2 Basic Principles of Chemical Defense 1. Introduction to the Chemical Weapons Convention The information presented in this chapter gives a short summary of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The CWC serves as an introduction to chemical defense, which encompass a set of protection strategies against chemical weapons attacks. Several aspects of the CWC, such as the prohibition, disarmament, export control of chemicals, as well as policies of non-proliferation and criminalization of offenses in the context of chemical defense strategies have reduced the attractiveness of chemical weapons use in wars waged amongst the Community of Nations, excluding rogue states and terrorist elements. When defensive measures are implemented, casualties in military conflicts due to chemical weapons are minimal. 1.1. The Chemical Weapons Convention is special Treaties that ban certain classes of weapons are of little value if strict adherence to the rules of the treaty is impossible due to ambiguities in the rules or definitions. Additional difficulties arise if the treaty is not combined with sanctions or determined responses to the use or threat of the weapon’s use. The CWC remains the first and only disarmament treaty to introduce a verifiable ban on an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. In 2009, more than 188 statesbecame party (State Parties) to the CWC. Seven states remain outside the CWC and are referred to as non-State Parties. In addition to a strict verification regime, the CWC provides rules for export controls and proliferation prevention. In addition, national laws impose criminal penalties to the development of any such weapons. Compliance with a treaty is enhanced by the administration of specific benefits for State Parties and limitations for non-State Parties. One limitation takes the form of export controls on scheduled chemicals. (A State Party will not export chemicals to a non-State Party if those chemicals could be used to produce chemical weapons). One benefit is that any State Party threatened with chemical weapons is entitled to assistance in the areas of chemical defense, in the form of protective equipment or software from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) or other State Parties. This support includes guidance for setting up a chemical defense program to protect from military or terrorist attacks. The objective of the present document is to provide basic information on the elements of such a protective program. The CWC includes implementation of the above-mentioned measures, and many State Parties provide active support to the OPCW and member states. 1.2. History Several attempts have been made to ban poison from battlefields. In the early 1600s, international law condemned what would today be regarded as chemical or biological warfare. 3 Serious attempts to ban these weapons were made with the Brussels Declaration of 1874, even before the weapons were systematically used in war. The intention to ban poisons and poisonous weapons was articulated at conferences in The Hague in 1899 and 1907. These first attempts did not have much impact in view of their widespread use during World War I (WWI). In 1922, an attempt was made to simultaneously ban submarines and chemical weapons (both considered covert weapons), but the ban never came into force. After WWI, some chemical weapons officers went so far as to promote chemical weapons (CWs) as a more humane battlefield strategy. One out of every three high explosive casualties died, whereas less than one out of ten CW casualties proved lethal, and the number dropped to fewer than one in fifty for mustard gas exposure. In 1925, the Geneva Protocol established a “Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare". Although their intentions were different, many State Parties reserved the right to use CWs in retaliation against an attack that employed such weapons. This reservation made the treaty a non-first-use agreement, and a comprehensive prohibition of CWs still was considered a necessity. The CWC was negotiated in Geneva over the course of 22 years and was opened for signing and ratification in 1993. By April 1997, 60 State Parties had ratified the treaty, which enabled the treaty to be enforced. By the year 2009, 188 Nations had ratified the CWC. Unfortunately, some of the countries of most concern have not yet ratified the CWC treaty, but the situation is improving. Where applicable, State Parties have declared their possession of chemical weapons and initiated the destruction of these weapons, although destruction in Russia, for example, has proceeded thus far at a slow pace. Although the pace of weapons destruction has been slower than the original agreed time frame, within the next decade, most if not all of the larger stockpiles in the world are expected to be destroyed. When this occurs, the mass of CWs that might be encountered is likely to be two to three orders of magnitude smaller than was in the previous century, which represents a significant threat reduction. What remains might be a few hundred tons of CWs in the hands of non-member States. Without appropriate chemical defense measures, these quantities have a high casualty potential. 1.3. Aspects of the CWC The CWC contributes to world safety through the prohibition of State Party CW stockpiles and limiting the access of non-State Parties to chemical weapons. Restricting proliferation of chemical weapons is another aspect of the CWC. Most chemicals that could be used to develop chemical weapons are subject to verification inspections. Trade and export of these scheduled compounds to non-State Parties is prohibited. Verification inspections check the handling of scheduled compounds. Export controls increase the difficulty and costs associated with the development of massive amounts of chemical weapons by non-State Parties. If a State Party is suspected of CWs research and development or may be stockpiling CWs, the CWC may order “challenge inspections” and even an investigation into alleged activities. Although many of the nations on the suspect list, given in open sources, (e.g., SIPRI, Association of American Scientists, etc.) are State Parties of the CWC, none has been challenged thus far. The most likely explanation for the absence of challenge inspections is a lack of confidence in the information on which the suspicion is based. The CWC contains a general purpose criterion that states that every toxic chemical and its precursors is a CW if it is used to harm life processes, whether human, animal, or plant. If an attempt is made to circumvent CWC verification inspections by developing CWs based on 4 non-scheduled compounds, which are not subject to verification inspections, the general purpose criterion would allow for challenge inspections. One method for making nonscheduled compounds subject to verification inspections would be to modify the schedules each time such a compound is identified. However, this method would make public the details of potential uses of this compound, such as how it may be produced. Non-State Parties could gain access to this information and circumvent the CWC. Another approach would be to state that every compound with a toxicity of less than X mg/kg is regarded as a scheduled compound. A similar criterion is used for toxins listed in the rolling text of the Biological and Toxin Weapon Convention (BTWC). State Parties of the CWC that feel threatened by an opponent that might use CWs against them may receive chemical defense support from the other State Parties. This support may take the form of information or hardware, such as detectors, masks, or protective clothing. The CWC, together with its broad band of protective measures, makes chemical warfare very unattractive to any possible opponent. The combination of prohibition, export controls on scheduled chemicals, verified destruction of current stockpiles, and a well-organized chemical defense are mutually reinforcing measures that significantly deter potential users. The measures in the CWC form a web of deterrence in which prohibition and protection are important contributors. 1.4. Changes over time In the 1990s, the US Defense Department began publishing assessments of CW proliferation. These assessments, together with other open source reports, for example, media reports and research, were used by several organizations (see Chapter 3) for threat assessments that were then published online. During the 1990s, the main contributors to both chemical and biological weapons proliferation were countries in the Middle East and North Africa, with several countries showing increased activity. Several countries in South and East Asia were assessed as retaining probably CW and BW programs. According to those assessments, some proliferant States had become largely self-sufficient in their CBW requirements, making the task of tracking and preventing CBW proliferation activities more difficult. Two nations mentioned in those assessments deserve special attention: Iraq and Libya. IRAQ: Since the withdrawal of UNSCOM inspectors, assessments of the Iraqi CW and BW programs have varied widely. Some assessments reported that the whereabouts of many precursors are unknown and BW agents have been hidden in the desert. These reports concluded that Iraq may have retained stockpiles of CW and BW agents, including in weaponized forms. The technology and expertise for the production and use of CWs and BWs had not disappeared from Iraqi, and resurrection of the CW and BW programs was a definite possibility. Despite the damage sustained during the Gulf War and the industrial deterioration associated with eight years of sanctions, Iraq was assessed as being capable of quickly restarting production of CW and BW agents. World leaders used sections of these assessments to justify the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Interviews presented in Axis of Evil, the war on terror by Moorcraft, Winfield and Chisholm form an illustration of the uncertainties in CBW threat assessment and intelligence. Several years after the invasion of Iraq, the search for CWs, programs, or precursors has not revealed any evidence to support these suspicions. Moreover, Iraq has become a State Party to the CWC. 5 LIBYA: Libya was suspected of supporting a CW production plant at Rabta, known as Pharma 150. This plant was renovated for the production of pharmaceuticals, but again the technology and production expertise for CWs had not disappeared during this restructuring program. The lifting of sanctions (Libya admitted involvement in the downing of a passenger airliner over Lockerbie in Scotland) was thought to have encouraged Libya to restart CWs production. In a Pentagon assessment, Libya was assumed to support an offensive BW program, possibly at the R&D stages. However, the biological knowledge base for such a program was assessed as limited. Libya has recently abolished all activities pertaining to the development and maintenance of weapons of mass destruction, has opened its country to international inspections, and has become a State Party to the CWC. 1.5. The contents of the CWC The main text of the CWC comprises a preamble and 26 articles (45 pages). The document contains two Annexes: one annex covers scheduled chemicals that may be used for the production of chemical warfare agents; the other annex describes the implementation and verification policies of the convention. The second annex is referred to as the verification annex. The verification annex comprises 11 sections with 4 additional annexes (100 pages in total). The construction and implementation of such a complex treaty required an in-depth review process in which several points were open to debate. Books longer than 500 pages have attempted to elucidate the legalities and correctly interpret all articles and obligations contained in the annexes. A detailed treatment of the CWC is beyond the scope of this book, although some aspects will be highlighted. The preamble refers to the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the wish of the UN to achieve disarmament, and a statement in the Biological Weapon Convention that articulates the need for a general prohibition of the use, production, and stockpiling of chemical weapons (CW). Article I describes 5 general obligations: 1. Completely prohibits CWs, including: development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transferral, or usage of CWs, also including preparations for the use of, or assistance, encouragement, or induction of others to engage in any activity prohibited by the convention; 2. Each State Party will destroy all CWs in its possession; 3. Each State Party will destroy all abandoned CWs; 4. All CWs production facilities will be destroyed; 5. Riot control agents shall not be used as a method of warfare. Article II provides a series of definitions of chemical weapons, toxic compounds, etc., including the important General Purpose Criterion: Every toxic chemical that is used to harm life processes is a chemical weapon and thus prohibited under the CWC. Article III declares a set of policies regarding the treatment of CWs, old and abandoned CWs, CW production facilities, and related facilities. Articles IV and V describe the obligations of a State Party in possession of CWs or CW production facilities. 6 Article VI describes activities not prohibited by the convention. One such activity is the right to perform research that may improve protections against CWs. Article VII describes national implementation measures, including the establishment of a National Authority. Article VIII establishes the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Conference of State Parties, the Executive Council, and the Technical Secretariat. Article IX treats aspects of consultations, co-operation, and fact finding. This section defines the procedures for challenge inspections. 1.6. Assistance and Protection, Article X Article X addresses assistance and protection policies against chemical weapons, which is the subject of this book. Each State Party has the right to request and receive assistance and protection against the use or the threat of use of CWs if a) CWs have been used against it; b) Riot control agents have been used against it as a method of warfare; c) It is threatened by actions or activities of any State that are prohibited for States Parties by Article I. It should be noted that only under item (c) is a State mentioned. Activities of non-state actors are included in items (a) and (b). Article X is quite specific in articulating the assistance that should be provided and the time frame for that assistance once a State Party has asked for help. Assistance is granted not only in the case of an eminent threat, but also for advance preparations, particularly in setting up a passive chemical defense program. The actual assistance provided may be related to a challenge inspection, pursuant to article IX, or an investigation into an alleged use, pursuant to article X, described in detail in Part X and XI of the Verification Annex. Specifically for this book, Article X paragraph 5 is relevant and is, therefore, presented in full: “The Technical Secretariat shall establish, not later than 180 days after entry into force of this Convention, and maintain, for the use of any requesting State Party, a data bank containing freely available information concerning various means of protection against chemical weapons as well as such information as may be provided by State Parties. The Technical Secretariat shall also, within the resources available to it and at the request of a State Party, provide expert advice and assistance to a State Party in identifying implementation strategies for its programs that develop and improve its protective capacity against chemical weapons.” The remaining articles treat the economic and technological development, relation to other agreements, settlement of disputes, and management aspects of the convention. 7 1.7. The CWC; Does It Make a Difference? 1.7.1. Introduction Examining the history of the CWC over a 25 year period, from 1987–2012, enables us to assess the efficacy of the CWC toward its intended goals. There are good reasons for choosing to examine this period in particular. In 1987, the former Soviet Union publicly displayed its chemical weapon arsenal for the first time in history, clearly demonstrating its intention to decommission this class of weapons. The Soviet show was a response to an opening invitation presented by the US President Ronald Reagan, who had announced a change in the US policy on disarmament: “Trust but Verify”. At this time, the working text of the CWC was near completion. Everyone involved knew what was at stake. The year 2012 is the date at which, according to the original text of the CWC, all chemical weapons, production facilities, etc., in the “possessor States” were to have been destroyed. At the start of the 25-year period, two opposing blocs were prominent: the old NATO and the former Warsaw Pact. Both blocs felt strongly that the other was threatening, amongst other threats, with the use of chemical weapons. Has anything changed? Does the CWC make a difference in global chemical weapon security? Many feel that there is still a serious threat of chemical warfare, for instance, from non-member States. Many fear the use of toxic chemical compounds by terrorists. It is often pointed out that a significant fraction of the former Soviet Union stock, now controlled by Russia, will still be around in 2012. The complete destruction of weapons stocks in other possessor States was scheduled to be destroyed by 2012, but this assessment must be made. The real question is: do we believe that the CWC and OPCW have contributed to a safer world; was it worth the investment? The following paragraphs attempt to answer that question from a technical viewpoint in relation to chemical defense. 1.7.2. Quantifying the hazards of chemical weapons. If a small quantity of CWs is nearly as hazardous as a large quantity, then destruction of 90% or 99% of the present stock would mean little in terms of threat or hazard reduction. To evaluate if the CWC makes a difference, it is valuable to quantify the hazards posed by the present quantities of chemical weapons. After WW I, a discussion took place regarding the effectiveness of some weapon systems and whether or not the weapons were humane. The issue of chemical weapons incited fierce debate, in which those in favor of use stated that they were more humane than high explosives, and those opposed to use emphasized the cruel nature of the weapons. Those opposed to CWs partly won the debate, which resulted in the non-first use declaration of the Geneva Protocol in 1925. The arguments used by those in favor of CWs were based on WWI statistics that were correct but somewhat manipulated. The statistics are discussed in detail in Chapter 3. At the moment, it is sufficient to state that the statistics must be viewed as summarizing the cumulative effects, and large margins of error may apply. Later, computational models of the CW attacks showed that for unprotected personnel in a defensive scenario, the number of effective dosages that would produce a casualty was on the order of 1 to 10 million. Another rule of thumb was that the use of 1 billion effective dosages against a military target would produce 30% casualties, sufficient to neutralize the target. For nerve agents, this dosage would be 8 delivered by about 1 kg of the agent to produce one casualty, or 1 ton of agent to attack a military target of limited size (infantry). The message from WWI was: relatively small amounts of CW may be effective in producing casualties amongst unprotected personnel (on average 1 ton was estimated to produce 10 - 100 casualties). The second important lesson from WWI was that equipping troops with rudimentary forms of protection increased the amount of chemical agent required to produce a casualty. This increase was proportionally to the gear protection factor. In 1916, all British troops were equipped with some form of mask. These masks prevented the recurrence of serious Wehrmacht attacks using CWs until 1917, when the first mustard gas attacks were aimed at troops with respiratory protection. The results were devastating. Within three weeks, the British faced more CW casualties than they had in all of 1916. The conclusion again was CWs worked when protection was circumvented, but they became almost completely ineffective when some form of protection was deployed. The WWI statistics found that if the respiratory protection factor of the troops was 10, the amount of asphyxiating gases required to cause one casualty would have exceeded 1000 kg, disregarding the explosives and containers required to transport the agents. The short-term goal of the CWC was to reduce the quantities of chemical agents present in the world. Each ton of modern agent may still produce 100 to 1000 casualties amongst military personnel in defensive positions. The few hundred tons that are available in rogue states may be able to cause several hundred thousands of victims. If the quantity of CWs was reduced to 10,000 tons in the timeframe 1987 to 2012, a full chemical defense system would still be required. However, the picture becomes very different if protection is deployed. When the skin and respiratory system are continuously protected by a factor of 1000 (present day masks and clothing aim at these or higher numbers), the few hundred tons of CWs in rogue states would only be sufficient to attack a single target with minimal effect. Donning the full protection, in particular protective clothing takes time; it would therefore be wise to wear the protective clothing continuously during operations in a high threat environment. 1.7.3. Incomplete destruction by 2012 It is unlikely that possessor States will have destroyed all CW stocks by 2012, and significant quantities are expected to remain. However, technological developments beyond the agent itself are required to start a chemical war. At the beginning of WWII, the US estimated that within the first two months of a chemical war 25,000 tons of (mainly) mustard agent would be required. This estimate is still considered accurate, and large stocks are assumed to be required to start a chemical war. If the agent is available, the first requirement for weaponization is the establishment of a filling station that would fill shells and bombs. Next, weapon systems must be available to deliver the weapons, and trained personnel are required to carry out the missions. For instance, artillery-firing tables are required to calculate ammunition expenditure for various climatic conditions. The military doctrine for using chemical weapons, troop training, standard operating procedures, and the artillery firing tables have all disappeared from the military scene over the last 20 years. Above all, the political will to carry out a chemical war has been abandoned by the member states. 9 The conclusion is that even if the destruction is not complete by 2012, what remains of the original 100,000 tons does not pose a real hazard. If a hazard is present, it may be posed by the few hundred tons that are possibly available in rogue states. The few hundred tons estimate comes from US open sources published on the Internet. Recently, a larger quantity (3000–5000 tons) was mentioned in a South Korean intelligence estimate. However, records of the intelligence community regarding this estimate are not very accurate. In 1987, the same sources estimated the quantities in the USSR to be 400,000 tons, more than 10 times the present day value. The last estimate of the Iraqi capabilities, 700 tons, appeared to be false, as was the estimate for Libya’s CW capabilities. For the time being, it is reasonable to assume that a few hundred tons per rogue state is the best available estimate. 1.7.4. The consequences of a few hundred tons To neutralize the few hundred tons of CWs that are outside of the control of the OPCW, chemical defense is mandatory. Without this defensive posture, the effects of an agent might be devastating. The available quantity of agent in a conflict will be reduced by pre-emptive strikes. In addition, superior air power will not permit a full attack to develop. The total amount of agent in a conflict will have been reduced by at least a factor of one hundred if not one thousand relative to what it was 25 years ago. This means that a chemical attack will become a rare incident and will incur few consequences, provided the troops are protected and trained. The paradox is that if the troops lack chemical defense techniques and equipment, the consequences of a CW attack might be very serious. Chemical defense is usually formulated in several steps: The first step is to identify the agents of interest and assess the likely quantity that soldiers may encounter in the battlefield? Combined with this is the effective dosage of an agent or how much protection is required to prevent casualties in an attack. Actually, this is the ratio between the challenge dosage and the "just" no-effect dosage. The next steps are the technical chemical defense issues of Detection / Physical Protection / Medical Countermeasures / Decontamination / Training. With a fair chemical defense system, comprising mainly detection, protection, and training, the effects of a few hundred tons will be largely neutralized to the degree that they are militarily non-significant. However there will be encumbrances due to the physical protection and possibly psychological effects due to the use of CW. Present day detectors are capable of detecting most classical agents of interest (scheduled compounds). Problem areas sometimes mentioned are toxic industrial chemicals (TICS) and non-scheduled highly toxic compounds (Novichoks?) or synthesized toxins. Detection of TICS is not a problem because one can smell their presence. Detectors are discussed in Chapter 5 Non-scheduled nerve agents act as cholinesterase enzyme inhibitors, and enzymatic detectors successfully detect them. Methods are under development to rapidly detect pathogenic aerosols and toxin aerosols. Two parameters, the efficiency (reduction in the challenge dosage) and the capacity (total dosage that can be stopped by the protective system) characterize the physical protection 10 provided to the troops. The total amount of agent, concentrations, and dosages in a future individual attack are lower than they were in the previous century. Potential opponents will not have the capabilities to carry out major attacks. The casualty acceptance is also reduced. As a consequence, the efficiency, defined as the ratio between the challenge dosage and the permissible exposure dosage, remains constant. Physical protections are discussed in detail in Chapter 6. In this picture the most common form of possible CW attack is used, a low intensity but possibly a high frequency. Some opponents might try to generate a high intensity, cold war type of attack but that automatically reduces the frequency to extremely low values due to the limited amount of agent and the limited number of weapon systems that can reach a high value (rear area) target. If such a high intensity attack would be carried out against an infantry target it might be wise to withdraw, clean up and continue operations The capacity required to protect against the lower quantities is considerably reduced. Multiple attacks to a single unit are no longer of interest. Secondly, the “fight dirty” concept has been abandoned, and troops will withdraw to a contamination-free area shortly after contamination. The required protection times and, therefore, the capacity are reduced. Consequently, the number of spare canisters (filters) can be reduced, the number of protective suits, gloves, and boots can be reduced, protective clothing can be made lighter, and the decontamination of suits after exposure to chemical agents becomes superfluous. TICS should not pose a real threat. The locations of large TICS storage sites in areas of operation are known. Operations in the vicinity of storage sites should be prevented. The canisters used currently to store the compounds release small amounts of TICS, as reflected in the detectable chemical levels encountered some distance from a storage site. Special canisters are required if operations will approach the storage sites at closer range. Because chemical warfare will be reduced to rare incidents with very limited numbers of casualties, it is unrealistic to pay enormous attention to medical countermeasures for chemical casualties within the military. In contrast, medical countermeasures are one of the few aspects of chemical defense that ameliorate civilian casualties. Large sums have been spent over the past 90 years in a search for treatment of, as an example, mustard gas poisoning. Success has been elusive, and breakthroughs are not expected in the near future. Medical countermeasures are discussed in detail in Chapter 7. The extensive research toward treatment therapy and prophylaxis for CW agents would better be spent in the area of countermeasures for biological and toxin weapons. Decontamination of CW agents will seldom, if at all, be used in future conflicts. Nuclear and biological decontamination may be of interest, but nothing more complex than water rinses will be sufficient to reduce exposure at sites to acceptable levels during operations. Chemically contaminated equipment will be abandoned, and clean-up might become of interest only after the conflict ends. No military wants to transport equipment that has been contaminated, because a toxic-free guarantee is impossible outside of a laboratory. Decontamination is described in detail in Chapter 8. In view of the updated CW status, it is mandatory to establish new doctrines and new forms of training with respect to chemical defense. Without training, chemical defense systems will not work adequately, and the few hundred tons of CW may become very hazardous again. 11 1.7.5. Does the CWC make a difference; or, where is the CWC dividend? Technically, the main success of the CWC is the significant reduction in quantities of CW agents intended for use in conflicts. Chemical warfare will be restricted to rare incidents. This has consequences for the defensive posture of armed forces. A lower emphasis on medical countermeasures and decontamination may be applied. Detection remains crucial, but less emphasis is required on the capacity of physical protection. These conditions reduce investments in canisters and in the number of suits required per person. Protective clothing can be made lighter, which will reduce the physiological burden of a mask and clothing. Physical protection, decontamination, and medical countermeasures are the main areas in which a return on investment in the CWC can be found. Training of the adjusted chemical defense posture is essential. An important aspect of the training is anticipating and preparing for the psychological effects of a chemical or biological attack. If this is not adequately covered, a minor attack could quickly paralyze large groups. Although there are undoubtedly more efficient means of killing large numbers of people, none are as terrifying to unprepared troops and civilian populations, and, therefore, no other attack carries as great a psychological impact as chemical or biological agent exposure. When the military is properly trained, few casualties will be incurred and the terrifying effects are reduced. In this case, the CWC and chemical defense will work together toward a common future goal, to make chemical warfare an issue of the past. The motto of this book is, therefore: “Trust, Verify, but Protect”. During inspections, complex pieces of equipment are often encountered, from ammunition to rockets or missiles. Detection of leakages and decontamination can become complex. However, inspectors are well-trained and well-protected. 12 2. Protection against chemical and biological agent attacks 2.1. Chemical and biological agents In principle, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) (1) is concerned with chemical agents, usually manmade compounds, although some toxins are included. In the future, the distinction from the Biological and Toxin Weapon Convention (BTWC) (2), concerned with agents of biological origin, might become even more blurred due to the increasing possibilities of synthesizing toxins and even viruses (In 2001, the polio virus was synthesized from mail order house chemicals.) Chemical (C) or biological (B) incidents have very little specific signature. Unless an attack was announced as C or B or advanced detection equipment was available, it is most likely that the incident of release of a biological agent would go unnoticed. Chemical incidents, which are usually associated with a distinct odor and rapid casualty development, will be the incidents to which emergency services will respond. Biological incidents would require a medical response. When more is known about the type of agent released, more specific countermeasures can be taken. From the defense and protection point of view, many countermeasures may be applied toward both chemical and biological agents; individual protection, collective protection, and decontamination apply to both C and B agents. The areas of detection, identification, and medical countermeasures include distinct differences in a response to C or B agents. Because this book was initiated by Article X of the CWC, it should cover only C agents. However, as argued above, because the distinctions between the response to C agents and the response to B agents are often blurred and sometimes nonexistent, both types of agent will be covered here, with an emphasis on chemical agents. 2.2 Methods for defending against CB attacks During and after WW 2, CB attacks were discussed mainly in the framework of military operations. Few countries (Israel, Sweden, and Switzerland) provided protection for the civilian population against these attacks. Although attacks against a civilian population are now considered (see 2.4), most of the protection concepts originate from consideration for classic military scenarios. The military defense strategy with respect to chemical and biological weapons typically relies on four pillars: Passive defense measures, all forms of protection; Active defense, including determined responses; Verifiable arms control regimes; Non-proliferation by control of relevant materials, for example, hazardous materials or their precursors, (bio) reactors, etc. Although each individual pillar will reduce the threat of chemical and biological weapons, none of the pillars is absolute. Therefore, a combination of pillars forms the best available web of deterrence. 13 In this respect, the opinion of the relative value of the pillars by an Alliance, such as NATO, is relevant. “The Alliance's defense posture against CB weapons and their delivery means must continue to be improved. This will include work on missile defense with the aim of deterring and defending against the use of CB weapons. The alliance’s strategy does not include a CB capability. The Allies support universal adherence to the relevant disarmament regimes. But, even if further progress with respect to banning chemical and biological weapons can be achieved, defensive precautions will remain essential.” (Statement from the Washington Summit; 50 years of NATO, 1998). Arms control regimes and non-proliferation pillars are less effective in the case of terrorist involvement in CB attacks. Active defense through which the capabilities of terrorist groups are reduced to the degree that they no longer form a hazard is extremely difficult if not impossible. Often it is not known who the opponent is until an incident has taken place, and the identity of the terrorist may not be known for some time (US 2001 Anthrax letters). In any case, arms control through CWC and BTWC should go hand in hand with passive defense to reduce the probability of a CB incident and to reduce the casualty numbers as much as possible in the event of an attack. 2.3. Chapters To cope with any type of CB incident, the military has traditionally relied upon the countermeasures of: Detection, including warning of a potential hazard, detection of the type of hazard, monitoring the course of the hazard over time, and identifying the exact nature of the hazard to support medical countermeasures. Physical protection, including respiratory protection, masks, skin protection in the form of protective suits, gloves and boots, and collective protection inside an enclosed space where ingress of agent is reduced. Contamination control and decontamination; Contamination control prevents the spread of contamination and decontamination involves cleanup. If these protective measures have failed to fully protect the potential victims, medical countermeasures are needed to reduce fatalities. In general, two medical countermeasures are used. One is prophylaxis, which is a part of protection because it is administered prior to exposure to enhance the resistance of an individual. The best known examples of prophylaxis are vaccinations against common diseases. The other medical countermeasure is therapy that attempts to cure a victim. In contrast with the physical protection, which is non-specific, medical countermeasures are usually highly specific. Warning the civilian population of a CB incident is very difficult. Physical protection of the civilian population in most countries relies on duct taped sealed rooms. Although chemical agents act quickly, decontamination of victims can reduce casualty numbers and help protect the first responders. Consequently, protective measures applied to the civilian population emphasize therapeutic measures. (Prophylaxes for several types of potential CB agents are not available. Prophylaxis administered after contamination is regarded as a therapeutic measure.) 14 To develop countermeasures, it is of vital importance to identify the types of agents that might be encountered and the quantities or dosages. This is generally called threat analysis or hazard analysis. Equally important is to know the concentration levels or dosages below which agents are no longer hazardous. Together, these two aspects guide the degree to which outside exposure must be reduced to safe levels, e.g., by physical protection or prophylaxis. The non-hazard threshold guides detector development and sets the required levels of decontamination. For this reason, this book is organized in the following way: Chapter 3: Threat; Chapter 4: Human Toxicity Estimates; Chapter 5: Detection; Chapter 6: Physical Protection; Chapter 7: Medical Countermeasures; Chapter 8: Decontamination; Annex A presents some background information about chemical warfare agents. As with all emergency response measures, it is essential to train procedures thoroughly in realistic field exercises. This book is not designed as a training manual; instead, this book provides only the background information required for dealing with CB incidents. 2.4 Response to Terrorist Incidents The response to a non-military chemical or biological incident comprises essentially the same steps as the response to a military incident, but the task is more complex and requires the cooperation of many services, each with their own expertise and operating procedures. The services involved comprise emergency response teams, police, and medical services, including ambulances and medical personnel. Civil defense organizations are sometimes available or special military units come into play to mitigate the effects of an event. Incidents may occur at facilities, such as a metro station or a chemical plant, that require local expertise. In responding to a problem it is, therefore, important that all personnel involved are trained to work together and the strategy employed to address an incident should be common knowledge across all services involved, particularly among those implementing the command structure. Generally, first responders follow standard risk management procedures in a series of steps. It is important to note that although the generic steps are the same; the approaches to chemical versus biological incidents differ widely, and approaches to toxin incidents fall between these classes of incident. One difference is the time over which an incident develops. A comprehensive description of risk management has been provided by the group of experts that produced the report on chemical and biological weapons for the World Health Organization. A short summary is provided here to outline the process. After an incident involving toxic chemicals, casualties appear within minutes and the effects may develop on the time scale of hours, up to 24 hours. To have a widespread effect, kilogram quantities of the more toxic chemical agents must be released. Among toxic industrial chemical agents, release must be on the order of tons, and both releases most likely will be noticed. If the release itself is not noticed, the location of the casualties will rapidly indicate the location of the hot zone. The most hazardous (high) concentrations introduced in a chemical incident typically last no more than a few minutes. If the hazard is spread over 15 longer times, the concentration involved is reduced by diffusion or decomposition. The most important response action that will save lives is to evacuate the site of release and to move persons to non-hazardous areas. Responders need some degree of protection, but it is extremely unlikely that they ever will see high concentrations of hazardous compounds during terrorist incidents. Two examples of chemical incidents demonstrate the timeline of an adequate response. Consider, for example, a truck loaded with a volatile hazardous compound that is exploded in the vicinity of a staging area. The agent will evaporate quickly, a cloud of appreciable concentration will form within 15 minutes, and the cloud will drift over the target area. With a low wind speed of 1 m/s the front of the cloud moves at a rate of 3.6 km/h. For most hazardous toxic industrial chemicals, the concentration (dosage) will decrease to non-lethal levels after the cloud travels 1–2 km, on the order of half an hour. (For higher wind speeds, the velocity of the cloud increases and the concentration is inversely proportional to the wind speed. At 5 m/s wind speed, the hazard zone is 0.2–0.4 km, and this distance is covered within ten minutes.) The conclusion is that the timeframe for protective actions employed by responders is very short. As a second example, consider the well-known Tokyo metro incident of 1995. Terrorists released a total of one kg Sarin inside several metro cars and stations in the Tokyo subway system. The incident developed within a few minutes. People panicked and left the subway stations as quickly as possible. One courageous metro employee seized one of the packages containing the agent and brought it into the open. In doing so he was exposed to such a degree that he died. Because the incident occurred in a relatively enclosed environment, the hazardous concentrations were present for a longer time, but after 15–30 minutes the concentrations had been diluted such that only simple respiratory protection was needed. Tokyo March 1995; the second large-scale terrorist attack using a homemade nerve agent. Some months earlier, the same group had launched an attack in Matsumoto. 13 people died in the attack. One thousand victims suffered from effects of nerve agent poisoning. Over 4000 other subway travelers sought medical attention. During the commemoration of 2005, it appeared that a large fraction of the victims still showed some effects, including psychological effects. After 14 years, one more victim died. Exposure to Sarin was partly responsible for at least one premature death. A large number of healthcare workers who responded to the incident became exposed due to off-gassing of the agent from the hair and clothing of the primary victims or casualties. Protection of healthcare workers against secondary hazards would have been appropriate. Incidents involving pathogenic biological agent microorganisms develop on a much longer time scale. If the release is not observed (witnessing a release will be an exception because of 16 the small quantities of agents involved) or has not been announced (terrorists may announce an attack or intent to conduct an attack to cause panic, even though such a warning might reduce the spread of disease) effects may not become apparent for usually more than one but up to several days. Response actions at this point are now mostly medical. It must be determined if the disease is contagious and whether affected persons should be quarantined. Hazardous concentrations of airborne biological agents in the area of release will dissipate rapidly, leaving only some surface contamination. We shall consider two examples of biological incidents. The first example consists of the only known terrorist attack involving a biological agent, in which a sect in the US sought to influence local elections by contaminating the salad bar in a restaurant with Salmonella. During the night and the following day, several people came down with serious diarrhea. If present in sufficiently high dosages, salmonella will take effect quickly. As an example, at a street party in a suburb of Dusseldorf, Germany, a potato salad with homemade mayonnaise was served. Within two hours of ingestion, people began to leave not feeling very well. Within 5 hours, everyone who had eaten a serving of potato salad was sick and 1 hour later ambulances brought the most serious cases to the hospitals. No one died in this case, but it is not uncommon that Salmonella infections are fatal to the elderly. The second example concerns infections with the Legionella bacteria. The disease was discovered in the US during a 1976 reunion of veterans. Tens of veterans died from mysterious causes before the bacterium causing the disease was found in the hot water tanks of the hotel in which the veterans had stayed. In 1999, during a flower exhibition in the Netherlands, fountains of water containing Legionella contaminated the air and tens of visitors fell ill in the days and weeks following the visit to the exhibition. It took several weeks before the cause of the small epidemic became clear and the “hot zone” was discovered. It is not clear how many people were exposed and how many fell ill. At least 32 victims died. Estimates led to the conclusion that the infection was lethal in 20 to 30% of cases. Toxic effects in patients take between a few hours and a few days to develop symptoms. Only a few grams of the more highly toxic toxins are required to pose an effective threat, so a release event would probably not be noticed. The situation is similar to the release of microorganisms, and the response will be medically directed. An important difference is that the toxins never produce a contagious disease. Again, toxins are most damaging when exposure occurs through the lung tissue. To affect a large number of people, particles should be so small that they float in the air. Larger particles will settle in the vicinity of the release point and even if they became airborne they would not reach the lungs because they would be trapped in the upper respiratory tract. The conclusion is that the development of casualties over time is the most important indicator of the type of incident: chemical or biological/toxin. This indicator guides risk management in the follow on steps: i. Identify the hazard; ii. Evaluate the situation and determine the initial risk; iii. Apply risk reduction; iv. Determine residual risk. Is it acceptable or should it be further reduced? v. Monitor the program. Is everything working as expected? 17 Chemical Biological (v) Monitor program Monitor effectiveness of prevention and control and adjust if required. Rehabilitation of hot zone if contamination present. Monitor hazard level on the site of release. Assess potential long-term effects on casualties. Rehabilitation of the hot zone. . It is obvious from the above considerations that protection of the civilian population and responders to CB incidents will be different from protection of the military. Protection from biological incidents must be sought mainly through medical countermeasures. It is of little use to protect the first responders to the highest possible degree because they will not be exposed to a hot zone situation. Chemical incidents develop much faster in time, and protection of the civilian population must be improvised, e.g., by evacuating the hot zone or finding shelter inside houses with windows and doors closed. Again, it is highly unlikely that first responders will encounter high concentrations in the early stages of an incident. They will need protection from secondary contamination, e.g., low vapor concentrations from residual liquid or small not evaporated droplets that have settled on a surface. (i) Identify the hazard Detect hazard zone using rapid detectors Sampling and Identification by specialists. Identify the agent. Define a sick person: a difficult decision must be made regarding who will benefit from treatment. Determine the distribution of casualties. Determine the hazard zone. Where did the agent originate, what was the nature of the attack? (ii)Evaluate the situation and determine the initial risk Assess the type of release that has occurred. Assess the quantities involved? Evaluate the impact on response? Carry out downwind hazard area prediction. (Use military procedures not models based on Gaussian plume). Assess potential casualty numbers. Is the infection contagious? Spreading of disease. Assess casualty management required capacity. (iii) Apply risk reduction Implement risk communication based on information and instructions on how to handle Protect responders to the extent required. Prevent spread of contamination. Decontaminate casualties to prevent exposure of medics or ambulance personnel. Triage casualties. Provide medical care and evacuation of casualties Risk communication and instructions to the affected population. Protect responders and healthcare workers. Introduce prevention procedures. Conduct triage. Provide medical care to casualties. (iv) Determine residual risks Assess if resources are adequate. OPCW assistance required? Assess if resources are adequate. International assistance required? 18 2.5. NBC/HAZMAT/CBRN incidents The three abbreviations in the title describe different types of incident. The most common understanding is that NBC stands for nuclear, biological, or chemical incidents in war directed mainly against military, such as exposure to vapor, liquid drops, aerosols, or detonated nuclear devices. In almost all cases, it will be obvious that an attack has occurred through detection, a system for reporting, and the ability to predict the downwind hazard. The military can don the required protective equipment and mitigate the effects through decontamination and medical countermeasures. HAZMAT indicates an incident with hazardous chemicals at an industrial site or during transport. It mostly involves quantities of more than 100 kg to several tons. It will be obvious if and when an incident is developing. Only those who approach the source might risk liquid splashes. The agents involved are rapidly identified. First responders have protective equipment that can provide protection against most if not all agent. The population in the downwind hazard area can be ordered to take shelter inside houses or other suitable structures. In extreme cases, populations can be evacuated. CBRN incidents indicate the terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons against the civilian population. The indicator that an incident has taken place will, in most cases, be the occurrence of casualties: for chemical attacks, within minutes to hours after release; for biological attacks, after several hours to days; for radiological attacks, after weeks to months; and for nuclear attacks, within seconds. If the release of the agent is noted or casualties occur quickly after the release, first responders will be alerted and can appear on the scene. Equivalent to the response of fire brigades to local fires, the response time can be as long as 15 minutes. In those 15 minutes, the CBRN agents may become largely dispersed in the environment. Pockets of liquid chemical agent or radioactivity may remain at hot spots near the release. If they are not evaporated or dispersed they produce only low concentrations of hazardous compounds in the atmosphere. Detecting hot spots and identifying the agent involved is a laborious process that requires hours or even days. Several rescue services have taken the position that protection of responding personnel, as in the case of HAZMAT incidents, is mandatory. This requirement makes the response process even more timeconsuming in situations in which the fastest response possible is required to reduce casualties. However, because contamination as a result of liquid splashes is extremely unlikely, and vapor and aerosol concentrations will have reduced considerably by the time of arrival at the incident site, less elaborate protection should be more than sufficient. Time should, therefore, be used to save casualties instead of donning complex protection. The UK Police correctly stated at the VIIth CBRN Symposium at Shrivenham in October 2004: “CBRN is not NBC, CBRN is not HAZMAT”. CBRN might have some similarities with NBC and HAZMAT but it should be treated as a separate type of incident requiring its own type of dedicated countermeasures. This book discusses two of the situations: NBC for military incidents during war and CBRN for civilian incidents. 19 3. The Threat from Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents 3.1. General 3.1.1. Introduction Over the past two decades, the geopolitical situation in the world has changed considerably. The two major power blocs of the past, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, are no longer opponents and, thanks to an effective Chemical Weapon Convention, the large stores of chemical weapons are undergoing destruction. It is expected that in the next decade these 60,000+ tons CWAs will be destroyed. Similarly, programs that develop biological weapons have been abandoned. The reduction of threats through the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) (1) is significant. Negotiations with the goal of strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapon Convention (BTWC) (2) are ongoing. The CWC imposes a strict verification regime and trade limitations with non-State Parties and has been in effect since 1997. Threat reductions through the CWC and BTWC (when it becomes effective) should only improve in the next decade. Chemical and Biological (CB) terrorism has become a reality in the past decade. The most infamous example is the Sarin attack in the Tokyo metro in March 1995. Another example is the anthrax letters in the US in 2001 3.1.2. Sources of information Countries that have their own intelligence systems will usually make assessments regarding the CB capabilities of potential opponents. These reports are mostly classified and are not directly available. Excerpts from the US reports are made available on a yearly basis in a CB threat review from the US Defense Department. This report discusses the types of agent involved and the countries and terrorist organizations of concern to the US. Recent events with regards to Iraq and also the historical record of CB intelligence dating back to WW I have shown that the reliability of CB threat assessments is poor. Situations of both over- and underestimation of an opponent’s capabilities have occurred frequently. However, several open sources provide information (3–8). The reliability of this information is uncertain, although it is expected that a group of WHO consultants (9) will be able to provide an unbiased review of threats. Similar information is generated by the Swedish Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (10). Both internet information and the WHO and SIPRI reports contain references to original documents from which information can be derived. The information provided in the various sources is not always consistent. In addition, extensive research performed over the years has shown that some of the specific threats reported are less likely to occur. A scientific and critical review of the information quoted by the various sources is impossible, although from time to time these sources may indicate less likely threat agents. 3.1.2.1. Incorrect assessments A few examples from earlier publications (3) illustrate that in the past 100 years, 20 (1) The military assessment of the use of chemical and biological weapons, (2) The intelligence regarding an opponent’s capabilities, (3) The scientific aspects of chemical and biological weapons, and (4) The reporting in the media often have led to a completely incorrect assessment of a threat of biological and chemical weapons. In fact, misunderstandings and misinterpretations have occurred so frequently in history that extreme caution should be taken when presenting new intelligence data or using the data for justifying an action to counter the supposed threat. Both the scientific community and military analysts have often wrongly assessed the capabilities of C and B weapons, but the intelligence community and media have most often provided unreliable information. This is at least partly due to the mythic perceptions of chemical and biological warfare. Often, the casualty potential from an agent is estimated from the ratio of the total amount of agent to the lethal dosage per individual, disregarding all loss due to dissemination and dispersion. WWI statistics as well as modern computer simulations show that in a military scenario, an average of one million times an effective dosage must be released to produce a single casualty. 3.1.2.2. The start of chemical warfare Despite the possibilities discussed during the Brussels convention and the conferences in The Hague around 1900 on the control of chemical weapons, despite the use of many types of chemical weapon during the early stages of WW I, despite the information provided by several prisoners of war and defectors, the massive chlorine attack of April 1915 came as a complete surprise. The effect of chemical weapons was new to the German military, and they did not exploit the sudden advantage that was achieved. At the end of WWI, experts agreed that CWs were effective against an unprotected opponent, but were ineffective against protected troops. In fact, it is useless to attack protected troops with chemicals. 3.1.2.3. The mustard gas case In the search for new weapons that could break the protection provided by masks, both sides in WWI screened many compounds. In 1916, the UK rediscovered a compound, mustard gas, synthesized for the first time nearly 100 years earlier. It caused serious blisters but the British military rejected the compound as ineffective because it did not kill. Angry young scientists wanted to prove the effectiveness of the compound and placed a drop on the chair of the Director of Porton Down. He had to eat his meals from the mantelpiece standing for a month. One year later, British troops were attacked with mustard agent and in three weeks faced more casualties due to chemicals than in the twelve preceding months. The German scientific community, not aware of the fact that the UK had produced these compounds, told the military that they did not have to fear retaliation on the grounds of the difficulty for the British to identify the exact structure of mustard gas. The UK had established the correct formula within a week. In those years, mustard gas was called the king of the war gases. Even today, it is one of the most effective CWA. 21 3.1.2.4. The dusty mustard agent case The 1938 Italian forces in Libya introduced mustard agent that had been adsorbed onto a fine clay powder. The purpose was to increase the persistence of the agent in the hot desert and to facilitate dispersion by spraying. The clay concept was shared with the Nazi German allies of Italy during WWII, and investigations were carried out regarding the effectiveness of the dusty agent in the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin. A handwritten report from 1944 (historical archives of the Wehrmacht in Freiburg, Germany) mentioned that those who carried out the experiments had protected their hands and arms with an impermeable material, but still they developed blisters in the wrist area. This finding induced the claim that dusty mustard was much more effective than ordinary mustard agent, ignoring the fact that the deposition of dusty mustard in the opening between the hand and arm protection on very wet skin may have contributed to the severity of the effects. Thus far, no studies have been published demonstrating that dusty mustard is more aggressive for humans than ordinary mustard agent or would cause more severe effects at a lower dosage. Dusty mustard agent was never introduced into the German army. Nevertheless, the dusty agent problem pops up from time to time, most recently in the attacks on the Kurds in the late 1980s. 3.1.2.5. The HCN Cases The use of HCN stretches over many years, even as far back as the Napoleonic Wars. In a later case, a German pharmacist suggested dipping the bayonets of the Prussian soldiers in cyanide to be more effective against Napoleon's troops. During the screening of potential CWAs during WWI, one of the first agents to be examined was HCN. Initially, there appeared to be significant difficulties in weaponizing the agent. (During testing, the HCN exploded or burst into flames.) Eventually, the French army succeeded in developing a usable form. To produce a sufficiently high concentration, they used a rapid firing 75 mm gun. Porton Down advised strongly against the use of HCN because in their opinion it was extremely difficult to create a sufficiently high concentration of HCN in the field. In a very illustrative and bold experiment, a researcher (a professor) and a dog were sealed in a gas chamber. When the gas chamber was filled with HCN, the professor continued to quietly read a book and the dog died in a matter of minutes. The professor knew that dogs were much more sensitive (at least ten times) toward HCN poisoning than humans. The French form of HCN was not very effective, and, as the record shows, once the German troops smelled the HCN they did not bother to don masks because they liked the smell (the smell is almond-like). Despite this experience, HCN resurfaced in WWII. The German counter intelligence discovered that the Soviet Union (SU) used aircraft to spray HCN. Due to the boiling point and density of HCN gas relative to air, this seemed physically impossible. Germany carried out an experiment in Munsterlager, which failed. After capture of an SU spray aircraft, the experiment was repeated, this time with great success. The trick was that very large drops were sprayed. A fraction of the HCN evaporated during the free fall and cooled the agent to such a degree that it froze or water/ice from the atmosphere condensed onto the drops. The agent was described as HCN snow. Additional experiments were carried out using dogs, and the effectiveness of the agent was determined by the number of dogs that were killed. In some experiments, actual concentrations and dosages were measured. Seldom was a concentration or a dosage found that would kill a human. Nevertheless, HCN remained on the threat list, and it appeared in a 1969 study book from the former German Democratic Republic, East Germany: NATO was accused of possessing HCN snow weapons. 22 3.1.2.6. The nerve agent case The first Nerve agent was synthesized by Schraeder and co-workers in 1936. Industrial production of Tabun and Sarin began sometime between 1941 and 1942. Several thousand tons were weaponized but fortunately never used. The British counter intelligence received some reports about the German developments. After careful analysis, including scientific screening, the conclusion in 1944 was that such highly toxic agents did not exist and that the reports must be viewed as Nazi propaganda. One year later, British troops were involved in the demolition of the storage bunkers in Munsterlager, and they dumped CWAs into the Baltic Sea. The next group of even more toxic nerve agents, the V-agents, was developed in the UK some ten years later. 3.1.2.7. The cobweb case In 1939, guards on the Southern coast of the UK reported a phenomenon with potential implications for biological warfare. Cobwebs were floating through the air. The UK scientists quickly ascribed this to natural phenomena: each fall, spiders migrated by floating in the air. This phenomenon sometimes was observed in unusual intensity. In the 1890s, the sky around Chicago was blackened from cobwebs. In another example, during his trip to the Galapagos Islands, Darwin discovered migrating spider webs on board a ship 100 km outside the Rio Plata. Cobwebs appeared once more as potential agents during the Serbia–Croatia conflict in the 1990s, and some cobwebs were collected. After analysis, a manmade compound (poly ethylene glycol) was found, however neither the sample-taking nor the analysis complied with the strict rules of the OPCW. Cobwebs as biological warfare agents must be rejected as fairy tales. 3.1.2.8. The yellow rain case In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the use of yellow rain as a biological warfare agent was discussed. A much disputed analysis of a sample from Southeast Asia indicated the presence of trichotecene mycotoxins. The Secretary of State of the US, Alexander Haig, accused several countries of being involved in biological warfare. The book Yellow Rain, by Seagrave, described several incidents but independent investigative teams did not agree on the facts and explanations. The debate continued for some time until an alternative explanation for the yellow rain was presented, namely, bee droppings. Bees’ droppings contain large amounts of yellow pollen. If these droppings are released during a rainstorm the surface tension causes the pollen to concentrate on the outer shell of a raindrop, turning the drop yellow. The likelihood of this explanation was increased when the Russian expert on mycotoxins, Joffe, who was living in Israel, declared that the effects cited by the victims could not be due to mycotoxins. Some years prior, Joffe had obtained from the Soviet Union (via mail) the most virulent strains of the fungi for experimental production of the toxin. He worked with those compounds in a minimally equipped laboratory close to the Israeli parliament without any special protective measures and never observed skin effects. The “Yellow Rain” case was further discredited in a study by Tucker in 2001 (J.B. Tucker, “Yellow Rain” controversy: lessons from arms control compliance. The Nonproliferation Review, 29 January 2001, 8:25–42). However, in 2004 another yellow rain incident was reported, this time in India 60 km north of New Delhi. At the time, considerable tensions between India and Pakistan led to the 23 circulation of rumors of biological warfare. In a matter of weeks, scientists in India declared that the phenomenon was due to yellow pollen from bee droppings. However, some investigators still believe that the Kurds were attacked with mixtures of mycotoxins and mustard agent. The evidence presented was not very convincing. 3.1.2.9. The Angola case In the late 1980s, accusations were made that the Angola government, supported by Cuban and Russian troops, used an agent against the rebel forces (UNITA), which were supported by South Africa. Medical personnel from South Africa indeed found a number of victims all with paralyzed extremities. Despite thorough investigations, no reasonable explanation was found. A year after the reported incidents, a toxicologist from Belgium conducted further research on some of the victims. During a televised session, the toxicologist showed that one year after exposure, the Chemical Agent Monitor gave a positive response to nerve agents, which seemed physically impossible. No one could duplicate this finding, but many believe the findings to be correct. As of today, no absolute proof has been presented of exposure to any agents. A more likely explanation is that the rebel forces prepared their food in gun oil or oils from tanks, armored vehicles, or downed aircraft. These oils contain tri-ortho-cresyl phosphate, a compound known to cause paralysis of the extremities. Similar incidents occurred accidentally with the Swiss army in 1939 and in Spain and Morocco when criminal merchants mixed olive oil with machine oil. References to the cases described above are given in the original publication. 3.1.3. Definitions It is difficult to make a clear distinction between chemical and biological weapons. One class of biological weapons are microorganisms and other self-replicating entities, including viruses, infectious nucleic acids, and prions, the intended target effects of which are due to infectivity (9). The pathogenicity of some biological agents arises from the toxic substances that they themselves generate. These toxins are sometimes isolated and sometimes synthesized. As the name indicates, these toxins work through their toxicity, not infectivity, and therefore fall under the definition of chemical weapons. Originally, all toxins were of biological origin and were regarded as biological weapons (9). Chemical agents work through their toxicity. The CWC defines a chemical action against life processes, as causing death, permanent harm, or temporary incapacitation. Chemicals used as propellants, explosives, incendiaries, or obscurants may also have toxic effects. Only in cases in which those toxic effects are exploited as a weapon system are they regarded as chemical weapons. Military use of any toxic chemical used for peaceful purposes must be regarded as a chemical weapon (1, 9). The verification schedules in the CWC contain, for special reasons, two toxins: saxitoxin and ricin. 3.1.4. History The use of chemicals, in forms of evil-smelling smoke or poisonous substances, to disable an enemy dates back to antiquity. It was not until the growth of the chemical industry during the second half of the nineteenth century, however, that the technology was developed to produce chemical warfare agents on a large scale and the liquefaction of gases became feasible. Toxic compounds and pathogenic microorganisms are natural health hazards. They form a threat that is insidious, damaging, or deadly (9). Throughout history, codes of military 24 conduct have forbidden the use of poisons and the deliberate spread of disease as a method of warfare. The last century saw, on the one hand, the massive use of chemical weapons, but also efforts to abandon them in the form of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (11), the BTWC of 1972 (2), and the CWC in 1993 (1). During the First World War, chemical warfare began in its early stages. Only one month into the war, experiments with incapacitating agents commenced. Although not well documented, the first attacks with chlorine gas took place at the eastern front in January 1915. There are, however, few records of these attacks and the damage that they inflicted. Generally, the massive attack with chlorine gas near Ypres, Belgium, on 22 April 1915, was claimed as the beginning of modern chemical warfare. The German army, under the guidance of the well-known chemist, Haber, released 150 tons of chlorine gas from 6000 cylinders along a front line of 6 km. The results upon the unsuspecting and unprepared Allied troops were devastating. According to French reports: five to six thousand fatalities were recorded and an additional fifteen thousand men were poisoned to a lesser degree. In this total surprise attack, with no protection whatsoever or standard operating procedures to mitigate the effects (climb a tree, or breath through cloth watered by urine), nearly 100 kg was required to produce ten casualties. Famous picture of a gas attack during World War 1, somewhere along the western front. The employment of chemical warfare agents rapidly became a "normal" part of front-line life for both sides. In the years to come several additional chemicals that acted through the respiratory system and were more deadly than chlorine, were used. The most hazardous of these was phosgene. HCN is often mentioned as a very deadly poison, but it appeared not to have been very effective because high concentrations in short periods of time were required to generate the apparent effects. When soldiers were exposed to low concentrations of HCN over a long period of time, no casualties resulted. Air filters, masks, and respirators were quickly developed to counteract the effects of the poison. The first filters developed were based on the chemical destruction of the poison and could, therefore, easily be circumvented. When active carbon was used as a general filter media, almost any compound could be stopped. In turn, this induced the development of agents capable of circumventing the filter. The most successful development was the compound best known as mustard agent. As well as being an inhalation hazard, mustard agent also generated percutaneous effects. Protections against this type of compound were developed after WWI. Initially, these protections were based on chemistry that was easy to circumvent or on air-impermeable clothing for specialized troops. 25 These suits were cumbersome to wear and offered little protection. This protective equipment existed until the Second World War, which saw the development of activated carbon-based filter layers. Today, most technologically advanced nations have their forces protected by this type of clothing. Together with a proper mask, these suits form a deterrent to the use CWA against troops because once protected, the effects of the poison are minimal. Vulnerabilities remained for countries not in a position to invest in an elaborate protection of troops or the civilian population. Examples are mainly in Africa and Asia. The deliberate use of CW against totally unprotected populations is regarded as an act of barbarism. The influence protection can have become clear during WWI. The first troops equipped with a mask were the British, by the end of 1915. As a result, the number of chemical casualties among British troops in 1916 was relatively small, the main reason being that German forces regarded chemical attacks on the British forces as useless. The statistic that 250 kg of explosives had to be targeted on the enemy to create one casualty (with 1 in 3 killed), and only 100 kg of asphyxiating gas was required to cause one chemical casualty (with 1 in 10 killed) demonstrated the effectiveness of chemical weapons. However, as soon as a respiratory protection factor of ten was provided, ten times the quantity of chemicals had to be used. Limited protection clearly was a serious disadvantage for the use of chemicals, causing explosive munitions to once again be favored. At the end of the First World War, 110,000–125,000 tons of chemical warfare agents had been used, of which 90% were choking agents and the remaining 10% was mustard gas. Chemical warfare agents were responsible for 1.3 million casualties. The percentage of deaths due to chemical weapons was small in relation to that inflicted by other weapons, i.e., 7% (91,000 deaths) and 30%, respectively. Although the total number of casualties was high, the employment of chemical warfare agents was of minor efficacy: on average, one ton of chemical warfare agents put ten men out of action (note, the weight of the containers used in the dispersal of the gas was not included in the calculations). This low efficacy was partly due to protective measures, which, although primitive, were rapidly developed. It should be noted that the less than 10,000 tons of mustard agent used in the last year of the war was responsible for several hundred thousand casualties. Only 30 kg of mustard gas was required to cause ten casualties, of which less than 2% were lethal. This was sometimes used to support the argument that chemical warfare was more humane than warfare in which metal and explosives were employed. The fact that CW casualties suffered for many years after the war ended was not considered when this conclusion was drawn. Chemical warfare casualties from the Iran–Iraq war in the 1980s have suffered for more than 20 years and possibly many more to come. These WWI statistics are grand total averages. Later analysis by Haber’s son (12) showed that the effectiveness of some attacks was much lower, and in some cases it was much higher. The total amount of agent used was around 125,000 tons, of which about 8000 tons was mustard agent. The total number of chemical casualties was estimated to be 1,250,000, of which 250,000 were due to mustard, mainly used by Germany. Assuming that 117,000 tons of nonmustard agents produced 1 million casualties, it appears that on the average just under 100 kg was required to cause one casualty. Because the toxicity of the agents with respect to producing casualties is, on average, 100 mg/man, one million times an effective dosage was required in WWI to have this effect. For mustard the effective casualty-causing dosage is a few milligrams (based on whole body exposure), requiring, once again, about one million 26 times the toxic dosage for casualties, using the 8,000 ton figure cited previously. (The calculations regarding mustard agents are somewhat uncertain because at the end of the war, starting in the second half of 1917, the quality of the German chemical munitions became unreliable and more than half of all chemical munitions did not detonate. In addition, there are no good records of the quantities of chemical ammunitions destroyed or dropped in the sea directly after the war.) One of the first gas masks. It does not look too comfortable, but it worked well in preventing casualties. Despite the low efficacy of the chemical weapons used during the First World War, research on CW agents continued after 1918. For example, the blistering agents Lewisite and nitrogen mustard gas were developed. The use of chemical weapons continued virtually wherever warfare was in progress during the inter-war period. Use by the Spanish and French in their North African colonies, by the Italians in Abyssinia (nowadays Ethiopia) in 1936–1937, and by the Japanese in China during the 1930s are well known events. The first representative of a class of much more toxic chemical warfare agents, the nerve agents, was invented in 1936. In the course of his research on new insecticides, Schraeder prepared Tabun in the laboratories of IG-Farben, Germany, and several analogs were discovered a short time thereafter. In 1938, the Ministry of Defense of Nazi Germany decided to build a factory to produce nerve agents. The first lot of Tabun was manufactured in 1943, and small quantities of Sarin in 1944. A third nerve agent, Soman, was in the laboratory testing stages at the end of the WWII (18a). Chemical warfare agents were not used during the Second World War, even though only the Germans possessed nerve agents. It is still a mystery why the Germans did not resort to the use of chemical weapons, particularly during the later stages of the war. In all likelihood, the main reason could have been fear of reprisal. In the beginning of the war, none of the belligerents had sufficient stocks to conduct chemical warfare, but each was convinced that 27 the others were fully prepared. Later in the war, Germany came into the possession of Tabun (1943), but it was dangerous to transport it to the front zone. Additionally, at that time they were convinced that the Allied troops also had supplies of nerve agents. Chemical warfare would have been less efficient because the troops were equipped with masks and later with forms of skin protection, although over the course of the war and in the absence of the use of chemical warfare, the haversacks for carrying a mask were often used for carrying liquor and other contraband. Amazingly, the Allied counterintelligence regarded the information that Germany was in the possession of nerve agents as war propaganda. Still more toxic nerve agents, the V agents, were developed by researchers in the UK in the 1950s. Also in this period, military research institutes became interested in nonlethal incapacitating chemical warfare agents. The end of the war in 1945 and beyond saw no prohibition of chemical warfare. During the Yemen War (1963–1967), mustard gas was used, and herbicides (defoliants) and tear gases were deployed on a large scale in the Vietnam War (1961–1970). Highly efficient chemical warfare protection devices of Soviet origin were captured by Israel during the Yom Kippur War in 1973, which resulted in an increased emphasis on chemical protection within NATO. By the end of 1970, the US accused communist troops of using unspecified chemical warfare agents, called "yellow rain", in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan. The agents used were denoted as trichothecenes, a group of mycotoxins. A team of experts that investigated the alleged use for the United Nations could neither state that the allegations had been proven nor could they disregard the circumstantial evidence presented of possible use. Later, some scientists argued that the positive analytical identification of the trichothecenes was an artifact, and that the yellow rain was most likely due to bees dropping their feces in a rain storm. In 2004, another “attack” with yellow rain took place in India 60 km north of New Delhi. This time scientists confirmed that the “attack” was indeed due to bee droppings. Colombian army confronted with chlorine attacks from FARC. The recent past has seen several incidents of chemical warfare usage. Definite evidence was presented of the employment by Iraq of both nerve agents and mustard gas during the Iran– Iraq War (1980–1988). Furthermore, Iraq attacked the Kurds living in Iraq. Recently, Iraq 28 explicitly threatened Coalition troops with the use of chemical weapons during the Gulf Conflict (1991). South America was, until recently, a continent free of CWs. However, there are reports that the FARC used CWs against the Colombian military. Finally, CWs have become available to an increasing number of countries during the last decade. Fortunately, many of these countries have acceded to the CWC and are in the process of destroying their stocks. 3.1.5. Threat reduction through arms control Arms control is covered by the CWC for chemical weapons and by the BTWC for biological weapons and toxins. It is generally understood that a treaty to ban a certain class of weapons is of little value if strict verification of the rules in the treaty is not possible or if they are not combined with sanctions or determined responses. Adherence to a treaty is enhanced if there are benefits for the State Parties and limitations for non-State Parties. Finally, national laws should criminalize research, development, or manufacture of any such weapons. The CWC has implemented most of these measures in its statutes. Limiting proliferation of chemical weapons is another objective of the CWC. Most chemicals that could be used in the development of chemical weapons are subject to verification inspections. More importantly is that trade and export of these so-called scheduled compounds to non-State Parties is prohibited. Verification inspections check the correct handling of these scheduled compounds. Export controls make it more difficult and costly for non-State Parties to develop massive amounts of chemical weapons. Limiting proliferation could be less effective if the CWs are based on non-scheduled compounds that are not subject to verification inspections. The General Purpose Criterion however, would allow other forms of inspections, e.g., a challenge inspection. Biological weapons have been totally prohibited by the BTWC (2), which was opened for signature in 1972 and entered into force in 1975. The BTWC banned, for the first time, a complete class of weapons but the treaty has no verification regime or benefits for State Parties. Therefore, the response to the threat of biological weapons has been somewhat different. Considering the threat posed by biological and toxin weapons thus far, that there are a number of measures that together are mutually reinforcing and form a web of deterrence. With recent advances in biotechnology, it is tempting for certain States to develop biological warfare capabilities, particularly because it is possible to easily break-out of the convention and build a biological weapon in a matter of weeks, rather than several years. Therefore, it is important to maintain passive defense measures because these measures will considerably increase the required amount of warfare agent, as illustrated by the following example. A contamination of approximately 10 g pure Anthrax, containing 1013 spores per gram is required per km2 to produce significant casualties to make its use worthwhile, if the biological warfare agent is disseminated with high efficiency. Such a low level can only be achieved under ideal conditions (according to the former Soviet Union doctrine, 5,000 g/km2 would be disseminated (13)). The level must be increased to one ton of Anthrax for every km2 to achieve the same effect if the troops are warned and equipped with masks that provide a protection factor of 105 . (A factor of 105 is required for most military masks for protection against vapor, and the protection factor against 0.3 m aerosol particles is around 104 ). Protection factors for larger 1–5 m aerosol particles are usually 1–2 orders of magnitude higher. 29 Preventing proliferation, especially of the knowledge for producing biological warfare agents, is difficult. Students from States that might be interested in developing a BW capability may study at Western Universities. In addition to the required technologies, the means for production of CWs and BWs are proliferating over the world. Worldwide illicit drug trafficking and production form a good example that demonstrates how difficult it is to block the transport of illegal goods and the means to produce them. Shipments often pass through many countries before they arrive at countries of concern. An additional difficulty, at least with respect to BW proliferation, is that the research and means nearly always are dual use. Research into pharmaceuticals and cancer therapies are some of the many examples. The technical means for preparing pharmaceuticals and some BW agents are very much the same. Selectively blocking materials intended for BW development is not feasible. Stopping all research in this area, as suggested by Mirzayanov (CBRNe World summer 2009 issue), is not feasible either. Occasionally, it is remarked that: “The CWC (and also the BTWC) may have had more of an effect on changing the character of proliferant activity than in stopping it.” Although not every State fully believes in non-proliferation and, therefore, threat reduction offered by the CWC, it is obvious that the CWC is a major contributor to these causes. At the end of the previous century, there were 80,000–100,000 tons of chemical warfare agents in the world. In the coming ten years, Member States will have destroyed their stocks, and a much smaller amount here and there may remain in States that do not adhere to the CWC. The total mass of CWAs will be reduced by a factor 100 if not 1000. If chemical warfare should occur, it would be on a smaller scale and less frequent, but unfortunately also less predictable. 3.1.6. Dissemination of CB agents The most common target for chemical and biological agents is the respiratory tract. Agents must be dispersed as vapors or aerosols that are absorbed by the lungs. This is particularly difficult to achieve for biological agents, because the size range of interest is around 5 m. Larger particles are stopped by the upper respiratory tract and very small particles are not absorbed well by the lungs; they are carried away in exhaled air. Advanced technologies are required to produce 1–10 m particles efficiently, and even then the efficiency will not exceed 25%. Some chemical agents also act through the skin, either in the form of vapor or as small droplets. The absorption of the liquid agents by a fine dust powder has been proposed as a means for deploying an agent. Essential to these threats are the capabilities of an opponent to deliver warfare agents to a target. Means of delivery for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) include, for instance: Ballistic Missiles Offensive Aircraft Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), Cruise Missiles Non-State actors may use any form of dissemination, from release of dust or aerosol spray cans to evaporating liquid depositions. UAVs have been considered by the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo sect for dispersal of biological agents. 30 Aircraft vortices, droplet size, etc. render the aircraft spray technique an unpredictable method for disseminating CWs. 3.2. Threat agents 3.2.1. Scope of threat agents Chemical and biological warfare agents of interest form a spectrum from Toxic industrial materials (TIM’s); Classical chemical warfare agents, including emerging chemical agents; Mid-spectrum agents, i.e., toxins and bioregulators, either from natural origin or synthesized; Self-multiplying organisms, possibly genetically modified. The criteria for assessing the hazard of certain types of agent have often been defined from an offensive point of view. According to pre-WWII Soviet doctrine, the military value of a toxic or pathogenic agent is determined by: Its toxicity (inhalation or dermal), stability, and physical state; The capacity to produce the agent from indigenous raw materials; The simplicity and economy of its production; and The ability of the agent or its precursors to be used in peacetime. (14) This type of assessment is subjective because all aspects involved must be assessed and rated on a scale. The scale, however, may be very different in different parts of the world. 3.2.2. Toxic industrial materials (TIM’s) or chemicals (TICs) Toxic industrial materials (TIM) include toxic industrial chemicals (TICs). A TIC is defined as an industrial chemical that has an LCt50 value of less than 100,000 mg·min/m3 in any 31 mammalian species and is produced in quantities exceeding 30 tons per year at one production facility. TICs that pose an acute inhalation hazard are of greatest concern. TICs, such as chlorine, phosgene, hydrogen cyanide, or cyanogen chloride have been used as chemical warfare agents during WWI. (These agents are still classified as TICs rather than chemical warfare agents.) The most toxic of these compounds, phosgene, is at least 100 times less toxic than the nerve agent Sarin, requiring large quantities to be released before an effect is achieved. (The trench warfare of WWI required 100 kg for one casualty!) HCN and ClCN are only hazardous at high concentrations delivered within a short period of time. Detoxification of these agents in the human body proceeds very quickly. Other examples of TIMs include ammonia, acids, solvents, pesticides, herbicides, fertilizers, fuels, petrochemicals, and intermediates used in the manufacture of plastics. They are legitimate articles of commerce that are traded in very large volumes and are not subject to the same regulations or export controls as chemical warfare agents. TICs are still attractive as improvised chemical weapon fills and have potential for inclusion in clandestine weapons programs or contingency plans. These chemicals are stored in large quantities and are transported daily. Therefore, the deliberate or inadvertent (collateral damage, industrial accident, fire, or environmental disaster) release of TICs cannot be excluded. In the case of terrorist incidents, the maximum amount of TICs involved would likely be a truckload or a railroad car. Local storage sites could be attacked as well. The simplest form of protection is to reduce the quantity of locally stored chemicals as much as possible and to divide it over several separated storage tanks. TICs are particularly attractive agents because of their ready availability, but their efficiency is limited against troops that employ current measures of protection. However, TICs might be a serious threat for populations living in the vicinity of large storage sites. These people should be trained and provided protection inside their homes (see Chapters 5 and 6). A group of experts in Canada, the UK, and the US (15) evaluated the inhalation hazards of TICs. An initial screening identified 1164 chemicals that met the toxicity criteria. This list of chemicals was reduced by including only those that were gases, liquids, or solids with an appreciable vapor pressure at 20°C, or those that were listed in the US Department of Transportation Emergency Response Guide. Available production data were used to reduce this list to 156 chemicals. Actual production figures were difficult to obtain. The Chemical Manufacturer Association provided a list of chemicals produced in excess of 30 tons per year in at least one production site. This information reduced the list to 98 chemicals. A hazard index was then developed. This index considered the distribution of producers in the world as well as the number of continents in which the chemicals were produced. Concentration values were reported in units corresponding to the Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH) as a parameter for toxicity. Vapor pressure was used as a parameter as well. Higher vapor pressures produced higher inhalation hazards. Each parameter was rated on a scale from 1 to 5. The Hazard Index (HI) is the product of the four parameters and was used to identify and rank TICs. HI = f {(toxicity) x (physical state) x (geographical distribution) x (number of producers)}, with a maximum value of 625 The TICs were ranked in three categories as an indicator of their relative importance and to assist in hazard assessment: 32 High Hazard, HI>81; widely produced, stored or transported TIC, very toxic and easily vaporized; 21 chemicals meet this criterion; Medium Hazard, 36