10 FUTURES OF DEVELOPMENT Whither development is an old question. Considering future trends in development by way of trend extrapolation, even if it is a limited exercise, provides an opportunity to uncover background questions. Clearly there will not be a single future trend. Secondly, complexity is a factor of growing importance in development, and this raises the question of whether complexity is enabling or disabling. For some time the dominant mood in the development field has been scepticism bordering on pessimism - can't work, can't do. From a shortcut to utopia, development has become a dystopia. This closing chapter seeks to problematize and open up futures of development. This is taken up first through an overview of futures of development thinking, by taking a stroll through the current preoccupations of the major development theories and, by way of extrapolation, their likely future problematics. In bird's-eye fashion this also recapitulates key themes of the book. The second section signals major changes in the development field and argues that these add up to a growing awareness of the complexity of development, which is taken further under the heading of reflexivity. Considering that the career of development follows from and parallels that of modernity, reflexivity is taken up first in relation to modernity and next as it relates to development. Reflexive development and politics brings us to forward options in relation to philosophies of change and politics of change. This involves redefining development, no longer as 'improvement', but as collective learning. The final section focuses on reconstructions of development and submits that a reform platform in development thinking is in the making that may add up to a coherent alternative to neoliberalism. Futures of Development Thinking To start with, let me make a general note on development theory. 'Development theory' is a limited notion. It would be more adequate to say 'perspective' or 'analysis', and thus make the point that theories are important as ways of seeing and analytics. Many 'development theories' are not development theories properly speaking; they are derived from other social sciences and are being applied to the development terrain. The singular in 'development theory' is distracting, considering that development issues generally require a combination of analytical perspectives. Development is multidimensional and hence issues are not simply settled at one level. The terrain is complex also from a theoretical point of view because there are multiple dimensions to development thinking - of explanation, methodology, epistemology, interest articulation, imagination and policy agenda (Chapter 1). The current array of perspectives in the development field represents a dispersal in stakeholders and interest positions (Chapter 1) that is likely to be sustained. This means that for each of the current development perspectives there is a set of options in facing changes and challenges. Accordingly, futures of development are being viewed through multiple analytical lenses and each shows different options. Several options are prefigured in current debates and others are hypothetical or can be inferred by logic. The starting point in this section is the existing set of development perspectives, each of which, as a framework or sensibility, continues to attract adherents and renew itself. This is a sketch rather than an exhaustive treatment. Addressed are the major development perspectives: modernization theory, dependency, neoclassical economics, alternative development, human development and post-development. Modernization Theory Current themes in relation to modernization theory include neo-modernization theory, which involves a complex understanding of modernity and a revaluation of 'tradition', no longer as obstacle but as resource (So 1990). This revaluation matches more profound and less schematic understandings of modernity in the West (e.g. Tiryakian 1996), yielding options such as the 'modernization of tradition'. A practical application of this kind of outlook is cooperation between development agencies such as NGOs, and 'traditional' social organizations, which has been under way in several places. The current emphasis on good governance recalls the concern with political modernization and nation building in modernization thinking. A current theme that will likely become a future trend is to view modernities in the plural. This means that developing countries no longer view themselves merely as consumers of modernity (Lee 1994) but also as producers of modernity, 'reworking modernity' (Pred and Watts 1992), generating new and different modernities. Voices in the majority world are now not merely critical of Western modernity, or argue for some kind of fusion, but assert alternative modernities (e.g. Ibrahim 1996, Mahathir and Ishihara 1995). Another trend is a serious engagement with postmodernism, not merely as a condition (flexible specialization, post-Fordism, urban and social complexity) or a target of criticism, but also as a sensibility, a style and philosophical disposition (e.g. Giri 1998). Postcolonial studies and its destabilizing of modernist assumptions is part of this outlook. Dependency Theory In reworking dependency theory, a well-established trend is the analysis and critique of NICs. Rethinking dependency theory includes the renewal of structuralist analysis (Kay 1998) and innovative historical revisions (e.g. Frank 1996, 1998). Approaches that involve a renewal of dependency thinking in a broad sense are new political economy and international political economy. In the 1990s, key problems revisited from a dependency point of view were neoliberalism and uneven global development (e.g. Cardoso 1993, Boyer and Drache 1996). This takes the form of a general critique of uneven globalization (e.g. Amin 1997, Hoogvelt 1997, Chossudovsky 1997). A crucial distinction that is rarely clearly drawn runs between globalization as & process and as a specific project, or between globalization as a historical trend and recent global neoliberal policies.1 Analyses of globalization projects focus, for instance, on the World Trade Organization and multinational corporations, but globalization involves more than specific projects. Neoclassical Economics In the 1980s Deepak Lai argued that 'The demise of development economics is likely to be conducive to the health of both the economics and the economies of developing countries' (1983: 109). How does the 'counterrevolution in development' shape up in the twenty-first century? Now structural adjustment no longer appears as the end of development, as was believed some years ago, but rather as an intermezzo. The adjustment of structural adjustment policies has been a major concern for some time. Earlier adjustments sought to give structural adjustment a 'human face' in combination with safety nets and poverty alleviation; another concern is to make structural adjustment policies country-specific and more user-friendly. Good governance and state effectiveness represent further adjustments (World Bank 1997, Kiely 1998). In the 1990s, the World Bank returned to its 1970s position in favour of equitable growth. This reorientation involved a growing tension between neoliberalism and the politics of the 'Wall Street-Treasury-IMF complex' (Wade and Veneroso 1998), and the social or populist liberalism of the World Bank. Obviously, the 'Washington consensus' is not what it used to be (discussed below). Alternative Development Elements of alternative development, such as participation, have increasingly been coopted in mainstream approaches. The strength of alternative development is its regard for local development and social agency, from grassroots groups and social movements to NGOs. With local development comes a concern with project failure, cultural diversity and endogenous development (e.g. Carmen 1996). The disaffection with the state in alternative development resonates with neoliberal misgivings about state failure and this odd conjuncture has contributed to the great wave of 'NGO-ization' since the 1980s. The trend of NGO professionali-zation runs the risk of depoliticization and managerialism, along with the erosion of state capabilities and 'alternative dependency' on donor support and agendas. The current trend of 'strengthening civil society' by supporting NGOs is deeply apolitical, ignores contradictions within civil society, overrates NGOs and weakens state capabilities (cf. Tvedt 1998: 170ff). On the other hand, the blurring of the line separating alternative and human development approaches, or society and state-oriented perspectives, opens the way to synergies between civic organizations, local government and firms, which may contribute to supply-side social development (Chapter 8). i u i um:j ur UCVCLUľMtIN I I53 Alternative development thinking used to be strong on critique and weak on alternatives beyond local empowerment and decentralization politics. For some time the attention also turns to global-scale alternatives 'beyond Bretton Woods', or 'alternative globalization' (e.g. Körten 1990, Arruda 1996). It may be argued that now that it is no longer simply 'alternative', alternative development is not an appropriate heading and a more distinctive terminology would be welcome. Besides, alternative development is tainted by the discourse of strengthening 'civil society'. Alternative terminologies could be grassroots or 'popular development' (Brohman 1996); but such headings gloss over the trend of NGO professionalization and alternatives beyond the local level (meso, macro, global alternatives) slip out of the picture. Another option is 'participatory development', but participation is too vague to serve as a centrepiece. It may be possible to redefine core components of alternative development (such as empowerment, emancipation) more sharply and critically to distinguish participatory from mainstream approaches, but to suggest a different heading is more difficult. Human Development The human development approach now extends to gender (as in the Gender Development Index), political rights (as in the Freedom Development Index) (UNDP 1997) and environmental concerns (sustainable human development). Through regional human development reports, it extends to different regions and countries (e.g. ul Haq and Haq 1998). In combination with participatory development, new fusions arise such as 'just development' (Banuri et al. 1997). The theme of human security refers to a new combination, at the conjunction of conflict and development (e.g. Naqvi 1996). This finds expression in the problematic of humanitarian action and 'linking relief and development' (e g Nederveen Pieterse 1998a). What may be a substantive growth area for the human development approach is to examine the relationship between human capital (its starting point) and social and cultural capital. Bourdieu (1976, 1988) has argued all along that the different forms of capital are interrelated and interchangeable. For Bourdieu, this served as an analysis of 'modes of domination'. What is on the agenda now is the significance of these interrelations from an analytical and a policy-oriented view. This ties in with new institutional economics (Harriss et al. 1995) and socioeconomics, with the cultural turn in development and social capital (Fine 1999). Social capital now figures in social and economic geography: 'institutional densities' and civic political culture emerge as significant variables in explaining regional economic success or failure (Chapter 8). Thus, what underlies the success of micro-credit schemes may be the fact that they build on people's social capital. Part of the cultural turn in development is regard for local cultural capital, for instance in the form of indigenous knowledge. Cultural diversity and the mingling of different cultural flows (diasporas, migrants, travellers) are found to be potent ingredients in economic innovation and growth (Griffin 2000a). The human development approach has all along been concerned with global reform, from the role of the UN system in relation to the Bretton Woods institutions and the World Trade Organization (Singer and Jolly 1995) to macroeconomic regulation and global taxes (Cleveland et al. 1995, ul Haq et al. 1996). Global reform (discussed below) is likely to remain a major preoccupation. A nti-developm en t Anti-development has all along been concerned with local autonomy, at times advocating local delinking. A constructive turn is the nexus with ecological liberation movements (Peet and Watts 1996). Another major concern is 'resistance to globalization' such that anti-development and anti-globalization are becoming synonyms: economic globalization is viewed as the main form of developmental-ism at the tum of the millennium (Körten 1995, Mander and Goldsmith 1996). The local orientation risks overlooking wider dimensions. Thus in this view, the Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas is concerned with local autonomy and land rights; but the Zapatistas also organize with a view to political reform in Mexico and global alliances of resistance (Castells 1997). The major limitation of the post-development approach is that beyond local autonomy it offers no significant future perspectives, so that the most likely future of post-development is localism. Table 10.1 gives a telegram-style precis using key words of (column 1) understandings of development according to the major development perspectives, (2) ongoing revisions and (3) future options. We stand on the shoulders of these perspectives, they make up the terms of our analytics and, as if through a kaleidoscope of multiple angles, we perceive the field of development through them, for they have been the guiding lights through several development decades. But these optics are also coloured by old polemics, as strategic simplifications that make sense in particular contexts that, by and large, are no more. Each of these paradigms is swarmed by a growing number of 'exceptions' that cannot be accommodated. Often they are no longer in the centre of our vision but at the periphery, so we no longer see simply through but also past them. They are but one way of looking at development, only part of the toolbox. Development and Complexity This section takes up general analytical and methodological features of the development field and then considers changes that have taken place at an institutional level and general policy directions, recapitulating points made in previous chapters. Development involves different stakeholders and actors, who typically hold different perspectives and policy preferences. Yet these agents and their preferences should not be essentialized. Seen up close each position itself is a cluster of positions and an arena of different views and arguments. In Table 10.2 these internal differences are briefly summed up in key words signalling salient bones of contention. For example, in relation to structural adjustment there are conflicts within and between the Bretten Woods institutions, within and between the World Bank and IMF, also involving the scope of poverty alleviation. Obviously all these characterizations are shorthand and meant only as illustrations of the present situation. Table 10.1 Development perspectives and future options Theories and definitions of development Current themes Future options Modernization Development is state-led growth. Keynotes: industrialization, Western model, foreign aid, linear progress, convergence Dependencia Development is underdevelopment (or dependent development) by comprador bourgeoisie; or state-led autocentric development (associated dependent development) by national bourgeoisie Neoclassical economics, neoliberalism Development is market-led growth. Keynotes: overcome state failure through structural reform (deregulation, privatization, liberalization) and get prices right Alternative development Development should be society-led, equitable, participatory and sustainable Human development Capacitation or human resource development is the means and end of development, measured in Human Development Index Anti-development Development is destructive, immiserizing, authoritarian, past. Keynotes: discourse analysis, critique of science and modernity Revaluation of 'tradition'. Neomodernization. Triumphalism, 'end of history' Critique of NICs, new international division of labour, social exclusion. New political economy: brings the state back in. International political economy: power and economics. Uneven global development Market failure, safety net, human capital, infrastructure, good governance, sustainability. Debt reduction. New institutional economics: institutional analysis Adopted in mainstream. Decentralization. Professionalization. Alternative globalization. Gender DI, Freedom DI, human security, global reform Local delinking. Connection with ecological movements. Resistance to globalization Modernities plural. Postmodernism Critique of uneven globalization Regulation of finance. Civic economy Social economy, social development. Global reform Social and cultural capital. Social development. Global reform Localism Development unfolds in diverse contexts of relations of power, cultural values, social practices, ecological conditions and historical itineraries. Development is intrinsically contextual. However, these contexts are not sealed off from one another. Thus, while cultural differences matter, they are not rigid boundaries; they are crossroads, traffic circles and junctions where different kinds of traffic meet. Development is an intercultural transaction (Chapter 5). This refers to the meanings of development as well as to implementation. Hence conventional modernization = Westernization views, on the one hand, and endogenous or indigenous development views on the other, are both too simple. They are based on binary oppositions and by privileging either end of the continuum of perspectives, ignore the fact that actual development involves continuous traffic back and forth across the spectrum. While profound changes have taken place in the development field, assessing change is itself a complex operation, polycentric in meaning and significance. So i _» vy Ai-^ Table 10.2 Another outline of the development field v> Agents Perspectives Neoliberalism, Policies Conflict areas IMF and Structural reform, Adjust SA. World Bank vs. World monetarism, social structural adjustment (SA) IMF. Poverty alleviation Bank liberalism WTO Free trade Multilateral agreement on With regions, states, trade investment, trade-related unions, INGOs intellectual property rights UN Human Capacity building, human Conflicts in UN system and system development resource development, between UN and safety net, human security international financial institutions, OECD. 20:20 compact States Modernization, SA, capacity building, SA, corporations, human security, human globalization, regionalism, development, development, innovation, decentralization, donors, neoclassical competitiveness social cohesion, poverty economics, alleviation monetarism (I)NGOs Human and Empowerment, Revise SA. Conflict with alternative humanitarian assistance, GOs, among and within development lobbying, poverty NGOs. Tension between eradication relief and development Local Alternative Autonomous development, Conflicts among locals actors development democratization about participation, and/or post- autonomy, values development it is not easy to indicate a general direction in which changes in development thinking and policy point, and even less to rank them in importance. With this proviso, let's signal some of the most significant changes, focusing on the postwar period. The first change concerns the understanding of the nature of development. Early development efforts concentrated on the hardware of development, such as infrastructure, capital inputs and technology. The recent trend is to pay equal attention to the software of development, to institutions, processes and management (e.g. World Bank 1997), education and knowledge (World Bank 1998). Or indeed to argue that development is essentially human software development, as in the human development approach and the World Bank's aspiration to become a 'knowledge bank'. The emphasis on knowledge parallels the shift in the North towards the knowledge-intensity of production. It implies a major reorientation, from a general preoccupation with the external dimensions and facade of development (infrastructure, capital inputs) to its 'inner' conditions: from a one-dimensional to a multidimensional understanding of development. This includes environmental management as a learning process. 'Sustainable development' is now part of any approach to development, which presents the option of 'anthropocentrism with a human face' (Ariansen 1998). Another major change is that the unit of development has become multi-scalar. This in turn affects the agency of development. If early on this was the state, now it includes international and regional institutions and regimes, urban and local government, civic associations (operating at multiple scales) and households. Development actors have become polycentric. Grassroots interests count more than previously (for instance Dalits in India who have become politically active). It follows that development is no longer simply a mathematics of power and reshuffling the status quo. If previously the West dominated development thinking, in recent decades perspectives from the South and Japan have become increasingly important.2 While this happens at a policy level, it ties in with profound revisionings of history (e.g. Frank 1998). At the same time, development is no longer simply confined to the South. Since the former Eastern Bloc countries have become 'transition' countries (in transition toward market economies and democracies) development policies are relevant also here. Changes taking place in the advanced economies -regionalization, deindustrialization, flexibilization, migration, urban problems -also lead to what are in effect development policies, albeit at different economic and institutional levels. Accordingly the line between 'developing' and 'developed' worlds has been blurring. The North faces questions of social exclusion (Judt 1997, Gaventa 1998, Young 1999), empowerment (as in urban empowerment zones and in management-speak), good governance (crony capitalism in the North also requires transparency; Warde 1998) and the renewal of democracy. Learning from South-North links takes place for instance in microfinance (Rogaly and Roche 1998). A related trend is towards the convergence of advanced countries and NICs. In light of technological change and globalization, NICs are presently developing much like advanced countries, though starting from a lower base, with less stable institutions and less diversified economies. If we compare the forward policy profiles of the United States with those of e.g. Korea and Brazil, we find broadly similar agendas. In both, much emphasis is on innovation-driven growth, human capital, technopoles, industrial districts, research & development and knowledge intensity (e.g. Connors 1997). This is a new form of 'betting on the strong', driven by the imperatives of global competitiveness and efficiency. The crises in Mexico, Asia and Latin America show the frailty of the emerging markets. While the net figures in terms of productivity and exports may line up with those of advanced countries, the institutional settings are much more vulnerable. At the same time, while the gap between advanced countries and NICs is in some respects narrowing, the gap between both of these and the least developed countries is widening. The sprawling delta of development actors and concerns raises the question of policy coherence: what understanding of purpose and process conceivably unites all these diverse actors? In international cooperation, this is the issue of consistency - between bilateral and multilateral policies, between trade, finance and security policies and international development policies. This would imply a trend towards a broad collaborative understanding of development efforts. 'Participatory development' in this context signals an undercurrent of deep-seated change. Development action is dialogical, involving the concerted efforts of actors in different settings and at many levels. In development thinking this reorientation is in evidence in social choice theory, public action and new institutional economics. At'b'i a policy level, it comes across in the concern with interactive decision-making, public-private partnership, empowerment, social inclusion, migration and managing urban problems. However, the trend towards the democratization of development coincides with the simultaneous extension of transnational power structures and regimes. These twin trends are in contradiction. The democratization of development runs into the hurdle of power structures, from local landlords all the way to international financial institutions. This is not a simple opposition or contradiction that can be settled through conventional politics of resistance and conflict (e.g. Chin and Mittelman 2000). Democratization also requires institutionalization (deinstitutionalization and reinstitutionalization). In a brief time span, there have been profound changes in the Gestalt of development. The changes do not all point in the same direction. There is a growing awareness of development as an asymptotic rendezvous, an undertaking that like the horizon recedes and changes as we approach. Development by this understanding is intrinsically uncertain and contested: coherence is a moving target; concertation is never fully achieved; dialogue is ever imperfect; software is never complete; learning never ends. In addition, development is not simply progress but the trial-and-error clarification, redefinition and management of progress. It concerns the translation of growing human capabilities into hardware and the translation of hardware into software, including collective reflection and institutions of collective management. Complexity Politics These considerations affect the understanding and definition of development. It may be argued that in the absence of a simple yardstick, the conventional understanding of development as some form of improvement is no longer tenable. Over time improvement has meant economic growth, modernization, nation building, industrialization, betterment of life opportunities, enlarging people's choices, enhancement of capacities, rollback of the state, good governance, state effectiveness, sustainability, poverty alleviation, poverty eradication, social inclusion, etc. It follows from the different meanings of development over time (Chapter 1) that improvement is a historically contingent notion. It follows from the plurality of development actors that development is polycentric in its meaning, objectives, agency and methods of implementation, and therefore what constitutes improvement in development is intrinsically contested. 'Development' is a moving target situated somewhere in between underdevelopment and post-development, to take two extremes on the continuum of development perspectives (and one might add over-development). Actual development thinking and action is about finding a balance or accommodation between different actors, perspectives, interests and dimensions within specific historical, political and ecological settings, and thus requires a holistic approach (Chapter 9). It remains attractive to understand development as improvement, but which improvement and how? Understanding development as improvement virtually inevitably invites a one-dimensional perspective, privileging one or other dimension, and a managerial approach, while actually what constitutes improvement never is and never can really be settled. Consequently, development unfolds in a peculiar 'as if mode: while everybody knows that development-as-improvement in any form is open to question, it seems necessary to proceed as if there is a consensus. Wouldn't it be more appropriate to make this contingency part of the understanding of development? It would mean redefining development as a collective learning experience. This includes learning about different understandings of improvement, as a collective inquiry into what constitutes the good life and sensible ways of getting there. Learning is open-ended. This also makes sense as a point about development methodology, in action and inquiry. Learning is a theme of growing salience. Collective learning figures in organization studies and the 'learning organization' (Senge 1990, Cooperrider and Dutton 1999), local economic development and industrial districts (Lawson and Lorenz 1999), planning and sustainability (Meppem and Gill 1998), risk analysis and disaster management (Comfort 1999). Collective learning is a way of looking at social action (Foley 1999) and public action and social choice theories centre on collective learning and feedback processes. In this view, local policy formulation and implementation is a 'social experiment requiring flexibility, experimentation and social learning with the people' (Olowu 1988: 17). Collective learning as the point of development places development policy discussions on a different footing: the focus shifts to the role of complexity in development. The diagnosis of complexity is often the endpoint of analysis or critique. An approach or policy is scrutinized and then criticized because it ignores certain elements and the conclusion is the diagnosis of complexity. The usual coda is to call for further research. Matters are complex and therefore.... This kind of weary note has been a standard conclusion in public administration. Matters are complex; therefore, nothing or not much can be done, which in effect celebrates the comforts of the status quo. This weariness informs the classic definition of public administration as the science of 'muddling through' (Lindblom 1959).3 Thus, complexity per se is easily a cul-de-sac. So if we have established the complexity of development, the next question to ask is whether complexity is disabling or enabling. Emery Roe in Taking Complexity Seriously argues for 'triangulation' or the 'use of multiple methods, procedures and/or theories to converge on what should or can be done for the complex issue in question' (1998: 5). Part of this approach is recourse to perspectives that involve a theory of uncertainty and theories that defamiliarize the problem, considering that 'more conventional analytical frameworks, such as microeconomic analysis, are often part of the problem being analyzed' (1998: 23). One of the issues is management: 'The more managers (want to) manage, the more they (have to) confront the unmanageable. But it is equally true that the more unmanageable things are, the greater the pressure to manage them' (1998: 96). Following critical theory in the version of the journal Telos, Roe draws a distinction between 'organic negativity', or resistance at a popular level, and 'artificial negativity', in the sense of disputes within the 'new class' of managers. The question that follows from this kind of approach is, whom does triangulation serve? Is complexity analysis an instrument of managers, or does or can it contribute to popular self-organization? This becomes a key issue in deciding whether complexity is disabling (leave it to experts) or enabling (creating an opportunity and necessity for democratization). A detour via the theme of reflexivity may yield further insight. Modernity has resurfaced as a central theme in social science and has been reproblematized from various angles, as in notions such as high, late, advanced, neo, critical, reflexive, radical, post modernities. A strand that runs through these lines of questioning is that modernity has become its own problem. Ulrich Beck (1992) contrasts simple modernity concerned with 'mastering nature' with reflexive modernity, the condition in which the moderns are increasingly concerned with managing the problems created by modernity. Reflexivity figures in relation to the self, social theory, cultural studies, political economy, financial markets, organization studies and research methodology. New social movements are said to be reflexive in the sense of information oriented, present oriented and concerned with feedback (Melucci 1989). Beck refers to the 'new modernity' as risk society, emerging in conditions in which scarcity is no longer the dominant theme because of the growth of productive capacities. Risk distribution society, which in Germany emerged in the early 1970s, is contrasted to scarcity society, which predominates in the South where the primary concern is with modernization through techno-scientific development. All the same, scarcity societies and risk societies interact and overlap in various ways. One, they interact through the globalization of risk: through generalized effects such as the erosion of the ozone layer; through the commonality of anxiety; and boomerang effects of crisis in developing countries on developed countries (as in Susan George's argument of the Debt Boomerang) and vice versa. Stagnation in the advanced economies also affects the developing economies. Two, they interact through the export of risk to scarcity society. The relocation of traditional industries in the South is affected by different trade-offs between accumulation and risk in scarcity societies (witness the Bhopal disaster). Countries in the South may serve as an ecological waste dump also because of rural naivety in relation to industrial risk. Extreme poverty and extreme risk attract one another. Third, there is a North-South transfer of risk awareness, among others as mobilization arguments for social movements. Critique of science and of corporate practices and public relations, for instance oil companies and pharmaceuticals, is increasingly being transnationalized (as in campaigns on Nestle baby formula or Shell in Ogoniland in Nigeria). This is addressed in political ecology (Peet and Watts 1996). Environmental movements in the South also inspire collective action in the North (Martinez-Alier 2000). These interactions are reflected in ongoing debates. Can we understand these debates better in light of the notion of reflexive development? Is there an emerging pattern of reflexive development? In the course of several development decades, development thinking and policy have become increasingly aware of failures and crises of development. Development also entails the 'production of errors'. Evaluation and impact studies have become a major industry alongside development programmes. New policies are increasingly concerned with managing the hazards 4 rUTURES OF DEVELOPMENT 161 unintended consequences and side-effects brought about by development In development theory this questioning is reflected in the rejection of developmen-tahsm and linear progress. Critiques of the role of science and techno-scientific development lead to revaluation of indigenous technical and local knowledge which is a logical turn in view of the crisis of 'Western' models This section develops four arguments: (1) Development thinking is reflexive That is, almost invariably, development theory stems from a reaction to and thus also a reflection on the limitations of a preceding development policy or theory (2) One way of looking at development thinking over time is as a layer of reflex-ivities, i.e. reflection upon reflection upon reflection. (3) Development thinking increasingly participates in the general trend towards reflexivity in and m relation to modernity. (4) Development thinking is not consistently and sufficiently reflexive; it should be more reflexive and its reflexivity should be thematized Arguably, there is both a historical and an emerging pattern of reflexive development. Critiques of development follow from and lead to critiques of modernity and its consequences, and from the crisis of development policies. A feedback pattern is emerging in which development policy becomes increasingly concerned with the management of development itself. A similar process took place in modernity and as offspring of modernity, development participates in its dialectics. Risk society, according to Beck, is a 'catastrophic society', replete with dystopias and subject to apocalyptic mood swings. In countries in the South, extremes of pessimism are frequent - on account of negative growth, the failure of trickle-down and the consequences of development, populist swings in politics or the paralysis of politics, and double dealing on the part of Western institutions The perplexities of progress are shared North and South. The modern crisis of techno-scientific progress translates into a crisis of development. 'Progress is a blank check to be honoured beyond consent and legitimation' (Beck 1992- 203) and now there is a breakdown of faith that technical progress = social progress It is no longer taken for granted either that the negative effects of technical progress can be treated separately, as mere social consequences of technological change A parallel questioning in development is whether growth = development and economic growth = social development. Progress as a paradox is an established theme (e.g. Stent 1978, Ashton and Laura 1999). Ashis Nandy's definition of progress as 'the growing awareness of oppression' (1989) is insightful, but serves more as a warning signal than a guiding light. Probing the meaning of progress ľooí *? *orth-South differences goes back some time (e.g. Banun et al 1993) and redefining progress' has become a major preoccupation North (Halstead and Cobb 1996) and South. Thus, 'anti-development' thinking parallels critiques of progress, and post-development resembles the aprogrammatic, directionless, radical scepticism prevalent in postmodernism. The core problem posed in post-development is the question of modernity. However, to be 'for' or 'against' modernity is, either way too simple a position. Post-development, as an uneven combination of postmodern methodologies and neo-traditionalist sensibilities, articulates profound sensibilities but is not policy-oriented and does not have a future programme Reflexive development, as a corollary to reflexive modernity, may be more enabling as a perspective (Chapters 1 and 6). There are different stages and kinds of modernity and, short of rejection, reflexive development offers a critical negotiation of modernity and development. The deeper argument here is that development has been reflexive all along. According to the conventional interpretation, development thinking was an extension of 'progress', but Cowen and Shenton (1996) document that the origins of development thinking lie in the critique of progress. Classical political economy was a reaction to the social problems and dislocations brought about by industrialization, and thus the origins of development thinking lie in reflexivity in relation to industrialization and not simply in catching-up policies. In this light we can reread the seesaw history of economics and development policy as a series of reactions to and reflections on policy dilemmas caused by previous policies and conditions. Viewed in this way, the neomercantilism of the late industrializers (Germany, France, etc.) was a reaction to Britain's dominant position as the workshop of the world. Central planning and building 'socialism in one country' were variations along the same route. In Britain in the 1870s, neoclassical economists resumed the Manchester School legacy in order to capitalize on Britain's leading position. In the 1890s bankers adopted monetarism and attempted to control inflation in reaction to the depression and the boom-and-bust cycle. During the 1930s Depression, Keynesian demand management sought to mitigate the business cycle and Fordism was founded on Keynesian principles. Neoliberalism in the 1980s was a reaction to the limitations of Keynesian demand management under conditions of stagflation in the 1970s in conjunction with technological and political changes. If the keynote of neoliberalism was state failure, the recent preoccupation is market failure. The 'Third Way' is an attempt at a new political balance and synthesis. In the development field, modern development theory while rejecting the universal applicability of neoclassical economics resumed the legacy of classical political economy (which had been a reaction to the social dislocation and instability brought about by industrialization). Its first orthodoxy was modernization and growth theory. Structuralism, dependency theory (resuming the legacies of Keynesianism and neomercantilism) and alternative development (resuming the legacy of populism) arose out of the failure of modernization policies. The neoliberal counterrevolution (resuming the tradition of liberalism) was a rejection of orthodox development economics and state intervention. Post-development involves a rejection of conventional development in toto. Human development builds on East Asian education-centred policies, resumes the 'growth and equity' approach of the 1970s along with Rawlsian social liberalism, and rejects neoliberalism. The preoccupation with safety nets and structural adjustment 'with a human face', human security and poverty alleviation is a reaction to the limitations of neoliberal reform. This zigzag history is usually interpreted in terms of the pendulum swing of state-market predominance (with different emphases reflecting the changing status of various development actors).4 However, these historical processes also show a pattern and layering of reflexivities, represented in institutional changes and policy measures and accompanying shifting indices. A disadvantage of redefining development as collective learning is that it suggests an evolutionary bias and a linear process of accumulative knowledge. This can be remedied by considering learning as a non-linear process. Another disadvantage is that it is apolitical, because where is struggle in this framework? Do landlords, multinational corporations or governments yield their positions of privilege and power on account of learning and reflexivity? They do so only under pressure of collective action. Thus, reflexivity must have a political edge and refer to collective feedback loops that generate and inform collective action challenging existing power relations. It must refer explicitly to reflexive politics that translates collective learning into forward analytics and politics. One layer of reflexivity arises from methodological and philosophical reflection on development, but reflexivity is not a purely intellectual process: it concerns ongoing political changes. Reflexivity is taken here not as an academic exercise but as collective reflexivity:'' a collective awareness that unfolds as part of a historical process of changing norms, ideologies and institutions, which crumble and then regroup under different headings. Collective reflexivity takes shape through changing institutions and policies, changing expectations and agendas. There is distortion along the way when reflexivity arising from particular circumstances is institutionalized or abstracted as an ideology or theory and then applied out of context; this is the problem of institutional lag, generalization and orthodoxy. Since theory implies generalization, this effect is inherent in economic and development theory. Specificity, diversity, contingency have only recently been adopted as principles of methodology and policy, and current development policies seek to strike a balance between specificity and generality. Reconstructions Like all social change, development unfolds in parallel universes. It unfolds as philosophies of change and politics of change, as structural and conjunctural changes, as local politics and as transnational regimes generated in faraway places. The challenge facing development is to retrieve hope from the collapse of progress. The collapse of progress is not just an occasional episode of collective moodiness but the onset of a different awareness. The Enlightenment has cast a long shadow. Through most of its career development has been steeped in authoritarian high modernism (Scott 1998), which is part of the failure of three development decades. But all along, as argued above, it has also been a series of reactions to and negotiations of the crises of progress. The dilemmas of development parallel the dilemmas of modernity on one question at least: what of a politics of hope? In one view, the current situation is a retreat of intellectuals (Petras 1990), but is the recovery of old positions an option? Presently the development field is bifurcating into a managerial stream - managing development as part of development bureaucracies - and an interpretative stream whose major concern is to deconstruct development, to unpack its claims and discourses, and once that is done, to deconstruct the deconstruction, for deconstruction is a never-ending task. This is the interpretative turn in development studies. In the career of modernity, in the wake of the routinization and bureaucratization of modern institutions, intellectuals from legislators became administrators or interpreters (according to Bauman 1992), and for some time, development intellectuals have been facing similar career options. According to Rorty (1997), what good politics needs are not principles but 'stories'. The reflexive turn is disabling if it leads to a cul-de-sac of pessimism. What matters is not just the methodology but the intention; what matters is not just deconstruction but why deconstruction. If the intention is to tell a story of the uselessness of stories, it will end up a thin story; if the intention is to tell a story of the significance of stories, it's a different story. Reflexivity is enabling if it is taken as the achievement of a new level of awareness, awareness of the meanings of trying as well as of failure. Among the reconstructions discussed in the course of this work the widest and most general forward reorientation is critical holism (Chapter 9). More specific is development as intercultural transaction (Chapter 5). Participatory development (Chapter 6) and supply-side social development (Chapter 8) go together as alternative politics and alternative economics of development. These two are now considered in relation to neoliberalism, asking the question whether there is scope for a coherent policy alternative to neoliberalism. The discussion on critical globalism (Chapter 3) is resumed in concluding observations on global transformations. The development field is a field of hegemonic compromise that papers over the differences between the dominant stakeholders. These can be characterized as different modernities or different capitalisms: Anglo-American free enterprise capitalism, West European welfare capitalism (Rhineland capitalism), East Asian capitalism, the NICs, market socialism in China, transitional countries, the rentier capitalism of the oil-producing countries, etc. The differences among them reflect geographical locations, historical itineraries, the timing of development, levels of technology, cultural capital, institutional differences and resource endowments.6 Typically, in line with their own historical experiences, these different capitalisms take diverse approaches to development; but development is also a transnational undertaking. The first synthesis in modern development was the state-centred Keynesian consensus, which reflected the experiences of European capitalisms (and East European socialism). The current successor to this approach is human development, which is close to the experiences of East Asian capitalism. The market-centred neoclassical approach as represented by the Washington consensus reflects the interests of Anglo-American capitalism. The third major synthesis, society-centred participatory development, is now being coopted by the other two approaches, which both embrace 'participation'. The diverse approaches to development are being papered over in the hegemonic language of development. Who can reasonably object to 'good governance', 'democracy', 'civil society', 'transparency'? Of course, each of these can be unpacked. Thus, embedded in 'good governance' is the contentious idea that the free market and democracy go together (cf. Attali 1997). Seen from this angle, development discourse appears as a large-scale spin-doctoring operation, in which the Washington consensus is dressed up as a Trilateral consensus and next, as a global consensus. Against the backdrop of the long hegemony of Anglo-American capitalism, the Washington agenda is now being transmitted globally through the international financial institutions, the WTO, the G8 and G22, in part by default, in the absence of an alternative policy consensus. The Washington consensus 'maintains that economic growth is best furthered by more open trade, export-led growth, greater deregulation, and more liberalized financial markets' (Palley 1999:49). Neoclassical economics and monetarism represent (a) good house-holding (don't spend more than you earn), (b) technical expertise, (c) a theoretical legacy, (d) an ideological mindset and (e) an interest coalition. These dimensions cannot be neatly separated. The technical skills of economic and financial monitoring and planning are steeped in analytical and ideological assumptions, mental frameworks and institutional paths, such as competitiveness indexes, international credit ratings and banking policies. They tend to assume Anglo-American capitalism as the 'norm' of capitalism, and in the process represent the perspectives and interests of major financial institutions such as the Wall Street-Treasury-IMF complex. This approach faces several problems: growing inequality, financial instability and crisis management. We inhabit a global theatre of the absurd, a winner-takes-all world in which the wealthiest billionaires own as much as approximately half the world population. The statistics are familiar.7 If trickle-down does not hold in national economies it is even less valid at a global level. There is no global trickle-down. Global inequality, refracted in local inequality, goes together with environmental imbalances. Development and environment are the two central world problems. Such is the world fashioned by Anglo-American capitalism and the Washington consensus is part of the problem. The problems of the Washington consensus have been widely discussed.8 For decades, criticism of and protest against the Washington consensus have been plentiful, but no coherent alternative has emerged, as if confirming that 'there is no alternative'. But in recent times, several streams have gradually been coming together. International civic organizations have long argued for an alternative to Bretten Woods (e.g. Niva 1999, Griesgraber and Gunter 1996b). Now there is a growing reform consensus in international development (e.g. Edwards 1999) which includes reorientations in the World Bank and OECD. In addition, the Washington consensus has been cracking itself. Criticisms of the IMF's handling of financial crises show a rift within the Washington consensus: within the IMF (Camdessus 1998) and World Bank (Stiglitz 1998), and among free market advocates such as Jeffrey Sachs who have come back on their endorsement. Dissident voices in Wall Street (Soros 1998) also plead for reform. These are signs of and responses to the growing difficulty of the neoliberal regime in reproducing itself. What used to be the Washington consensus has now been reduced to a Washington agenda. Financial instability poses risks even for the winners. Reform proposals converge on calls for financial re-regulation, in particular change in the international financial architecture to control the flows of 'hot money' (Akyuz 2000). In the wake of the Mexican, Asian, Latin American and Russian crises, the IMF (and the US Treasury, which finances the bailouts) has been pondering the scope for re-regulation. The regulation of international finance has temporarily made place for a concern with transparency, which refers to the world-wide alignment and standardization of accounting systems. If double bookkeeping was essential to the rise of modern lUU <-"- • *•'-*-'• ■ • —......— capitalism, the standardization of accounting systems is part of the globalization of capitalism. The other approaches also have their problems, in part as a function of Washington hegemony. Participatory development is an indication of a larger change that is imperceptibly taking place in political systems and cultures. It reflects a relative disempowerment of states and political systems in relation to development and technological change, that takes the form of depoliticization and technocracy, and repoliticization through the emergence of subpolitics, manifesting in special interests, lobbying, social movements and localization, ethnic mobilization and religious resurgence. As both cause and effect of democratization, civil actors seek empowerment and the boundaries between political and non-political, public and private spheres have become increasingly fluid. Infor-malization and liberalization involve a transfer of responsibilities from government to NGOs and the emergence of parallel structures, for instance in welfare and public health. Thus in several countries in sub-Saharan Africa, much of the health care and welfare sector has been subcontracted to foreign-funded NGOs. But what are not being replaced are the procedures of accountability, inadequate as they were. Hence, the new democratic culture of which participatory development is part also has new democratic deficits. The problems of participatory development are in part a function of the Washington hegemony. While 'participation' has become the leading development talk since the 1990s, it is a highly elastic term.9 The alternative platform matches the Washington consensus in the common theme of state failure, the trend toward privatization and informali-zation, i.e. a greater role for firms or NGOs; and the discourse of civil society and democracy. The new policy agenda of civil society building and 'NGO-ization', community development and self-reliance matches the new right agenda of government rollback and decentralization. Another problem is alternative dependency through foreign-funded NGOs. Accordingly, in the words of Michael Woost, 'we are still riding in a top-down vehicle of development whose wheels are greased with a vocabulary of bottom-up discourse' (1997: 249). In view of these problems, should we go back to the Keynesian consensus? Structural conditions are now different. If we look at the difficulties of welfare states in the North, could they survive in the South under much more difficult circumstances? The human development approach is state-centred at a time when government influence is being curtailed. The capabilities approach that underlies human development does not challenge power relations. There is no going back to governmentalism as it used to be; there is no going back to daddy state because of changes in technology, organization, production, markets and consumption. The conjunction of the Washington consensus and the alternative platform is too significant to be merely a matter of ideological manipulation. The point then is to find a narrow path in which participatory approaches retain their meaning, the role of the state is reinvented through public sector reform, and the Washington agenda itself is reconsidered. This task is common to North and South. The general concern with public-private partnership and corporate citizenship is part of this change. Participatory development (articulating social interests) and human development (articulating perspectives of states and international institutions) form a strategic combination of development perspectives, for together they represent social, state and institutional perspectives. The major rift in the development field now runs between these approaches and the Washington agenda. Underlying this rift is the central question of finding a way for the world of banking and finance, their abstract indicators and narrow agendas, to communicate meaningfully with the real world of social questions, work, poverty and human security. The core of the Washington agenda, 'free markets and sound money', is the ratio of the world of banking and finance as viewed through the lens of Anglo-American capitalism. Viewed from a global perspective, the Washington agenda is a minority concern and development, per definition, is a majority concern. A major principle for reform in the development field is that the accommodation between different capitalisms should take place according to majority and not according to hegemonic interests. Against this backdrop, the contours of a coherent alternative to neo-liberalism may gradually be taking shape. This involves a new convergence in development thinking and a consensus that, though short of a global consensus, is broad and growing. With apologies for offering another list, the outlines of this reform platform include the following components: Q Investment-led growth (Griffin 2000b) and domestic demand-led growth. 'This is a strategy that lifts all boats, because demand growth in one country pulls in exports from others, so that all grow together' (Palley 1999: 50). □ Human rights, core labour standards and independent unionism. Domestic demand-led growth requires rising wages and this entails evening the balance between capital and labour. □ Political reform and active democracy to counteract economic cronyism. □ Controls on short-term capital movements to require investors to commit for a minimum period.10 Q Taxes on buying and selling of currencies to curb financial speculation. Q Measures to prevent tax competition. Q Debt reduction for low-income countries (as in Jubilee 2000). O Reform of the IMF and World Bank to make them more accountable. Q A review of global trade and investment institutions and policies. These measures would contribute to evening the balance between capital and labour. A growing ensemble of social forces and political institutions shares this approach. In the South, this broadly matches the politics of reforming governments. It matches the Alternativo Latinoameričana (Conger 1998). It matches the forward proposals by critics of liberalization in South Asia (Bhaduri and Nayyar 1996: Ch 6). In the North, Third Way politics is a significant departure, not so much in terms of principles but in terms of establishing a centre-left political momentum. In terms of principles, the Third Way is too vague (Giddens 1998); in practice, it has been driven by electoral opportunism, and in delivery it has been too weak (Faux 1999, Ryan 1999). Labour, civic organizations, reform and Green parties might be able to carry the Third Way beyond electoral opportunism. In the United States, a coalition of left Democrats and labour adds up to a 'Mainstreet Alternative' (Palley 1999). In the UK, there are significant perspectives and political forces beyond New Labour (e.g. Hutton 1995) and similar conditions exist presently in most countries in the North. Internationally the principles of a reform alternative to neoliberalism are broadly shared in the UN system and other international institutions. The World Bank's comprehensive development framework endorses pro-poor growth (e.g. Sen and Wolfensohn 1999). The IMF has begun to accommodate social and human dimensions of development. In international development cooperation, where criticism of policy incoherence has been rife (Smillie 1997), reform initiatives are now being widely shared, including by the OECD (Bernard et al. 1998). Labour internationalism and the ILO are significant forces. International NGOs and civic organizations have contributed significantly to changing public discourse and promoting public and private accountability. Features of this reform platform are that it bridges concerns North and South, avoids old leň orthodoxy and populism as well as right sloganeering and market worship, and combines national reform with global reform. It's not a matter of going back to conventional Marxism or Keynesianism. Several components of the Washington agenda - public sector reform to achieve effective government, good governance, accountability and transparency -are part of the reform agenda. A difference is that if accountability in the Washington formula refers primarily to international monitoring institutions and overseas investors through the standardization of accounting systems, in the reform agenda it refers primarily to accountability to the electorate. Part of the reform platform is the awareness that no matter how ingeniously development is reinvented, it cannot be settled without global reform. Virtually all development approaches now engage the global level. In dependency thinking, this takes the form of criticizing uneven globalization. Neoliberalism involves the project of neoliberal globalization. Alternative development envisages alternative globalization and human development seeks global reform, while anti-development converges on anti-globalization. The global horizon is a compelling rendezvous, a prism in which all angles on development are refracted. This illustrates the dramatic salience of globalization as well as the diversity in development thinking. Since we have entered the era of global capitalism, while national settlements are important, global engagement is essential. Globalization requires political adjustments for all development actors, while development actors seek political adjustment of globalization. The crossroads of globalization may be summed up as either neoliberal globalization or taking a developmental approach to globalization (Pronk 2000). A Keynesian approach to a global new deal could take the form of global neo-Keynesianism (e.g. Lipietz 1992). Straddling society-centred and state-centred approaches to global reform are proposals for global social contracts (Group of Lisbon 1995) and transnational social policy (Deacon et al. 1998). The challenge for a global development approach is to bring separate and opposing interests and constituencies together as part of a world-wide bargaining and process approach. Together with proposals for reform of the UN system and strengthening the international legal order, this adds up to a global reform platform." At this point, development becomes world development, a horizon radically different from the original Gestalt of development. ruiuKĽS ur utVtLUPMhNI 169 Notes 1 Global neoliberal projects are widely discussed, among others by McMichael 1996 and Dessouk, Íľetersľ200ÔblnCtlOn ^^ gl°ballZatl°n 3S pr°CeSS and as ProJect ls d'scu*^ >» Nederveen 2 A case in point is the role of Japan m representing the "East Asian Miracle', discussed in Wade 1996. 3 For forty years, this has been the most quoted source in public administration. 4 This is a summary treatment; a more extensive discussion is in Chapter 3 5 Several perspectives concentrate on reflexivity of the self (Taylor 1989, Habermas 1990 Giddens 1991) while others (e.g. Beck 1992, Soros 1998, Foley 1999) use reflexivity in a collects sense including reflex,ve institutions (Fischer 1993). Self-reflex,v,ty and collective reflexivity are combined m approaches that br.ng together the personal and the political, such as feminism and new social movement research (Melucci 1989). A new approach to NGOs combines commitments to social justice With attentiveness to interpersonal relations and psychological states (Edwards and Sen 1999) In discussing the work of Aurobindo, Pande and Habermas, Giri also probes the relationship between self-refiexivity and collective reflexivity (1998: Ch. 11). A critical discussion of reflexivity is Lynch 6 Different capitalisms and different modernities are twin-track descriptions. Cf Eisenstadt 2000 Nederveen Pieterse 2000c. 7 Since the 1980s the gap between rich and poor countries has been widening dramatically The poorest 20 per cent of the world population accounts for 1.3 per cent of total private consumption expenditure, while the highest 20 per cent, i.e. those living in the highest-income countries, account for 86 per cent (UNDP 1998: 2). 8 E.g^B.enefeld 1994, Gills and Philip 1996, Cypher 1998. For instance, 'One country's exports are another country's imports, and this means that all cannot rely on export-led growth' (Palley 1999 /a EXP°f;'ed grOWth may lead to competitive devaluation and global deflation or global shortage of demand (Greider 1997). b _ 9 Also the World Bank publishes a Participation Sourcebook (1996). Arguably, it should not be community participation in development', but state and international agencies participating in community affairs. Cf. Stiefel and Wolfe 1994. 10 Proposed by Soros 1998 and shared by Stiglitz and others (cf. 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