What's So New About Divided Cities?*

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A divided city is certainly nothing new, historically. Never mind the slave quarters of ancient Athens and Rome, the ghettos of the middle ages, the imperial quarters of colonial cities, or the merchant sections of the medieval trading cities. At least from the outset of the industrial revolution, cities have been divided in a way quite familiar to us. Disraeli coined the phrase 'dual city' in the 1860s,[1] and even earlier Engels had described, in striking detail worth rereading today,[2] the differences between the back-alley tenements of the working class in Manchester and the houses on the main streets in front of them.

Is the fact that cities today, at least in the advanced industrialized economies of the West, are not 'dual', but more like 'quartered' cities, new? The purpose of this paper is to try to isolate that which is really new — post 1979, generally — about the structure and functioning of our cities, and then to suggest some implications of the patterns that are continuing ones and the ones found to be new. The argument about a turning-point somewhere in the postwar period, of a shift from a fordist to a postfordist society, from a manufacturing to a service economy, from a national to a global organization of production, distribution and services, from a welfare to a post-welfare state, from modern to postmodern structures, will not be repeated here. The object is rather to specify concretely what aspects of the present urban situation are attributable to these recent causes, what aspects are longer-term and more enduring, and what consequences for the possibilities of change flow from the answer.

To recapitulate the argument about the patterns of the contemporary city[3] briefly, the city may be seen as divided roughly into the following quarters:[4]

(1)   Luxury housing, not really part of the city but enclaves or isolated buildings, occupied by the top of the economic, social, and political hierarchy.

(2)   The gentrified city, occupied by the professional-managerial-technical groups, whether yuppie or muppie without children.

1.   For a discussion of the phrase, its uses and misuses, see Marcuse (1989a).
2.   See Marcus (1974) for an excellent new discussion, comparing Engels' account to the much less perceptive accounts of his contemporaries.
3.   The reference throughout is to the major cities of the advanced industrialized private market economies. The model used is of course New York City, and many of the examples are drawn from that city, but parallel, although not identical, examples will be found in most other major cities.
4.   See Marcuse (1989a) and (1991). 'Quartered' is used both in the sense of 'drawn and quartered' and of residential 'quarters', although there are also essentially four of such quarters, the very wealthy not being bound by any specific spatial configuration as to where they live. For slightly different approaches, also, however, differing from 'dual city' formulation, see Mollenkopf and Castells (1991), especially the Introduction and Conclusion, reviewed by Bob Beauregard with focus on this issue in this journal, 17.1 (1993), 143, and Wallock (1987).

(3) The suburban city, sometimes single-family housing in the outer city, other times apartments near the centre, occupied by skilled workers, mid-range professionals, upper civil servants.

(4) The tenement city, sometimes cheaper single-family areas, most often rentals, occupied by lower-paid workers, blue- and white-collar, and generally (although less in the United States) including substantial social housing.

(5) The abandoned city, the end result of trickle-down, left for the poor, the unemployed, the excluded, where in the United States home-less housing for the homeless[5] is most frequently located.

These felt divisions in the residential city are roughly paralleled by divisions in the economic city:

(1) The places of big decisions include a network of high-rise offices, brownstones or older mansions in prestigious locations, but are essentially locationally not circumscribed; it includes yachts for some, the back seats of stretch limousines for others, airplanes and scattered residences for still others.

(2) The city of advanced services, of professional offices tightly clustered in downtowns, with many ancillary services internalized in high-rise office towers, heavily enmeshed in a wide and technologically advanced communicative network.

(3) The city of direct production, including not only manufacturing but also the production of advanced services, in Saskia Sassen's phrase; government offices, the back offices of major firms, whether adjacent to their front offices or not, located in clusters and with significant agglomerations but in varied locations within a metropolitan area — sometimes, indeed, outside of the central city itself.

(4) The city of unskilled work and the informal economy, small-scale manufacturing, warehousing, sweatshops, technically unskilled consumer services, immigrant industries, closely intertwined with the cities of production and advanced services and thus located near them, but separately and in scattered clusters,[6] locations often determined in part by economic relations, in part by the patterns of the residential city.

(5) The residual city, the city of the less legal portions of the informal economy, the city of storage where otherwise undesired (NIMBY) facilities are located, generally congruent with the abandoned residential city.

As one progresses down the scale both in the quarters of the residential city and of the economic city, in the United States, the proportion of Afro-American, hispanic and immigrant households increases; the proportion of women heading households increases. Race, class and gender create overlapping patterns of differentiation — invidious differentiation, for there is no doubt that the differences are not simply of 'lifestyles' or 'special needs', but reflect positions in a hierarchy of power and wealth in which some decide and others are decided for.[7]

Are these patterns spatial? They are certainly reflected in space, and their spatial characteristics strongly influence their substance. But they are not rigid spatial patterns, in the old sense in which Burgess and Parks tried to describe city structure. And their spatial pattern varies widely from city to city, country to country; Los Angeles, for instance, has a pattern I have described as fluid, separations as of oil and water together with walled enclaves, rather than the more clearly bounded and more homogeneous quarters of New York City (Marcuse 1992b is a preliminary version of that description).

5. For the concept of 'home-less housing' and discussion of its location, see Marcuse and Vergara (1992).

6. See, again, some of Saskia Sassen's work, for instance Sassen (1989), whose brief but provocative comments on the spatial aspects of the trends she describes deserve further development.

7. For a discussion of the differences between special needs and invidious differentiation, see Marcuse (1989b).

But the spatial patterns are hard to avoid, and deserve much further empirical exploration. The 1990 census results will certainly help, in the USA.

Are these patterns new? In some ways, of course not. The divisions of society, whether one chooses to speak of classes or socio-economic status or consumption or racial/ethnic/colonial groupings, are age-old; those derived directly from capitalism are hardly products of the postwar era. Whether the postfordist system has created new classes, or simply shifts in size and influence and perhaps function among them, is debatable; certainly all of the groupings described above have existed for at least decades. 'Yuppies' is a new term, but discussion of the managerial revolution is not, nor are arguments about the nature and role of a professional-managerial-technical class. Homelessness may be different today from what it was in the 1930s — that argument is made below — but it is not the existence of homelessness, nor even the numbers of those who are without shelter, that is new.

Perhaps the extent of inequality within the city, among the divisions of the city, is new? Inequality as such in the city is certainly nothing new. The palace:hovel ratio was enormous in the middle ages; so was the mansion:tenement ratio in the nineteenth century; and so is the penthouse condominium:abandoned unit ratio today. It is more sensible to express outrage at all three than to spend time trying to decide which is worst.[8] In the recent past, the gap between the richest and the poorest has widened, then narrowed, then widened again, narrowing in the immediate postwar period and widening again since 1970; but the order of magnitude of the changes hardly demonstrates a qualitative turning point within this period.[9]

Inequality is in any event the wrong concept to employ in evaluating what is happening within a city, particularly in looking at the distribution of housing and residential benefits, for two reasons: First, inequality suggests some continuous linear distribution within which each individual or household can be placed. In fact, historically there have been major differentiations by group, or class or caste or status, quite discontinuous in their impact. For policy purposes it is much more important to locate the breaks, the basic lines of cleavage, than simply to measure the extent of the differences. The concept of inequality can obscure those cleavages. Second, equality tends to become synonymous with uniformity.[10] That is not what is desired; the equation is the Achilles' heel of all but the best of the east European product. Equality of real choice may be an acceptable formulation for the goal, but it may result in wide inequality of result.

Invidious differentiation may be the most accurate, if not the most monosyllabic, formulation for the real issue. Not inequality *per se*, but inequality that reflects a hierarchical relationship, one of domination and subordination, inclusion and exclusion, privilege and deprivation, is the policy concern.[11] But even looking at the city from this perspective, differentiation of housing quality and divisions into areas invidiously differentiated from each other are hardly new. Even in the nineteenth century, one could easily have distinguished mansions from middle-class apartments from working class tenements from skid rows; Clara Cardia (forthcoming) has mapped the changing areas of such housing in New York City over a period of a hundred years.

8. If the range of inequality were the only consideration, the eastern European housing systems, which have met with widespread condemnation among their own residents as well as in the West, would come out as the least unequal by almost any measure; yet that hardly makes them ideal patterns to emulate elsewhere.

9. The preliminary 1990 census figures seem to bear this out: a widening of the gap, but on a small scale. See the controversy around Paul R. Kruman's calculations of the share of growth reaped by the richest 1%, the Treasury Department's response, and the criticisms of that response, and the series of reports in the *New York Times*, Sunday 26 July 1992, pp. 18, 30.

10. There is a substantial, sometimes esoteric, literature on the definitions and measurement of equality. Herbert Gans's contributions are among the best; those centring on legally cognizable differences are among the most interesting, e.g. *Hawkins v. Shaw* (1992) and the line of cases and literature it generated; for interesting reflections on equality in the racial context, see the pieces collected in Abrams, Marcuse *et al.* (1965).

11. Rolf Kuhn has spelled this out in the context of the GDR in Kuhn (1985).

What then is so new about what we witness today? It is, it seems to me, an under-debated question, but an important one.[12] I want to argue here that there are very specific features of the contemporary scene that are, in fact, new. They may be seen as particular characteristics of the 'postfordist city', but leave that phrase in quotation marks for now. These new characteristics include:

(1) The nature and extent of homelessness: *advanced homelessness*.
(2) The growth in the size of certain quarters — notably, the gentrified city and the abandoned city — and the shrinking of others, notably the tenement city: realignment.
(3) The dynamic nature of the quarters, in which each grows only at the expense of the others: *displacement as the mechanism of expansion*.
(4) The importance which the identity of the quarter has in the lives of its residents: *the intensity of turf allegiance*.
(5) The walls created between quarters, and the intensity with which they are defended: *turf barricades and turf battles*.
(6) The role of government, not only acceding to but promoting the quartering of the city in the private interest, fortifying both the gentrified and the abandoned city: *the subsuming of the public interest under the private*.
(7) The nature of the lines of political conflict and coalition-building: *reoriented political cleavages*.

There are three other new phenomena, again linked to each other, which are necessary background for the above, but into which I do not propose to go here:[13]

(8) The growing internationalization of the connections between certain sections of the city and the outside world, with impacts in all quarters of the city.
(9) The growing centralization of control of economic activity, with the locus of centralization being a limited number of global cities.
(10) Changes in the technical aspects of the production of goods and the production of services.

To take the first seven points up one at a time:

(1) Contemporary homelessness is not just like depression homelessness, or nineteenth-century homelessness, or homelessness in the middle ages. Today the physical and technical resources are abundantly available to provide every man, woman and child in the United States with a decent home. That has probably been true for some time, but the failures to order society rationally so as to avoid homelessness have been more visible in times of economic recession and less in times of prosperity. Today, that is no longer the case. Today, those who are homeless or at risk of homelessness are likely to be so in good times as well as bad: the figures since 1975 show a steadily rising rate of homelessness as employment falls and also as it rises, as average wages go down and as they go up.[14] Needless to say, what is new is new not because people have newly changed, as some of the proponents of the culture of poverty and underclass theses hold, but because of the different situation in which people, vulnerable and excluded then as today, find themselves today.

The role of government is also significantly different today from its role in previous explosions of homelessness. The comparison with the Great Depression is instructive.

12. For one of the few explicit discussions, see Fainstein and Fainstein (1989). On the uniqueness of the gentrification process, Chris Hamnett has commented that 'it can be seen as constituting no more than an historically and spatially specific manifestation of a set of more general transformation processes' (Hamnett and Randolph 1986). The question, of course, is for what purpose the line between 'general' and 'specific' is sought to be drawn.
13. On these points, see Fainstein *et al.* (1992) and Sassen (1991).
14. The figures are provided in my contribution to Hartmut Häuserman (forthcoming).

In the 1930s, federal public housing in the United States was adopted for the working class, for those either already employed or presumptively only temporarily unemployed. They were considered a 'submerged middle class'; it was assumed public housing residents were upwardly mobile. The homeless programmes adopted nationally today (locally the pattern is similar) provide for emergency accommodations, and, if they provide for perma-nent housing at all, tend to assume that coupled with it should be a major effort to pull those on the streets up to the level where they will appreciate and take care of permanent housing. Such efforts may indeed be essential for an adequate programme for many of the homeless, as well as for many of the already housed. But the assumption that the problem is a personal one, that it arises from particular characteristics of the homeless, is new. Unlike charitable housing programmes a century ago, when the assumption was that improved living conditions would create the conditions that would largely by themselves reform the lives of slum-dwellers, who were, apart from their living conditions, essentially like everyone else, the homeless today are treated as essentially different from the rest of society. The policies resulting from such assumptions are visible today. And, linked to such policies as cause is to effect, those who are not housed today are not employed today either, nor will they be tomorrow, nor the next day. They are simply not needed: providing them with shelter is thus charity, not part of an effort to create a healthy economy.

Contemporary homelessness thus is large-scale, permanent and independent of the short-term business cycle, a combination never before existing in an advanced industrial society. It represents the inability of the market and the unwillingness of the state to care for the most basic needs of a significant segment of the population (see the misnamed 'underclass' discussion), and their consequent complete exclusion from or suppression in the spatial fabric of a technologically and economically advanced city. It may thus fairly be called 'advanced homelessness'.

(2) The linked pattern of expansion of the gentrified city and of the abandoned city, at the expense of the tenement city, have been described in detail elsewhere (Marcuse, 1985; Smith and Williams, 1986) and the economic logic underlying the changes, both on the labour market and the real estate market ends, is clear. Detailed quantitative discussion for the United States should be postponed till data from the 1990 census, now slowly becoming available, is subject to analysis. Only one point is worth taking up briefly here: that which emerges from the 'underclass' discussion.

In a number of studies, most notably some of those brought together by Christopher Jencks and Paul E. Peterson (1991), it is argued that the 'underclass' is shrinking.[15] One might thus expect the size of the abandoned quarters of cities, as here defined, to be shrinking. But the argument is fallacious. It relies for its statistical measure on the use of the index of dissimilarity, a measure of segregation that is quite useful in presenting a gross comparative view of developments among different cities, but provides no measure either of the intensity of segregation nor its spatial pattern.[16] In the more detailed analysis by Paul A. Jargowsky and Mary Jo Bane in the same volume, the figures for New York City are given. Using a definition of ghetto neighbourhoods — more than 40% of the residents under the poverty line — that may well approximate the definition of the abandoned quarters of a city, they find that the number of residents of such neighbourhoods increased between 1970 and 1980 from 134,139 to 477,621. Similar results are presented for other

15. See in particular the contributions by Peterson and by Reynolds Farley in Jencks and Peterson (1991).
16. The index calculates the percentage of a population group that has to move in order for the proportion in each subunit (generally, census tract) to be equal to the proportion in the unit as a whole (generally, the city). Thus 100 is complete segregation, 0 is uniform mixture. But the index says nothing of the pattern of segregation, i.e. whether all more segregated subunits are concentrated together or scattered, and it says nothing about the degree of concentration, i.e. if the proportion minority in a city is 10%, and two equally populated adjacent census tracts each are 40% minority, the same number will have to move as if 80% of the minority population lived in one of the tracts and 20% in the other.

major north-eastern and north-central cities, i.e. Philadelphia goes from 49,657 to 127,134, Chicago from 74,370 to 194,338.[17]

(3) In earlier periods, the expansion of residential areas for use by particular groups came out by a process of new settlement, the incorporation of new areas into the existing urban structure. New York City is a classic case: the northward movement of population in the nineteenth century, the outward movement following train and subway lines in the late 1800s and early 1900s, the suburbanization after the first and second world wars, have all been graphically traced.[18] Haussman's forcible slum clearance in France, redevelopment schemes in London several decades later, were forerunners of the displacement that today accompanies expansion; but only in the last 15 years or so have the twin phenomena of gentrification and abandonment played a major role in city restructuring.[19]

Displacement is perhaps a more central concept than gentrification here. Alan Murie (1991) highlights the displacement of working-class and poor council housing tenants by home owners, of higher income and occupational status, over time, as council housing is privatized. The changing demographics of public housing in the United States are largely a function of public policy, and many have left public housing when they would have preferred to stay because of such policies. And the patterns creating displacement are linked: at one end abandonment replaces a working-class occupancy by the very poor and the unemployed, themselves at high risk of becoming homeless altogether; at the other end professional-managerial-technical types, when they gentrify a neighbourhood, evict those below them occupationally and by income, while the very rich isolate themselves from all others by increasingly crass measures. And those in between, in the tenement and suburban quarters, are pushed either up or down in the process.

The new pattern is thus one of the replacement of groups within one area by members of other groups: the conversion of a quarter from use by one strata/class to use by another. The city, through policies of triage, up-zoning, allocation of public services, investment in infrastructure, and often directly by its housing policies, from the privatization of public housing to the sale of foreclosed units, if not directly by planned land acquisition and disposition directly as in earlier urban renewal, provides substantial impetus for the process. Displacement as the fundamental mechanism of expansion, propelled by the private market but shaped and accelerated by governmental action, is thus new in scope and effect.

(4) The role of residence and neighbourhood has increased geometrically in the last 40 years. Slum clearance schemes in the 1920s aroused negligible opposition on the grounds of turf. Geographically based community solidarity was the exception rather than the rule. That changed significantly as a result of the earliest redevelopment efforts, e.g. Robert Moses' in New York City. But even in the 1960s the hope was still for integration, for better housing and better neighbourhoods, whether in the existing location or not, the goal equality of opportunity to move and choose location. Both public policy and, although not uniformly, actual patterns of residence reflected these goals; segregation, at least in its racial form, diminished by many definitions.

Not only have the facts changed,[20] but goals have changed also. Neighbourhood has

17. The reason southern cities do not show similar changes may have to do with southern to northern migration; for western cities, census definitions (here calculations use SMSA data) may have an impact on the results. Again, careful analysis of the 1990 data along similar lines should be revealing.
18. See Cardia (forthcoming); K. Jackson (1984), Spengler (1930), Walker (1970). For Philadelphia, see Warner (1968); for Boston, see Edel and Sclar (1984); for London, see A.A. Jackson (1973).
19. For a discussion of causes, see Marcuse (1985 and 1991).
20. Although the results of the 1990 census have not yet been analysed, the intra-city patterns experienced by most city residents certainly reflect an intensification of segregation and separation. The new patterns may be better seen from measures of concentration than from measures of segregation (the dissimilarity index, discussed in n. 16 above.) See the preliminary results of Andrew Beveridge of Queen's College, reported in the *New York Times*, 15 July 1992.

become more than a source of security, the base of a supportive network, as it has long been; it has become a source of identity, a definition of who a person is and where she or he belongs in society. The shift from workplace to residence-based self-identification has been much discussed.[21] Whether such residence-based self-classifications are consumption-based or not, and what their relation to production-based identities is, remains much disputed; certainly there is a great deal of congruence between residential location and economic position, as our descriptions of the quarters of the city, summarized above, suggest. That the importance of neighbourhood in the equation is greater by a quantum leap than in earlier times seems hard to dispute; the intensity of turf allegiance is a new element in the urban (and perhaps as well the national) picture today.

(5) Putting the new displacement dynamic and the new intensity of turf allegiance together, increasing divisions between quarters and increasing battles over residential turf become inevitable. Any week's worth of the *New York Times* issues will disclose them: violent Afro-American *v.* Hassidic Jewish confrontations in Brooklyn; anti-gentrification marches on the Lower East Side; protests against high-rise re-zoning for luxury units by the middle-class and yuppie-muppie upper West Side at the Trump development site; conflicts over the disposition of city-owned property for homeless accommodations in working-class and abandoned Harlem; passage of a Fair Share ordinance to deal with the apparently intractable problem of locating NIMBYs, an ordinance generally approved in theory but disregarded when it comes to any concrete issue, as recently in the location of homeless housing; and so on and on.

Both the market and city government have sought walls between quarters that might avoid direct clashes; what they seek is more like barricades than boundaries. Rivers are of course natural boundaries: the location of a project such as Battery Park City provides a wonderful natural barrier against the intrusion of outsiders, and every architectural and policy means available was used to ensure the essential homogeneity and security of its residents. In other cases, redevelopment projects have formed such boundaries; the history of the West Side Urban Renewal Project and the Morningside Heights Neighbourhood Renewal Plan provide exemplary evidence. The conflicts are no longer simply among gangs coming from a particular neighbourhood, sports clubs or local school loyalties, or even simply ethnic, religious and national tensions. They are geographically based, and divide ultimately along a few sharp cleavages — four are suggested here — as never before. Turf-based tensions and measures to avoid their explosion are a qualitatively new and pervasive phenomenon on the New York City scene. The prevalence of barbed wire, and indeed the razor-edge wire developed by the United States army for military use after the second world war, is a graphic and frightening symbol of the cleavages running throughout the city.

And not only New York City. My current and limited exposure to southern California suggests that walls and fences are, not metaphorically but actually, an increasing part of the accepted everyday landscape in that Horatio Alger city of fluid boundaries even more than elsewhere.[22] New private cities are built with walls around them, policed by private security patrols whose permission is needed for access. Even in the public city, fences around developments are ubiquitous; whether it be luxury coops or public housing, each cluster wishes to be protected from intrusion from the outside. The scale of the phenomenon exceeds anything heretofore seen.

Where 'defence of turf' was once a phrase used to describe only the conduct of street gangs, it today describes the conduct of the majority of the city's residents, the rich perhaps in even more extreme form than the poor.

21. Katznelson (1984) is still the leading discussion.
22. See Leavitt and Goldstein (1990); (1992b).

(6) Government has always contributed to the invidious differentiation of sections of the city from each other, in ways that should have long ago made the old hypotheses of 'natural preferences' and 'market forces' leading to stratification no longer defensible. But the mechanisms by which such actions were legitimated have changed significantly over time. In the planned cities of the feudal period, monarchic decisions did not need to pay even lip service to market needs; in the market cities, development was incremental, and planning directly controlled by associations of merchants, not by mechanisms of allocation by price. In the brief heyday of *laissez-faire*, working-class quarters were allowed to spread virtually without regulation; but the resultant externalities, the dangers of fire and epidemic and social explosion, were so great as to lead to public regulation almost from the outset. Haussman's actions in Paris were justified by both military and technical needs; that they produced a radical restructuring of residential locations by class was taken as more an incidental than an intended consequence of government action. Thus, before the modern era of redevelopment and urban renewal, government action was seen as independent of, or indeed in opposition to, the actions of private interests in the private market.

With redevelopment and urban renewal government powers were for the first time clearly and openly placed at the service of private interests, but under the claim that the contemplated result was a public benefit. A purely private benefit would not, some courts ruled, justify the use of public powers such as 'eminent domain'.[23] The separation of public and private spheres remained intact in theory, if often blurred in practice. It is this distinction that has today evaporated.

Under slogans ranging from economic development to public–private partnership, government in the United States has for the first time unabashedly taken the position that the increase in private profits is *per se* a public benefit, and without any reliance on redistribution or any control of ultimate benefits. In western Europe and Japan such an assumption has for a long time, at least since the end of the first world war, been accepted as the grounds for national economic policy. But that acceptance has been legitimated by its linkage with the policies of a welfare state (or perhaps in Japan with social benefits allocated directly by industry). That linkage is absent in this new phase of governmental action in the urban arena in the United States. Again, in contrast to western Europe, economic policy focused on direct aid to business has been more visible at the local than at the national level (with some major exceptions, of course).

The rise of what might be called local economic development policy[24] has in fact been paralleled by a radical conservative shift in national and local policies and ideology, departing from the earlier welfare-state compromise reached in most of western and northern Europe. Programmes such as the UDAG, Urban Development Action Grants, which provide direct federal subsidies for municipal actions from land acquisition to infrastructure investment for the purpose of aiding private business enterprises, or programmes of tax abatement and tax exemption or municipal loan programmes, or the currently touted enterprise zones, aid private firms virtually without conditions.[25] Where private market uses has faltered or met resident opposition, government has not hesitated to move in with direct physical force. The recent 'clearing' of Tompkins Square Park in the Lower East Side of the homeless who lived there, so that the occupants of the gentrified housing in

the neighbourhood would not be disturbed and the process of gentrification might continue, is but the latest and most blatant example in New York City.[26]

At the same time, political leaders are using government to build and reinforce ghettos. *Per se*, that is nothing new, of course. Public housing, at its inception, was racially segregated; the subsidization of the suburbs ghettoized women by gender and class. But the tendency, at least in talk and, in the case of public housing, in law, was in the opposite direction for the first postwar years. Today, in a movement that can find its magnification beginning in the early 1980s, the pattern of ghettoization is reoccurring in vastly greater force. Look at a map of the location of public housing in any major city in the United States;[27] look at where homeless shelters, AIDS clinics, drug treatment centres, halfway houses, are located, and you will find a pattern in which some areas are saturated (the abandoned city), and others are insulated (the suburban and gentrified city). Where there is counter-movement and protest, as in the Fair Share efforts in New York City, the outcome of the battle is hardly in doubt: segregation will prevail.

This open subsumption of the public interest under the promotion of private profit is thus new, both in its bald assumption of legitimacy and in the directness in which its goals are skewed upwards. Under this ideological cover government has fortified well-to-do areas, the gentrified and suburban cities, and has concentrated and exacerbated the problems of the ghettos, the abandoned city. It has contributed to the increase of invidious differentiation within United States cities in a way that goes beyond anything that preceded it.

(7) The political consequences of these new developments make change in the status quo difficult. On the one hand, coalition-building is made more difficult as the spatial quartering of the residential city reinforces economic and social divisions. The conscious policy of the established political leadership has been — quite logically, and in some cases quite openly, as with Mayor Koch in New York — to base its control on alliances of the middle and professional-managerial-technical and ruling groups, geographically the suburban and gentrified cities and the luxury enclaves, dividing the less well-paid working blue- and white-collar workers from the very poor, the tenement city from the abandoned city. On the other hand, as the areas of conflict appear more and more residentially and neighbourhood based, and thus more locally oriented, it becomes more difficult to develop a common agenda among disempowered groups on any broader base, whether city-wide or national.

Turf-based battles can be the basis for broader coalitions if they leave the particularities of the turf and take up the issues of policy and practice that underlie turf-based problems. Gentrification directly affects particular areas only, but the economic and social forces that produce the pressure for gentrification are city-wide — indeed, much broader than that. It needs to be dealt with on that broader terrain, if the champions of one turf are not simply to fight the residents of another turf, shifting the locus of gentrification but not altering its impact.

The history of social movements in the last decades has demonstrated these facts amply. If the focus is fighting one urban renewal plan, success or failure will depend on local strength; if the issue is translated to an attack on the urban renewal programme as a whole, local issues being only exemplary of common problems, wider changes may be produced. If a community group seeks only to develop housing it itself will own or manage, it may divide itself from its natural allies elsewhere; if it seeks to change the city's housing policies, coalitions with its natural allies will be easy. In the most recent experience in New York City, attempts by tenement and abandoned communities to control what happens in their

23.   See Hagman (1975: 311 ff.).
24.   Not to be confused with community economic development, which, as far as most governments in the United States are concerned, is more prominent in statements and speeches than in actual policy.
25.   See the several analyses by State Senator Franz Leichter of real estate tax benefit programmes in New York City, or the analysis by Susan Fainstein (1987), or by the South Brooklyn Legal Services Office of the Metrotech project in Brooklyn. On enterprise zones, see William Goldsmith's analysis (1982).

26.   Neil Smith (1992) provides a graphic description, and its context.
27.   The pattern has been traced for New York City, Philadelphia, Chicago, Cincinnati and Richmond, at least, that I know of.

own neighbourhoods, in New York City at the Community Board level, have led to the strategy of development of local community plans governing zoning, investment in public facilities etc. As long as the campaign was to change the charter of the city to permit such local plans to have effect, a broad coalition was developed; now that partial victory has been achieved, each community board is pursuing its own plan, and the broad-based coalition earlier in process of formation has dissolved.

The political problem is not accidental. Divisions have always plagued oppositional movements: racism and sexism have divided directly political movements, sexism has been a problem in the civil rights movement and racism a thorny issue in the women's movement. Religious and ethnic differences can be divisive. But the focus on turf accentuates the differences qualitatively; perhaps there are local parallels to what is happening in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Locally, smart political leaders today see these divisions as desirable: decentralization takes a city-wide leadership away from the difficulties of allocation, yet leaves city-wide, and critical, policies out of reach of turf-based decentralized entities. Each community board is given a greater voice in deciding whether it wants its potholes fixed or the grass cut in its parks, a pittance of new housing or of rehabilitated housing; but how much money is allocated to housing, and what city-wide priorities in allocation of revenues are, become questions out of the reach of community influence.[28]

So, while the restructuring of cities, the creation of deep and shifting divisions within them, are of long standing, important aspects of the particular form that restructuring takes today are new. Whether the new outweighs the old depends on the purpose of the question. If the point is that what is wrong, inhuman, uncivic, invidiously discriminatory, in advanced cities today is something unseen before, that injustice in the city is a recent phenomenon, attributable to events since the first world war or since 1970 or so, and the remedy is thus to learn to deal with these new forces and thereby return to an earlier long-term trend of steady progress, integration, justice and civic democracy, then no — what is happening is not a new and unfortunate exception to a benign long-term pattern. But if the question has to do with the need to modify strategies of change, to create new coalitions to provide democratic control over the forms and functions of cities and what happens within them, to adapt long-term efforts to create really human urban environments to the specific circumstances of today, then there is substantial new with which to deal.

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28. The handling of the CHAS, the newly mandated Comprehensive Housing Affordability Strategy each city must adopt under the 1990 Housing Act, is evidence; where the law technically requires a clear and formal statement of priorities among policies and programmes, city leaders do everything in their power to modify the regulations to make these requirements meaningless, and then deliberately fill out the forms so that no traceable commitments will be contained in the required reports. See Marcuse (1992a).

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