

Cross-cultural civility in global civil society: transnational cooperation in Chinese NGOs

STEPHANIE CHAN

*Department of Sociology, University of California, San Diego,
401 Social Science Building, 9500 Gilman Drive,
La Jolla, CA 92093-0533, USA
stchan@ucsd.edu*

Abstract *Transnational networks and organizations are often hailed as embodiments and carriers of global civil society, yet these assessments remain incomplete due to a lack of empirical research on their internal dynamics. In this article, I investigate whether or not transnational NGOs embody the cooperation across multiple social, cultural and political cleavages central to definitions of global civil society by exploring how multiple memberships are negotiated in the context of their everyday tasks. Using organizational documents and interview data with staff of two Protestant Christian development NGOs in China, I analyse how actors within these transnational organizations successfully manage their multiple memberships in national polities, national cultures, religious communities and a world culture. While multiple memberships exhibit the potential both to enable and to constrain an NGO's organizational tasks, the key to making such ties enabling are staff who act as skilful cross-cultural brokers. Thus, the type of social capital required to render multiple memberships beneficial and not harmful to the organizations also makes these organizations true indicators of a developing global civil society.*

Keywords GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY, TRANSNATIONAL NGO, RELIGION, SOCIAL CAPITAL, CHINA

Transnational networks and organizations are often treated as primary indicators of global civil society (Anheier et al. 2001; Smith 1998; Smith and Wiest 2005; Tsutsui and Wotipka 2004). Yet, most of these analyses ignore the internal dynamics of these networks and organizations, rendering assessments of whether or not they are truly representative of global civil society incomplete. The inner workings of these transnational interactions matter most for conceptualizations of civil society that draw upon Tocqueville and his theoretical successors. In Helmut Anheier's (2007) recent assessment of the current state of the field of global civil society research, he suggests that one of the most neglected elements in empirical research is the civility aspect of global civil society. As Peter Berger (2005: 14) asserts:

Civil society is as civil society does. If there are institutions and cultural developments that enhance civility across borders and continents, then one can indeed speak of global civil society in the making. NGOs can be part of this. But it is important not to lose sight of the fact that there are other globalizing institutions, movements, and cultural diffusions that are highly uncivil. And NGOs can be a part of this, too.

Do relationships in transnational non-governmental organizations (NGOs) actually embody the ‘civility’ characteristic of ‘global civil society’? In particular, do they embody the cooperation across crosscutting social, cultural, religious and political cleavages that is central to global civil society? How are these crosscutting ties negotiated in the process of conducting a transnational NGO’s organizational tasks?

To answer these questions, I examine two Protestant Christian development NGOs in China that have been successful in achieving transnational cooperation across extreme social, cultural and political cleavages. I refer to these organizations as *transnational NGOs* since they involve high degrees of transnational cooperation.¹ According to prevailing theories and previous studies, China represents one of the least probable historical, political and cultural contexts in which to find NGOs that exhibit the transnational cooperation characteristic of a truly global civil society. Moreover, according to some perspectives, religious organizations like these are also improbable sites of the ‘civility’ component in definitions of global civil society. Studying sites where an outcome predicted by theory does not occur helps us to test the governing assumptions of a theory as well as to expand its range of explanation (Emigh 1997). Although some of my conclusions in this article may be case and locale specific, there are lessons we can extract from these cases regarding the mechanisms of cross-cultural negotiation and the effects of multicultural environments on a transnational NGO’s organizational tasks that may be illuminating for analysing other transnational organizations constituted by crosscutting ties and multiple memberships.

The results of this investigation reveal that we must re-examine some of the assumptions underlying theorizing about NGOs and global civil society. Contrary to theories that predict that China is an unlikely locale, these cases reveal that there are at least pockets of a thriving global civil society in China. Contrary to theories that predict a lack of civility among religious NGOs, I find that religion can both constrain and bolster civility. Finally, filling in the gap in research on the mechanisms that facilitate cooperation across crosscutting ties, these two cases illustrate how the process of cross-cultural negotiation works via the agency of staff who act as skilful cross-cultural brokers. Thus, the type of social capital required to render multiple memberships beneficial and not harmful to the organizations also makes these organizations true indicators of a developing global civil society.

Transnational cooperation, global *civil* society, and social capital

John Keane’s ideal type of global civil society provides a framework for examining whether or not the internal dynamics of transnational networks and organizations are

Stephanie Chan

indicative of global civil society. As Keane (2003) points out, five features characterize this ideal type. Global civil society:

1. consists of non-governmental structures and activities;
2. is a form of society;
3. exhibits civility;
4. contains both strong traces of pluralism and strong conflict potential; and
5. is global.²

By definition, transnational NGOs fit three of these five criteria – they are non-governmental, a form of society, and global.³ However, it is in the remaining two criteria – civility and strong conflict potential – that assessments of transnational networks and organizations as indicators of global civil society become murky. Keane (2003: 14) defines civility as a ‘proclivity towards non-violence and respect for the principles of compromise, mutual respect, and power-sharing among different ways of life’. The strong conflict potential results precisely from these different ways of life. Thus, civility combined with strong conflict potential means that global civil society ‘looks and feels expansive and polyarchic, full of horizontal push and pull, vertical conflict and compromise’ (Keane 2003: 16). For transnational networks and organizations truly to embody global civil society, they must exhibit cooperation across crosscutting social, cultural, religious and political cleavages. Neither the cleavages nor the cooperation can be absent.

Abdullahi An-Na’im further elaborates on how the quality of this negotiation process and the ability to participate in it should be central to studies of civility in global civil society. He states that ‘global civil society can be seen as consisting of various actors with different objectives negotiating to broaden and deepen their overlapping consensus about the normative framework of their global association’ (An-Na’im 2002: 57). Global civil society is about agreement, despite differences, on the conditions necessary for the process of negotiation: ‘mutual respect and appreciation of cultural and contextual difference and the possibility of peaceful coexistence’ (An-Na’im 2002: 57). Thus, civility is contingent on how diverse cleavages are managed.

Despite an increase in empirical research on global civil society, empirical studies of ‘civility’ within it are lacking. When searching for the emergence of global civil society, scholars often look towards international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs) as key indicators, treating them as instances of the transnational cooperation that characterizes a global civil society. Scholars of domestic civil society who have been informed by Robert Putnam’s (1993; 2000) work on civic associations and social capital test theories of the vibrancy of civil society by examining domestic voluntary and civic associations. Scholars of global civil society, in turn, have made INGOs and TSMOs their stock-in-trade (Anheier et al. 2001; Smith 1998; Smith and Wiest 2005; Tsutsui and Wotipka 2004). However, the true test of whether or not these transnational organizations are representative of the emergence of global civil society is not only in

their quantitative increase but also in the quality of their internal dynamics. Associations, according to Putnam, are indicators of a vibrant civil society because they both indicate the existence of and facilitate the production of social capital. Putnam (1995: 67) defines social capital as 'features of social organizations, such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit'.

However, since not all types of social capital are conducive to 'civility' or to cooperation across diverse groups, we must investigate not only whether or not these associations exist but also what types of social capital are evident within them. Social capital may produce negative effects, including the exclusion of outsiders to the group (Portes 1998). Putnam distinguishes between 'bonding' and 'bridging' social capital. Bonding social capital is 'inward looking and tend[s] to reinforce exclusive identities and homogenous groups', while bridging social capital is 'outward looking and encompass[es] people across diverse social cleavages' (Putnam 2000: 22). He argues that both have potential to have positive effects; however, he also notes that bonding social capital may negatively lead to out-group antagonism. An important question for global civil society, then, is how to manage bonding capital so that it is beneficial and not corrosive to a group. For transnational NGOs to embody global civil society, they should exhibit a delicate blend of bonding and bridging social capital that promotes connectedness as well as civil give-and-take. Improving upon counts of organizations, some scholars have focused on investigating not only the quantity of organizations but also the quality of the ties within and across these organizations (Paxton 2002; Stolle and Rochon 1998). Yet, it is still a mystery how the presence of multiple memberships and crosscutting ties is actually worked out within the organization.

While one can view social capital as an indicator of civil society, it also refers more generally to social networks that serve as a resource for getting things done. Pamela Paxton (2002: 256) writes that it is 'the notion that social relations can facilitate the production of economic and non-economic goods'. Organizations, in this case, development organizations, can benefit from the social capital of its members. Social capital can facilitate certain organizational tasks. Given that we can consider social capital as both an indicator of civil society and a conduit for the more effective completion of goals, we must ask whether the type of social capital that is conducive to organizational tasks is also the type of social capital that may be characterized as part of global *civil* society. Therefore, I analyse the social capital present in these transnational organizations in the context of their everyday tasks.

Managing multiple cleavages

What types of cleavages are likely to emerge in transnational networks and organizations? Drawing from the literature on transnational social movements, we may speculate on the types of cleavages likely to be pervasive in instances of transnational cooperation. Transnational organizing often breaks down along national lines, as in the case of the Socialist International (Chatfield 1997) or the Mexican–Canadian labour organizing efforts against NAFTA (Gabriel and Macdonald 1994). Perhaps the most outstanding power asymmetry exists between Northern and

Stephanie Chan

Southern actors within transnational networks (Smith 2002), which underlies even the most successful transnational efforts (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Most INGOs are still based in the North (Sikkink and Smith 2002) and funding most often flows from Northern funders to Southern beneficiaries, which some argue reinforces structural inequalities. Moreover, while the Northern actors often focus on civil and political issues, Southern actors are often more concerned with economic issues (Keck and Sikkink 1998).

Important for the purposes of this article, in which I analyse religious NGOs, are the theorized divides between religious and secular actors and limits to the civility of religious actors. Historically, the concept of civility has been formulated in contrast to the incivility of religion. Heba Raouf Ezzat (2004: 45) explains, 'Civility was linked to notions of secular rationalism and measured in daily life by European cultural values that were heavily ethno-centric in this respect.' As a result, many studies of transnational NGOs have focused on secular, 'progressive' organizations to the exclusion of religious ones (Anderson and Rieff 2004; Tarrow 2002). John Boli and George Thomas (1999: 43) observe a small and declining percentage of INGOs in religious sectors and speculate that this trend could reflect how 'the individualism of world culture works against collectivist forms of transnational organizing (labor, family, religion, distinctive cultural identity)'. Paxton (2002: 270), in her study of the presence of multiple memberships among international associations, concludes, 'Three associations stand out as less connected than others: trade unions, sports associations, and religious associations.' Transnational religion is often cast as oppositional to globalization, universalism, and civic transnationalism (Barber 1995; Juergensmeyer 2005). Berger (2005: 15) writes, 'I suspect that, in the aggregate, religion is more likely to have negative consequences for civility – that is, religion, more than not, tends to create conflict both within and between societies.' Some religious groups, like the Italian Catholic Church in Putnam's study (1993) and the Chinese Catholics in Richard Madsen's study (1998) exhibit the 'vertical bonds of authority' rather than 'the horizontal bonds of fellowship' characteristic of civic community (Putnam 1993: 107).

However, one should not consider religion as uncivil by definition. Religion may manifest itself in ways that are a threat to civility or in ways that are a strong motivation for civil engagement, and the cases in which religion motivates one type of action or the other must be investigated empirically (Ezzat 2004). What requires further research is how 'different global agents "negotiate" across the secular-religious divide and how they achieve an "overlapping consensus"' (Ezzat 2004: 45).

An emphasis on the process of establishing a transnational collective identity often overshadows this negotiation process. Transnational social movement scholars focus on the establishment of a collective identity that serves to unify transnational actors despite their many differences. Citing Leila Rupp and Verta Taylor's (1999) example of the collective identity of 'international sisterhood' serving to unify feminists across national, cultural and class distinctions, Jackie Smith (2002) and Sharon Erickson Nepstad (2001) argue that establishing a collective identity is the mechanism used to ease other potentially conflictual differences. Nepstad demonstrates how, despite their

racial, class, ethnic, national and ideological differences, participants in the US–Central America peace movement unified transnationally around their collective identity as progressive Christians. Christian Smith (1996: 18) makes a similar claim regarding religious bonds: ‘Most religions are national and transnational by nature, and therefore create common bonds between people of differing national and global regions, races, and classes, which can transcend and defy more proximate loyalties.’ In these accounts, it seems as if multiple social, political and cultural cleavages are managed through the transcendence of a single membership above the others.

Yet such a zero-sum game where one membership trumps the others does not seem compatible with the complex process of civil give-and-take necessary to embody global civil society. Hence, if the diverse crosscutting ties in these transnational NGOs are managed by the emergence of a ‘master’ tie that supersedes the others, then this challenges the contrary claim that they are indicators of global civil society. We see this paradox emerge in Nepstad’s study of the US–Central America peace movement. She asks why not all American Christians, particularly the evangelicals, fundamentalists and conservative denominations, joined the peace movement and argues that the non-joiners were not ‘socialized to focus on justice, peace, and the plight of the poor and oppressed’ (Nepstad 2001: 34). What we see is that the establishment of a collective identity that serves to unify the members of the peace movement also serves to exclude certain individuals or groups. While transcending some differences, it also serves to reinforce others. As Nepstad (2001: 23) remarks, ‘Although a collective identity may enable activists within a transnational movement to transcend their internal differences, we must also study how activists deal with the external pressures and challenges of competing interests and identities.’ And, it is precisely this element of the process of transnational cooperation, dealing with the challenges of competing interests and identities, that would seem to provide the best window into the civility, or lack thereof, within instances of transnational organization. This negotiation process is the central concern of this article.

China: an improbable context for global civil society

China is an improbable place to find evidence of global civil society. Statist and non-democratic societies, according to previous studies, are not conducive to thriving domestic civil societies nor the type of social capital that would support membership in global civil society (Paxton 2002; Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001; Smith and Wiest 2005). Searches for civil society in China have come up rather empty. The lack of fit between the concept of civil society and the conditions of NGOs and other non-state actors in China has led scholars to conclude that civil society in China is at best ‘emerging’, ‘nascent’, ‘partial’, or ‘incipient’ (Frolic 1997; He 1997; Hjellum 1998; Madsen 1998; Pei 1998; Weller 1998; White 1996; Whyte 1992; Zhang 1997). Though scholars of transnational social movements provide examples of statist, non-democratic societies that are active participants in transnational activist networks, for some an indicator of global civil society, they argue that the invulnerability of China to military pressures and economic sanctions makes it a difficult target for

Stephanie Chan

transnational activism (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (1998: 118) use China as their 'negative case': 'The Chinese case is negative substantiation for the argument presented here: a weak, repressed, and divided domestic movement, combined with little possibility for leverage politics, constitutes exactly the conditions under which we would *not* expect successful human rights pressures.'

Given the statistical odds and pessimistic accounts of domestic civil society in China, it presents a surprising context in which to find any semblance of global civil society and the types of social capital supportive of a global civil society. It is precisely this improbability that makes transnational NGOs in China and their successful exhibition of the global give-and-take across social, cultural and political cleavages interesting cases for study. What enables successful civil cooperation within even a seemingly extreme and improbable case?

In sum, we are left with a theoretical puzzle. First, we must explain how these transnational religious NGOs in China, despite the theorized antagonistic political environment and theorized presence of potentially uncivil religious ties, are able to exhibit cooperation across multiple social, cultural, religious and political cleavages. Second, if it holds that the mechanism responsible for successful transnational cooperation across diverse and multiple ties is the establishment of an overarching collective identity, then a mode of cooperation exists within these NGOs that may be incompatible with the civility and strong conflict potential aspects of Keane's (2003) global civil society ideal type. The following case studies will illuminate how we need to reconsider the mechanisms of cooperation in light of the empirical study of the internal dynamics of transnational NGOs. Transnational networks and organizations do serve as accurate indicators of a global *civil* society, but through a dynamic process of negotiation among crosscutting ties rather than through a transcendent master tie.

Case studies: China Agape and ServeChina

Using interview data and organizational material, which includes internal documents, annual reports and newsletters, I examine how crosscutting memberships in two Protestant Christian development NGOs are managed and how they enable and constrain their organizational tasks. I conducted ten in-depth interviews with staff members and former staff members of China Agape and ServeChina.⁴ Both these NGOs have offices in mainland China and Hong Kong. I interviewed staff from both sites for both these organizations, three staff in the mainland China office and one in the Hong Kong office for China Agape and three staff in the mainland China office and three in the Hong Kong office for ServeChina.

Although both these organizations focus their work on China, their donors, volunteers and staff are transnational. While there were six foreign and forty local staff at China Agape at the time of the interviews, 97 per cent of the organization's funding came from abroad, with only 3 per cent originating in China. Though it is a very localized organization, as the high proportion of staff from China shows, its partnerships with organizations and individuals from Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland,

Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the United States shows that it is very international as well. ServeChina, which places foreign development and relief professionals in China, has 100 national and 195 expatriate staff. In 2003, at the time of the interviews, the staff included people from 21 different nations. Their funding comes mainly from international NGOs, support networks in the professionals' countries of origin, and the Hong Kong government, and not locally from mainland China. It is difficult to get accurate figures on the number of organizations like China Agape and ServeChina. Estimates on the number of INGOs in China range from a conservative 490 by China Development Brief, to 2297 in 2002 by the Union of International Association's Yearbook of International Organizations (Chen 2005), and 3000–6000 by Wang Ming, director of the NGO Research Centre at Tsinghua University. According to Wang Ming, 1000 of his estimated 3000–6000 organizations are, like China Agape and ServeChina, faith-based.

The two NGOs I study here, China Agape and ServeChina, have achieved 'success' at the most basic level – survival. Given the precarious legal environment for NGOs in China, particularly those with religious affiliations, this is no small task. China Agape and ServeChina have many similarities. They are both development organizations, aimed at promoting multi-faceted development in China. Both were established in the 1980s, prior to the promulgation of any legal provisions for NGOs in China. Local Chinese Christians founded China Agape in 1985, while Christian business people and academics in Hong Kong founded ServeChina in 1981. Both form partnerships with international organizations and communities; and both have local offices in China to handle affairs on the Chinese side and a branch office in Hong Kong to handle overseas affairs. Both self-identify as 'Christian', though we shall see this has different meanings for different people within the organizations. One notable difference is that China Agape has close connections with the official Three-Self Church in China. ServeChina, on the other hand, though founded by Hong Kong Christians, lacks these same local Chinese Christian connections.

To analyse how multiple memberships are managed, I study these processes in the context of an organization's everyday tasks of raising funds, hiring staff, recruiting volunteers, establishing legitimacy in multiple contexts, meeting government officials, reporting to donors and making connections with local communities. In analysing how crosscutting ties affect organizational tasks, I show how multiple memberships can enable and constrain a transnational NGO's organizational tasks. This allows us to observe how actors sort out multiple memberships in everyday settings and how such actions affect the organization's other tasks.

Religion as a resource

For China Agape and ServeChina, religious ties supply the bonding and bridging of social capital necessary to raise funds for the organizations' activities. As scholars studying social movements would have anticipated, religion serves as a 'resource' for these NGOs. In both cases, Protestant churches and Christian organizations provide

Stephanie Chan

the bulk of the funding for their development projects. Many of these are long-term funding relationships and not single grants or donations. In both organizations, the sole support for all foreign staff comes from local churches and Christian mission agencies in the countries of origin. While support from Christian organizations and agencies abroad signifies a 'thinner' or more generalized trust, supporting foreign staff in a particular NGO provides a 'thicker' type of trust (Putnam 2000) built on personal relationships with the donors. Donors are able to give to someone they know and trust and recipients are required to keep the donors updated. Thus, there is both an element of personal investment and additional accountability. Drawing funding from local congregations in the countries of origin is a form of 'bloc recruitment' that scholars of domestic movements have recognized as a valuable asset in movements that involve churches. Local staff salaries come from the organization's overall budget, which means that funding from Christian organizations abroad also indirectly supports them.

Staff in both these organizations are 'recruited' through Christian networks. ServeChina's director of operations described the NGO situation in China as 'very nebulous', lacking 'clear provisions'. He also mentioned that people move from one NGO to another, which turns the 'organizations' into loose clusters of people who retain several affiliations at once. He had formerly worked as an intermediary who matched people wanting to work in China with those needing human resources. In the course of this work, he often encountered people from ServeChina and it was because of his frequent contact over the years with the ServeChina China director that he was eventually hired. ServeChina's international director had also performed many similar jobs on the NGO circuit before entering his current position. The assistant to the international director remarked that she had 'married into this job'. Other members of staff had heard of the organization through friends or had formerly worked as a volunteer before joining the staff. For China Agape, the local university provides a ripe recruiting ground for volunteers and staff. The associate general secretary of China Agape heard about the organization from students at the local university where he worked compiling dictionaries. He said that his interest in Christianity was another reason for joining. Once in these organizations, the staff members often hop from one position to another as the NGO community in China is small. In an interview with a woman who is starting an NGO development and training centre in China, whom I met through the director of a university's NGO study centre, I discovered that she had also formerly worked at China Agape.

Though similarly embedded in Christian donor networks and the NGO community in China, what distinguishes China Agape from ServeChina is the former's embeddedness in the local Chinese Christian network. Local churches and Christian communities play an important role in initiating and carrying out its local projects. In working with local churches, China Agape is able to utilize an already developed and extensive organizational network, or in the words of one observer, the 'largest grass-roots NGO in China'. The vice-president of China Agape writes in the organization's newsletter:

In [---] County now, each township has a church, and the presence of the church in development work is extensively felt. In the past, I was told, a villager would say: ‘Church? What’s that? I don’t care.’ Today, however, they would say: ‘Yeah, I know what the church is about. It does good things. It helps us alleviate poverty.’

He also recounts stories of how the Christians in these local villages are beginning to care for other villagers despite being poor themselves, cultivating a spirit of altruism. He remarks, ‘What [ChinaAgape] does is very, very little, and if it can do anything at all, it is because of the gifts these people have offered, although they might be poor in material terms.’

This contrasts with ServeChina’s rural projects coordinator’s observation that the greatest challenge in their village development projects is that the villagers have no sense of community. He observed that everyone took care of his or her own interests and lacked what he called a ‘community sense’. I commented that this surprised me because I would have expected villages to be tight-knit communities (as our social science categories might suggest). He said that this might have been the case prior to 1949, when people used public property to help the needy, but not after 1949 when the government took over all land ownership. With reform, land has been de-collectivized, but a sense of both dependence on the government and a suspicion of neighbours left over from the events of the Cultural Revolution remain. This, combined with the politicization of all organizations during the Mao era as well as the introduction of a competitive market economy, has depleted social capital in these villages. According to Gold (1985: 664), the lack of community sense the rural projects coordinator observed has deeper and more traditional roots. He argues that social relations in reform era China represent a ‘resurgence throughout society of the importance of particularistic ties, distinguishing us from them (*neiwai youbie*, literally “there is a difference between inner and outer”)’.

Although their Christian affiliations serve as a valuable resource for ServeChina, and even more so for China Agape, their religious ties come with extra challenges, particularly in having to deal with the constraints of overlapping and multiple cultural structures, or the collective norms, beliefs, symbols, scripts and practices of each culture. In addition to establishing legitimacy with the Chinese government, with local beneficiaries and with the wider NGO community, these organizations also have to establish legitimacy within the Christian community. Navigating within these various cultural structures is quite difficult, in fact so difficult that China Agape has considered shedding its Christian ties. However, thus far, it has been successful at managing these delicate, multiplex connections.

Negotiating crosscutting religious ties

While the Chinese government is wary of NGOs in general, as it sees them as a threat to their authority, the suspicion surrounding Westerners and, even more specifically, Christians, is the result of a legacy of Western imperialism and Christian missionary

Stephanie Chan

activity. The Chinese government has associated Christian missionaries with the Western imperialist enterprise. Thus, conflicts between Westerners and Chinese locals are not simply a matter of cultural conflict, but a matter of historical political conflicts. Culture here is inseparable from power and politics. As evidence of this, we may look at the Government White Paper on Freedom of Religious Belief in China (October 1997). This document lists the atrocities that Catholic and Protestant missionaries committed in China. It claims that Western Protestantism and Catholicism were simply guises for Western colonialism and imperialism. It further states, 'While playing an inglorious role in modern Chinese history, Western Catholicism and Protestantism manipulated and controlled Chinese churches turning them into the appendages to Western religious orders and mission societies.'

The sensitivity of the government to religious activity requires both of these organizations to master the craft of simultaneously maintaining legitimacy with the government and with their Christian supporters. While their Christian identity acts as a liability in their relations with the Chinese government, it simultaneously serves as legitimization in the eyes of overseas Christian supporters. The staff in both these organizations seemed to be well equipped with the 'right' answers when I asked them what makes their organization a 'Christian' one. In other words, they were able to adapt discursively to the ideological structure in China. Since the Chinese government does not tolerate proselytizing, documents from these organizations explicitly state that their intention is not to proselytize. ServeChina's website states, '[ServeChina] is a not-for-profit, non-governmental organization (NGO) with a Christian ethos and background. However [ServeChina] does not get involved in political issues nor engage in religious activities unacceptable in China.' Prefacing his description of China Agape's church-run projects, the organization's vice-president writes in the newsletter, '[China Agape] is not a church organization and does not engage in proselytizing work. However, since it is initiated by Chinese Christians and, in [--- province], works through local churches, this work improves the relations of the church with the local government and with the people who have no religious belief.'

In practice, however, the line is more blurred. This became evident when most of my interviewees asked me if I was a Christian before proceeding with the interview questions dealing with Christianity. My religious social capital factored into these discussions. The assistant to the director of ServeChina said that, in China, they are legally a secular organization and that local staff members are not required to be Christians, yet all the international staff and associates are Christian. I asked her how she would respond if a non-Christian called and asked to teach with the organization. She said she would tell the person in question that they want to 'minimize differences between the team members' because a lot of issues already arise from the difficulties of adjusting to a new place, so unity and similarity are important for the team. Here we see an instance of viewing bonding social capital as more important than bridging social capital. Eventually, she would politely turn him or her down. China Agape's volunteers are not required to be Christians, but most of them are because they are recruited through Christian channels.

When the discussion turned to evangelism, all the Christians stressed 'lifestyle'

evangelism as preferable to direct proselytization. The disabled projects coordinator at ServeChina said that evangelism is a 'by-product, not the objective'. According to the rural projects coordinator, the organization has changed a lot from a more direct evangelism approach to an action-based, lifestyle evangelism approach. The focus now, he said, is on doing projects and doing them well; it is not evangelism. He calls this a 'long-term plan for the good news'. The director of operations at ServeChina had a more complex way of explaining the relationship between meeting physical and spiritual needs. In his characteristic style of giving roundabout, yet very informative responses to my questions, he said that the Christian message needs to be heard, and then went into a discussion of communication theory. From his perspective, cultural and language differences can create a lot of 'noise' and stop the communication of the message to the receiver. Unless there is a way to identify the person who comes in, the outsider, he explained, the message will remain unheard. By going in and doing these projects, they are entering into people's lives in ways they can understand. In a separate interview, he also mentioned that ServeChina has 'a gospel motivation'.

The pre-approved answer at China Agape differs a little from that of the staff at ServeChina. When asked what made China Agape 'Christian', the associate general secretary, a local non-Christian Chinese, mentioned its values, its founders and the organization's name. A former staff worker at China Agape, also a local Chinese non-Christian, responded that Christianity forms the 'background' for the organization. When I asked her if there were any cultural conflicts within the organization, she said there are cultural differences but no cultural conflicts because of Christianity. She added that all members of staff received Christian training upon entering the organization and that Christians are 'good-hearted people' so there are not many conflicts.

While the religious connection does seem to have beneficial effects as a conflict-mitigator, as a cultural frame that transcends national cultural differences, it has also been a challenge for China Agape to manage. Asked how China Agape is a Christian organization, the communications director, a German Christian who works at the Hong Kong office, replied, 'That's a nut we're cracking every day.' The Christian donor community is concerned about China Agape's close ties with the China Christian Council (CCC), the umbrella organization for all Protestant churches in China. Some overseas Christians are worried about the CCC and Chinese government co-opting China Agape, calling China Agape the 'social service arm of the CCC', but the communications director claims that this is untrue. While they have a close relationship through personal links, they are not the social service arm of the CCC, as evidenced, she added, by the CCC's recent establishment of its own social service department. An internal document describes the complications associated with having Christian ties:

For some, probably most of our partner organizations, it is essential that [China Agape] has a 'Christian face' ... to justify giving funds to [it]. Their regulations stipulate that their work be related to 'Christian' organizations, however that term may be defined. To meet this need, [China Agape] tries to highlight the 'Christian' aspects of its work when relating to partners.

Stephanie Chan

Within China, however, expectations towards [China Agape] are slightly different, and this is reflected in [China Agape's] formal position. All Chinese NGOs must be officially registered under a governmental 'host' organization. In [China Agape's] case, this is the Provincial United Front of --- Province. This alignment underlines [China Agape's] middle position as a church-related, but not church organization (for which the [Religious Affairs Bureau] would be the appropriate host). At the same time, the arrangement reflects the political reality of the time when [China Agape] was founded.

Though it is a complex relationship to maintain, the document also states that its 'mixed identity' has at least one benefit: 'In the context of China, this enables us to relate to a variety of societal groups and to recruit Christian and non-Christian staff, while at the same time emphasizing our commitment to certain Christian values.'

ServeChina faces similar challenges and adopts a similar multi-fronted strategy. The director of operations presented me with his 'formula for effectiveness' and sketched a diagram of the local Chinese community labelled '1' and of the overseas Christian donor community labelled '2'. As he described the role of ServeChina, he waved his pen back and forth between '1' and '2', providing a tangible illustration of bridging social capital. He said that ServeChina needed to mediate between these two communities, particularly translating the local work in China into terms that resonated with the Christian donor community. This describes a situation with which sociologists of religion are intimately acquainted in studying evangelical social engagement in the USA. The emphasis that evangelicals place on transforming individual lives often blinds them to larger social problems and impedes their engagement in broader social transformation (Smith et al. 1998; Wuthnow 1999). This paradox appears to extend to their activity abroad. The director of operations implied that there is a mismatch between the narrower outlook of donors and the broader engagement of the organization. Thus, we see how the evangelical cultural structure within which the organization works might constrain its actions. As the director's description illustrates, however, they overcome this incongruence by bridging social capital, or through what social movement scholars might call cultural 'brokerage' (McAdam et al. 2001). They define brokerage as the 'linking of two or more previously unconnected social sites by a unit that mediates their relations with one another and/or with yet other sites' (McAdam et al. 2001: 26).

National political and cultural cleavages

Despite a slight decline in the post-1978 reform era, the dominance of the government is still present in every aspect of life in China. As a former local Chinese staff member at China Agape told me, 'You can see the government, feel the government everywhere.' In addition to jumping through all the legal hoops necessary even to exist as an organization under an authoritarian regime, a crucial part of any development project is to cultivate positive relationships with local government officials. ServeChina's rural project coordinator, also a Chinese local, said that possibly the

most crucial relationship in these projects is their relationship with the village leader. He explained that you cannot contact the villagers directly but must always go through the village leader. If the official does not approve then the villagers will neither welcome nor accept you. A former China Agape staff member similarly asserted that foreigners try to adopt models they have used elsewhere, as in Bangladesh and India, and think they will work without adjustment in China. She said:

There are big differences, the primary being that the government is rather messy in these other countries and you can enter and contact villagers directly. It does not work this way in China because the government is so 'perfect' in China. You need the government for your project to succeed.

What she means by 'perfect' is not faultless, but rather, omniscient and omnipotent.

The cultivation of village social capital requires an extensive knowledge of the local social and cultural norms, a skill that many foreigners lack. The ServeChina rural projects coordinator described the situation:

The government will ask the foreigners to have dinner and that kind of stuff, but when it comes to negotiating they will not do it with a 'white face', only with a Chinese face. It is hard for foreigners to assess and understand the situations in political gatherings, who is important, what is the history, who are the stakeholders.

I asked him if they would negotiate with an overseas Chinese person, and he said, 'Yes, there is just something about a white face that makes them uncomfortable. There is a guy [a Westerner] who has worked here and lived here for ten years and his Chinese is excellent but they still will not negotiate with him.' This conversation arose out of another we were having about cultural conflicts, which began in English. When we conversed in English, he mentioned that there were not any cultural conflicts. However, once I began to converse with him in Chinese, he opened up and the above story emerged. My 'Chinese face' probably helped.

These cultural factors have encouraged ServeChina to recruit more Chinese staff. The Chinese office representative for ServeChina is from Hong Kong and has a background as a lawyer who specializes in mainland Chinese law. She was recruited to help ServeChina navigate through the Chinese legal environment as well as to be a cultural bridge builder. The office representative mentioned that Hong Kong culture is closer to Chinese culture. The general assistant to the international director, the one responsible for recruiting the office representative, chimed in at this point and said that despite most people in the organization being Christian, the cultural gap is still very wide. Likewise, the director of operations at ServeChina, an American, mentions that Westerners are often the targets of suspicion in China. He says 'If a Westerner is present the government becomes more suspicious. Singaporeans, [American-born Chinese], overseas Chinese can go into areas that Europeans cannot.'

Stephanie Chan

Foreigners are constant targets of suspicion in China. The Public Security Bureau (PSB), China's law enforcement agency, visits the ServeChina China office, which has some foreign staff, weekly. This is not the case for the fully local Chinese-staffed China Agape China office. ServeChina's American project coordinator, who helps run education programmes for disabled children at local schools, states that, 'there is a lot of turnover in school positions. In my observation, it seems that whenever they get too close to foreigners they are transferred.' The ServeChina urban project coordinator, a German, remarks that urban areas are highly complex and politically sensitive. He adds that you can do more with less money and under less scrutiny in rural areas.

Though all the informants mentioned that cross-cultural cooperation was more prevalent than cross-cultural conflict among the staff, there were mentions of potential conflicts that were eventually resolved. When speaking of the difficulties of Sino-German cooperation, one of the former staff members from China Agape spoke of always having to 'fight' with the German partners while putting up her hands boxing style. However, she said that in the end they came around and compromised. Some of the problems were different cultural styles, as the urban projects coordinator from ServeChina notes, '[German and Chinese culture] are polar opposites. ... Germans are task-oriented, precise, critical, analytical, and perfectionist.' However, divisions also emerge from unequal partnerships. According to a former China Agape staff member, many foreign organizations do not trust their Chinese partners. She comments, 'Partnerships should be equal. Germans come in and say "do this, this, and this", and don't consult with the Chinese.' They eventually resolved these conflicts by sitting down with both sides and having them negotiate as equals.

Adapting to world cultural norms

An added set of cultural norms within which the staff of these NGOs must negotiate is a set of world cultural norms (Boli and Thomas 1999; Meyer et al. 1997). Boli and Thomas (1999: 15) state, 'Like all cultures, world culture becomes embedded in social organization, especially in organizations operating at the global level.' Staff at both China Agape and ServeChina felt the need to conform to certain organizational and cultural norms to legitimize themselves within the larger NGO community.⁵ A point of concern for many of my informants, especially those staff members with most contact with the academic community, was the need to professionalize. The communication director at China Agape, who holds a Ph.D., said, 'Like all [non-profit organizations] those working for this one have about 90 per cent enthusiasm and 10 per cent professionalism.' According to the rural project coordinator at ServeChina, the people working there have a strong religious background but very little experience with project management, a wealth of religious social capital but a scarcity of world cultural social capital. ServeChina's urban project coordinator had a master's degree in development studies and was about to leave the organization to pursue a doctoral degree. When he first came, he developed a training curriculum, participatory methods and project evaluation, all of which were weak upon his arrival three years

earlier. All of these were ideas imported from academic studies of development. John Boli (2005: 388) considers science and professionalization to be part of the 'core of world culture'. When asked if outside culture affected local office practices, the general secretary of China Agape said that the primary influence was in terms of 'communication and efficiency'.

Not only do these organizations feel pressure to be professional and efficient, but numerous informants also advocated participatory models and methods. Participatory models for some meant grassroots initiation and participation in development activities. When I asked if local projects were sustained after China Agape staff had left the project sites, the general secretary responded affirmatively and quoted one of the organization's mottos: 'Local people are agents of change.' Another informant contrasted 'participatory methods of leadership' with 'remnants of a communist regime leadership style'. She said that the older members of the organization adhered to a communist leadership style while the younger ones preferred a more participatory method of leadership.

If there is a common 'culture' among the diverse staff it seems to be an organizational culture with a strongly Western flavour. Every local Chinese staff member at China Agape speaks English, and though the office is located in China, the associate general secretary said that the dominant language in the office is English. A former China Agape staff member who recently established an NGO training centre said that a key to bridging cultural divides is having people who understand both cultures. She mentioned that over half the staff at China Agape had majored in English in college and that they had to take an English test to work for the organization. This reinforces the extent to which staff members are required to be cultural brokers as much or more than they are required to deal with the administrative and logistical tasks of the organization. She herself has a Ph.D. in sociology from a Chinese university and a master's degree in public administration from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. Thus, a unifying culture appears to be one that is highly- and Western-educated and English-speaking.

Conclusion

Returning to the initial questions that guide this study, we find that these NGOs embody the characteristics of a global civil society in that they exhibit cooperation across intersecting social, cultural and political cleavages. China Agape and ServeChina illustrate both the benefits and challenges of working among crosscutting memberships. They sit at the intersection of multiple memberships of national polities, national cultures, religious communities and a world culture. This amalgamation of ties seems to be extremely vulnerable to conflict. Indeed, the evidence reveals social, cultural, political and religious cleavages. Surprisingly, however, as one respondent remarked, there are many cultural differences but few cultural conflicts. Therefore, these transnational NGOs exhibit both the 'civility' and 'strong conflict potential' features of Keane's (2003) ideal type of global civil society.

Stephanie Chan

The key to managing crosscutting ties and multiple memberships successfully appears to be, as one of my informants insisted, people who understand both cultures and are able to bridge the cultural divides. An essential resource in these organizations is a diverse staff comprised of actors with varying dimensions of bridging and bonding social capital. Their cause-based collective identity is invaluable to creating internal solidarity and civility, while their additional identities, including national and religious ones, are valuable for connecting them with both donors and beneficiaries. Contrary to the hypothesis that it is only possible to manage multiple cleavages through a single membership that transcends the others, from this article we see that one can dynamically engage multiple memberships. The staff members of these NGOs exhibit a complex push and pull among various memberships. The interaction of multiple memberships is not a zero-sum game, and it is precisely this fact that makes these relationships 'civil'. The negotiation of multiple memberships must *not* be a zero-sum game if it is to be cast accurately as civil society. Since China is a particularly tough climate for the flourishing of civil society, the fact that pockets of global civil society can even thrive in such democratically arid conditions bodes well for its prospects in other contexts and bolsters support for the necessity of skilful cross-cultural brokers as a key factor in a thriving global civil society.

Through these cases, we observe that crosscutting ties and multiple memberships have the potential to complicate as well as facilitate an NGO's organizational tasks. Religious ties certainly act as a resource. In addition to aiding resource mobilization, Christianity provides these organizations and their staff with motivation and unifying values and reveals the potential to mitigate other cultural conflicts. At a local grassroots level, it helps cultivate a spirit of philanthropy and altruism that would otherwise be missing. Conversely, it greatly complicates the process of establishing legitimacy, for these organizations have to juggle multiple identities at once. Moreover, the tendency of Christian donors to be concerned exclusively with evangelistic efforts and individual transformation restricts rather than enables the organizations they support to engage in broader social change. Local social capital, in the form of connections and good relations with local village officials, using pre-existing village social networks, knowledge of local customs and styles of negotiation, and even the physical features of being associated with 'us' rather than the 'them' of imperialism and foreigners, is critical to these organizations' development activities. Finally, as members of a larger NGO community, or world polity, these NGOs need to conform to the norms of professionalism, efficiency and education.

Whether multiple memberships serve to enable or constrain an NGO's organizational tasks appears to hinge on the actions of skilful cross-cultural brokers. The very type of social capital that serves as a main indicator of global civil society – cooperation across multiple memberships – is therefore also a central resource in completing organizational tasks. Negotiating crosscutting ties directly facilitates organizational tasks while also indirectly building the basis for global civil society. This confirms the findings of other scholars on the critical role of transnational brokers in facilitating cooperation among diverse members (Bandy 2004; Bandy and Smith 2005).

In this article, I have elucidated what social processes and patterns were present in

two NGOs that achieved cooperation across multiple social, cultural and political cleavages in an unlikely environment. I provided a glimpse of the internal dynamics that often remain elusive in studies of transnational NGOs in relation to global civil society. Yet, the generalizability of these claims rests on further study of what is going on within transnational networks and organizations in different sectors, in different regions of the world, and which are affected by different types of divides and intersecting memberships.

Acknowledgements

The author thanks Gordon Chang, Se-Hyun Cho, John Evans, Jeff Haydu, Rachel Jacob-Almeida, Denis Kim, Kris Kohler, April Linton, Richard Madsen, Seiko Matsuzawa, Junkyun Mok, Kevin Moseby, Lisa Nunn, and Eric Van Rite for their insightful comments and suggestions. Alisdair Rogers and anonymous reviewers also provided valuable comments and suggestions. I presented different versions of this article at the 2004 annual meeting of the American Sociological Association and at the 2006 International Studies Association meeting where discussants, participants and audience members provided helpful feedback. The UCSD sociology department funded part of this research. The NGO informants provided the invaluable information that made this project possible.

Notes

1. I use the term 'transnational NGO' rather than INGO because an INGO is sometimes used to designate only an NGO that works in more than one country. Since these organizations operate in China with staff, volunteers and donors from numerous parts of the world, I have labelled them transnational NGOs.
2. Some people argue that the related concepts of 'global civil society' and 'civility' carry too much cultural baggage and Western liberal bias to serve as useful concepts for empirical analysis. However, I agree with Anheier (2007) in his reflections on this critique. He asserts that not only is it impossible to formulate a neutral, value-free definition of global civil society, but that one needs to judge a concept by its ability to 'generate knowledge and enhance understanding' (Anheier 2007: 4).
3. The term 'global' is, however, contested; according to most definitions, organizations that are transnational or international would qualify as global in the sense that it is used here.
4. I have used pseudonyms for NGOs and informants to protect their confidentiality.
5. World culture theorists acknowledge that what they have identified as 'world culture' arose out of Western Christendom (Boli and Thomas 1999); thus world culture tends to look like Western culture. Yet some elements of Western culture have come to be seen as globally valid, which Boli (2005) argues makes them elements of 'world culture'. What is important for the purposes of this article is that there are certain norms propagated by the NGO community to which the NGOs studied feel the need to conform. Since an NGO that works internationally claims to embody 'world culture', I equate the norms of the international NGO community with 'world culture'.

References

- Anderson, K. and D. Rieff (2004) "'Global civil society': a skeptical view", in H. Anheier, M. Glasius and M. Kaldor (eds) *Global civil society 2004/5*, London: Sage, 26–39.
- Anheier, H. (2007) 'Reflections on the concept and measurement of global civil society', *Voluntas*, 18, 1–15.

Stephanie Chan

- Anheier, H., M. Glasius and M. Kaldor (2001) 'Introducing global civil society', in H. Anheier, M. Glasius and M. Kaldor (eds) *Global civil society 2001*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3–22.
- An-Na'im, A. (2002) 'Religion and global civil society: inherent incompatibility or synergy and interdependence', in M. Glasius, M. Kaldor and H. Anheier (eds) *Global civil society 2002*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 55–73.
- Bandy, J. (2004) 'Paradoxes of transnational civil societies under neoliberalism: the Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras', *Social Problems*, 51, 410–31.
- Bandy, J. and J. Smith (2005) 'Factors affecting conflict and cooperation in transnational social movement networks', in J. Bandy and J. Smith (eds) *Coalitions across borders: transnational protest and the neoliberal order*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 231–52.
- Barber, B. (1995) *Jihad v. McWorld: how globalism and tribalism are reshaping the world*, New York: Ballantine Books.
- Berger, P. (2005) 'Religion and global civil society', in M. Juergensmeyer (ed.) *Religion in global civil society*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 11–22.
- Boli, J. (2005) 'Contemporary developments in world culture', *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 46, 383–404.
- Boli, J. and G. M. Thomas (1999) 'INGOs and the organization of world culture', in J. Boli and G. M. Thomas (eds) *Constructing world culture: international nongovernmental organizations since 1875*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 13–49.
- Chatfield, C. (1997) 'Intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to 1945', in J. Smith, C. Chatfield and R. Pagnucco (eds) *Transnational social movements and global politics: solidarity beyond the state*, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 19–41.
- Chen, J. (2005) 'NGO community in China: expanding linkages with transnational civil society', Working Paper 128, Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University.
- Emigh, R. J. (1997) 'The power of negative thinking: the use of negative case methodology in the development of sociological theory', *Theory and Society*, 26, 649–84.
- Ezzat, H. R. (2004) 'Beyond methodological modernism: towards a multicultural paradigm shift in the social sciences', in H. Anheier, M. Glasius and M. Kaldor (eds) *Global civil society 2004/5*, London: Sage, 40–58.
- Frolic, B. M. (1997) 'State-led civil society', in T. Brook and B. M. Frolic (eds) *Civil Society in China*, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 46–67.
- Gabriel, C. and L. Macdonald (1994) 'NAFTA, women and organizing in Canada and Mexico: forging a feminist internationality', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 23, 535–62.
- Gold, T. (1985) 'After comradeship: personal relations in China since the Cultural Revolution', *The China Quarterly*, 104, 657–75.
- He, B. (1997) *The democratic implications of civil society in China*, New York: St Martin's Press.
- Hjellum, T. (1998) 'Is participant culture emerging in China?' in K. J. Brodsgaard and D. Strand (eds) *Reconstructing twentieth-century China: state control, civil society, and national identity*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 216–49.
- Juergensmeyer, M. (2005) 'Religious antiglobalism', in M. Juergensmeyer (ed.) *Religion in global civil society*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 135–48.
- Keane, J. (2003) *Global civil society?* New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Keck, M. and K. Sikkink (1998) *Activists beyond borders: advocacy networks in international politics*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- McAdam, D., S. Tarrow and C. Tilly (2001) *Dynamics of contention*, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Madsen, R. (1998) *China's Catholics: tragedy and hope in emerging civil society*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

- Meyer, J. W., J. Boli, G. M. Thomas and F. O. Ramirez (1997) 'World society and the nation-state', *American Journal of Sociology*, 103, 144–81.
- Nepstad, S. E. (2001) 'Creating transnational solidarity: the use of narrative in the US–Central America peace movement', *Mobilization*, 6, 21–36.
- Paxton, P. (2002) 'Social capital and democracy: an interdependent relationship', *American Sociological Review*, 67, 254–77.
- Pei, M. (1998) 'Chinese civil associations: an empirical analysis', *Modern China*, 24, 285–318.
- Portes, A. (1998) 'Social capital: its origins and applications to modern sociology', *Annual Review of Sociology*, 24, 1–24.
- Putnam, R. D. (1993) *Making democracy work: civil traditions in modern Italy*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Putnam, R. D. (1995) 'Bowling alone: America's declining social capital', *Journal of Democracy*, 6, 65–78.
- Putnam, R. D. (2000) *Bowling alone: the collapse and revival of American community*, New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Rupp, L. J. and V. Taylor (1999) 'Forging feminist identity in an international movement: a collective identity approach to twentieth-century feminism', *Signs*, 24, 363–86.
- Schofer, E. and M. Fourcade-Gourinchas (2001) 'The structural contexts of civic engagement: voluntary association membership in comparative perspective', *American Sociological Review*, 66, 806–28.
- Sikkink, K. and J. Smith (2002) 'Infrastructures for change: transnational social movement organizations, 1953–1993', in S. Khagram, J. Riker and K. Sikkink (eds) *Restructuring world politics: transnational social movements, networks, and norms*, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 24–44.
- Smith, C. (ed.) (1996) *Disruptive religion: the force of faith in social-movement activism*, New York: Routledge.
- Smith, C., M. Emerson, P. Kennedy and D. Sikkink (1998) *American Evangelicalism: embattled and thriving*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Smith, J. (1998) 'Global civil society? Transnational social movement organizations and social capital', *American Behavioral Scientist*, 42, 93–107.
- Smith, J. (2002) 'Bridging global divides? Strategic framing and solidarity in transnational social movement organizations', *International Sociology*, 17, 505–28.
- Smith, J. and D. Wiest (2005) 'The uneven geography of global civil society: national and global influences on transnational association', *Social Forces*, 84, 621–52.
- Stolle, D. and T. R. Rochon (1998) 'Are all associations alike? Member diversity, associational type, and the creation of social capital', *American Behavioral Scientist*, 42, 47–65.
- Tarrow, S. (2002) 'From lumping to splitting: specifying globalization and resistance', in J. Smith and H. Johnston (eds) *Globalization and resistance: transnational dimensions of social movements*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 229–50.
- Tsutsui, K. and C. M. Wotipka (2004) 'Global civil society and the international human rights movement: citizen participation in human rights international non-governmental organizations', *Social Forces*, 83, 587–620.
- Weller, R. P. (1998) 'Horizontal ties and civil institutions in Chinese societies', in R. W. Hefner (ed.) *Democratic civility: the history and cross-cultural possibility of a modern political ideal*, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 229–48.
- White, G. (1996) 'The dynamics of civil society in post-Mao China', in B. Hook (ed.) *The individual and the state in China*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 196–221.
- Whyte, M. K. (1992) 'Urban China: a civil society in the making?' in A. L. Rosenbaum (ed.) *State and society in China: the consequences of reform*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 77–101.

Stephanie Chan

- Wuthnow, R. (1999) 'Mobilizing civic engagement: the changing impact of religious involvement', in T. Skocpol and M. P. Fiorina (eds) *Civic engagement in American democracy*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 331–63.
- Zhang, Y. (1997) 'From state corporatism to social representation: local trade unions in the reform years', in T. Brook and B. M. Frolic (eds) *Civil society in China*, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 124–48.

Copyright of Global Networks is the property of Blackwell Publishing Limited and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.