other indicators, e.g., the marriage intensity, it
is not. But together and combined, the indicators might give an accurate picture of
an overall, macro-social development. Our starting point is that during the 19th
century, marriage and family life underwent a more or less progressing privatisation.
More and more formerly public activities became `domesticizeď and in
interpersonal relations between partners, parents and children, emotions became
crucial (Perrot, 1990). Apparently more and more people wanted to be actively
involved in this process. An additional assumption is that romanticisation was
furthered primarily by women (Dentith, 1998: 128­155; Caine and Sluga, 2000:
32­54; Davidoff and Hall, 1987: 319). As will become clearer below, our basic
PRIVATISATION OF MARRIAGE IN 19TH CENTURY FLANDERS 377
hypothesis is partly confirmed, but it must also be qualified: there are some tentative
indicators that the privatisation trend seems to be restricted to first marriages (for
remarriages there are some unexpected, although interesting conclusions), it seems
to accelerate in the second half of the 19th
century, and the decade around 1850
appears to be a crucial turning point.
2. Hypotheses
According to Gillis (1996) the decades around 1850 were a symbolic turning point.
It was the time when highly-valued quality time became increasingly equated with
intimate family time. In order to fulfil the new expectations, an entire range of
marriage and family symbols were created, expanded and imitated en masse from
the mid-19th
century onwards. Bastard children, abandoned children, step-families,
cohabitation and barbarian ways were thrown on the dung heap of society. By
contrast, their middle-class counterparts were actively working their way to the
foreground: anyone wanting to celebrate religious rites, buy children's clothes,
organise birthday parties or spend Christmas in a family group, simply had to
marry. Families were or became museums of family portraits and family albums,
timeless places where the past was constantly commemorated. The family was
no longer a place where people shared instrumental tasks and anonymous rooms;
it was no longer a household, but an environment in which the shared past and
joint future were realised. Physical proximity was not the only crucial aspect,
but intense instinctive involvement was also important. The family became the
ultimate supplier of quality time. All kinds of rituals were intended to stimulate
family stability, a sense of belonging, affection and continuity. This was chiefly
the woman's role and one reserved for Sundays. Sunday was not a day of rest
for women, but a day for "labours of love" (Gillis, 1996: 13­14). Increasingly
strict requirements were imposed on this invisible labour and, by 1900, housework
had become a full-time job. It was a job involving increasingly more daily tasks
taking longer to perform, precisely at a time when the public discussion was one
of reducing the hours worked outside the home (by men)!
Based on this general trend, nine hypotheses on long-term developments are
formulated: (1) first marriage intensity will increase, (2) age at first marriage will
fall, (3) remarriage intensity will increase, (4) the interval between widowing and
remarriage will increase, (5) the number and proportion of family members acting
as witnesses to marriage will increase, (6) the number and proportion of witnessing
family members from the bride's side will increase relatively more than from the
bridegroom's side, (7) the proportion of women in first marriages working outside
the home will fall, (8) the proportion of illegitimate births will fall and, (9) the
proportion of marriages with at least one legitimised child will increase.
People married and remarried during the (second half of the) 19th
century more
and earlier and this behaviour was played out within a legally guaranteed and
socially highly esteemed family context. The `new' domesticity was translated not
378 KOEN MATTHIJS
only into the husband/wife system, but also into the mother/daughter relationship.
According to Roberts (1973), in the second half of the 19th
century a `mum' culture
developed, not only in middle-class enclaves, but also in working-class districts.
This culture refers to the close contacts between and the mutual involvement of
mothers and their married daughters. The latter often settled in the immediate
vicinity of the parental home. This house became the centre and the network of
mutual neighbourly help, of intimate social intercourse and a little secret language
­ in brief, of a congenial family culture. This had consequences for (the perception
of) marriage and the marriage ceremony.
The more or less `autonomous' process of privatisation, and related developments
such as emotionalisation and domesticisation, are a central guide for our
study, but not the only one. These processes can also be the result of civil and religious
disciplinary activities. This was incidentally prominent in the 19th
century,
particularly the second half (Art, 1992). This had consequences for the frequency
of marriage during Lent and Advent, two periods during which marriage was
forbidden by the Church, subject to dispensation (Lesthaeghe, 1989; Matthijs and
Van de Putte, 2001). Nonetheless, romance and emotion were not immediately the
first areas to receive attention from the Church: passion and affection were not the
most important ingredients of a good marriage. Rather, the `ideal family' was based
more on domesticity then on emotional ties, more on marital love than on romantic
love (Cloet and Storme, 1991: 19­21).
Another characteristic of the 19th
century was economic modernisation. A
carefully qualified transition took place at this time from a small-scale, traditional
agricultural society to a centralised, mechanised and large-scale industrial
economy, flanked and supported by an expansive service sector. This was all
pushed and pulled by the mutual reinforcement of scientific knowledge and technical
skill. Some see this movement as the driving force behind all kinds of
socio-demographic and cultural changes, including at the level of the structure,
the organisation and the functions of the family, as well as of marriage and the
marriage ceremony.3
At first sight, this seems obvious but, upon closer inspection,
additional explanation is needed. After all, central features of industrialisation,
such as rationalisation and instrumentalisation cannot simply be logically linked to
privatisation: on the contrary, these processes can be better designated as the private
reaction to economic modernisation. `Culturaľ and `economic' processes influence
each other reciprocally. For this reason, the degree and direction of privatisation
will differ depending on socio-economic status: to an unskilled factory worker, the
song of emotion and romance sounds different than to small-scale farmers or a large
industrialist. This is also translated into highly specific events: the interval between
widowing and remarriage is different for low-status groups than for high-status
groups. This interval not only measures emotionalisation but also, for example,
economic needs. Since all the elements of the nine hypotheses are status-sensitive,
this social-status dimension is incorporated into our study where necessary and in
so far as is possible.
PRIVATISATION OF MARRIAGE IN 19TH CENTURY FLANDERS 379
3. The Study
3.1. SOURCES
We examine the evolution of the nine stated indicators in three different regions
for the period 1800­1913. The study areas are Leuven, Aalst and Bierbeek, three
municipalities in Flanders ­ roughly the northern half of Belgium ­ with different
socio-economic structures and different cultural climates. All the data for these
municipalities were coded from almost 17,000 marriage certificates.4
In Leuven
and in Aalst, a sample was taken of one out of three certificates; in Bierbeek
all certificates were coded. This resulted in 9,330 certificates for Leuven, 7,510
(80%) of which relate to a first marriage ­ i.e., a marriage between a man and a
woman neither of whom had previously been married. In Aalst, 5,496 certificates
were coded, 83% of which were first marriages. In Bierbeek this figure was 2,129,
85% of which related to first marriages. Besides information from the marriage
certificates, for some calculations (e.g., the marriage and remarriage intensity) also
census data were necessary.
3.2. STUDY AREAS
Leuven is located in the present-day province of Vlaams-Brabant, in central
Belgium, approximately 30 km east of Brussels. At the beginning of the 19th
century, Leuven was economically in decline.5
All social groups were suffering
in one way or another under French occupation. During the Dutch period (1814­
1830) recovery took place. Leuven was one of the first Belgian cities to have
reliable rail connections. This simplified the supply of raw materials to the Leuven
foodstuffs industry. In the second half of the 19th
century, several trading activities
pumped fresh blood into Leuven's economy. However, Leuven never became an
industrial city. Trade and services remained the driving forces behind the economy.
By the mid-19th
century, 45% of the workforce were employed in (small) trading
companies, the transport sector and services. Growth in the services sector was
supported by the expansion of the university, the city administration, the military
barracks, schools, courts, prisons and hospitals. Around 1800, Leuven had approximately
20,000 inhabitants; by around 1900 this number had grown to over 42,000
people. This doubling over a 100-year period is insignificant when compared to
other medium-sized Belgian cities. Only between 1875 and 1890 did the population
of Leuven grow relatively rapidly ­ from 34,400 to 40,700 inhabitants.
The second study area is Aalst.6
This town is located in the south-east of the
province of Oost-Vlaanderen, and approximately the same distance (25 km) from
Brussels and from Ghent. The sandy loamy soil there is very fertile, which makes
farming profitable. Flax provided the raw material for the widespread cottage
industry in the first half of the 19th
century. At the end of the 18th
and beginning
of the 19th
centuries, the textiles, foodstuffs and cotton-processing industries in
particular expanded. As elsewhere, the reconstruction was supported by the Dutch
380 KOEN MATTHIJS
regime. In 19th
-century Aalst, textiles played a major role. The population of Aalst
Grew more quickly during the 19th
century than that of Leuven. Around 1800 Aalst
had almost 11,000 inhabitants, rising to a little over 35,000 by 1910. This growth
was under pinned by the attraction of the textile industry. Its employees were
often underskilled women. However, not only did Aalst have more immigrants
than Leuven, but its natural growth was also higher, particularly after 1880.
The third study community, Bierbeek, was a small country community.7
The
community lies just less than 10 km south-east of Leuven. Around 1750, Bierbeek
had fewer than 1,000 inhabitants, 2,700 around 1850 and 3,700 by around 1910.
Geographically, Bierbeek is on the border between the loamy ground of Brabant,
the Hageland and western Haspengouw. This border roughly coincides with the
soil science border between sand/loam and loam. The agricultural land is generally
suited to arable farming. In the 19th
century, the vast majority of the population was
employed in farming.
3.3. DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONS BY REGION
In order to gain an idea of the socio-economic profile of those marrying and, therefore,
to a certain extent of the study regions, the occupations of those marrying
were coded and classified.8
Following consultation and based on contact with
the sources and on theoretical considerations, we developed our own occupation
classification model (Matthijs, 2001: 68­73). A rough distinction is made between
occupations based chiefly on education and training (mainly occupations in the
services sector), and occupations based chiefly on capital and economic activities
(chiefly occupations in trade and industry). Within these, a hierarchy can be created
from low, through middle, to high. Farmers and the `no occupation' group are not
included in this model.
Tables 1 and 2 divide up the occupations of first-marriage bridegrooms and
brides along the dual dividing line of capital/education and high/middle/low.9
The
totals show us that in Leuven a relatively high proportion ­ approximately 10% ­
of bridegrooms had a high class position, either based on training and education or
on capital. In Aalst and Bierbeek, these figures were much lower. Bierbeek had a
great many farmers. In Bierbeek, on average over the entire century among firstmarrying
men, 43% were farmers; in Leuven and Aalst these figures were 2% and
10%. Relatively speaking, the low and middle economic occupations were overrepresented
in Aalst. This is in line with expectations (see study areas). It must
be stressed that ­ with the exception of the last decades of the 19th
century ­ the
differences between Leuven and Aalst were fairly small. Among brides, the differences
were somewhat larger, which is related to the fact that much of the industrial
employment in Aalst revolved around textile processing, which was primarily a
female occupation. During the last decades of the 19th
century, the proportion of
the low capital occupations rose slightly in Aalst.
PRIVATISATION OF MARRIAGE IN 19TH CENTURY FLANDERS 381
Table1.Socialstatusofbridegrooms(Leuven,AalstandBierbeek,1800­1913,firstmarriages)
1800­18091810­18191820­18291830­18391840­18491850­18591860­18691870­18791880­18891890­18991900­1913Total
Leuven
Highcultural()6.94.63.55.43.95.44.96.26.57.25.85.6
Higheconomic()4.54.83.15.73.53.63.53.64.53.56.34.4
Middlecultural4.35.04.16.14.48.06.07.28.68.410.97.4
Middleeconomic22.922.316.113.514.713.014.316.511.019.718.816.6
Loweconomic59.460.370.765.370.164.866.060.964.959.355.962.4
Farmers1.93.11.02.43.03.51.31.41.20.20.91.6
Nooccupation0.00.01.41.70.51.84.24.23.21.81.42.0
N=100%4194184855415715516387217528951,4887,479
Aalst
Highcultural2.62.61.41.01.50.30.82.71.71.81.81.7
Higheconomic5.35.71.11.71.52.92.23.03.22.93.43.0
Middlecultural4.01.82.13.11.13.75.04.14.25.06.94.4
Middleeconomic24.218.816.025.318.615.014.417.320.817.316.318.0
Loweconomic33.553.763.155.568.366.162.262.363.167.162.3
Farmers30.417.515.011.610.28.710.38.27.07.93.69.5
Nooccupation0.00.01.41.70.81.11.12.50.81.90.91.2
N=100%2272292872922643793603654756181,0434,539
Bierbeek
Highcultural1.10.00.00.00.00.00.60.60.00.00.00.2
Higheconomic0.00.00.90.00.80.01.20.60.61.00.90.6
Middlecultural0.00.00.00.01.71.20.01.82.51.02.31.2
Middleeconomic3.38.510.45.06.67.04.17.16.88.18.07.0
Loweconomic74.463.255.758.351.252.343.541.139.340.637.547.4
Farmers21.128.333.036.039.739.550.647.049.748.251.043.1
Nooccupation0.00.00.00.70.00.00.01.81.21.00.30.5
N=100%901061151391211721701681631973491,790
Cultural:classdivisionbasedonschooling,educationandtraining.
Economic:classdivisionbasedoncapital.
Source:marriagecertificatesforLeuven,AalstandBierbeek;owncalculations.
382 KOEN MATTHIJS
Table2.Socialstatusofbrides(Leuven,AalstandBierbeek,1800­1913,firstmarriages)
1800­18091810­18191820­18291830­18391840­18491850­18591860­18691870­18791880­18891890­18991900­1913Total
Leuven
Highcultural()0.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.30.00.00.10.0
Higheconomic()0.00.50.91.82.93.10.71.51.10.80.71.3
Middlecultural0.00.30.00.20.20.20.00.40.90.50.60.4
Middleeconomic24.517.98.121.922.617.613.213.69.410.412.114.2
Loweconomic74.277.477.065.166.064.263.651.759.457.243.059.0
Farmers'wives1.32.10.20.41.10.90.70.70.40.00.10.5
Nooccupation0.01.313.610.77.014.020.829.328.230.343.324.0
Housewife0.00.0.20.00.40.01.12.50.50.80.20.6
N=100%1553854575445585506167207528911,4937,121
Aalst
Highcultural--0.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.0
Higheconomic--5.00.70.70.40.50.00.30.00.20.20.4
Middlecultural--0.00.40.30.00.00.30.00.40.70.20.3
Middleeconomic--10.914.617.222.114.010.314.912.08.97.912.0
Loweconomic--69.867.368.663.370.366.858.862.665.366.965.8
Farmers'wives--13.512.210.08.27.68.06.26.34.51.96.2
Nooccupation--0.84.93.15.26.814.719.518.320.522.815.2
Housewife--0.00.00.00.80.80.00.30.40.00.10.2
N=100%--1192872902673803613694766191,0394,207
Bierbeek
Highcultural0.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.0
Higheconomic0.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.01.20.00.00.1
Middlecultural0.00.00.00.00.00.60.00.00.00.00.00.0
Middleeconomic0.02.40.90.729.20.01.20.60.00.50.32.6
Loweconomic88.970.745.750.445.031.531.824.433.725.914.632.0
Farmers'wives11.124.447.445.321.720.053.541.156.420.80.69.4
Nooccupation0.00.06.02.23.347.913.532.78.652.384.535.4
Housewife0.02.40.01.40.80.00.01.20.00.50.00.4
N=100%18411161391201651701681631973491,646
Cultural:classdivisionbasedonschooling,educationandtraining.
Economic:classdivisionbasedoncapital.
Source:marriagecertificatesforLeuven,AalstandBierbeek;owncalculations.
PRIVATISATION OF MARRIAGE IN 19TH CENTURY FLANDERS 383
Table 3. Coale's marriage index Im (Leuven, Aalst and Bierbeek, 19th century census
years and 1910)
1846 1856 1866 1880 1890 1900 1910
Leuven 0.3508 0.3510 0.3568 0.4006 0.3913 0.4119 0.4479
Aalst 0.3661 0.3940 0.4188 0.4281 0.4403 0.4739 0.5005
Bierbeek 0.3763 0.3682 0.3962 0.4543 0.4398 0.4654 0.4966
Source: census figures for the years stated and statistics from registers of births,
marriages and deaths, own calculations.
4. Results
4.1. FIRST MARRIAGE INTENSITY
Table 3 shows the Coale nuptiality index Im for the three study areas.10
Roughly,
Im figures around 0.800 point to `many' and `early', figures around 0.300 point
to `few' and `late' marriages. Until the mid-19th
century, nuptiality scores were
low, which points to a restrictive `Malthusian' marriage pattern.11
This pattern
had two basic characteristics: first marriage age was high (27­29 for men, 24­26
for women) and a large proportion remained unmarried (10­15% of marriageable
people). According to Hajnal, this pattern ­ which he saw as emerging somewhere
around the period 1400­1650 ­ had its roots in the traditional farming economy of
the time: marriage aspirations had to be postponed until a person could take responsibility
for a household. Particularly for the children of farmers and craftsmen ­ i.e.,
for most of the population ­ this meant waiting to marry until the father gave up his
profession or died.12
This pattern persisted in Flanders through the first half of the
19th
century, the period when the first wave of industrialisation was nonetheless
engulfing some areas (Lebrun et al., 1979). This is an indication that economic
development was not the only and perhaps not even the most important driving
force behind the long-term evolution in first marriage intensity. This has to be put
into perspective because rapid industrial growth was not taking place in any of the
three study areas. From the mid-19th
century onwards ­ the time when the economy
picked up again following the crisis years of 1840­50 ­ the situation changed: the
Im indices rose systematically in every region, although regional differences were
evident. The Leuven indices were smaller than those for Aalst or Bierbeek. Overall,
however, the proportion of married (between 15 and 50) increased. Thus, this
measure of the `stock' of married women confirms our first hypothesis, although
in itself this is not a direct indication of domesticisation and emotionalisation, but
an indirect indication of the rapid diffusion of marriage as a highly valued social
institution.
Table 4 shows the same, but from another angle, viz. the first marriage rates
(the number of those marrying per 1,000 previously unmarried people by age and
sex) for Leuven and Aalst. In Bierbeek, the number of observation units is too
384 KOEN MATTHIJS
Table 4. First marriage rates (per 1,000 unmarried) of men and women (Leuven and Aalst, 19th
century census years and 1910)
Leuven Aalst
1846 1856 1866 1880 1890 1900 1910 1846 1856 1866 1880 1890 1900 1910
Men
20­29 41 37 74 81 82 100 93 21 40 70 99 107 151 126
30­39 82 93 143 90 74 72 74 57 64 97 67 85 114 95
40­49 70 67 75 67 35 29 26 41 59 66 40 41 36 33
50­59 45 37 37 18 21 30 17 19 26 8 8 13 29 14
60­69 13 26 37 41 30 15 6 16 0 9 0 17 0 0
Total 50 50 83 76 72 83 77 30 44 68 76 86 118 101
Women
20­29 52 51 78 81 89 107 95 56 72 88 103 96 139 122
30­39 63 63 72 60 47 46 52 42 78 78 36 61 63 65
40­49 23 17 30 32 13 8 15 26 31 12 22 9 20 12
50­59 12 9 0 5 5 7 4 0 6 0 0 5 5 5
60­69 0 4 0 0 6 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 44 43 59 57 57 67 60 42 58 61 65 68 91 83
Source: marriage certificates for Leuven and Aalst, and statistics from population registers.
limited for this calculation. This information fits in more closely with our research
intention than Im because we are dealing here only with first marriages, while Im
also includes remarriages (roughly one fifth of the total). In the mid-19th
century
the first marriage rates of men and women aged 30­39 were actually higher than
those of people aged 20­29! Initially, even the first marriage rates of 40­49-yearold
men were higher than those of 20­29-year-olds. This changed dramatically
over the course of the second half of the 19th
century. The first marriage rate in
the youngest age group (20­29 years old) increased considerably in the second
half of the 19th
century.13
This is an indication of the erosion of the Malthusian
marriage pattern. This confirms our first hypothesis. One explanation of this might
be that during the third quarter of the 19th
century the economy expanded rapidly.
Material obstacles to marriage declined in importance, although not everybody
profited equally from this phenomenon. Unskilled industrial workers, for example,
found life very difficult, as they had during the previous decades ­ their standard
of living barely improved, if at all (Scholliers, 1996). It is not possible to tell from
the available data whether this prevented an increase in their first marriage rates.
This will, however, be possible for the evolution in first marriage age by social
status (see below). Nonetheless, some indications exist that first marriage intensity
increased in all social groups. After all and globally speaking, the increase in first
marriage rates was fairly significant and this was perhaps only possible because
marriage behaviour was evolving in the same direction in all social groups. In other
words, the general increase would not have been possible if only the marriage rates
of the economically successful groups increased. Another element to support this
argument is that the first marriage rate for young people in Aalst increased more
PRIVATISATION OF MARRIAGE IN 19TH CENTURY FLANDERS 385
Figure 1. First marriage age of bridegrooms (Leuven, Aalst and Bierbeek, 1800­1913).
Figure 2. First marriage age of brides (Leuven, Aalst and Bierbeek, 1800­1913).
than it did in Leuven, although this was precisely the region where factory workers
were present in large quantities.
4.2. FIRST MARRIAGE AGE
Figures 1 and 2 show the evolution of average age at first marriage in Leuven, Aalst
and Bierbeek for the period 1800­1913.14
As well as the annual observations, the
386 KOEN MATTHIJS
sixth degree polynomials are also shown: these provide a visual synthesis of the
long-term trend.15
In the further description and in the sociological interpretation,
the emphasis is on these trends and less on short-term fluctuations, which are
incidentally not insignificant.16
At the beginning of the 19th
century, the average age at first marriage for
men was 30 to 32, for women 28 to 30. This confirms, from an age perspective,
that the marriage pattern at the time was restrictive. These results are along the
same line as those of different studies in Flanders (Vandenbroeke, 1976). Over the
course of the first two decades of the 19th
century, age at first marriage fell by
approximately two years, both for bridegrooms and for brides, and in each region.
This decline was more intense and lasted longer for men than for women which,
certainly at the beginning of the century, was linked to attempts by young men to
escape French (war) demands by marrying. It is striking that Belgian independence
(1830) ­ undoubtedly a politically turbulent period ­ had no visible effect on the
evolution in first marriage intensity or age. This has also been established for other
demographic indicators (Hofstee, 1981). In the second quarter of the 19th
century ­
a period of economic decline in Flanders ­ age at first marriage rose in each region,
although without reaching the level of the beginning of the century. This increase
was relatively weak and short-lived and was quickly followed by a `definitive'
decline in age at first marriage. By `definitive' we mean a consistent, long-term
decline without reverting to the previous high levels. The beginning of this decline
can be placed somewhere between 1840 and 1860, therefore around the same time
as the beginning of the increase in the marriage index Im (Table 3) and 20­25 years
before the start of the decline in fertility. The second hypothesis is therefore also
confirmed and, again, the mid-19th
century seems to be a turning point.
The first marriage age of bridegrooms in Bierbeek is higher for almost the entire
period than for those in Leuven and Aalst. One obvious explanation is the large
number of farmers in Bierbeek, a group which usually has a higher first marriage
age than other occupational groups (see e.g., Van Poppel, 1992). The level and
evolution of first marriage age of bridegrooms in Leuven and Aalst do run parallel,
in spite of the substantial economic differences between the two towns. A different
picture emerges for brides. The fluctuations in first marriage age among brides
are generally smaller than among bridegrooms. The evolution in first marriage age
of brides follows approximately the same pattern throughout the 19th
century in
Leuven and Bierbeek, but in Aalst the first marriage age is lower, which could
be related to the large number of female textile workers. The late decline in first
marriage age in Aalst is striking. This is unexpected, given the large proportion
of poorly skilled and unskilled (female) workers. It could mean that industrialisation
in Aalst did not have a decisive effect on the evolution of first marriage
age. If industrialisation and proletarianisation facilitated the decline in age at first
marriage, this decline should have taken place first in Aalst and last in Bierbeek ­
but it did not!
PRIVATISATION OF MARRIAGE IN 19TH CENTURY FLANDERS 387
As well as the differences ­ which are related to local circumstances ­ striking
similarities certainly exist between the three regions. This is sociologically and
demographically interesting, since the regions studied differ significantly from one
another in terms of the timing and intensity (of the reception) of modernisation,
proto-industrialisation, proletarianisation and development of the services sector.
This can indicate that an underlying process was at work here which encountered
only little resistance from territorial and economic factors.
In general the decline in first marriage age started earlier for brides than for
grooms. Apparently women played a pioneering role in the 19th
century decline
in marriage age. In a sense, this produces additional evidence for the existence
of an underlying process of domesticisation and emotionalisation. Apparently, the
changed social position and gender identity of women, together with the fact that
they were pushed back into the private sector, played a key role in the decline in
first marriage age. This hypothesis is more or less at odds with hypotheses which
associate the 19th
-century evolution of first marriage age with the consequences of
the 19th
-century (economic) developments on the social position of men. Although,
in his semi-economic model, Hajnal concentrates on the evolution of the first
marriage age of women, in his explanation little is said about the contribution of
the woman. When Hajnal speaks of economic needs, he is referring to male needs.
Our Flemish data raise critical questions about this, and even suggest that women
in particular played a crucial role in bringing about (a process of change which led
to) the decline in first marriage age.
In discussing first marriage rates (see previous point) and the evolution of
first marriage age, the importance of insight into differences in socio-economic
status has emerged. For this reason, the evolution in the first marriage age of
bridegrooms and brides has been reconstructed by socio-economic status.17
The
macro-image which emerged earlier, i.e., a decline in first marriage age during the
first two decades of the 19th
century, followed by a slight increase for two to three
decades, then a `definitive' decline until the end of the study period, is roughly
speaking also apparent for the various status groups. The fluctuations are more
intense among bridegrooms than brides. Overall, the highest status groups have
the highest average first marriage age, the middle groups marry somewhat younger
and the lowest socio-economic groups even younger still. This does not indicate
the existence of a young proletarian marriage pattern: until 1865, the average age at
first marriage of low-status bridegrooms was almost never under 28. For almost the
entire study period, farmers had the highest first marriage age. This could explain
why the first marriage age in Bierbeek (see Figure 1) was higher than in Leuven
or Aalst. A similar pattern emerges for brides, at least from approximately 1870
onwards. This explains why the first marriage age of brides in Aalst was lower than
those in Leuven and Bierbeek (see Figure 2). Brides in Aalst included a relatively
large number of unskilled or poorly educated textile workers, who married fairly
young.
388 KOEN MATTHIJS
Figure 3. Remarriage intensity of widowed people (Leuven, Aalst and Bierbeek, 1800­1913).
4.3. REMARRIAGE INTENSITY
In the light of increased domesticisation and of the greater zest for marriage, we can
expect remarriage intensity to increase over the course of the second half of the 19th
century. However, this is not self-evident because marriage and remarriage differ
significantly from one another in terms of characteristics, functions, expectations
and intentions. What is true for the first marriage market is not necessarily true for
the remarriage market, and vice versa. It is possible that in some respects the two
`markets' operate independently. It is even possible that as marriage became more
highly regarded over the course of the 19th
century (see previous point), remarriage
was regarded less highly.
The remarriage intensity is the ratio of the number of widowers (widows)
remarrying in year x compared to the average number of new widowers (widows)
in year x and in the six preceding years.18
The number of men (women) widowed
in year x equals the number of married women (men) deceased in that year. This
information is given in the (civil) death certificates and these have been kept in
Belgium since the middle of 1796.19
Our calculation does not include migration,
which could cause an error unless inflow and outflow balance each other out.
Formally, the remarriage intensity of widowers Rim(x) (or Rif(x) for widows) in year
x is calculated as follows:
Rim(x) = Nwidowers who remarry (x)/((Ndeaths of married women (x) + . . . +
Ndeaths of married women (x-6))/7)
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the remarriage intensity for bridegrooms and
brides in the three regions together.20
At the beginning of the 19th
century, one
PRIVATISATION OF MARRIAGE IN 19TH CENTURY FLANDERS 389
in three widowers and one in four widows remarried. From 1840 onwards, the
remarriage intensity of widowers declined. Initially, the decline was gradual but,
towards the end of the century, it accelerated. These findings contradict our hypothesis:
over the course of (the second half of) the 19th
century, the remarriage
intensity did not increase but declined, particularly among widowers. Since the
first marriage intensity increased in the same period (see above), the proportion of
those remarrying fell sharply, specifically from one in five around 1800 to one in
ten by around 1900.
Broadly speaking, the three study areas demonstrate a parallel pattern from
approximately 1830 onwards, in terms of the evolution in remarriage intensity.21
The cultural and socio-demographic differences between Leuven, Aalst and Bierbeek,
which were fairly wide, appear to play only a subordinate role in this case.
This was also observed for the evolution in first marriage rate and first marriage
age. Nonetheless, regional differences can be seen.
Among widows, the decline of the remarriage intensity began a few decades
later: it only became noticeable by the end of the 19th
century and did not accelerate
until the beginning of the 20th
century. The difference in remarriage intensity of
widowers and widows therefore gradually shrank. Until around 1890, the remarriage
intensity of widowers in Leuven was always higher than in Aalst or Bierbeek.
These latter two communities show a comparable pattern between 1815 and 1885.
Among widows, the figures for Leuven and Aalst run parallel, and those for Bierbeek
are usually the lowest. The remarriage intensity was therefore lower in the
countryside (Bierbeek) than in the towns, which could mean that farmers (and
servants and day labourers) remarried less often than other occupational groups.
This raises critical questions about the hypothesis which associates the 19th
-century
decline in remarriage intensity with the changed socio-economic structures, particularly
the erosion of the traditional farming society, the reduction in the farming
population and the growth of industrialisation and the services sector (Cabourdin,
1981: 282; Bellettini, 1981). Various authors are fairly quick to assume that the
pressure to remarry was so high in farming societies because farmers' households
had to continue functioning even after a death, which meant that vacant family
positions had to be filled quickly. This would mean that the remarriage intensity
should be highest in Bierbeek and lowest in Leuven and the decline in this intensity
would start the latest in Bierbeek. This was definitely not the case. Our study results
suggest, on the contrary, that the remarriage market in urbanised areas was more
open. Apparently, widowed people found it easier to find a new marriage partner
in such areas. Perhaps less restrictive marriage control was exercised in the urban
culture.22
Various factors explain the decline in remarriage intensity: falling mortality,
the demographically less favourable remarriage market and remarriage-unfriendly
economic and cultural changes.23
An argument in favour of our privatisation
hypothesis might be found in the long-term evolution of age-specific remarriage
rates. These rates are indeed age-sensitive: the older a person is, the lower
390 KOEN MATTHIJS
the remarriage rate.24
The remarriage rates of widows remained fairly stable
throughout the 19th
century for all age groups. In Leuven, for example, the agespecific
remarriage rate for the 20­29 old widows was 200 in 1846, 222 in
1880 and again 200 in 1900. The corresponding rate for the age group 50­59
was respectively 4, 8 and 11. Among widowers, remarriage rates declined in
period 1846­1900 in the three youngest age groups, among older widowers they
remained fairly stable. In Leuven, the age-specific remarriage rate for the 20­29old
widowers was 333 in 1846, 83 in 1880 and 0 in 1900. The decline in remarriage
intensity for widowers was therefore confined to the younger age groups. In a sense,
this is an indication that emotional considerations became more important in the
concrete planning of life. Maybe that from the middle of the 19th
century onwards,
the deceased partner was more romanticised and idealised, which caused a kind of
remarriage blockage. The new family discourse, the idealisation of close relationships
and the enthusiastic emotionalisation of all internal family subsystems were
so central to social contacts and they became so highly valued in public opinion that
a watered-down version, in the form of a remarriage and a reconstituted family, was
held in low esteem and sometimes even disdained.
4.4. INTERVAL BETWEEN WIDOWING AND REMARRIAGE
Another way of measuring the emotional bond between the former partners is
the interval between being widowed and remarrying. In the Early Modern Period,
people remarried `quickly' ­ in specific terms, this means within one year of being
widowed ­ which would point to a significant affective distance between the partners
(Aris, 1981; Segalen, 1981; Shorter, 1977; Van Poppel, 1992).25
The death of
a partner was apparently quickly processed and he/she was quickly replaced. Seen
against the emotionalisation process, we can expect the interval between widowing
and remarrying to increase over the course of the 19th
century. The deceased partner
remained emotionally and symbolically `presenť in the family for a longer period,
which resulted in a kind of emotional blockade, leading to the postponement or
even abandonment of a new marriage (see previous point).
Figure 4 shows the waiting time (in months) between the time of widowing and
of remarriage in the period 1800­1913 for the three study areas together.26
Among
widowers, the average interval was 2.5 to 3 years, among widows one year longer
(for comparisons, see Ihinger-Tallman and Pasley, 1987: 28; Cabourdin, 1978: 316;
Charbonneau, 1970: 82; Bideau, 1980: 38; Van Poppel, 1992: 375; Segalen, 1981:
68; Lundh, 2002: 424­425). This male-female difference has to do with the fact that
the social regulations regarding marriage, mourning and the mourning period were
less far-reaching for widowers than for widows (Van Poppel, 1992: 307; Lundh,
2002: 433). There is also a legal aspect: in order to prevent confusio sanguinis
(offspring confusion), the widow had to wait three hundred days before she could
remarry.27
PRIVATISATION OF MARRIAGE IN 19TH CENTURY FLANDERS 391
Figure 4. Interval (in months) between the time of widowing and remarriage (Leuven, Aalst
and Bierbeek, 1800­1913).
What is more important to our hypothesis is that the interval between widowing
and remarriage changed only slightly over the course of the 19th
century. If the first
and last decades of the period under observation are removed from the analysis
­ which is defensible ­ a slight increase in that interval is observed, more for
widowers than for widows (a lower-degree polynomial makes this much more
clear). Note that this observation runs parallel to the one in the previous section
on remarriage intensity. We also examined whether (the evolution of) that interval
differed per type of remarriage, but this was not the case.28
The results therefore
only partly confirm the expectation that the interval between widowing and
remarriage would increase over the course of the 19th
century.
4.5. NUMBER AND PROPORTION OF WITNESSING FAMILY MEMBERS
As is the case today, the marriage ceremony in the 19th
century involved witnesses.
These witnesses were there to control and verify the proceedings. Those marrying
were free to choose the witnesses, but some formal rules did apply. Except during
the French Period, when both men and women could act as witnesses, during the
19th
century only men could be witnesses. The entire study group contained only
thirteen female witnesses; they were rejected from the analysis. The 19th
-century
rules also stipulated that there must be four witnesses, two from 1908 onwards. The
relationship of each of them to the bride or bridegroom, as well as other details, is
registered on the marriage certificate. This is now further examined as an element
of privatisation or, more accurately, of `familiarisation' of the marriage ceremony.29
392 KOEN MATTHIJS
Figure 5. Average number of family members among witnesses (Leuven, Aalst and Bierbeek,
1800­1913) (maximum = 4).
The starting point is the hypothesis that mobilising family members as witnesses
is an indication of privatisation of family life: the higher that proportion (relative
to all witnesses), the stronger the privatisation. This is clearly confirmed by our
study; the proportion of witnessing family members increased in each study area
over the course of the 19th
century (Figure 5). By the mid-19th
century, one or two
of the witnesses were relatives of the bride or groom; by the end of the 19th
century,
this was three out of four. From approximately 1900 onwards, the witnesses were
almost always family members. This is a strong indication of the increasing importance
of family ties. The marriage ceremony increasingly became a matter for the
partners and their families and less for the anonymous environment. In a manner
of speaking, the marriage ceremony became `familiaľ and this can be interpreted
as an aspect of privatisation. Important to note is that, here too, the period around
1850 is a turning point.
Figure 6 examines whether the four (two after 1908) witnesses were relatives
of the marriage partners, for each witness separately. This analysis is confined to
Leuven because of the restricted number of observations for Aalst and Bierbeek.
A clear pattern emerges: the proportion of witnesses who are family of one of
the marriage partners is higher for the first witness than for the second, higher
for the second than for the third and higher for the third than for the fourth. The
order in which the witnesses were officially registered was not random. Non-family
members were not involved until the group of potential family member signatories
had been exhausted and this was carried right through to the order of the signatures
on the marriage certificate. This observation also strongly points in the direction of
privatisation of marriage in the second part of the 19th
century.
PRIVATISATION OF MARRIAGE IN 19TH CENTURY FLANDERS 393
Figure 6. Percentage of witnesses with family tie, per witness (Leuven, 1865­1913).
4.6. MALE OR FEMALE RELATIONSHIP OF THE WITNESSES
In detailing our hypotheses, we take as our basis the additional hypothesis that the
history of privatisation took place principally, but not exclusively, via women and
was, in this sense, gendered. Following on from this, the previous point (proportion
of witnessing family members) can be specified, i.e., that in choosing witnesses,
stronger and increasing preference was given to the bride's family (the `female'
line) than to the groom's family (the `male' line). Specifically, we expect the
proportion of witnessing family members from the bride's side to increase over
the course of the 19th
century. This is not obvious because of the possible reaction
from the groom's `female' side, i.e., his mother. Bridegrooms ­ certainly younger
bridegrooms ­ usually have a living mother who interferes with the marriage
aspirations of her offspring. However, it seems plausible that the negotiating position
and the micro-social power to control the marriage ceremony of the groom's
mother is usually less than that of the bride's mother because, in the latter case, no
`disruptive' male link is present.
The results are presented in Figure 7.30
Around 1840­1850, the division was
approximately equal: one in three witnesses was related to the bride, one in three
to the bridegroom and the remaining third was not related. In the course of the
19th
century, the proportion of the `no relation' group gradually diminishes. This is
completely in line with our basic hypothesis. Abstracting from this last group, the
proportion of witnesses related to the bride and the groom remains approximately
equal throughout the entire 19th
century, i.e., 50%. The loss of the proportion
of the `unrelateď group is equally compensated by an increase in the group of
related witnesses on both the bride's and the bridegroom's side. This contradicts
394 KOEN MATTHIJS
Figure 7. Family ties of witnesses on the `female' or `male' side (Leuven, all witnesses
1865­1913).
our hypothesis. Apart from the aforementioned restraint ­ the bridegroom's mother
also interferes in the marriage ceremony ­ another, purely pragmatic explanation
is also possible: achieving a fair balance in terms of number of related witnesses
in the `male' and `female' line prevents conflicts within and primarily between
families. The new marriage cannot be encumbered with disputes between families
from the outset. As to witnesses, this presupposes a fair exchange.
4.7. EMPLOYMENT OUTSIDE THE HOME OF WOMEN IN FIRST MARRIAGES
Data concerning the evolution in the level of activity in the 19th
century usually
come from the censuses (see e.g., Pott-Buter, 1993), but this evolution can also
be checked fairly reliably from marriage certificates, although it relates, of course,
only to people getting married. This is now empirically checked, but a methodological
problem arises: some women stopped working when they married while
others did not wish to see their work status registered on the marriage certificate
(Van Poppel, 1992; Matthijs, 2001). That some stopped working when they married
says a great deal about domesticisation. The material advantage (in the form of
an additional income) of continuing to work did apparently not counterbalance
the (expected) disadvantages. These disadvantages were mainly cultural, which is
where the tension emerges between income and status. In our study period, the
meritocratic society was in full swing, but that path was clearly male. The wife's
income did generate increased financial clout, but apparently not additional status.
Perhaps this was even interpreted in precisely the opposite way: the fact that a
married woman had to go to work indicated that the husband had a low income and
PRIVATISATION OF MARRIAGE IN 19TH CENTURY FLANDERS 395
Figure 8. Proportion of first marrying women employed outside the home (total group,
1815­1913).
`therefore' a low family status. By not going out to work, the wife was indicating
that she did not have to work ­ whether or not this was true. In this way, the wife
could make enough time to take part in the `new' 19th
-century bourgeois (female)
culture of the middle classes and to shaping the cult of motherhood.
The analysis is confined to period after 1815 because, before that date, major
fluctuations were seen in the stated numbers of women working outside the home.
This was related to registration errors and administrative oversights, perhaps even
to the deliberate withholding of information. Here, employment outside the home is
measured by whether or not an occupation is explicitly stated on the marriage certificate.
Figure 8 shows that the proportion of (marrying) women working outside
the home fell systematically over the course of the 19th
century, especially in
the second half. Between 1815 and 1860, over 80% of marrying women had an
occupation; subsequently this figure fell to 60%. As already indicated, this was
not only a real reduction, it was also related to the fact that increasing numbers
of women did not wish to register the fact that they worked outside the home. It
must be stressed that the stated percentages significantly overestimate the general
employment of women outside the home. Our research group consists mainly of
young, unmarried and childless women. Their employment outside the home is, of
course, substantially higher than that of the older, married women with dependent
children.
The reduction in employment outside the home supports the domesticisation
hypothesis. Whether this was a genuine development or a shift in registration is in a
sense of little relevance: both processes point to the fact that work outside the home
was increasingly regarded as male and instrumental, domestic labour as female
396 KOEN MATTHIJS
and expressive (Perrot, 1990). The contrast between male, public work outside the
home and female, private domestic labour became clearer. The man/husband/father
was responsible for income and status, while the woman/wife/mother took care of
the household and the children.
4.8. PROPORTION OF ILLEGITIMATE BIRTHS
In various Western European countries, including Belgium, the proportion of illegitimate
children rose considerably between 1750 and 1850. According to Shorter
(1977), this was a result of female emancipation and primarily the female struggle
for (sexual) liberation from oppressive male power structures. Increased industrial
employment provided the necessary leverage. The `new woman' was more individualist
and more independent, she rebelled against parental authority, opposed
traditions and sought sexual gratification. Her `olď rural values were eroded and
replaced by a libertarian and proletarian sub-culture full of romanticism and eroticism.
The result was an increase in the number and proportion of illegitimate
children. Much opposition was voiced against this attitude (Tilly et al., 1976:
463­469; Anderson, 1980: 56; Damsma, 1993: 178­184). To begin with, it is not
easy to check whether the shift in the perception of sexuality and sexual behaviour
took place earlier among women employed in industry than among other
women. The data required to check this do not exist. This is also the case for the
motives of young girls going to work in factories: the emancipatory effect of this
is hard to see. On the contrary: this work was hard, monotonous and underpaid.
Moreover, only a small minority of women worked there, while the vast majority
remained employed within the home, on the farm and in the classic cottage industry
circuit. Those who did still work in factories did not do so out of rebellion, but
to increase the family's income. Their reasons were utilitarian, not emancipatory;
family interest took pride of place, not their own benefit. Many women were at
that time in a structural poverty trap: they had no property of their own, no money,
no permanent job, no family network, no circle of friends. In order to escape from
loneliness and mind-numbing factory labour, they looked for a partner. Pregnancy
helped put this partner under pressure to marry. This devious intent was sometimes
successful, but not always: many men simply left their pregnant partners high and
dry because they, too, had no money and suffered appalling (working) conditions.
In a nutshell, the fact that many women at the time had illegitimate children was
the result of a calculated risk which often did not pay off. This was the result of
two conflicting breeding grounds: despair resulting from economic problems and
hope that marriage would offer a way out.
Over the course of the second half of the 19th
century, the proportion of illegitimate
births declined. Living conditions improved considerably for many: men
earned more and women were not pushed so much into working outside the home.
The number of servants and poor migrants fell ­ two groups which had been highly
vulnerable to unwanted pregnancy (Tilly et al., 1976: 475). Young couples now
PRIVATISATION OF MARRIAGE IN 19TH CENTURY FLANDERS 397
Figure 9. Proportion of illegitimate births (Leuven, Aalst and Bierbeek, 1840­1913).
found it economically easier to marry `in time'. In this sense, economic growth
put the brakes on illegitimacy. Nonetheless, the effect of this economic factor
should not be overestimated: for various groups, purchasing power and consumption
pattern around 1900 did not differ greatly from those of 1800 (Scholliers,
1981, 1985, 1992). The decline in the proportion of illegitimate children can also
be explained culturally. Over the course of the 19th
century, a very child-friendly
environment developed (Cunningham, 1997). Moral newspeak stipulated on all
fronts that children should be born within marriage and should grow up in a
`normal family'. An unmarried woman with children had to marry (quickly) so
that the children would immediately be legitimised. As a consequence of these
new values and of the associated social control, it was now no longer possible to
separate motherhood from marriage (Tilly and Scott, 1978; Gillis, 1985). This is
an additional indication that all kinds of aspects of domesticisation were spreading
in all directions. In the above paragraphs, the partner system took pride of place,
now it is the parental system.
Figure 9 shows the evolution (from 1840 onwards) in the proportion of illegitimate
children (relative to all births) in Leuven, Aalst and Bierbeek. In Leuven,
the proportion of illegitimate births decreased substantially. Fairly large regional
differences prevail. This also emerges in the measurement of extramarital fertility
using the Coale-index Ih (Table 5). On this scale, Leuven scores up to four times
higher than Aalst or Bierbeek. In the mid-19th
century, one in four to one in five
births in Leuven were illegitimate, but this figure fell from 1850 onwards.31
This
proportion was lower and more stable in Aalst and Bierbeek, fluctuating around
5% throughout the period of observation, leaving little room for a decline. The
high illegitimacy score for Leuven is related, among other things, to the presence
398 KOEN MATTHIJS
Table 5. Coale's extra-marital fertility Ih index (Leuven, Aalst and Bierbeek, 19th
century census years and 1910)
1846 1856 1866 1880 1890 1900 1910
Leuven 0.0947 0.1091 0.0889 0.0859 0.0823 0.0620 0.0455
Aalst 0.0247 0.0236 0.0221 0.0204 0.0419 0.0415 0.0378
Bierbeek 0.0128 0.0060 0.0446 0.0222 0.0472 0.0260 0.0254
Source: census figures for the years stated and statistics from registers of births,
marriages and deaths, own calculations.
of army barracks and the large number of university students. However, these were
also present in the second half of the 19th
century and the illegitimacy ratio still
declined considerably in that period. This indicates that, in the second half of the
19th
century, people succeeded in culturally incorporating groups which had previously
operated more or less outside the regular marriage pattern and to impose
upon them new standards relating to sexuality, homeliness, marriage and family
formation. However, in addition to this intensive and extensive social control (e.g.,
by the state and church authorities), it is just as plausible that these groups were
themselves now sufficiently sensitive and receptive to the new values and standards
and that they followed the prescribed route without external pressure. Conforming
to the expectations of the dominant, highly esteemed marriage system and family
pattern was, at the end of the day, the driving force behind social promotion.
4.9. CHILDREN LEGITIMISED BY MARRIAGE
The evolution in illegitimacy and the link with domesticisation can be empirically
demonstrated from a different angle of approach, i.e. through the evolution in the
proportion of marriages in which at least one child is legitimised (Figure 10).32
On
average in Leuven during the period 1810­1913, at least one child was legitimised
in one out of five marriages, in Aalst and Bierbeek this figure was one in ten. At
the beginning of the 19th
century, this proportion was lower in every region than by
the end of the century. This confirms and reinforces the basic hypothesis that more
parents wanted to see their children growing up in the conventional family circuit.
Apparently, the `false starť to a relationship ­ in the form of an illegitimate child
­ could and should quickly be corrected by marrying. The fact that this proportion
declined again at the end of the 19th
and beginning of the 20th
centuries can be
explained in part by the sharp decline in illegitimacy at that time (see Table 5 and
Figure 9). Illegitimacy had indeed now become fairly rare ­ in Belgium as a whole,
the proportion of illegitimate births was only 6% by around 1910.
Taken together, Figures 9 and 10 suggest that the proportion of children legitimised
by a marriage, per year of birth, increased over the course of the 19th
century.
In order to check this, a legitimacy index was developed, which is the ratio of the
number of children legitimised by marriage in a given year to all the children born
PRIVATISATION OF MARRIAGE IN 19TH CENTURY FLANDERS 399
Figure 10. Proportion of marriages with at least one legitimised child (Leuven, Aalst and
Bierbeek, 1810­1913).
Figure 11. Legitimacy index (Leuven, Aalst and Bierbeek, 1840­1913).
illegitimately in that year.33
Figure 11 confirms that, by the end of the 19th
century,
most illegitimately born children were legitimised by marriage; in the first half
of the 19th
century this figure was only half. This confirms the stated hypothesis.
Apart from the cultural pressure to allow children to grow up in a `normaľ family,
a demographic factor was also at work here, i.e., the decline in infant mortality.
Initially, the likelihood of illegitimate children dying was fairly high, particularly
400 KOEN MATTHIJS
Table 6. Proportion of marriages with at least one legitimised child by socio-economic
status of the bride and bridegroom (total group, 1810­1913)
Brides Bridegrooms
% Number of % Number of
marriages marriages
Upper classes
Large land owners 1.0 296 3.1 196
Occupations with high cultural capital 0.0 12 3.9 1,526
Senior occupations in trade and industry 9.5 222 7.7 1,437
Middle and lower classes
Shop owners, small entrepreneurs 15.9 4,089 15.7 7,006
Occupations with average cultural capital 2.1 145 10.8 2.559
Small land owners 6.5 1,747 5.4 496
Farmers 6.1 1,714 9.2 2,724
Poorly educated, not employed in a factory
Non-factory workers 24.4 9,516 22.3 12,648
Domestic staff 14.2 8,601 16.2 2.967
Economic craftsmen 30.8 1,014 16.8 2,027
Poorly educated factory workers 21.5 3,217 20.5 6,095
Unskilled 33.9 3,074 29.6 3,281
Others
No occupation 12.7 8,872 11.1 738
Housewives 29.3 382 -- --
Source: marriage certificates for Leuven, Aalst and Bierbeek; own calculations.
when very young. This situation improved by the end of the 19th
century: more
children were living longer and, as a result, their probability of being legitimised
increased.
There are indications that illegitimate fertility among lower social groups was
higher than among the medium and higher groups (Van Bavel, 1998). With the
usual reservations, the evolution in the proportion of marriages with at least one
legitimised child by socio-economic status can be regarded as an approximate
measure of the evolution in the difference in illegitimacy between these groups.
We expect that the proportion of marriages with at least one legitimised child will
be higher in the lower social groups. Over the entire 19th
century on average and the
three study areas together, at least one child was legitimised by 34% of unskilled
workers getting married; this figure was lower for the middle and certainly the
higher social groups (Table 6).
PRIVATISATION OF MARRIAGE IN 19TH CENTURY FLANDERS 401
5. Conclusion and Discussion
At the beginning of this study, we formulated nine hypotheses concerning the 19th
century
(mainly the second part) development of certain indicators in family and
marriage. The basis for these hypotheses was the assumption that domesticisation
and privatisation were intensifying at the time, that women were the pioneers in
this process and that this was then translated into renewal (or reinforcement) of
all kinds of aspects of the content and form of marriage, the marriage ceremony
and the family. The main results can be summarised roughly as follows: (1) first
marriage intensity increased; (2) age at first marriage fell; (3) remarriage intensity
declined; (4) the interval between widowing and remarriage increased slightly;
(5) the number and proportion of witnessing family members increased; (6) the
number and proportion of family members did not increase more on the female side
than on the male side; (7) the proportion of women working outside the home fell;
(8) the proportion of illegitimate births declined; (9) the proportion of marriages
involving at least one legitimised child increased.
Most of these hypotheses, particularly those relating to the first marriage,
witnesses, working outside the home and illegitimacy, are confirmed. It must be
stressed, however, that each of these developments is the result of the complex
interplay between various social and cultural factors. It was not the intention of
this study to disentangle these patterns. The intention was to demonstrate empirically
that various macro-sociological and demographic indicators point in the
same direction. This suggests an underlying process which we refer to here as
domesticisation and privatisation of marriage.
There are some indications that, from the mid-19th
century onwards in Flanders
­ as elsewhere in Western Europe ­ (first) marriages were the object of much
social enthusiasm. The probability of first marriage increased and first marriage age
declined. Within less than one generation ­ roughly the generations from 1800­
25 and 1825­50 ­ the Malthusian marriage pattern of `few' and `late' marriages
imploded. The decline in first marriage age began earlier among women than
among men, which is an intriguing social puzzle. After all, men benefited first
and most from the new economic possibilities and we can therefore expect them
to marry earlier ­ they were the ones with fewer material obstacles to marriage.
Apparently, these new opportunities were not enough to take men over the marriage
threshold more quickly. On the other hand, at first sight women had no reason at all
to marry earlier and with greater intensity. In the 19th
century, their legal competence
was, after all, limited. With very few exceptions, a married woman could
not act legally, unless she had her husbanďs consent. He controlled her marital
property, he could `punish' her and was `responsible' for her, in the same way as
for their under-age children. An unmarried (or widowed) woman could, however,
act legally in her own name and do business. Which led to the key question: why
did women desire precisely that which pushed them into a legally subordinate
position?
402 KOEN MATTHIJS
Another striking and consistent pattern emerges, which is that the decline in age
at first marriage occurred among all social groups, i.e., both among `new' groups
such as the middle classes and the poorly-qualified industrial workers and among
`olď groups such as farmers. Here too, however, socially significant differences in
terms of start and pace are evident: first marriage age fell first and fairly slowly
among the lower social groups; the middle and higher groups followed later but,
once started, the decline was rapid. Age at first marriage was higher on average
among the highest-status groups than among the middle groups and higher among
the middle groups than among the lower social classes. This is also a challenging
paradox, since the higher groups were apparently not using their material opportunities
and status to marry early. In other respects, the low-status groups certainly did
not marry early; in no way can we speak of an early, `proletarian' marriage pattern.
The low-status groups probably saw marriage as a means of social emancipation; a
form of imitation of highly esteemed (private) behaviour which was typical of the
middle and high-status groups, i.e., groups which pulled and pushed the domestication
project. Marrying early was a means of anticipatory socialisation with the
intention of gaining access to the world and the private role behaviour of the higherstatus
groups. Once again, however, it appears that the groups which postponed
the decline for the longest made a rapid start on catching up. The result of this
movement was that by the end of the 19th
century, the ages at first marriage of
both men and women and of all socio-economic groups were moving increasingly
closer to one another. One possible sociological consequence was that, from then
on, marriage maybe became a less relevant social distinction mechanism.
The proportion of remarriages declined from 20­25% in the first half of the
19th
century to 10­15% by the end of the century. This proportion remained the
highest throughout the study period in urbanised Leuven, it was slightly lower
in Aalst ­ where a substantial agricultural minority still lived at the beginning of
the 19th
century ­ and was the lowest in Bierbeek, a markedly rural region. The
interval between the time of widowing and of remarriage changed little over the
course of the 19th
century. Among widowers, this was an average of 2.5 to 3 years,
one year longer for widows, and this differed little among the three study regions.
Contrary to expectations, the remarriage intensity ­ the proportion of widowed
people remarrying ­ declined over the course of the second half of the 19th
century.
Around 1830­'40, almost half of widowers remarried and one in five to one in four
of widows. By the beginning of the 20th
century, one quarter of widowers remarried
and one in seven of widows. This is entirely contrary to the expectations, since it
was assumed that the social enthusiasm for marriage would also spill over into
remarriage rates.
Other indicators also point in a direction which can be interpreted as expressions
of domesticisation in the course of the second half of the 19th
century. The number
and proportion of family members acting as witnesses increased, the numbers of
marrying women working outside the home declined and the proportion of illegitimate
children fell. Furthermore, it appeared that, towards the end of the 19th
PRIVATISATION OF MARRIAGE IN 19TH CENTURY FLANDERS 403
century, the majority of children born illegitimately were being legitimised by
marriage, while this proportion was only half in the first half of the 19th
century.
In brief, various demographic and social indicators show that domesticisation
subtly shaped 19th
century private life. This took place by people marrying more
and earlier, by the development of a `female' marriage discourse, by the promotion
of marriage and family rituals, by not going out to work and by doing everything
possible to ensure that children were born into a conventional marriage and brought
up within a family. All these aspects were institutionally rooted in marriage and
the family ­ two legally safeguarded and socially highly esteemed institutions.
If `the marriage' was not always and everywhere of the quantitatively dominant
type, it was a qualitatively highly esteemed model. For this reason it was `imitateď
on a large scale and, for this reason also, we can talk, somewhat exaggeratedly,
of a mimetic appetite for marriage. This explains why the age at first marriage
declined first among the lower social groups: more than for the other social groups,
marriage was for them a vehicle for social promotion. In other respects, this was
only possible because the prevailing economic and social developments permitted
it: more people were now becoming economically independent (from their parents)
at an earlier age and could therefore marry younger. However, this explanation is
not enough. This can be seen from the fact that the timing of the 19th
-century
economic cycles and of indicators such as the evolution in first marriage intensity
and first marriage age did not run parallel. The differences between the three socioeconomically
very diverse regions and between the status groups are also not in line
with expectations.
Of course, to interpret 19th
-century socio-demographic and family sociology
developments, the social and economic processes of the time must be taken into
the equation. Specifically, this includes the expansion of liberalism, the process of
state-creation, the development of the `nation state', the growth of democratisation,
industrialisation and the service sector, and the spreading of professionalisation.
These were all macro-developments with major micro-social consequences. All of
this turned the conventional mechanisms of status struggle and competition upside
down. From then on, education, profession and income played a major role. This
new status struggle was to a large extent `public' and `economic' and, in this
sense, `male'. Despite the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, liberalisation,
economic expansion ­ in other words, despite `favourable' social and cultural limit
conditions (or precisely because of them?) ­ women were increasingly kept out
or pushed out of public life, where `new' status could be acquired. In a manner
of speaking, women were banished to the private living environment. The social
position and gender identity of women changed substantially: over the course of
the 19th
century they were increasingly pushed out of public life and banished
to the private living environment. In response to this exclusion and subordination,
women developed a separate, `female' status scale within their private world, which
revolved around a `gooď marriage, a `clean' home, a `closeď family, `expressive'
contacts and a permanently available mother. From then on, women had to look
404 KOEN MATTHIJS
for social appreciation and individual recognition within these environments. The
division of tasks became even more gender-specific than it already was (Duby and
Perrot, 1993). The notion of `outside the home' became symbolically associated
with husband, work, money, prestige, public ­ and future. The notion of inside the
home was associated with wife, leisure time, private, children, emotion, warmth
­ and past. In the male mind, this produced an unusual paradox: more so than
women, they lived in two worlds ­ one within the house and one outside the house.
Their families and their homes were associated with home-coming and cosiness.
The new citizen was therefore confronted with a sharp contradiction: on the one
hand, he had all kinds of public roles and responsibilities; on the other hand he felt
himself strongly attracted to the new homeliness. This schizophrenic phenomenon,
for men, has received and is still receiving little attention, historically speaking.
The `new' marital and family life could only develop in the dynamic 19th
century
economic setting. The emotionalisation of interpersonal intercourse, the
domesticisation and development of affective partner relationships were only
possible because the economy permitted them. The hypothesis put forward here
is that 19th
-century structural, economic and political marginalisation encouraged
women to develop their dyadic power in primary relationships. Marrying young
and creating an identity around expressive family and motherhood tasks was,
for (many?) women, a reaction to and a remedy for their public exclusion and
economic subordination. This process distanced men and women from one another,
but it also produced ­ paradoxically enough ­ social and individual pacification
between the sexes. Marrying and being able to create a family independently
defused the gender problem which industrialisation reinforced. This problem was
translated in specific terms as deprivation, perhaps even as discrimination, but it
was precisely this which gave women the ammunition to write a new social history.
Acknowledgement
This research has been supported by the Fund for Scientific Research ­ Flanders.
Notes
1 This study forms part of a wider historical study of the demographic and sociological characteristics
of three Flemish communities ­ Leuven, Aalst and Bierbeek. For a description, see Matthijs
(2001).
2 The list of nine indicators is, of course, not exhaustive. E.g., another important indicator is the age
homogamy of people marrying for the first time (Van de Putte and Matthijs, 2001).
3 People develop permanent economic adjustment strategies; to this end, they exchange and deal
in material and symbolic goods and services. For a thorough summary of these strategies, see Kok
(1994: 108­116) and Seccombe (1992: 166­199). Seccombe contends that the economic changes in
general and the labour market shifts in particular played (and play) a central role in the permanent
adjustment of family and population characteristics. Birdsall (1983) also sees a direct link between
the economy and demographic parameters. For example, proto-industrialisation led to a higher
marriage intensity and marriage fertility and to a lower first marriage age. The conclusion reached by
PRIVATISATION OF MARRIAGE IN 19TH CENTURY FLANDERS 405
Schofield (1983: 279) that the evolution in the number of marriages in the past and the development
of the wage level points to the same thing.
4 The marriage certificate establishes the marriage in law. As well as information about the date
and place of the marriage ceremony, it contains all kinds of information about the marriage partners
themselves, their parents and the witnesses. The registration of births, marriages and deaths began in
Belgium on 17 June 1796. For many different reasons, some of the observations from the beginning
of our study period may be unreliable. During the Dutch Period (1815­1830) the registration system
was perfected. The Civil Code (Article 109) of the independent Belgium, which was grafted on to
the Napoleonic Code (1804), continued the existing registration practices. With the exception of a
few adjustments, little changed in the content of the marriage certificates during the 19th century.
Comparability was, however, made more difficult at the beginning of the 19th century because the
Republican calendar was in use during the period 1792­1805. This has been taken into account in
the study.
5 Historical aspects of 19th-century Leuven are discussed in Torfs (1899); Jonckheere (1960);
Camerlinckx (1960); Magits (1974); Stadsbestuur Leuven (1975); Brepoels et al. (1985); Van Croonenborch
(1988); Peeters (1992); Van Ermen (1997) and Matthijs et al. (1997).
6 Historical aspects of 19th-century Aalst are discussed in Courteaux and Van Lul (1956); Van
Rossem (1965); Van Melkebeke (1977); Willems (1984); Praet (1986); Poddevijn et al. (1991); De
Hauwere (undated).
7 For more information on Bierbeek, see Bovin et al. (1985); Vliebergh and Ulens (1914).
8 The marriage certificates almost always state the occupation of the bridegroom, that of the bride
much less frequently (Matthijs, 2001). Some officials evidently did not think the work of certain
women was important enough to ask about it, let alone state it. Furthermore, for all kinds of reasons,
some marrying women withheld their occupations from the attention of the officials and thus from
the eyes of society. Others stopped working when they married. The description `housewife' occurs
only rarely; apparently this was not seen as an occupation in the strict sense of the word. One other
problem is the description `no occupation'. This can refer to a high social level (people who were
so rich that they neither had to nor wanted to work and also wanted to be registered as such), as
well as to unemployed people looking for work, non-job-seeking housewives or homeworkers who
did not state their job as an occupation (lace workers, for example). The status of people marrying,
particularly of brides, is not only determined by their own education, occupation and income, but also
by that of their parents, particularly the father. His occupation is, however, (usually) only registered
on the certificates if he was still alive at the time of the marriage ceremony. In our study, this was
true in one out of two cases. Nonetheless, the social weight of the father does not expire when he
dies. The extent to which prospective brides attached importance to their own occupation (or status)
or to that of their fathers depends on the value attached to those occupations. The higher their own
occupation and the lower that of the father, the more the woman will make of her own occupation on
the marriage market. However, if the father has a highly-regarded occupation, she will make more of
her background on the marriage market. Additional measurement problems are posed by the fact that
a person's social status at the time of the marriage ceremony is determined by both his own and his
parents' position. For the ways in which these problems were resolved, see Matthijs (2001: 68­80).
9 These tables contain some anomalies which almost certainly have to do with administrative procedures
and official registration practices.
10 For more information about the backgrounds to, calculation method and interpretation of the
Coale indices, see Coale and Watkins (1986, appendix B).
11 See Hajnal (1965) for a description of the characteristics, causes and consequences of the Malthusian
marriage pattern. Hajnaľs basic proposition has never been thoroughly negated. Both aspects ­
marriage intensity and first marriage age ­ are often empirically linked: marriages are either early and
many or late and few but, in fact, all combinations are possible. See Watkins (1984), Stone (1977),
Dixon (1978), Lehning (1983, 1988).
406 KOEN MATTHIJS
12 That restricting marriage was a response to a shortage of land and to limited economic possibilities
seems obvious but must nonetheless be qualified: examples exist of early and almost universal
marriage in regions where and at times when, in view of the economic problems, more reticence
would be expected (Alter, 1991). Examples also exist of few, late marriages at times, in places or in
groups where virtually no economic restrictions existed: the rich bourgeoisie, for example, did not
use their wealth to marry off their children quickly.
13 At the beginning of the 20th century, another reversal seems to be noticeable. However, we do
not examine this further.
14 The average first marriage ages can, for various reasons, present a misleading picture of actual
evolution. The number of marriages by age is, after all, not only dependent on the age-specific
marriage rate, but also on the available numbers of marriageable people by generation and by age.
Differences between groups regarding first marriage age thus can point to genuine differences, as
well as to differences in the age structure of the population. In the same way, differences in average
marriage ages by social level can be a result of actual differences, as well as of the unequal age
structure of the marriageable people per occupational group.
15 In addition to the polynomial, the R2 values are also shown. These values illustrate the extent to
which the actual curve deviates from the trend line, i.e., from the polynomial. The R2 values vary
between 0 and 100%, where 100% refers to a perfect match. Particularly at the extremes, the direction
and intensity of the polynomial can be misleading and, for this reason, these have to be interpreted
with caution.
16 For a thorough analysis of the evolution of the age at first marriage in the three study areas, see
Matthijs (2002).
17 These figures are not reproduced here; see Matthijs (2001: 190­196).
18 The choice of a seven-year period is pragmatic: remarriage usually takes place within this period.
The calculation method described does have disadvantages, but nonetheless provides a close approximation
of remarriage behaviour. One difficulty is that no account is taken of the timing of remarriage;
a decline in remarriage intensity can be linked either to deferment or to abandonment and, if wide
fluctuations occur, the measure used could become inaccurate. For other calculation methods, see for
example Van Poppel (1992); Bideau (1980); Beex (1982).
19 The coding of the death certificates for complete years is possible from 1797 onwards; for this
reason, the remarriage intensity can be calculated from 1803 onwards. For the three previous years,
extrapolation was required. In addition to this methodological problem a substantive problem also
exists: many people from the surrounding countryside died in the hospitals of Leuven and Aalst.
They did not therefore die where they legally lived. This was a rare occurrence in Bierbeek. In order
to correct for this, these deaths were counted and deducted from the original number. Specifically,
the legal place of residence of the deceased was checked for every tenth year. The figures for the
intermediate years were estimated by interpolation. A second problem is that widowed people are
geographically mobile ­ even at an advanced age. The measurements are distorted because some
people return to their village of birth after being widowed ­ women more so than men ­ while others
move to the town to start a new social life, which can also mean looking for a new partner (Van
Poppel, 1995: 431).
20 For a thorough analysis of the methods of calculation of the remarriage intensity, see Matthijs
(2003).
21 For more information and comparisons, see Matthijs (2001: 207­210).
22 The fact that agricultural regions were more closed in terms of nuptiality was perhaps related to
the fact that farmers were under significant pressure to marry within their own class and perhaps this
pressure was stronger in second marriages than in first marriages. It is also possible that agricultural
regions differed from non-agricultural regions in terms of household composition in the sense that
cohabitation and living with parents was more common in the countryside. After all, cohabitants
can fully or partially take over the family functions of deceased family members, which reduces the
emotional and economic pressure to remarry. Inheritance questions can also play a role: Bierbeek
PRIVATISATION OF MARRIAGE IN 19TH CENTURY FLANDERS 407
had a great many larger and smaller owner-farmers and their inheritance could in some cases have
played a part in curbing remarriage aspirations.
23 What is known as crisis mortality ­ i.e., mortality as a consequence of `economic stress',
epidemics and wars ­ fell over the course of the 19th century as a result of better medical knowledge
and prevention, better nutrition and the development of social provisions such as the supply of clean
water and the efficient disposal of contaminated water (Burnett, 1991: 59; Schofield and Reher, 1991:
1). Since life expectancy was rising, marriages were dissolved later and since remarriage rates decline
as age increases (see below), this resulted in a lower remarriage intensity (Charbonneau, 1970: 81;
Ihinger-Tallman and Pasley, 1987: 28; Van Poppel, 1995: 280; Dyrvik, 1981: 305; Knodel and Lynch,
1985: 39). Generally speaking, this proposition has to be put into perspective because the decline in
mortality was not linear, but differed with age (see e.g., Vallin, 1991: 54). It is difficult to say whether
another demographic factor, the late 19th-century decline in fertility, also played a role in the decline
in remarriage intensity. According to most research, the remarriage rate is smaller if (several) children
are involved, but children can sometimes also be an incentive to remarry. This depends partly on
their age and gender (Van Poppel, 1992: 326­327). Older children can help with the household and
provide an additional income, which lessens the pressure to remarry (Knodel and Lynch, 1985: 53).
If only young children are involved, things are more difficult: from the point of view of the parent,
this `burden' can be a worthwhile reason for remarrying, while this is precisely the reverse for any
new partner and, for this reason, he/she is not inclined to remarry (Grigg, 1977: 194). Changes on
the (local) marriage market also play a part in the evolution of remarriage intensity (Knodel and
Lynch, 1985: 58). Over the course of the second half of the 19th century, the first marriage intensity
increased (see above) and, as a result, the supply of marriageable people declined, which squeezed the
probability of remarriage. The emigration of young adults for economic reasons played a comparable
role; one example is the exodus of young farmers from Bierbeek to the urban industries and services.
This disrupted the already precarious balance on the local marriage market. The remarriage intensity
also declined as a result of the 19th century changes in the (economic) production system (Van
Poppel, 1992: 405). Together with the development of the industrial capitalist production method, the
quantitative and qualitative importance of family production and of proto-industry declined, while
employment in industry and in the services sector rose (Karush, 1977). This had consequences for
internal family functioning: the family evolved from a production unit into a consumer unit, which
led to a shift in (the importance of some) family functions (Parsons, 1954). A consumer unit is less
sensitive to vacant positions and can more easily continue functioning `incomplete' than a production
unit.
24 These figures are not given here. See Matthijs (2003).
25 The following quotation by Burguire (1981: 41) illustrates this very nicely: "Lorsqu'un mari
perd sa femme (. . .) ou une femme son mari, le survivant donne de mme un repas. Pendant que le
corps est l gisant, les convives rient, boivent, et chantent et font des arrangements pour marier, de
nouveau, ľhôte qui les traite. Le veuf ou la veuve donne des raisons ďacceptation ou de refus du
personnage qu'on lui propose: mais les amis ne se séparent gure que le marché soit conclu." (When
a husband loses his wife (. . .) or a wife her husband, the surviving partner organises a meal. While
the body is lying there, the guests laugh, drink and sing and make arrangements for the remarriage
of the host who is feeding them. The widower or widow gives reasons for accepting or refusing the
person suggested; but the friends barely part until the deal is done.)
26 The waiting time differed little between the three study regions. Specifically, remarriage took
place a little more quickly in Bierbeek than in Leuven or Aalst. It is difficult to say whether this is
related to the pressure on farmers to remarry quickly, but this is unlikely. The figures by region are
not reproduced here; they are available upon request from the author. See Matthijs (2001).
27 Bideau (1980: 40) observed that these regulations about waiting to remarry were by no means
respected at all times.
408 KOEN MATTHIJS
28 Leaving separated people aside, three remarriage types exist: a widow with an unmarried man,
a widower with an unmarried woman and a widower with a widow. For concrete information and
figures, see Matthijs (2003).
29 Information about the relationship of the witnesses to the marriage partners is available
throughout the study period for Bierbeek, from 1830 onwards for Leuven and from 1865 onwards
for Aalst.
30 The results are shown from 1835 onwards because they are not reliable until this date.
31 By way of comparison: in the mid-19th century, the proportion of illegitimate births in Belgium
was 8­10%, in the Province of Brabant 15­20%, in Brussels 30­35%.
32 The civil status of the parents ­ or more accurately of the mother ­ determines whether a
child is legitimate or not. In the 19th century, this status had major social and legal consequences.
Children born of a married mother were, of course, legitimate. If the mother was not married, three
possibilities existed. Firstly, the child could remain illegitimate for the rest of its life, a person with
no legal father. Secondly, the father could acknowledge the child, without marrying the mother. In
that case, the child was acknowledged, but not legitimised. In acknowledging the child, the natural
father was making it known that he was the father of the child ­ no more, no less. Thirdly, it was
possible to acknowledge and immediately legitimise the child by marrying. Legitimisation went
further than acknowledgement both in fact and in law. A legitimised child had the same rights as a
legitimate child. Acknowledged illegitimate children, by contrast, were excluded from certain rights,
for example concerning inheritance and public assistance.
33 The number of illegitimate births is known from birth certificates, the number of children
legitimised by marriage from marriage certificates. Some distortion caused by migration is possible.
References
Alter, G., 1991. `New perspectives on European marriage in the nineteenth century'. Journal of
Family History 16(1): 1­5.
Anderson, M., 1980. Approaches to the History of the Western Family, 1500­1914. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Aris, P., 1962. Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life (translated by R. Baldick).
New York: Knopf.
Aris, P., 1981. `Introduction to Part I', in J. Dupâquier, E. Hélin, P. Laslett, M. Livi-Bacci and
S. Sogner (eds.), Marriage and Remarriage in Populations of the Past, pp. 27­40. London:
Academic Press.
Art, J., 1992. `De pastorale methodes van de Vlaamse parochiegeestelijkheid: verandering of
continuteiť (The pastoral methods of Flemish parochial clergy: change or continuity), in E.
Lamberts (ed.), Een kantelend tijdperk. De wending van de kerk naar het volk in Noord-WestEuropa
(1890­1910), pp. 227­243. Leuven; Universitaire Pers.
Beex, B., 1982. `Hertrouw in Nederland in de jaren zestig en zeventig: een sociaal-demografisch
perspectief' (Remarriage in the Netherlands in the sixties and seventies: a socio-demographic
perspective). Bevolking en Gezin 2: 185­204.
Bellettini, A., 1981. `Les remariages dans la ville et dans la campagne de Bologne au dix-neuvime
sicle' (Remarriage in towns and in the Boulogne countryside in the nineteenth century), in J.
Dupâquier, E. Hélin, P. Laslett, M. Livi-Bacci and S. Sogner (eds.), Marriage and Remarriage in
Populations of the Past, pp. 259­272. London: Academic Press.
Bideau, A., 1980. `A demographic and social analysis of widowhood and remarriage: the example of
the castellany of Thoissey-en-Dombes, 1670­1840'. Journal of Family History 5(1): 28­43.
Birdsall, N., 1983. `Fertility and economic change in eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe: A
commenť. Population and Development Review 9: 111­123.
PRIVATISATION OF MARRIAGE IN 19TH CENTURY FLANDERS 409
Bovin, K., Goedseels V. and Van Mellaert, P., 1985. Boerderijen in Bierbeek (Farms in Bierbeek).
Leuven: Centrum Agrarische Bouwkunde.
Brepoels, J. et al., 1985. Stadsboek Leuven. Leuven: Kritak.
Burguire, A., 1981. `Réticences théoriques et intégration pratique du remariage dans la France
ďAncien Régime' (Theoretical reticence and practical integration of remarriage in France during
the Ancien Régime), in J. Dupâquier, E. Hélin, P. Laslett, M. Livi-Bacci and S. Sogner (eds.),
Marriage and Remarriage in Populations of the Past, pp. 41­48. London: Academic Press.
Burnett, J., 1991. `Housing and the decline of mortality', in R. Schofield, D. Reher and A. Bideau
(eds.), The Decline of Mortality in Europe, pp. 158­176. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Caine, B. and G. Sluga, 2000. Gendering European History. London: Leicester University Press.
Cabourdin, G., 1978. `Le remariage' (Remarriage). Annales de Démographie Historique: 307­336.
Cabourdin, G., 1981. `Le remariage en France sous ľAncien Régime (seizime ­ dix-huitime
sicles)' (Remarriage in France during the Ancien Régime (sixteenth ­ eighteenth centuries)), in
J. Dupâquier, E. Hélin, P. Laslett, M. Livi-Bacci and S. Sogner (eds.), Marriage and Remarriage
in Populations of the Past, pp. 273­285. London: Academic Press.
Camerlinckx, H., 1960. Bijdrage tot een studie van de demografische en sociaal-economische structuur
van Leuven tijdens het Hollands Bewind (Contribution to a Study of the Demographic
and Socio-economic Structure of Leuven during the Dutch Regime). Leuven: K.U. Leuven,
Department of History lecture.
Charbonneau, H., 1970. Tourouve-au-Perche aux XVIIime et XVIIIime sicles (Tourouve-au-Perche
in the 17th and 18th Centuries). Paris: P.U.F.
Cloet, M. and Storme, H., 1991. `Relatie en huwelijk in de Nieuwe Tijď (Relationship and
marriage in the New Age), in R. Burggraeve et al. (eds.), Levenssrituelen. Het huwelijk. Leuven:
Universitaire Pers.
Coale, A. J. and Watkins, S. C., 1986. The Decline of Fertility in Europe. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Courteaux, F. and Van Lul, A., 1956. `Aalst in de 19de eeuw' (Aalst in the 19th century). Gazet van
Aalst en omstreken 13(13): 170­207.
Cunningham, H., 1997. Het kind in het westen. Vijf eeuwen geschiedenis (The Child in the West. Five
Centuries of History). Amsterdam: Van Gennep.
Damsma, D., 1993. `De dubbele revolutie en het gezin' (The double revolution and the family), in T.
Zwaan (ed.), Familie, huwelijk en gezin in West-Europa, pp. 165­192. Amsterdam: Boom/Open
University.
Davidoff, L, and Hall, C., 1987. Family Fortunes: Men and Women of the English Middle Class
1780­1850. London: Hutchinson.
De Hauwere, H. (undated). Vergelijking tussen twee Vlaamse steden die een zeer verschillende demografische
ontwikkeling kenden in de hedendaagse tijden (1784­1940): Aalst en Dendermonde
(Comparison between two Flemish Cities and Their very Different Demographic Development
in Modern Times (1784­1940): Aalst and Dendermonde). Leuven: K.U. Leuven, Department of
History lecture.
Demos, J., 1970. A Little Commonwealth: Family Life in Plymouth Colony. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Dentith, S., 1998. Society and Cultural Forms in Nineteenth-Century England. London: Macmillan
Press.
Dixon, R.B., 1978. `Late marriage and non-marriage as demographic responses: Are they similar?'
Population Studies 32(3): 449­466.
Duby, G. and Perrot, M., 1993. Geschiedenis van de vrouw. Deel 3. De negentiende eeuw (History of
the Woman. Part 3. The Nineteenth Century) (eds. G. Fraisse and M. Perrot). Amsterdam: Agon.
Dyrvik, S., 1981. `Gagne-pain ou sentiments? Trait du remariage en Norvge au dix-neuvime sicle'
(Source of Income or Feelings. Views of Remarriage in Norway in the Nineteenth Century), in
410 KOEN MATTHIJS
J. Dupâquier, E. Hélin, P. Laslett, M. Livi-Bacci and S. Sogner (eds.), Marriage and Remarriage
in Populations of the Past, pp. 297­306. London: Academic Press.
Gillis, J., 1985. For Better, for Worse: British Marriages, 1600 to the Present. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Gillis, J., 1996. `Making the family: The invention of family times(s) and the reinvention of family
history'. Journal of Family History 21(1): 4­21.
Grigg, S., 1977. `Toward a theory of remarriage: A case study of Newburyport at the beginning of
the nineteenth century'. Journal of Interdisciplinary History 8(2): 183­220.
Hajnal, J., 1965. `European marriage patterns in perspective', in D.V. Glass and D.E. Eversley (eds.),
Population in History, pp. 101­143. London: Edward Arnold.
Hareven, T.K., 1978. The Family and the Life Course in Historical Perspective. New York: Academic
Press.
Hofstee, E.W., 1981. Korte demografische geschiedenis van Nederland van 1800 tot heden (Brief
Demographic History of the Netherlands from 1800 to the Present). Haarlem: Fibula-Van
Dishoeck.
Ihinger-Tallman, M. and Pasley, K., 1987. Remarriage. California Newbury Park: Sage.
Jonckheere, W.G., 1960. Bevolking en mortaliteit. Aspecten van de demografische evolutie te Leuven
onder het Frans Bewind (1794­1814) (Population and Mortality. Aspects of the Demographic
Evolution in Leuven under the French Regime (1794­1814)). Leuven: K.U. Leuven, Department
of History lecture.
Karush, G. E., 1977. `Industrialisation et changements de la population active en Belgique de
1846  1910' (Industrialisation and Changes in the Workforce in Belgium from 1846 to 1910).
Population et Famille 40(1): 37­76.
Knodel, J. and Lynch, K., 1985. `The decline of remarriage: Evidence from German village
populations in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries'. Journal of Family History 10(1): 34­59.
Kok, J., 1994. `Collectieve strategie en individuele levensloop' (Collective strategy and individual
lifecycle), in M. Baud and T. Engelen (eds.), Samen wonen, samen werken? Vijf essays over de
geschiedenis van arbeid en gezin, pp. 97­121. Hilversum: Verloren.
Lebrun, P., Bruwier, M., Dhondt, J. and Hansette, G. (eds.), 1979. Histoire quantitative et développement
de la Belgique au XIXime sicle. Essai sur la révolution industrielle en Belgique.
Bruxelles: Academie Royale de Belgique.
Lehning, J. R., 1983. `Nuptiality and rural industry: Families and labor in the French countryside'.
Journal of Family History 8(4): 333­345.
Lehning, J. R., 1988. `The timing and prevalence of women's marriage in the French department of
the Loire, 1851­1891'. Journal of Family History 13(3): 307­327.
Lesthaeghe, R., 1989. Motivation and Legitimation: Living Conditions, Social Control and the
Reproductive Regimes in Belgium and France from the 16th Through the 19th Century. Brussel:
VUB-Centrum voor Sociologie.
Lundh, C., 2002. `Remarriages in Sweden in the 18th and 19th centuries'. The History of the Family
7(3): 423­449.
Magits, M., 1974. Demografische en sociale structuren te Leuven (1846­1860). Bijdrage tot de
stadsgeschiedenis in de 19de eeuw (Demographic and Social Structures in Leuven (1846­
1860). Contribution to the City's History in the 19th Century). Brussels: VUB, Centre for social
structures and the economy.
Matthijs, K., 2001. De mateloze negentiende eeuw. Bevolking, huwelijk, gezin en sociale verandering
(The Extravagant Nineteenth Century. Population, Marriage, Family and Social Change).
Leuven: Universitaire Pers.
Matthijs, K., 2002. `Mimetic appetite for marriage in nineteenth-century Flanders: Gender disadvantage
as an incentive for social change'. Journal of Family History 27(2): 101­127.
Matthijs, K., 2003. `Frequency, timing and intensity of remarriage in 19th century Flanders'. The
History of the Family. An International Journal 8(1): 135­162.
PRIVATISATION OF MARRIAGE IN 19TH CENTURY FLANDERS 411
Matthijs, K., Van Bavel, J. and Van de Velde, I., 1997. Leuven in de negentiende eeuw. De bevolking:
een spiegel van het dagelijkse leven (Leuven in the Nineteenth Century. The Population: A
Reflection of Everyday Life). Leuven: Acco.
Matthijs, K. and Van de Putte, B., 2001. `Huwen tijdens de advent en de vasten in de 19de eeuw in
Vlaanderen'. Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis 31(1­2): 75­112.
Mitterauer, M. and Sieder, R., 1983. The European Family. Patriarchy to Partnership from the Middle
Ages to the Present. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Parsons, T., 1954. Essays in Sociological Theory. New York: The Free Press.
Peeters, M. G., 1992. Leven in het oude Leuven (Living in Old Leuven). Ghent: Stichting Mens en
Kultuur.
Perrot, M. (ed.), 1990. A History of Private Life. Volume 4. From the Fires of Revolution to the Great
War (translated by A. Goldhammer). Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Poddevijn, D., Van Gyseghem, G. and Baert, K., 1991. Van paternalisme naar emancipatie. Een
bijdrage tot de sociaal-economische geschiedenis van het arrondissement Aalst uitgegeven naar
aanleiding van 150 jaar Kamer van Koophandel en Nijverheid van Aalst en Gewest (1841­1991)
(From Paternalism to Emancipation. A Contribution to the Socio-economic History of the District
of Aalst, Published to Mark 150 Years of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry for the Aalst
Region (1841­1991)). Aalst: Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
Pott-Buter, H. A., 1993. Facts and Fairy Tales about Female Labor, Family and Fertility. A Sevencountry
Comparison, 1850­1990. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Praet, P., 1986. Bijdrage tot de studie over de armoede in Aalst tijdens de 19de eeuw (Contribution
to the Study of Poverty in Aalst during the 19th Century). Leuven: K.U. Leuven, Department of
History.
Roberts, R., 1973. The Classic Slum: Salford Life in the First Quarter of the Century. Harmondsworth:
Penguin Books.
Schofield, R., 1983. `The impact of scarcity and plenty on population change in Englanď. Journal
of Interdisciplinary History 14: 265­291.
Schofield, R. and Reher, D., 1991. `The decline of mortality in Europe', in R. Schofield, D. Reher
and A. Bideau (eds.), The Decline of Mortality in Europe, pp. 1­17. Oxford: Clarendon.
Scholliers, P., 1981. `Arbeidersconsumptie in transitie (Workers' consumption in transition) 1890­
1930', in J. Hannes (ed.), Consumptiepatronen en prijsindexen, pp. 30­36. Brussels: VUB Press.
Scholliers, P., 1985. De Gentse metaalarbeiders in de 19de eeuw (Metalworkers in Ghent in the 19th
Century). Brussels: VUB, Centre for contemporary social history.
Scholliers, P., 1992. `Historical food study in Belgium: Development, problems and results in the 19th
and 20th centuries', in H. J. Teuteberg (ed.), European Food History. A Study Review, pp. 71­89.
Leicester: Leicester University Press.
Scholliers, P., 1996. Wages, Manufacturers and Workers in the 19th Century Factory: the Voortman
Cotton Mill in Ghent. Oxford: Berg.
Seccombe, W., 1992. A Millennium of Family Change. Feudalism to Capitalism in Northwestern
Europe. London: Verso.
Segalen, M., 1981. `Mentalité populaire et remariage en Europe occidentale' (Popular mentality and
remarriage in Western Europe), in J. Dupâquier, E. Hélin, P. Laslett, M. Livi-Bacci and S. Sogner
(eds.), Marriage and Remarriage in Populations of the Past, pp. 67­80. London: Academic Press.
Shorter, E., 1977. The Making of the Modern Family. New York: Basic Books.
Stadsbestuur Leuven, 1975. Leuven, een stad die groeit (Leuven, a Growing City). Leuven:
Stadsbestuur.
Stone, L., 1977. The Family, Sex and Marriage in England, 1500­1800. London: Weidenfeld.
Tilly, L. and Scott, J. W., 1978. Women, Work, and Family. New York: Routledge.
Tilly, L., Scott, J. W. and Cohen, M., 1976. Women's work and European fertility patterns. Journal
of Interdisciplinary History 6(3): 447­476.
412 KOEN MATTHIJS
Torfs, J. A., 1899. Geschiedenis van Leuven. Van den vroegsten tijd tot op heden (History of Leuven.
From the Earliest Times to the Present). Leuven: Drukkerij Emiel Charpentier.
Vallin, J., 1991. `Mortality in Europe from 1720 to 1914: Long-term trends and changes in patterns
by age and sex', in R. Schofield, D. Reher and A. Bideau (eds.), The Decline of Mortality in
Europe, pp. 38­67. Oxford: Clarendon.
Van Bavel, J., 1998. Economic crisis, illegitimacy and first marriage before the fertility transition: A
cohort case study in Leuven, Belgium, 1846­1866. Paper presented at the 1998 Social Science
and History Conference. Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
Van Croonenborch, J., 1988. De Leuvense Vaart (The Vaart in Leuven) 1830­1913. Leuven: K.U.
Leuven, Department of History lecture.
Van Ermen, E. (ed.), 1997. Van Petermannen en koeienschieters. Kroniek van Leuven. Leuven:
Uitgeverij P.
Van de Putte, B. and Matthijs, K., 2002. Romantic love and marriage. A study of age homogamy
in 19th century Leuven. Belgisch Tijdschrijft voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis xxxi, 2001, 3­4: 579­
619.
Vandenbroeke, C., 1976. `Karakteristieken van het huwelijks- en voortplantingspatroon. Vlaanderen
en Brabant, 17de­19de eeuw' (Characteristics of the Marriage and Reproduction Pattern.
Flanders and Brabant, 17th­19th Centuries). Tijdschrift voor Sociale Geschiedenis 2(2): 107­145.
Van Melkebeke, D., 1977. Seizoensarbeid in het arrondissement Aalst (Seasonal labour in the District
of Aalst) (1880­1914). Leuven: K.U. Leuven, Department of History.
Van Poppel, F., 1992. Trouwen in Nederland. Een historisch-demografische studie van de 19de- en
vroeg-20ste eeuw (Marriage in the Netherlands. A Historical Demographic Study of the 19th and
Early 20th Centuries). The Hague: Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute.
Van Poppel, F., 1995. `Widows, widowers and remarriage in nineteenth-century Netherlands'.
Population Studies 49: 421­441.
Van Rossem, B., 1965. Bijdrage tot de studie van het analfabetisme en de geschiedenis van het lager
onderwijs te Aalst (Contribution to the study of illiteracy and the history of primary education in
Aalst) (1790­1860). Leuven: K.U. Leuven, Department of History.
Vliebergh, E. and Ulens, R., 1914. Het Hageland. Zijne plattelandsche bevolking in de xixde eeuw
(The Hageland. Its Rural Population in the 19th Century). Brussels: Hayez.
Watkins, S. C., 1984. `Spinsters'. Journal of Family History 9(4): 310­325.
Willems, C., 1984. De Dender en zijn Vlaamse steden. Geraardsbergen, Ninove, Aalst en Dendermonde
(The Dender and its Flemish towns. Geraardsbergen, Ninove, Aalst and Dendermonde).
Brussels: Artis-Historia.