CHEMICAL SAFETY
VERSUS
TERRORISM
Pavel CASTULIK
CB 050 Military Chemistry, Toxicology and Protection Against High Toxic Agents
Masaryk University, Faculty of Nature Sciences
Spring 2011
Civilians are the most vulnerable
victims
WWI Phosgene experience
Guidance for Chemical Terrorism
Phosgene is still there, however, there
is no antidote available
BHOPAL MEMENTO
Chemical leak of methyl isocyanide
7
Scene of Casualties
EURATOX 2002 courtesy Dr. A. Ziegler
Terrorism
 The term terrorism was first used to describe the
post-revolutionary French "reign of terror" of
1793 to 1794
 The term is now applied also to CBRNE
releases and other actions that violate
international law, and which seek to intimidate,
demoralize, or subjugate a population for
political, religious, or ideological purposes
Terrorism targets
 High-risk targets for acts of terrorism include
military and civilian government facilities,
international airports, large cities, and highprofile
landmarks
 Terrorists might also target large public
gatherings, water and food supplies, utilities,
and corporate centers
 Further, terrorists are capable of spreading fear
by sending explosives or chemical, biological
and radiological agents through the mail
Potential methods used by terrorists
 Contamination of reservoirs
and urban water supply
systems
 Contamination of food,
beverages, drugs, or
cosmetics in manufacturing,
distribution processes and
near the point of consumption
 Miscellaneous product
contaminations:
stamps/envelopes, IV fluids,
etc.
 Release of gases or aerosols
into building HVAC systems
 Release of gases or aerosols
from aircraft and unmanned
vehicles
 Dispersal in bombs or
projectiles
 Miscellaneous direct methods:
hand sprayers, water guns,
parcels
 Release of industrial/agricultural
chemicals via attacks on
production or storage facilities
 Release of industrial/agricultural
chemicals via attacks on truck,
rail, or barge shipping
 Miscellaneous releases of
industrial/agricultural chemicals,
especially anhydrous ammonia,
fumigants and pesticides, and
disinfectant gases (e.g.,
chlorine, chlorine dioxide,
ethylene oxide)
Criteria for determining terrorist
priority chemical agents
 Chemical agents already known to be used as
weaponry
 Availability of chemical agents to potential
terrorists
 Chemical agents likely to cause major morbidity
or mortality
 Potential of agents for causing public panic and
social disruption, and
 Agents that require special action for public
health preparedness
Categories of chemicals include
 CW Agents
 Pulmonary agents
 phosgene
 chlorine
 vinyl chloride
 Volatile toxins
 benzene
 chloroform
 trihalomethanes
 Flammable industrial
gases and liquids
 Gasoline
 Propane
 Explosive nitro
compounds and
oxidizers
 ammonium nitrate
combined with fuel oil
Categories of chemicals include cont.
 Psychochemical agents
 Pesticides
 Persistent, and
 Non-persistent
 Rodenticides
 Sodium fluoracetate
 Tetramethylenedisulfotetramine
 Poison industrial gases, liquids,
and solids,
 Cyanides,
 Nitriles
 Corrosive industrial acids and
bases,
 Nitric acid,
 Sulfuric acid
 Fluoride acid
 Caustic soda
 Dioxins, furans, and
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs)
 Heavy metals and compounds
 Arsenic
 Barium
 Lead
 Mercury
 Thallium
Chemical Facility-Security and Safety
Concerns
• Chemical manufacturers
• Chemical processors
• Ports and terminals
• Storage
• Transportation facilities
• Corporate headquarters
• Warehouses, etc.
Chemical Sector vs Other Sectors
The Chemical Sector covering:
 Basic chemicals
 Specialty chemicals
 Petrochemicals
 Agricultural chemicals
 Pharmaceuticals
 Consumer products
is dependent on, depended on by,
and overlaps with a wide range
of other sectors, including:
 Transportation Systems
 Energy
 Water
 Dams
 Agriculture & Food
 Emergency Services
 Healthcare and Public Health
 Postal & Shipping
 Information Technology
 Communications
 Banking & Finance
 Governmental Facilities
 Commercial Facilities
 Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and
Waste
Processing-Storage-Transport
of Chemicals
Vulnerability of chemical facilities
 When we look at all of the different targets for a
potential attack around us and ask ourselves
which target present the greatest possibility of
mass casualties and are the least well-secured
at the present time - „these are chemical
facilities“
 The government needs more authority and
collaboration with chemical facilities owners to
reduce the vulnerability of chemical plants to a
terrorist attack or sabotage
High-risk chemical facilities
 Chemical manufacturing,
storage and distribution
 Agriculture and food
 Paints and coatings
 Explosives
 Plastics
 Healthcare
 Nuclear industry
 Energy and utilities
 Mining
 Electronics
 Public Water Systems
(chlorine)
 Refrigeration industry
(ammonia)
 Sport facilities (ice
skating-ammonia)
Chemical Industry
Material source for chemical terrorism
 A reasonably open society with a well-developed
chemical industry provides many vulnerabilities
that might be exploited by skilled, committed,
and adequately-funded makers of improvised
chemical weapons
 Safety and security of chemical facilities is still
lagging behind nuclear installations
Key Shortages in Effective
Chemical Security Planning
 Most chemical-related firms have
comprehensive emergency
planning and response processes
 However, those processes
typically don't consider or allow
for security-related
emergencies and crises
 The most chemical firms have
done much to screen and manage
their own employees
 While relatively little has been
done concerning contractors
and non-company drivers who
may have equal levels of access
and exposure
 Most firms do not have dedicated
security managers typically the
security function is managed by
someone who:
 wears "many hats," which may
include
 EHS
 Safety
 Human Resources
 Facilities Management/Maintenance,
 Engineering, etc.
Chemical Facility Safety & Security
Course of Action
 Chemical security
vulnerability assessments
 Development chemical
security plans for
chemical facilities
 Build up capabilities and
capacities for chemical
facilities safety and
security
 Gaps in chemical
facility's safety &
security is an invitation
for terrorism to attack
chemical facilities
and/or gain chemical
products for intentional
use during terrorist
events
Chemical facilities as source
chemical terrorism
 Release-Fire-Explosion -Toxic, flammable, or explosive chemicals
or materials that, if released from a facility, have the potential for
significant adverse consequences for human life or health
 Theft or Diversion - Chemicals or materials that, if stolen or
diverted, have the potential to be misused as weapons or easily
converted into weapons using simple chemistry, equipment or
techniques, in order to create significant adverse consequences for
human life or health
 Sabotage or Contamination - Chemicals or materials that, if mixed
with readily available materials, have the potential to create
significant adverse consequences for human life or health
Cyber attack at chemical facility
1. Defeat the perimeter fence
2. Gain access to the control
cabinet
3. Install a wireless “man in the
middle” device
 Use the wireless device to
damage the information
network
 Physical Damage (offset by
Safety Shutdown Systems)
 Economic Damage
 I. Historical Data
 II. Accounting Information
 III. Tuning and other
instrument information
Counter-terrorism considerations
 In addition to counterterrorism
considerations,
chemical security
assessments should
consider all sorts of
security-related harm that
could occur including:
 Sabotage
 Arson
 Theft and pilferage
 Hijacking
 Vandalism
 Trespassing
 Workplace violence
 Activist disruption
 Contamination
 Cyber attack, etc.
Lower chemical facility's risk
 To assess vulnerability and
have plans to reduce hazards
 Two factors that must be
considered:
 The ease of access to the site
and are security measures
adequate?
 To place each plant in a ''risk
tier" based on the kinds and
amounts of chemicals it has
and its proximity to dense
populations
 Reducing the amount of
hazardous substances
 Using less hazardous
materials
 To switch chemical facilities to
inherently less dangerous
processes where feasible and
 Simplifying plant design and
procedures
Key Concepts of Effective Chemical
Security Planning
 An effective chemical security
program should complement
existing programs and
processes:
 including safety and safety
awareness
 environmental management
 hiring and screening
procedures
 emergency and crisis planning
and response
 shipping and receiving, etc.
 The team-based chemical
plant security vulnerability
assessment
 Positive security awareness by
employees is the most
powerful, cost effective and
frequently neglected of all
security countermeasures
 Modification of comprehensive
emergency planning and
response processes
Risk Based Performance
Standards
 Restrict area perimeter and
access
 Physical Security Around 􀂃
 Control of Vehicles Around 􀂃
 Inspection of Vehicles Around
 Background checks on personnel
with access to materials or the
systems that control them
 Shipping, receipt, and storage
 Secure site assets
 Screen and control access
 Deter, detect, delay
 Theft and diversion
 Sabotage
 Cyber
 Training
 Personnel surety
 Elevated threats
 Response
 Monitoring
 Specific threats, vulnerabilities, or
risks
 Reporting of significant security
incidents
 Significant security incidents and
suspicious activities
 Officials and organization
 Records
Chemical plant security include
 Perform chemical and refinery
security and vulnerability
assessments and surveys
 Develop chemical securityrelated
policies, plans and
procedures
 Develop self-assessment and
audit methodologies
 Train staff in conducting
chemical facility security self-
assessments
 Provide security awareness
and workplace violence
prevention training
 Develop emergency and crisis
plans, to include workplace
violence, bomb threats,
terrorism, sabotage,
contamination, etc.
 Conduct penetration testing
 Plan for strikes and work
stoppages
 Develop and enhance contract
and proprietary security officer
programs
 Review or develop security
departments
Fire at Chemical Plant and/or at
storage of HazMat
A model for chemical terrorism
Destruction of 122 mm artillery rockets
with leaking sarin at Al Muthana
Fire at Plastic Processing Plant
(08.04.2011)
Fire at Plastic Processing Plant
(08.04.2011)
Fire at Plastic Processing Plant Site
(08.04.2011)
250 meters long
building complex
Plastic Processing Plant Site
Toxic plume area
Plume contains a hundreds of
hazardous chemical substances
generated during burning of PVC
and other plastic material
Substances
have toxic,
carcinogenic,
mutagenic and
teratogenic
properties 08-10.04.2011
11-12.04.2011
Toxic plume from Plastic Plant Site fire
Long distance toxic plume affected
area (09.04.2011)
cca 60 km
08.04.2011
Fire at Tires Recycling Plant
(2008)
Tires Depot in Recycling Plant
Grain
Silo
Two large fires at tires depot
Tires in ensilage
booth
Tires in
recycling plant
Location of burned tires from
ensilage booth (2008)
Chemical terrorism
 Chemical terrorism acts are likely to be overt
because the effects of chemical agents
absorbed through inhalation or by absorption
through the skin or mucous membranes are
usually immediate and obvious
 Certain chemical agents can also be delivered
covertly through contaminated food or water
 Such attacks elicit immediate response from fire,
police, EMS and healthcare personnel
Insidious chemical terrorism
 The insidious and
somewhat mysterious
nature of poisons makes
them potential weapons
of mass terror, because
people in a target area or
simply in what they
perceive to be a target
area - will not know
whether or not they've
been poisoned
 Chemical terrorism is
asymmetric warfare as
practiced by nonuniformed
forces using
light and/or improvised
weapons and means
against non-combatant as
well as combatant targets
Overt versus Covert
Chemical Incident
 Hesitation of responders
to inform public correctly
and in time
 Delay of individual
protection measures
 Delay of evacuation
 In the name of „Panic and
Rumor Damage
Avoidance“
 Bias false-negative
information/statements:
 „The concentration of
hazardous material in the
air is bellow permissible
threshold, however, we
recommend close and
tape the window“
 In the same time the
public and environment is
being covertly exposed
and contaminated.
Terrorists are knowledgeable of gaps in
CBRN preparedness and response
 Without special preparation at the local and state levels, a largescale
attack with CBRN/HazMat could overwhelm the local and
national public health infrastructure and trigger „lock down“ hospitals
due to potential contamination
 Large numbers of patients, including both exposed/infected persons
and the "worried well" would seek medical attention, with a
corresponding need for medical supplies, diagnostic tests, and
hospital beds
 Emergency responders, health-care workers, and public health
officials could be at special risk, and everyday life would be
disrupted as a result of widespread fear of contagion and covert
contamination
 Because of the hundreds of new chemicals introduced
internationally each month, treating exposed persons by clinical
syndrome rather than by specific agent is more useful for public
health planning and emergency medical response purposes
Flow of self-referred casualties to
medical facility
DECON
SITE
CASUALTY
CLEARING
STATION
LOADING
POINT
H
HEL
AMBULANCE
SELF-REFERRED CASUALTY
Concept of Casualty Decontamination
Flow
TRIAGE
ADVANCED
HOSPITAL
PHASE
ADMISSIONADMISSION
TRANSFER
DISCHARGEDISCHARGE
DECEASEDDECEASED
NON
AMBULANT
AMBULANT
MIXED
TRAUMA
& CBR
DECEASED
TRIAGE
PRE-HOSPITAL
PHASE
EMERGENCYEMERGENCY
DECON
INDIVIDUALINDIVIDUAL
DECON
MASS
DECON
THOROUGHTHOROUGH
DECONAMBULANT
NON
AMBULANT
ON SITE
FLOW
HOSPITAL FLOW
CURRENT EMERGENCY MEDICAL
TRAIN
SEARCH
&
RESCUE
CEASED
EXPOSURE
PRE
TRIAGE
AIRWAY
SUPPORT
ANTIDOTE
THOROUGHTHOROUGH
DECON
TRANSPORT
HOSPITAL
ADVANCED
TREATMENT
COMPLE-
MENTARY
DECON
RELEASE
FROM
HOSPITAL
POST-TRAUMA
PSYCHOLOGICAL
TREATMENT
TRIAGE HOSPITAL
ADVANCED
TREATMENT
?
Priority of victims mass decontamination delays their first aid and treatment
ADVANCED EMERGENCY MEDICAL
TRAIN
SEARCH
&
RESCUE
CEASED
EXPOSURE
AIRWAY
SUPPORT
PRE
TRIAGE
EMERG
DECON
ANTIDOTE
RAPID
TRANSPORT
HOSPITAL
ADVANCED
TREATMENT
THOROUGH
DECON
RELEASE
FROM
HOSPITAL
POST-TRAUMA
PSYCHOLOGICAL
TREATMENT
SECONDARY
TRIAGE
„MIXED
INJOURY“
TREATMENT
HOSPITAL
ADVANCED
TREATMENT
???Budget for chemical mass panic
and social disruption project???
 Chemical Facility
Free of Charge
 Safety Matches
50 cents
 Lighter
1€
 Cyber-Internet
20 €/month
www.paranoiaterror.com
Test of 1 ton chlorine release
Released gaseous chlorine plume
is heavier than air and also due to
its dropped temperature
during expansion is „grounded“
and more stable
Test of 1 ton ammonia release
Released gaseous ammonia
react with air moisture
and form visible cloud
with increased
caustic properties
Comments
&
Questions
pcastulik@yahoo.co.uk
pcastulik@nbox.cz
Biography-Pavel Castulik
• Education: University of Defense, Chemical Engineering and NBC
Defense, Dipl. Eng., PhD
• Commander of NBC Battalion
 PhD Thesis on Decontamination
 Head of Research & Development Decontamination Department
 Head of R&D Protection Division against Weapons of Mass Destruction
 UNSCOM-Search chem/bio program in Iraq and destruction of chemical
weapons
 Development of the Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
 Head of Training at the OPCW
 Head of Chemical Weapons Demilitarization at the OPCW
 Chief Inspector at the OPCW
 University lecturer
 Consultant on CBRNE matters
 Member of the Association for Crisis Preparedness of the Health and
 Co-Editor of the association's magazine