In the summer of 2002, after the Russian government
introduced the flat income tax, completed
fiscal reforms, created the Stabilization Fund, and
introduced land reform in Russia, I had a premonition
that the window of opportunity for further
reforms would be closing for a number of years. I
was correct in my prediction.
As a result, I decided to turn to more academic
pursuits. The title of my latest book, which I would
like to discuss today, can be translated as The Collapse
of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia.1 It
relates the story of the last few years of the Soviet
Union. But when I wrote about the collapse of the
Soviet Union, I also had in mind dilemmas of contemporary
Russia.
There were several factors which pushed me to
write this book. The first was the rise in oil prices,
which in real terms have started to approach the
level of the late Brezhnev period. The second was
the disturbing tendency to mythologize the late
Soviet period in current Russian society and
popular culture. These myths include the belief
that, despite its problems, the Soviet Union was a
dynamically developing world superpower until
usurpers initiated disastrous reforms. At least 80
percent of Russians are convinced of this flawed
interpretation of history.
Historically, such myths have a dangerous
precedent--namely, Germany between World
War I and World War II. Then, the legend went
that Germany was never defeated in the war, but
"stabbed in the back" by the Jews and the Socialists.
To some degree, the responsible party was the
democratic German government, as it was unprepared
to publish materials about what really happened
before and after World War I.
Similarly, access to documents about the
Soviet collapse is becoming increasingly restricted,
but we were still able to make public a number of
them that can properly explain what happened to
our country.
To be frank, I never thought that the book--
half of which is tables, graphs, or official materials
of the Soviet government--could be a bestseller
in my country. Yet it is, a fact which provides a
glimmer of hope.
The Story of Grain
In a simplified way, the story of the collapse of
the Soviet Union could be told as a story about
grain and oil. As for the grain, the turning point
that decided the fate of the Soviet Union began
1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 202.862.5800 www.aei.org
OntheIssues
The Soviet Collapse: Grain and Oil
By Yegor Gaidar
Yegor Gaidar is director of the Institute for Economies in Transition in Moscow. Between 1991 and 1994,
he was acting prime minister of Russia, minister of economy, and first deputy prime minister. Between
1993 and 2003, Gaidar was a founder and a co-chairman of the Russia's Choice and the Union of Rightist
Forces Parties, and a deputy of the State Duma. His most recent book, Gibeľ Imperii: Uroki dlya
sovremennoi Rossii [The Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia], was published in 2006.
The English translation of the book will be published by the Brookings Institution Press on July 30, 2007.
Research assistant Igor Khrestin compiled this text
from the transcript and the video recording of the
lecture delivered by Yegor Gaidar at AEI on November
13, 2006, and translated the conclusion of this
article from Russian. The text was edited by resident
scholar Leon Aron and augmented by Mr. Gaidar.
April 2007
with the economic debate of 1928­29, when the discussion
centered on what would later be called the
"Chinese path" of development. (By several important
economic and social indicators, the Soviet Union of
that period and China in the late 1970s took similar
approaches to reform. See figure 1.) At the time, the
head of the Soviet government, Aleksei Rykov, and
the chief ideologist of the Communist Party, Nikolai
Bukharin, earnestly defended the idea of a path which
included preserving private agriculture and the market,
and ensuring financial stability--but holding onto the
party's political control.
The Soviet leadership ultimately chose another path.
The solution preferred by Joseph Stalin was the expropriation
of peasants' property, forced collectivization, and
extraction of grain. Judging from the available documents,
the essence of this decision was relatively simple. Bukharin
and Rykov essentially told Stalin: "In a peasant country, it
is impossible to extract grain by force. There will be civil
war." Stalin answered, "I will do it nonetheless."
The result of the disastrous agriculture policy implemented
between the late 1920s and the early 1950s was
the sharpest fall of productivity experienced by a major
country in the twentieth century. The key problem
confronting the Soviet Union was well-expressed in
the letter sent by Nikita Khrushchev to his colleagues
in the leadership of the party. The letter fundamentally
stated: "In the last fifteen years, we have not increased
the collection of grain. Meanwhile,
we are experiencing
a radical increase of urban population.
How can we resolve this
problem?"
Once again, a serious discussion
ensued among Soviet leaders
in the early 1950s, resulting in
two positions. The first position
was to attempt to improve the
situation in the agricultural
regions outside of the fertile
"black soil belt" in southern Russia.
The other position was to
resolve the problem by utilizing
the socialist planning system:
large projects and a concentration
of resources. Naturally, doubts lingered
about whether this strategy
would cause even higher fluctuations
in long-term production.
But these considerations were ignored and, tactically,
the strategy of dramatically expanding the land
under cultivation yielded temporary success. Between
the mid-1950s and the early 1960s, the amount of the
grain produced by the Soviet Union increased significantly.
The problem was the limited amount of suitable
land and the continuing growth of the population in
large cities. Thus, already in the late 1960s, the shortcomings
of this plan were evident.
In 1963, Nikita Khrushchev sent a letter to the leaders
of the Socialist bloc, informing them that the Soviet
Union would no longer be able to supply them with grain.
That year, the Soviet state bought 12 million tons of
grain--and spent one third of the country's gold reserves
to do so. Khrushchev commented: "Soviet power cannot
tolerate any more the shame that we had to endure."2
Therefore, in the 1960s, state production of grain stabilized
and, regardless of attempts by the Soviet leadership,
remained fixed at 65 million tons per year until the
late 1980s (see figure 2). The cities, however, continued
to grow. What policy could succeed if a country had no
increase in grain production and an 80 million­person
increase in its urban population?
The picture was bleak. Russia, which before World
War I was the biggest grain exporter--significantly larger
than the United States and Canada--started to be the
biggest world importer of grain, more so than Japan and
China combined.
- 2 FIGURE
1
COMPARISON BETWEEN USSR IN 1930 AND CHINA IN 1980,
BY GDP PER CAPITA AND BY LEVEL OF URBANIZATION
NOTES: All figures are taken in part from Yegor Gaidar, Gibeľ imperii: Uroki dlya sovremennoi Rossii [The
Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia] (Moscow: Rossiyskaya Politicheskaya Entsiklopedia,
2006), and presented at a lecture by Gaidar at the American Enterprise Institute on November 13, 2006.
More information and all figures can be located in full at www.aei.org/event1420/.
* In international dollars of 1990 (Geary-Khamis dollars)
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
USSR, 1930 China, 1980
0
5
10
15
20
USSR, 1930 China, 1980
Urbanpopulation,%
GDPpercapita,$*
Soviet imports had to be paid for in hard currency.
Mikhail Gorbachev was quite frank in one of the meetings
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(CPSU): "We are buying [the grain] because we cannot
survive without it."3 There were, of course, examples of
nations, such as Japan, that also massively imported grain
and other agricultural products. Unlike the Soviet Union,
however, these nations were able to export products from
their machine-building and processing industries.
Why could the Soviet Union not pursue the same
policy? Because "socialist industrialization" had resulted
in the Soviet industry being unable to sell any processed
(value-added) products. Nikolai Ryzhkov, chairman of
the USSR Council of Ministers, expressed the sentiment
clearly at another meeting of the Soviet
leadership: "No one will take our machinery
production. That is why we are exporting
mainly raw materials."4
The Story of Oil
The Soviet economy thus hinged on
its ability to produce and export raw
commodities--namely, oil and gas. The
Soviet leadership was extremely fortunate:
at almost exactly the time when serious
problems with the import of grain emerged,
rich oil fields were discovered in the Tyumen
region of Western Siberia.
Already in 1970, Western Siberia was
considered a large oil region by international
standards. During the next twelve
years, the Soviet Union increased oil production
there twelvefold. There was
intensive debate among the Soviet leadership
about how to best exploit the Western
Siberian oil. The oil industry experts
warned the CPSU leadership and government
State Planning Committee that it
would be impossible to increase the production
at such a rapid pace in the future
without facing serious technical problems.
Yet the Soviet leadership told the oil
ministry there was no other choice. The
Soviet premier, Aleksey Kosygin, used to
call the chief of the Tyumenneftegaz, Viktor
Muravlenko, and explain the desperation
of the situation: "Dai tri milliona ton
sverkh plana. S khlebushkom sovsem plokho"
[Please give three million tons above the planning level.
The situation with the bread is awful].
The "Spanish" Curse
By 1975, the Soviet Union began having serious problems
with the output of new oil wells: much higher
investment was needed for the current operations to get
the same output (see figure 3). But the Soviet Union
was fortunate to get unusually high oil prices starting in
the mid-1970s.
The oil market is peculiar because of the varying
levels of elasticity of the demand and supply in both the
short and the long terms. The fluctuations of prices are
- 3 FIGURE
2
PROCUREMENT OF GRAIN IN THE USSR
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1966­69 1980­85 1986­90
ProcurementofgrainintheUSSR
FIGURE 3
AVERAGE OUTPUT OF NEW OIL WELLS BEING PUT IN OPERATION
IN THE USSR
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
1975 1980 1985 1988 1989 1990
g
enormous (see figure 4). There is a very well-known economic
concept of external shocks. In the United States,
the worlďs largest economy, the biggest external shock
during the last fifty years was in 1974, when oil prices
quadrupled and terms of trade worsened by 15 percent.
For the Soviet Union, skyrocketing oil prices had a
much more substantial effect on GDP, which could be
measured in hundreds of percentage points. Thus began
the collapse of the Soviet empire.
Imperial ambitions based on such unstable resources
were not exclusive to the Soviet Union. The "resource
curse" was well-analyzed by the School of Salamanca
in the experience of Spain of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. The influence of the inflows of gold
and the silver from America to Spain are comparable to
the impact of oil and gas revenues to the Soviet Union
(see figure 5). The Spanish empire, without losing a
single battle on the ground for fifty years, managed to
lose all of its possessions in Europe outside of the Pyrenees,
including Portugal, and came very close to losing
Aragon and Catalonia as well. In 1989, also without
losing on the battlefield for fifty years, the Soviet Union
lost control over Eastern Europe.
In the 1970s and early 1980s, the Soviet leadership,
however, was not intellectually prepared to heed lessons
from the School of Salamanca. The shortest quotation
about the intellectual capacity of the Soviet leadership
came from the Politburo minutes: "Mr. Zasiadko has
stopped binge drinking. Resolution: nominate Mr. Zasiadko
as a minister to Ukraine."
While intellectual capacity was not the strongest
quality of the Soviet leadership, they still understood the
need to manipulate the oil market. Excerpts from Politburo
materials indicate that the head of the Committee
for State Security (KGB), Yury Andropov, facilitated
contacts between the KGB and the Arab terrorists, who
sought assistance for terrorist attacks on oil fields in
order to keep energy prices high.5 The general resolution
was that the Soviet Union should support the Arab terrorists
in this battle.6
Yet one of the Soviet leadership's biggest blunders
was to spend a significant amount of additional oil revenues
to start the war in Afghanistan. The war radically
changed the geopolitical situation in the Middle East. In
1974, Saudi Arabia decided to impose an embargo on oil
supplies to the United States. But in 1979 the Saudis
became interested in American protection because they
understood that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was
a first step toward--or at least an attempt to gain--
control over the Middle Eastern oil fields.
The timeline of the collapse of the Soviet Union can
be traced to September 13, 1985. On this date, Sheikh
Ahmed Zaki Yamani, the minister of oil of Saudi Arabia,
declared that the monarchy had decided to alter its oil
policy radically. The Saudis stopped protecting oil prices,
and Saudi Arabia quickly regained its share in the world
- 4 FIGURE
4
DYNAMICS OF PRICES OF CRUDE OIL IN LONG-TERM PERSPECTIVE (1880­2004)
NOTE: All prices are pegged to the constant 2004 level.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Mean historic price
($19.41 per barrel)
Mean annual price
in real terms
Price,USDperbarrel
market. During the next six months, oil production in
Saudi Arabia increased fourfold, while oil prices collapsed
by approximately the same amount in real terms.
As a result, the Soviet Union lost approximately $20
billion per year, money without which the country simply
could not survive. The Soviet leadership was confronted
with a difficult decision on how to adjust. There
were three options--or a combination of three options--
available to the Soviet leadership.
First, dissolve the Eastern European empire and effectively
stop barter trade in oil and gas with the Socialist
bloc countries, and start charging hard currency for the
hydrocarbons. This choice, however, involved convincing
the Soviet leadership in 1985 to negate completely the
results of World War II. In reality, the leader who proposed
this idea at the CPSU Central Committee meeting
at that time risked losing his position as general secretary.
Second, drastically reduce Soviet food imports by
$20 billion, the amount the Soviet Union lost when
oil prices collapsed. But in practical terms, this option
meant the introduction of food rationing at rates similar
to those used during World War II. The Soviet leadership
understood the consequences: the Soviet system
would not survive for even one month. This idea was
never seriously discussed.
Third, implement radical cuts in the military-industrial
complex. With this option, however, the Soviet leadership
risked serious conflict with regional and industrial
elites, since a large number of Soviet cities depended
solely on the military-industrial complex. This choice
was also never seriously considered.
Unable to realize any of the above solutions, the
Soviet leadership decided to adopt a policy of effectively
disregarding the problem in hopes that it would somehow
wither away. Instead of implementing actual reforms, the
Soviet Union started to borrow money from abroad while
its international credit rating was still strong. It borrowed
heavily from 1985 to 1988, but in 1989 the Soviet
economy stalled completely.
The Search for Loans
The money was suddenly gone. The Soviet Union tried
to create a consortium of 300 banks to provide a large
loan for the Soviet Union in 1989, but was informed
that only five of them would participate and, as a result,
the loan would be twenty times smaller than needed.
The Soviet Union then received a final warning from
the Deutsche Bank and from its international partners
that the funds would never come from commercial
- 5 FIGURE
5
INFLOW OF GOLD TO SPAIN IN 16TH­18TH CENTURIES, AND THE INFLOW TO THE USSR
OF FOREIGN CURRENCY FROM OIL EXPORTS IN 1970S­1980S
1971 1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977 1978
1979
1980
1981
1982 1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
1521­
1525
1531­
1535
1541­
1545
1551­
1555
1561­
1565
1571­
1575
1581­
1585
1591­
1595
1601­
1605
1611­
1615
1621­
1625
1631­
1635
1641­
1645
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Inflow of gold to Spain (left-hand axis)
The USSR's income from oil exports to developed capitalist countries (right-hand axis)
Loss of control over Portugal, risk of
losing control over Aragon and Catalonia
Loss of control overLoss of control overLoss of control over
Eastern Europe
GoldinflowtoSpain,millionpeso
Oilexportstocapitalistcountries,$milion
sources. Instead, if the Soviet Union
urgently needed the money, it would have
to start negotiations directly with Western
governments about so-called politically
motivated credits.
In 1985 the idea that the Soviet Union
would begin bargaining for money in
exchange for political concessions would
have sounded absolutely preposterous to
the Soviet leadership. In 1989 it became
a reality, and Gorbachev understood the
need for at least $100 billion from the
West to prop up the oil-dependent
Soviet economy. According to chairman
of the State Planning Committee Yury
Maslyukov:
We understand that the only source of hard currency
is, of course, the source of oil. . . . If we do not
make all the necessary decisions now, next year
may turn out to be beyond our worst nightmares. . . .
As for the socialist countries, they may all end up
in a most critical situation. All this will lead us to
a veritable collapse, and not only us, but our whole
system.7
Ryzhkov commented at the same meeting:
The Vneshekonombank's [Soviet Foreign Trade
Bank] guarantees are needed, but it cannot provide
them. . . . If there is no oil, there will be no national
economy.8
It is fascinating to hear now the opinion that Eduard
Shevardnadze, then foreign minister, "betrayed" the
interest of the Soviet Union--especially when documents
that were prepared for him at the time are available.
In reality, a number of Soviet agencies urged him to
secure at any cost these "politically motivated credits."9
In the meantime, the Soviet Union started to have
severe food shortages, and grain deliveries were not
being made to large cities. One of Gorbachev's closest
associates, Anatoly Cherniayev, described the situation
in Moscow in March 1991:
If [the grain] cannot be obtained somewhere,
famine may come by June. . . . Moscow has probably
never seen anything like that throughout its
history--even in its hungriest years.10
The Crash
When the situation in the Soviet Union is examined
from financial and hard currency perspectives, Gorbachev's
policies at the time are much easier to comprehend
(see figure 6). Government-to-government loans
were bound to come with a number of rigid conditions.
For instance, if the Soviet military crushed Solidarity
Party demonstrations in Warsaw, the Soviet Union would
not have received the desperately needed $100 billion
from the West. The Socialist bloc was stable when the
Soviet Union had the prerogative to use as much force
as necessary to reestablish control, as previously demonstrated
in Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. But in
1989 the Polish elites understood that Soviet tanks would
not be used to defend the communist government.
The only option left for the Soviet elites was to begin
immediate negotiations about the conditions of surrender.
Gorbachev did not have to inform President George
H. W. Bush at the Malta Summit in 1989 that the threat
of force to support the communist regimes in Eastern
Europe would not be employed. This was already evident
at the time. Six weeks after the talks, no communist
regime in Eastern Europe remained.
Of course, the West was still careful about directly
supporting independence movements inside the Soviet
Union. When the Lithuanian authorities approached
the American embassy in Moscow to ask whether the
United States would lend support to the independence
of Lithuania, the immediate response was negative.
When the Soviet Union tried to use force to reestablish
control in Baltic states in January 1991, however, the
- 6 FIGURE
6
STATE DEBT TO FOREIGN SUPPLIERS
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
1 June 1990 1 September 1990 1 October 1990
Statedebt,million"hard-currency"roubles
reaction from the West--including from the United
States--was fairly straightforward: "Do as you wish, this
is your country. You can choose any solution, but please
forget about the $100 billion credit."
What were Gorbachev's options at the time? He
could not easily dissolve the Soviet empire; the conservative
elements inside the Soviet leadership were strongly
against this notion. Yet he could not prevent the dissolution
of the empire without a massive use of force. But if
force was employed, the Soviet state would not get the
necessary funds from the West, without which Gorbachev
had no chance of staying in power.
This conundrum was the source of Gorbachev's
dilemma, forcing him to strike a deal with both the military
and Boris Yeltsin. Hardliners from the KGB and
the army who perceived that Gorbachev was simply too
weak of a leader staged a coup in August 1991 under the
banner of the State Committee for a State of Emergency
(GKChP).
Within three days it was clear, however, that the plot
had failed because its leaders did not know how to deal
with the situation. Even if they found one division able
to crush all the people who demonstrated against the
GKChP, would the grain appear? Where would they
find the food necessary to feed the larger cities? Would
the West rapidly give the $100 billion? Their case, like
the Soviet state itself, was entirely lost.
On August 22, 1991, the story of the Soviet Union
came to an end. A state that does not control its borders
or military forces and has no revenue simply cannot
exist. The document which effectively concluded the
history of the Soviet Union was a letter from the
Vneshekonombank in November 1991 to the Soviet
leadership, informing them that the Soviet state had not
a cent in its coffers.11
* * *
What lessons can we learn from the Soviet collapse and
apply to the current situation in Russia? First, we must
remember that Russia today is an oil-dependent economy.
No one can accurately predict the fluctuations of oil
prices. The collapse of the Soviet Union should serve
as a lesson to those who construct policy based on the
assumption that oil prices will remain perpetually high.
It would seem that in our country, which has lived
through the collapse of the late 1980s and early 1990s,
this fact would be evident. But as soon as the prices went
up again at the beginning of 2000 and in 2004 became
comparable in real terms to those at the beginning of the
1980s, the idea that "high oil revenues are forever" has
gained an even wider acceptance.
Of course, the Russian government has taken into
account some lessons from the experience of the Soviet
collapse and has been conducting a careful policy during
the current period of high oil prices. The administration
has accumulated a considerable reserve of foreign currency,
"sterilized" a significant portion of oil revenues in
the Stabilization Fund, and approached budgetary spending
with great care. Nevertheless, the temptation to take
and immediately divide these revenues is great. Those
who argue on every television channel or newspaper
about how to better spend these relatively modest funds,
which would only be enough for maintaining stability
for two to three years if oil prices decline, should read
again the documents that demonstrate how a seemingly
stable superpower disintegrated in only a few short years.
One more lesson that is relevant for Russian politics
today is that authoritarian regimes, although displaying a
façade of strength, are fragile in crisis. In conditions of
relative stability, society is prepared to tolerate the lack
of real elections. People are prepared to come to terms
with this situation as an inevitable and habitual evil. But
they will do so only until the country encounters a serious
challenge, requiring decisive and tough measures in
order to adapt to unfavorable conditions.
In this latter case, it becomes evident that the "contract"
between authoritarian rulers and their subjects--
which secures stability by people's tolerance of the
authorities and the authorities' noninterference in people's
affairs--will need to be reexamined. Such reevaluation
undermines the regime. The rulers, who for the
longest time have insisted that their rule is the best,
find it hard to ask for and get broad societal support in
a moment of crisis. In this situation, the society has a
habit of answering, "For many years, we were told that
we are led to a `brighter future,' but now you would like
us to tighten our belts. Instead, tighten your belts--
or leave."
Russia does not need new upheavals. During the
course of the twentieth century it saw enough of them.
In this regard, the understanding by the elites and society
that a real democracy is not an ideological dogma or
something imposed by the West, but rather an important
precondition for the stable development of the country,
will finally give Russia the hope of escaping crises and
cataclysms. This realization is vitally important for Russia's
development in the next decades.
- 7 -
Notes
1. Yegor Gaidar, Gibeľ Imperii: Uroki dlya sovremennoi Rossii
[The Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia]
(Moscow: Rossiyskaya Politicheskaya Entsiklopedia, 2006),
available at www.iet.ru/publication.php?folder-id=44&publica-
tion-id=8912.
2. "Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). 1954­1964: Unofficial
Protocol Notes of Proceedings. Stenograms. Directives". 2nd ed.,
v.1. p. 778.
3. "Stenogram of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum,
January 27­28, 1987". The Russian State Archive of Contemporary
History (RGANI), fond [record group] 2, opis' [series] 5,
delo [file] 45, list [page] 3.
4. Nikolai Ryzhkov, Desyať let velikih potryaseniy [Ten Years
That Shook the World] (Moscow: Kniga. Prosveshchenie.
Miloserdie, 1995), 229.
5. A note from Yury Andropov, the head of the Committee
for State Security (KGB), to the general secretary of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Leonid Brezhnev. "O konspirativnoy vstreche rezinenta KGB v
Livane c V. Haddadom" [Regarding the Conspiratorial Meeting
of a KGB Resident in Lebanon with V. Haddad.] April 23,
1974. No. 1071-A/OV. www.2nt1.com/archive/pdfs/terr-wd/
plo75a.pdf.
6. A note from Yury Andropov, the head of the Committee
for State Security (KGB), to the general secretary of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Leonid Brezhnev. "O peredache V. Haddadu partii inostrannogo
oruzhiya i boepripasov k nemu" [Regarding the Handover of a
Consignment of Foreign-Made Weapons and Ammunition to
V. Haddad]. May 16, 1975. No.1218-A/OV. www.2nt1.com/
archive/pdfs/terr-wd/plo75d.pdf.
7. Stenogram from the meeting at the office of the chairman
of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Nikolai Ryzhkov. "O
postavke dlya gosudarstva nefti, gazovogo kondensata i nefteproduktov
v 1991 godu." [Regarding the Deliveries for the State of
Oil, Gas Condensate, and Oil Products in 1991]. State Archive
of the Russian Federation. fond [record group] 5446, opis' [series]
162, delo [file] 379, list [page] 131­137, 143­149.
8. Ibid.
9. "Pamyatnaya zapiska dlya besedy E. Shevardnadze s G.
Kolem" [Memorandum for the Discussion between Eduard Shevardnadze
and Helmut Kohl]. State Archive of the Russian Federation
fond [record group] 5446, opis' [series] 162, delo [file]
1464, list [page] 83­84.
10. Anatoly Chernyaev, Dnevnik pomoshchnika Prezidenta
SSSR [The Diary of an Assistant to the President of the USSR],
(Moscow: TERRA, Respublika 1997), 124­26.
11. A note from A. P. Nosko, deputy head of the
Vneshekonombank [Foreign Economic Bank of the USSR] to
the State Committee for Operative Management of the USSR
National Economy. "Ob ischepanii likvidnykh valyutnykh
resursov" [Regarding the Exhaustion of Liquid Hard Currency
Resources]. 26 November 1991. State Archive of the Russian
Federation. fond [record group] 5446, opis' [series] 163, delo [file]
1504, list [page] 11­12.
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