

A Companion to the City

Edited by

Gary Bridge and Sophie Watson



Chapter 23

Cities in Quarters

Peter Marcuse

Everyone can see today, in any city in the world, that there are extremes of wealth and poverty, each concentrated in one or more sections of the city. The wealthy areas seem pretty well insulated from the city around them, sometimes in high-rise towers, sometimes at suburban-type remove. The poor areas, on the other hand, seem marginalized, unconnected to the economic and social life of the city around them. The concentration is voluntary for the rich, involuntary for the poor, it would seem. And there are other sections of each city that are neither very rich nor very poor; among them, differences can be perceived, not only of richness, but perhaps also of housing style, of culture, of language, of street pattern, of public spaces. Business areas are also very differentiated; factories are clearly different from office buildings, and their locations differ correspondingly. But some manufacturing is done in or near older business districts too. Commercial areas cater to buyers of different tastes and different incomes; they tend to cluster together in certain sections of town, often but not always near where their targeted customers live. Recreational areas, likewise, are used by different types of people for different purposes: the elderly want peace and quiet, toddlers need playgrounds, youth want fields for active sports – and different sports for different people, bocci for some, baseball for others, volleyball for a third type, with baseball even meaning different sports for different people.

All of these differences, these divisions of the city, seem quite natural and common-sensical to most of us, most of the time. But there are disturbing aspects to some of them, too. Poor areas seem to be getting poorer, rather than being in transition to improvement, and they seem, in many places, to be disproportionately occupied by members of minority groups, usually distinguishable by their color. They are more and more considered dangerous places to be in or to go. Ethnicity seems to be more and more a controversial issue, as the scale of immigration swells and debates about bilingualism, multiculturalism, self-segregation crowd newspaper columns and referendum ballots. Business areas seem more and more to be fencing themselves off, requiring permission and identification to even go in. Public places, like parks and streets and squares and plazas, seem to offer less and less opportunity for different people to meet people unlike themselves, to mix, to express themselves in a public arena. Cities today seem fragmented, partitioned – at the extreme, almost drawn and quartered, painfully pulled apart.

Are these perceptions correct? Are our cities becoming increasingly divided, polarized, fragmented?¹ If so, why? Is there a pattern to what is changed, a logic behind it? Who is responsible – is it simply a private sector phenomenon, reflecting changing individual preferences and behavior patterns, or is government involved, and if so, how? Is marginalization more than simply someone having to be at the bottom of the pile, and is it related to ghettoization? Should anything be done about these developments? Can anything be done?

These questions have been central to much of the debate about urban policy around the world today, and not coincidentally have been major themes in urban research and writing over the last 30 years or so. Much of that discussion involves the relationship between these divisions and the effects of globalization on urban structure. Globalization is a broad and sometimes amorphous concept, but it is generally linked to a shift from manufacturing to services, from Fordist mass production to post-Fordist flexible production within manufacturing, to a heightened mobility of capital across national borders, partly in consequence of a reduced power of labor vis-à-vis capital, and thus also to a reduced welfare provision by national states. These developments have accentuated longer-term trends in the spatial structure of cities, in general leading to increased inequalities, increased social and economic divisions, and increased reflection of those divisions in space. This chapter traces some of those spatial consequences.²

The Nature of Divisions in Cities

To begin with, divisions in cities have always existed. It is not the fact that they are divided that is the particular characteristic of the partitioned city today; rather, it is the source and manner of their division. Some divisions arise of economic functionality, some are cultural, and some reflect and reinforce relationships of power; some are combinations of all three.

Division by economic function, broadly defined, is a generally accepted necessary division within a city. Zoning is today the accepted legal embodiment of such divisions. That zoning should be by function, generally defined as economic use (residential from heavy industrial from light industrial from retail from wholesaling from offices), is not as self-evident as it might seem; “performance zoning,” for instance, attempts to define permitted uses of land not by their economic nature but by their environmental impact: traffic generated, shadows cast, air circulation impeded, green space occupied, etc. And, while “use” may separate manufacturing from retail from residential, it has never been quite clear why residential use for one family should be a different type of use than residential use by two or three families.³ Be that as it may, separation by function, by use, is generally accepted today as in general an appropriate division within a city.

Other forms of division seem much more problematic, however. We may name four as of growing importance and concern today: divisions by

- class
- “race” or color
- ethnicity
- lifestyle.

These separate sources of division are often commingled, and even more often confused.⁴ Walled or gated communities, for instance, are a growing feature of urban settlement patterns throughout the world, and reflect separation along each of these lines.⁵ Only those living within them or their announced and welcomed visitors, are allowed in; usually private security is provided to enforce restrictions not only on entry but also on activities within. An estimated 4 million live in such communities in the United States, with the figure climbing to 15 million if all forms of privately regulated living communities are included.⁶ If we add high-rise apartment buildings with security arrangements regulating entry, essentially vertical walled communities, the number grows even larger. If we were then to add the number of communities where restrictions on entry are enforced by effective social custom—racially discriminatory suburbs, developments limited to a narrow band of income-eligibles by price or law – we may almost describe many of our contemporary cities as entirely fragmented, composed only of a collection of separate areas of concentration of different people all desiring to stay apart from all others.

But the bases of separation between each of these parts of the contemporary city – ethnicity, lifestyle, class, and “race” – are not the same, and have very different impacts on the city. As a general rule:

- Divisions by class and “race” tend to be hierarchical, involuntary, socially determined, rigid, exclusionary, and incompatible with a democratic city life – although often legitimated as cultural divisions.
- Divisions by ethnicity and lifestyle tend to be cultural and voluntary, individually determined, fluid, non-exclusionary, and consistent with a democratic city life.

“Class” is a much-debated concept,⁷ but for our purposes, the understanding of the division of space in cities, two characteristics are central: income, and power. Income, because much (not all!) of the allocation of land to different users is made in the market, in which those with higher incomes able to pay higher prices will prevail in their choices over those with lower incomes, and power, because that large part of land allocation not determined solely by the market, e.g. governed by zoning rules, owned or controlled by the state, subject to tax payments or entitled to subsidies, etc., is determined by relationships of power in the state and the economy. These two characteristics, which largely go together, are not bad indicators of class; they correlate quite consistently with “higher” and “lower” in almost any ranking of classes, but are somewhat more ambiguous in the exact lines of demarcation between them.⁸

Using these criteria, then, we may almost speak of separate cities within most cities today.

The Residential Cities

One may speak of separate residential cities. The *luxury areas of the city*, the residences of the wealthy, while located in clearly defined residential areas, are at the same time not spatially bound. The very rich, in terms of residential location, are not tied to any quarter of the city, just as the men that whipped the horses that pulled

apart the quartered prisoner are not linked to any one of the resulting quarters. For the wealthy, the city is less important as a residential location than as a location of power and profit. The restructuring of cities has led to an increased profitability of real estate, from which the already wealthy disproportionately benefit. Joel Blau cites figures that indicate from 1973 to 1987 additional revenue from property constituted 45 percent of the income growth among the top 1 percent of the population.⁹ It is for them first and foremost a profit-making machine. They profit from the activities conducted in the city, or (increasingly) from the real-estate values created by those activities; they may enjoy living in the city also, but have many other options. If they reside in the city, it is in a world insulated from contact with nonmembers of the class, with leisure time and satisfactions carefully placed and protected. If the city no longer offers profit or pleasure, they can abandon it; 75 percent of the chief executives of corporations having their headquarters in New York City lived outside the city in 1975.¹⁰ It is a disposable city for them. Many years ago they were concerned to protect their separate space in the city by public instrumentalities such as zoning;¹¹ Seymour Toll vividly describes the interests of the wealthy residents of Fifth Avenue to protect their mansions from “inconsistent neighboring uses” through the adoption of New York City first zoning law in 1916. Today, each private high-rise condominium has its own security, and elsewhere walls protect the enclaves of the rich from intrusion. The new architecture of shopping malls, skywalks, and policed pedestrian malls is a striking physical mirror of the social separation. Downtown skywalks, for instance, both symbolically and physically, permit the men and women of business to walk over the heads of the poor and the menial.¹²

The *gentrified city*¹³ serves the professionals, managers, technicians, yuppies in their twenties and college professors in their sixties: those who may be doing well themselves, yet work for and are ultimately at the mercy of others. The frustrated pseudo-creativity¹⁴ of their actions leads to a quest for other satisfactions, found in consumption, in specific forms of culture, in “urbanity” devoid of its original historical content and more related to consumption than to intellectual productivity or political freedom.¹⁵ The residential areas they occupy are chosen for environmental or social amenities, for their quiet or bustle, their history or fashion; gentrified working-class neighborhoods, older middle-class areas, new developments with modern and well-furnished apartments, all serve their needs. Locations close to work are important, because of long and unpredictable work schedules, the density of contacts, and the availability of services and contacts they permit.

The *suburban city* of the traditional family, suburban in tone if not in structures or location (see below) is sought out by better-paid workers, blue- and white-collar employees, the “lower middle class,” the petit bourgeoisie. It provides stability, security, the comfortable world of consumption. Owner-occupancy of a single family house is preferred (depending on age, gender, household composition), but cooperative or condominium or rental apartments can be adequate, particularly if subsidized and/or well located to transportation. The home as symbol of self, exclusion of those of lower status, physical security against intrusion, political conservatism, comfort and escape from the work-a-day world (thus often substantial spatial separation from work) are characteristic. The protection of residential property values (the home functioning as financial security and inheritance as well as

residence) are important. Archie Bunker is the pejorative stereotype; the proud and independent worker/citizen is the other side of the coin.¹⁶

The *tenement city* must do for lower-paid workers, workers earning the minimum wage or little more, often with irregular employment, few benefits, little job security, no chance of advancement. Their city is much less protective or insular. In earlier days their neighborhoods were called slums; when their residents were perceived as unruly and undisciplined, they were the victims of slum clearance and “up-grading” efforts; today they are shown their place by abandonment and/or by displacement, by service cuts, deterioration of public facilities, political neglect. Because they are needed for the functioning of the city as a whole, however, they have the ability to exert political pressure, to get public protections: rent regulation, public housing, were passed largely because of their activities, although often siphoned up to higher groups after the pressure went off. When their quarters were wanted for “higher uses,” they were moved out, by urban renewal or by gentrification. The fight against displacement, under the banner of protecting their neighborhoods, has given rise to some of the most militant social movements of our time, particularly when coupled with the defense of the homes of their better-off neighbors.

The *abandoned city*, economic and, in the United States, racial, is the place for the very poor, the excluded, the never employed and permanently unemployed, the homeless and the shelter residents. A crumbling infrastructure, deteriorating housing, the domination of outside impersonal forces, direct street-level exploitation, racial and ethnic discrimination and segregation, the stereotyping of women, are everyday reality. The spatial concentration of the poor is reinforced by public policy; public (social, council) housing becomes more and more ghettoized housing of last resort (its better units being privatized as far as possible), drugs and crime are concentrated here, education and public services neglected.

The Multiple Cities of Business

In similar fashion, one may speak of different *cities of business and work*. The city of business and its divisions is not congruent in space with the residential city and its divisions. The dividing lines in the spatial patterns of economic activity define areas in which people of many occupations, classes, status, work in close proximity. Yet, if we define economic divisions by the primary activity taking place within them, one may again get a four- or five-part division.

The *controlling city*, the city of big decisions, includes a network of high-rise offices, brownstones or older mansions in prestigious locations, that is less and less locationally circumscribed. It includes yachts for some, the back seats of stretch limousines for others, airplanes and scattered residences for still others. But it is not spatially rooted. The controlling city is not spatially bounded, although the places where its activities at various times take place are of course located somewhere, and more secured by walls, barriers, conditions to entry, than any other part of the city.

Yet the controlling city tends to be located in (at the top of, physically and symbolically) the high-rise centers of advanced services, because those at the top of the chain of command wish to have at least those below them close at hand and responsive, and so it goes down the line. Our interviews with those responsible for planning the then new high-rise office tower for the Bank für Gemeinwirtschaft in

Frankfurt revealed professionals who had concluded that a separation of functions, with top executives downtown but all others in back-office locations, was the most efficient pattern for the bank, but who were overruled by their superiors, with only the advantage cited above as their reasoning. By the same token, Citibank in New York City wants its next level of professionals directly accessible to its top decision makers; credit card data entry operations may move to South Dakota, but not banking activities that require the exercise of discretion. Those locations, wherever they may be, are crucially tied together by communication and transportation channels which permit an existence insulated from all other parts of the city, if dependent on them.

The controlling city parallels in its occupancy and character, but is not congruent in time or space with, the luxury areas of the residential city. Its prototypical form is the citadel, the protectively defended high-rise complex in which business, refreshment, amusement, can be undertaken without threat of intrusion by anything unwanted, generally in "smart" buildings where communication with the world is possible without leaving the citadel, with either residential possibilities inside or direct access from luxury enclaves outside without touching the remainder of the everyday life of the city. Battery Park City in New York, Docklands in London, La Defense in Paris, Berinni in São Paulo, Lujiazui in Shanghai, all come close to the model.

The *city of advanced services*, of professional offices tightly clustered in downtowns, with many ancillary services internalized in high-rise office towers, is heavily enmeshed in a wide and technologically advanced communicative network. The skyscraper center is the stereotypical pattern, but not the only possibility. Locations may be at the edge of the center of the city, as in Frankfurt/Main, outside it, as in Paris at La Defense or outside Rome or the Docklands at London, or scattered around both inside and outside a city with good transportation and communications, as in Amsterdam. Social, "image," factors will also play a role; the "address" as well as the location is important for business. Whether in only one location or in several in a given city, however, there will be strong clustering, and the city of advanced services will be recognizable at a glance.

The city of advanced services parallels in the economic city the characteristics of the gentrified residential city.

The *city of direct production*, including not only manufacturing but also the lower-level production aspect of advanced services, government offices, the back offices of major firms, whether adjacent to their front offices or not, is located in clusters and with significant agglomerations but in varied locations within a metropolitan area. Varied, indeed, but not arbitrary or chaotic: where customers/clients (itself an interesting dichotomy!) wish to be in quick and easy contact, inner-city locations are preferred (as in the industrial valley between Midtown Manhattan and the Financial District for the printing industry, or Chinatown and the garment district for textile production, in New York City).

For mass production, locations will be different. Here the pattern has changed dramatically since the beginning of the industrial revolution. At first factories were near the center of the city; indeed, to a large extent they led to the growth of the city around them, as in the manufacturing cities of New England or the Midwest or the industrial cities of England. But more modern manufacturing methods require more single-story space, vastly more, with parking for automotive access rather than paths

for workers coming on foot, and many more operations are internalized; so land costs become more important than local agglomeration economies, and suburban or rural locations are preferred. The city of direct production parallels but is clearly not congruent with, in either space or time, the residential suburban city. In a development pushing the suburb as a spatial form one step further, edge cities,¹⁷ cities within the metropolitan area of major centers but largely self-contained in terms of residence and employment increasingly house both service and production functions, excluding only those relegated to the abandoned city in the center.

The *city of unskilled work* and the informal economy, small-scale manufacturing, warehousing, sweatshops, technically unskilled consumer services, immigrant industries, is closely intertwined with the cities of production and advanced services and thus located near them, but separately and in scattered clusters,¹⁸ locations often determined in part by economic relations, in part by the patterns of the residential city. Because the nature of the labor supply determines the profitability of these activities, the residential location of workers willing to do low-paid and/or unskilled work has a major influence. Thus in New York City sweatshops located in Chinatown, or the Dominican areas of Washington Heights, in Miami in the Cuban enclave, or in the slums of cities throughout the world.

The economic city of unskilled work parallels the tenement city, although again in different times and places. In many developed countries, the city of unskilled work counts within it major ethnic enclaves, concentrations of immigrant communities whose recent arrival and sometimes fragile legal status makes them particularly vulnerable to the conditions of work at the lowest ends of the legal pay scale, and/or pushes them into subsistence activities within the informal labor market.

The *workless city*¹⁹ (not because its residents do not work, but because their work is not rated or valued as “real” work in the prevailing view), the city of the less legal portions of the informal economy, the city of storage where otherwise undesired (NIMBY – Not In My Back Yard) facilities are located, the location of abandoned manufacturing buildings, generally is also congruent with the abandoned residential city. But for political protest many of the most polluting and environmentally detrimental components of the urban infrastructure, necessary for its economic survival but not directly tied to any one economic activity, are located here: sewage disposal plants, incinerators, bus garages, AIDS residences, housing for the homeless, juvenile detention centers, jails. New York City’s recently adopted Fair Share regulations, aimed at distributing NIMBY facilities “equitably” among districts, are a reflection both of the extent of the problem and its political volatility.

The workless city largely parallels the abandoned city. And it is, in many places, also a ghetto to which a “racial,” ethnic, or immigrant population is confined. We will return to this issue below.

Thus the cities of business. Divisions of commercial activity, of recreation, of entertainment, are likely to parallel these cities. For commercial activities, the sophisticated marketing analyses of modern merchandising define for us with operational precision the exact market a given retailer seeks. Income is the primary consideration: how up-scale a store is depends on the incomes of those it hopes to lure as its customers. Within the circle of wants of those at different income levels, appeal may further be narrowed to specific population groups, by lifestyle or demographic characteristic or, to a much lesser extent (except perhaps for foods)

by ethnicity. Thus an up-scale department store near the coast may feature more shore-related sporting goods, near the mountains more goods related to skiing; a more down-scale store may feature bowling equipment here, gambling paraphernalia there. Mapping the location of Starbucks coffee bars, the latest craze in yuppie relaxation, provides a good map of the location of the gentrified city in New York. Malls will attract one class, boutiques another. And the location of each will be near the area in which it expects to find its customers.

The same divided distribution of recreational facilities can be easily traced: by looking at the kinds of facilities provided, one can judge quite accurately the class composition of the neighborhood in which it is located. Jockey clubs will be in the luxury city, country clubs in the gentrified city, baseball fields in the suburban city, basketball courts in the tenement city, fire hydrants in the abandoned city. And divided locational patterns similarly characterize religious institutions, from storefront evangelical sects in the abandoned city to high Episcopalian in the luxury city. None of these divisions is of course in complete congruence with the other; individual tastes can outweigh social conformity, historical locations are not so easily changed as population and class change, public efforts may or may not try to counteract the effect of distinctions by wealth.

“Racial”, Ethnic, and Cultural Divisions

None of the foregoing can be understood, certainly not in the United States, and to a lesser extent not elsewhere either, without taking into account issues of “race,” ethnicity, and culture.

The formation of the ghetto has been alluded to several times above. Ghettos are very different from enclaves; ghettos are involuntary spatial concentrations of those at the bottom of a hierarchy of power and wealth, usually confined on the basis of an ascribed characteristic such as color or “race”; enclaves are voluntary clusters, usually based on ethnicity, often coupled with immigrant status, in which solidarity provides strength and the opportunity for upward mobility.²⁰ Today’s ghetto differs, not only from such enclaves, but also from older forms of the ghetto. It is new in that it has become what might be called an outcast ghetto, a ghetto of the excluded, the marginal, rather than only the isolated and “inferior.”²¹ It embodies a new relationship between the particular population group and the dominant society: one of economic as well as spatial exclusion.²² The older integrationist hopes that the ghetto might disappear as an involuntary confinement in the face of an ever more open, democratic, and nonracist society, have largely disappeared.

The integrationist view of the ghetto is no longer shared by many in the United States deeply involved in the struggles of minority communities for justice.²³ They are responding, not only to the entrenched force of racism in the United States, but also to economic changes which broadly affect all major cities: a new situation in which capital is replacing labor and is shifting its locations for production at a rapid pace and on a worldwide basis, leaving an ever growing percentage of the population in the older industrial countries²⁴ not needed for production – no longer a “reserve army of the unemployed,” because no reserve at home is any longer needed. Similarly, the opening of new markets worldwide has reduced the economic importance of maintaining an effective market at home with high wages and full employment,

the old Keynesian strategy. Thus business interests see no use in ghetto residents for purposes of business; political leaders see more to lose than to gain in shaping public policies to benefit ghetto residents, and many in the majority, for complex reasons, continue to look down on ghetto residents. The ghetto is functional for “society” to the extent that it provides protection against the anger and the disorder that ghetto residents might cause if not limited to the space of the ghetto. Spatial isolation further gives employers, public officials, and agencies an easy way to identify the economic and social position of a given applicant for a job, for admission, or for benefits: by their address shall they be known. Ghetto residents are outcasts; hence an outcast ghetto, to “define, isolate, and contain” their victims.²⁵

The developments that lead to ghettoization exist in many countries other than the United States as well. Events in Britain are similar enough to those in the United States to provoke an extensive debate as to whether there are “ghettos” in Britain;²⁶ major studies in continental Europe have raised similar questions about the concentration of Turks in Germany, Algerians in France, Indonesians in the Netherlands.²⁷ The conclusion of these studies generally has been to raise serious concern about tendencies moving in the direction of the pattern in the United States, but not yet comparable to it in scale.

In developing countries, while the impact of the factors that constitute globalization has been much more recent, current trends show a convergence of patterns, e.g. between São Paulo and New York City, or Shanghai and London. *Favelas* are the extreme example of abandoned cities – although abandonment is perhaps not the right word, since there was no prior period when they were better off. Early research focused, however, on precisely that characteristic that differentiated *favelas* from the outcast ghetto: their close relationship to the economy of the city in which, or around which, they developed. And in most developing countries race or color distinctions played a minor role. South Africa is of course the notable example of the exception, although the shantytowns that were much of the townships of apartheid South Africa were not, deliberately not, parts of the cities to which they related, and they were created well before the present phase of globalization of the world economy. Today, however, the pattern of ghettoization visible in the First World is also visible in the Third.²⁸ As unemployment increases in the industrial portions of the metropolitan region of São Paulo, the social “disorganization” characteristic of the ghettos of the United States, including the level and role of criminal activity, increases, and the overlapping of skin color and poverty becomes more visible.

Homelessness, both its extent and how it is treated, is a painful indicator of the strength of these processes of division in any given city. The homeless are essentially the diaspora of the abandoned city. The point is startlingly evident in the obsequiousness with which a city like New York rushes to evict the homeless from the streets or transportation centers that serve the citadels and the gentrified city, removing the homeless from the sight and sensibility of the rich to the distant ghettos of the poor, from washing down the floors of Grand Central Station with lye so no one would sleep on them to putting up “occupied look decals,” posters of plants and venetian blinds pasted on the boarded-up windows of abandoned houses to create a Potemkin village for the rich to look at on their drive to work. Engels would have found the pattern familiar. But a new ingredient has been added to the historical picture: the homeless today, and the residents of the abandoned city in general, are permanent.

They have little hope of getting jobs, of joining the mainstream when conditions get better; in fact, the number of the homeless remains high through good times and bad, unlike in previous years, creating what is appropriately called the “new homeless.”²⁹

Conclusion

The criticism of the quartering of our cities does not imply a desire for cultural or social uniformity, or for the suppression of differences or the neglect of personal preferences and individual choices. Hierarchical differences, differences based on ascribed rather than achieved characteristics, differences that permit some to exercise power over others, are the problem, and it is a problem that is growing. What is called for then is not an egalitarian uniformity that wipes out all differences, but rather a careful structuring of public actions that will counteract the invidious pressures of hierarchical division and will solidify spaces of public openness, solidarity, and communication, so structured as to allow of a full expression of civic life and the activities of civil society without the distortions of power. The types of concrete public action such a policy would imply can only be briefly mentioned here: the constitution of public space, the attention to boundaries between groups and activities that promote positive contact and harmony, zoning that rewards social as well as physical diversity, public support for those organizations needing it to become full participants in city life, adequate subsidies (implying adequate redistribution) to provide an acceptable quality of life for all citizens.

The formulation of policies to deal with the harms revealed by the patterns of contemporary city life and structure is not hard; but the conflicts involved in putting such policies in place do not promise an easy success.

NOTES

1. For a criticism of the use of some of these terms, see Peter Marcuse, “‘Dual city’: a muddy metaphor for a quartered city,” *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 13, 4, (December 1989), pp. 697–708.
2. For a detailed discussion of the relationship between spatial structure within cities and globalization, see Peter Marcuse and Ronald van Kempen (eds.), *Globalizing Cities: A New Spatial Order?* (Blackwell, Oxford, 1999), and, more generally, Saskia Sassen, *Cities in a World Economy* (Pine Forge Press (Sage Publications), Thousand Oaks, CA, 1994).
3. The United States Supreme Court struggled with this issue in its landmark decision legitimating zoning under the United States Constitution, *Euclid v. Amber*, 272 US 365 (1926), and some commentators today consider it to have been mistaken in accepting this particular division. Even a separation between high-rise and low-rise buildings is today often questioned, as in new developments which deliberately mix sizes and configurations for variety and esthetic appeal.
4. The Chicago School, for instance, and the subsequent attempts to apply factorial analysis to the spatial structure of cities, their urban morphology, all share this weakness.
5. See Edward J. Blakely and Mary Gail Snyder, *Fortress America: Gated and Walled Communities in the United States* (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Cambridge, MA,

- and Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC, 1995); and Peter Marcuse, "Walls of fear and walls of Support," in *Architecture of Fear*, ed. Nan Ellin (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1997), pp. 101–14, and Sophie Watson and Katherine Gibson (eds.), *Postmodern Cities and Spaces* (Blackwell, Oxford, 1994).
6. Evan McKenzie, *Privatopia: Homeowners Associations and the Rise of Residential Private Government*. (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1994).
 7. See Erik Olin Wright, ed. *The Debate on Classes*, Verso, London, 1989. Classes used here are in any event not the same as Rex's "housing classes," because the basis for the distinction is economic, housing the result, rather than the reverse. John Rex, *Race, Community and Conflict* (Oxford University Press and Institute of Race Relations, London, 1967).
 8. And they are of course not substantively defined by these indicators.
 9. Joel Blau, *The Visible Poor: Homelessness in the United States* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1992), p. 85.
 10. Steven Brint, in Mollenkopf and Castells, p. 155.
 11. Toll, Seymour, 1969 *Zoned American*, Grossman, New York.
 12. See Marcuse, Peter 1988. "Stadt – Ort der Entwicklung," in *Demokratische Gemeinde*, November, pp. 115–22; and Jonathan Barnett, "Redesigning the metropolis: the case for a new approach," *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 55, 2 (spring 1989), pp. 131–5.
 13. I use the term here, not in its narrower sense, as a portion of the city in which higher-class groups have displaced lower class, see definitions in Peter Marcuse, "Gentrification, abandonment, and displacement: connections, causes, and policy responses in New York City," *Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law*, 28 (1985), pp. 195–240, but in the broader sense of areas occupied by, or intended for, professionals, managers, technicians, which may include newly constructed housing as well as housing "gentrified" in the narrower sense of the word.
 14. The reference here is not to creative artists, to what in earlier days would have been called Bohemians, who cannot generally afford the prices of the gentrified city, and are more likely to live somewhere between the abandoned and the tenement city. To the extent that they tend to congregate in specific neighborhoods, they may serve as precursors of gentrification (see Damaris Rose. "Rethinking gentrification," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 2 (1984), pp. 47–74, who differentiates sharply among different categories of gentrifiers.
 15. Hartmut Häusermann and Walter Siebel, 1987. *Neue Urbanität*. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main. See also Marcuse, Peter, "Housing Markets and Labour Markets in the Quartered City," in *Housing and Labour Markets: Building the Connections*, ed. John Allen and Chris Hamnett (Unwin Hyman, London, 1991), pp. 118–35.
 16. I still find Damaris Rose's "Toward a Re-evaluation of the Political Significance of Home-Ownership in Britain," in Political Economy of Housing Workshop, Conference of Socialist Economists, March 1980 *Housing Construction and the State*, London, pp. 71–6, one of the best pieces dealing with the very ambiguous relationships of home-ownership to political position.
 17. The term comes from the quite uncritical but vivid discussion: Joel Garreau, *Edge City: Life on the New Frontier* (Doubleday, New York, 1991).
 18. See, for instance Saskia Sassen, "New trends in the sociospatial organization of the New York City economy," in *Economic Restructuring and Political Response*, ed. Robert A. Beauregard (Sage, Newbury Park, CA, 1989), pp. 69–114, with brief but provocative comments on the intra-city spatial aspects of the trends she describes.
 19. William Julius Wilson has been prominent among those pointing to the central position of the absence of work in shaping the lives of those in this division of the city; see

- William Julius Wilson, *When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor* (Alfred A. Knopf, New York City, 1996).
20. I have suggested formal definitions in Peter Marcuse, "The enclave, the citadel, and the ghetto: what has changed in the post-Fordist US city," *Urban Affairs Review*, 33, 2, (November 1997), pp. 228–64.
 21. Christian Kesteloot suggests, in an interesting paper, that "the growing importance of exclusion over marginalization" is a key characteristic of the present phase, Christian Kesteloot, "Three levels of socio-spatial polarization in Brussels." Paper presented at the ISA International Congress, Bielefeld, Germany, 1994.
 22. "Institutionalized" is added to the definition by Van Amersfoort: a ghetto is "an institutionalized residential area in which all the inhabitants belong to a single ethnically, racially or religiously defined group and all members of this group live in this area . . . 'institutionalised' means that the inhabitants did not choose their dwelling or residential area themselves: they were to some degree coerced by society . . . by law or . . . by subtle discrimination." Quoted in Ronald Van Kempen, "Spatial segregation, spatial concentration, and social exclusion: theory and practice in Dutch cities." Paper presented at European Network for Housing Research Workshop, Copenhagen, May 1994, p. 3. It is thus apparently intended to be synonymous with "involuntary," and an important, if self-evident, addition to the definition. Were it to mean either "with its own institutions" or "created by formal institutions of the dominant society" it would raise other important questions.
 23. See, for instance, Derrick Bell, *Faces at the Bottom of the Well: The Permanence of Racism* (Basic Books, New York, 1993).
 24. And increasingly in newer ones also, witness the unemployment rate of 34% in São Paulo where 20 years ago it was in one of the fastest industrializing regions in the world.
 25. The appropriate historical analogy for the outcast ghetto is more the leper colony than the medieval Jewish ghetto. For a detailed history of the United States ghetto, see Peter Marcuse, "Space over time: the changing position of the Black ghetto in the United States," *Netherlands Journal of Housing and the Built Environment*, 13, 1 (1998), pp. 7–24.
 26. See Ceri Peach, "Does Britain have ghettos?" *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 22, 1 (1996), pp. 216–35.
 27. For instance, John O'Loughlin and Jürgen Friedrichs, *Social Polarization in Post-Industrial Metropolises* (Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1996), H. Priemus, S. Musterd, and R. van Kempen, *Towards Undivided Cities in Western Europe: New Challenges for Urban Policy*. Part 7: comparative analysis (1998), pp. 5–20, and Marcuse and van Kempen, *supra*.
 28. If indeed that distinction is still appropriate; major "Third World" cities could as easily be considered First World, from all points of view except the timing of their development and the nature of the national economies and states in which they exist.
 29. See Peter Marcuse, "Space and race in the post-Fordist City: the outcast ghetto and advanced homelessness in the United States today," in *Urban Poverty and the Underclass*, ed. Enzo Mingione (Blackwell, Oxford, 1996), pp. 176–216.