

If individual achievement motivation can be measured by the projection method, how can national achievement motivation be measured? McClelland, again, used an innovative method to measure achievement motivation at the national level. He first collected popular literature—such as folk songs, comic books, poems, plays, and children's stories used in public textbooks—and then coded the degree of achievement motivation displayed in each of them. For example, on the topic of boat building, the popular literature of one nation emphasized the fun children have in constructing a boat together, while the popular literature of another nation stressed that it is necessary to have a bright leader to organize and plan boat-building activities. Clearly, the literature of the second nation has a higher achievement motivation score than that of the first nation. It is McClelland's assumption that folk stories are reflections of the minds of the people in a nation, otherwise they would not have become folk stories.

After collecting information on national achievement motivation, McClelland raised an interesting question: To what extent is achievement motivation related to national economic development (as measured by the consumption of electricity)? His cross-national research revealed that countries with high scores on achievement motivation have high economic development. In addition, he reports that the timing of development is significant. The rise and fall of achievement motivation are also associated with the rise and fall of national economic development. For example, although Great Britain was very high on the scale of achievement motivation in the nineteenth century, British achievement motivation scores fell below average in 1950. On the other hand, although France, Russia, and Germany were all quite low on the achievement motivation scale at the turn of the twentieth century, all three countries' achievement motivation scores rose sharply by the 1950s. The United States had approximately the same level of achievement motivation as the Soviet Union in the 1950s, but the Soviet Union's score was on the way up, whereas that of the United States was on the way down. According to McClelland, it takes about 50 years for a nation's economic development to match its trend of rising achievement motivation.

Finally, what are the sources of achievement motivation? Where does it come from? As a psychologist, McClelland tends to locate it in the family, especially in the process of parental socialization. First, parents need to set high standards of achievement for their children, such as expecting their children to excel in education, to get good jobs, and to be well known and respected in the community. Second, parents need to use the methods of encouragement and warmth in socialization. They need to give their children encouragement and affection, and to reward them if the children actually accomplish the tasks assigned. Third, parents should not be authoritarian. They should not do everything for the children, but should let the children develop their own initiatives and create their own ways to handle different situations. In addition, McClelland points out that Western-style education and cultural diffusion are helpful for Western nations in injecting achievement motivation into Third World countries.

The policy implication of this line of research is as follows. In order to promote economic development in Third World countries, it is necessary to promote achievement motivation among Third World entrepreneurs. It is not sufficient for the United States to provide financial aid, technology, and advice to Third World countries; the Third World must have a group of high-achieving entrepreneurs who know how to turn foreign aid into productive investment. McClelland further assumes that the more contacts Third World countries have with Western countries (such as educational exchange and cultural diffusion), the easier it will be for Third World people to adopt the traits of high achievement motivation.

#### INKELESS: MODERN MEN

Another classic modernization research project was conducted by Inkeless (1964), who has written many books and articles on the subject of "modern men." Inkeless is concerned with the following research questions: What is the impact of modernization on the individual's attitudes, values, and ways of living? When Third

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World people are exposed to Western, modern influence, will they adopt more modern attitudes than before?

In researching these questions, Inkeless, like McClelland, carried out cross-national studies. His research included Argentina, Chile, India, Israel, Nigeria, and Pakistan; these countries were chosen because they were situated at different positions on the scale of modernization, ranging from nonindustrialized to industrialized countries and from nondemocratic to democratic countries. Inkeless interviewed 6,000 young men, chosen from various categories such as peasantry, migrants, urban nonindustrial workers, urban industrial workers, and students. He developed a lengthy questionnaire that included over 300 items and took an average of three hours to complete. He received funding from the Rockefeller Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the National Science Foundation, the Department of Health, the U.S. Air Force, and Harvard University in carrying out this large-scale project.

Inkeless discovered a stable pattern of "modern men" across countries. In other words, the criteria used to define men as modern in one nation can be used to define men as modern in other countries as well. Inkeless constructed a scale of modernity ranging from 0 to 100 in order to measure this stable pattern of personality among modern men. The following are some of the traits shared by modern men, according to Inkeless:

- *Openness to new experience*: Modern men are willing to try new activities or to develop new ways of doing things.
- *Increasing independence from authority figures*: Modern men are not under the control of such figures as parents, tribal heads, and emperors.
- *Belief in science*: Modern men believe that human beings can conquer nature.
- *Mobility orientation*: Modern men are highly ambitious; they want to climb up the occupational ladder.
- *Use of long-term planning*: Modern men always plan ahead and know what they will accomplish in the next five years.
- *Activity in civil politics*: Modern men join voluntary associations and participate in local community affairs.

After describing the characteristics of the modern men, Inkeless raises another question: What makes men modern? What are the

crucial factors that have led Third World men to adopt modern values? According to Inkeless, education is the most important indicator of modern values. One year of education increases modern values by 2 to 3 points on a modernization scale of 0 to 100. Inkeless further points out that it is not the technical curriculum—such as the study of mathematics, chemistry, and biology—that matters, but the informal curriculum—exposure to the pro-Western values of teachers, the use of Western textbooks, the watching of Western movies—that facilitates the acquisition of modern values. Occupation, as measured by factory work, also has an independent effect on modern values. There is a late socialization effect in the sense that if an individual has missed a good formal education, he or she could still have a chance of becoming modern by working in a large-scale factory.

The final question that Inkeless raises is whether modernization produces psychological stress among Third World people. According to Inkeless, the literature on Third World modernization has tended to stress the negative impacts of modernization—social disorganization, personal demoralization, deviance, and alienation. This is especially true of the work of the Parsonian functionalists, who favor slow, gradual social change instead of rapid, sudden social change in Third World countries. But, Inkeless argues, in using his Psychosomatic Symptoms Test on Third World people he has revealed no difference between modern men and nonmodern men on stress scores. Consequently, he concludes that modernization does not necessarily produce psychological stress among Third World people; modern men exhibit no more stress than do nonmodern men.

#### BELLAH: TOKUGAWA RELIGION

*The research problem*. Bellah's (1957) study examines how the Tokugawa religion has contributed to the rapid economic development of Japan. Bellah focuses on Japan not only because it was the only non-Western nation to undergo industrialization at the turn of the twentieth century, but also because it exhibited a peculiar pattern of industrialization. Japan's initial wave of industrializa-

tion in the late nineteenth century was promoted not by industrialists, craftsmen, or merchants, but by a samurai class. It was the samurai class who restored the emperor, supplied a large number of vigorous entrepreneurs, and lay the foundation for Japanese modernization. In following the path of the research of Weber, Bellah wonders "whether religious factor might also be involved in the Japanese case." In other words, "was there a functional analogue to the protestant ethics in Japanese religion" that gave rise to modern Japanese industrial society?

*Theoretical background.* As a student of Parsons, Bellah borrows many functionalist concepts to study the connections between religion and modern industrial society in Japan. For Bellah, the term *modern industrial society* refers to a society centered upon economic values such as rationalization of means, universalism, and achievement in the value system. Without such modern economic values, Bellah argues, it would be impossible to liberate the economy from traditionalist restrictions to rational dynamism. The term *religion* in Bellah's work refers to an individual's attitudes and actions with respect to his or her ultimate values. Bellah argues that it is one of the social functions of religion to provide a meaningful set of ultimate values upon which the morality and central values of a society can be based.

When the great world religions emerged out of primitive or magical religion, they provided an impetus for redefinition of the central values of a society from traditionalism to rationalism. For Weber, Protestantism in Europe provided such a redefinition and institutionalized the values of universalism and achievement. Bellah undertook the study of traits in the Japanese religion that might have provided such a critical shift of central values.

*Japanese religion.* Bellah makes two basic observations concerning the study of Japanese religion. First, despite the fact that there are many religions in Japan (including Confucianism, Buddhism, and Shinto), it is possible to speak of Japanese religion as a single entity. This is because the various religious traditions have interpenetrated and are inseparably fused together. Thus "Confucianism and Shinto had borrowed Buddhist metaphysics and psychology; Buddhism and Shinto had borrowed much of Con-

fucian ethics, and Confucianism and Buddhism had been rather thoroughly Japanese." As a result, Japanese Confucianism is quite different from Chinese Confucianism, and Japanese Buddhism differs from Indian Buddhism.

The other observation that Bellah makes is that Japanese religion constituted the central value system of the society. Japanese religion historically began as the ethics of the samurai warrior class; it then became so popularized through the influence of Confucianism and Buddhism that it became the ethics of the entire Japanese population, including the backward peasantry living in remote villages.

With these two observations, how does Bellah explain the linkages between religion and economic development? Specifically, he points to three kinds of correlations: (1) Religion directly affected the economic ethics; (2) the influence of religion on the economy was mediated through the political institution; and (3) the influence of religion was mediated through the family institution.

*Direct influence of religion.* Bellah examines the Buddhist sect of Shinshu. In the early period, Shinshu stressed salvation by faith alone and paid little attention to ethical demands, so anyone could be saved, no matter how wicked. By middle Tokugawa (1600-1868), however, as a result of the promotion of Rennyō Shōnin, the so-called second founder of the sect, salvation and ethical action became indissolubly linked. Nothing more was heard about the wicked being saved. There was a shift of religious values in that ethical action was emphasized as the very sign of salvation.

Bellah notes three characteristics of this new ethical requirement. First, diligent work in this world, especially in one's occupation, occupied the central place among the ethical duties. Second, an ascetic attitude toward consumption was also present, as can be seen from the following maxims:

- Always think of divine protection.
- Cheerfully do not neglect diligent activity, morning and evening.
- Work hard at the family occupation.
- Be temperate in unprofitable luxury.
- Do not gamble.
- Rather than take a lot, take a little.

Third, although dishonest profit was prohibited, normal business profit was legitimated in religious terms through the doctrine of Bodhisattva spirit. In Bellah's (1957, p. 120) account, the businesses of merchants and artisans were allowed because these activities were considered to be beneficial to consumers. By bringing benefits to other members of the community, merchants and craftsmen received the right to profit themselves. This was the virtue of the harmony of *jiri-rita*.

To document the impact of the Shinshu religion on the actual behavior of Japanese merchants, Bellah cites the concentration of Shin temples in the Omi merchant towns, the large number of merchants in the temple registers, and the pious statements frequently made in the biographies of these merchants.

*Indirect influence of religion via the political system.* In China, Confucianism stressed that production should be aimed at sufficiency, harmony, and integration among different parts of the society. But in Japan, as Bellah points out, Confucianism took on a new meaning after being integrated with Buddhism. Instead of stressing harmony among the parts, Japanese Confucianism advocated the selfless subordination of all the parts to a single collective whole.

This principle of subordination is reflected in the economic ethics of the Japanese samurai. The duties and tasks of the samurai's occupation were seen as fulfilling his limitless obligation to his lord. The samurai had to fulfill his obligation with utmost devotion and without any consideration for himself. According to Bellah, however, this samurai work ethic spread to the rest of the society in the Tokugawa period, and all classes of citizens were expected to be loyal and to make returns for the lord or for the blessings of the nation. Through this calling of limitless obligation, Japanese society was said to be moving in a unified direction of fulfillment of obligations to superiors.

This calling of limitless obligation explains why the samurai class started the Meiji Restoration. The aims of the Restoration were to reverse the emperor, to expel the barbarians, and to increase national power. According to Bellah, the motivation of the samurai in leading the Meiji Restoration was primarily political rather than economic. The samurai were concerned with increasing national power; the increase in wealth was only a means to an end. Thus

the samurai turned themselves into vigorous entrepreneurs on a massive scale, not because they wanted to get rich, but because they wanted to save the nation through economic development. As an illustration of the adaptation of samurai ethics to modern entrepreneurship, Bellah (1957, p. 187) cites the house rules of Iwasaki, the samurai founder of Mitsubishi:

- Operate all enterprises with the national interest in mind.
- Never forget the pure spirit of public service.
- Be hardworking, frugal, and thoughtful to others.
- Utilize proper personnel.
- Treat your employees well.
- Be bold in starting an enterprise but meticulous in its prosecution.

In observing the continuation of the Tokugawa central values in the modern Meiji period, Bellah remarks that the modern industrial economy is permeated by the political values of an earlier period.

*Indirect influence of religion via the family.* The notion of limitless obligation was used not only to govern the nation, but also to manage the merchant houses. The merchant house was considered a sacred entity that symbolized ancestral worship. In a manner similar to the expectation of filial service of children to parents and the loyal service of clerks to their superiors, it demanded the gratitude of all its members. The standards of filial service to the merchant house were set very high, rivaling in strictness those of the samurai. In order to promote family honor and to fulfill one's sacred obligation to the family, lazy, extravagant, or dishonest behavior was condemned. To injure the reputation of the merchant house or to let the business decline would bring shame on one's ancestors. Thus the merchant class's economic motivation was not self-interest, but "family profitism." Bellah argues that this ethics of family obligation reinforced high standards of honesty, quality, and credit; reinforced universalistic norms in the business world; and provided a powerful impetus toward economic rationalization in modern Japan.

If familism promoted modernization in Japan, why did it fail to do the same in China? According to Bellah, China had too much familism. In China, the family system was the central institution in

the society, and filial piety formed the basis of Chinese moral principles. With the dominance of familism, loyalty to the lord (or the emperor) had a very restricted focus. Even the Chinese gentry entered government service not to build up national power, but to gain immunity and wealth for their families. In Bellah's functionalist terms, Chinese society was therefore characterized by the primacy of integrative values such as family solidarity and harmony. These values stressed system maintenance and lacked the dynamics to overcome the traditionalism of the masses.

In Japan, however, due to the fusion of Confucianism and Buddhism, the ethic of warrior loyalty persisted, and loyalty to the nation was therefore valued much more highly than filial piety to the family. Bellah characterizes Japan as being dominated by political or goal-attainment values, and this set of values provided the dynamism to pull the Japanese society together to pursue the collective goal of strengthening national power. Thus Bellah argues that the primacy of goal attainment explains the modernization of Japan and China.

In sum, Bellah's study of the Tokugawa religion shows that it directly or indirectly, through the polity and the family, exerted a favorable influence on the economic rationalization of Japan.

#### LIPSET: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY

*The research problem.* Lipset's (1963) work is concerned with examining how political democracy is related to economic development. He points out that from Aristotle to the present, the literature tends to assert that "the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy" (p. 31). Lipset addresses the question of whether only wealthy societies can give rise to democracy, and whether poor societies with a large impoverished mass lead to oligarchy (government by a small upper stratum, such as traditionalist dictatorships found in Latin America) or to tyranny (popular-based dictatorship, such as communism or Peronism).

*The variables.* To carry out his research, Lipset needed to define and operationalize the concepts of democracy and economic de-

velopment. *Democracy*, in Lipset's work, refers to a political system that supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials, and that permits the population to influence major decisions by choosing the holders of political office. Lipset distinguishes four types of political systems in Europe and Latin America:

- *European stable democracies* (e.g., United Kingdom): countries with an uninterrupted continuation of political democracy since World War I and the absence of a major political movement opposed to the democratic "rule of the game"
- *European unstable democracies and dictatorships* (e.g., Spain): countries in Europe that do not meet the above criteria
- *Latin American democracies and unstable dictatorships* (e.g., Brazil): countries with a history of more or less free elections since World War I
- *Latin America stable dictatorships* (e.g., Cuba): countries in Latin America that do not meet the above criteria

As Lipset explains, and as this list shows, the criteria for Latin American countries are less stringent. In Europe we look for stable democracies, while in South America we look for unstable dictatorships.

With respect to the concept of economic development, Lipset uses various indices, including the following:

- *wealth*, as measured by per capita income, number of persons per motor vehicle, and the number of physicians, radios, telephones, and newspapers per 1,000 persons
- *industrialization*, as measured by the percentage of employed labor in agriculture and per capita energy consumed
- *urbanization*, as measured by the percentage of population in cities over 20,000, in cities over 100,000, and in metropolitan areas
- *education*, as measured by primary education enrollment, post-primary enrollment, and higher education enrollment per 1,000 persons

*The findings.* Using data published by the United Nations, Lipset found that no matter what index is used for economic development, it is always higher for democratic countries than for dictatorships. Thus more democratic countries have higher average

wealth, a higher degree of industrialization and urbanization, and a higher level of education than do less democratic nations. To illustrate, Lipset reports that the per capita income for European stable democracies is \$695; for European dictatorships it is \$308; for Latin American democracies it is \$171; and for Latin American dictatorships it is \$119.

Furthermore, Lipset notes that all the indices of economic development—wealth, industrialization, urbanization, and education—are so closely interrelated that they form one major factor that has high correlation with the variable of democracy. Citing Lerner, Lipset entertains the idea that this high correlation may be a result of the different phases of modernization: starting with urbanization, followed by the development of literacy and the mass media, and, finally, leading to the birth of the democratic institution of participation.

*The explanation.* What explains the strong relationship between economic development and democracy? Lipset (1963, p. 45) basically provides a social class explanation: "Economic development, producing increased income, greater economic security, and widespread higher education, largely determines the form of the 'class struggle' " that lays the foundation of democracy.

First, the lower class in poor countries experiences more status inferiority than its counterpart in wealthy countries. When a country is poor, the sharing of goods, services, and resources must inevitably be less equitable than in a country in which there is relative abundance. Consequently, when the lower class in the poor countries is exposed to a better way of life by modern means of communication and transportation, sufficient discontent is aroused to provide the social basis for political extremism. Thus the political parties in poorer countries are more extremist and radical than those in wealthier countries. On the other hand, economic development, with its accompanying increase in wealth and consumer goods, serves to reduce the social distance between the lower and upper classes. Thus the lower class in wealthy countries tends to develop longer time perspectives and more complex and reformist views of politics. Lipset points out that a belief in secular reformism can be the ideology of only a relatively well-to-do lower class in wealthy countries.

Second, increased wealth also affects the middle class. There is a diamond-shaped social stratification in wealthy countries, with an expanded middle class. Since middle-class members are the ones most likely to join voluntary political organizations, they provide a countervailing force to check the power of the state, form a source of new opinion for the mass media, and help to train citizens in political skills and to arouse political participation. Lipset asserts that a large middle class also tempers conflict by rewarding moderate and democratic parties and by penalizing extremist groups.

Third, the politics of the upper class is also related to national wealth. In poor countries, the upper class tends to treat the lower class as vulgar and innately inferior, as a lower caste beyond the pale of human society. Naturally, in poor countries, the upper class resists granting political rights to the lower class—which often intensifies the latter's extremist reactions. On the other hand, in wealthy countries, where there are enough resources for some redistribution to take place, it is easier for the upper class to extend some rights to the lower class.

In sum, Lipset has documented and explained the strong relationship between economic development and democracy. However, as a shrewd political sociologist, he also makes an important qualification. He disagrees with political commentators' interpretation of his findings that "if only the underdeveloped nations can be successfully started on the road to high productivity, . . . we can defeat the major threat to newly established democracies, their domestic Communists" (p. 54). Lipset disagrees with this interpretation because lower-class political extremism is found not only in low-income countries, but also in newly industrializing countries. Consequently, Lipset qualifies his findings by adding a new factor of the rate of industrialization. In Lipset's words, "Wherever industrialization occurred rapidly, introducing sharp discontinuities between pre-industrial and industrial situation, more rather than less extremist working-class movements emerged" (p. 54). This is because under slow industrialization, workers have been employed in an industry for a long time, and those newcomers who have been pulled from the rural areas and who might have supplied the basis for an extremist party are always in the minority. But if

ization. Inkeless points out that modern men in Third World countries tend to possess Western traits, such as mobility orientation, the use of long-term planning, and participation in civil affairs. Bellah assumes that Western values such as universalism and achievement are necessary to liberate Third World economies from traditionalistic restrictions to rational dynamism. And Lipset implies that Third World countries need to attain a Western style of economic development (such as industrialization, urbanization, and education) before they can sustain a Western style of democracy (including elections and the change of government administrators).

*The methodology.* Except for Bellah's study, the empirical works discussed above tend to anchor their discussions at a highly general level. For example, achievement motivation and modern men are taken as universals that can be applied to any Third World country, irrespective of whether it is India, Chile, or Nigeria. Lipset combines Latin American countries into just two categories (democracies and unstable dictatorships versus stable dictatorships), without investigating the historically specific political developments of the different Latin American countries.

The modernization school was very popular in the post-World War II era. Students of development, therefore, tended to share the research focus, the analytical framework, and the methodology of the modernization school in the 1950s. However, by the late 1960s, the modernization school came under increasing attack.

#### CRITICISMS OF THE MODERNIZATION SCHOOL

Before presenting a discussion of the radical critiques of the Marxists, I will first present academic critiques of the modernization school from mainstream social scientists (Bendix 1967; Eisenstadt 1974; Gusfield 1967; Huntington 1976; Lauer 1971; Nisbet 1969; Tipps 1976). These academicians have reservations about the evolutionary and functionalist assumptions of the modernization school.

#### THE MODERNIZATION SCHOOL

industrialization is rapid, it results in a sudden growth in the number of unskilled workers from the rural areas, thereby providing the fuel for extremist politics.

#### POWERS OF THE CLASSICAL MODERNIZATION PERSPECTIVE

This chapter has reviewed four classical modernization studies: McClelland on achievement motivation, Inkeless on modern men, Bellah on Tokugawa religion, and Lipset on political democracy. These four studies show how the basic assumptions of the modernization perspective shape the research focus, the analytical framework, and the methodology of modernization research.

*The research focus.* Despite the fact that the above studies were carried out by a psychologist, a social psychologist, a sociologist of religion, and a political sociologist, respectively, they all share a similar research focus on modernization. They are interested in the examination of the following key research questions: What are the factors that have promoted the modernization of Third World countries? What are the consequences of the modernization process on Third World societies? For example, McClelland highlights the strong correlation between achievement motivation and economic development. Bellah examines the role of the Tokugawa religion on Japanese economic development. Lipset addresses the possible role of economic development in the democratization of Third World countries. And Inkeless discusses the consequences of the modernization process for individual attitudes and behavior.

*The analytical framework.* The four studies also share a similar modernization framework. The authors all assume that Third World countries are traditional and that Western countries are modern. In order for Third World countries to follow the Western path of modernization, the four studies explicitly or implicitly propose that Third World countries must drop their traditional traits and acquire Western traits. Thus McClelland advocates the injection of Western achievement values into Third World countries as a means of promoting entrepreneurship and modern-

### *Unidirectional Development*

First, the critics have challenged the evolutionary assumptions of unidirectional development. Why do Third World countries need to move in the direction of Western countries? According to the critics, this element of modernization theory is simply the result of the fact that most modernization researchers are Americans and Europeans. Born and raised in Western countries, modernization researchers believe that their own cultural values are the most natural and the best in the world. Thinking that their Western countries represent the future of the Third World countries, they assume that the Third World countries will move toward the Western model of development. According to the critics, this belief in Western superiority is "ethnocentric." For example, why are Western countries placed at the higher end of the evolutionary path and labeled "advanced" or "modern" societies? And why are Third World countries placed near the lower end of the evolutionary path and called "primitive" or "traditional" societies? The critics argue that concepts such as "advanced," "modern," "traditional," and "primitive" are merely ideological labels used to justify Western superiority.

Second, the critics assert that belief in unidirectional development has resulted in modernization researchers' overlooking alternative paths of development for Third World countries. Since modernization researchers assume that Third World countries must follow the Western model, they have practically defined away the possibility that these countries may select different models of development. For example, since the United States has democratic institutions, modernization researchers assume that democracy is a major component of modernization. But is democracy necessary for economic development? Do Third World countries have other choices? For instance, can they follow the authoritarian development of Taiwan and South Korea? Can they create their own models of development?

Third, the critics argue that modernization researchers are overly optimistic. They have mistakenly assumed that since Western countries have achieved development, Third World countries can also. Researchers have not fully explored the possibility of non-

development. Many critics assert that the future of Third World development is uncertain. There is a real possibility of modernization breakdown such as that in Ethiopia, where the people have faced starvation and the nation has faced extinction. The critics point out that many Third World countries have in fact gotten worse over the past century. It seems that the modernization process can be stopped or even reversed, contrary to the claims of the modernization school.

### *The Need to Eliminate Traditional Values*

Critics of the modernization school also attack the functionalist assumption of incompatibility between tradition and modernity. First, the critics ask: What is really tradition? Is it true that Third World countries have a set of homogeneous and harmonious traditional values? According to the critics, Third World countries have heterogeneous values systems. For example, Redfield (1965) has distinguished the "great tradition" (the values of the elites) from the "little tradition" (the values of the masses). The elites may value poetry, painting, dancing, hunting, leisure, and philosophy, while the masses may value working in the fields, diligence, thrift, and earning one's own living. Furthermore, not only are Third World countries culturally diverse, but their cultural systems are full of conflicts. The functionalists generally hold the misleading conception that societies in the past were peaceful and stable. But throughout history, there have always been conflict and instability in the form of peasant protests, national movements, and religious wars.

Second, the critics ask: Are traditional values and modern values mutually exclusive? The critics assert that in traditional societies, modern values have always been present. For example, in traditional Chinese society, which emphasized particularistic ascription, there was an impersonal examination system that stressed universalistic achievement. On the other hand, in the modern society, traditional values have always been present. For example, particularistic values (such as ethnicity, gender, and age) can never be eliminated in the recruitment and promotion of personnel in a



values, it is not clear which nation (Japan, Egypt, or Peru?) the modernization school is talking about. It is also not clear which historical period the modernization school is describing. Is it the seventeenth, the eighteenth, the nineteenth, or the twentieth century? Modernization researchers anchor their arguments at such a high level of generalization that their propositions are beyond time and space limitations.

In addition, the critics argue that there is a lack of before-and-after historical research undertaken by modernization social scientists. They simply take cross-national research at a given period to be historical research over time. For example, to study why China has failed to modernize in the post-World War II era, critics of modernization researchers argue that the correct research method is to examine what China was like in the eighteenth century, what has happened to China since then, and how these historical factors have affected the Chinese path of development in the twentieth century. But, instead of pursuing a historical research method, modernization researchers simply adopt a cross-national method. They assume that twentieth-century China is like eighteenth-century Great Britain. If eighteenth-century Great Britain needed to invest 10% or more of its national income in the economy, then twentieth-century China needs to do the same in order to arrive at the takeoff stage of economic growth.

Aside from the above academic criticisms, the modernization school has been the subject of political criticisms from neo-Marxists (Bodenheimer 1970b; Cardoso and Faletto 1979; Chilcote and Edelstein 1974; Frank 1969; Portes 1976; Pratt 1973; Rhodes 1968). Since the neo-Marxist approach to development will be discussed in depth in Chapter 5, only a brief review of two aspects of neo-Marxist criticism are presented here—the ideological critique and a critique based on the neglect among modernization researchers of the issue of foreign domination.

#### *The Ideological Critique*

From the neo-Marxist viewpoint, the modernization perspective is a cold war ideology that is used to justify the intervention of

modern bureaucracy. Consequently, it seems that traditional and modern values have always coexisted.

Third, the critics ask: Are traditional values always obstacles to modernization? Do we need to eliminate traditional values in order to promote modernization? As some critics point out, traditional values may sometimes be very helpful in promoting modernization. For example, in the modernization of Japan, the value of "loyalty to the emperor" was easily transformed to "loyalty to the firm," which helped to enhance workers' productivity and to cut down the turnover rate.

Finally, the critics ask: Can modernization totally displace traditional values? They point out that traditional values will always be present in the process of modernization. As the cultural lag theory points out, traditional values will persist for a very long time even though the original conditions that gave rise to them have disappeared. Not only is there never a simple, one-sided displacement of traditional values, but traditional values are bound to remain and affect the development of modern values. For example, strong beliefs about Chinese medicine have altered the manner in which the Chinese have accepted Western medicine in China—a Chinese person may drink a cup of herbal soup in the evening after taking an aspirin in the morning. Moreover, even when traditional values seem to be declining, they may come back at a later time to affect Third World development. Traditional values are usually revitalized at a crucial turning point in the modernization process. During national independence movements, for instance, traditional values such as folk religion, folk songs, and native language are often emphasized in the effort to unite the whole nation. As such, traditional values never die.

#### *Methodological Problems*

According to their critics, modernization researchers tend to formulate their arguments at such a high level of abstraction that it is hard to know what country and what historical period that they are discussing. For example, in discussing pattern variables such as particularistic, ascribed, collective, diffused, and affective

the United States in Third World affairs. Thus in a well-known article titled "The Sociology of Development and Underdevelopment of Sociology," Frank (1969, p. xi) claims to examine "the North American emperor's social scientific clothes and exposes the scientific nakedness behind his ideological sham."

Along the same line of criticism, Bodenheimer (1970b) points to the "ideology of developmentalism" that has suffused the literature of comparative politics and sociological theory. According to Bodenheimer, the literature of development has suffered from the following four epistemological sins: (1) belief in the possibility of an objective social science free of ideology, (2) belief in the cumulative quality of knowledge, (3) belief in universal laws of social science, and (4) export of these three beliefs to Third World countries. "These epistemological sins led to the theoretical errors of belief in incremental and continuous development, the possibility of stable and orderly change, the diffusion of development from the West to the third-world areas, and the decline of revolutionary ideology and the spread of pragmatic and scientific thinking" (see Almond 1987, p. 445).

#### *Neglect of the Issue of Foreign Domination*

The modernization school is also criticized for ignoring the crucial element of foreign domination. While focusing on internal traits such as traditional values and lack of productive investment, modernization researchers have paid little attention to external dynamics such as the history of colonialism, the control of multinational corporations over Third World economies, the unequal pattern of trade between Western and Third World countries, and the nature of the international system. Although modernization researchers simply assume that Third World countries have attained political autonomy at the termination of formal colonial domination, the neo-Marxists argue that these countries are still politically, economically, and culturally dominated by Western countries. Consequently, the neo-Marxists criticize modernization researchers' neglect of such a crucial factor as foreign domination in the shaping of Third World development.

In sum, the academic and political critics of the modernization school have pointed to its misleading evolutionary and functionalist assumptions, methodological problems, and ideological biases. The issue facing modernization researchers, then, is how to address their critics. How seriously should they deal with these criticisms? Is it true that there is nothing good about the modernization school and that it therefore should be disbanded? Or is it possible for the modernization school to incorporate the strong points made by its critics into its theory and research?

In the heat of theoretical debate in the late 1960s, modernization researchers generally became defensive and paid little attention to their critics. However, after the dust has settled in the late 1970s, they began to take these criticisms seriously. The modernization school modified some of its basic tenets and embarked upon a series of original studies—the "new modernization studies" discussed in the next chapter.

to eliminate some of the dubious assumptions of the classical modernization studies. As such, this new wave of modernization studies is different from classical modernization studies on the following grounds.

First, the new modernization studies avoid treating tradition and modernity as a set of mutually exclusive concepts. In new modernization research, tradition and modernity not only can coexist, but can penetrate and intermingle with each another. In addition, instead of arguing that tradition is an obstacle to development, the new modernization studies attempt to show the beneficial role of tradition. This new conception of tradition has opened up new research agendas, as new modernization researchers have placed much more emphasis on traditional traits (such as familism and folk religion) than they did before.

Second, there is a change in methodology. Instead of drawing typologies and anchoring their discussions at a high level of abstraction, the new modernization studies tend to focus upon concrete cases. History is often brought back in to show the specific pattern of development in a particular country. Often in-depth case studies are supplemented by comparative perspectives, such as research into why the same institution has played different roles in different countries.

Third, as a result of paying more attention to history and concrete case studies, the new modernization studies do not assume a unidirectional path of development toward the Western model. Instead, these studies take it for granted that Third World countries can pursue their own paths of development.

Finally, the new modernization studies lay more emphasis on external (international) factors than before. Although their focus is still on internal factors, they do not neglect the role played by external factors in shaping the development of Third World countries. In addition, they place more emphasis on the phenomenon of conflict. They often incorporate the factors of class conflict, ideological domination, and religious revolution into their analyses.

(See Table 4.1 for a summary of the differences and similarities between the new modernization studies and the classical studies.)

## CHAPTER 4

### *The New Modernization Studies*

#### RESPONSES TO THE CRITICS

By the late 1970s, when the heat of criticism of the modernization school had subsided, there was a revival of modernization research. Like the classical modernization studies, these new modernization studies focus on Third World development. The analyses in these studies are conducted at the national level, and they aim to explain that development occurs mainly through internal factors, such as cultural values and social institutions. The new studies use terms similar to those found in the classical studies, terms like *tradition* and *modernity*, and they basically share the same assumption that modernization (and contact with Western countries) is generally beneficial to Third World countries.

However, there are also striking differences between the classical and the new modernization studies. Members of the new modernization school are now on the offensive. On the one hand, they have fought back and labeled their Marxist critics as propagandists who have misread their arguments (Almond 1987, p. 450-468; Moore 1979, p. 154). On the other hand, they have candidly reexamined the basic assumptions of the modernization school. They voice their own in-house criticisms, and they are not hesitant

**Table 4.1** Comparison of Classical Modernization Studies and New Modernization Studies

	<i>Classical Modernization Studies</i>	<i>New Modernization Studies</i>
<b>Similarities</b>		
research focus	Third World development	same
level of analysis	national level	same
key variables	internal factors: cultural values and social institutions	same
key concepts	tradition and modernity	same
policy implications	modernization generally beneficial	same
<b>Differences</b>		
on tradition	tradition an obstacle to development	tradition an additive factor of development
on methodology	typology construction high-level abstraction	concrete case studies historical analysis
on direction of development	unidirectional path toward the U.S. model	multidirectional paths of development
on external factors and conflict	relative neglect of external factors and conflict	greater attention to external factors and conflict

By revising some of the basic assumptions of the modernization school, the new modernization studies have opened up a whole new set of research agendas. In the following sections, some research problems addressed by the new modernization studies will be discussed, such as how familism has promoted entrepreneurship in Hong Kong, how folk religion has shaped the modernization of Japan, how the Islamic religion was related to the Iranian Revolution, and how the international environment has influenced democratic development in Third World countries.

### WONG: ENTREPRENEURIAL FAMILISM

Wong's (1988) study starts with a critique of the classical modernization theorists' interpretation of the traditional Chinese family. In the classical modernization literature, Chinese families are seen as a strong force of traditionalism that has promoted nepotism, weakened work discipline, thwarted the free market selection of labor, diluted individual incentives to invest, blocked rationalization, and inhibited the emergence of universalistic business norms. As a result, classical modernization researchers advocated discarding traditional Chinese family values in order to promote economic growth in China. However, Wong argues that this negative economic effect of traditional Chinese values has been exaggerated. Tracing the influence of the family on the internal organization of Chinese enterprises in Hong Kong—especially through paternalistic managerial ideology and practice, nepotistic employment, and family ownership—Wong demonstrates that the family does have a positive impact on economic development.

First, he addresses the practice of *paternalistic management* in Hong Kong enterprises. Wong's (1988, p. 137) research on the cotton spinners shows that there were "industrial patriarchs who exercised tight control, shunned the delegation of power, conferred welfare benefits on their employees as favors, acted as moral custodians of their subordinates, opposed protective labor legislation, and disapproved of trade union activities." Wong points out that the metaphor of the family provides ready-made cultural rhetoric to legitimate a patron-client relationship between employer and employee. The economic foundation of this benevolent paternalism is that it helps the entrepreneur to attract and retain workers in industries of highly fluctuating production. The political consequence of paternalism is that it retards the growth of class consciousness among workers. Wong asserts that when paternalism is working, labor discontent is expressed more in the form of individual acts, such as absenteeism and resignations, than in the collective acts of bargaining and strikes.

Second, *nepotism*—the preferred employment of one's relatives—may also contribute to the success of Hong Kong firms. Wong notes that most Chinese will ask relatives for jobs only as a

Entrepreneurial familism has three distinguishing characteristics. The first is a high degree of centralization in decision making, but with a low degree of formalization of organizational structure. Second, autonomy is highly valued, and self-employment is preferred. The common ideal, for managers and workers alike, is to become one's own boss. Since managerial loyalty cannot be assumed, employers rely on paternalistic practice, tight supervision, and minimal delegation of authority as a means of coping with the situation. Third, family firms seldom endure, and they are constantly in flux. In addition, enterprises are unlikely to join in collusion since entrepreneurial autonomy is jealously guarded.

If the family plays such a positive role in Hong Kong, why did it fail to realize its potential in the past on the Chinese mainland? For Wong, the explanation lies in the external sociopolitical milieu of the family. Although the family is and was an economically active force, in the past it was probably checked by a state preoccupied with the task of integration and a peculiar ecological and economic environment that constituted a "high-level equilibrium trap." In Hong Kong, these external constraints of the state and environment are removed, as Hong Kong is governed by a colonial state that does not compete with the family for talent. Consequently, the family in Hong Kong has realized potential as the motor of economic development.

In sum, Wong criticizes classical modernization theorists for overlooking the dynamic role of the Chinese family in promoting economic development. Their tendency to see only the sharp dichotomy between European universalism and Chinese particularism resulted in their inability to understand the family's role. Wong believes that the European experience of capitalist development is not likely to be replicated in China; China's different patterns of social structure will necessarily result in divergent patterns of modernization. Wong further cautions that Chinese familism, too, may be different from its Korean and Japanese counterparts because of differences in social structures. As such, the roles of Korean and Japanese families in economic development might be distinctive enough to warrant individual treatment.

last resort, and relatives generally make up just a tiny fraction of the personnel in nepotistic companies. On the other hand, for small firms, family members provide a reliable and cheap labor force. In fact, kin are expected to work harder for less pay, which helps to enhance the competitiveness of the firm during recession. If family members are in managerial positions, Chinese entrepreneurs are generally careful to equip them with formal education as well as on-the-job training. Therefore, Wong argues that the kin managers are seldom standard employees with poor ability.

Third, Wong addresses the family mode of ownership; in 1978, nearly 60% of small factories in Hong Kong were owned by individual proprietors and their families. Wong points out that the principle of patrilineal descent has resulted in a discrete and enduring corporate kinship unit that is conducive to the management of economic resources. Even if family division were to take place, it would take the form of dividing profits rather than physical fragmentation of the family estate. With these family traits, Wong (1988, p. 142) asserts that the competitive strengths of the Chinese family firms are considerable:

There exists a much stronger measure of trust among *jia* [family] members than among unrelated business partners; consensus is easier to attain; the need for mutual accountability is reduced. These factors enable family firms to be more adaptable in their operations. They can make quick decisions during rapidly changing circumstances and maintain greater secrecy by committing less to written records. As a result, they are particularly well-suited to survive and flourish in situations where a high level of risk is involved.

Therefore, instead of treating family as antithetical to economic development, Wong argues for an economically dynamic ethos of "entrepreneurial familism." This ethos involves the family as the basic unit of economic competition, providing the impetus toward innovation and risk taking. Furthermore, Wong argues that this ethos exists not only among the entrepreneurs, but throughout all of Hong Kong society.

## DAVIS: JAPANESE RELIGION REVISITED

Following Wong's line of argument in criticizing the classical modernization studies, Davis (1987) reexamined the intricate relationship between religion and development in general and the role of Japanese religion in Japanese modernization in particular.

*A Theory of Hurdles*

According to Davis, Weber (1958) has offered a theory of hurdles—treating development as though it were an extended obstacle course stretching between the starting line (traditional societies) and the finishing line (modern societies). In this race, runners (i.e., developing nations) who succeed in surmounting all of the hurdles of the course are rewarded with the trophies of "rationality" and modern civilization.

What, then, are these hurdles of development? First, developers must overcome economic hurdles to attain the basic characteristics of the capitalist system itself: rationality, asceticism, continuity in production and markets, and formally free labor markets. Second, there are social-political hurdles—replacement of patrimonialism and kinship economy with rational administrative organizations and legal institutions, separation of places of business and residence, distinctions between corporate and private property. Third, there are psychological hurdles—achievement of spiritual ethos (such as the duty to work according to one's "calling"), rejection of magic, and cultivation of an existential tension between the world as it is and the ethical demands of a transcendent deity. According to Weber, the Protestant ethic—especially the Puritan concern for the soul's salvation—provided Western Europe an impetus to leap these economic, social, political, and psychological hurdles in the race toward modern capitalism.

Weber's studies on religion started a trend of searching for analogues to the Protestant ethic in Japan, Korea, Singapore, and other Third World countries. In the 1950s, as discussed in Chapter 3, Bellah (1957) suggested that Tokugawa religion provided the source of a "central value system" to move Japan into modern

capitalism. In the 1980s, Morishima (1982) has picked up Bellah's line of thinking, arguing that Japan's success can be attributed to its Confucian traits of loyalty, nationalism, and social collectivism. Morishima further asserts that due to its Confucian heritage, Japan failed to absorb the West's liberalism, internationalism, and individualism even though Japan imported the West's science, industry, and technology. As a result, the ex-samurai who founded and originally managed the large firms imparted to industry their own Confucian sense of loyalty, creating a loyalty market (permanent employment and seniority advancement) for its recruitment of employees. According to Davis, Morishima's account is a version of the popular "Japan theory" that has exaggerated the uniqueness of Japanese culture in order to provide an explanation for the economic success of Japan.

According to Davis, Weber and his followers in the modernization school have committed the following errors in explaining the relationship between religion and development. First, they assume a priori that religion is the source of some "spiritual ethos" or "central value system," which, in turn, influences all segments of society in the same way. Rather than one central value system, however, Davis sees the possible emergence of several different "spirits" in the rise of capitalism—buyers and vendors cultivate the spirit of "creditworthiness," entrepreneurs stand in need of an ethos that will promote risk taking, investors need a spirit that will inspire delayed gratification, and management needs a disciplinary spirit to impose on workers.

Second, Davis criticizes Weber and his followers for taking secularization or disenchantment for granted as part of the inevitable fate of modern civilization. Davis argues that if modern society consists of different "spirits," it need not be assumed that each one will be secularized in the same way. In fact, some "spirits" may not be secularized at all, while others, now and then, may even undergo "resanctification." Thus each modern society has to be studied anew with respect to its decline of religion.

Third, the followers of Weber, who tend to stress the uniqueness of Japanese culture in explaining its economic success, fail to deal with other social relations, such as the role of individual self-interest, competition, disloyalty, and conflict. Criticizing Morishima's




Figure 4.1. Davis's Model of Traditional Society  
SOURCE: Davis (1987). Reprinted by permission of the author.

economy," which restricts the scope of the market by traditional rituals and ceremonies, ensuring that the market will function within existing narrow limits.

In Davis's (1987, p. 232) barricades model, "economic development takes place not just when an 'enemy' (i.e., a modernizer or developer) scales the ramparts and invades the citadel of society, but when the barriers themselves grow old and weak, and finally begin to crumble, or when their defenders lose heart and surrender."

In Figure 4.2, the porousness of the religious barricades (represented by a dotted line) has allowed the economy and its values to expand and penetrate the domain of society. Through the barricades metaphor, Davis reinterprets the rise of capitalism in the West. A rational economy came into being not only because "hot Protestants" filled the market with the "zeal of the Lord," but because lukewarm Christians offered so little resistance to exploitation. In England, the church had virtually nothing to say about the misery (such as enclosures, poorhouses, and sweatshops) produced by the Protestant modernizers. This barricades

THE MODERNIZATION SCHOOL

loyalty theory. Davis points out that if ethos accounts for so much, how much weight should researchers put on the contribution of the government, banking system, tariffs, industrial planning, and wages and bonuses? Furthermore, Davis notes that loyalty cannot exist in a vacuum, but is always situated in a network of incentives, rewards, exchanges for patronage, coercion, and constraints. This material foundation must be considered in understanding the real dynamics at work in Japanese society.

A Theory of Barricades

After refuting Weber's theory of hurdles, Davis offers a new theory of barricades. The theory of hurdles looks at religion primarily from the point of view of aggressive modernizers and developers, and assumes that hurdles in the way of development can simply be leapt over in the race course. Davis offers another view of the same situation from the standpoint of traditionalism—how traditional societies set up barricades to protect themselves from the disruptive advance of capitalist values. What traditional societies fear is not progress, but the social turbulence and moral turpitude caused by unrestrained trade and commerce.

In presenting his theory of traditional barricades, Davis portrays traditional society as consisting of three concentric rings (see Figure 4.1):

- an inner ring representing the economy and its values (e.g., achievement and universalism)
- a middle ring representing the "immunological barricade" that traditional societies erect against the economy (made up of taboos, magic, traditional religion, morality, law, philosophy, folk religion, and the like)
- an outer ring representing the society and its values, status, and power relations

Davis conceptualizes the middle ring as made up of defensive institutions that would keep the economy in check. This middle ring operates in a way similar to Polanyi's (1944) "embedded




Figure 4.2. Davis's Model of Development and Secularization  
SOURCE: Davis (1987). Reprinted by permission of the author.

model, therefore, offers a new approach to the examination of the relationship between religion and development. Instead of focusing on the ways that modernizers leap over hurdles, Davis's new approach calls for an analysis of the activities of the defenders of traditional religion. Davis (1987, p. 247-248) says that we must be careful to attribute to the new defending actors the same capacities we ascribe to the advancing modernizers:

We must endow them with the ability to dodge, huddle, feint, fall back, regroup, conspire, collaborate, betray, compromise, and even surrender to the foe, . . . how they grew as proud of development as the developers themselves, and how their rhetoric and strategies were co-opted by the victors and made part of the master plan of development itself.

#### *Rewriting the Religious History of Japan*

Using his barricades model, Davis attempts to reinterpret the relationship between Japanese religion and development. He

focuses on two aspects: (1) the negative enablements of religion (Why did Japanese religion fail to obstruct change?) and (2) the positive enablements of religion (How did Japanese religion promote change?).

*The negative enablements.* Davis argues that Japanese religions have posed no obstruction to change for the following reasons. First, with respect to Buddhism, it had done nothing to prevent the rapid development of the Japanese countryside. Unlike Islam, Buddhism sought to impose no sacred law upon society that ultimately would obstruct change. For example, Buddhism imposes no restrictions on a person's occupation. Most Buddhist priests just limit their services to funerals and the routine performance of ancestral rites.

Second, since Shinto had no universal prelates to enforce its claims, it gave in even more easily to the modernizing forces. Davis (1987, p. 251) illustrates this point: "If a festival interfered with new work schedules, it was postponed, curtailed, or simply dropped from the calendar. Ancient taboos limiting intercourse with outsiders were prudently overlooked or forgotten."

Third, because of the coexistence of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Shinto, there is a high degree of religious tolerance in Japan. Furthermore, the Japanese even develop the practical value of multiple religious affiliations. Davis argues that this pattern of religious tolerance enabled the Japanese to borrow from the science, technology, and cultures of the Western world at minimal psychological cost.

Fourth, Japanese urbanization has promoted a secularization of religion, leading to a this-worldly spirit among urban merchants and Confucian scholars. Davis cites a Confucian scholar's remark that "in this world there are no gods, Buddhas, or ghosts, nor are there strange or miraculous things" (p. 253). This secular attitude also would not obstruct development.

Fifth, Davis observes the postwar boom in new religions, with huge mass movements founded by charismatic (or shamanistic) leaders who whipped up new confessions in the old pantries of Shinto, Buddhism, Christianity, and Confucianism (p. 253). The new religions promoted ancestor worship, prewar ethnocentrism, and other traditional values. Their members were recruited from



the segments of the population hurt by the rapid process of Japanese industrialization. Unprotected by large industries or labor unions, the oppressed turned to the new religions for miracles. The preachers' remedies were always religious or magical nostrums, such as a spell that would take care of everything or a vague promise of the coming of a "future Buddha" who would set everything right. New religions of this sort helped believers cope with a fallen world, enabled them to accept the unequal burdens of a rapidly developing society, and thus seldom got in the way of development.

Finally, observing the revival of folk religion, Davis asserts that magic and miracles are perfectly compatible with the "rationality" of industrial society. Magic could adapt itself to the modern economy once that economy was in place. Thus workers could be faithful to their industrial "callings" by tending their "gardens of magic" on weekends or on their days off. Davis argues that so long as magic is situational and functional, it poses no serious threat to modern institutions.

*The positive enablements.* According to Davis, religion is often used to enhance economic production. Even in premodern society, religion and magic were used to increase the productivity of the embedded economy. Thus the common man turned to religion when he wanted his cow to calve, his wife to bear, the plague to pass by, or the drought to end.

In early modern Japan, Davis (1987, p. 260) argues that the folk religion had developed a set of work ethics for the common people. The Fuji sect, for instance, promoted virtues of "benevolence, self-restraint, frugality, and diligence. . . . One should labor, they say, not merely to enrich oneself, but in order to support one's family and indigent neighbors." In the twentieth century, moreover, this religious work ethic of early modern Japan was picked up by the social teachings of the new religions. Davis observes that many new religions continue to preach "a feudalistic morality in the context of a capitalist economy" (p. 261). Mrs. God, for example, teaches her followers that "each person should remind himself of his responsibilities to God and his employer and make certain he renders his best efforts to both." Consequently, Davis remarks, Japan's folk religion may have more to do with the

implementation of the popular work ethic than any other symbolic factor.

However, Davis also notes that Japanese industry takes pain to transmit this religious work ethic to workers (from the "top down") through various initiation rites, training sessions, and "spiritual education." In addition, the work ethic is propagated in the Japan theory of Morishima's work. Stressing the uniqueness of the Japanese national character, this Japan theory advocates that "to be Japanese, a person must work hard, be loyal and sincere." Through the sponsorship of the Japanese government and industry, work is made part of the values of harmony, unity, consensus, loyalty, sincerity, and altruistic service to the individual's family, company, and nation.

As there is a mixture of civil religion and work ethic, so there is a mixture of civil religion and business ideology. Davis (1987, p. 262) observes:

During the Tokugawa period, Confucian schools aimed at producing men who would be useful to their fief. Later on, the same ambition was legitimated in the name of Japanese nationalism. The nouveaux riches in Japan justified its wealth in the name of family and nation, as much as early English entrepreneurs dedicated the fruits of their labor to the glory of God and the improvement of man's estate.

Nevertheless, Davis argues that the mixing of civil religion and business ideology was unsuccessful. In the 1920s, the traditional Confucian "barricades" held ground. The business elite failed to formulate a persuasive rationale for capitalism, and they were condemned for their selfishness and profit-mongering. This failure led to the rise of militarism and fascism, leaving little space for Western democracy to develop.

#### *Japan as a Post-Confucian Industrial Society*

Davis argues that by the 1980s, little remained of the barricades that defended traditionalism. Instead of being embedded in the




Figure 4.3. Davis's Model of Post-Confucian Industrial Society  
SOURCE: Davis (1987). Reprinted by permission of the author.

society in the traditional phase, the economy now expanded and took charge of the modern society. Today, it is industry that asks to be made safe from society, and new barricades rise up to protect the economy from the intrusion of society. For Davis (1987, p. 264-265), the new barricades include the "secular preachers of the gospel of wealth, Reaganomics, administrative reform, Japan theory. Standing beside them, however, are the evangelists, shamans, magicians, and high priests of both traditional and New Religions who now bless the very institutions they once cursed" (see Figure 4.3).

In sum, Davis recapitulates that his three figures (reproduced here as Figures 4.1-4.3) are not intended to be interpreted as a unilinear model of development *per se*. Instead, they merely highlight the way in which religion sanctifies society, and the way the economy has become "secularized." Davis also wants to remind his readers of the functional or legitimating role of religion, and how religion itself has been transformed in order to accommodate its new role in development. Davis asserts that the decline of religion should no longer be taken for granted, and that folk

religion and magic can continue to exist and collaborate with the institutions of modern society.

### BANUAZIZI: ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN IRAN

Like Davis, who examines the role of folk religion in development, Banuazizi argues for a greater appreciation of tradition in its own right. Following the trend of the late 1960s, Banuazizi (1987) criticizes the classical modernization theorists for (1) evoking an ideal image of contemporary Western society, (2) defining tradition in residual and negative terms, and (3) arguing that the Third World has to get rid of its traditional obstacles before modernization can occur. Banuazizi advocates bringing tradition back; tradition can be as reflective, creative, and responsive to individual and collective needs as its modern counterpart can, and tradition has immense potential for social mobilization and change.

From this perspective, Banuazizi observes the revival of a traditionalist movement in the form of the "Islamic resurgence." In the 1980s, there was hardly a Muslim country in which the Islamic revival had not already had a noticeable impact—on the form and content of politics, on the rejection of Western values and lifestyles, or on the strict observance of Islamic codes and enforcement of sacred laws. In particular, Banuazizi examines one of the most dramatic outbursts of the Islamic revival—the Iranian Revolution of 1977-1979. The Iranian case is especially noteworthy because it is the only revivalist movement that has actually brought a fundamentalist Islamic regime to power. What were the causes of the Iranian Revolution? How can this interesting case enhance our understanding of the new modernization studies?

In the Western media, Islamic resurgence movements have been portrayed as extremist, anachronistic, and retrogressive. From the point of view of classical modernization studies, these movements have been indicative of a "breakdown" in institution building under the strains of mass politics and rapid social mobilization. It has been feared that these movements would bring about authoritarian regimes, escalation of ethnoreligious conflicts, and political

disintegration. With respect to the Iranian Revolution of 1977-1979, the Islamic resurgence is generally portrayed as a backlash of reactionary elements, such as the Islamic clerics, who adopted a defensive reaction against modernization in Iran.

Banuazizi argues that these interpretations are one-sided because they fail to examine factors such as the structural bases, the cultural division, and the nature of the Shi'ite religion, as well as the intricate coalitions of different social forces that explained the origins of the Iranian Revolution.

First, Banuazizi points to the structural roots of the Iranian Revolution. In the 1970s, Iran underwent extensive modernization, including heavy industrialization, urbanization, expansion of formal education, and growth of the mass media. However, this wave of modernization favored mainly the Westernized, predominantly urban, upper and middle strata, and "labor aristocracy" in the modern industrial sector. Side by side with modernization were growing structural inequalities, the subservience of the shah to the United States, the contempt of the shah for Islamic culture, and the repression and endemic corruption of the shah's regime. These conflicts led to resentment against the shah by virtually every segment of the population.

Second, the forces of modernization had produced a profound cultural division between a small modern segment of Western-educated elite and a large traditional segment of peasants, the urban poor, small merchants, and artisans. The modern segment favored such Western values as individualism, freedom, liberty, and democracy, while the traditional segment adhered to Islamic values, life-styles, and behavior.

Third, the unique nature of the Shi'ite religion acted to propel the revolution. On an ideological level, Shi'ism in Iran never lost its inherently oppositional potential. Banuazizi (1987, p. 304) explains:

Its powerful symbolism of steadfastness, suffering and self-sacrifice in pursuit of truth and justice displayed in its various dramatic rituals; its remarkable capacity for redefining political conflicts in religious terms; its populist logic and vocabulary of pitting the "disinherited" against the "oppressed";

sors"; and its messianic promise of a just social order with the return of the "Hidden Imam" make it an unusually powerful religion of protest.

In addition, the Shi'ite *ulama* (Islamic clerics) acted ably as the political-cultural elite to lead the revolution forward. They could play such a role because they had long been active in every major oppositional movement over the past century, had close economic and personal ties with the traditional urban middle and lower strata, possessed financial resources, and could use mosques, shrines, and associations to voice public grievances and criticize the regime with relative impunity. Finally, there was the factor of religious charisma. Khomeini was enormously popular among the various oppositional groups, and his militant followers launched a well-coordinated revolutionary mobilization, using every traditional and modern form of communication and agitation to realize their aims.

Fourth, the Iranian Revolution was a mass-based social revolution, involving a coalition of social forces and political ideologies. At the ideological level, there was no single, monolithic "Islamic ideology," but a number of Islamic and secular ideologies. Each of these ideologies appealed to a particular social group that played a role in the revolutionary struggle. On the Islamic side alone, Banuazizi points out that there were four variants:

- *radical Islam*: the ideology of the young intellectuals who wanted to turn Iran into a classless Islamic society
- *militant Islam*: the ideology of the *ulama*, the petty bourgeoisie, and the dispossessed—groups that wanted to establish "God's" government on earth
- *liberal Islam*: the ideology of the bourgeoisie and the middle class—groups that wanted to share power with the state through non-violent means
- *traditional Islam*: the ideology of the old middle strata, a group that desired the return of the old order

Banuazizi argues that the ideals and values of Islam could be made so elastic that they would fit the interests and proclivities of any particular group. In addition, the clerics and the charismatic lead-

ers acted as coalition builders to bring all these groups together for revolutionary mobilization.

What have we learned from this analysis of the Iranian Revolution? First, like Davis, Banuazizi points out that modernization does not necessarily bring about secularization. Religious movements such as that of Islam can easily be revived when institutional and historical conditions are favorable. Thus the Islamic revolution in Iran has to be seen in relation to the historically specific processes that took place in that society, particularly the growing social inequalities, cultural divisions, unpopularity of the shah's regime, and inherent oppositional character of Shi'ite Islam.

Second, Banuazizi remarks that traditionalist actors do not seem to be hampered by their "traditionalist" traits. Consequently, traditional ideologies seem to be at least as efficacious in articulating the demands of a movement for social change as any of their modern secular counterparts. This applies to Shi'ite Islam as well as to ultra-Orthodox Judaism in Israel, "liberation theology" in Latin America, and the Catholic church in the Polish workers' movement.

Third, traditionalist religious movements can also appeal to those who have extensive exposure to modernizing institutions (such as the new middle class), as well as to marginal social elements (such as the poor and the dispossessed).

Finally, since 1979, Banuazizi has observed the triumph of a traditionalist element and the elimination of virtually all other groups that had participated in the revolutionary coalition in Iran. There is an Islamic campaign, extending its control into all spheres of public and private life. Given this observation, Banuazizi asserts that the dialogue concerning tradition and modernity should be reopened, this time with an emphasis on tradition.

#### HUNTINGTON: WILL MORE COUNTRIES BECOME DEMOCRATIC?

As Banuazizi provides a sophisticated analysis of the Iranian Revolution, Huntington presents a comprehensive review of the crucial factors relating to the development of democracy in Third

World countries. In the 1960s, Lipset optimistically entertained the hypothesis that more economic development would lead to democracy. In the 1970s, with the breakdown of many democratic regimes, researchers in the modernization school became more pessimistic about the prospects for democracy in the Third World. In the 1980s, however, the prospects seem to have brightened once again, and there is a trend toward research on the possibilities of transitions to democracy.

It is within such a context that Huntington (1984) raises the question: Will more countries become democratic? In researching this question, Huntington distinguishes two sets of factors: (1) the preconditions that favor democratic development and (2) the political processes by which democratic development has occurred.

#### Preconditions of Democratization

After two decades of research, Huntington provides a more sophisticated analysis of the preconditions of democracy than Lipset's one-variable analysis. In addition to economic wealth and equality, Huntington has included social structure, external environment, and cultural context for consideration.

First is the factor of *economic wealth*. Lipset's (1963) pioneering research postulates that the more well-to-do a nation, the greater its chance of becoming democratic. The literature's explanation of this strong correlation between wealth and democracy is that a wealthy economy makes possible high levels of literacy, education, and mass media exposure, all of which are conducive to democracy. A wealthy economy also moderates political tensions through providing alternative opportunities for unsuccessful political leaders. In addition, an advanced, complex, industrialized economy cannot be governed efficiently by authoritarian means; decision making is necessarily dispersed, power is shared, and rules must be based on the consent of those affected by them. Furthermore, a country with a wealthy economy tends to have more equally distributed income than do poor countries, and thus a smaller impoverished mass.

However, Huntington raises the question as to what level of economic development is required to make possible the transition to democracy. Various countries have become democratic at widely varying levels of development. On the other hand, there are many countries, especially in East Asia and Latin America, that have gone through economic development and yet turned away from democracy. In opposition to Lipset's wealth-democracy theory, O'Donnell (1978) has developed a theory of bureaucratic authoritarianism that accounts for the emergence of a new and stronger form of authoritarian rule when a country is undergoing the strains of import substitution.

In trying to reconcile the contradictory evidence in the literature, Huntington proposes a new concept of the zone of transition (or choice). According to this concept, as countries develop economically, they move into a zone of transition in which traditional political institutions become increasingly difficult to maintain. Development alone does not determine what political system will replace those institutions. Instead of moving in a linear direction toward Western-style democracy, countries in the zone of transition may have choices among different alternatives, and their future evolution is dependent upon the historical choices made by their political elites. In short, although economic wealth is a necessary condition for democracy, it is not a sufficient one. A study of democratic transition, therefore, must consider other factors.

The second factor that Huntington discusses is *social structure*. If there is a widely differentiated and articulated social structure with relatively autonomous groups (such as business, occupational, religious, and ethnic groups), then these groups will provide the basis for the checking of state power and the groundwork for democratic political institutions. If there is no autonomous intermediate group, then the society will likely be dominated by a centralized power apparatus in the form of an absolute monarchy, an oriental despotism, or an authoritarian or totalitarian dictatorship.

Of all the intermediate groups, Huntington stresses the existence of an autonomous bourgeoisie as the most significant. A gre-

ing with Barrington Moore (1966), Huntington remarks, "No bourgeois, no democracy." The problem with Third World countries is that they lack a strong, autonomous bourgeois class. Although there is some economic growth in the Third World, it is mostly carried out by the state and by multinational enterprises. When economic development runs ahead of the development of a bourgeoisie in Third World countries, there tends to be a failure of democracy.

Another key element in the social structure that promotes democracy is the existence of market-oriented economies. All political democracies have market-oriented economies, although not all market-oriented economies are paired with democratic political systems. The reason, Huntington explains, is that a market economy requires a dispersion of economic power, thereby creating a check to state power. A market economy thus enables the bourgeoisie to limit state power and to exploit democratic means to serve its interests. In addition, a market economy is likely to give rise to economic wealth and to more equitable distribution of income, which provides the infrastructure of democracy.

The third factor that Huntington highlights is *external environment*. As Huntington succinctly states, democratization is the result of diffusion rather than of development, ascribed in large part to British and American influence, through settlement, colonial rule, defeat in war, or fairly direct imposition. Where American armies went in World War II, democracy followed. Where Soviet armies went, communism followed. In this respect, the rise and fall of democracy on a global scale is a function of the rise and decline of the most powerful democratic states. The spread of democracy in the nineteenth century went hand in hand with the Pax Britannica, and the extension of democracy after World War II reflected the global power of the United States. Conversely, the decline of democracy in East Asia and Latin America in the 1970s was a reflection of the waning of the American influence. This democratic influence, as Huntington (1984, p. 206) points out, "is felt both directly, as a result of the efforts of the American government to affect political processes in other societies, and also indirectly by providing a powerful and successful model to be followed."

Moreover, Huntington notices that in some regions, a regional trend may exist. By and large, Latin American governments moved in a democratic direction in the late 1950s and early 1960s, then in an authoritarian direction in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and then once again in a democratic direction in the late 1970s and early 1980s. These regional shifts might have been the result of economic development, the influence of neighboring countries, and the promotion of the U.S. government.

The fourth factor Huntington discusses is the *cultural context*. Examining the impact of religion on political culture, Huntington finds that Protestantism has a high correlation with democracy, that Catholicism has a moderate and delayed impact on the growth of democracy, that Hindu and Shinto cultures did not prevent democratization, and that Islam, Confucianism, and Buddhism have been conducive to authoritarian rule.

How can these differences be explained? Huntington distinguishes two types of religious culture. A *consummatory* religious culture—where intermediate and ultimate ends are closely related—is less favorable to democracy. In Islam, for example, there is no distinction between religion and politics (or between the spiritual and the secular), and political participation has historically been an alien concept. An *instrumental* religious culture is characterized by the separation of intermediate ends from ultimate ends. Hindu tradition, for instance, tolerates diversity and conflict among groups, recognizes the legitimacy of compromise, and conflict should pose no barrier to democratization.

In sum, Huntington concludes that the preconditions of democratization are economic wealth, pluralistic social structure (an autonomous bourgeoisie and a market-oriented economy), greater influence vis-à-vis the society of existing democratic states, and a culture that is tolerant of diversity and compromise. He argues that with the exception of a market economy, no single precondition is necessary to produce such a development. Some combination of the above preconditions is required for a democratic regime to emerge, but the nature of the combination can vary greatly from one case to another.

### Processes of Democratization

In addition to focusing on the preconditions of democracy, Huntington examines the political processes through which democratic development has occurred. He discusses three models of democratization. The first is a *linear* model that draws from both British and Swedish experience. In the British case, democratization progressed from civil rights to political rights, to gradual development of parliamentary supremacy and a cabinet government, and finally to an incremental expansion of suffrage over the course of a century. In the Swedish case, it took the following route: national unity, prolonged and inconclusive political struggle, a conscious decision to adopt democratic rules, and finally habituation to the working of those rules.

The second model of democratization is a *cyclical* one of alternating despotism and democracy. This model is most common in Latin American nations. In this model, key elites normally accept the legitimacy of democratic forms. Elections are held from time to time, but rarely is there any substantial succession of government coming to power through the electoral process. Governments are as often the product of military intervention as they are of elections. The military intervenes when a radical party wins election, when there is economic chaos (e.g., high inflation and unemployment), or when there is widespread political unrest. Once a military junta takes over, it usually promises to return power to civilian rule in the near future. It does so, however, only if it is forced to by mass protest or by its own inability to govern effectively. In a praetorian situation like this, Huntington points out that neither authoritarian nor democratic institutions are effectively institutionalized. Once a country enters into this cyclical pattern of alternating military authoritarian and civil democracy, it appears to be difficult for it to break the cycle.

The third model of democratization discussed by Huntington is *dialectical*. In this model, the development of an urban middle class leads to growing pressures on the authoritarian regime for political participation and contestation. At some point there is an "urban

breakthrough," the replacement of the existing authoritarian regime with a democratic one. The new middle-class regime, however, finds it hard to govern effectively, and usually there is an overthrow of the democratic regime and a return to the authoritarian system. In due course, however, the authoritarian regime collapses and a transition is made to a long-lasting democratic system; this model characterizes the experience of Germany, Italy, Greece, and Spain.

In addition to his discussion of the linear, cyclical, and dialectical models, Huntington addresses the issue of the best sequence for democratic development. His preferred overall process is as follows:

- (1) Define national identity.
- (2) Develop effective political institutions.
- (3) Expand political participation.

Huntington stresses that political participation must occur late in the sequence of change, after the installation of effective political institutions such as electoral and party systems. If participation expands too early in the sequence, it will lead to political instability and violence. To reinforce this point, Huntington asserts that democratic regimes that last have seldom been instituted by popular action. Instead, democracy has come as much from the top down as from the bottom up. It is only when political elites, after calculating their own interests, decide to negotiate and compromise with one another that democratic institutions come into existence.

Stressing the elitist origins of democracy, Huntington refutes Barrington Moore's (1966) argument that democracy can be inaugurated by bloody revolution. Although all guerrilla insurgencies and revolutionary regimes claim to be democratic, they turn out to be authoritarian once they achieve power through violence, often imposing even more repressive regimes than those they overthrew. Huntington emphasizes that democracy tends to be the result of gradual evolutionary process with minimum violence, rather than the result of revolutionary outflow of existing hegemonies.

After surveying the preconditions and processes of democratization, Huntington applies these criteria to an examination of the prospects for democratization in the 1980s. He has high hopes for democratization in Latin America because of the current regimes' cultural traditions, levels of economic development, previous democratic experience, social pluralism, and the elites' desires to emulate European and North American models. However, he is not as optimistic about regimes in East Asia. Although the East Asian states have achieved some economic development and have experienced some influence from the United States, their cultural traditions, social structure, and weaknesses of democratic norms serve to impede democratic development. Huntington points out that the East Asian states present the issue of whether economics or culture has the greater influence on democratization. With respect to the Islamic countries in the Middle East and most African countries, prospects for democracy are slim, due to their religion, poverty, or the violent nature of their politics. The likelihood of democratic development in Eastern Europe is virtually nonexistent. The Soviet presence is a decisive overriding obstacle, and Huntington argues that no communist country has become democratic through internal causes.

In conclusion, Huntington suggests that the United States can contribute to the democratic development in Third World nations in the following ways: by assisting their economic development, by fostering their market economies and the growth of a vigorous bourgeoisie, by exercising greater influence than it has in world affairs, and by helping the elites of these countries enter the transition zone to democratization.

#### POWERS OF THE NEW MODERNIZATION THEORIES

According to Almond (1987, p. 454), "the test of any research approach is its productivity. Does it generate novel ways of looking at the subject matter? Does it increase our knowledge and make it more reliable?" Using Almond's criteria, we can see that

the new modernization studies have gone beyond the relatively crude analyses of the classical modernization studies. After dropping some of the shaky assumptions of the classical modernization studies—such as characterizing modernization as an irreversible, progressive, and lengthy Americanization progress, and treating tradition as an obstacle to modernization—the new modernization studies open up new research agendas and provide a more sophisticated analysis than the old modernization studies.

*Bringing tradition back in.* Guided by new concepts such as entrepreneurial familism, the theory of barricades, and Islamic resurgence, the new modernization studies have taken a much closer look at what tradition is, how it interacts with Western forces, and what role it has played in the process of modernization. Although the classical modernization studies focused on the negative role of tradition, the new modernization studies reveal the intricate relationship between tradition and modernity. Thus Wong shows that paternalistic management, nepotism, and a family mode of ownership have promoted the economic development of Hong Kong. Davis argues that Japanese industry takes pains to transmit a traditional religious work ethic to workers through spiritual education. Banuazizi points to the crucial role played by the Shi'ite religion and the Shi'ite ulama in propelling the Iranian Revolution forward. And Huntington takes note of the differential impacts of religion on democracy.

*Bringing history back in.* The new modernization studies have also adopted a different methodology. Instead of typological construction at a highly abstract level, the new modernization studies have brought history back into the picture, focusing on the unique development of each case study. Thus instead of adapting cases to illustrate theory, the new modernization studies use theory to explain individual case studies. For example, Wong concludes that his findings on Hong Kong familism may not be applicable to other places, such as mainland China, Korea, and Japan. Davis rewrites the religious history of Japan by emphasizing how folk religion and magic can continue to exist and collaborate with modern industrialism. Banuazizi focuses on how the historical combinations of social, political, and religious factors in 1979 gave rise to the unique Iranian Revolution. And Huntington stresses

that it is important to examine the historical processes and sequences of democratic development.

*Toward a more sophisticated analysis.* The new modernization studies have avoided making simplistic statements or presenting single-variable analyses. Instead, they pay attention to multi-institutional (social, cultural, political, and economic) analysis, to multilinear paths of development, and to the interaction between external and internal factors. For instance, Wong brings in the factor of colonial government of Hong Kong and entertains the possible divergent pattern of modernization in East Asia. Davis's new barricades theory is more sophisticated than the old hurdles model because it takes into account the defending actors of traditional religion, charismatic leaders, exploitation, and militarism in Japanese history. Banuazizi examines the structural roots, cultural divisions, and religious elements of the Iranian Revolution. And Huntington provides a comprehensive analysis of a variety of factors—wealth, social structure, external environment, cultural context, political process, and sequence—in his exploration of whether more countries will become more democratic.

In light of the modifications demonstrated in this chapter, it seems that the modernization school has recovered from its crisis of the late 1960s and should be able to continue its fruitful line of research with vigor in the 1990s. Furthermore, it is possible that, as Portes (1980, p. 224) points out, modernization studies "may emerge in a new guise as correctives to the exclusive external focus of the new [dependency and world-system] perspectives."