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“Rock and Rolling the Soviet Rocket City”: International Tourism, Ideology and Cultural Consumption in the “Closed” City of Soviet Ukraine: 1964 - 1984

This paper is a part of my research project about cultural consumption and ideology in the city of Dnepropetrovsk in the Soviet Ukraine during the late socialism before the Gorbachev reforms. This city was officially closed by the KGB for visits of foreigners in 1959 because Dnepropetrovsk became a location for one of the biggest missile factories in the Soviet Union. The most powerful rocket engines for the Soviet military industrial complex were manufactured in Dnepropetrovsk, which was called by their inhabitants “the rocket city.” A tight ideological and political control was introduced in this city that led to a very conservative, pro-Stalinist and anti-Western ideological atmosphere, which was very different from more liberal conditions in the main Soviet capital cities (such as Leningrad and Moscow). Given its “closed” existence Dnepropetrovsk became a unique Soviet social and cultural laboratory in which various patterns of late socialism, collided with the new Western cultural influences. Using archival documents, periodicals, and personal interviews as its historical sources, this paper focuses on how international tourism contributed to the most popular form of cultural consumption in the Soviet society - consumption of Western popular music which was officially forbidden, but nevertheless was widely used for the organization of “socialist leisure.” On the eve of perestroika the “organized” Komsomol tourism became a part of lucrative business, which after 1987 became a starting point for the business and political careers of many prominent post-Soviet politicians, such as Yulia Timoshenko, a “heroine” of the Orange Revolution in 2004.

Brezhnev's rule in the Soviet Union (1964-82) opened a new chapter in "socialist consumption." In the 1930s, during Stalin regime, the Communist party and Soviet leadership had always to think about material consumption under socialism as a measure of their achievements in "historical struggle" of socialist system with capitalist one. If the communists' goal was to build a better, more productive and human society than capitalism, Soviet leaders had to care about different forms of consumption in the USSR and the efficient production of various consumer goods for the Soviet people, "to satisfy the needs of the builders of communism."¹ Communist society had to prove its superiority in a competition with capitalism. All Soviet leaders, beginning with Lenin and Stalin, understood this. But nobody, before Brezhnev, publicly announced and included an idea of "socialist consumption" as the main official social policy of the communist party and Soviet state. Brezhnev pointed out that the production of consumer goods had to be the main goal of the entire socialist economy. Both Stalin and Khrushchev always emphasized an investment in a "production of items which belonged to a group A" ("heavy industries") as a major priority for both the Soviet state and people. Since the decisions of the 15th Congress of the Communist Party in December of 1927, "the party directives" for each five-year plan had usually begun with an emphasis on this priority, trying to justify "an intensive development of heavy industry" by a necessity either "to strengthen the military state defense system" or to "produce more goods for mass consumption." Only during the 24th CPSU Congress, in March-April 1971, Leonid Brezhnev changed this

¹ See about "Soviet consumption" under Stalin in: Elena Osokina, *Za fasadom "stalinskogo izobilija". Raspredelenie I rynok v snabzhenii naselenia v gody industrializatsii, 1927-1941* (Moscow, 1998); Catriona Kelly and Vadim Volkov, "Directed Desires. Kulturmost' and Consumption," *Constructing Russian Culture in the Age of Revolution: 1881-1940*, Ed. by C. Kelly and D. Shepherd. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Natalia Lebina, *Povsednevnaia zhizn' sovestskogo goroda. Normy i anomalii. 1920/1930 gody.* (St Petersburg, 1999); Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Jukka Gronow, *Caviar with Champagne: Common Luxury and the Ideals of the Good Life in Stalin's Russia* (Oxford: Berg, 2003), esp. pp. 69-86. See also about tourism and consumption during

emphasis in the directives for the USSR Ninth five-year plan. Instead of “heavy industry” as priority number one, the Soviet leadership turned their attention to the “the products of group B” – “goods for mass consumption.” Therefore, at least in the Soviet official discourse, Brezhnev introduced “Soviet consumerism” as a legitimate precondition of what Communist ideologists had been already calling “the developed socialism” since 1967. The Soviet leadership planned more investment in agriculture, food and “light” industries to satisfy growing demands of Soviet consumers under developed socialism, which was, according to the new Brezhnev’s theory, the “last stage before the final phase of communist social and economic formation.” In February of 1976, the 25th CPSU Congress still followed this pattern. Soviet leaders still “prioritized” a “fast growth in the consumer sector.”²

During the 1960s and 1970s, Soviet ideologists paid more attention to an organization of leisure time and so-called “cultural consumption” (reading, watching films, listening to music etc.) among the Soviet population. Soviet consumers had to be provided not only with consumer

late Stalinism in: Anne E. Gorsuch, “‘There’s No Place Like Home’: Soviet Tourism in Late Socialism,” Slavic Review, (Winter 2003), Vol. 62, No. 4, 760-785.

² Leonid I. Brezhnev, Report to the 24th Congress of the CPSU 1971 (Moscow: Progress, 1971), 12-53; idem, Report to the 25th Congress of the CPSU 1976 (Moscow: Progress, 1976), 99; Leonid I. Brezhnev, Leninskim kursom (Moscow: Politizdat, 1972), Vol. 3, 24, 124, 235. See also about consumption and developed socialism in A. Butenko, “O razvitiu sotsialisticheskogo obshchestva,” Kommunist, 1972, No. 6, 48-58, and J. R. Millar, “The Little Deal: Brezhnev’s Contribution to Acquisitive Socialism,” Slavic Review, (Winter 1985), Vol. 44, No. 4, 694-706. See also a new “revisionist” approach to this problem in: Mark Harrison, “Economic Growth and Slowdown,” Brezhnev Reconsidered / Edited by Edwin Bacon and Mark Sandle. (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), 38-67, Mark Sandle, “A Triumph of Ideological Hairdressing? Intellectual Life in the Brezhnev Era Reconsidered,” Brezhnev Reconsidered, 135-164, and Mark Sandle, “Brezhnev and Developed Socialism: The Ideology of *Zastoi*?” Brezhnev Reconsidered, 165-187. Compare with the Cold War studies of the Brezhnev era: Developed Socialism in the Soviet Bloc/ Ed. by J. Seroka and S. Simon. (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1982); D. Kelley, The Politics of Developed Socialism (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986); Soviet Society and Culture/ Ed. by T. L. Thompson and R. Sheldon. (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1988). Despite the negative treatment of Brezhnev economic policy as a part of infamous “stagnation”, even the typical American textbook in Soviet History for undergraduate students had to acknowledge this: “Criticizing the USSR’s poor economic performance, [Brezhnev] singled out “Group B” (consumer goods) enterprises. He castigated ministerial-level officials for treating consumer goods as ‘something secondary and ancillary.’” See: Woodford McClellan, Russia: The Soviet Period and After (Upper Saddle River, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1998 [the 1st pr. 1986]), 227; see also 224-228. New textbooks in Soviet History usually ignore Brezhnev period. Compare with a sketchy overview of post-Stalin development in: Nicholas V. Riasanovsky and Mark D. Steinberg, A History of Russia: Seventh Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 529ff. Much better an overview is in: Ronald Grigor Suny, The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States

goods but also with new services and new ideologically “healthy” goals for consumption. According to the ideological requirements of the “developed socialism,” socialist consumption had to be different from the capitalist one and excluded notions of profitability and accumulation of wealth. Soviet ideologists tried to combine traditional Stalinist goals of “rational consumption” and the “rational use of leisure” with new requirements of the “developed socialism” theory. In the new interpretation of Soviet consumerism, the Stalinist “noble objectives of education and cultural growth of Soviet citizens” still dominated the ideological discourse of the Brezhnev era.³ Soviet tourism had to play an important role in this consumption – in satisfying, on the one hand, new demands for leisure time and socialist consumer goods and services, and in contributing, on the other hand, to a variety and intellectual wealth of “cultural consumption” by widening cultural horizons of the members of the “developed socialist society.”

Before Brezhnev made “Soviet consumerism” a part of the ideology of “developed socialism,” the local Soviet apparatchiks from Dniepropetrovsk had already tried to figure out what was “socialist consumption” and what were differences between “cultural” and “non-cultural” consumption. As the first secretary of the regional committee of CPSU in Dniepropetrovsk, A. Vatchenko, explained to young consumers, Komsomol activists, in January of 1969, the main essence of the “correct socialist cultural consumption” was the ability of “young consumers” to give a “correct class evaluation of the pieces of bourgeois arts and music and avoid non-critical attitudes toward a eulogy of the capitalist way of life.”⁴ In April of 1970, Z. Soumina, a representative of the city administration in Dniepropetrovsk, elaborated this theme further: “We are not against consumption. But this should be a *cultural* consumption. Take a

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 421-446.

³ See about this Anne E. Gorsuch, “‘There’s No Place Like Home’, 781, and Catriona Kelly and Vadim Volkov, “Directed Desires. Kulturnost’ and Consumption,” Constructing Russian Culture in the Age of Revolution: 1881-1940, Ed. by C. Kelly and D. Shepherd. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 293.

look at our city offices of music recording and what our youth is consuming there as ‘music.’ They are recording the tapes with songs of Vysotsky, music by the Beatles (‘bitlov’). Where is the real cultural consumption here? You can’t see that our young people are recording classical music by Tchaikovsky or Glinka. They still prefer the dances with their boogie-woogie to the concerts of classical music.”⁵ As we see, the Soviet apparatchiks, who experienced a real problems of new consuming Soviet society, tried to make a difference between “cultural” (good) and “non-cultural” (bad) forms of consumption. At the same time, they also understood what recent scholars of “cultural studies” defined as “cultural consumption” – consumption of cultural products such as books, plays, movies, TV shows and music. Therefore they fused these meanings together in their discourse – 1) the notion of positive consumption, which would lead to the widening of the cultural horizons of the Soviet consumer (and it should be correct from the ideological point of view, based on the Marxist theory of class struggle) and 2) the idea of consumption of various products of culture (literature, music, etc.)⁶

Tourism, international tourism, in particular, became a very important testing ground for these notions of “cultural consumption”, especially by the end of the Brezhnev era. This kind of tourism was growing during the period of developed socialism. As early as 1929, under Stalin, the Soviet government created a special tourist agency, “Intourist” (an abbreviation from two Russian words “Innostrannyi turist” – “Foreign Tourist,” or “International Tourist”) to serve the foreign tourists, who visited the USSR. Later on, in 1964, with the transition to the consuming society of developed socialism, the All-Union Administration for Foreign Tourism introduced state control over all forms of international tourism. In a few years it changed its name to “the

⁴ Derzhavnyi arkhiv Dnipropetrovs’koi oblasti (hereafter – DADO), f.22, op. 15, d. 252, l. 62.

⁵ DADO, f. 416, op. 2, d. 1565, ll. 306-307.

⁶ See a survey of growing literature on cultural consumption in John Storey, Cultural Consumption and Everyday Life (London: Arnold, 1999).

State Committee for Foreign Tourism.” This committee established its control over the old agency, “Intourist,” and two new ones: 1) the international youth tourist organization “Sputnik” (Komsomol travel agency), and 2) the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions’ international travel agency. According to the first historian of Soviet tourism, the number of foreign tourists who visited the Soviet Union increased from 486,00 in 1956, to 711,000 in 1960, to more than 2 million in 1970, more than 5 million in 1980 and 6 million in 1985. More than 60% of all these tourists represented countries of the “socialist camp.” The number of Soviet tourists who traveled abroad also grew from 561,000 in 1956 to more than 1,800,000 in 1970 and more than 4,500,000 in 1985.⁷

On the local level, in Ukraine, domestic tourism was governed by the Republican Tourism and Excursion Board. As everywhere in the USSR, in the Dniepropetrovsk region of Ukraine, this form of tourism was the most popular. However, the KGB officials did not encourage international tourism in this strategically important region and tried to stop any attempt to develop “active forms of domestic tourism,” which would lead to breach of secrecy.⁸ Despite the KGB’s cautious attitude toward tourism in the region, the local administration followed closely the new party directives about “cultural consumption” and creation of the better living conditions for Soviet citizens, and promoted forms of the “health oriented” tourism as a part of the new party’s strategy.⁹ In the region of Dniepropetrovsk a number of tourist facilities grew during the Brezhnev era. In 1940 the region had only two sanatoria with 70 beds, in 1984

⁷ G. P. Dolzhenko, *Istoria turizma v dorevoliutsionnoi Rossii i SSSR* (Rostov, 1988), 150. See also Denis J. B. Shaw, “The Soviet Union,” in *Tourism and Economic Development in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union*/ Ed. by Derek R. Hall. (London: Belhaven Press, 1999), 137-140. See about tourism and Soviet trade unions in Blair Ruble, *Soviet Trade Unions: Their Development in the 1970s* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

⁸ See the KGB report on the situation in the region, which was submitted to the Communist party regional committee on July 4, 1968: DADO, f. 19, op. 52, d. 72, ll. 1-4.

⁹ See about Soviet classification of tourism and recreation in: Denis J. B. Shaw, “The Soviet Union,” in *Tourism and Economic Development in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union*/ Ed. by Derek R. Hall. (London: Belhaven Press, 1999), 120-136.

there were 33 sanatoria, pensions and tourist hotels with 7,407 beds. (Overall, in the USSR, the number of these facilities increased from 469 in 1940 to 2,566 in 1988.) If the region of Dnepropetrovsk had 39,600 summer camps for children with special children's tourist facilities in 1950, there were more than 142,600 camps with tourist facilities for children in 1984.¹⁰ In 1973 the Komsomol tourist organization "Sputnik" in Dnepropetrovsk region used three facilities to accommodate more than 6 thousand young tourists (mainly secondary school students) from 160 cities of the Soviet Union, in 1980 this organization used six tourist facilities, including a fashionable hotel "Dnepropetrovsk", to accommodate more than 36 thousand of the Soviet tourists, and one modern hotel "Kiev" in Krivoi Rog to accommodate 100 foreign tourists.¹¹

In the Soviet Ukraine outgoing international tourism was governed by the Trade Union Republican Board Tourism Department ("Buro ekskursii i puteshestvii" in Russian) and by the Komsomol organization "Sputnik". Incoming foreign tourists were welcomed by the state organization "Intourist" (the Ukrainian branch), and "Sputnik." Given the status of Dnepropetrovsk as "the closed city," foreign tourists were not allowed to visit the city. In fact, only one industrial city of the province of Dnepropetrovsk, Krivoi Rog, was opened for foreigners, who were mostly students of the local mining college and represented the socialist and developing countries. Therefore, the city of Dnepropetrovsk branches of the Trade Union Tourism Department and "Sputnik" were mainly preoccupied with the local inhabitants of the region who traveled abroad rather than with foreign tourists. An overwhelming majority of the local outgoing tourists participated in so-called "cultural international tourism." They bought

¹⁰ Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie Dnepropetrovskoi oblasti. Dnepropetrovshchina v tsifrakh. (K 40-letiu pobedy v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine)/Ed. by L. G. Glushkina (Dnepropetrovsk, 1985), 69, 68. Denis J. B. Shaw, "The Soviet Union," 122.

¹¹ DADO, f. 22, op. 19, d. 156 (1973-74), l.1, 2, 14; f. 22, op. 26, d. 102 (1979-80), l. 1, 2, 4, 5.

special traveling plans ('putiovka' in Russian), usually for a week or two weeks trip abroad. They visited specially designated places in foreign countries, according to the officially approved travel itinerary and travel expenses, and they stayed in the hotels strictly designated by the Soviet tourist authorities. These authorities took care of all travel documents for Soviet tourists – foreign passports and visas, and an amount of foreign currency permitted for foreign travel according to a given travel plan for each tourist. Only few tourists went abroad as “business tourists” – mainly as visiting scholars and scientists who also had their own travel plans, called in Russian “tvorcheskaia komandirovka” (“creative business trip”).¹²

A majority of Dnepropetrovsk tourists who participated in international travel did this in groups (34-40 people each) which were closely monitored by the representatives of the Soviet tourist administration. All these representatives (usually Soviet, trade union, party and Komsomol apparatchiks) were approved by KGB offices and had to submit their reports about their groups to both their tourist administration and the KGB immediately after the return of their tourist group back to Dnepropetrovsk. The first organization, which started “international group tourism” in the region, was the Dnepropetrovsk trade unions. The local KGB office was reluctant to permit mass international tourism because of the strategic secretive status of the city-producer of military rockets. In 1961 the regional council of trade unions planned to send 613 local tourists abroad. But under pressure of the KGB, Dnepropetrovsk trade unions had to limit this number up to 551.¹³ In 1966 the regional trade unions sent 1,299 local tourists abroad.¹⁴ In 1970 the regional trade unions organized travel abroad for 2,027 people, including 1,930 tourists who bought their travel plans through “Intourist”, 82 workers who were sent by the trade unions

¹² See about the origin of all these forms of tourism in Stalin's times in: Anne E. Gorsuch, “‘There's No Place Like Home’,” 769-770.

¹³ DADO, f. 1860, op. 1d., d. 7, l. 1.

¹⁴ DADO, f. 1860, op. 1d., d. 62, l. 28.

which covered all their travel expenses and 15 people who were taking medical care in medical centers abroad.¹⁵ In 1972 the trade unions sent 3,192 local tourists to various locations in different countries. Four years later, in 1976, despite all KGB restrictions, 4,931 people traveled abroad through the trade union travel agency.¹⁶

Only in 1972 did the KGB permit new forms of travel abroad - “the youth group international tourism” for “Sputnik” in the city of Dniepropetrovsk.¹⁷ Ideological basis for supporting Komsomol international tourism in the region came from the Communist party’s directives. As early as 1973 Leonid Brezhnev pointed out that “international connections of Komsomol, the contacts of Soviet boys and girls with the youth from foreign countries became the crucial part of the entire Soviet foreign policy.”¹⁸ Following these directives, tourist administration sent only the best (ideologically reliable and KGB approved) industrial workers, engineers, collective farmers and teachers, who “would be able to represent the Soviet politics at its best.” Each group of these tourists had also one or two “non-official” representatives of the KGB and Komsomol apparatus. Usually one member of this group represented directly the regional Komsomol committee of Dniepropetrovsk. In 1977, for an example, all 28 group leaders were the high regional or district Komsomol apparatchiks.¹⁹

In 1973 Dniepropetrovsk “Sputnik” organized a visit of 125 foreign tourists (mainly from Poland and Czechoslovakia) in the city of Krivoi Rog and more than 6 thousand Soviet tourists from 160 cities of the Soviet Union. At the same time Komsomol tourist organization sent more than 8 thousand local tourists to other places in the Soviet Union and 430 tourists from the region

¹⁵ DADO, f. 1860, op. 1, d. 1249, l. 45, 46.

¹⁶ DADO, f. 1860, op. 1, d. 1533, l. 5.

¹⁷ DADO, f. 22, op. 22, d. 62, ll. 1-11.

¹⁸ Citation is from: DADO, f. 22, op. 19, d. 156, l. 7.

¹⁹ Authors conversation with Karlo A. Markov, Dniepropetrovsk University, April 12, 1992; Author’s conversation with Natalia V. Bocharova, Dniepropetrovsk University, March 15, 1993. DADO, f. 22, op. 24, d. 67, ll. 10, 13, 16.

to 23 different foreign countries (380 of them traveled abroad the first time in their lives). According to the data of the regional Communist party committee, during 1973, more than four thousand tourists from the region of Dnepropetrovsk visited foreign countries. It was only a tiny fraction (0.1%) of the growing regional population of 3.5 million people.²⁰ In 1974 “Sputnik” received 131 foreign tourists in the region and sent 13,031 people as domestic tourists and 488 as international tourists. At the same time 4,167 local tourists went abroad through the trade unions traveling agency. Besides, Komsomol tourist organization usually sent approximately 300 young tourists to the international youth camps each year.

A number of young tourists who went abroad increased in the region. In 1975 “Sputnik” sent 700 local tourists to foreign countries (and 17,300 as domestic tourists), in 1976 – 828 as international tourists (and 16,111 as domestic tourists). In 1977 815 young tourists visited 18 foreign countries. 747 of them (92%) in 22 tourist groups went to the socialist countries, and only 68 (8%) in 5 groups visited capitalist countries.²¹ Still, an overwhelming majority of local tourists who went abroad did this through the trade unions. According to “Sputnik” reports, there were 1,000 local tourists who went abroad in 1979 and 1,245 in 1981. During the same years trade union tourist agency sent abroad 5242 and 5400 local tourists accordingly. As we see, only 18 per cent of all international tourists from the region used Komsomol travel agency. During the 1980s more than one thousand young tourists from the region on regular basis visited various foreign countries annually.²² In 1990, the zenith of perestroika, a number of travels abroad

²⁰ DADO, f. 22, op. 22, d. 4, l. 110. TsSU SSSR: Statisticheskoe upravlenie Dnepropetrovskoi oblasti, Dnepropetrovskaia oblast' za tri goda deviatoi piatiletki (1971-1973 gody). Kratkii statisticheskii sbornik (Dnepropetrovsk, 1974), 6.

²¹ DADO, f. 22, op. 24, d. 67, l. 16.

²² See documents of the Dnepropetrovsk branch of “Sputnik” and the reports of leaders of tourist groups in: DADO, f. 22, op. 22, d. 62, ll. 1-64; f. 22, op. 24, d. 141, ll. 1-42; f. 22, op. 30, d. 85, ll. 1-84. Figures of the population of Dnepropetrovsk region see in official statistics: Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie Dnepropetrovskoi oblasti. Dnepropetrovshchina v tsifrah. (K 40-letiu pobedy v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine)/Ed. by L. G. Glushkina (Dnepropetrovsk, 1985), 10. Numbers of the tourists see in “Sputnik” reports in: DADO, f. 22,

reached a peak for the entire history of the region. During this year, 2,130 people visited capitalist and developing countries on business and as guest scholars or scientists. 5,123 and 23,000 local inhabitants went accordingly to capitalist and socialist countries as tourists. Therefore, in general, 30,253 tourists from the region of Dnepropetrovsk went abroad that year. And even then, they still represented less than one per cent of the entire regional population (0.77% from 3,905,200 people). Even if we add a number of emigrants who left the region for Israel and USA (7,368 people), an overall amount of those who traveled abroad was still very small and less than one percent (0.96%).²³

From the beginning, international tourism in the “closed” city of Dnepropetrovsk was directly connected to cultural consumption among a population of the region of Dnepropetrovsk. Officially, all travelers abroad from the region were qualified as the “cultural tourists.” The recent cultural and sociological studies of tourism always portray “cultural tourists” as those who “gaze collectively upon certain objects which in some ways stand out or speak to them.”²⁴ Yet, for the Soviet tourists their travel abroad was a unique opportunity not just to “gaze” (or its better to say “to take a peep”) on the certain objects of the “alien” world, but to memorize their own entire experience of visiting non-Soviet places. Even for Soviet ideologists and loyal subjects of the Soviet state, a trip abroad was a rare and remarkable occasion when they felt very ambiguous about “the foreign style of life.” On the one hand, given to indoctrination in Communist

op. 19, d. 156 (1973-74), l.1, 2, 14; f. 22, op. 26, d. 102 (1979-80), l. 1, 2, 4, 5; f.22, op. 22, d. 61 (1974), l. 8; op. 22, d. 403 (1975), l.4ob.; op. 23, d. 86 (1976), l. 4; op. 24, d. 67(1977), l. 10; op. 30, d. 83 (1981), l. 3; op. 32, d. 71 (1982), l. 11; op. 34, d. 73 (1983), l. 14; op. 36, d. 73 (1984), l. 14. A number of the trade unions' tourists came from: DADO, f. 1860, op. 1, d. 1991 (1976), l. 5; d. 2441 (1979), l. 3; d. 2836 (1981), l. 1-206; d. 2837 (1981), l. 1-201.

²³ Ispolkom Dnepropetrovskogo oblsatnogo Soveta narodnykh deputatov, *Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoe razvitie Dnepropetrovshchiny za 1986-1990 gg. Statisticheskii sbornik* (Dnepropetrovsk, 1991), 3, 78.

²⁴ See especially John Urry, *The Tourist Gaze: Leisure and Travel in Contemporary Societies* (London: Sage, 2002). Citation is from his chapter: John Urry, “The ‘Consumption’ of Tourism,” in *The Consumption Reader* /Ed. by David B. Clarke, Marcus A. Doel and Kate M. L. Housiaux (London: Routledge, 2003), 117-121. See also chapter

ideology, they were skeptical and critical about everything non-Soviet. On the other, they were attracted to and stunned by what they lived through during their travel abroad.²⁵ For Soviet tourists who traveled for their first time abroad, everything looked, smelled, tasted, and sounded different. As one character of the popular Soviet comedy film of 1968 asked her husband who just returned from his foreign trip: “Did you taste Coca-Cola? How was it?” The wife was so anxious to know what the product which official Soviet propaganda always associated with “Western consumerism” and “Western life” tasted like. She was more interested obviously in a physical (almost physiological) experience of the travel abroad rather than in the cultural objects (museums, historical sights etc.), which usually attracted the Western tourists during their foreign travels.²⁶

Soviet people wanted not just to gaze, but to touch, smell and taste what Western tourists took for granted and considered as just “ordinary consumer goods” not worthy of tourist attention (e.g., a can of “Coca-Cola,” a pair of “Levi’s” jeans etc.) The leaders of tourist groups from Dnepropetrovsk, which traveled abroad from 1964 to 1984, complained about the same problem in their official reports. All tourists usually were more interested in visiting shopping centers and local stores rather than museums and other important objects of “cultural tourism.”²⁷ According to former leaders of tourist groups, such as Serhiy Tihipko, Karlo Markov and Natalia Bocharova, both trade unions’ and Komsomol tourist delegations spent more time in the shops than in museums during their foreign travels in such different countries as Hungary, East

“Consuming Places: Cites and Cultural Tourism” in: Steven Miles and Malcolm Miles, Consuming Cities (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 66-85.

²⁵ Even those Soviet apparatchiks, who used to live in the West, still had these ambiguous feelings about foreign countries. See an interesting analysis of Stalinist apparatchik’s feelings about his trips to Europe in: Michael David-Fox, “Stalinist Westernizer? Aleksandr Arosev’s Literary and Political Depictions of Europe,” Slavic Review, (Winter 2003), No. 62, No. 4, 733-759.

²⁶ I refer to the Soviet movie “The Diamond Arm” (Director: Leonid Gaidai, “Mosfilm,” 1968).

²⁷ See complaints about these preferences in official reports: DADO, f. 1860, op. 1, d. 1532, l. 11-112 (for 1972). See also DADO, f. 22, op. 22, d. 62, ll. 1-64; f. 22, op. 24, d. 141, ll. 1-42; f. 22, op. 30, d. 85, ll. 1-84.

Germany, Egypt or India.²⁸ At the same time, the KGB officers, who were members of those tourist groups, and sometime even the leaders of these groups themselves, testified that even supervisors (both formal and informal) of the tourist groups were more interested in material aspects of consumption of foreign goods and services rather than in cultural and educational aspects of their travels.²⁹

In contrast to other regions of Ukraine which had a direct supervision by central Ukrainian administrations from Kiev, given a status of “strategically important military center” in Dniepropetrovsk, this region had direct supervision from Moscow. This effected many spheres of life, including tourism. Dniepropetrovsk tourist administration was more flexible and had less control from Kiev.³⁰ By the end of the 1970s, the local tourist administration developed their own travel itineraries, which were more attractive to local consumers. During 1974-1982 the most popular destinations for Dniepropetrovsk tourists (through “Sputnik”) were socialist countries, such as Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland (in 1981 Poland, practically, was closed to the Soviet “cultural tourists” because of “Solidarity” movement). The most popular tourist travel plans (through Trade Union Tourist Department) included a “Mediterranean cruise trip on the steam boat from Odessa” and “cultural travels to Egypt and India.”³¹

²⁸ Author’s interview with Serhiy Tihipko, a director of “Privatbank” in Dniepropetrovsk, October 12, 1993. Author’s conversation with Karlo A. Markov, Dniepropetrovsk University, April 12, 1992; Author’s conversation with Natalia V. Bocharova, Dniepropetrovsk University, March 15, 1993.

²⁹ Author interview of Igor T., KGB officer, Dniepropetrovsk, May 15, 1991. Author interview of Askold K., a son of a head of tourist department in Dniepropetrovsk Trade Unions branch, Dniepropetrovsk University, April 15, 1993. Author’s conversation with Karlo A. Markov, Dniepropetrovsk University, April 12, 1992; Author’s conversation with Natalia V. Bocharova, Dniepropetrovsk University, March 15, 1993.

³⁰ Author’s interview with Serhiy Tihipko, a director of “Privatbank” in Dniepropetrovsk, October 12, 1993. Author’s conversation with Karlo A. Markov, Dniepropetrovsk University, April 12, 1992; Author’s conversation with Natalia V. Bocharova, Dniepropetrovsk University, March 15, 1993.

³¹ See both documents: DADO, f. 22, op. 22, d. 62, ll. 1-64; f. 22, op. 24, d. 141, ll. 1-42; f. 22, op. 30, d. 85, ll. 1-84, and personal opinion of the travelers: Author interview of Askold K., a son of a head of tourist department in Dniepropetrovsk Trade Unions branch, Dniepropetrovsk University, April 15, 1993. Author’s conversation with

Soviet travel agencies took care of the preparation of travel documents (passports and visas) and currency. An amount of hard currency for individual tourist depended on the country of destination and duration of the trip. Usually for two weeks of travel in the capitalist or developing countries one tourist was allowed to exchange (on average) no more than 150 rubles in Dnepropetrovsk (during a period from 1972 to 1984). For the same duration of trip to Bulgaria or East Germany, a tourist usually exchanged 10 or 15 rubles maximum. Even in their official reports, the tourist group leaders complained about “humiliation” of Soviet tourists abroad when they had no enough hard currency to “behave decently.” As A. Kurochkin, a leader of tourist group which participated in Danube cruise in 1968, complained, “our tourists felt very constrained in their financial spending when they could not visit a toilet or drink water because of lack of cash.”³² On rare occasions, like the Danube cruise in October of 1978, the Soviet tourist authority could permit 300 rubles for an individual exchange.³³ Of course, many “enterprising” members of the Soviet elite, who were interested in the foreign consumer goods, brought their items for “friendly exchange” during their travel. These objects for “friendly exchange” included everything, from bottles of vodka to Soviet badges. Usually KGB and custom officers allowed these items to cross the Soviet border.³⁴

In exchange, Dnepropetrovsk tourists could bring more foreign goods home. These cultural tourists became real “cultural consumers” of the foreign products they had dreamed

Karlo A. Markov, Dnepropetrovsk University, April 12, 1992; Author’s conversation with Natalia V. Bocharova, Dnepropetrovsk University, March 15, 1993.

³² Citation is from: DADO, f. 1860, op. 1, d. 1022, l. 114. See also: DADO, f. 22, op. 19, d. 73, l. 15 (for 1972) and f. 22, op. 24, d. 141, l. 21 (for 1978); see also a typical report about attempts of the Soviet tourists to bring illegally extra Soviet currency in *ibid.*, f. 22, op. 22, d. 62, l. 40, or an exchange of Soviet goods into money in *ibid.*, f. 1860, op. 1d., d.62, l. 31 (for 1966), and f. 22, op. 32, d. 73, l. 85-86 (for 1982).

³³ DADO, 1860, op. 1, d. 2278, l. 95.

³⁴ See especially DADO, f. 1860, op. 1, d. 1533, l. 7, 8-9, d. 2637, ll. 26, 27-27ob., and also f. 22, op. 22, d. 62, ll. 1-64; f. 22, op. 24, d. 141, ll. 1-42; f. 22, op. 30, d. 85, ll. 1-84. Author interview of Askold K., a son of a head of tourist department in Dnepropetrovsk Trade Unions branch, Dnepropetrovsk University, April 15, 1993. Author’s

about but were not able to get them in the Soviet official stores or black market. Some of these products, such as foreign music records, became the most desirable object of consumption among many tourists – from the regular members of tourist groups to their leaders. Eventually, these “cultural tourists” from Dnepropetrovsk contributed to a growing market of Western popular music which became an important part of cultural consumption in the region.

A relative growth of outgoing international tourism from after 1975, to some extent, was a result of propagandist efforts of the Soviet government to demonstrate to the world that the Soviet Union followed literally a section of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. This section acknowledged that “freer tourism was essential to the development of cooperation amongst nations.”³⁵ When in 1978 the United States began negotiating tourism agreements with Egypt, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Poland, these countries became more attractive for the Soviet tourists as well because of an influx of new Western tourists from the USA and the new opportunities for consumption there.³⁶ In 1980-1984 because of the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, deployment of the Soviet intermediary range missiles in Europe and “Solidarity” movement in Poland, a destination of tourist groups from the Soviet Union (including Dnepropetrovsk tourists) changed. An overwhelming majority of organized international tourists went now not to the developing countries, such as Egypt and India, but to the relatively stable and loyal socialist countries such as Hungary, East Germany and Bulgaria. Yugoslavia was also very popular among Soviet tourists. However, the local KGB officers and

conversation with Karlo A. Markov, Dnepropetrovsk University, April 12, 1992; Author’s conversation with Natalia V. Bocharova, Dnepropetrovsk University, March 15, 1993.

³⁵ Authors conversation with Karlo A. Markov, Dnepropetrovsk University, April 12, 1992; Author’s conversation with Natalia V. Bocharova, Dnepropetrovsk University, March 15, 1993. See also David L. Edgell, International Tourism Policy (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1990) 40.

³⁶ Authors conversation with Karlo A. Markov, Dnepropetrovsk University, April 12, 1992; Author’s conversation with Natalia V. Bocharova, Dnepropetrovsk University, March 15, 1993. See also David L. Edgell, International Tourism Policy (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1990) 43.

Communist ideologists, who loved to travel there, did not want to encourage local tourists to buy “travel plans” to socialist Yugoslavia, which was not an official member of the Soviet bloc.³⁷

During the 1970s and 1980s, Dnepropetrovsk international tourists usually traveled to European socialist countries by a train from Kiev. If their destination was Poland or East Germany, they went through the railway station of Brest (in Byelorussia). If they traveled to Hungary, Czechoslovakia, or Yugoslavia they went through the railway station at Chop in Western Ukraine. Another popular travel plan included a sea trip from Odessa to Bulgaria and Romania. So called “Mediterranean cruises special travel plans,” which included visits of big ports on the Mediterranean sea, were organized by Trade Unions and were available only for the experienced tourists who were double checked by the KGB. The KGB office had an “unwritten rule” for the local international tourists. Nobody was allowed to visit a capitalist or developing country without previous experience of a travel to socialist countries. If during his/her travel to socialist country, a tourist did not make ideologically harmful mistakes (buying pornography, anti-Soviet products, etc.), and he/she demonstrated only loyal behavior of Soviet patriot, the KGB would permit such a tourist to travel to capitalist countries. Any travel abroad required also the special recommendation from the certain Komsomol, Communist and Trade Union organization, where a potential tourist was a member. It usually took at least a couple of months for the Soviet travel agency to check all documents of the candidate for travel abroad. Even communist party apparatchiks and Komsomol functionaries used to complain of the long

³⁷ Author interview of Igor T., KGB officer, Dnepropetrovsk, May 15, 1991. Author interview of Igor T., KGB officer, Dnepropetrovsk, May 15, 1991. Author interview of Askold K., a son of a head of tourist department in Dnepropetrovsk Trade Unions branch, Dnepropetrovsk University, April 15, 1993. See also David L. Edgell, International Tourism Policy (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1990) 41.

bureaucratic procedures of this “security” checking, which usually involved not only a special KGB officer but also the representatives of administration, party, Komsomol and trade unions.³⁸

The “direct” representatives of trade union and Komsomol administration in the international tourist groups always used their official trips abroad for their own consumption (sometimes not very “cultural” consumption at all). On many occasions, as a gesture to their supervisor, they brought a gift back, as a token of their loyalty from their tourist assignment.³⁹ Usually these “direct” representatives used their “special status” and brought some foreign goods to Dnepropetrovsk, which were impossible to get in the Soviet Union. An overwhelming amount of these goods were Western fashionable items – jeans, cigarettes, records of popular music and perfumes. Sometimes these goods included the popular books in Russian, which had been printed in the Soviet Union and sent to other socialist countries as a part of a cultural mission in promoting Soviet culture and Russian language among members of the Soviet bloc. Usually these books, especially adventure novels by Alexander Dumas and Arthur Conan Doyle, were extremely popular in the 1970s among the Soviet reading audience, but they were missing from Dnepropetrovsk book stores. Two major publishing houses in Dnepropetrovsk re-printed the boring collections of Brezhnev’s works and other ideological literature of the Communist party and ignored a growing demand for the more popular and readable books.⁴⁰ Because of the ideological paradoxes of the trade policy between members of the Soviet bloc, these books in Russian language (including Russian classical literature) became available in many socialist countries, a destination of the travel for many Soviet tourist groups. As a result, many tourists

³⁸ Author’s interview with Serhiy Tihpko, a director of “Privatbank” in Dnepropetrovsk, October 12, 1993. Author’s conversation with Karlo A. Markov, Dnepropetrovsk University, April 12, 1992; Author’s conversation with Natalia V. Bocharova, Dnepropetrovsk University, March 15, 1993.

³⁹ Alena Ledeneva gave many examples of these tokens of loyalty in her description of “blat” as “the Soviet system of personal favors”. See Alena V. Ledeneva, *Russia’s Economy of Favours*, 3, 63, 67, 151, 196.

⁴⁰ Tsentral’noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie Dnepropetrovskoi oblasti. *Dnepropetrovshchina v tsifrakh*, 78.

used their trips as an opportunity to bring these books from Bulgaria or Hungary, back to Dnepropetrovsk.⁴¹

After the first international tourist groups returned to Dnepropetrovsk, their leaders in reports to their administration noted the “unhealthy enthusiasm” (“nezdorovyi azhiotazh”) of Dnepropetrovsk tourists for the Western products, especially jeans and music records. After 1974 all groups’ leaders complained that a majority of tourists “were preoccupied” with an idea to find cheap shops with music records of popular musicians. Instead of participation in the intensive cultural program in Sophia or Budapest, these tourists spent their time in the downtown part of these cities, looking for music records (“disky”).⁴² Besides information about frequent cases of drinking among Dnepropetrovsk tourists, the complaints about pop music consumption were a typical part of the official reports after each tourist trip abroad. In 1978 leaders added new complaints – about cases of buying various music equipment. From 1978 till 1985, all tourist groups reported about new Western reel-to-reel tape recorders and small audio-cassette players, and how buying these products became an ultimate goal of the entire travel abroad for many of these tourists.⁴³ As many contemporaries testified, Komsomol activists and group leaders were the most active participants in this cultural consumption during their tourist trips. The leaders of tourist groups not only participated in the shopping sprees together with their co-citizens, they also tried to use their connections with customs authorities in Chop, Brest or Odessa to get permission for bringing music equipment to Dnepropetrovsk. Overall, Komsomol activists, who

⁴¹ Author’s interview with Serhiy Tihpko, a director of “Privatbank” in Dnepropetrovsk, October 12, 1993. Author’s conversation with Karlo A. Markov, Dnepropetrovsk University, April 12, 1992; Author’s conversation with Natalia V. Bocharova, Dnepropetrovsk University, March 15, 1993. These books were so popular that even Soviet military officers who were stationed in the socialist countries used to bring them together with pieces of furniture, jewelry etc to their Soviet homes.

⁴² See a typical case of exchange of a pack of the Soviet cigarettes into a music records in DADO, f. 22, op. 32, d. 73, l. 85 (for 1982).

⁴³ DADO, f. 22, op. 22, d. 62, ll. 1-64; f. 22, op. 24, d. 141, ll. 1-42; f. 22, op. 30, d. 85, ll. 1-84. See also Alexei Kozlov, *Op. cit.*, 364, 365 about an amount of new Western music equipment among Ukrainian musicians.

made a major part of these tourists, preferred visits to capitalist countries because they were allowed more currency and had more opportunity to buy various goods there. But by the end of 1970s, they brought more rock albums and music information to Dnepropetrovsk from the socialist countries rather than from other parts of the world.⁴⁴ The main reason for this was that the KGB and Communist ideologists usually considered the information from socialist countries more “ideologically reliable” than the “direct music information” from the Western countries. As a result, they permitted Komsomol tourists to bring more “cultural products” (books and music records) from the countries of the Soviet bloc.⁴⁵ “After 1980, - said Askold, a young traveler who used the connections of his mother, a local trade union boss, to get a “travel plan” for his visit to Hungary in 1981, - Soviet customs rejected only items which were bought in Poland and did not permit them in Ukraine. But similar items – the same music records, which were bought in Hungary, were allowed in without any problem. For the Soviet customs officers Polish music markets were ideologically wrong because of anti-Soviet ‘Solidarity’ movement there, but Hungarian markets and products were OK.”⁴⁶

After 1976 the most popular object of cultural consumption during the tourist trips abroad was the records with Western popular music. As it turned out, many international tourists had the lists of music records which had been ordered by the local consumers. These music records were a part of the very important cultural consumption which affected not only many young inhabitants of the region of Dnepropetrovsk, but also their Komsomol ideologists. This was the rock and disco music consumption. Because of the All-Union Komsomol discotheque campaign,

⁴⁴ See how they provided information about foreign disco clubs and dancing parties in their reports as early as 1972 in: DADO, f. 22, op. 19, d. 73, ll. 13-14.

⁴⁵ Author’s interview with Serhiy Tihipko, a director of “Privatbank” in Dnepropetrovsk, October 12, 1993. Author interview of Igor T., KGB officer, Dnepropetrovsk, May 15, 1991. See also memoirs of the famous Soviet jazz musician: Alexei Kozlov, *Dzhaz, rok i mednye trubny* (Moscow: EKSMO, 2005), 181, 182-183, 194, 230.

⁴⁶ Author interview of Askold K., a son of a head of tourist department in Dnepropetrovsk Trade Unions branch, Dnepropetrovsk University, April 15, 1993.

which reached Dnepropetrovsk in 1976, both Komsomol leaders and Komsomol activists became involved in the organization and supervision of various forms of popular music consumption. After 1976 the Central Committee of All-Union Komsomol required Dnepropetrovsk Komsomol leaders to participate actively in the new discotheque movement which was triggered by the Komsomol of the Baltic republics in 1974-75.⁴⁷ The main goal was to keep ideological control over dancing floors where a majority of the Soviet youth spent their free time. Therefore, local Komsomol leaders, who were responsible for the organization of leisure time, became participants of a new network of connections and personal relations, which by 1986 had been called the “discotheque mafia” in Dnepropetrovsk. Suddenly, the loyal young Komsomol functionaries found themselves in a very ambiguous situation. They had to communicate with those, who provided dancing parties with the most popular music but whose ideological preferences were questionable. These people were connected to the black market of rock music, which had flourished in downtown Dnepropetrovsk since the early 1960s. Because of a necessity in the “ideologically reliable” music programs for disco clubs, Komsomol ideologists now depended on music material and information, which was unavailable through the traditional official sources of information. At the same time, Dnepropetrovsk enthusiasts of rock music, who became organizers of the first Komsomol discotheques in the city, were able to get the necessary information through the black market. Thus, non-directly, the Komsomol ideologists became involved in the new connections, sometimes with very murky and illegal activities of rock music providers from the “music market,” two black market areas that still

⁴⁷ Yu. Milinteiko, “Pervye shagi diskoteki,” Dnepr vechernii, February 26, 1977; B. Ivashura, I. Manevich, “Ruzhane dariat prazdnik,” Dnepr vechernii, March 23, 1977.

existed in downtown Dnepropetrovsk despite many efforts of official authorities to arrest dealers in Western music records.⁴⁸

At the end of 1976, the first disco club was organized by young enthusiasts of rock music who worked for the Dnepropetrovsk “secret” rocket-building factory – “Yuzhmash.” They used facilities and funds of Komsomol and trade union organizations there. In 1977 this discotheque became the base for various Komsomol disco clubs in the city. Eventually, on May 15, 1977, the city Komsomol committee sponsored an opening of the central city discotheque “Melodia” (“melody” – in Russian), and hired Valerii Miakotenko, a former manager of the local rock band and organizer of the “Yuzhmash” disco club, as its main disc jockey. “Melodia” combined music equipment, dancing hall and local cafeteria in one successful business. This place became a center not only for all discotheque movement in the region but also for various music business activities. (Some of these forms involved illegal trading of the Western music records, audio tapes and music equipment). By July 1978, “Melodia” had controlled all new eleven disco clubs, which were open now in the city of Dnepropetrovsk.⁴⁹

Officially, Komsomol apparatchiks and trade union bosses worked together with the “discotheque activists” from the early beginning of the discotheque movement in 1976. Moreover, a rapid spread of this movement made this region exemplary for many Soviet ideologists, who used a case of the Dnepropetrovsk central discotheque as proof of an ideological success in propaganda of the new forms of socialist leisure for the Soviet youth. The region of Dnepropetrovsk was praised by the republican Komsomol ideologists in Kiev for “the efficient organization of disco club movement.” On October 18, 1979, the city of

⁴⁸ During February-July of 1972 the police organized 100 raids and arrested 200 such dealers and confiscated hundreds of music records and tapes. See DADO, f. 19, op. 60, d. 85, ll. 7, 17.

Dnepropetrovsk became a location for the “first All-Ukrainian republican final festival contest of the discotheque programs.”⁵⁰ The city Komsomol organization of Dnepropetrovsk had prepared a special report about the achievements of the city disco club “Melodia” before this festival and summarized major forms and methods of “music entertainment” in the city. In October this published report was widely circulated among the participants of the All-Union festival competition. Many guests of the city used this publication as a guide for their “disco club activities.”⁵¹ During the first year of its existence, “Melodia” organized 175 “thematic” dancing parties with special music lectures. More than 60 thousand of young people became regular participants of these parties.⁵² In 1979 many apparatchiks who were involved in this movement were promoted and awarded for “excellent ideological and educational activities among the regional youth.” By the beginning of 1982 there were more than 560 youth clubs with 83 officially registered discotheques in the region of Dnepropetrovsk.⁵³ Despite the Communist ideologists’ criticism of these discotheques’ spreading bourgeois mass culture among the local youth, Komsomol leaders kept their collaboration with activists of the discotheque movement. To some extent, by the middle of the 1980s Komsomol ideologists and discotheque activists had mutual interests and became more and more dependent on each other.

As Mikhail Suvorov, who worked in various capacities (from an audio engineer to a disc jockey) in “Melodia” from 1977 to 1985, recalled, “After 1980, when John Lennon was assassinated, the central Komsomol administration asked the local Komsomol ideologists to

⁴⁹ See a story of these relations in: I. Chenous’ko, “Disko-klubu – zelionuiu ulitsu,” *Dnepr vechernii*, July 1, 1978; L. Titarenko, “Tsikavi tsenry vidpochynku,” *Zoria*, August 15, 1978; I. Rodionov, “Vecher v diskoklube,” *Dneprovskaia pravda*, January 14, 1979; A. Belkina, “Vechir u dyskotetsi,” *Prapor iunosti*, December 11, 1979.

⁵⁰ A. Belich, “Diskoteka: ot fakta k priznaniu,” *Komsomol’skoe znamia*, October 20, 1979; A. Belich, “Pervye – vse: v Dnepropetrovske podvedeny itogi 1-go respublikanskogo smotra-konkursa diskoteknykh program,” *Komsomol’skoe znamia*, October 24, 1979.

⁵¹ *Zdes’ možno uznat’ mnogo pouchitel’nogo: Iz opyta raboty Denpropetrovskogo molodezhnogo diskokluba “Melodia.”* (Dnepropetrovsk, 1979), 1-4.

⁵² DADO, f. 17, op. 11, d. 1, l. 28.

prepare music events about Lennon's songs as an example of progressive anti-capitalist music of the West in the struggle against war and imperialism. But by this time the Soviet official label "Melodia" had released only one John Lennon's album "Imagine" and few songs like "Give Peace A Chance" in a music magazine "Krugozor." Therefore when one Komsomol apparatchik approached us and requested anti-capitalist songs by Lennon, such as "Power to the People," "Sunday Bloody Sunday," or "Woman Is the Nigger of the World", I had to ask 'my connections' from the 'music market' to bring me the tapes with Lennon's songs. Another time, the same apparatchik had to deliver a lecture on the old (of the early 1970s) Soviet ideological campaign in support of an American Communist, Angela Davis, who was arrested then by US government. And he needed again a 'rare' Lennon's song "Angela" from the album of 1972 - "Sometime in New York City." The similar situation was repeated, when the Komsomol ideologists requested from "the discotheque people" tapes with recording of Pete Seeger's, Bob Dylan's and Joan Baez's songs which became very important items in an official Communist music ceremony devoted to an international solidarity of workers. When at the end of 1984 the rumors about the anti-imperialist and anti-American ideas of the Bruce Springsteen's album "Born in the U.S.A." reached Dniepropetrovsk, the local Komsomol ideologists asked the organizers of our Komsomol discotheque to include Springsteen's songs in our dancing program. And again we had to go to the music market and pay for the tapes with Springsteen's album. And I explained this to our ideological supervisors. But they did not care about our sources. What they needed was an ideological efficiency and immediate response to the ideological suggestions of their bosses from Moscow."⁵⁴

⁵³ DADO, f. 22, op. 32, d. 1, l. 44.

⁵⁴ Author interview of Mikhail Suvorov, June 1, 1991.

This ambiguity in the attitudes of the Komsomol apparatchiks toward the “music market” was especially evident in the 1980s. Serhiy Tihipko, who since 1984 had worked as Komsomol apparatchik in Dnepropetrovsk, was an eye-witness of these developments.⁵⁵ When he was a student of local college during 1977-1982, Tihipko used to listen to the Western rock music and knew that some of his rock music tapes reached him through the black market. When in 1984, he became responsible for Communist propaganda among the youth of Dnepropetrovsk and dealt with the organization of dancing parties and discotheques he had to face a very serious problem. How was it possible to organize an “ideologically reliable and politically loyal” mass event (meropriaitie) based on music and video material which came from “ideologically unreliable and politically incorrect sources” (as the “music products of the capitalist countries” that came through the illegal black market)? As Tihipko recalled, some of his Komsomol colleagues, trying to avoid the Dnepropetrovsk black market, used “Sputnik” as a new venue for getting music information and products from the socialist countries. They considered these products as more reliable and correct material for the proper Communist propagandist actions. These “actions” included an organization of various events during the leisure time for the local youth. Tihipko’s department was responsible for of such “actions” - lectures, “visual agitation,” special testing of the level of ideological maturity of Komsomol members, and also using discotheques as a “venue for ideological propaganda.”⁵⁶

Discotheques became a new responsibility of the department of agitation and propaganda after the death of Brezhnev, when Yurii Andropov, a new Soviet leader, began his campaign of struggle with corruption in the Communist party and Komsomol. During these years, 1983-84,

⁵⁵ See Tetiana Honchatova, “Serhiy Tihipko on Sharp Turns,” *The Ukrainian*, 2001, No. 2, 60-65; *Ukrains’kyi Nezaleznyi Tsentri Politychnykh Doslidzhen’*. “Dnepropetrovs’ka sim’ia”: *Informatsia stanom na 25 lystopada 1996 roku.*/ Ed. V. Pikhovshek a.o. (Kyiv, 1996), 246-24. Author’s interview of Serhiy Tihipko, a director of “Privatbank” in Dnepropetrovsk, October 12, 1993.

according to the Soviet and the Western scholars, the Soviet leadership was concerned “with the social control of young people, mentally through improved ideological training and physically, through the greater regulation of their leisure time and activity.”⁵⁷ Andropov emphasized “the need for discipline and ideological purity.” Speaking at the July 1983 Plenum of the Central Committee of CPSU, Andropov declared the war on “the Western pop music consumption”: “It is intolerable to see the occasional emergence on a wave of popularity of musical bands with repertoires of a dubious nature.”⁵⁸ He pointed out the danger of an ideological confusion created by the Western popular music which became the main object of consumption for millions of the Soviet young people. Andropov reminded the Komsomol that leisure-time activities were “the battleground for fierce ideological conflict between Communist and bourgeois ideologies.” Andropov suggested the special “counter-propagandist” efforts which would be able to protect the mentality of the “young builders of the initial stage of developed socialism” from “distortions, confusion and anti-social patterns of behavior” associated with “Western music of degeneration.”⁵⁹ As a response to the Andropov’s suggestions, in 1983-84 Komsomol introduced “special counter-propagandist measures” which affected the discotheque movement as well. Eventually Tihipko became involved in various counter-propagandist activities checking the “ideological purity and political correctness” of all forms of leisure in the city of Dnepropetrovsk, including dancing parties and the youth tourism.

In 1984, after Andropov’s death, a new Soviet leader, Chernenko, began a new round of criticism of Komsomol ideological work among the Soviet youth. According to Communist

⁵⁶ Author’s interview of Serhiy Tihipko, a director of “Privatbank” in Dnepropetrovsk, October 12, 1993.

⁵⁷ Hilary Pilkington, Russia’s Youth and Its Culture: A Nation’s Constructors and Constructed (London: Routledge, 1994), 79.

⁵⁸ Citation is from: Paul Easton, “The Rock Music Community,” Soviet Youth Culture /Ed. by Jim Riordan (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1989), 56.

⁵⁹ See especially his theoretical article: Yuriy Andropov, “Uchenie Karla Marksa i nekotorye aspekty stoitel’sstva sotsializma v SSSR,” Kommunist, 1983, No. 3, No. 9-23. See also his speech in Pravda, 1983, August 16, 1.

ideologists, Komsomol failed to “combat new temptations on the youth scene,” and “the blind imitation of Western fashions and lack of interest in politics.” Komsomol leadership accepted this criticism and called “for a mobilization of Komsomol forces to patrol the performances” of local rock bands and check “the repertoires of Soviet discotheques.”⁶⁰ During the same year, on July 25, the USSR Ministry of Culture, and on August 22, the USSR Ministry of Higher and Specialized Education, issued the special orders about “the regulation of activities of vocal-instrumental groups and improvement of the ideological-artistic standard of their repertoires.” These orders were used now for strengthening an ideological control of the local rock bands and discotheques all over the Soviet Union.⁶¹ A new Soviet legislation now threatened to punish people who provided thriving music market of Komsomol discotheque movement with music information. The activities of sound engineers and discotheque activists involved in the mass production of music recordings came under articles in the Soviet Criminal Code regarding entrepreneurial activities (Article 153) or the practicing of an illegal trade (article 162).⁶²

On October 1, 1984, the USSR Ministry of Culture issued a list of 68 Western rock bands and 38 Soviet “unofficial” rock bands whose music was not recommended for playing in public places within the city limits of Moscow. The list of “forbidden Western bands” included the favorites of the Soviet youth, such as KISS, AC/DC, Black Sabbath, Alice Cooper and Pink Floyd. The list of “ideologically unreliable Soviet bands” included those who were especially popular among students of high schools and undergraduate college students, such as Aquarium,

⁶⁰ See about anti-rock music campaign in 1983-84 in: Artemy Troitsky, Back in the USSR: The True Story of Rock in Russia (London: Omnibus Press, 1987), 89-93ff.; Timothy W. Ryback, Rock Around the Bloc: A History of Rock Music in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 220-222 and Sabrina Petra Ramet, Sergei Zamascikov, and Robert Bird, “The Soviet Rock Scene,” Rocking the State: Rock Music and Politics in Eastern Europe and Russia / Ed. by Sabrina Petra Ramet (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 190-191.

⁶¹ Timothy W. Ryback, Rock Around the Bloc, 220; Paul Easton, “The Rock Music Community,” 57.

⁶² Komsomol'skaya pravda, 1984, April 7. In another issue this newspaper informed their readers that the spread of rock music in the Soviet Union was the result of “Operation Barbarossa Rock and Roll,” a CIA and military intelligence of NATO plan to undermine the USSR. See Komsomol'skaya pravda, 1984, September 16.

Kino and Nautilus Pompilius. As a result, all these bands were officially prohibited for the cultural consumption of the Soviet youth. By the end of 1984 many regional Komsomol committees in Ukraine, including one in Dnepropetrovsk, used these “official” and “unofficial” lists of “forbidden music” in their campaign to purify the “pop music consumption” of Komsomol members. They wanted to replace the bad “non-cultural” consumption of “bourgeois” music with good “real cultural” consumption of the “ideologically reliable socialist music.”⁶³

Inspired by the new ideological campaign, Komsomol activists, “moved against recording studios, discotheques, and underground record networks.” As Timothy Ryback wrote, “the Soviet Union seven thousand discotheques also felt repercussions of the 1984 crackdown. By 1982, about 90 percent of the music played in Soviet discotheques was of Western origin, primarily hits by the Bee Gees, Donna Summer, and other disco music groups. The 1984 crackdown banned the playing of all Western groups, including officially promoted bands like ABBA and Boney M. Disc jockeys caught spinning Western albums received fines. Some discotheques, deemed to be of a “low artistic” level, were simply closed down. Many establishments, anxious to appease officials, introduced political and cultural instruction.”⁶⁴ The same happened in Dnepropetrovsk as well. Many disco clubs were closed in 1984-85. A famous discotheque at the cultural center of Dnepropetrovsk University was transformed into a “music lecture club” with a name “Dialogue: Music in Ideological Struggle.” Instead of dancing, students now listened to boring lectures about modern music and important issues of

⁶³ This list was published first time in Komsomol'skaya pravda, 1985, November 10. See the first publications of the Soviet lists with “forbidden bands” in English in: Timothy W. Ryback, Rock Around the Bloc, 221 and Sabrina Petra Ramet, Sergei Zamascikov, and Robert Bird, “The Soviet Rock Scene,” 191. Alexei Yurchak re-printed recently the similar list used by Nikolaev regional Komsomol committee (in Ukraine) in January 1985. See his, Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More : The Last Soviet Generation (Princeton University Press, 2005), 213-216.

⁶⁴ Timothy W. Ryback, Rock Around the Bloc, 221. See also an excellent analysis of the Soviet scholars’ and executives’ reaction to the new ideological campaigns of 1984-85 in: Hilary Pilkington, Russia’s Youth and Its Culture, 80-85.

international politics. The local ideologists preferred this kind of “cultural” consumption rather than spontaneous dancing parties to “bourgeois” music, which was difficult to control. Many talented disc jockeys and music engineers, such as Mikhail Suvorov, left Komsomol discotheques in 1985-86 and moved to a safe ground of other ideological institutions, far away from the dangerous restrictions about rock music.⁶⁵

In 1983-84 the police organized the special raids on locations of the “music market” in downtown Dnepropetrovsk. They were looking not for black marketers, but for the “anti-Soviet music products,” including music records and audio tapes of KISS and AC/DC songs. Thousands of original Western records were confiscated and hundreds people were arrested during those two years. By the beginning of 1985 the police destroyed a thriving music market for growing rock music consumption in the city. But they were not able to stop this consumption. Disco clubs, restaurants and bars still existed in the city. The administration of all these places still was interested in the “fresh” Western popular music. As a result, people in charge of music entertainment had to find other sources for music information and products to satisfy growing demands of Dnepropetrovsk consumers. Neighboring cities of Krivoi Rog and Zaporozhie, which were open for foreigners, became more important locations for obtaining “fresh” music products for Dnepropetrovsk music consumers. The local Komsomol leaders, who were responsible for music entertainment, also had to explore the new non-traditional sources of music products and establish the new connections with the “providers” of new music. International tourism became the major source of new music information for rock music consumption during 1983-85. In 1972 only 30% of all music records and tapes with the “Western music” came directly through the channels of international tourism to Dnepropetrovsk music market. By the

⁶⁵ At Dnepropetrovsk University I became a new head of the music club “Dialogue” in September 1986, when I started my teaching career there. Author’s interview of Serhiy Tihpko, a director of “Privatbank” in

end of 1984 more than 80% of all “fresh” Western music reached Dniepropetrovsk music dealers via local tourists who traveled abroad, including those who used service of Komsomol traveling agency.⁶⁶ Many objects of pop music consumption, which were banned in the region, came to Dniepropetrovsk through the representatives of the ruling Soviet elite, who visited foreign countries as the members of local tourist groups. According to Mikhail Suvorov and other discotheque activists, in 1979, the KGB supervisors of local tourists, one from a trip to Hungary, another from a trip to Poland, brought to Dniepropetrovsk the original rock music albums, which Communist ideologists banned later, - “Highway to Hell” by AC/DC and “Dynasty” by KISS - for their own children who were active participants of the music market in the city. Through these KGB children, tapes of AC/DC and KISS music became available for thousands of rock music consumers in the region, many months before foreign students brought these albums to Krivoi Rog, a city, which was opened for foreign tourists.⁶⁷ During the anti-rock music campaign the Komsomol apparatchiks who had an opportunity to go abroad, brought new music records, audio tapes, cassettes, new audio and after 1984 video equipment. According to Mikhail Suvorov, during the crisis of 1983-84, when the music market was closed by the police, the same Komsomol apparatchik, who had once asked Suvorov about rare songs by Lennon, brought the new music records to the central city discotheque. All these records were bought by him in Hungary when he was a leader of the local tourist group.⁶⁸

An irony of the situation was that given to the ideological requirements these Komsomol leaders and activists had to demonstrate how effectively they performed their duties in the

Dniepropetrovsk, October 12, 1993. See also an author interview of Mikhail Suvorov, June 1, 1991.

⁶⁶ DADO, f. 22, op. 19, d. 2, 143, f. 19, op. 60, d. 85, ll. 9-11 See also an author’s interview with Serhiy Tihipko, a director of “Privatbank” in Dniepropetrovsk, October 12, 1993.

⁶⁷ Author interview of Mikhail Suvorov, June 1, 1991. Author interview of Vladimir Sadovoi, March 10, 1992. See also author interview of Aleksandr Gusar, May 4, 1990; Author interview of Vladimir Solodovnik, June 21, 1991. Author interview of Igor T., KGB officer, Dniepropetrovsk, May 15, 1991.

⁶⁸ Author interview of Mikhail Suvorov, June 1, 1991.

organization of the youth entertainment. But because of narrowing channels of music information by the anti-rock campaign, they had to depend more and more on their old “discotheque movement” network which necessarily involved the old enthusiasts of rock music who were connected to the black market. In addition, they used also domestic and mainly international tourism, and especially “Sputnik.” This involvement in popular music consumption produced a very important network of connections for the new Komsomol elite in the region. After the beginning of the “discotheque movement” in 1976-77, they became active organizers, supervisors and participants in this system of rock music consumption. By 1985 they had an access to all major forms of profit and money making which this consumption involved. Moreover, as the young ideologists of the Soviet state they had a legitimate right to participate in all these forms. Through their discotheque connections Komsomol leaders started a new type of entertainment – “video salons.” The first video recording equipment appeared in Dnepropetrovsk radio shops in 1983. Any attempt to use VSR and to show foreign films to make money in private homes was considered a crime, and people who tried to do this were punished.⁶⁹ But by the end of 1984 Komsomol activists with their “discotheque friends” started their initiative to organize an official Komsomol “video business.” Only in 1986, during Gorbachev’s perestroika, did the city administration permit the opening of so-called “video salons” in Dnepropetrovsk.⁷⁰ Like the discotheque movement, video salons became relatively lucrative business, and young Komsomol leaders used both their legal connections in tourist organizations and regional Soviet administration and their non-formal connections with rock music enthusiasts to succeed in this business. Therefore, since 1976 the new forms of cultural consumption, especially popular music and video became a means for the creation of new

⁶⁹ See about police persecution of illegal “video salons” in private homes: L. Gamol’sky, N. Efremenko, V. Inshakov, Na barrikadakh sovesti: Ocherki, razmyshlenia, interviu (Dnepropetrovsk, 1988), 146-147.

managerial and business connections, which would contribute to the post-Soviet political and business activities of former Komsomol elites.

Another paradox of the ideological campaigns of late socialism was that the lists of the “forbidden Western musicians,” which were widely used by Communist ideologists and Komsomol activists in their campaign to “purify” the markets of pop music consumption in Dnepropetrovsk, had not reached the Soviet customs officers and frontier guards before 1985. As a result, many forbidden items continued to flow into the Dnepropetrovsk music market via Soviet apparatchiks, who traveled abroad. During the anti-rock campaign in the region of Dnepropetrovsk international tourism became an important source for feeding music information the centers of leisure, which still needed the “new music for dancing and fun.” Two main organizations (with their corresponding tourist agencies) – Komsomol and Trade Unions – were competing for this music information, and for favors of people who controlled the “music market” of Dnepropetrovsk, the people who were called the “discotheque mafia” by the local police.⁷¹ The functionaries of both organizations, who were in charge of various forms of music entertainment - from ideological lectures on modern music, dances, “subotniks” (actions of volunteer labor), concerts, to just informal wedding or birthday parties, - depended on music information, music equipment etc. By 1985 the practical aspects of these apparatchiks’ career (an importance of success in their office) tied the Dnepropetrovsk “music market” (including the people from the “discotheque mafia”), international tourism, and Komsomol and Trade Unions’ structures in one important network of business connections.

⁷⁰ Author interview of Igor T., KGB officer, Dnepropetrovsk, May 15, 1991.

⁷¹ Author interview of Igor T., KGB officer, Dnepropetrovsk, May 15, 1991. Author interview of Askold K., a son of a head of tourist department in Dnepropetrovsk Trade Unions branch, Dnepropetrovsk University, April 15, 1993.

The crisis of 1983-84 created a unique situation, when Soviet apparatchiks who were responsible for pop music consumption of young people, used all elements of the discotheque network to survive and succeed. This network included Komsomol functionaries of the regional, city and district committees responsible for ideological work and entertainment, officials of travel agencies, trade union apparatchiks, who were in charge of various “travel plans” for both domestic and international tourism, officials of the palaces of culture, locations of various activities of leisure and entertainment, and finally the Soviet officials who were in charge of various diners, café, and restaurants that provided discotheques with room for dances and an audience with a place to eat and drink. This complicated system of interconnections and mutual obligations, with elements of personal favors, which was called “blat” in Russian, had begun many years ago, before 1976. Everybody depended on other participants in this system.⁷² The beginning of the discotheque movement in 1976 added to this system a new element - people from the music market, who provided organizers of leisure time with the necessary music information and music products for a mass consumption.

In the middle of the 1980s, when perestroika created favorable conditions for old managerial skills of Komsomol activists, this system produced the new activities for cultural consumption - “video salons” – that became a new business, which brought to their organizers more profits than traditional disco clubs. This new “video business” used the same infrastructure and network of discotheque movement – international tourism, Komsomol activists, trade union bosses and “discotheque mafia.” This network contributed to the business career of two other

⁷² See on “blat” Alena Ledeneva, Russia’s Economy of Favours

fans of Western popular music: Yulia Timoshenko and her husband, Alexandr.⁷³ In 1988, they, using their old connections in the world of Komsomol discothèques, opened a public service enterprise, a video-renting shop in Dnepropetrovsk, which they started with 5,000 of Soviet rubles they borrowed. The profits made from this first venture were used to open the video rentals chain. They used the experience of the tourist groups of Komsomol apparatchiks, who brought the first VCRs in Dnepropetrovsk through travel agency of “Sputnik.” The people from the discotheque movement helped these apparatchiks with the Western video tapes and an audience, which was ready to consume the new Western products. Former “discotheque people” tested the new business practices, and they initiated an idea of “video salons” which had already become the most popular and fashionable form of entertainment in the Soviet capital cities and Baltic republics after 1984. As a result, during perestroika, both the Komsomol and discotheque mafia provided infrastructure for these salons in the city. When in 1987, the KGB opened the city of Dnepropetrovsk for foreigners again, “Yuzhmash,” the “rocket factory,” imported thousands of VCRs, using barter agreements with South Korean businessmen. As a regional Communist party apparatchik, Yulia Timoshenko’s father-in-law had an access not only to these Korean VCRs, but also to local movie theaters, which provided the first mass audience for “video shows.” With these family’s connections, using traditional discotheque infrastructure, Yulia Timoshenko organized the Komsomol cooperative Terminal, which controlled a chain of video salons with “Yuzhmash” VCRs in 1988.⁷⁴

⁷³ In 1975, while in school, Yulia Timoshenko wrote in her biography: “I am fond of sports, especially of ping pong, skating, and also of sport games such as volleyball, basketball. I like music by Bach, Mozart, Strauss. I like also the modern rock bands such as The Beatles, Manfred Mann Earth Band, Led Zeppelin and others.” See: Dmitrii Popov, Iliia Mil’shtein, *Oranzhevaia printsessa. Zagadka Yulii Timoshenko* (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Ol’gi Morozovoi, 2006), 55.

⁷⁴ About Timoshenko’s biography in English see: Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine’s Orange Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 18-22. See the up-dated biography of Timoshenko in: Dmitrii Popov, Iliia Mil’shtein, *Oranzhevaia printsessa*, 52-89.

All elements of Timoshenko's "initial" business had been already developed during the Brezhnev era, when the "cultural consumption of developed socialism" combined the structures of the Soviet international tourism and ideological efforts of Komsomol activists in one network of the important business and managerial relations. Without these relations it is impossible to imagine the development of post-Soviet capitalism. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and Soviet "organized" state tourism in 1991, the representatives of the Komsomol elite from the Brezhnev era, such as Timoshenko, who used the same Soviet network of connections and experiences, demonstrated again that a skilful adjustment of this network to a new economic situation was an important foundation for a success in the post-Soviet business activities.