

13

The Assertion of Third World Solidarity: Global Development Approaches

Overview of Global Development Approaches

The notion of global development covers a series of related approaches which stress the interdependent nature of the global system, the special concerns of the Third World and the interests which the First World has in seeing the situation of the Third World improved. In this case we can note: (a) the general development arguments stressing the unity of mankind made by the United Nations and other international organizations with declarations of Development Decades, the programme for a New International Economic Order, and the programme of basic needs; (b) a concern for environmental pressures first expressed in the Club of Rome's reports on the limits of the earth and recently restated at the Rio Earth Summit; and (c) a concern for the poverty of the Third World when measured against the need for markets of the hugely productive First World which generates after the fashion of Keynesian pump-priming the thought that the rich should underpin the growth of the poor to everyone's benefit.

Patterns of Reconsideration in Development Theory

It is probably true to say that growth theory was an early and quickly superseded approach to the problem of development. On the other hand modernization theory did for a time attain the status of an unchallenged orthodoxy within Western discussions of development. However, it is with institutional development theory that we find the most intellectually sophisticated version of the orthodox line of analysis. The work of the institutionalists offered a sharp criticism of the economic bias of the orthodoxy and attained a wide and continuing influence amongst specialists in various agencies dealing with development. Overall, we have considered the process of the construction of a series of delimited-formal ideological positions which although different in detail have in common that they evidence a predilection for expert intervention in social systems to secure development goals established by First and Third World elites.

The period of the construction of the orthodox position in development theory was one of general optimism. The various agents involved in development work were all confident that the goal of effective nationstatehood lodged in the orthodox approach could be realized. The goal of development was taken to be clear in principle and attainable in practice. However, the early optimism slowly faded as old problems unexpectedly persisted. As old problems persisted and new problems emerged those involved in working for development began to look for new approaches. The conventional wisdom entered a long slow period of drift and decline during which old ideas were reconsidered and reworked, or discarded, and new ideas were presented, considered and sometimes pursued. The business of the decline and dissolution of the orthodox interventionist position is important because it is via this process of dissolution and reconsideration that a new approach to development emerged to secure a brief period of influence.


I will begin the discussion of the decline and dissolution of the orthodoxy around the substitution of the core idea of global interdependence for recapitulation and the affirmation of the policy programme of international Keynesianism. The treatment will be divided into three parts: (a) an overview of the shift in debate and proposed action in respect of development; (b) a review of the debates surrounding the rules of the game, in particular the programme for the new international economic order (NIEO); and (c) a review of the debate surrounding the business of resource transfers, in particular the notions of basic needs. In the light of this review we can add a note on the subsequent continuing influence of the work produced¹ (see figure 15).

The Shifts in Debate in the 1970s

It can be argued that modernization theory represented for a period something like a consensus within orthodox development theory. However, that

¹ A. Hoogvelt 1982 *The Third World in Global Development*, London, Macmillan, offers a useful review of these matters which I draw on in this chapter.

Figure 15 Global development approaches



consensus broke down in the 1970s and although the work of the institutionalists attained great professional influence no new consensus emerged. In its place a diffuse body of work was presented which we can grasp with the notion of global development approaches. In its earliest phase in the 1970s there was a pronounced concern for the mutual interests of all those working within the global system, and the interlinked set of concerns presented have been called international Keynesianism. The particular institutional location of these approaches has been the United Nations, NGOs, charities and pressure groups. The governments of the countries of the First World and the key institutions of the post-Second World War liberal-capitalist system, the World Bank and the IMF, have had to accommodate to the pressures for reform. Overall, the key idea presented in the 1970s is that of global interdependence and there are two major areas of concern: first, with the calls for a new international economic order (NIEO); and second a concern for the transfer of resources to the poor to meet basic needs in development.

The NIEO was presented to the United Nations in the early 1970s as a series of proposals for the reform of the world economic system. Around the idea of global interdependence the NIEO programme looked to shift the balance of economic power towards the countries of the Third World. A series of issues which concerned the proponents of the programme, the countries of the Third World, were advanced and included the following: trade reforms; monetary reforms; resource transfers; debt relief; and technology transfer. It was an ambitious programme to upgrade the economies of the poor countries and to integrate them as equal partners within the global system. In this way the 'rules of the game' could be made more equitable in principle and operation to the benefit of all.

An aspect of the NIEO programme was the transfer of resources from the First to Third World and in the mid-1970s the matter came to be addressed in a quite particular fashion. The idea of basic needs derives from a utopian Latin American group concerned with arguing that a little more equality in the world would mean rather less poverty and a much easier development task. The basic needs approach found favour with international agencies. It was argued that basic needs were obvious targets for urgent help and amenable to authoritative expert treatment. At the same time it was argued that a basic needs approach entailed targeting aid on the poorest, those most in need. Overall, it is clear that the fundamental strategy of orthodox interventionism is here conjoined with a grassroots activism, as NGO groups became involved in running local level development projects, to the detriment of the autonomy of the states and governments of the countries of the Third World.

A significant element of international political manoeuvring can be identified. As the NIEO programme implied a shift of power to the states of the Third World, so the basic needs programme implied a shift of power away

World War decades within the non-aligned group and other groupings organized in the context of the United Nations. Overall there was a long-drawn-out assertion of Third World solidarity. On the basis of general arguments in favour of solidarity and the dramatic example of the economic power of OPEC in the early 1970s, the drive to bring the plight of the poor countries of the world to the centre of the international political stage reached a peak in the proposals for the NIEO. Thereafter, it would be fair to say that whilst both areas of debate, the NIEO and basic needs, have continued and have seen action, it is the notion of basic needs which has received by far the greatest attention from development theorists in the First World.

The background considered

There was a series of circumstances which together conspired to redirect the attention of development theorists and which undermined their hitherto remarkable optimism in respect of the future of development work: (a) the end of the post-Second World War economic boom; (b) the rise of OPEC; (c) shifts in the terms of trade which disadvantaged the Third World; and (d) new problems of population growth, environmental degradation and the generally detrimental impact upon development work of the burgeoning global arms trade. It should also be noted that there was a new alternative theoretical approach to development available in the form of Latin American dependency theory which called attention to the role of the First World in creating and sustaining the relative poverty of the Third World.

The optimism in respect of the future of the countries of the Third World had been strongly assisted by the long experience of economic prosperity which unexpectedly characterized the early years of the post-Second World War period. However, the Bretton Woods institutional structures which underpinned the successful US-centred global economy came under severe pressure in the early 1970s. A combination of factors meant that the post-Second World War economic boom faltered throughout the late 1960s and then in the early 1970s drifted to a halt with the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed currency exchange rates. The shift to floating currency rates was initiated by the USA in response to the demands upon its economy of the costs of the war in Vietnam. The new financial system of unregulated financial markets introduced great instability into the global economy and generally reduced economic growth rates. Overall, the global economy experienced a general downturn in economic activity.² The new situation of downturn and instability cut against the economic optimism which underpinned modernization theory.

2 E. Hobsbawm 1994 *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991*, London, Michael Joseph, ch. 9; See also E. A. Brett 1985 *The World Economy Since the War*.

A related problem at this time was generated by the decisions of the oil producers' cartel the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to raise the price of oil. In the early 1970s OPEC was dominated by the countries of the Arabian Gulf region and together they produced a major part of the oil used by the Europeans and the Japanese. A general concern to increase their revenues and thereby finance the development of their own countries coincided with a further episode of conflict between the state of Israel and its Arab neighbours. The rise in the price of oil was used as a political and diplomatic weapon against the countries which had generally been sympathetic to Israel. The rise in the price of oil contributed directly to a sharp reduction in economic activity in the developed countries and to a rise in inflation. The OPEC action was expressive not only of short-term concerns in respect of finance and politics but also of a new assertiveness on the part of those whom the global community had regarded as underdeveloped and relatively powerless. The notion of recapitulation which lay at the back of modernization theory and which looked to the slow evolutionary process of the Third World catching up with the First World was directly challenged. The determination of the members of OPEC to use oil money to build industrial economies offered a general example to the countries of the Third World of a development strategy which did not depend upon First World models or aid money.³

A third issue relates to the terms of international trade, that is to the relative position of Third World exporters/importers compared with the exporters/importers in the First World. In brief, the terms of trade moved against the essentially primary product exporters of the Third World who saw the prices their crops realized fall at the same time as the prices realized by First World manufactures rose. As the situation of the countries of the Third World deteriorated the optimism of modernization theory in respect of the process of economic and social development was further undermined.

A series of new problems also made their first appearance within development debate: overpopulation; environmental degradation; and the proliferation of armaments throughout the Third World. And all three problem areas coincided in their impact upon development work in that they drew resources away from the task of raising levels of living for the peoples of the Third World. The rapid growth of population placed severe demands upon governments and resources. The degradation of the environment compounded these problems (and they were often seen as interlinked). And the rapid growth of the global trade in armaments had the dual effect of drawing resources away from development projects whilst at the same time promoting the interests within the countries of the Third World of the

3 Which is not to say that these countries were politically, economically or socially progressive as many were feudal countries. See F. Halliday 1979 *Arabia Without Sultans*, Harmondsworth. Penguin; F. Halliday 1979 *Iran: Dictatorship and Development*, Harmondsworth.

military machines. The major exporters of weapons at this time were the USA, the USSR, France and Britain.

If all these represent real world problems, it is also the case that there was an influential general counter-view to modernization theory available. The mixture of changing circumstances and new ideas combined to push debates about development in new directions. The influential new theories came to be known as the dependency approach. The theory originated in Latin America and its softer versions have been widely used by development theorists, policy-making agencies and political commentators. In brief, dependency theory contains the key idea that development can only be understood as an historical and global process. In other words, the object of enquiry of development theorists shifts from the recapitulation by the poor countries of the historical experience of the rich towards the question of how the global system developed over time to produce a system having both rich and poor. An idea of the historical creation of present global interdependence is advanced.

In the light of this new overarching conception the circumstances of the Third World countries cannot now be discussed in terms of how they can modernize and thereby catch-up with the countries of the First World, but in terms of their continuing role within the global system. The role of the countries of the Third World has to be characterized in detail so as to display the responsibilities of the powerful for creating and sustaining the subordinate role. In an interdependent world the onus for achieving development no longer rests exclusively with the ruling groups of individual countries because the possibilities for the development of any Third World country are conditioned by the global contexts within which they operate. Accordingly, the rich and powerful are now directly implicated in the business of securing development as the centres of power within the global system lie within the countries of the First World.

The early theories

The earliest theorists of the global system evidenced a 'kaleidoscopic diversity'⁴ of approaches to the future development of the system and first and second generations can be identified. The former are the futurologists who tried to plot the macro development of the system such that governments at an international level could order the future, and the latter are the theorists of international interdependence who looked rather more plausibly to presently identifiable areas of possible practical cooperation between governments in respect of common problems.

The 'world futures theorists' tried to sketch likely future lines of development for the whole global system.⁵ The methods used include the production

of large-scale models, the attempt to make long-range extrapolation of macro trends, and the speculative and formal simulation of alternative scenarios of long-term change. All this rests on general systems theory which is an intellectual relative of modernization theory and it is similarly interventionist. It attempts to reduce the intervenor to the status of extra-systemic cause. As this position is unavailable the theorists fall back on appeals to reasonable people acting on behalf of humankind. The members of the 'first generation' include people like the 'futurologist' Herman Kahn who offered broad predictions/scenarios of future global trends, and the various eco-doomsday theorists of the Club of Rome.⁶ I shall ignore these people as they are peripheral to the main trend of development thinking at this time although their concerns do continue and in the case of environmental concerns do attain significance in the late 1980s.

The second generation are the proponents of international Keynesianism who argue that where Keynes urged national governments to stimulate demand within their economies during times of depression so as to preserve the system, the international community must grant the necessity of international agreement on a new economic order lest the Third World countries collapse back into a miserable poverty and in so doing damage the interdependent economies of the countries of the First World. It is possible to identify two areas of concern for international Keynesianism: first, the business of the rules of the game which can be discussed in the context of the NIEO programme; and second the business of reforms in resource transfers and utilization, all of which can be pursued under the heading of the programmes of basic needs provisions. In the first noted area development theorists looked to the business of stimulating economic growth in the Third World and its better integration within the global economic system (thereby providing reliable economic partners for First World countries). In the second noted area development theorists looked to the provision of better fundamental conditions for the majority of the people of the Third World, who comprised in fact the majority of humankind, in the long-term expectation of lifting their levels of living which was seen as a matter of mutual benefit to Third and First World.

Overall, it should be noted that the period of the 1970s when these debates were underway saw considerable economic upheaval as inflationary pressures moved through the global system. The post-Second World War Bretton Woods system had produced a long period of growth and stability but the 1970s and 1980s were to prove to be much more unstable. In the 1970s there was a long period of recession plus inflation in the developed countries and recession coupled to the accumulation of debt in the underdeveloped countries. The optimism for a new international economic order rapidly faded as countries came to face problems of debt and economic

4 Hoogvelt 1982 op. cit. p. 128.

5 Ibid. p. 123.

6 The Club produced a series of reports, beginning in 1972, which argued that there were limits to the economic growth which the planet could sustain

regression. In due course the problems of debt spill over into the 1980s and become a matter of central concern for the New Right.

The Debate on the Rules of the Game

The UN was originally established with a relatively small membership in the period following the Second World War and the expectation of the First World was that the organization would naturally be dominated by their interests. However, as the period of decolonization ran its course a series of new nationstates took their seats in the UN organization. The UN has subsequently become both a major platform for the expression of the concerns of the Third World and a key centre of formal political conflict within the global system between First and Third Worlds. The UN has become an important arena of debate and political activity as the organization is not restricted in membership unlike the major economic and financial institutions of the post-Second World War global system.

The presentation of the NIEO programme in the United Nations is a complex story in itself. The matter can be summarized as follows: 'the *Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order* . . . and the accompanying Programme of Action, were adopted without a vote at the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly in May 1974, and were confirmed in November 1974 in the *Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States*'.⁷ These texts contain declarations of principles and programmes of action in respect of development and they were further elaborated in a series of subsequent and related conferences. The detail of the institutional politics of the UN can be set aside and we can look simply at the NIEO and its concern to adjust the rules of the game in favour of the countries of the Third World.⁸ The NIEO can be taken to have had two main elements: a general declaration in respect of the economic development of the countries of the Third World enshrined in the Charter and a more specific and concrete agenda of reforms presented in the Programme. The latter identified five principal areas of concern: trade reforms; monetary reforms; debt relief; technology transfer; and regional cooperation.⁹

In respect of international trade the concerns of the proponents of the NIEO centre on the problem of the declining value of the primary products which are the principal export of the countries of the Third World. The proposals advanced included both the establishment of buffer stocks which can be used to smooth out price fluctuations and the global redistribution of industrial production in favour of the countries of the Third World which could be aided by the setting of targets for such a redistribution and the provision of liberalized trade preferences for Third World economies.

⁷ Hoogvelt 1982 op. cit. p. 79.

⁸ On the record of the UN, see United Nations 1995 *Yearbook of the United Nations*.

In respect of international monetary arrangements the proposals for reform advanced by the proponents of the NIEO began with the observation that the Bretton Woods system with its key institutions of the World Bank and the IMF had been designed by the developed countries with the interests of the First World economies in view. Moreover the current location and functioning of these institutions reflected the overwhelming influence of the developed countries. The Bank and the Fund are located in Washington. It was proposed that the rules of association of the institutions be adjusted to raise the power of the countries of the Third World and that the rules of procedure of the institutions be similarly altered to reflect the needs and aspirations of the countries of the Third World.

In respect of the issue of debt relief and the related matter of resource transfers the proponents of the NIEO called attention to the heavy burden of debt payments carried by many Third World countries and to the relatively restricted and limited nature of resource transfers from rich to poor countries. In the matter of resource transfers a series of proposals to increase both bi-lateral transfers and multi-lateral transfers were made with mixed overall success. On the other hand a series of proposals were made in respect of debt relief including debt forgiveness, moratoriums on repayment, the transfer of debt into equity and various strategies of debt refinancing. All these issues came to be very important in the 1980s when the levels of Third World debt became not merely a problem for the poor countries but a threat to the banking system of the developed countries.

In respect of the issue of the transfer of technology the proponents of the NIEO pointed out that the countries of the Third World were not merely technology-deficient but were having to pay large sums in royalties and licences for the First World technology which they had managed to acquire. It was noted that much of the technology transfer was accomplished in the context of the operations of commercial multi-national corporations whose key interest was to establish enterprises which were profitable. This concern could conflict with the development needs of the host country. The proposals which were made included revisions to international patent law to permit the easier and cheaper import of technology and suggestions for regulating the activities of MNCs so as to encourage technology transfers. Overall, the policy concern was with maximizing the benefits to host countries of the operations of the MNCs and minimizing the costs of technology.

In respect of the matter of inter-regional cooperation the proponents of the NIEO pointed out that patterns of trade tended to follow a centre-periphery pattern which favoured the already rich and powerful centres. It was proposed that the countries of the periphery in the Third World could strengthen their local economies and their bargaining power with the centre if they encouraged and built up intra-peripheral economic linkages.

After the presentation of the NIEO programme the First and Third World

initially strongly negative but the reaction was modified shortly thereafter when it was realized that suitably reworked the proposals could be made to fit with the interests of the rich countries. Over the decade of the 1970s the debate continued in the United Nations and other international organizations. The upshot was the slow winding down of the radicalism of the NIEO programme at the same time as the dialogue between what were now referred to as North and South continued. However, as the debate continued it came to be thought, in particular by the development experts within the various organizations,¹⁰ that a related area could usefully be explored, that is the business of the receipt and use of resource transfers. The shift of attention to basic needs also undermined a key aspect of the NIEO programme, namely the concern to strengthen the countries of the Third World in relation to the First World, because the new strategy of focusing the attention of development agencies on the needs of the poorest entailed the submission of the countries of the Third World to greater external direction of their development efforts.

The lessons of the debate

The drive for the NIEO represented a particular expression of Third World solidarity in regard to their dealings with the developed countries.¹¹ The assertion of solidarity was a product of events which were particular in time and place. The institutional vehicles of this expression of solidarity were found within the various organizational structures of the United Nations. The debate about the NIEO proposals generated considerable interest amongst development theorists. The debate also generated conflict amongst governments but little by way of direct practical results. The countries of the First World were not prepared to countenance the scale of the reordering of the global balance of economic power which was implied in the programme. It is also true that the countries of the Third World began to discover quite sharp divergences in interest amongst themselves. Overall, the episode offers a number of lessons: (a) that the Third World is not and cannot be regarded as a unitary phenomenon as the interests of those countries thus labelled are divergent; (b) that the role of the United Nations is severely limited and cannot be treated as some sort of world government-in-waiting which might properly attend to the matter of the development of the presently disadvantaged countries within its remit as the interests of its members are widely divergent; (c) that the particular interests of the First World will not be overborne by abstract general arguments presented in international institutional gatherings; and finally (d) that there is indeed a global system which is extensively interdependent and in the 1990s this last noted lesson was once again presented in broad debate when the issues of how to characterize, explain and order the global system became important.

10 Ibid. p. 96.

11 Ibid. ch. 2.

The Debate on Basic Needs

The idea of basic needs originated with a group of Latin American theorists¹² and 'was officially launched at the ILO World Employment Conference in 1976'.¹³ The basic needs approach was constructed so as to deny the pessimistic position of the first Club of Rome report which spoke of the limits to growth and asserted that in a radically changed world economic system all people could have an acceptable standard of life. Rather more specifically they argued that a more egalitarian national and international system would allow basic needs to be achieved with much lower economic growth rates than were needed in the present inegalitarian world system.

The basic needs debate drew an important distinction between economic growth and the provision of the basic necessities of life. The debate about development was pulled away from narrowly economic discussions which were inevitably biased in favour of the schedule of assumptions which governed debate within the First World. The drive to attend directly to the needs of the poor of the Third World opened up the range of relevant debate. In the work of the ILO this was expressed directly in the preference for employment creation over economic growth and in practical terms this focused attention on employment in agriculture and the informal sector as these were where the majority of the populations of the countries of the Third World made their livelihoods.¹⁴ It can be argued that the approach adopted by the ILO was heir to a long tradition of thought which in various ways preferred to stress the value of the small-scale and local in the face of the demands of the encroaching industrial capitalist system.¹⁵ It is also clear that the idea of basic needs has been easily associated with a spread of other critical ideas which have it in common that they stress the value of established patterns of life and deny the assumption of the self-evidently beneficial nature of economic growth which is made by orthodox development theory.¹⁶

The debate on the idea of basic needs quickly became extensive with many groups contributing. A key distinction in reflection on the issue was between universal and objective needs on the one hand and culturally shaped needs on the other. The former definition implied a concentration on the minimum physiological needs of human beings whereas the latter implied a broader set of concerns which embraced both material minima and the minima of particular cultural forms-of-life. In other words, basic needs were seen to involve not merely survival but also participating in the life

12 In a report prepared by the Barlioche Foundation, Canada, and presented by A. O. Herrera et al. eds. 1975 *Catastrophe or a New Society*, Ottawa, Barlioche Foundation.

13 Hoogvelt 1982 op. cit. p. 100.

14 See B. Hettne 1990 *Development Theory and the Three Worlds*, London, Longman, ch. 5.

15 See G. Kitching 1982 *Development and Underdevelopment in Historical Perspective*, London, Methuen, ch. 4. The author takes the view that the approach is essentially 'populist' and unrealistic.

16 See Hettne 1990 op. cit. ch. 5.

of the particular community. The former approach came to be associated with World Bank versions of the basic needs approach which tended also to stress the efficiency of delivery of these basic needs, which in turn implied directing or bypassing the governments and state machines of the recipient countries. It is clear that the idea of basic needs was picked up by theorists in the orthodox tradition and by international institutions – the World Bank in particular – and used to justify a reworked interventionist stance. The general notion of basic needs implied that aid and development work had to be targeted at the poorest and that success had to be carefully monitored. It was made more or less clear that both elements of the approach would have to be pursued in such a way as to protect the work from the interference of the local state and local politics. The governments of the countries in receipt of basic needs funding were required to acquiesce in their own downgrading. It quickly became clear that the autonomy which the governments of the countries of the Third World had been pursuing in the context of the NIEO proposals was being subtly undermined and the governments of the countries of the Third World quickly came to see the basic needs approach as thoroughly ambiguous.

If we simplify matters, we can see that the basic needs approach involves the following elements: (a) it calls attention to the needs of the poorest of the poor, those who have been called the inhabitants of the Fourth World; (b) it attempts to define basic needs in operational terms with food, water, health and thereafter education, work and political participation; (c) it seeks the establishment of targets for countries and the specification of criteria of performance so that progress can be measured; and (d) it makes an acknowledgement of the necessity for internal structural transformations in the economic and socio-political patterns of the countries of the Third World.¹⁷ In general the basic needs approach has three obvious characteristics and they recall the orthodoxy in development theory: (a) an appeal to the obviousness of certain problems, as (b) the basis for the intervention of the planners, (c) in pursuit of a series of crucial internal reforms.

The covert appeal to obviousness lies in the focus on the poorest of the poor. The distress of the people of the Fourth World is such as to constitute a presently extant crisis. In the circumstance of crisis what ought to be done is not in general in doubt. The crisis must be confronted in terms of immediate attempts to alleviate the distress of the people concerned. Thereafter the way to deal with the crisis is via expert guided intervention. It is perfectly clear with basic needs approaches that we have not left the realm of aid targets, aid flows, aid projects and performance criteria and monitoring. It is clear that the basic needs approach is far from being a radically new departure in theorizing and action. However, there is some novelty in the way in which the approach urges the necessity for internal social, political and economic reform. It is here, with the concern for schedules of internal reforms to be secured by outside expert assistance which may

well bypass the host country government, that we come across the reasons why Third World governments have viewed the approach as ambiguous. Perhaps more interestingly it is also clear that we now confront the apparent limitations of the theorists of basic needs in respect of the role of the global system in creating the problems of corruption, inefficiency, and wastefulness which they are at such pains to address, and the impossibility of reducing the political realities and development problems of the present global system to a size that can be encompassed by authoritative planning interventions.

Basic needs and global systems

In the arguments of the advocates of the basic needs approach the politics of the real world, involving patterns of power and economic advantage,¹⁸ tend to be presented as a problem for the planners. It is assumed that the problems of the poor are of such demanding urgency that a simple measure of attention on the part of the established structures of power would be enough to ensure that action could be taken. However, it seems clear that matters of internal social, political and economic change cannot be treated in this oversimplified fashion. The substantive realities of the societies of the Third World cannot be thus elided because making social reforms the precondition of effective planning begs the question of how such changes might be brought about in the first place. Paul Streeten, who has been an eloquent proponent of a basic needs approach, illustrates this point quite clearly.¹⁹ Streeten argues that the schedule of basic needs lists concrete goals which are obvious and specific. Streeten goes on to say that the basic needs approach: (a) reminds us that development studies are about making better lives for people; (b) spell out in detail the human requirements of food, water, health, housing and so on; (c) remind us that economic and social models are abstract and that theorists should be specific; (d) appeal to the international community because the idea is clear; and (e) have great intellectual organizing power as all other development problems fall into place around them. Streeten adds:

In one sense, this is a home-coming. For when we embarked on development 30 years ago, it was surely the needs of the poor of the world that we had in mind. In the process we got sidetracked, but we also discovered many important things about development . . . We are now back where we started in the 1950s . . . But we are back with a deeper understanding . . . [and] with a clearer vision of the path.²⁰

Streeten thinks that the work of thirty years has been useful in learning what development studies are about even if the successes have been less than had

been hoped. It is true that there is something in this claim although it would be remarkable if no learning had taken place. However the basic needs are still presented as crisis-engendered obvious goals for technical expert intervention in the context of world community approval. The substantive judgements that Streeten makes in favour of a helping hand to the poor are unexceptionable and the recent work of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in presenting a human development report which addresses these concerns²¹ is wholly to the good, but the idea that the global system might be structured in a fashion that effectively reduces the plight of the poor to a marginal issue amongst power holders escapes the compass of the basic needs approach.

The lessons of the debate

The basic needs approach has continued to exercise considerable influence amongst those who concern themselves with development. The approach has gained over the years further refinements and would now encompass not merely the basics of human life, but also the need for a clean and viable environment and an appreciation of the value of diverse cultural traditions. A series of key lessons can be derived from this debate. Firstly, the role of NGOs and charities in encouraging basic needs approaches to development has secured widespread support amongst the populations of the countries of the First World and has revealed a preference amongst these populations for effective action to assist the poor in preference to aid linked to trade. Secondly, in many countries of the First World pressure groups targeted at their own governments are increasing in strength as it becomes more widely realized that governments running ODA programmes can be indifferent to interests outside those of their own industries. Thirdly, the pursuit of basic needs, with its concern for the detail of the lives of ordinary people in the Third World, has fostered amongst First World populations an appreciation of the diversity of the cultures of the world and an appreciation of the ambiguous nature of the notion of development. Finally, amongst Third World countries the preference for basic needs has directed attention to the needs of the poorest and has drawn local-level support and action.

Global Development Approaches in Retrospect and Prospect

In order to summarize this review of the period of the decline of the orthodoxy we must note that the relationship of the NIEO and basic needs

21 See United Nations Development Programme 1990 *Human Development Report 1990*, Oxford University Press. The first report contains a wealth of statistical information on levels of living in the Third World. It is the broad social scientific counterpart to the narrowly laissez-faire economic material presented each year by the World Bank as the

approaches was complex, and the relationship of both to the interventionist ethic of the orthodoxy in development theory is also complex. The key idea to have come to the fore in this general line is that of global interdependence. It is suggested that the present world system is an integrated and interdependent system and can only be saved from decline and failure if this is acknowledged. However, the governments of the First World have acted cautiously and defensively in the area of the overall setting of the rules of the game (NIEO) but have acted rather more aggressively with respect to basic needs analyses which focus attention upon the recipients' use of resource transfers. It is clear that the overall strategy of interventionism both in rule-setting and resource-using continues to lie at the core of this orthodox position.

It might also be noted that the global development line has subsequently generated a series of concerns related to the notion of basic needs. The core ideas of basic needs have been pursued in a wide range of contexts. Hettne summarizes the range of debates under the heading of alternative approaches and traces the spread of new ideas back to a UN-sponsored symposium on development in Mexico in 1974 which announced its findings by issuing the Cocoyoc Declaration.²² It is reported that the declaration affirmed the importance of basic needs and then added that a richer set of goals centred on human freedom was required, as was a critique of overconsumptionist patterns of life in the West. It is possible to identify four variants of the alternative approach: (a) egalitarian development or basic needs which looks to attend to the basic requirements of human life; (b) self-reliant development which implied a criticism of the existing global system's demands on the poor and suggested a strategy of withdrawal in order to pursue development free of existing distorting demands and which also implied a preference for democratic and small-scale activity; (c) eco-development which acknowledges the concern for the environment which emerged in the First World in the 1970s and which implies small-scale industry which is sustainable over the long run; and (d) ethno-development which notes that development processes have often fostered ethnic conflict and insists that this be addressed and the diversity of cultures in the world be respected.²³

However, in the metropolitan heartlands of the global system a new intellectual and political project emerged at the start of the 1980s and, notwithstanding the intrinsic interest of many of these alternative development ideas, as the balance of political power within the First World changed so too did approaches to development theory. The analysis of the global economic, social and political situation offered by the New Right begins from a diagnosis of far too much government and agency intervention and a return to the sovereign joys of the free market is urged. As the agenda of the New Right gained in influence within the First World in the early years of the 1980s the arguments of the proponents of both the NIEO,

22 Hettne 1990 op. cit. pp. 152-67.

basic needs and other alternatives were swept away. When the nature of the interdependence of the global system reemerged it did so in the very different context of talk about free-market-driven globalization.

Chapter Summary

The notion of global development covers a series of related approaches which have in common that they stress both the interdependent nature of the world system and the interests which the First World has in seeing the situation of the Third World improved. In this case we can note: (a) general development arguments stressing the unity of mankind made by the United Nations and other international organizations; (b) a concern for environmental pressures first expressed in the Club of Rome's reports on the limits of the earth and later restated at the Rio Earth Summit; and (c) a concern for the poverty of the Third World when measured against the need of the hugely productive First World for markets – hence, after the fashion of Keynesian pump-priming the thought that the rich should underpin the growth of the poor to everyone's benefit. It is an important area of work which has continuing intellectual and organizational influence.

14

The Affirmation of the Role of the Market: Metropolitan Neo-liberalism in the 1980s

Overview of the Position of the New Right

The work of the New Right neoliberal theorists on development has been characterized as a counter-revolution whose aim has been to undermine and replace orthodox notions of how development in the Third World might be achieved.¹ When we examine the claims of the New Right we find a complex group of claims in respect of the scientific status of their work and its centrality within social science coupled to an unrestricted celebration of the power of the unregulated free market. Against these claims, theorists have offered replies which effectively dispose of the arguments of the New Right,² but there are wider debates beyond the narrow confines of recent polemics dealing with the relationship of state, economy and political action. The debates about states and markets evolve out of the slow collapse of the post-Second World War political settlement which in turn can be seen as an element in the wider shift towards an integrated tripolar global system.

1 J. Toye 1987 *Dilemmas of Development*, Oxford, Blackwell.

2 See, for example, D. Seers ed. 1981 *Dependency Theory: A Critical Reassessment*, Lon-

The Eclipse of the Liberal-democratic Orthodoxy

In the early 1970s the post-Second World War welfare state settlement between capital and labour in the metropolitan heartlands of capitalism drifted into crisis. The steps on the road to political and intellectual collapse were many but commentators cite as a key moment the US decision in 1973 to end the Bretton Woods system by allowing the dollar to float. Over the period of the 1970s there were severe upheavals within the First World economies and there was rising concern with the apparent inability of established national and international mechanisms to deal with the new economic problems.³ In the wider international system there were political problems as the bipolar system of the USA and USSR came under pressure. In particular the USA became embroiled in a futile war in Vietnam designed to 'contain communism'. It has been suggested that this involvement was an instance of imperial overstretch⁴ but more mundanely one can point to the burden of the war on the US economy and the collapse of its moral claims to leadership of the Free World. Relatedly we may note the rise of new economic and political powers in Japan and the European Union.

The relative eclipse of the post-Second World War liberal-democratic welfare state compromise has seen both a regressive and a progressive response. The progressive reply within the First World countries of the capitalist system has been presented by theorists of democracy⁵ but the immediate advantage was seized by the political right. After some thirty-odd years of opposition⁶ it was with the elections of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher that the New Right finally took power.⁷ The extent to which the theorists of the right can be taken to have provided new ideas and strategies as opposed to ideological public-relations fig-leaves vehicled through sympathetic media commentators is a matter of debate. However,

3 E. A. Brett 1985 *The World Economy Since the War: The Politics of Uneven Development*, London, Macmillan.

4 P. Kennedy 1988 *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, London, Fontana.

5 I have in mind the work of J. Habermas, A. MacIntyre and C. B. Macpherson in particular.

6 It was European democratic reformism plus the active promulgation of emerging US hegemony that acted to structure the post-Second World War compromise in Europe. Yet, in the construction of this compromise there were irreconcilable opponents who saw post-war liberal-democratic polities as socialistic. Amongst the early intellectual critics were Friedrich von Hayek, Karl Popper and Milton Friedman. In the early post-war period the re-writing of history proceeded apace and soon the European fascists were linked up to Soviet communism under the umbrella label of totalitarianism. The culpability of the Western powers in regard to the pre-war rise of European fascism, and the aggressive US drive against the left and the USSR after the war, were rapidly and actively forgotten. An extensive vocabulary of legitimation was developed, and free enterprise was equated with free economies, which were equated with the Free West, which in turn was equated with freedom.

7 See J. Krieger 1986 *Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics of Decline*, Cambridge, Polity; on Thatcher see B. Jessop et al. 1988 *Thatcherism: A Tale of Two Nations*, Cambridge, Polity, and S. Hall and M. Jacques eds. 1983 *The Politics of Thatcherism*, London, Lawrence and Wishart

to take them at face value initially, what the New Right theorists claim is that the modern free-market capitalist system is maximally effective in producing and equitably distributing the economic, social, political, and intellectual necessities of civilized life (see figure 16).

The Logic of the New Right Position


The theorists of the New Right offer a stark restatement of economic liberalism with its central role for the free market. An overarching claim is made that free markets maximize human welfare and in turn this unpacks as a series of interlinked claims: (a) economically, the claim is that as free markets act efficiently to distribute knowledge and resources around the economic system, then material welfare will be maximized; (b) socially, the claim is that as action and responsibility for action reside with the person of the individual, then liberal individualistic social systems will ensure that moral worth is maximized; (c) politically, the claim is that as liberalism offers a balanced solution to problems of deploying, distributing and controlling power, then liberal polities ensure that political freedom is maximized; and (d) epistemologically, the claim is that as the whole package is grounded in genuine positive scientific knowledge then in such systems the effective deployment of positive knowledge is maximized.

The substantive core of the package is made up of the claims in respect of the functioning of the free market. The free market comprises atomistic individuals who know their own autonomously arising needs and wants and who make contracts with other individuals through the mechanism of the marketplace to satisfy those needs and wants. The market is a neutral mechanism for transmitting information about needs and wants, and goods which might satisfy them, around the system. A minimum state machine provides a basic legal and security system to underpin the individual contractual pursuit of private goals.

A key figure in all this has been Milton Friedman who has presented his views in both technical and popular form. Some of the technical material will be dealt with later but for the moment the popular material will allow us to grasp the conservative political ideology. Friedman argues that *laissez-faire* capitalism is a necessary condition of political freedom.⁸ In a competitive capitalist society individuals freely enter into exchanges in the marketplace and in society. The role of the state is minimal: economic power is dispersed in a competitive capitalist economy and political power must also be dispersed. The separation of economic power from political power lets the former act as a check on the concentration tendencies in the latter: the proper role of the latter, the state, is in setting the rules of the social game and arbitrating disputes. This position is taken to rule out not only the historical objective of socialism but also the social-democratic welfare

8 M. Friedman 1962 *Capitalism and Freedom*, University of Chicago Press.

Figure 16 Neoliberalism in the 1980s



states of the post-Second World War First World.⁹ In the light of the evident ideological commitments of the New Right the attempt to reduce the scope of economics and of political and policy analysis to the sphere of the proper functioning of a putatively self-regulating equilibrium system deeply unpersuasive.

The general pro-market position of the New Right has informed the policy of the World Bank, the IMF and the US government over the 1980s. The position of the New Right translates into policy advice for Third World countries around the core commitment to free markets. The argument has been unpacked in terms of a series of principles which guide policy advice for Third World countries:¹⁰ (a) any regulation of the market is to be avoided, save for crises and the removal of malfunctions or inhibitions to full functioning; (b) any intervention in the market is to be avoided, save to remove causes of price distortions, so subsidies should be abolished, tax rates adjusted to encourage enterprise, tariff barriers removed along with other non-tariff barriers or disguised restrictions; (c) any government role in the economy should be avoided, as private enterprise can usually do the job better, and when governments do become involved it should be both market-conforming, short-term and involve a minimum of regulations; (d) any collective intervention in the market should be avoided, so labour union must be curbed; and (e) international trade should be free trade with goods and currency freely traded.

The work of the New Right in respect of the development of the Third World has been much discussed and it is suggested that they are guilty of oversimplification and sloganeering.¹¹ It has been noted that both the political left and the right came to agree in the 1970s that the Third World did not exist separately from the global system. The former assimilated it into the world capitalist system as a degraded dependent sector and the latter assimilated it into a mythic functioning world market system. Against this orthodox critics insist that the Third World does indeed exist as an internally complex sphere which is integrated within the global system which must be studied in a pragmatic fashion.

The New Right came to prominence in the wake of the slow collapse of Keynesianism which was the intellectual counterpart to the post-Second World War liberal-democratic welfare state compromise. The collapse was a mixture of the impact of real world events, in particular the surge in inflation coupled to a lack of very obvious success in securing development, plus the intellectual impact of structuralist economics (a progenitor of dependency theory which we will consider later). The New Right seized the opportunity to advance their long prepared restatements of economic liberalism.

⁹ On Friedman's ideas of freedom see C. B. Macpherson 1973 *Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval*, Oxford University Press.

Critics have suggested that this was often accomplished with scant regard to the truth of particular cases, as when for example New Right theorists pointed to the example of the growth of East Asia as supporting their position where in fact East Asian development has been state-centred and routinely regulated-market in character. The entire New Right approach was always strongly ideological in character and the approach captured the World Bank, IMF and development agencies of those First World governments wedded to the ideals of free markets. In the space of a few years the New Right celebration of the market became a new orthodoxy.

In general all this economics work, by both the orthodox professional neo-classical theorists and the overt ideological celebrants of the unregulated market, revolves around the model of the pure market economic system.¹² We can summarize the core elements of this model of a satisfaction-maximizing automatic asocial mechanism as follows: (a) in respect of goods and services there is a fundamental underlying naturally given situation of scarcity; (b) there is legally guaranteed private ownership of the means of production; (c) there is pervasive perfect competition amongst suppliers who operate in a complex division of labour and who are aiming to meet the demands of sovereign consumers, all ordered via the market; and (d) there is a definite politics attached to this model – thus the free market is taken to underpin human freedom in general. So far as the New Right are concerned this model represents the essential character of all human economic activity in society. However, this pure market model is a sophisticated intellectual construct and when it is examined it rapidly disintegrates.¹³

The 1980s have seen the New Right experiments in the First World fail as the experiment has produced unemployment, reductions in general welfare, social dislocation, declining manufacturing production, and extensive debt burdens. In the Second World the post-1989 rush to celebrate the 'end of history', understood as the triumph of the ideas of liberal-democracy,¹⁴ via the rapid marketization of the old Eastern Bloc countries has proved ill judged as the reform processes in these countries have drifted to a halt as the intractable problems of these areas have continued and deepened. It is now clear that any social change will be slow. In the Third World the work of the New Right as it has been vehicled through the IMF and World Bank has been regarded as less than helpful. In general, against these ideological schemes, in regard to the First and Second Worlds European commentators look to the model of Germany where the social market system is a variety of consensus-centred corporatism. And against the claims of the proponents of the sovereign joys of the marketplace, development theorists cite the models of Japan and East Asia as examples of state-assisted development.¹⁵

12 M. P. Todaro 1982 *Economics for a Developing World*, London, Longman.

13 See P. Ormerod 1994 *The Death of Economics*, London, Faber, ch. 3.

14 F. Fukuyama 1992 *The End of History and the Last Man*, London, Hamish Hamilton.

15 Indeed the World Bank and IMF are even now presenting their ideological counter-offensives on behalf of their fantasy model of the market. See, for example, World Bank 1993 *The East Asian Miracle*, Oxford University Press.

Overall, in place of celebrations of the ordering capacity and benefit-maximizing properties of the free market, an analysis informed by the classical social scientific tradition with its concern to elucidate the dynamics of complex change would look to offer characterizations of the global system and the actions of powerful agents within this system. The relevant intellectual resources would comprise the strategies of political-economic analysis, institutional analysis and the critical interpretation of culture. In substantive terms, we have the issue of the emergent blocs of Japan/Asia, the Americas, and Europe. And relatedly, in regard to development, the issue is one of the continuing extension of the capitalist mode of production with the consequent remaking of the economies and societies of the countries of the Third World.

The Overall Record of the New Right

The theorists of the marketplace offer strong claims in respect of both the coherence of their views and the success of policy positions informed by these views. In recent years the track records of various countries and regions within the global system have been subject to competing claims from the New Right and their opponents in respect of the appropriate explanation for recorded success.

In the First World

In discussions of the monetarist aspect of the New Right experiment (the scheme of reducing government intervention in the economy to a narrow technical sphere of monetary control in the expectation that after a period of adjustment as the Keynesian poison worked itself out of the system market forces would thereafter maximize benefits), commentators have argued that it has been a failure both in the USA and in the UK.¹⁶ These two countries have seen clear tests of the theories of the New Right.¹⁷ The free marketers would offer a reply to this in terms of the test having been not quite correct or otherwise defective by virtue of a lack of policy clarity or rigour but this is not persuasive.

However, there are further questions and disaggregating the UK record we can say that there has been no state withdrawal from the economy, merely a different pattern instituted. A similar argument could be made for the experience of the USA under Reagan.¹⁸ In general what seems to have been done is that the post-Second World War liberal-democratic settlement has been rewritten such that the economic direction of society is no longer a tripartite matter for government, industry, and unions, but is increasingly

16 D. Smith 1987 *The Rise and Fall of Monetarism*, Harmondsworth, Penguin.

17 On the UK see J. Mitchie ed. 1992 *The Economic Legacy 1979-1992*, London, Academic Press; on the USA see Krieger 1986 op. cit.

18 Krieger 1986 op. cit.

a matter of government and large corporations.¹⁹ There has been a marked shift of economic power away from formal democratic institutions, which at the very least paid some deference to the ideal of the responsibility of the economic sphere to consider and consult wider constituencies representing society in general, into the modern monopoly marketplace. Economic power, and relatedly social, cultural and political power have been removed from the public and state spheres and lodged in the private market. However, when power is shifted from the state and the institutions of the public sphere into the market it is not shifted into the ambit of a neutral efficiency-maximizing mechanism; rather it is shifted into the hands of the monopoly firms, the multi-nationals, the big banks and their allies in the higher echelons of government and para-statal organizations. The slogans used to legitimate this shift of material and ideological power have been drawn from the lexicon of the free marketeers and ideologues and have spoken warmly of the processes of privatization, liberalization, enterprise, competition, free trade and the related rise in individual responsibility. The machineries of social control of the marketplace which were intermediate between citizen and market, the realm of the public sphere ordered by the state, have been dismantled. Individuals, taken atomistically as mere consumers and no longer citizens even in aspiration, now face an enormously more powerful and unconstrained array of giant firms. Any perception of enhanced economic, political or social freedom is on any routine social scientific description an illusion for all but a tiny elite minority.²⁰

In the Second World

In the period following the 1989–91 upheavals in the old East European Bloc there have been a series of distinct phases in the commentaries offered by New Right theorists based in the West: (a) celebrations of victory; (b) the deployment of recipes for rapid marketization; (c) a muted and puzzled recognition of evident failure; and (d) the slow growth of a realistic social scientific approach to these issues.

The initial reaction of Western New Right commentators to the upheavals in eastern Europe was an attempt to assimilate the changes to the positions of the New Right. It was suggested that here was the inevitable drive to market freedom reasserting itself against tyranny and socialism. The end of history in the final victory of the notions of liberal-democracy was confidently announced.²¹ In fact the changes in eastern Europe had nothing to do with the New Right and everything to do with the final revolt of ordinary people, organized by citizen groups, churches and artists, against

19 See E. Hobsbawm 1994 *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991*, London, Michael Joseph, ch. 14.

20 The postmodernist view that celebrates the 1980s as a new sphere of consumption centred freedom I dismiss as fantasy. See D. Harvey 1989 *The Condition of Postmodernity*.

a moribund and discredited state-capitalist system that had been in terminal decline ever since its aged rulers declined the opportunity to effect reforms in the 1960s.²²

In the wake of the collapse of the old USSR and its satellites there was a rush of Western advisors offering bizarre blueprints for a rapid transfer to market systems. The argument was made by these policy advisors that a rapid shift to the market was both possible and desirable. However, the exercises in social reconstruction which were advocated were not available in reality. The proposals owed more to dogma than any defensible social science. In the swathe of countries bordering the European Union the model which has been pursued has been that of a German-style social market and not the free market advocated by the ideologues of the New Right. It is also clear that social and economic change will be slow because in most of the areas of the former Soviet bloc there is neither a pristine capitalism nor an historical memory of such an order ready to spring into life at the moment governmental regulation is removed.²³ As the institutionalists argue, all economic systems are lodged in social systems and change is slow. Indeed, most recently, this seems to have been accepted. The return of socialist governments in several of the old Eastern Bloc countries in protest against the upheavals and failed promises of the marketeers came as a surprise to Western right-wing commentators. Of late, their celebrations of victory and statements of confidence in the marketplace have been considerably less emphatic. It might be suggested that a pragmatic and rational approach to the analysis of complex change in these territories is slowly gaining ground.²⁴

In the Third World

In respect of the Third World the ideology of the free marketeers has governed the major institutions of capitalist development efforts since the early 1980s. The IMF and World Bank have pressed for economic liberalization and proposals have involved: (a) the elimination of market imperfections, thus the removal of controls on the private sector, the privatization of state assets, the liberalization of foreign investment regulations and so on; (b) the elimination of market-inhibitory social institutions and practices, thus curbing trades unions and professions, abolishing various subsidies, liberalizing employment regulation and so on; (c) the elimination of surplus government intervention, thus the imposition of restrictions on government spending, the reduction in government regulative activity, the reduction of government planning activity, the abolition of tariff regimes and

22 See Hobsbawm 1994 op. cit. chs. 13, 16. See also A. Callinicos 1989b *The Revenge of History*, Cambridge, Polity; B. Denitch 1990 *The End of the Cold War*, London, Verso; T. Garton-Ash 1989 *We The People*, London, Granta.

23 The one exception is the Czech Republic which was both an advanced economy before disaster overtook it in 1938 and which now shares a common border with Germany. In similar terms one might also point to Hungary, again having shared a border with Germany.

tion have

as a fig-
ans. They
ducted in
was effect-
end of the
as wrest-
l position
ted) mis-
ent in the
ead influ-
any other
hedule of
to be suc-
tempt to
on of the

²⁶

to untold
l.²⁷ It has
Bank can
world safe
IMF and

my

nd policy
l debates
political
e broad
inflation;
e; thirdly
use struc-
of their
llapse of

llan; R. P.
acific Rim,

blems, the
es and the
34 *Ill Fares*

n this vein

the post-Second World War liberal-democratic compromise advanced by the theorists of democracy.

The debate about inflation

The problem of inflation came to dominate economic thinking in the late 1970s and it was within this particular setting that New Right work attained its fashionable status. The theorists of the New Right argued that inflation was a phenomenon generated in the money economy (the sphere of the circulation of money as opposed to the real economy which was the sphere of the circulation of manufactured goods) and that it was caused by government over-spending; that is, putting too large a quantity of money into the system. The remedy was quite simple. All governments should stop their oversupply of money. Thereafter, it was argued that governments should look to the reinstatement of the free market as this would maximize human welfare.

The debate in respect of inflation may be seen to turn on the matter of the cause of inflation. Keynesians do not distinguish between the money and real economies and have spoken of two varieties of inflationary pressure: cost-push inflation, so called because costs push up prices; and demand-pull inflation, which occurs when many consumers compete for scarce goods. The Keynesian concern with inflation, which was secondary to the focus on maintaining high levels of employment, centres on the efforts of governments to curb rises in prices and incomes. The right mix of policies was always a matter of debate. However as the post-Second World War economic boom faded away a new situation combining economic slump and inflation came into being and was dubbed 'stagflation'.³⁰ The circumstances of the political-economies of the First World in the early 1970s were very difficult for social theorists to understand.

The early theorists of the New Right offered a simple cure to the disease of inflation. Milton Friedman adopted the strategy of the American economist Irving Fisher and distinguished between the real economy and the money economy and then announced that 'inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon' which is caused by governments taking the easy way out of economic problems by printing money.³¹ The solution was to curb government spending and thereby reduce the quantity of money in the system. The message has the great merit of simplicity: analogies can be drawn between profligate householders who spend all the money they have and responsible householders who budget carefully and live within their means. The monetarists suggested that the key problem was the profligacy of governments.

The New Right did not believe that governments have much influence on rates of economic growth or rates of unemployment. However, they did think that governments had a major impact on rates of inflation and that

30 P. Donaldson 1973 *Economics of the Real World*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, ch. 6.

31 M. Freidman and R. Friedman 1980 *Free To Choose*, London, Secker, p. 224.

this should be addressed by spending cuts. As the government cuts its spending so the inflation rate will drop and the self-regulating system attain its equilibrium position, and thereafter it will function smoothly. In the short term there will be unpleasant side-effects such as a dramatic fall in the output of the economy and an equally dramatic rise in the rate of unemployment. And all this, say the Keynesians, is little more than a recipe for a slump and there are no reasons to suppose that this slump will cure itself.

In contrast, Celso Furtado presents a structuralist analysis of inflation which begins with a denial of the relevance of either Keynesian or neo-classical economics to the circumstances of Latin America.³² Furtado insists that the economies of Latin America must be modelled directly and not in terms of the *a priori* schemes imported from the First World. In this case the typical Latin American economy presents itself as comprising a loosely related set of quasi-autonomous sectors each of which represents either a residue of the historical processes of the expansion of European capitalism or a present requirement of the newly dominant capitalist centre of the USA. The distinctively autonomous national economy of orthodox economics simply does not exist in Latin America where there is rather a concatenation of historical residues, introjected enclaves and various parasitic forms. The structuralist analysis of inflation³³ begins by noting the inflation proneness of traditional primary-product exporting economies and then goes on to note that the pursuit of industrialization 'based on import substitution started a new inflationary cycle'.³⁴ Any weaknesses in the capacity to import were met by generating local credits (or in monetarist terms printing money) and this 'sparked off a number of structural tensions which were translated into an inflationary process'.³⁵

The debate around the matter of inflation lets Furtado counterpose a structuralist approach to those orthodox discussions which regard inflation as a matter of the poor functioning of money flows. Furtado insists that even if familiar patterns of inflation did occur then they were more often than not the outcome of more complex processes, whose main ingredients were structural inflexibility and the determination to press ahead with a development policy'.³⁶ This argument is unpacked in terms of the various responses contrived by the different sectors of the economy in endeavouring to avoid the burden of financing (through increased taxes or reduced subsidies and so on) the government's deficit. Thus Furtado deploys notions such as basic inflationary pressure, circumstantial pressures, propagation mechanisms and decision centres. The decision centres include the financial authorities of the state, the treasury and the state-bank, and it is here that

32 C. Furtado 1976 *Economic Development in Latin America*, 2nd edn, Cambridge University Press.

33 See 1981 edition dealing with monetarism, *Institute of Development Studies Bulletin*, 13.

34 Furtado 1976 op. cit. p. 118.

35 Ibid.

the
an a
Lati
orth
syst
the
Jo
of r
that
fort
fact
imp
resis
sequ
Rob

is
T
th
st
sr
in
w
th

Cels
spec
histo
to d
omit
nom
In
Righ
of ec
matt
argu

Pe
ic
ca
an
pr

ience,

ematiza-
al theory
1 is diffi-
Against
alistic, it
is accur-
seen to
nomena
ances'.⁴⁰
ics and
on this
hodoxy
Keynes
,⁴¹ that
pitalist
ie neo-
) more
onom-
) more
act of

1 of
out
eo-
gies
The
We
s.⁴²

ralism
e the
jective
vised
antity
⁴³ The
id the
is fed
cut at
ionist

, p. 4.

nguine.

role of the state securing stable growth at full employment through judicious deficit-financed spending, we have not merely inflation but also a higher rate of natural unemployment than would otherwise have been the case. If this central claim, in respect of the occasion of inflation could be secured then the Keynesian project was effectively dead. This was the strategy adopted by Friedman.⁴⁴

The intellectual aspect of Friedman's work centres on econometric analysis and the claim to positive scientificity. The procedure involves modelling on the basis of large sets of economic data. In regard to econometrics, however, critics report increasing doubt amongst economists as to the value of the procedure as little has been achieved by way of defensible results.⁴⁵ Relatedly, a critique of positivist models in social science is available which points out that all that can be claimed for these efforts is an arbitrary plausibility in respect of their relation to their object-spheres.⁴⁶ If there are doubts about econometrics and modelling, then there are also doubts about the way in which Friedman has handled these strategies. One commentator reported that 'Friedman's most notable research work was *A Monetary History of the United States* published in 1963 . . . [and there] is a sense, running through Friedman's research work, of reading a "whodunit" having already glanced at the final page'.⁴⁷ Others have noted the commitment of the New Right and have argued that, whilst social theory properly addresses real world problems, the robust intellectual pragmatism of Keynes has 'become, in the hands of the counter-revolution, a much more manipulative approach to the intellectual standards of economics'.⁴⁸

In my terms what we have from the New Right is the promulgation of a delimited-formal ideology in the form of a restatement of the model of free-market capitalism. The original ideas of monetarism were sold in the UK by a comparatively small group of people who assiduously fed policy ideas to those likely to be sympathetic within the media-city-parliament arena: a few professors, a few journalists, and a couple of right-wing think tanks were particularly important.⁴⁹ The issue of the relationship of scholarship to political spokespersonship and the role of both styles of enquiry/action in the public sphere are difficult matters. The work of the New Right has the intention of eliminating from debate the historical and structural

44 Smith Ibid.

45 J. Pheby 1988 *Methodology and Economics: A Critical Introduction*, London, Macmillan.

46 See B. Hindess 1977 *Philosophy and Methodology in the Social Sciences*, Hassocks, Harvester.

47 Smith 1987 op. cit. p. 20.

48 Toye 1987 op. cit. pp. 23-4.

49 Smith 1987 op. cit. This is also an issue much debated in Australia, another site of New Right experimentation, where commentators diagnose a similar capture of influential points in policy and state system. See D. Horne ed. 1992 *The Trouble with Economic Rationalism*, Newham, Scribe, and M. Pusey 1991 *Economic Rationalism in Canberra: A Nation-Building State Changes its Mind*, Cambridge University Press. For the USA, J. Krieger 1986 *Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics of Decline*, Cambridge, Polity, speaks of the construction of an arithmetical coalition based on particular interests articulated around the celebration of the market.

circumstances of particular economies. The problem is not the New Right's attempt to persuade a wide audience amongst politicians, policy-makers and public but the flawed nature of their argument which by misrepresenting delimited-formal ideology as positive science does indeed look manipulative.⁵⁰

State, economy and action in the global system

I remarked above that there was a progressive reply to the collapse of the post-war contested compromise of liberal-democracy. In respect of the First World this reply, to cast the matter in general terms, is carried by the critical-theoretic attack on the technocratic invasion of the life world and the decline of partially realized democracy.⁵¹ Thus the civil sphere of private economic action is increasingly subject to regulation and control via giantism of monopoly capitalist firms, and the public sphere of citizen discourse is shrinking as power becomes concentrated in an opaque state machine clearly concerned more with its linkages to the business world than with ordering the public sphere. Thus the spheres of civil society – the public sphere and the arena of state activity – are increasingly subject to the complex of economic, social and political demands which flow from the particular interests of the monopoly capitalist sector of the economy. Habermas speaks of the political project of reconstructing the public sphere, such that decisions in respect of core industrial and scientific activities are taken by the community. There are many strands to the present theoretical and practical drive in Europe for a more effective formal and substantive democracy. Where the New Right would affirm albeit spuriously the relative separateness of state and economy, and the liberal-democratic orthodoxy would affirm the general subordination of economy to enlightened state, the question to be addressed for the democratic line is the precise nature of the exchange between state, economy and political action. What might be known and how might such knowledge be deployed to secure agreed social goals?

Offering at this stage a schematic treatment of a key issue in social theory we can distinguish between three spheres of relevant debate: (a) the narrowly polemical where the issue is whether or not the state can influence or direct the economy; (b) the political-theoretical where the issue is the nature of the exchange between state and economy; and (c) the abstract-theoretical where the matter of structure and agency in the spheres of economy, society and polity might be raised.

Against the New Right claim that the state can do no more than play the role of underlabourer to market forces which are to be seen as a reality *sui generis*, we can begin by insisting that political power shapes economics both directly and indirectly. The occasion and intention of the original

50 On the issue of political writing see P. W. Preston 1987 *Rethinking Development*, London, Routledge; and on the political writing of the monetarists, with their substitution of supposedly technical argument for explicit political judgement see C. Furtado 1976

marginalist theorists have been noted earlier, and their inheritors, the New Right, offer claims in respect of the relationship of state and economy that are, if taken seriously, simply incredible. The real questions centre on the nature, extent, occasion and character of state involvements in markets.

Looking at the matter generally, in the case of direct state influence upon matters economic we can recall episodes ranging in social scale from securing strategic class interests (for example Weber's work on the role of political action as against economic forces which was addressed to the sleepy German bourgeoisie⁵²) through to the establishment of formal institutional mechanisms of economic control (as with Bretton Woods), down to simple pork-barrel politics in respect of the distribution of government largesse. The point here, broadly, is that economic structures are to be seen as social structures which are created and recreated in routine social practice, and not as absolute and given as the free marketeers would have us believe.

Turning now to the political-theoretical issue of how to conceptualize the relationship of state and economy it is clear that this matter has been extensively discussed within social science. Thus for the free marketeers the relationship of state to economy is one of subordination and rule protection. The self-regulating maximizing market may be minimally assisted by the state to better realize its potential: a framework of law to protect that self-generating and regulating market. The extent of available economic knowledge, upon which a state would act were it necessary to restore system self-regulation, is minimal: this is one of the paradoxes of naturalistic economics: they commit themselves to strong models of knowledge and then report that only a very little of this knowledge can be provided. Enough to correct but, emphatically, not enough to direct.

For the liberal-democratic orthodoxy the state is the overseer of the economic activities of society. This line of theorizing can be traced back into the late nineteenth century and the beginnings of a reaction on the part of the reform-minded bourgeoisie to the evident problems of emergent industrial society. In social science this reform line is developed at the same time as classical political-economy fades away and the marginalist anti-socialist theories take hold in economics. State direction of the economy, both directly, as in state industries, and indirectly as in fine-tuning or, later, development projects, is necessary as the free market left to its own devices is productive of extensive mal-development. Optimistically these theorists take the view that the knowledge necessary to order this active interventionist role is also in principle available; usually it is a product of the range of social sciences, not just the economists.

For the democratic line the state is one major locus of citizen activity in regard to ordering society and economy. The state is an institutionally elaborate membrane ordering internal and trans-national flows of economic and political power, such trans-national flows of economic and political

ris is not
ed.⁵³ The
ly know-
uirements
political-
cent years
ble about
o suppose
economy.⁵⁴
ith access
he project
is now a

namics of
n groups.
rojects of
o state at-
ne encom-
gies (how
e inherent
projects).
o remains
cture and
rtly, their
art of the
ssical and
ctures are
Clearly it
problems.
centring
ed, all of
g, and of
to make
ral struc-
ial life.⁵⁵

emocratic
pitalism⁵⁶

Harvester

id Practice,

dge, Polity;

has seen a dual reply on the part of social theorists and political commentators/activists. The regressive reply to this real-world-occasioned eclipse is that of the New Right ideologues who claim that the free market provides the sovereign remedy to all our ills, but who are in reality merely servants of metropolitan capitalism. In the USA and the other Anglo-Saxon economies the track records of right-wing governments over the last decade have been poor. The New Right have of course typically backed reaction in the Third World.⁵⁷ The progressive reply may be said to encompass all those who would analytically reduce the sphere of the market to the sphere of the social in order to fashion programmes of democratization.⁵⁸ Against the New Right's celebration of the sovereign role of the market and the inevitable incapacity and incompetence of the state, it can be safely asserted that the state can be mobilized for democracy and development. In recent years it is quite evident that states have been mobilized for authoritarian non-democracy and thoroughly dubious patterns of development.⁵⁹

Chapter Summary

The 1980s saw a resurgence of theories of society which stressed the role of the market. These theories came to prominence in the West in the wake of the seeming failure of post-Second World War Keynesian growth and welfare schemes. These celebrations of the market have been influential in development theory and practice, especially via the activities of the World Bank and the IMF. The intellectual core of the New Right approach is the neo-classical model of the market as a self-regulating system which maximizes the benefits of all participants. In development work it led to a stress on outward-directed development strategies and the encouragement of unregulated markets. As the 1980s progressed two lines of criticism were made: (a) that the market model at the centre of the programme was radically unsatisfactory intellectually; and (b) the policy flowing from the model did not seem to be working in either the First or Third World where, if anything, poverty seemed to be increasing. New Right theory was a contentious area of work which was very influential in the 1980s.

A. Woodiwiss 1993 *Postmodernity USA: The Crisis of Social Modernism in Postwar America*, London, Sage.

57 N. Chomsky 1991 *Deterring Democracy*, London, Verso.

58 Habermas 1989 op. cit.; D. Reuschmeyer et al. 1992 *Capitalist Development and Democracy*, Cambridge, Polity.

59 We might also note that the intellectual imperialism of neo-classical economics has been recently expressed in the guise of 'rational choice theory' whereby a methodological individualism coupled to an ethical preference for liberalism is presented as a procedural requirement of positive social scientific enquiry. A brief discussion is offered by H. Ward 1995 'Rational Choice Theory' in D. Marsh and G. Stoker eds. *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, London, Macmillan.


15

Global System Interdependence: The New Structural Analyses of the Dynamics of Industrial-capitalism

Overview of New Structural Analyses

In the 1980s a new concern for analysing the global industrial-capitalist system has been expressed. A newly intensified interdependence has been identified. There are a number of ways in which this emerging global system has been theorized: (a) from the market-oriented postmodernist theorists we have had ideas of the transformation of capitalism such that the knowledge-based system was now global in reach and geared to consumption in the marketplace; (b) from the dependency and marxist theorists we have had ideas of the global reconstruction of the capitalist system as patterns and styles of production change with the rise of East Asia, the collapse of the Second World bloc, and the further partial dependent integration of areas of the Third World; and (c) from those identifying mutual interdependence and interest and who are concerned with global development there has been an increasingly vigorous concern both to detail the ways in which various groups live within the global system in order to identify common problems, and to reinforce global-level rule-setting in place of simple power relations (see figure 17).

Figure 17 New structural analysis of the global system



The Postmodernist Theory of the Global Cultural Marketplace

An influential new analysis has been presented by the market-oriented postmodernist theorists. The theory of globalization details the transformation of industrial-capitalism such that the system is now knowledge-based, geared to consumption in the marketplace and global in its reach. The power of the

marke
and T.
of em

The d
ionabl
indust
cultur
first in
moder
austeri
past a
structu
and pl
tions s
century
argued
the un
been m
theoris
tion of
the op
collar :

Thes
argues
gress w
the Fre
tems of
lectuall
bureau
of learn
systems
of the p
entatio
This
politica

- 1 R. Ro
- 2 A. Ca
- 3 Ibid.
- 4 Ibid.
- 5 Ibid.
- 6 Ibid.
- 7 F. Ly

is dominated by flows of knowledge or information, produced via a natural science oriented to discontinuities and novelties rather than the task of uncovering a single coherent truth, and within these flows groups and individuals compete for the means to fashion discrete life-styles. It may all be viewed in an optimistic libertarian fashion, a system offering freedom to choose and construct life-styles from open flows of knowledge, but the pessimistic reading sees a renewed centrality for capitalist market relations, and these are unequal.

Lyotard argued that the contemporary world is best seen as a field of language-games through which individuals move. It is a relativistic, provisional and fragmented social world where received metadiscourses of progress are abandoned as patterns-of-life structured by the practices and cultures of capitalist-industrialism give way to life-style creation within the knowledge-based global system of post-industrial society.

One important aspect of the postmodernist material is its insistence that received patterns of social theoretical argument are now in need of radical renewal. In place of the experience of continuous intelligible progress, the experienced world of postmodernity has become one of partial truths and relativistic subjective perspectives. In our ordinary lives we are invited to select from proffered consumer alternatives in order to construct a life-style, and in the realm of social theorizing we are similarly enjoined to reject received traditions aspiring to universal knowledge in favour of the local, the partial and the contingent.⁸

The political-economy of postmodernity

The political-economic changes within the global system which are taken to underpin this shift to a postmodernist culture can be elucidated around the marxist regulationist school⁹ distinction between fordist and post-fordist modes of production: the former characterized in terms of mass production, extensive state regulation, corporatist industrial relations and mass consumption of essentially common products; whilst the latter is characterized in terms of flexible production, restricted state-regulation, market-based industrial relations and personalized schedules of consumption from a varied menu of consumer goods.¹⁰

This broad characterization can be unpacked by reference to the detail of the political-economy of both Western and non-Western countries over the period since the First World War. The 1930s can be read as the confused episode of the construction of the fordist system, from New Deal politics in the USA, and Keynesianism in the UK, through to National Socialism in Germany. The essence of the productive system was the mass production of standardized products for a mass consumer market. The technologies, patterns of

industrial organization, patterns of political ordering and expectations in regard to consumption of the output all took time to fix in place. Indeed, the shift to a widespread use of fordist modes of accumulation and regulation belongs to be post-Second World War period of Keynesian demand management and the economic long boom. The goals of the early phases of optimistic decolonization and nationbuilding were similarly fordist.

The shift to post-fordist accumulation and regulation strategies can be dated with reference to familiar political-economic and political events. The episode of inflationary pressures compounded by the oil-price hike of the early 1970s tipped the fordist system into crisis. The post-fordist mode of production is thereafter taken to be in process of construction. The theorists point to a new rapidity in technological innovation, and to patterns of production which are decentralized, multi-plant, multi-national and which adopt the flexible specialization strategy such that a wide range of products can be made with designs quickly changed. The new pattern of production requires an educated, adaptable and complaisant workforce, coupled with government deregulation of the market. The restructuring of production takes place on a global scale, and the countries of the Third World are automatically drawn in as new locations for both production and consumption of global products.

However, against the theorists of postmodernity, critics have argued that it is not clear that the system has changed fundamentally. The 1980s might simply have seen reactionary political regimes in power in the countries of the First World who took advantage of improved transport and communications network to engineer a further round of dependent development by relocating a limited spread of production units in low-cost Third World countries.

The social-institutional order of postmodernity

The theorists of postmodernity analyse the shift from the modern to the postmodern world in terms of a series of characterizations. In the sphere of social institutions the complex changes can be grasped in terms of the shift from a core of institutions surrounding the state and embracing the community to a set of institutions surrounding the individual and extending through the marketplace.

The modern state ordered a series of key social institutions (family, welfare, employment and security) and fostered a wide spread of informal associations which were oriented towards the community (citizen groups, sports groups, community groups, churches, charities and the like). In all, a dense network of association bound each individual into the wider community where membership was construed as a matter of both rights and duties.

In the post-war period this is the form of social institutional life which

individual who freely chooses patterns of association and consumption in order to construct a life-style. The private companies of the marketplace offer those family supports, welfare provisions and security forces which had been the concern of the state in the modern period. A key difference is the reliance on the unregulated market as a source of employment. All these relationships are mediated by the marketplace and are essentially voluntaristic and contractual.

In the post-war period this is the form of social institutional life which has been typical of the American free-market capitalist system.

The culture of postmodernity

Notwithstanding the available doubts in respect of the precise nature of recent political-economic and social-institutional changes, it has been argued that postmodernist culture has to be taken seriously as it could be the cultural form of a new stage in the development of the world capitalist system.¹¹ The culture of postmodernism centres upon the pre-eminent position in contemporary life of the commercial consumer marketplace. The ideas of progress which we take from the classical social scientific traditions of the nineteenth century are rejected. All that is available to humankind are the consumption opportunities offered by global capitalism. The individual exercise of choice within the marketplace is the basis of arbitrarily constructed life-styles. In this vein, those earlier cultural schedules which distinguished high culture from low culture are dismissed. In postmodernist culture any product offered on the cultural marketplace is as good as any other. In a similar way, by extension, those earlier schedules of the socially acceptable and unacceptable are dismissed because any product may be taken up into a life-style package. Indeed in the context of the marketplace-centred non-aesthetic and non-ethic of postmodernism, the production and consumption of novelties become prized simply because they are novelties. Overall, commentators identify certain key characteristics of postmodern culture: (a) depthlessness, as in place of structural analyses and understandings the surface image is stressed; (b) ahistoricism, as in place of analyses and understandings that place events and processes in history, the present is stressed; (c) intensities, as in place of considered ethics and aesthetics, subjectivist emotionality is stressed; (d) technologies, as in place of a view of technology-as-servant the power of technology is stressed; (e) pastiche, as in place of realism the play of invention is stressed; and (f) episodocity, as in place of the coherence of sequential discourses, the broken nature of discourse fragments is stressed.

It is clear that there is a link between liberal-individualism and postmodernist consumerism¹² because the idea of positive liberty,¹³ the freedom of

agents in charge of their own lives, has been rejected in favour of an idea of negative liberty, the freedom from imposed restriction that lies at the core of the liberal-individualist political philosophy. It can be argued that the modernist project of democracy, the pursuit of positive liberty,¹⁴ was forgotten long ago. Hannah Arendt has argued that the rise of the social question of poverty in the late nineteenth century turned attention away from fully realizing the public sphere of positive liberty, and the pursuit of democracy declined into the amelioration of poverty and the pursuit of material consumption, and the consumption sphere became self-perpetuating.¹⁵ In this way it is argued that consumer-capitalism has both offered freedom-as-consumption (the negative liberty of freedom from the constraint of want and uncertainty) to all, or most, and has effectively blocked the modernist project. The consumer-capitalist system is now stable and successful. The individual and the system are linked via consumption of goods. Once inside the ideological circle it all makes perfect sense.

The power of the language of postmodernist politics centres on the notion of the market.¹⁶ The notion of the market is a political resource which serves the interest of ruling groups. The pure market never did exist so debate about it is not debate about real social processes; rather the idea is a crucial area of ideological struggle. It can be granted that the language of the market superficially describes present patterns quite well – after all, ideology and reality intermingle as we (mis)organize our lives in the light of (mis)descriptions, but as an intellectual analysis it is vacuous¹⁷ and as a prescriptive programme it is reactionary. The peculiar sexiness of the idea of the market can be traced to the 1980s' linkages of market and media. The realm of media-carried consumerism became the illusory exemplar of market freedom, and the notion of the market was taken into common thought as both a natural system-given and a realm of freedom.

The postmodern Third World

Notwithstanding the generally much lower levels of material living experienced by the peoples of the Third World, postmodern theory has been used to make sense of their changing circumstances. A series of changes are adduced as evidence of the rapid integration of these poor countries within the global consumer capitalist system. Postmodernists argue that the extent of penetration of industrial capitalist forms of life into Third World countries has increased very rapidly in recent years. A series of particular areas of activity are cited: (a) global production systems which ensure that schedules of material goods which were restricted in their availability to the rich West are now widely available (brand names like Sony or Ford or IBM are

11 F. Jameson 1991 *Postmodernism, Or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*, London, Verso.

12 Z. Bauman 1988 *Freedom*, Milton Keynes, Open University Press.

13 I. Berlin 1989 *Four Essays on Liberty*, Oxford University Press.

14 C. B. Macpherson 1973 *Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval*, Oxford University Press.

15 Arendt is cited by Bauman 1988 op. cit. pp. 96–8.

16 Jameson 1991 op. cit.

17 Recall the arguments of P. Ormerod 1994 *The Death of Economics*, London, Faber.

now recognized globally); (b) global cultural forms which revolve around expressive consumption which used to be restricted to the West are now widely available (Hollywood movies, Coca-Cola, satellite TV are now consumed globally); and (c) global travel in the forms of migration (of poor people to richer areas) and mass tourism (often of rich people to poorer areas) ensures both a mixing of people and a standardization of activities (as the international style of airports, hotels, shops and leisure activities becomes more widespread).

The theorists of postmodernity have argued strongly that a process of globalization of culture is slowly taking place as patterns of consumption across the global system grow ever more similar. The theorists of the emergent markets of the Second and Third Worlds point to the growth of consumerism amongst those groups able to take advantage of the new opportunities within the marketplace. In this way the theorists of postmodernity draw the poor of the Second and Third Worlds into a global-market-based expressive consumerism which has recently been celebrated as the political-philosophical end of history.¹⁸ However, critics have suggested that these patterns of consumption are available only to a narrow group and that the poor who lie outside the consumer sphere are subject to severe control. In First World consumer capitalism the poor are subject to the control of the bureaucratic-welfare system. Similarly the citizens of the Second World state-socialist systems prior to the revolutions of 1989 inhabited a culture which resembled the bureaucratic welfare control system. At the present time the poor who make up the majority of the populations of the countries of the Third World are excluded. In the context of the patterns of power within the global system these groups are not sources of alternative thinking, they are merely failed or aspirant consumers.¹⁹

The Reconstruction of Global Industrial-capitalism

A series of tendencies within the global system can be identified as patterns and styles of production change. First, the intermingled upgrading and hollowing out of the metropolitan core economies (flexible-specialization and the new international division of labour). Second, the rise of East Asian developmental capitalism as a discrete and novel variant of the industrial-capitalist form-of-life (tripolarity and the eclipse of the liberal market model). Third, the collapse of the Second World state socialist bloc and its confused shift towards market-based political-economies (a mixture of political collapse and thereafter general reconstruction in the USSR and Eastern Europe, and authoritarian market reforms in China and Indo-China). Fourth, the further partial dependent integration of areas of the Third World (in Asia, Latin America and the oil-rich Middle East). And fifth, the slow shift

18 F. Fukuyama 1992 *The End of History and the Last Man*, London, Hamish Hamilton.
19 On the globalization of culture, see M. Piore and C. Sabel 1984 *The Second Industrial Divide*, New York, Basic Books.

of areas of the Third World into a situation of apparent semi-detachment from the global system (much of Africa south of the Sahara).

Flexible specialization and the new international division of labour

The notion of flexible specialization is associated with the institutional economic analyses of Piore and Sabel.²⁰ They focus on the industrial organization of contemporary society and consider the nature of technological organization of the workplace, the demands of the labour force at interaction of the place of work with the wider society. The authors argue that the familiar pattern of geographically concentrated large-plant mass production of standard products has given way in the 1980s to geographically dispersed small-plant post-fordist innovative product individualized products. The mass production of similar products has way to the large-scale production of a diversity of products.

It is suggested that there are two alternate reasons for the post-fordist mass production: (a) a series of external shocks to the fordist system including labour problems and the oil crises of the 1970s which included the problems of inflation and slump and provoked an attempt by firms to ameliorate these difficult circumstances; (b) the internal needs for reform a mass production system which could no longer respond to the increasingly sophisticated demands from consumers. On the basis of this analysis there are two ways in which the problems of the breakdown of fordist production can be addressed: (a) an increase in global demand such that the system is reinvigorated (this could be achieved after the suggestion of the Brandt Commission of 1980 which looked to an international Keynesian system which identified the Third World as a potential marketplace for the First World in a mutual interdependence); (b) a shift to new patterns of production which are knowledge-based, small scale, and oriented to an individualized product spread, or the flexible specialization of a post-fordist system of production.

A related analytical concern has been with the changing geographical pattern of production within the global industrial capitalist system. In the 1980s some industrial production was relocated from First World to Third World and some newly established industrial production was set up in the Third World in preference to the First World. The change has been argued by the theorists of the new international division of labour.

Frobel and Heinrichs referred to the theoretical machineries of world system analysis, which are a variant of Latin American dependency theory, and pointed out that in the 1970s a new phase of the development of world capitalism could be identified.²¹ It took the form of the relocation

20 M. Piore and C. Sabel 1984 *The Second Industrial Divide*. New York. Basic Books.

of certain industries in the Third World and the establishment of some new industries in that region rather than in the First World. A complementary development took place with First World industries relocating to the Third World as these countries pursued export-oriented development strategies. It is certainly the case that over the late 1970s and 1980s some areas of the Third World saw rapid export-oriented industrial growth. The export goods produced have in significant measure served the demands of the First World consumer markets. The new global market for goods and the rise of the MNCs favour the new international division of labour. The other factors which helped this new pattern to develop included the labour reserves of the Third World, the advance of technology such that tasks could be simplified and easily relocated to traditionally low-skill areas, and the development of transport and communications such that multi-national production and distribution could be achieved by the MNCs.

In the First World two concerns about the nature of the global system have been voiced: (a) the social implications of the upgrading of the core economies where the demand for semi-skilled or unskilled labour falls away rapidly which in the absence of state corrected action leads to structural unemployment of a large scale and long duration; and (b) the hollowing out of core economies as industrial production is relocated to low-cost offshore production platforms leaving head-office functions in the production sphere and an ever larger service sector. In the Third World the concerns about the changing nature of the global system revolve around the character of the industrialization that has recently occurred and the stability of the commitment of the First World to the relatively open trading economy which has in part underpinned this development. However, the long-term implications of these observed patterns of change in production patterns are far from entirely clear.²²

Tripolarity and the eclipse of the liberal market model

One aspect of the recent debates about patterns of global change has been a rise of concern for the tripolar nature of the system. The global system has been taken both to be in the process of becoming more integrated and to be forming into three distinct blocs: the Americas, Europe and Pacific Asia. The characteristic form-of-life of the peoples within these blocs and their interactions within the global system have become important issues. It has been suggested that within each of the three spheres a distinctive form of life is developing where each presents a particular version of industrial-capitalism. At the global level it is suggested that the system is increasingly shaped by the flows of material goods, finance and cultural resources between

these three spheres as the post-war period of Cold War division and US hegemony over the market sphere comes to a close. The emerging sphere of Pacific Asia has occasioned considerable interest.

In the case of Pacific Asia it has been argued that a novel form of industrial-capitalism has been developed. Pacific Asia has been a significant base for export-oriented production destined for the First World countries of America and Europe. It is also the case that since the 1985 Plaza Accord²³ that a new round of export-oriented development has taken place as Japanese firms have relocated within Pacific Asia so as to escape the problems of the high yen. The result of these changes in production within the global system has been that over the period of the 1980s the economies of Japan, Southeast and East Asia have grown very rapidly. It is possible to analyse the Pacific Asian model in terms which gesture to the idea of a typical political-economic configuration with related social-institutional structures and associated cultural forms.

In the post-Second World War period the political-economies of the countries of Pacific Asia have undergone extensive change and there are a series of versions of the political-economic aspect of the story. The development orthodoxy would speak of the evolutionary and planned achievement of effective nationstatehood. In the case of Pacific Asia this would seem to find familiar expression in terms derived from modernization theory. The Pacific Asian countries have successfully achieved take-off and as their economies mature so their societies are being remade in a fashion similar to that in other industrial countries. In time their politics might be expected to shift away from their presently authoritarian style towards the liberal-democracy familiar in the West. On the other hand, in contrast, the recently influential economic liberals would offer a different tale. In place of the stress on planning they would bring to the fore the dynamism of the free market. Economic liberals would point to the dynamic nature of the Pacific Asian economies and would read this as evidence of the spontaneous order which minimally regulated capitalistic business enterprise might be expected to produce. Expectations in regard to the future seem to be cast in terms of more of the same. The notion of a 'borderless world'²⁴ has been advanced.²⁵

There is also available a thoroughly sophisticated political-economy reading of the Pacific Asian model in its Japanese form. In this perspective the development experience of Japan which is the core country of Pacific Asia is read in terms of the exchange between an oligarchic ruling group (involving the bureaucracy, business, politicians, and in earlier versions the military),

23 An agreement made in New York which revalued the yen upwards.

24 K. Ohmae 1990 *A Borderless World*, Tokyo, Kodansha.

25 There are also conservative American commentators who look at East Asia with unease. See P. W. Preston 1995 'The Debate on the Pacific Asian Miracle Considered' in idem *Aspects*

22 A review of these debates is available in J. Allen and D. Mashev eds. 1988 *The Economy in Question*, London, Croom Helm.

determined to secure the position of a late-developer within the expanding global system, and the structures of that system, which flowed from the activities of the other major participants/players.²⁶ In the post-Second World War period this drive to achieve position and security has evidenced itself in strategic concern for economic expansion. It can be said that Japan is a capitalist developmental state.²⁷

If the political-economy of the Pacific Asian model has been a success it is often argued that this is in no small measure due to the particular character of Pacific Asian society. In particular, society is held to be familial and communitarian, and not individualistic on the model of the West (a model dominated by the experience of the USA). Relatedly society is held to be disciplined and ordered (unlike the West, again with the image of the USA to the fore, which is taken to be riven by the unfortunate consequences of excessive individualism).²⁸

In a similar way the political life of these countries has routinely diverged from the model of the West. In terms of overall political-economic, social institutional and cultural packages it is possible to speak of models of democracy: the Northwest European; the North American; and now the Pacific Asian.²⁹ It has been argued that the Pacific Asian model centres on an Asian communitarian politics stressing community, hierarchy, consensus and a strong dominant party state.³⁰ It can be noted that democracy is a real world historical achievement which is neither spontaneously generated by systemic evolution nor to be considered a recipe to be authoritatively applied by an enlightened elite. It is rather a laboriously achieved set of ideas, institutions and routine social practices. Overall, the Pacific Asian model is distinct from the received models of American liberal market and European social-democratic polities. The pattern is undoubtedly coherent and effective and in general offers an interesting example to other countries in the Third World peripheries.

Partial collapse and partial renewal in the socialist bloc

In the People's Republic of China in the late 1970s Deng Xiaoping inaugurated an economic policy turn towards the marketplace. Over the period of the 1980s China has taken its place within the burgeoning Pacific Asian region. The patterns of political-economic and social institutional change

26 B. Moore 1966 *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Boston, Mass., Beacon. R. Dore 1986 *Flexible Rigidities*, Stanford University Press; K. van Wolferen 1993 *The Enigma of Japanese Power*, Tokyo, Tuttle.

27 C. Johnson 1982 *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*, Stanford University Press.

28 E. Vogel 1980 *Japan as Number One*, Tokyo, Tuttle.

29 C. B. Macpherson 1966 *The Real World of Democracy*, Oxford University Press.

30 H. C. Chan 1993 'Democracy: Evolution and Implementation - An Asian Perspective' in R. J. Bentley ed. *Democracy and Capitalism: A Comparative Study*, London, Routledge.

within China have been extensive and suffused with conflict.³¹ However, the overall success of the Pacific Asian region and the lack of any political reform has meant that the changes have not been widely remarked. Changes in China have been read in the First World as one further episode in the very slow renewal of the state socialist sphere. However, in contrast to the events of 1989-91 in eastern Europe have begun a series of changes where the final equilibrium point of the emergent system is unclear. Overall, a transition is in process from the command economic state socialism towards a market-based system with a pluralist polity.

The dramatic reform movements in the old Eastern Bloc had a series of elements. The process started with the democratization and liberation moves within the USSR initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev's government in the late 1980s. The most dramatic upheavals took place in 1989-91, and reform continues within Russia. The depth of the problems facing the leadership are clearer - as are the apparent difficulties of securing deep change. In the old Eastern Bloc territories of Europe the situation is at least clearer in some respects whilst in others earlier clarity has given way to deeper confusion. In the case of political reforms the generally peaceful shifts from bloc-given Stalinist style command political-economies to a range of variants on the Western model was completed with elections throughout 1990. However, it has become clear that many tensions within these countries will have to be resolved. The reappearance of nationalism is a problem. In regard to economic matters the situation is more obscure. An initial enthusiasm for models of *laissez-faire* capitalism is giving way to a dawning appreciation of the difficulties of securing economic reform. The problematical nature of the pure market schemes advocated by intellectual groups within eastern Europe and by western experts in the guise of the IMF/World Bank.

Credit for these changes has been claimed by the American marketeers and commentators have spoken of the West having won the Cold War with the consequence that further development within the global system would necessarily follow the Western model. One commentator offered a celebration of westernization as the ethico-political end of history.³² However, it was the people of eastern Europe who made their revolution. It was a revolution led by intellectuals, trades unionists, Church groups and artists. The final resting point of these upheavals is yet to be established. Their politics are in flux. It has been suggested that the crucial distinction in respect of eastern European politics will be between backward-looking nationalists and European modernists.

It is clear that laying claim to the events of eastern Europe is a

31 See J. Howell 1993 *China Opens its Doors: The Politics of Economic Transition*, Hempstead, Harvester; D. Goodman and G. Segal eds. 1994 *China Deconstructs: P. Trade and Regionalism*, London, Routledge.

32 See E. Hobsbawm 1994 *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-*

Right tactic. It continues their hitherto domestic ideology of the Free West by imputing this idea-system to eastern Europe. It has been argued that it was a mistake for the New Right to lay claim to the revolutions in the eastern Europe.³⁴ It has been suggested that the Right's aim is to present the 'East Europeans as a living, historical proof of the common sense (and clichéd) truths of free-market Western capitalism'.³⁵ Against this strategy of analysis, what 'is actually happening there is the collapse of the state, around which the old system was based'.³⁶ It seems clear that the natural resting point for an eastern European politics was social-democratic. Nonetheless if social-democracy did not succeed in eastern Europe then the alternative was the extremes of racist and nationalist movements.

If anything, subsequent events have tended in the direction of a new Third World. The early optimism in eastern Europe for the liberal market faded as IMF and World Bank austerity-adjustment went ahead. With the December 1991 dissolution of the USSR in favour of the seemingly politically inchoate and economically damaged Confederation of Independent States (CIS) all the conditions for 'third worldization' were in place. Overall it seems that the real battle is not about which model of development eastern Europe should adopt but is about the shape of an emergent Europe as political and economic reforms continue in Russia, and as the European Union moves towards some sort of unification. The attempt of the New Right to annex the events in eastern Europe to its liberal market position is essentially a defensive manoeuvre within a broader game about the shape and nature of the tripolar system.

The situation of the Eastern Bloc countries as they move to reassert local political-economic and cultural models in the wake of the abrupt ending of bloc-imposed conformity is difficult. Problems are legion, of which two may be cited: the resurgence of nationalism; and the severe problems of economic adjustment in the face of a legacy of problems, debts and Western market-nonsense coupled to practical indifference.³⁷ A series of conclusions about the situation of eastern Europe can be presented:³⁸ (a) the political-cultural framework of the Cold War era, with ideas of socialism and talk of 'middle Europe', is now disregarded or of no help; (b) relatedly there are ambiguous new cultural idea-sets being drawn down upon, in particular varieties of nationalism; and (c) the most often cited new political-cultural notion is that of a return to Europe, where this is neither left nor right and counts as some sort of coming home. By way of response, commentators offer two thoughts: the first is that the resurgence of nationalism is a danger; and the second is that it is precisely the indifference of the West, illustrated in their thoughtless market recipe-ism, that is most likely to trigger

34 O. Figes in *The Guardian*, London, 17 February 1990.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

37 M. Glennon 1990 *The End of the Cold War*...

political and social upheavals in the Eastern Bloc as they flounder under their received economic problems.³⁹

Dependent integration and semi-detachment in the Third World

The initial post-Second World War enthusiasm for the pursuit of development slowly waned as the early efforts at industrialization ran their course in a mix of success and failure as import-substituting industrialization strategies reached their low maximum potential. The global system context within which early development work had been pursued changed as the long post-Second World War economic expansion came to an end in the early 1970s. In addition the oil-shock damaged Third World economies as markets for their products contracted and at the same time recycled petrodollars fuelled ill-advised attempts to carry on with established development work. In Africa the result was stagnation and in Latin America inflation and the debt crisis of the early 1980s. The experience of the countries of the Third World in the post-colonial period has evidenced a diverse mix of advance, drift and stagnation.

If we consider the very broad sweep of the countries of Pacific Asia, Latin America and the oil-rich Middle East it is clear that there has been a sharp process of differentiation within the Third World. In the case of Pacific Asia the basis for economic success is elusive. In the 1980s the New Right claimed that the success of the area proved the correctness of market-oriented development policies. However, the countries of the area have all pursued state-directed development. The core regional economy has been Japan which industrialized in the late nineteenth century and which has subsequently played a key role in the development of Pacific Asia. The pace of development in the region as a whole over the 1980s has been so rapid that Pacific Asia is now spoken of as one of the three major economic blocs within the global economy. In the case of the Middle East it is clear that the basis for its economic success is primary product exporting, in particular oil, but these countries have also invested heavily in industrial development. It is also clear that many of the countries of the Middle East have experienced considerable political dislocation in the shape of war and revolution. At the same time the progress of what has been called westernization, the introduction of modern social patterns, has been deeply problematical. In the case of Latin America the extent of success is more problematical as social inequalities, environmental problems and political instability work against economic successes.

In Africa the initial legacies of the colonial period included state and administrative machineries, legal systems, educated and mobilized populations,

39 Ibid. See also B. Denitch 1990 *The End of the Cold War*. London. Verso. On the model

and so on. All these slowly ran down. As the economic changes of the post-colonial period progressed the residual pre-contact and colonial patterns of life began to be reworked. This could include the decay of traditional patterns of family and kin. It could also involve problems with tribalism. In Africa there were problems of political corruption, incompetence and instability. The role of the military increased. A series of internal conflicts occurred. These problems were internal to the new countries of the Third World and were acutely felt in Africa.⁴⁰ At the same time African countries experienced interference from the two great powers as they pursued a series of overt and covert proxy wars.

If we try to summarize the period as a whole then we can say that by the mid-1970s the orthodox optimism of the immediate post-Second World War period had dissipated and was beginning to be replaced by fears about debt, instability and failure which were to come to the fore in the 1980s. At the same time the counter-optimism of the critics of the orthodoxy was similarly beginning to decline as unease grew about the further unequal development of the global system. It is also true to say that the unease about the post-Second World War settlement which underpinned the discussion about development also became acute as First World economies suffered economic slowdowns and societies saw rising problems. In the First World the intellectual and political confusion of the period saw the emergence of the Anglo-Saxon New Right. In the Third World the New Right sponsored a counter-revolution which aimed to sweep away the developmental role of the state in favour of the marketplace.⁴¹ The period of the 1980s was thus one of reduced expectations for both the orthodoxy and their radical critics. However, the position of the radical democrats was further undermined by the ferocious political reaction of the 1980s. The overall impact upon the Third World has been to reinforce the diversity of the area's patterns of integration within the global system; a mixture of dependent development and semi-detachment.

In the case of Pacific Asia it is clear that large areas of what might a few years ago have been called countries in the Third World have experienced relatively rapid development. In the case of Pacific Asia they have been drawn into the Japanese orbit within the tripolar global system. It is similarly the case for other areas of what would have been called the Third World a few years ago that they have experienced a further round of dependent capitalist development. It is possible to point to the oil-rich states of the Middle East and to parts of Latin America and the Caribbean. These last two fall within the ambit of the USA-centred sphere of the global capitalist system. In 1993 the NAFTA agreement was inaugurated which looks to a free trade zone within the Americas. In sharp contrast to the countries of Pacific Asia, the Middle East and Latin America, the countries of Africa have experienced

little progress in the period of the 1980s. In the case of Africa development specialists tend to speak of a lost decade. The African countries' share of world production and world trade is shrinking and is now slight. In the case of Africa it seems to be possible to speak of a slow detachment from the mainstream of the global industrial capitalist system.

Strategies for analysing complex change in the global system

In recent years a body of work has grown up which is called international political-economy. It offers a schematic way of framing analyses of patterns of complex change in the global system. The track records of particular state-regimes can be read as exemplifying a series of projects, which such projects represent creative responses to the enfolding dynamics of the global capitalist system. A context-sensitive analytic strategy dissolves the actions of the state-regime into a much more complex trans-state system. Analysing state-regimes as if they were autonomous units is misleading, and the familiar talk about nation-states, taken as somehow essentially self-contained, is an error which reifies a contingent set of relationships thereby obscuring the very processes under consideration.

Over the post-Second World War period, by way of example, this precisely how orthodox development theory analysed problems of Third World development. The early expectations of the First World theorists shaped in a period of optimistic decolonization and bipolarity, the high-tide of fordism, were that the Third World would recapitulate the historic experience of the West. The discourse of development saw the elaboration of a complex package oriented to the goal of the pursuit of effective nationhood which the experts imputed to the replacement elites of the nation-states of the Third World. This ideal goal can be unpacked to reveal a triple task involving the engendering of political and cultural coherence, the securing of political and social stability, and the achievement of economic growth and welfare. However the assumptions built into this model are extensive, and when examined untenable. There is a triple claim to knowledge (of claimed development sequences), to expertise (in regard to ordering the process), and ethic (in regard to the obligation of First World to Third, and the nature of the overall goal of liberal-democracy). The model slowly collapsed because the experts did not have the knowledge, or the expertise, and their Western ethic was only dubiously relevant.

As the model collapsed First World development work divided into three broad channels: state aid programmes continued for various reasons (which may or may not have included 'development'); practitioner groups looked to small-scale 'empowerment', a much more plausible engagement; and reluctantly theorists looked to revise the whole narrowly of received expectations

40 See B. Davidson 1968 *Africa in History*. London: Weidenfeld; idem 1994 *The Search*

Here we find a shift away from exporting recipes to analysing the detail of actual political-economic, social-institutional, and cultural processes using the established repertoire of concepts carried in the central tradition of European social science. The upshot has been a return to core concerns with the interpretive and critical analysis of complex change within the context of the on-going development of the global capitalist system.⁴³

Once the analysis of the new nationstates has been contextualized in terms of their position within the global system, a plausible way of handling the development experiences of these new nations is generated. In place of evaluations of track records according to the model of the pursuit of effective nationstatehood, which often generates tales of breakdown or falling away from liberal democratic grace,⁴⁴ or in terms of the pursuit of free markets, which generates an analogous literature of market-inhibitory failure, we can look at track records as exemplifying the political projects of state-regimes. Such political projects represent the agency of state-regimes within the structural circumstances they inhabit. In practice, of course, all this is fraught with the usual problems of coalition building and conflict control internally, plus reading global structures and thereafter formulating practical programmes. The general point that countries operate within wider systems was very well illustrated by the four little tigers of Asia where internal class-groupings came to power and then seized the opportunities provided by the expanding global economic system to carve out distinctive economic spaces.⁴⁵ In sum, the material of development theory considered in the light of the remarks on international relations theory reveals that to grasp the nature of a particular state-regime it is necessary to consider the projects pursued by these agents within the context of global system structures.

There is a variety of approaches to the analysis of the projects of state-regimes, and all revolve around the political-economic, social-institutional and culture-critical analysis of the dynamics of the exchange of internal and external systems, where these structural dynamics constrain the possibilities open to agent-groups. An interesting approach looks to construct an international political-economy (IPE).⁴⁶ It is argued that orthodox international relations work is deficient because it focuses exclusively on the relations of governments. Similarly, orthodox economics and political-science are also rejected as both inhabit closed intellectual spaces and take their spheres of enquiry to be similarly closed – where economics is blind to issues of power, political-science typically ignores economics in its focus on governmental

machineries. Work from outside these usual areas is invoked and includes development economics, historical sociology and economic history. The key is an idea of the basic needs of any polity in respect of wealth, security, freedom, and justice. Any polity will evidence some mix of these four. An international political-economy approach can lodge agents (states or polities) within global structures of power and thus uncover the trans-state mechanisms which underpin given empirical configurations of wealth, security, freedom and justice. It is possible to distinguish structural and relational power where the former sets the broadest of agendas, the frames within which people and groups have to act, and the later focuses on specific episodes of agent exchanges.

On the IPE analysis structural power is found in the four spheres of security, production, financial credit, and knowledge; where the first is the familiar realm of state-state relations, the following pair note the crucial role of economic power. Finally, the importance of the subtler sphere of culture is acknowledged. The first noted, the security structure, comprises the networks of relationships between states which revolve around, and order, the use of force. These structures are extensive, and cover diplomatic, military, and security linkages. In regard to the second pair, the production structure, the sphere of the military overlaps in the history of the development of the modern First World-dominated global system with the rise of industrial production and global trade. Relatedly, the financial structure comprises an integrated global network, with major centres in Europe, the USA and Japan. This network is the source of credit, and the ability to generate credit confers significant power. Finally the knowledge structure is one of the underpinnings of the entire system, the production not merely of scientific and technical knowledge but also social technologies of management involved in the business of putting knowledge to work.

These networks of power constitute the underlying structure of the global system. Whilst resources of power, production, finance and knowledge are unevenly distributed they provide the start-point for the activities of any extant state-regime. Overall, the idea is that of a world system comprised of a variety of power structures within which states (and other actors) are agents: lines of power are relatively fixed and the polity itself given shape. We have a strategy of analysing the axes of structural power which necessarily constrain/enable the actions of state-regimes (as agents). In place of state-state relations we have a picture of many states-within-the-global-system enmeshed in a network of power relations. Most broadly, the IPE approach offers the model of a world system comprising a variety of power structures within which agent-groups, primarily states, move, and where the specific exchanges of agent-groups and global structures generate the familiar pattern of extant polities.

One particular problem with the IPE approach is that it reduces the business of the internal make-up of any state-regime to a reflection of trans-

43 See P. W. Preston 1994 *Discourses of Development: State, Market and Polity in the Analysis of Complex Change*, Aldershot, Avebury.

44 B. N. Pandey 1980 *South and Southeast Asia 1945-1979*, London, Macmillan; see also R. H. Jackson 1990 *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*, Cambridge University Press.

45 C. Hamilton 1983 'Capitalist Industrialisation in East Asia's Four Little Tigers', *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 13; see also W. Bello and S. Rosenfeld 1990 *Dragons in Distress: Asia's Miracle Economies in Crisis*. See *Essays in IPE*.

to the internal dynamics of state-regimes within the shifting patterns of power of the global system. The literature flows from the work of Aglietta⁴⁷ and centres on the identification of patterns of accumulation and regulation within state-regimes and across wider sweeps of the global capitalist economy. This school gives us the recently familiar analysis of the post-oil shock shift from fordist to post-fordist political-economic modes of accumulation and regulation.⁴⁸

The Claims to a Logic of Ever Greater Global Interdependence

A further series of arguments have been advanced by theorists working with global development. In these new structural analyses of interdependence there has been an increasingly vigorous concern to detail the ways in which various groups live within the global system (characterizing diverse patterns-of-life), to identify common problems (e.g., environment), and to reinforce global-level rule-setting in place of simple power relations (affirming a common humanity).

The concern for global cultural diversity can be taken to be a counterpart to an increasing appreciation of interdependence. As the global system becomes more integrated there is a corresponding concern to affirm the value of local cultures. We can speak of a kind of global multiculturalism. A key vehicle of such a celebration of diversity would be the UN and its various agencies. A related concern with the interdependence of the peoples of the global system is evidenced in the concerns of the environmentalist movement. It is proposed that there are a series of 'global commons' which are the common concern of humankind and should be dealt with accordingly. In this context the problems of population control, resource depletion, and pollution are cited. Again the UN is a key institutional vehicle for the dissemination of information. On the basis of an appreciation of interdependence there is a related concern to advance a global-level process of rule-setting which can supplement the inherited patterns of nationstate relations. A preference for multi-lateral rather than bi-lateral treaty making. And a preference for multi-lateral agency initiatives in place of bi-lateral work. Again, a key agency is the UN.

In the work of the theorists of global development there is a strong concern to attend to the detail of the lives of ordinary people. In practical terms this is evidenced in a preference for local small-scale development work organized via NGOs. The intellectual counterpart involves asserting the value of agent-centred analyses in contrast to the more familiar structural style of development theory, and it is to these matters that we can now turn.

Chapter Summary

In the 1980s a new concern for analysing the global industrial capitalist system has been expressed. A newly intensified interdependence has been identified. There are a number of ways in which this emerging global system has been theorized. The market-oriented postmodernist theorists have presented ideas of the transformation of capitalism such that the system was now global in reach, knowledge-based and geared to consumption in the marketplace. The dependency and marxist theorists have spoken of the global reconstruction of the capitalist system as patterns and styles of production change with the rise of East Asia, the collapse of the Second World bloc and the further partial dependent integration of areas of the Third World. The theorists who identify mutual interdependence and who are concerned with global development have shown an increasingly vigorous concern to detail the ways in which various groups live within the global system, and to identify common problems in order to reinforce global-level rule-setting in place of simple power relations.

to the internal dynamics of state-regimes within the shifting patterns of power of the global system. The literature flows from the work of Aglietta⁴⁷ and centres on the identification of patterns of accumulation and regulation within state-regimes and across wider sweeps of the global capitalist economy. This school gives us the recently familiar analysis of the post-oil shock shift from fordist to post-fordist political-economic modes of accumulation and regulation.⁴⁸

The Claims to a Logic of Ever Greater Global Interdependence

A further series of arguments have been advanced by theorists working with global development. In these new structural analyses of interdependence there has been an increasingly vigorous concern to detail the ways in which various groups live within the global system (characterizing diverse patterns-of-life), to identify common problems (e.g., environment), and to reinforce global-level rule-setting in place of simple power relations (affirming a common humanity).

The concern for global cultural diversity can be taken to be a counterpart to an increasing appreciation of interdependence. As the global system becomes more integrated there is a corresponding concern to affirm the value of local cultures. We can speak of a kind of global multiculturalism. A key vehicle of such a celebration of diversity would be the UN and its various agencies. A related concern with the interdependence of the peoples of the global system is evidenced in the concerns of the environmentalist movement. It is proposed that there are a series of 'global commons' which are the common concern of humankind and should be dealt with accordingly. In this context the problems of population control, resource depletion, and pollution are cited. Again the UN is a key institutional vehicle for the dissemination of information. On the basis of an appreciation of interdependence there is a related concern to advance a global-level process of rule-setting which can supplement the inherited patterns of nationstate relations. A preference for multi-lateral rather than bi-lateral treaty making. And a preference for multi-lateral agency initiatives in place of bi-lateral work. Again, a key agency is the UN.

In the work of the theorists of global development there is a strong concern to attend to the detail of the lives of ordinary people. In practical terms this is evidenced in a preference for local small-scale development work organized via NGOs. The intellectual counterpart involves asserting the value of agent-centred analyses in contrast to the more familiar structural style of development theory, and it is to these matters that we can now turn.

Chapter Summary

In the 1980s a new concern for analysing the global industrial capitalist system has been expressed. A newly intensified interdependence has been identified. There are a number of ways in which this emerging global system has been theorized. The market-oriented postmodernist theorists have presented ideas of the transformation of capitalism such that the system was now global in reach, knowledge-based and geared to consumption in the marketplace. The dependency and marxist theorists have spoken of the global reconstruction of the capitalist system as patterns and styles of production change with the rise of East Asia, the collapse of the Second World bloc and the further partial dependent integration of areas of the Third World. The theorists who identify mutual interdependence and who are concerned with global development have shown an increasingly vigorous concern to detail the ways in which various groups live within the global system, and to identify common problems in order to reinforce global-level rule-setting in place of simple power relations.


16

Agent-centred Analyses of the Diversity of Forms-of-life

Overview of Agent-centred Analysis

In the post-Second World War period development theorizing has tended to focus on structural change with a view to informing intervention. In recent years critics have suggested that this approach misses the detail of forms-of-life. The matter of agent-centred analysis of development problems may be approached both formally and substantively. In the first place it is possible to review a series of sophisticated critiques of structural styles of argument within development theorizing. In the second place it is possible to review the practical efforts of various social movements which have centred on the efforts of particular social groups. The key social movements which have had a major impact on development theorizing comprise three broad groups/concerns: (a) environmentalism; (b) the situation of women; and (c) the area of work by Non-Governmental Organizations or NGOs (see figure 18).

Figure 18 Agent-centred analysis



Agent-centred Analysis

The critics of structural analyses within development theory have made three broad points: (a) that development theory must pay attention to the micro-scale detail of the social processes of the construction of patterns of life; (b) that development theory must deconstruct notions of intervention and shift away from untenable rational models of plan-making followed by plan-execution, and grant that intervention itself is a drawn-out and complex social process involving many agents; and (c) that the further theoretical elucidation of these matters requires the supersession of the distinction between structure and agency. In this way both social scientific enquiry and development interventions are recast and the expectation is of dialogic exchanges in pursuit of piecemeal change.

Global structures and agent responses

In the area of debate about development the post-Second World War period has seen a variety of responses to the dominant discourse of technical planning which has relied heavily on structural argument. A general criticism has been made that structural explanations miss the detail of ordinary people's lives and that in doing so they vitiate their own analyses and inhibit the practice they would foster. In simple terms, it is suggested that as development plans are always translated into practice at the local level then a knowledge of local-level cultural patterns is seen as a logical precondition of the success of planning. In a related fashion the specific argument is also made that if social movements based on grassroots activism have been influential in the areas of food, health, environment and women then development theory should acknowledge this by attending to the business of agency.

The business of expert intervention

The first presentation of development theory in the period of rapid decolonization saw the imputation to replacement elites of the goal of attaining effective nationstatehood. Such a goal was to be achieved most centrally by expert intervention. This celebration of the role of the expert has figured not only within development theory but also within the wider traditions of Western social science.¹ It would now be argued that such a view of the role of social scientific work, and the implied claims in respect of general nature and distribution of knowledge of the social world, stands in need of correction. It is also clear in the wake of the failure of the 1980s enthusiasms for market solutions to human social problems, announced recently in Moscow in terms of the end of 'market romanticism',² that the multifarious ways in which the social world is ordered, the traditional

1 See Z. Bauman 1987 *Legislators and Interpreters*, Oxford, Polity.

2 The UK press reported that this was a phrase from Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin in the wake of the January 1994 government changes in Russia following the election of a new parliament.

concern of the core traditions of social science, cannot be set aside in expectation of spontaneous social order. In this way the core concern of social science, like development theory, can be seen to be with the interpretive critical elucidation of the dynamics of complex change within the global system.³

It has been argued that knowledge of how the social world works is widely distributed within society and that all social actors should be regarded as knowledgeable.⁴ In this way we could speak broadly of a plurality of familiar ways of knowing: the personal knowledge of the local domestic sphere; the common sense of the community within which people live; the folk knowledge of the culture within which people move; and the official knowledges of great traditions, which typically have been religious but now are more familiarly secular ideologies of one sort or another. Within the frameworks of these subtle cultural patterns of understanding that agents pursue their particular projects. In the light of these claims, the business of knowing is not passive; rather, it is an active achievement of social beings who are extensively knowledgeable about their societies.

In disciplinary reflection on the nature of social theorizing in recent times there has been a widespread concern with the active business of the construction of ways of understanding the world. Against the familiar empiricist stress on the accurate description of an independently existing world which makes enquiry essentially a passive accommodation to the nature given, theorists in traditions of enquiry such as hermeneutics, critical theory, structuralism, and the lately fashionable postmodernist work, have argued, one way or the other, not only that the world we inhabit and for granted is a product of our own cultures, or politics, or discourses of forms-of-life (or life-styles), but also that social theorizing must be realising an active engagement.

The critical commentaries on orthodox interventionism claim that their strategies are intellectually illegitimate. The crucial objections are that their approaches typically collapse all strategies of enquiry into the one mode of authoritative description/explanation, and moreover the model is itself the best implausible.⁵ An influential treatment of the different logics of enquiry and action available within the social sciences has been presented in the form of a discussion of three types of argument.⁶ The arguments are outlined: (a) the empiricist, where causal explanation is preferred in a scheme which equates explanation with prediction and which looks to authoritative control in practice; (b) the hermeneutic, where understanding of historically occasioned cultural meanings is preferred in a scheme which looks to the elucidation of shared meanings; and (c) the critical, where

3 P. W. Preston 1994 *Discourses of Development: State, Market and Polity in the Analysis of Complex Change*, Aldershot, Avebury.

4 A. Giddens 1976 *New Rules of Sociological Method*, London, Macmillan.

5 One dazzling critique is offered by A. MacIntyre 1981 *After Virtue*, London, Duckworth.

6 B. Fay 1975 *Social Theory and Political Practice*, London, Allen and Unwin.

he basis

e neces-
orld. In
d polit-
chnical
elation-

ooks to
adopt-
r work
gement
, more
which
tent of
of that
world

renors
rategy
gically
kind,
laims
iences
voca-
against
a fact
such
and
e key
y but
cally
such
ithin

f the
ving
shift
llec-
lern
iety
han
the
ent-

day form of this modern world is something of a travesty of the original modernist project in that the pursuit of market-offered consumer life-style has displaced the concern for the pursuit of a rational society of autonomous beings; (e) that the completion of the modernist project requires the reaffirmation of the open dialogic ideal of the early modern period; (f) that the route to such a reaffirmation lies via the critical dissolution of received idea-sets and thereafter political-economic structures; and (g) in brief a political project of democratization is implied by the intellectual supersession of narrow technical-rationality.

Development theory interventions

The set of ideas affirmed by those who operate within the frame of the planners can be uncovered by analysing 'national development planning as a major institution';⁸ that is, as a structured social practice now widely distributed throughout the world.⁹ The origins of modern forms of planning are located in the inter-war period with the diverse experiences of the Tennessee Valley Authority in the USA, the experience of some US universities with rural development work, the activities of the newly constituted USSR, the theories of J. M. Keynes, and the practical experience of some colonial development planning. In the post-Second World War period a major involvement is made in Third World planning schemes with ideas of modernization and nationbuilding. The late 1970s and 1980s saw something of a crisis of doubt in regard to the package but the complex social-cultural package remains important.

It is clear that planning is usually carried out by the state. In much of the Third World the models offered by foreign expatriate experts have been influential. It is also clearly the case that planning schemes embody ideologies. A national plan has routinely been a part of an attempt to build new nationstates. The discourse of planning reflects this dual function and typically involves partly technical and partly exhortative language.

It is clear that development discourse routinely presents itself as the technical neutral pursuit of the self-evidently desirable. The style of talk is unreflexive and hides a multiplicity of quite specific intellectual, professional and political commitments.¹⁰ The intellectual claims, related institutional structures and organizational practices come together as the vehicle for the imposition of the definitions of one group upon another. The discursive style of development discourse is a 'solution-side utterance, a form of teleological willing. Its statement of the problems is very much determined by the expected nature of their solutions... Development policy

8 F. Robertson 1980 *An Anthropology of Planned Development*, Cambridge University Press.

9 See also M. Hobart ed. 1993 *An Anthropological Critique of Development*, London, Routledge.

10 R. Apthorpe and A. Krahl eds. 1986 *Development Studies: Critique and Renewal*, Aldershot, Avebury.

practices are about people giving or doing things to others, to other people, countries, cultures'.¹¹

These authoritative planners are predisposed to see the resistance of targeted groups as unreasonable and when planning theory is translated into practice there is likely to be a clash of expectations. This is a point made forcefully by actor-oriented theorists¹² who argue that the ideas, interests and self-understandings of the bureaucracies can come into conflict with the ideas and interests of the target populations.¹³ In development planning the agencies are various with community councils, communes, cooperatives and the local officials of various state agencies. The scope for confusion and misunderstanding is wide and whilst the technocratic vision of the planners is likely to characterize local communities as unreasonably resisting the rational plan schemes, local communities are complex and the individuals that compose them may have a wide spread of specific interests.

It is clear that planning for the future has come to be seen as the preserve of the expert planners. In this way planning has 'coopted social science'.¹⁴ However, social science must recover its sceptical, critical and moral core. In this way the de-mystificatory role of anthropology, and by implication the other core social sciences, can be reasserted. In this light the efforts of the state planners can be seen clearly as specific political projects and judged accordingly.

In summary we can make the following points: (a) that planning interventions are not technical neutral exercises: they are political projects, and plans emerge from a highly complex bureaucratic context (including cultural, professional and political matters) and their deployment is again a political process of some complexity; (b) it is clear that in the post-Second World War period in the First World planning interventions have typically carried varieties of Keynesian growth and welfare ideas; (c) in the arena of development theory work intervention has been similarly shaped by both Keynesianism and the political agendas of the ruling groups of the First World; and (d) development theory has been constructed around the role of the expert planner and the role is regarded as the social scientific analogue of the natural scientist. In sum, finally, it is clear that the post-Second World War career of development theory can be read as a series of exercises in the construction and deployment of delimited-formal ideologies: arguments on behalf of those in authority and those with power.

The political discourse of planners

The modernist project in Europe cannot be taken to be a natural process but was rather the outcome of definite political projects which required the

11 R. Apthorpe 1986 'Development Policy Discourse', *Public Administration and Development*, 6 p. 386.

12 N. Long et al. eds. 1992 *Battlefields of Knowledge*, London, Routledge.

13 See J. C. Scott 1985 *Weapons of the Weak*, New Haven, Yale University Press.

radical remaking of extant forms of life. We can point to the rise of urban planning (to replace/control slums and their inhabitants), social planning (to discipline the population in line with the requirements of the new political-economic projects), and the cultural invention of the market (which affirmed the centrality in social relations of what Marx dubbed the 'commodity nexus'). In recent years rational Western planning has been the vehicle of an ideology which serves to assist the submission of Third World people to the demands of the metropolitan centres.¹⁵ The apparatus of planning has been central to the business of development since the inception of development endeavour in the wake of the Second World War.

Development planning in the post-Second World War period has engaged in the process of endeavouring to remake the forms-of-life of the peoples of the Third World and commentators have spoken of the project of 'dismantling and reassembling societies'.¹⁶ This metropolitan political project constructs a particular version of the territory with which it is dealing. The underdeveloped are characterized in terms derived from the experience of the metropole and presented as being deficient in many respects and in need of planned development. It is clear that this neglects the real history of these areas, acts to block direct consideration of their present circumstances and rules out *a priori* the idea that indigenous cultures have value and preclude the future by affirming the goal of modernity after the style of the metropole.

Yet it is equally clear that the denizens of the countries of the Third World who are subject to 'development' find many ways of continuing their creative responses. Scott has addressed the matter of practical replies to the demands of global structures.¹⁷ In his work on the moral economy of the peasantry and on everyday forms of resistance, he has shown how the moral resources of the relatively powerless can be invoked and find expression in a range of activities, all of which express the interests of the oppressed over against the concerns and demands of the strong. The general strategies as one might expect with strategies of evasion, avoidance, ignorance, resistance and rebellion. What Scott's work points to quite clearly is the multiplicity of ways in which local cultures can respond to the demands of the encroaching world industrial capitalist system. In Scott's work the peoples and communities of the Third World are not the passive victims of an overpowering force; rather they are active in seeking to read and react to the material forces which increasingly enfold their patterns of life.

The actor-oriented approach

A major concern of actor-orientation has been with the way in which communities are concerned in the matter of rural development construe and order their

15 A. Escobar 1992 'Planning' in W. Sachs ed. *The Development Dictionary*, London, Zed.

16 Ibid.

17 J. C. Scott 1976 *The Moral Economy of the Peasant*, New Haven, Yale University Press.

interactions. The central claim made is that those involved must be seen as agents, as having their own understandings of their situations, their own expectations of change, and their own strategies for securing such objectives. The actor-oriented approach presented by Long¹⁸ derives from an interactionist social anthropology whose injunctions have been buttressed both by the failures of structuralist/interventionist approaches and by the recent use of postmodernist thought. The central concern of such an approach to development studies will be with the exchange between structures and agents: in particular the ways in which agents make up their social worlds in routine processes of social life. Clearly, much of the theoretical inspiration for these reflections derives from ideas of structuration and the work has a similarly ambiguous relationship to the tradition of political-economy. Yet it is granted that such traditions can help theorists to grasp the dynamics of the wider systems within which particular agent-group interactions are played out.¹⁹

Overall, against the structural and interventionist orthodoxies of development theory three points are argued: (a) that development studies must pay attention to the micro-scale detail of the social processes of the construction of patterns of life; (b) that development studies must deconstruct the notion of intervention and shift away from untenable rational models of plan-making followed by plan-execution, and grant that intervention itself a drawn-out and complex social process involving many agents; and (c) that the further theoretical elucidation of these matters requires the re-assertion of the distinction between structure and agency via the detailed elucidation of these concepts, in particular the notion of agency.²⁰

The work of the actor-oriented theorists is concerned to spell out the detail and implications of an approach which centres on the anthropological experience of ethnographic fieldwork. Such fieldwork exercises are taken to be theory-drenched interventions in the ordinary patterns of life of those with whom anthropologists deal. The preparation of a formal academic/collegial statement in respect of fieldwork exercises represents a subsequent theoretically informed intervention in the discourses of traditions of anthropology. The type of work expounded has clear characteristics. It is interpretive; that is, it is concerned to spell out the detail of the processes whereby ordinary patterns of life are made and remade. It is dialogic; that is, the conduct of fieldwork exercises and their subsequent formal presentation takes place via conversations (with informants and colleagues). The fieldwork exercise is a social process itself and the formal report, the contribution to scholarship, is similarly a specific social process and the final product is thus a complex cultural construct. In orientation the approach may be said to be hermeneutic-critical: it is elucidatory in intention, aiming in a reflexive fashion to spell out the ways in which the agents involved make

N. Long et al. eds. 1992 op. cit.
Ibid. pp. 37-8.

sense of their respective worlds and the various exchanges between these worlds. The hermeneutic-critical elucidation of the detail of the social processes of the construction of the detail of ordinary life is applied in a quite particular context: that of development studies. The patterns of life typically dealt with are those of, to put it very simply, peasant farmers; the various development agencies with whom they deal; and the social anthropologist or development theorist who offers particular reports on these matters to an equally specific audience. The world of rural farming and development is seen by these development theorists to comprise a complex series of exchanges between those who are labelled farmers, peasants, petty-traders, agricultural-extension workers, aid groups, and state-planners. The development theorist is seen by those propounding the actor-oriented approach to be one more agent in the complex exchanges underway.

In the light of such a view of the dynamics of the social world the familiar development theoretic concern with planned intervention comes to look very odd indeed. Out of the wealth of social interactions which constitute the social world the development orthodoxy is overwhelmingly concerned with one pattern of interaction, that of intervention, and this it construes in what upon examination turns out to be a deeply implausible fashion, seeing the business of intervention as one involving active and rational intervenors and passive, and maybe recalcitrant, recipients.

Against this orthodox view the proponents of the actor-oriented approach advocate that this particular social exchange be studied directly, rather than in terms of the familiar ideology of the rational intervenors. In this case it quickly becomes apparent that the exchanges between intervenors and recipient groups are very complex indeed. As Long puts it:

Intervention is an ongoing transformational process that is constantly reshaped by its own internal organisational and political dynamic and by the specific conditions it encounters or itself creates, including the responses and strategies of local and regional groups who may struggle to define and defend their own social spaces, cultural boundaries and positions within the wider power field.²¹

Overall, one might say that the strength of the work of the actor-oriented approach derives from the detail of fieldwork exercises and the rigour with which these materials are subject to reflexive criticism. In the case of Long the expectation seems to be of a better development studies. However, the actor-oriented approach might prove to be rather more radical because any reflexive criticism entails clarity in respect of the expectations of the development theorists. Elucidations of these particular matters points to the supersession of development studies in a reaffirmation of the central preoccupations of classical social scientific traditions with the business of analysing complex change in pursuit of the modernist project.

The Contribution of Social Movements

The prime concern of the classical tradition of social theorizing has been with the elucidation of the dynamics of complex change in the process of the shift to the modern world. The most familiar expression of this concern has been within the sphere of political life and has taken the form of the construction and criticism of delimited-formal ideologies. The work of policy analysts which has been oriented to the bureaucratic ordering of change has run alongside the central ideological sphere of debate and the work of scholarship has contributed an overarching critical perspective deployed in pursuit of rational discourse within the public sphere. It is clear that within the classical tradition of social scientific enquiry there is a long-established and profound linkage between political, policy and scholarly concerns. The linkages between these concerns can vary as one element (or elements) is stressed. In the core tradition of social theorizing the focus has been on the political sphere and theorists have addressed their remarks to particular social groups or classes. However, in the post-Second World War period two apparently interrelated changes have been noted: (a) the apparent decline in socio-political salience of class groups; and (b) the rise in political prominence of social movements whose members are drawn from many class (or socio-economic) backgrounds and whose political projects focus on non-class single issues.

The emergence of social movements

One way in which the linkages between politics, policy and scholarship find direct expression is through the introduction by social movements of new issues of general intellectual concern.²² In the post-Second World War period, as class groupings have declined in salience, the social movements concerned with the environment and the situation of women have achieved a widespread practical influence. On the basis of this influence the general intellectual questions they have presented have become the subject of extensive debate.

The character of the new social movements is different from that of earlier social groups. In the work of the classical theorists of the nineteenth century active groups often appeared as class or socio-economic based collectivities self-consciously pursuing their own interests (which may or may not have had wider relevance within the society as a whole). In the case of the new social movements of the post-war period the character of these groups is quite different and the goals to which they commit themselves are also subtly different. In terms of their membership the new social movements draw recruits from across the socio-economic spectrum of modern society. In terms of their objectives these typically transcend any narrow

22 On social movements, see S. Yearley 1994 'Social Movements and Environmental Change' in M. Redclift and T. Benton eds. *Social Theory and the Global Environment*, London, Routledge.

material concerns in favour of practical issues which are of relevance to the lives of large numbers of people. The two major examples in the post-war period are the environmental movement and the women's movement. In both cases these social movements can be studied in terms of their practical concerns as vehicles of political influence. They can also be considered in terms of the contributions which their practical concerns have made to the abstract intellectual agendas of the world of social science.

The concern for the environment

The debate about development was pursued through the 1960s and with little practical success. The first United Nations Development Decade of the 1960s was optimistic. The second Development Decade of the 1970s recorded rising poverty and inequality. In the third Development Decade of the 1980s there was simultaneously a sharp turn towards market solutions to development problems which, in general, did not work, a better appreciation of the complexity of the pursuit of development. In the third development decade the problems of global interdependency were affirmed and at the local level the complexity of the pursuit of development was acknowledged. It was from this acknowledgement that an idea of sustainable development began to emerge, for it became clear that it was not possible to use pursuing improvements in one sphere if related spheres were neglected.

The debate about environment dates from the 1960s when a series of First World commentators called attention to the environmental costs of industrial forms-of-life. A series of arguments were presented which ranged from the relatively narrowly focused and natural scientific concerns with pollution through to the wider anxieties of social critics in respect of the rationalization and dehumanization of the world. At this time the environmentalist movement tended to be an informally organized middle-class concern within the First World. However, the character of the movement has subsequently broadened and the campaigns have become very well organized. A series of major environmental campaigns have become both widely known in the public realm and influential in the spheres of policy-making. In the 1960s and 1970s a series of environmental texts were produced and gained widespread publicity.²³ They contributed to the groundswell of public concern with environmental issues, which was acknowledged by state governments and international organizations.

In the early period of the presentation of environmentalist arguments an opposition between environment and development was supposed. Indeed much of the early environmentalist work was neo-Malthusian in

23 D. H. Meadows et al. 1972 *The Limits to Growth*, New York, Basic Books; P. Ehrlich 1968 *The Population Bomb*, London, Pan; P. and A. Ehrlich 1970 *Population Resources and Environment*, San Francisco, Freeman. On the early figures see A. Clark 1972 *Philosophers of the Earth*, London, Sidgwick and Jackson. See also D. H. M.

preoccupied with population growth in the Third World. On the other hand the elites of the new nations of the Third World were not well disposed to the environmental movement as economic growth was a high priority. A series of attempts was made to resolve the tensions and draw the two areas of concern into a more positive relationship and in the 1970s the concerns of development and environment began to move together. The two issues began to be brought together under the auspices of the United Nations at the 1972 Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm. A linkage between the two areas of concern was forged when it was made clear that environmental problems and poverty were intermingled as the poor suffered the worst conditions and in their search for livelihoods placed great stress on the environment. It was also made clear that environmental and development problems were global in their nature and could only be addressed within the context of the overall global system. The recognition of the linkage of environmental and developmental problems opened up a rich vein of social scientific research and practical activity.

As the link between a concern for the environment and a concern for development began to be made, the linkages of environmental damage to Third World poverty were explored. The marginal position of the Third World poor entailed that they suffered most directly from the degradation of the natural environment. In rural areas the poor would be forced into using the least productive marginal lands and in urban areas there was a similar pressure which generated communities living in informal housing areas and engaged in a myriad of informal economic activities. At the same time the drive for development within the Third World placed pressure upon the natural environment in terms of severe demands upon the natural resource base, both in terms of particular schedules of resource-exploitation and despoliation through pollution. There was a particularly strong concern for Third World population growth as the problems of development and environment were often taken to be exacerbated by the rapid increase in numbers. In particular there were acute problems occasioned by rural-urban migration in the Third World.

The global aspect of the problems of development and environment was also made clear. It was argued that the demands for resources of the industries of the First World placed heavy demands on the environment in both First and Third Worlds. It was argued that the countries of the Third World could not aspire to the levels of material consumption of the First World as there were insufficient global resources to sustain such levels of living. Indeed, it was suggested that the patterns of life of the countries of the First World should be characterized as over-developed. In a similar fashion the problem of pollution was noted as it spilled over national boundaries within the First World and was an identifiable problem in the Third World.

A key breakthrough in linking environment and development was made in 1987 when the Brundtland Commission reported to the UN and argued the case for a strategy of sustainable development. The notion of sustainable development was presented formally as development to meet the needs of

today's people without compromising the needs of future generations to meet their needs.²⁴ The idea of sustainable development has been widely discussed. Indeed the idea has been criticized by some: (a) radical ecologists deny that economic growth and environment are compatible and call for steady state economies; (b) market theorists argue that environmental concerns should be priced and then subject to market ordering; and (c) some marxists have argued that the concern for environment is futile as capitalism is intrinsically exploitative. However the UN mainstream now regards sustainable development as a proper way to reconcile the competing claims of the environmentalist movement and the concerns for growth within the Third World. The mainstream position was affirmed at the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro which was known as the Earth Summit.

It is one thing, however, to identify a desirable goal but another to translate theory into effective practice. The problems in securing sustainable development include: (a) the issue of access for people to resources as present patterns of development often push people to the margins where they have little choice but to degrade the environment in order to survive whilst at the same time the rich in First and Third World enjoy a privileged access to patterns of consumption which have high resource requirements; (b) the problem of the retreat of poverty to the margins as the poor try to utilize ecologically fragile land and perforce adopt environmentally damaging economic practices; and (c) the costs of present patterns of development to people and the environment as evidenced in patterns of ill health, poverty, pollution and environmental degradation. All these problems take on slightly different dimensions in rural and urban areas.

In rural areas sustainable development will involve a series of problems as people try to secure adequate stocks of food and money so as to meet basic needs. A key source of problems will be change in agricultural practices. The shift towards the model of the modern favours market-oriented production over subsistence. This generates new demands on the environment as mechanization and chemical use are increased. At the same time the new patterns of production are likely to generate social dislocation as some farmers become prosperous and others are forced into marginal economic activities or pressured towards migration to the towns. It has become clear that rural development planning is a complex problem that involves much more than introducing new technologies.

In the urban areas sustainable development will confront problems of rapid urban growth as the global population becomes increasingly an urban one. In urban areas the poor face a series of problems: (a) low incomes, underemployment and unemployment; (b) the unregulated nature of much of the informal sector with consequent insecurities; (c) homelessness, low-quality housing and squatter camps; (d) exposure to hazardous conditions

24 See W. Sachs 1992 'Development' in W. Sachs ed. *The Development Dictionary*, Lon-

and practices in employment and residential areas; (e) poor infrastructure; and (f) poor health. The drive to secure urban sustainable development requires action across a daunting range of problems and these will require to be acknowledged by international agencies and national governments. A key resource, as with rural sustainable development, will be the skills and energy of the local people.

It is clear that action for sustainable development would be required at a series of levels: (a) international (aid, trade, debt); (b) national (the regulation of patterns of development and economy; and (c) local (NGOs). First, at the international level the global industrial capitalist system is oriented to economic growth and free trade. These goals are evidenced in the behaviour of First World national governments and enshrined in the international machineries which order the global system. A broad area of reform has been identified in the activities of the relevant national governments, in particular with the use of their aid budgets to support home industrial exports, and in the goals and procedures of the institutions of the global system. Here the activities of the IMF, World Bank and World Trade Organization are subject to inspection and criticism. The concerns of sustainable development have to be asserted against their concern to maximize output and trade, but this is not easy.²⁵ Secondly, in respect of sustainable development national action can be inaugurated by national governments. In the First World regulation of industry and encouragement of recycling have begun. The same ideas will have to be promulgated in the Third World where, in addition, it may well be the case that sustainable patterns of development are more advantageous to the development goals of the governments. Then, thirdly, the role of the broad spread of NGOs will be crucial for education and action at the grassroots level. It is here that problems of poverty and environmental degradation are most acute but it is here also that new patterns of sustainable development might best be encouraged.

The arguments in respect of sustainable development have been widely influential. However there has been a spread of intellectual debates provoked by the social movements concerned with the environment. The exchange offers lessons for both participants. On the one hand, for the environmental movements and government agencies dealing with these issues the lessons of the social sciences relate to the complex ways in which concerns for the environment thread through the routine practices of social groups. It is clear that environmental problems cannot be understood to be amenable to a simple technological or bureaucratic solution. On the other hand the rise of environmentalism offers a series of challenges to received social scientific thinking: the relationship of culture and nature; the relationship of global system and national unit; the issues of time and space where environmental problems are present over wide areas and can persist over long time periods

both of which are awkward to any ahistorical formalistic social science; and the matter of disciplinary boundaries which environmental problems typically transcend.²⁶ The debates have produced a series of intellectual novelties.²⁷ One argument of researchers in the influential area of sustainable development is that much of the burden of poverty falls on women and it is also noted that women are often key players in the community organization which are the heart of NGO activity.²⁸ The situation of women is often seen as crucial in attempts to deal with the problems of the environment.²⁹

The concerns of women

The women's movement in the First World attained its present influence in the post-Second World War period when a combination of factors including unprecedented economic prosperity, social liberalization, the provision of cheap and effective contraception and the presentation of arguments to the effect that the evident widespread systemic discrimination against women was unacceptable, generated a spread of economic, social and legal reform which had the effect of placing the emancipation of women at the centre of public political agendas. The agendas of reform first advanced by the women's movement in the 1960s have been pursued with mixed practical success in the First World. However, the general intellectual questions which were raised in respect of gender divisions within society have become a significant new area of concern within the social sciences.³⁰ In turn, these concerns have been pursued within the countries of the Third World where the particular issue of the relationship of development to the patterns of life of women has been centrally important.³¹

The relationship of knowledge and ignorance in development work has been a subject of concern for critical scholars who have pointed out that claims to knowledge can be made in an unconsidered fashion which has the effect of generating significant areas of ignorance.³² The critics suggest that in the absence of a sceptical and reflexive epistemology the knowledge claims of development theorists are likely to have lodged within them a spread of unconsidered biases. These biases mis-direct enquiry and as a consequence

26 See the introduction to Redclift and Benton eds. op. cit.

27 See Redclift and Benton eds. op. cit.; K. Milton ed. 1993 *Environmentalism: The View from Anthropology*, London, Routledge; R. Eckersley 1992 *Environmentalism and Political Theory: Towards an Ecocentric Approach*, London, UCL.

28 See J. A. Elliot 1994 *An Introduction to Sustainable Development*, London, Routledge

29 See C. Jackson 1994 'Gender Analysis and Environments' in Redclift and Benton eds op. cit.

30 An overview of the contemporary social theoretical aspects is offered by S. Hekmar 1990 *Gender and Knowledge: Elements of a Postmodern Feminism*, Cambridge, Polity. See also B. L. Marshall 1994 *Engendering Modernity: Feminism, Social Theory and Social Change*, Cambridge, Polity.

31 A related route of influence was via the international agencies of development such as

25 A global-level analysis is presented in L. Sklair 1994 'Global Sociology and Global Environmental Change' in Redclift and Benton eds. op. cit.

contribute to the production of ignorance as partial statements in respect of given problem complexes are generated. A familiar complaint within development circles points to the unconsidered use by First World theorists of schedules of concepts and judgements which are appropriate to the metropolitan industrial capitalist countries in the quite different contexts of the countries of the Third World. The effect is to read-out of the analysis the particular experiences of the countries of the Third World. It has become clear that the pattern of life of women has been subject to a similar process of systematic exclusion, of reading-out.³³

In its early formulations development theory paid no special attention to women. It was supposed that the pursuit of economic growth would automatically attend to the needs of all the population. The implications of the neglect of these issues within development theorizing was that the diversity of the processes involved was simply overlooked. In the economic sphere the patterns of employment and other economic activity between the sexes are very diverse yet the assumptions of the orthodoxy revolved around the cash economy and the contribution of women to the processes of economic and social reproduction was simply ignored.³⁴

As research work turned more directly to the patterns of life of people in the countries of the Third World an initial focus of research was the household unit. However, development theorists treated the household as a unitary element of social analysis. It was assumed that the household would operate as a unit and that money and resources would be shared within the household and that any increase in the resources available to a household would have a broad effect upon the members of the household in general. It is now appreciated that the real situation is much more complex and that within the household there are patterns of power which are legitimated by tradition and which can be radically altered by changes in the resources available to household members. It is necessary for development theorists to be familiar with the household dynamics of the areas in which they are working. The provision of new employment opportunities can have direct implications for family patterns as members of the family are drawn into paid work away from the household base.

In a similar way the 1970s ILO concern for patterns of employment initially focused upon the paid employment sector. However, it quickly became clear that the patterns of life of people in the Third World involved economic activity within a broader spread of contexts. The idea of the informal sector was introduced which tried to grasp the activities of all those irregular employment practices. The work of many women falls into this category. However, again, the problem is one of implied exclusion.³⁵

33 See T. T. Minh-ha 1989 *Women, Native, Other: Writing Postcoloniality and Feminism*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press.

34 N. Heyzer 1986 *Working Women in Southeast Asia*, Milton Keynes, Open University Press, ch. 1.

The informal sector was regarded as distinct from the formal sector and the solution was understood in terms of integration. Yet, commentators have pointed out that the pursuits of the people within the informal sector are not separate from the formal sector but are related to it in a series of ways. What is at issue, the critics say, is not the separation of the sectors but the precise nature of the role of the informal sector, and within it of women.³⁶

In a broad perspective it is clear that the shift from traditional to modern societies will entail changes in the pattern of relations between the sexes. A similar pattern of continual reworking of relationships will follow from the shifting demands of the extant global industrial capitalist system. At the present time commentators are not clear that the post-colonial drive for economic development has had a beneficial effect on the situation of women. It can be argued that as the shift towards the modern world progresses it tends to be the men who take up the new opportunities whilst the women are left behind in a contracting traditional sphere.³⁷ In this case, once again, it is likely to be the women who suffer the most direct experience of poor conditions.³⁸

In general it can be said that women are responsible for biological reproduction (child-bearing), social reproduction (child-rearing, household organization, community networks), and are involved in economic production. In the Third World the business of child-bearing is often taken to lie entirely within the sphere of the women. It is women who are the midwives and the carers for infants. In the Third World it is often women who attend to the fabric of the community in the form of domestic duties, kin networks and local community activity. The patterns of women's economic lives in rural and urban areas are very diverse. In the rural areas the closer to the household the activity takes place the more likely it is to fall into the sphere of the women. In the urban areas women must work at a wider spread of activities in order to secure the minimum necessary for their survival and the survival of children.

The impact upon the lives of women of the processes of development can be extensive.³⁹ In the sphere of small-scale rural life the impact of agricultural change on women can include: a weakening of authority within the household as patterns of activity move away from that centre; an increasing burden of work as women support higher outputs generated by newer technologies controlled by men; limited participation within the bureaucracies created to enhance rural development; and in general a lack of alternative roles within the rural area as development erodes traditional patterns

36 Heyzer 1986 op. cit.

37 See H. Afshar 1985 *Women, Work and Ideology in the Third World*, London, Tavistock.

38 J. H. Momsen 1991 *Women and Development in the Third World*, London, Routledge uses this overall strategy of analysis whereby the situation of the Third World is read in terms redolent of the experience of the First. As an initial statement this may be useful, but

of roles. In a similar way the impact upon women of changes in plantation agriculture as men are drawn into newer industrial development can be severe: isolation on the plantations; limited social advancement as estates are run by men; and a struggle between men and women for the control of the money incomes which the women do earn. And there are further problems in the process of development where there is a movement away from rural agricultural life into the industrial and service activities of the towns. The effect of urbanization and industrialization upon women can be negative: there are poor prospects for regular employment and women occupy poorer jobs; and in these jobs they receive poorer wages; and they have poorer health; and the employment situation repeats the traditional pattern of relative female powerlessness.

It is clear that development theory must acknowledge the extensive household- or community-based role played by women. A series of development ideas relating to women has been advanced: (a) welfare focused on child-rearing; (b) anti-poverty programmes designed to draw women equally into the development process; (c) a concern for efficiency in markets such that the contribution of women is utilized; and (d) empowerment which looks to put women in control of their lives.⁴⁰ In particular there have been many formal and informal women's organizations over the years and a concern for the situation of women is now a formal element of the development plans of many countries in the Third World. However, commentators take the view that progress has been relatively slow and optimism for the future tends to revolve around the role of grassroots social movements and NGOs.⁴¹ These debates are ongoing and often the situation of women is linked with a concern for the environment. The present situation of women in the Third World is of relative disadvantage and poverty. It is because women experience multiple deprivation that a concern for improving the situation of women often coincides with a concern for sustainable development.⁴² As women carry the burden of the ills of development so they are also the active group in local community work in NGOs. It might therefore seem appropriate for development theorists to concentrate on sustainable development and the particular needs of women.⁴³

In general, recent analysis has shown that: (a) all societies have gender divisions which are expressed in the domestic sphere, the formal world of work, and the wider social sphere; (b) that to grasp the detail of these relations it is necessary to attend to exchanges within households, between households and the wider economy, and in the social world broadly; (c) that the ways in which gender is read into culture and ideology have to be addressed; and (d) that economic development impacts upon the sexes differently. It has become clear that development theory must acknowledge

40 Momsen 1991 op. cit.

41 Heyzer 1986 op. cit.

42 But see Jackson 1994

the issue of gender as these relationships suffuse the practical activities of all societies. An appreciation of the local pattern of life is clearly a necessary condition of effective development planning.⁴⁴

NGOs in the Third World

The reaction against structural explanation oriented towards the need of the authoritative planners and the newly stated preference for agent centered analyses, when combined with a continuing commitment to effective action for change, issued in a new concern for the work of the NGOs. The NGOs were taken to embody precisely the grassroots activism oriented to the empowerment of the poor which seemed to be implied by the criticism made of the orthodoxy.

In the post-war period the sphere of activity of NGOs has grown considerably. Not only are NGO groups involved across a wide range of development activities – in employment-generating activities, provisions for social welfare, political organizing and in groups concerned to protect the cultural legacies of local communities – but they are now routinely acknowledged within the framework of international and national development project work.

The work of NGO groups has typically been small scale, local and concerned to empower the ordinary people of the community. A formal theoretical justification for these activities has been found in the idea of the provision of 'basic needs' which are understood to be the minimum necessities of human social existence – housing, food, medicine, schooling, and welfare – and which, it was argued, might best be provided by development agencies working in close cooperation with the local people through NGOs.

The institutional recognition of the role of NGOs did have a political aspect. The major donor organizations did see NGOs as a way of bypassing Third World state machines which they saw as inefficient or corrupt. The place of NGOs within the overall context of institutionalized development work is consequently somewhat ambiguous so far as recipient states are concerned.

Overall, the burgeoning sphere of NGOs does constitute a distinctive arena of local-level action for change. The sphere has received support from First World governments and in particular from charity-based aid agencies. The record of NGO work is widely regarded as generally good although as with other development project work, it is as well to recall the advice of Norman Long who noted that all development project work involves a long-drawn-out exchange between those who are providers, those who are recipients and those who would lay claim, however modestly, to relevant expertise.

Chapter Summary

The matter of agent-centred analysis of development problems may be approached both formally and substantively. In the first place it is possible to review a series of sophisticated critiques of structuralist styles of argument within development theorizing. In the post-Second World War period development theorizing has tended to focus on structural change with a view to informing intervention. In recent years critics have suggested that this approach misses the detail of forms-of-life. In the second place it is possible to review the practical efforts of various social movements which have centred on the efforts of small-scale groups. The key social movements which have had a major impact on development theorizing comprise three broad groups/concerns: (a) environmentalism; (b) the situation of women; and (c) the activities of NGOs. It is clear that development theorizing will in the future pay more attention to the dynamics of structures and agents in the development process.

17

The Formal Character of a New General Approach to Development

Overview of the New General Approach

It can be argued that development theory is now in process of reconstruction as theorists and practitioners adjust to the lessons learned over time and the impact of recent changes in the global system. The reconstruction of development theory is made more awkward by the related reconstruction of social theory itself, where there has been decline in confidence in respect of simple positive analysis and a rise in interest in interpretive and critical strategies of engagement. A further series of complications revolves around the withdrawal of intellectual and ethical consent amongst theorists and practitioners for any claim to the priority of the model of the First World. The formal reconstruction of what must now be identified as a distinctively First World tradition of development theorizing entails the clear affirmation of the context-bound nature of that tradition of theorizing. The general reconstruction should identify the defensible intellectual and ethical core of the First World tradition of development theorizing, and indicate how this defensible core forms the basis for dialogic engagement with other traditions.¹ In substantive practical terms a new general approach to development will be concerned with the structural analysis of the dynamics of the global industrial-capitalist system and with the elucidation of the ways in which particular local groups read and react to the system's constraints and opportunities.

¹ A further twist to the tale, which I will not pursue here, relates to the distinctively European nature of the intellectual and ethical core of First World social theory, a matter which may become more important as the global system becomes a tripolar system.

The Decline of First World Theory

By the late 1980s it had become clear that discussions of development theory in the First World had reached an impasse. It was also possible to discern the broad outline of received discourse and to see how familiar ideas would have to be reworked. It became possible to argue that development theory which had been constituted in the post-Second World War period as a technical expert discipline was slowly returning to the mainstream of social theory with its central focus on elucidating the dynamics of complex change.² In addition, over the period 1989–91 the political and intellectual world changed radically and the impetus to rework development discourse was reinforced. In practical terms the Second World declared itself part of the Third and submitted requests for development assistance to the West. The intellectual and real world circumstances within which development theorists worked have now changed. A series of theoretical problems must be addressed and the overarching theme will be the requirement that theorists attend to the received intellectual and political positions from which their substantive work flows. In other words, contemporary arguments³ in regard to the multiplicity of cultures within the global system imply greater reflexivity in development theorizing (see figure 19).


The career of development theory

A series of approaches to Third World development has been considered in this text. It has been argued that post-Second World War development theory both inherits a long tradition of concern on the part of the First World with the Third World and has been shaped by the particular detail of the ongoing dynamic of the global industrial-capitalist system. The theories of development proposed over recent years have to be understood as quite particular interventions within the patterns of social action and argument which eventually constitute and drive the dynamic of the global social system which we inhabit. In this context the contributions of development theorists are both important, as they are the people who make the arguments, and of little real account when set against the scope of the dynamics of complex change which they would grasp. The work of development theorists is one contribution amongst many others.

In the post-Second World War period a sequence of formal theories has been presented. These theories may be analysed in terms of the particular circumstances within the dynamic of the global industrial-capitalist system which generated the concerns they addressed. In this sense social theorizing has an occasion in real world problems. The formal theory can be taken to be offering arguments on behalf of a particular client group. It is also clear that social theories do not gain any effect unless there is some institutional location which can provide the base for the promulgation of the arguments

² See P. W. Preston 1987 *Rethinking Development*, London, Routledge.

Figure 19 A new formal strategy



and the provision of relevant resources to pursue theory-informed development project work. It might be said that theories are translated into practice only if there is an institutional base from which they can be service and deployed. Thereafter, the impact of theoretically informed action within the global industrial-capitalist system will depend upon a host of local factors, but it might be said in brief that any new line of development will be determined according to the local balance of interests. In contemporary development theory a series of exchanges between real world demands and available theoretical resources can be identified. A series of formal theories has been produced and a series of institutional bases has figured in th

At the outset the United Nations-based work of growth theory provided an early post-Second World War statement which subsequently found further expression in the two disparate areas of modernization theory and institutional theory. The former was an influential delimited-formal ideology within the Cold War period and was embraced by the institutions of global industrial-capitalism whereas the latter found a base in the organizations of the United Nations. The United Nations subsequently provided a significant institutional base for the proponents of global development theories. A distinctive approach to development was produced in Latin America in the form of dependency theory. The approach had an early institutional base within the UN agency ECLA and the state machines of the countries of the region. It is fair to say that the United Nations over the post-war period has offered an institutional base to theorists offering approaches to development which tended to stress the social, political and cultural aspects of complex change.

In later years, the preferred First World approach to development within the Third World came to be expressed by the New Right. An influential institutional home for these intellectual and ideological departures was found in the Washington-based IMF and World Bank. These institutions have preferred to work in terms of market solutions to development problems for the entire post-Second World War period. In the early post-war years when the Bretton Woods system was in place these institutions might be taken to have had a positive impact on global development, but in recent years few development theorists would take that view. Over the period of the dominance of the New Right the preference for market solutions has become a damaging dogma.

If the structures of the UN and the World Bank/IMF offer institutional bases for arguments revolving around the respective roles of the state and the market, then it is to the spheres of social movements, NGOs and scholarly research organizations that we have to look to discover arguments which revolve around the role of the polity. The university world within the First and Third Worlds has over the years offered a base for many sceptical approaches to the business of development, yet the efforts of non-mainstream development agencies such as social movements, charities, and NGOs, whose institutional base might be said to lie in the political structures of local communities, have been the key vehicle of alternative thinking and practice.

In the inevitable real world confusion of debate and action it is important that scholarship has a clear idea of its own potential contribution. It is necessary to review in a general fashion the familiar spread of institutionally elicited development theories. We can identify three very broad approaches. On the basis of this synoptic review we can sketch a plausible role for scholarship. The formal reconstruction of development theory entails the affirmation of the context-bound nature of theorizing and the identification of an intellectual and ethical core. In practical terms a new approach will be concerned with the structural analysis of the dynamics of the interdependent

tripolar global industrial-capitalist system and with the elucidation of the ways in which groups read the system and order their projects.

The Pursuit of Effective Nationstatehood

The intellectual mainstream of development theory, with its key idea of modernization, derives from the historical episode of the dissolution of the mainly European system of formal colonial territories which were administered from their respective metropolitan centres. At this particular time a trio of factors came together: the logic of the industrial-capitalist system, nationalist rhetoric, and available theory.

Very broadly, any review of the historical expansion of the industrial-capitalist system reveals a system-requirement of access to various territories for resources, trade and markets. In the colonial period this access was secured via the machineries of the colonial regime. With the collapse of the colonial system a replacement political form was needed. The available idea, which was part and parcel of the nationalists' ideology of independence, and which was taken for granted within contemporary social theory, was that of the nationstate. It is clear that other political forms were available in principle and one could cite for example: UN trusteeship; continued linkages with the relevant colonial power; and various returns to the pre-colonial status quo ante. However, none of these were acceptable to the aspirant power-holders within the countries which were forming within the territories of the dissolving colonial territories. In addition, the rhetoric of nationalist developmentalism which had been used by local leaders in pursuit of independence affirmed the model of independent nationstatehood which was to be the vehicle of the achievement not merely of political freedom for the elite but also growth and welfare for the masses. And finally it is clear that in its earliest form development theory was influenced by the success of Keynesianism in taming the vagaries of the capitalist system. The period of post-Second World War planned growth and welfare coincided with the experience of decolonization and ideas fashioned in the First World to tackle specific problems were then shifted to the novel circumstances of the new nationstates of the Third World. Orthodox development theory has centred much of its argument on the policy interventionist role of the state. The whole approach demands the existence of a policy-interventionist state for it makes no sense without such an agent.

It is clear that for the new replacement elites in the Third World various demands coincide: the demands of the global capitalist system, the demands of their own people which flow from the rhetoric deployed by nationalists in their pursuit of independence, and the intellectual demands of available theory. The goal of the pursuit of effective nationstatehood is both irresistibly imputed to, and rhetorically embraced by, the new elite. On this view, ruling elites, having removed by various means the colonial rulers, will face the complex task of actually building the new nationstate. They must rapidly engender sentiments of political and cultural coherence as citizens must live

the experience of membership of a single nation, a single community. The elite must secure political and social stability because in place of colonial arrangements there must be new patterns of authority and new political mechanisms to absorb and resolve inter-group conflicts. Finally, the new elite must pursue economic development as this is the base line of claims to legitimacy. Once this goal had been promulgated the whole machinery of the development game came into action, and First World theorists came to lodge claims to relevant knowledge, expertise, and ethic.

The expectations which were held by early theorists were strongly influenced by the experience of the reconstruction of Europe in the post-Second World War period. It came to be thought that the social scientific knowledge necessary to characterize system dynamics authoritatively was indeed available or could be generated. Flowing from this, expert knowledge of social system dynamics was taken to permit the construction of appropriate machineries of intervention. With these two ideas the pursuit of the goal of effective nationstatehood could be presented in terms of planning – at international, national, regional and local levels. Additionally such knowledge and expertise were seen to be the property of First World experts, and their local assistants. An asymmetric relationship was built into the very discourse itself. Positive social scientific knowledge was Western and the recipients of the Third World were taken to be essentially passive. The final element was an appropriate ethic. That the First World ought to help the Third World was taken to be an ethical injunction which flowed from possession of available knowledge and expertise coupled to those broad traditions of European social reformist thinking. In retrospect it seems clear that this ethic was that of the liberal-democratic reformism familiar in the post-Second World War period drive for social reform at home and democracy elsewhere.

Overall it is clear that orthodox development discourse deployed a complex culture-bound package of claims, with the central policy-goal of the pursuit of effective nationstatehood, and the whole panoply of the international development business grew up. But after forty years effort of it is now evident that this clutch of assumptions was not supportable: (a) the requisite knowledge is not there (this has less to do with any failings of research than the unreflective acceptance of essentially positivistic models of the nature of social science and the knowledge it can produce and thus the social roles it can underpin); (b) the expertise in respect of planning was not available (and again this is not so much a matter of specifiable errors and incompetences as it is the affirmation of wildly overconfident models of the planning process); and (c) the ethic was only ever dubiously relevant (and once again it is not a problem of direct error; rather it is a matter of unreflectively deployed ideas). Overall, the imputation of the pursuit of the goal of effective nationstatehood to the replacement elites of the new nations of the post-colonial Third World increasingly looks like an error born out of the requirement to maintain system-access in the Third World coupled with the illegitimate transfer of a context bound intellectual package

The resultant intellectual construct now looks increasingly difficult to sustain. In place of the orthodoxy, and drawing upon the lessons it offers, we can posit a return to the classic tradition of social theorizing with its focus on elucidating patterns of complex change. Very broadly, it would see that we should not speak of the development-expert-assisted pursuit of effective nationstatehood but of the political-cultural projects of specific state-regimes which are characterized using our received traditions in dialogue with local scholars, policy analysts and activists.

The Spontaneous Order of the Marketplace

In the period following the 1971 ending of the Bretton Woods system and the 1973 oil shock the post-war fordist-based class compromise which was intellectually enshrined in the Keynesian liberal-democratic growth and welfare package came under severe intellectual and political pressure from finance-capital and post-fordist productive-capital. It has been argued that within the Atlantic sphere effective power was transferred from productive capital to finance-capital as the post-Second World War settlement failed. In the 1980s there was a strong resurgence of economic liberalism in the developed world. The intellectual core of the New Right neo-liberal accumulation strategy has been a reaffirmation of economic liberalism. The central and crucial role of the marketplace has been stressed. The New Right has made the material of neo-classical economics the basis of their claims to scientificity and intellectual centrality within the sphere of the social sciences. All this economics work revolves around the model of the perfect market economic system.⁵ The core elements of this model of a satisfactory fundamental naturally given situation of scarcity, the crucial role of private ownership of the means of production, and the existence of competition to supply sovereign consumers via the ordering mechanism of the market. The New Right take this model to represent the essential character of all human economic behaviour in society. The core of the social sciences is constituted by this sort of economic activity. It is the business of economic research to uncover the mechanisms of this given reality so as to be able to inform the practice of the rule-setting minimum state and other economic agents such as firms.

In the hands of the New Right the work of the neo-classical economic theorists of the self-regulating market, an approach which was originally designed to replace nineteenth-century political-economy which was seen by its critics as latently socialist,⁶ has been the basis of political reaction within the First World⁷ and what has been called a counter-revolution

4 K. van der Pijl 1984 *The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class*, London, Verso.

5 M. P. Todaro 1982 *Economics for a Developing World*, London, Longman.

6 See A. K. Dasgupta 1985 *Epochs of Economic Theory*, Oxford, Blackwell.

7 See P. W. Preston 1994b *Europe, Democracy and the Dissolution of Britain*, Alder-

Third World development theory.⁸ Around the core celebration of the market a series of proposals has been made: (a) the establishment of the minimum state and the related freeing of market-forces with privatization, deregulation, and sharply reduced government spending; (b) the removal of socio-political inhibitions to market functions with repression of trades unions, removal of welfare legislation, and relaxation of government controls on private firms; (c) the encouragement of enterprise with tax breaks for business, the affirmation of the right to manage, and the promulgation of ideas of popular capitalism; and (d) the opening up of the economy to the wider global system with the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers, and the free movement of capital.⁹ In general, the 1980s have seen New Right experiments produce unemployment, reductions in general welfare, declining manufacturing production, and large public and private debt burdens.

Against the familiar claims of the enthusiasts, it is clear that the New Right model of human economic behaviour and the associated pure market system does not describe the simple givens of human existence. The model of the market presented by the New Right is merely an intellectual construct. The major objection to the substantive position of the New Right is not that they favour markets in place of planning (because markets are social institutions and are thus ordered and controlled), rather it is that they adopt a simplistic recipe-interventionism (in favour of markets) in place of the intellectually more plausible task of elucidating the detail of social processes. In place of New Right celebrations of the ordering capacity and benefit-maximizing properties of the free market, an analysis drawing on the classical tradition of social theory would look to offer characterizations of the global system and the actions of powerful agents within this system. The relevant intellectual resources would comprise the strategies of political-economic analysis, social-institutional enquiry and culture-critical interpretation. In substantive terms we have the issue of the emergent tripolar global industrial-capitalist system with its major economic trading blocs of Japan/Asia, the Americas, and Europe. Relatedly, in regard to development, the issue is one of the extension of capitalist modes of production. Any attempt to address this sweeping pattern of complex change in terms of the vocabulary of neo-classical economics would be intellectually ridiculous.

The Legacy of Dependency Theory

As the optimism of the 1960s in respect of the prospects for Third World development slowly declined through the 1970s, culminating in the reaction of the 1980s, the dependency approach was dismissed as intellectually misconceived and politically incorrect. However, we can take from this material a useful concern for linking structural and agent-centred explanations. The key claim of dependency theory was always that the present circumstances

of the Third World were a product of those political-economic, social-institutional and cultural structures associated with the historical development of the industrial-capitalist global system. The structures which enfold the countries of the Third World and which narrowly circumscribe their actions are taken to have developed over time around the schedules of interests of the metropolitan core countries. It is clear that dependency theory has been presented in diverse guises and that it has generated extensive critical debates. In its initial formulations it was shaped by the particular historical experience of Latin America in the 1940s and 1950s when long-established trading and economic patterns were disturbed by the episode of the Second World War and occasioned a measure of import-substituting industrialization. These circumstances were theorized by a group of economists at ECLA and their work issued in a novel structuralist economics oriented to informing the policy positions of governments concerned specifically with national development. The work of structuralist economics provided the intellectual base upon which the broader schemes of dependency theory were articulated.

Against the schemes of analysis and policy advice derived from the work of First World development theorists who drew on the material of orthodox economics, the proponents of dependency stressed: (a) the importance of considering both the historical experience of peripheral countries and the phases of their involvement within wider encompassing systems; (b) the necessity of identifying the specific political-economic, social-institutional and cultural linkages of centres and peripheries; and (c) the requirement for active state involvement in the pursuit of development.

In contrast to both the aspirations to technical neutral expertise advanced by the orthodox proponents of state-centred development theory and the New Right's preference for putatively technical market mechanisms, the theorists of dependency advanced a prospective, multi-disciplinary and engaged theory oriented to the political practice of elites committed to the pursuit of national strategies of development. However, the initial English-language presentation of the material of this tradition took the form of polemical interventions within intra-First World theoretical debates and this had the unfortunate effect of confusing the reception of the lessons of dependency theory as those ill-disposed on political grounds were able to dismiss the entire approach as left-wing propaganda.¹⁰ In retrospect, it seems clear that the political activism of the early English-language proponents of dependency theory was overoptimistic and underestimated the capacity of the metropolitan centres, in particular the USA, to finance, organize and encourage worldwide reaction.¹¹ Nonetheless, the basic position of the dependency theorists was sound and the preference for popular political involvement and action has found an echo in a range of development work pursued by social movements, charities, NGOs and scholars.

Restating the Modernist Project

In the material presented above arguments centred respectively on the role of the planning state and the affirmation of the power of the marketplace have been considered. The continuing legacy of dependency theory has been acknowledged. It seems clear that the approaches centred on planning and market were in detail very different but they do have one characteristic in common. It can be suggested that both attempted to secure a measure of certainty in respect of discussions of development. The one looked to discourses of the intervention of experts, where reason secures surety in respect of the future, and the other to the spontaneous order of the market, where individualistic activity generates a structural regularity which offers surety in respect of the future. In both cases it is clear that mechanisms are invoked which are taken to ensure that the future will be in line with present expectations and wishes.

It can be argued that both lines of response could be taken as particular reactions to what critical theorists have called the fundamental insecurity of the modern world.¹² The position is taken that in the wake of the decline in influence of revealed religion, and the parallel rise of a natural science both demonstrably potent in terms of results and fundamentally sceptical in stance, there are no longer any absolute guarantors in respect of our knowledge of either the natural or social worlds to whom citizens, or rulers, or anyone else can appeal. A spread of familiar strategies of dealing with this anxiety can be identified, ranging from social movements claiming priority for their view of the world, or religious groups claiming a privileged access to the truth, through to the more subtle intellectual efforts of social theorists.

In the case of classical social theory we can identify just such a manoeuvre in the shift from analysing progress – which one can argue for as a tendential aspect of the form of life of modernity¹³ – to affirming a spurious confidence in respect of bureaucratically ordered social change. This has been critically discussed in terms of a distinction between legislators, who erroneously suppose that they can authoritatively decipher the logic of the social world so as to inform bureaucratically rational strategies of ordering, and interpreters, who operate in a sceptical piecemeal fashion so as to inform debate within the public sphere in the belief that reasoned

12 This theme of the 'insecurity of the modern world' is entirely familiar within certain strands of European social philosophical criticism. The idea has been unpacked in psychological and cognitive terms. The idea has been deployed in the context of various substantive issues. At this time I have in mind the culture-critical work of Zygmund Bauman. See Z. Bauman 1989 *Modernity and the Holocaust*, Cambridge, Polity, Z. Bauman 1992 *Intimations of Modernity*, London, Routledge. Bauman also makes reference to the work of Hannah Arendt; see her 1985 *The Human Condition*, Chicago University Press.

13 This is the cognitive strategy of Jürgen Habermas who lodges a demand for the prac-

debate, modelled on the broad pattern of the successful natural science will best illuminate routes to the future.¹⁴

In the case of post-Second World War development theory we can speculate that both the orthodoxy, with their concern for planned change, the neo-liberals, with their concern for spontaneous order, were determined to address the insecurity of the social world and to uncover a mechanism which would offer guarantees in respect of future development. In the case of the orthodox the reliance on planning mechanisms is familiar and has been routinely criticized. It is also clear that the neo-liberal belief in the spontaneous order of the marketplace plays a similar role to the New Right. It has been suggested¹⁵ that the liberals shift from Leviathan to the Market and in both cases humankind submits to an external authority and is thereafter secure.¹⁶ However, all such strategies fail because the project of modernity is both potent and insecure.¹⁷

In place of the variously articulated pursuits of certainty, and taking of the positive lessons of dependency theory in regard to the context-specificity of the historical experience of particular countries, it can be suggested that the classical tradition of social theorizing can provide the intellectual resources necessary to the articulation of a new discourse of development which allowed for the vagaries of social life, for the complexities of the dynamics of structures and agents, and which both granted the necessity of the detailed analysis of social processes and centred upon an affirmation of the role of the public sphere in securing patterns of order within the social world generally.

The modernist project is history-specific, which is to say that it is bound up with the rise of European capitalism. It was the alliances of intellectuals and commercial groups advancing their respective causes which brought together the agents, ideas and interests necessary to set the project in motion.¹⁸ Subsequently the bourgeoisie drew back from the radical implications and sought a new status quo, built around the self-regulation of the neo-classical market idea. The modernist project continues to be history-specific and it appears in various guises as agent groups read structural circumstances and promulgate their views. When deployed to read changing structural circumstances the core set of ideas admit of re-interpretation, mis-interpretation and mis-representation. It is a contested tradition.

14 See Z. Bauman 1987 *Legislators and Interpreters*, Cambridge, Polity.

15 F. Jameson 1991 *Postmodernism, Or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*, London, Verso.

16 In regard to the early monetary theorists J. Robinson 1962 *Economic Philosophy*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, remarks that the model of a smoothly working market in Freudian terms looks expressive of a desire to return to the security of the womb.

17 On this business of the linkage of modernity and natural science, see E. Gellner *Thought and Change*, London, Weidenfeld; E. Gellner 1988 *Plough, Sword and Book*, London, Paladin.

18 S. Bellard 1971 *The Idea of Progress*, Harmondsworth, Penguin.

The modernist project centres on the affirmation of the cognitive power of human reason, and the proposal that reason be deployed in regard to both the natural and the human worlds. The notion of material and ethical progress is affirmed and central to this project is the idea of formal and substantive democracy.²⁰ These reflections on the nature of the modernist project point to a new way of construing development which may be more adequate to changing world circumstances. The optimistic general expectation is of the possible role of the public sphere in resolving debates/conflicts in regard to matters of responding to societal change. In place of both the authoritative and the spontaneous pursuits of certainty, we can affirm the modernist-project-carried ethic of formal and substantive democracy as offering the outlines of a dialogic strategy whereby political-economic, social-institutional and cultural processes might be understood and their direction made subject to human will.

The shift from this abstract social philosophical point to substantive analyses, and political programmes, is of course more problematic than usually taken to be the case within the optimistic work of the classical social theorists of the nineteenth century. Our appreciation of the nature of the analytic task undertaken and the problematic nature of the political-economic, social-institutional and cultural processes we would grasp has grown throughout the twentieth century. This scepticism in regard to the extent to which social theorists can authoritatively characterize the social world, coupled to an appreciation of the culture-boundedness of the modernist project, even if it is a world-expansive project given that it is bound up with the global industrial capitalist system, and given the practical focus on coping with unpredictable and conflict-suffused social processes, leads to a quite distinct view of the nature of any new development discourse. In place of the untenable celebrations of the authoritative interventions of the expert in possession of technical knowledge, and in place also of the suggestions that we can rely on the spontaneous order of the market, those concerned with development must draw on received intellectual tradition illuminated in a sceptical, piecemeal, tentative and process-centred fashion, via dialogue with locally based scholars, policy analysts and activists, to discern the dynamics of complex change within the interdependent tripolar global industrial-capitalist system.

Towards a New General Approach to Development

In order to advance matters in respect of development theory we need to acknowledge that two inter-related processes of reflection within development theory and social theory are in progress. First, the relative eclipse of conventional development theory has had the effect of shifting development

See C. B. Macpherson 1973 *Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval*, Oxford University Press; J. Habermas 1989 *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, MIT Press.

theory back towards the mainstream of social theoretic enquiry; centrally, the preoccupation with making sense of complex change.²¹ Thereafter, secondly, in regard to social theorizing we can point to the eclipse of naturalistic analyses of industrialism-modernization in favour of the representation of the classical modernist project of the interpretive-critical elucidation of the dynamics of complex change in the global industrial-capitalist system.²²

The key formal elements of a new position

The key formal elements of the new position revolve around the objective of making a dialogic analysis of the dynamics of complex change within the global industrial capitalist system.

1 In the post-Second World War period it has been thought that the business of the analysis of the development of the countries of the Third World offered a quite distinctive intellectual task, and moreover one which had no particular implications for the developed countries. The analysis of the problem of the development of the countries of the Third World was more or less unthinkingly consigned to a subordinate status within the overall sphere of Western social science. The problem of development retained this status until the emergence of institutional theory in the 1960s. The proponents of this theoretical approach did make a determined effort to upgrade the status of development theorizing. However, the strategy which they adopted was to try to constitute development theory as a separate discipline within the established spread of social science work. The attempt failed and development theory slipped back into its familiar subordinate role. However, against this familiar intellectual positioning of development theory, it is clear that the concerns of development theorists lie very close to the core concerns of the received traditions of classical social theory. It would seem to be the case that development theorists do not need to assert their status against the lack of recognition of the presently influential groups within the social sciences; rather they need simply to be clear about their activities. In this perspective the concerns of theorists of development are close to the central concerns of the classical tradition of social theorizing.

In this context, a key claim is that general development theory is only distinct from the core received social scientific task of analysing complex change by virtue of a typical focus on dependent or peripheral industrial capitalism in the Third World.

2 In the post-Second World War period the proponents of social science in the developed countries were encouraged by a series of factors to adopt a very optimistic positive stance in respect of the nature and possibilities of social scientific work. In the theories which spoke of the convergent logic

of industrialism there were sets of expectations in respect of the authoritative modelling of social processes which fed a series of exercises in development plan-making. A strong commitment was made to the technical expertise of development theorists which simply overrode available doubts. However, in the long period of subsequent development practice and reflection it slowly became clear that the optimistic positive expectations in respect of the authoritative technical power of social science were badly mistaken. A slow return to the materials of the classical tradition of social theorizing has been accomplished, and the implications of that return have been sharply underscored by recent changes within the global system as the Cold War bipolar system has given way to an emergent tripolarity, and a restated sceptical commitment to the modernist project has been made.

In this context, it is clear that analysing instances of dependent or peripheral industrial-capitalism will entail the dialogic deployment of the core conceptual lexicon of the classical social scientific tradition in an interpretive-critical fashion (thus the elucidation of the real social processes involved in complex change rather than the export of intellectual recipes).

3 A significant feature of the post-Second World War concern to make sense of the situation of the countries of the Third World was the intellectual dominance of First World scholars and policy analysts. The initial contribution of Third World thinkers tended to be restricted to the spheres of political theory and action as the members of nationalist independence movements advanced their arguments in pursuit of political change within the colonial system. The dominant position of First World theorists was accompanied by an unremarked optimism in respect of the cognitive power of the analysis which they deployed. The early theorists of development were not self-critical. However, in recent years it has become clear amongst philosophers and theorists of social science that any exercise in social theorizing will be significantly marked by the intellectual and practical context from which it emerges. In other words, all exercises of social theorizing are shaped by particular cultural contexts. The direct implication of this view is that reflexive criticism is a necessary condition of the production of scholarship. It has become clear that it is necessary to review critically the great body of work which was produced in respect of Third World development in order to identify those ideas which were specific to the culture of the West and which were deployed uncritically within development theories. The familiar development theory concern for the modernization of the Third World where this entails the recapitulation of the historical experience of the developed West is no longer intellectually tenable. It is only on the basis of a critical self-awareness that those ideas which might tentatively be used can be identified and put to work within a sceptical restatement of the classical modernist project, and these ideas in turn are merely the received basis of dialogic exchanges with scholars, policy analysts and

of development theory is that achieving a process-centred strategy of understanding and engagement will involve a significant element of detoxification in regard to the sets of assumptions which First World scholars have brought to the analysis of the Third World and familiar ideas about knowledge, expertise and ethic will have to be examined and revised.

4 The orthodox consensus within post-war development theorizing assumed that their positive social scientific analyses had a broad range of applicability across a similarly broad range of cultures. The work referred back to the universalizing assumptions of Western science. At the same time, the proponents of the spontaneous order of the marketplace made similar claim in respect of the unrestrictedly universal character of marketplace rationality and its centrality within human life. The optimistic positive celebration of the model of the West and its social science reached an apogee in the modernization theory of the 1960s when the future development of the planet was assimilated to the model of the contemporary USA. One consequence of this intellectual stance was the more or less automatic disregard which was shown to the cultural patterns of those people who did not inhabit the industrial-capitalist countries of the West. It was assumed that as the logic of industrialism drove the development of the countries of the world through the grand process of modernization the patterns of thought of the peoples undergoing these changes would converge upon the cognitive models present in the West. The orthodox theorists found no occasion to attend to the detail of the forms-of-life of non-Western peoples. However, it has subsequently become clear that processes of development cannot be understood in terms of the Third World's recapitulation of the historical experience of the West but must be dealt with in terms of the sub-dynamics of structural constraint/opportunity and agent group response. The forms-of-life of local peoples will carry cultural resources which will be the basis upon which they read and react to global structural change.

In this context, as the intellectual task of analysing patterns of complex change within peripheral industrial-capitalist societies is pursued in terms of structural change and agent response it is clear that ethnographic work will assume a significant role. In this case it is clear that analysis can only proceed via dialogue with local scholars, policy analysts and activists.

5 The post-Second World War orthodox within development theory made the routine assumption of the cognitive priority of their formulations. It is clear that the intellectual and real world circumstances which they inhabited disposed them to make this judgement. However, it has become clear over the subsequent period that the claim to cognitive priority which was integral to First World theorizing is untenable. As the objective of development theorizing shifts from modelling the process of modernization towards the task of elucidating the dynamics of complex change, then it

18

A New Substantive Focus: Elucidating the Dynamics of Complex Change

Overview of the New Substantive Focus

A theoretical preference for the sceptical affirmation of the modernist project implies a particular schedule of substantive enquiry. The opening sections of the chapter will look at the substantive general theory implied by the sceptical affirmation of the modernist project. The later sections of the chapter will look at the dynamics of complex change in the integrated tripolar global system¹ (see figure 20).

fuller statement of this argument is made in P. W. Preston 1994 *Discourses of Development: State, Market and Polity in the Analysis of Complex Change*, Aldershot, Avebury.

Changes in Development Discourses

The original impetus to development work in the episode of decolonization has now exhausted itself. A change in the expectations of the proper objects of theorizing might be expected. In simple terms, new circumstances generate new problems and new formulations in respect of the matter of development. In order to survey these issues we can speak of discourses of development. Each discourse offers a way of grasping complex change and suggesting action. The key to these discourses is that they are broad, interpretive and prospective. And these discourses find their vehicles in particular institutional locations. The key discourses centre on the intervention of experts, the mechanisms of spontaneous order, and the role of the public sphere.

The discourse of the intervention of experts expresses certain key elements within received political theoretical traditions. What is characteristic of this strategy of constituting an object sphere and appropriate lines of action is that the social world is taken to be amenable to authoritative characterization by experts in possession of certain bodies of technical knowledge. An asymmetry is built into this discourse with on the one hand those who know, and on the other those subject to expert interventions. The agencies of intervention which use these arguments present them as technical-rational but they are running arguments-on-behalf-of-the-planners, and their engagement with the social world at large is to be seen as a political-type activity. I have criticized such approaches in other work.² In brief, a science of the social cannot plausibly take this form. There is no such authoritative knowledge available,³ notwithstanding that lodging arguments which lay claim to technical expertise is a pervasive feature of contemporary society.

This style of argument and action has been characteristic of the dominant post-Second World War school of development with its expectation of the new nationstates of the Third World recapitulating the nineteenth-century development experience of the metropolitan core capitalist countries. This broad strategy has been the way in which the metropolitan core of the global system assured continuing access to the Third World after the collapse of the colonial empire system. The discourse of state-engendered order revolves around the idea-set of authoritative intervention oriented to the goal of effective nationstatehood, all of which was occasioned by the episode of decolonization and was carried institutionally by the international agencies of the UN and various multi-lateral and bi-lateral aid agencies. However, this mode of social theoretic engagement was in the end intellectually untenable, and acted to mislead theorists, commentators and practitioners by offering an approach (that is, the pursuit of effective nationstatehood ordered by experts), which effectively exhausted available intellectual-institutional space and occasioned the neglect of the business of the elucidation of the detail of real processes.

2 P. W. Preston 1985 *New Trends in Development Theory*, London, Routledge.

3 A. MacIntyre 1981 *After Virtue*, London, Duckworth.

The discourse of spontaneous order refers back to the political project of liberalism with its characterization of the social world as comprising discrete self-moving individuals plus their contractual arrangements, a tradition quite distinct from the democratic tradition. The central claims are for the maximization of economic, social and political benefits. All the claims revolve around the notion of markets (as a natural given amenable to positive scientific analysis). The resultant package is a delimited-formal ideology rather than an exercise in social scientific scholarship. In regard to theorizing development the discourse of spontaneous order has been cashed in quite particular political terms. The adherents of the free market have pressed for deregulation, privatization and welfare reduction in the expectation that the market would spontaneously maximize human benefits.

The political-economic occasion for the representation of these ideas was the collapse of the post-Second World War social-democratic consensus in the First World with oil price shocks, stagflation and the end of the Bretton Woods system. The intellectual occasion was the failure-by-neglect of First World scholars to address the business of the sphere of the economic which had been left to orthodox economists.⁴ As the post-Second World War consensus dissolved away the New Right came to dominate the 1980s with notions of marketization and rolling back the state. The discourse of market-engendered spontaneous order centres on the idea-set of liberalism. Through much of the post-Second World War period this position was taken to be moribund but in the wake of the collapse of the Keynesian compromise in the First World the New Right reaffirmed the liberal package. Institutionally this has ever been the view of the World Bank and IMF. Many have argued that this goal is illusory, and indeed the stronger claim is that the ideology is little more than a public relations fig-leaf covering a straightforwardly exploitative stance in regard to the Third World.

In the discourse of spontaneous order the pursuit of effective nation-statehood is replaced with the market system, yet both approaches are external models (and both look to secure surety or certainty for the theorists and their clients). The upshot is that a strategy of analysis is proffered which acts to exhaust available intellectual space thereby squeezing out the more plausible strategy of attending to the detail of real processes via the analytical machineries of the modernist project.

The discourse of the public sphere expresses the optimistic modernist project of the celebration of human reason in the broad sense of the possibility of comprehending and ordering the natural and social worlds. The historical occasion of the modernist project was the shift to the modern world. Thereafter the familiar story is one of the decay of optimistic reason into machineries of control theorized in terms of positive science, all of which issues in the requirement to recover this optimistic core tradition. The discourse of the public sphere affirms an historical project as yet uncompleted.

4 See R. Dilley ed. 1992 *Contesting Markets: Analyses of Ideology, Discourse and Practice*, Edinburgh University Press.

Institutionally the position finds expression in the more marginal centres, universities, research centres, the critically minded media and NGOs.

In the sphere of the social sciences the modernist project can be cast in terms of the deployment of political-economic, social-institutional culture-critical analyses of the expansion of global industrial-capitalism to the public sphere such work revolves around the construction and critique of competing delimited-formal ideologies. The mode of engagement of scholarship is that of the interpretive-critical elucidation of the processes of complex change. After Habermas,⁵ we argue on behalf of humankind in pursuit of a reconstructed public sphere. The intimate relationship of the modernist project with the political project of formal and substantive democracy thereby revealed. The political project rejects both the further advance of bureaucratic rationalization and the disingenuous calls for a return to the neutral mechanisms of the market in favour of an extension of the sphere of public societal decision-making. In regard to the Third World the course of the public sphere affirms the notion of dialogue. In place of knowledgeable experts and spontaneous markets, it is proposed to substitute a piecemeal dialogue of equals oriented to the advance of the modernist project.

The Formal Commitments of the Discourse of the Public Sphere


In the discourse of the public sphere, social theorizing is taken to be a generic business of making sense of the social world. It comprises a variety of strategies including social scientific material. In the context of the intellectual and cultural tradition which Europeans inhabit the core strategies of social science express the modernist project: the celebration of human reason, and the expectation of material and moral progress. The historical location of the formulation of the modernist project may be placed in the period of the rise of industrial-capitalism.

Within the broad modernist project is lodged a particular role for scholarship. Broadly this role entails the interpretive-critical elucidation of the terms of complex change. It is thus closely related to, but separate from the core of the modernist tradition, with its focus on the sphere of political argument and action. Following Habermas/MacIntyre this location and role may be understood as the presentation of arguments on behalf of humankind in pursuit of a reconstructed public sphere (a reanimation via democratization of the classical modernist project).

The concerns of the metropolitan scholar will be with the business processes of the extension and deepening of the world capitalist system in exchanges with other groupings (having/inhabiting their own cultural conditions). In regard to the analysis of complex change in peripheral capitalism the lexicon of the modernist project may be drawn upon in a piecemeal

5 J. Habermas 1989 *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, Cambridge University Press.

Figure 20 A new substantive focus



dialogic fashion. A general theory might be constructed in terms of structures and agents. Thereafter smaller-scale enquiries might be made. These could be cast in external/non-dialogic terms but it would be a restricted engagement with the material and further work centred on the detail of

There is a double line of argument in favour of the notion of dialogue: one flows from the logic of the discourse of the public sphere, which uses ideas of critique; the other flows from the thought that the elucidation of processes underlying/constituting patterns of complex change via political-economic, social-institutional and culture-critical analysis entails amongst other things capturing the understandings of the agents involved, how they read and act within the structures which enfold them. It is not possible to conceive this work as external-descriptive; rather, it is ethnographic and centres on dialogue.

In sum, the main points argued for within the discourse of public sphere, are these: (a) that social theorizing comprises a diversity of loosely related strategies of making sense; (b) that the core strategy of sense-making for the social sciences is the modernist project (within which a role for scholarship is lodged); (c) that in regard to the analysis of complex change in metropolitan capitalism the core analytical strategies are political-economic, social-institutional and culture-critical analysis oriented to the production of delimited-formal ideologies (with scholarship pursuing related interpretive-critical work on behalf of humankind); and (d) that in regard to the analysis of complex change in peripheral capitalism these core analytical strategies are to be drawn on in a piecemeal dialogic fashion.

The Substantive Commitments Implied in the Discourse of the Public Sphere

The sets of intellectual commitments affirmed by theorists working within the discourse of the public sphere entail quite particular strategies of making substantive analyses of the dynamics of complex change within the interdependent tripolar global industrial-capitalist system.

The role of general theory

The notion of general theory is often read within orthodox social science in a way that invokes the natural sciences as they are ordinarily understood. General theory is understood as an exercise in descriptive/explanatory work. A collection of statements which together exhaustively describe/explain the object sphere in question. The intellectual aspiration to the production of a general theory may be articulated, but more usually it is simply assumed and thereafter it prevades enquiry.

In the frame of the discourse of the public sphere the notion of general theory designates a preliminary cashing of a moral stance. It is a limited and restricted set of statements which show in broad terms how the ethic affirmed by the theorist would judge the social world. It represents the simple and direct out-turn of the use of political-economic, social-institutional and culture-critical analyses. It is a substantive statement. It serves its intellectual purpose in this way. It is not to be taken as the basis of an empirical

The general theory might thereafter be buttressed by empirical material, policy statements might be derived, and explanatory/polemical notes in regard to competing schemes might also be added. At this point the general theory has begun to be developed into a delimited-formal ideological position. The construction of a delimited-formal ideology is a long-drawn-out and collective endeavour, something achieved over time by a group. The general theory is more particular to the work of an individual theorist.

The general theory acts to order enquiry and thereafter more particular substantive analyses can be accomplished. Having rejected the empiricist programme of the exhaustive description/explanation of a discrete object sphere we come to the alternative view carried within the discourse of the public sphere. In Wittgensteinian terms, the discourse of the public sphere affirms in regard to our social scientific interventions in the world an idea of 'finitism'.⁶ Enquiry is seen as specific, particular and restricted.

The moral stance carried within the discourse of the public sphere is that of the modernist project: thus, formal and substantive democracy.

It is characteristic of this material that it looks to elucidate the substantive dynamics of structure and agency. The general theory which this all generates in regard to the analysis of complex change is that of the expansionary dynamic of global industrial-capitalism. An example of such an analysis is provided by Worsley⁷ who indicates how changes in structures attendant upon the extension of the industrial-capitalist system call forth agent responses. Within the overarching logic of the expansionary system otherwise coherent cultures struggle to read and react to incoming pressures for change.

In the new interdependent tripolar global industrial-capitalist system, the issue for development discourse is the identification and effective characterisation of new areas of possible exchange, that is, who to talk to, about what, in which institutional settings and under the framework of which set of ideas? And in line with the shift of emphasis from legislation to interpretation identified by Bauman,⁸ all these analyses are to be arrived at dialogically. It is clear that the way in which such enquiry might translate into practice will be highly localised and complex.⁹

The substantive focus

The substantive focus implied by the discourse of the public sphere is the task of elucidating the dynamics of complex change within the interdependent tripolar global system. In this context, three elements may be noted: (a) a shift in concerns from Third World development to the analysis of complex

6 This idea I take from D. Bloor 1983 *Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge*, London, Macmillan.

7 P. Worsley 1984 *The Three Worlds: Culture and World Development*, London, Weidenfeld.

8 Z. Bauman 1987 *Legislators and Interpreters*, Cambridge, Polity.

change within the integrated tripolar global industrial-capitalist system; (b) a shift from a focus on nationstates to an analytical level which acknowledges the global system; and (c) a strategy of analysis looking to three interacting levels of political-economic, social-institutional and cultural structures: the global, the regional and the local (national and sub-national).

At the global level, Linklater proposes that a critical international relations theory will look to the development of the notion of a global community,¹⁰ hence: (a) the critical characterization of the record and possibilities of global trans-state organizations, for example the United Nations, which R. Gott commented that the end of the Cold War meant that the institutional and ideological stasis of the 1970s and 1980s was no longer sustainable and once again real debate would have to be undertaken;¹¹ (b) similarly, critical characterization of the record and possibilities of key global trans-state organizations, for example the World Bank and IMF, whose 1990s affirmation of a simplistic marketism will have to be rethought;¹² and in terms of the structure of the global capitalist political-economy a similar critical characterization of the record and possibilities of the development policy stances of G7 nationstates, and multi-national companies would seem to be a central concern.¹³

At the regional level the critical issues would be the patterns of international trade, finance, production and consumption, and relatedly the institutional vehicles whereby such economic activity was ordered with for trans-national organization, bi-lateral linkages and the spread of private economic links. Finally, there would be the issue of the extent to which peoples of the region self-consciously constituted themselves as a community (as with the USA and increasingly with the European Union).

At the local national and sub-national level the key agent is likely to be a state-regime affirming a particular political-cultural project, a way of thinking and reacting to the constraint and opportunity afforded by global regional structures. The local agent would promulgate an ideology so as to order the population of the relevant territorial unit and legitimate its rule. At the state-level the critical characterization of the political-economic, social-institutional and cultural strategies of state-regimes in the Third World will come into question as established track records and likely futures are evaluated. First World scholars will judge them according to our class traditions and standards and decide if and how to engage. One implication of this is that any general responsibility towards the Third World is rejected. In regard to the huge spread of local-level NGO work, the position is now principle clear as this is one area where dialogue and empowerment have long been the order of the day.

10 A. Linklater 1990 *Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations*, London, Macmillan.

11 R. Gott in *The Guardian* 30/31 December 1991.

12 See J. Tovey 1987 *Dilemmas of Development*, Oxford, Blackwell.

An overview of changing global structures

In the post-Second World War period the general issue of the nature of the global system had one overarching framework comprising the First World idea of the Free West and the Second World notion of socialism (and for the Third World, development). The key elements of the Cold War ideologies affirmed the distinction between the two realms in terms of the claimed benefits of the respective systems. The delimited-formal ideologies offered political-cultural identities for the masses who were enjoined to support the defence of freedom or socialism. It also offered political-cultural identities for the political elites who were offered roles and a set of slogans to legitimate these roles. However, the ways in which a series of agent-groups understand themselves and their place in the global system is presently undergoing significant change.

The received political wisdom current within the institutions of the global system was destroyed over the period 1985–91. The period sees Gorbachev unilaterally withdrawing from Cold War competition by initiating moves toward disarmament and detente (1985–9) and thereafter the Eastern Bloc simply dissolved itself (1989–91). In this fashion, the central element of the official ideologies of Cold War, the division of the global system into competing blocs, simply disappeared. There has been considerable confusion amongst political elites in the subsequent period as to what to think and what to do with all the institutional apparatus. There seems to be no replacement world view in prospect. It is also true that the end of the Cold War has underscored the importance of existing debates about the constituent elements of the global industrial-capitalist system.

Overall, the familiar post-Second World War situation with its two great powers, a divided Europe and a marginalized Third World was superseded in the period 1989–91 and we have seen the emergence of a tripolar global system. The changes can be grasped in terms of the dynamics of structural change and agent response. We can characterize the general situation of groups in relation to present patterns of structural change within the tripolar global system. In schematic terms we can speak of ascendant, stationary, descendant and non-affected peripheral groupings. In each of these situations the groups in question will read their situations in different ways.

The Presently Discussed Changes in the Global System

In the wake of the end of the short twentieth century and the related collapse of the received certainties of the Cold War which had shaped the understandings of European and American thinkers, it has become clear that a new integrated tripolar global industrial-capitalist system is taking shape. A series of tendencies within the global system can be identified as patterns and styles of production change. First, in the First World the intermingled upgrading and hollowing out of the metropolitan core...

Second, the collapse of the Second World state socialist bloc and its confused shift towards market-based political-economies (a mixture of political collapse and thereafter general reconstruction in the USSR and Eastern Europe, and authoritarian market reforms in China and Indo-China). And third, the further partial dependent integration of certain areas of the Third World in Asia, Latin America and the oil-rich Middle East, and the slow shift of other areas of the Third World into a situation of apparent semi-detachment from the global system (much of Africa south of the Sahara). On Hobsbawm's arguments this is an unstable system which recalls the equally unstable global system of the later years of the long nineteenth century.

At the present the global industrial-capitalist system shows a number of cross-cutting tendencies: (a) to integration on a global scale, with a financial system that is integrated across the globe and extensive increasingly de-nationalized MNC operations; (b) to regionalization within the global system, with three key areas emerging where intra-regional linkages are deepening; and (c) to division on a global scale, with areas of the world apparently falling behind the regionalized global system.

The reconstruction of global industrial-capitalism: the European Union

Western Europe was ordered at the macro-structural level in terms of the ideas, institutions and power relationships established by the Bretton Woods agreement. The USA was the core economy of an open trading region. However in the period of the last third of the short twentieth century this system came under great pressure and has slowly subsided. The following factors have contributed: (a) the oil-price shocks of the early 1970s; (b) the financial implications for the USA of the Vietnam War and the subsequent shift to debtor status in the Reagan years; (c) the rise of the EEC and the Japanese sphere in East Asia; (d) the (partial and uneven) globalization of the industrial-capitalist system; and (e) the abrupt ending of the comfortably familiar bipolar bloc system. The upshot of all these changes over the period 1973–91 has been a movement into an unstable, insecure and novel tripolar global industrial-capitalist system. Confronted with these slow patterns of structural change the countries of western Europe slowly moved towards a closer union. These ideas and institutional mechanisms were in place when the extent of global structural change finally became unequivocally clear with the collapse of the USSR. The countries of western Europe found an available reply in the guise of the European Union, itself a development of the European Economic Community which had been founded back in the early 1950s. The idea of the European Union was pushed to the fore in discussions about the future of the continent.

The core of the European Union lies in northwestern Europe. In Germany the end of the Cold War meant the end of post-Second World War division. It meant an abrupt and uneasy marriage of the two halves of Germany. The... of the German Democratic Republic lost their coun...

prosperous country. It meant an unexpected movement to the centre of Europe as the largest country with the strongest economy; this placed new demands on the key alliance with France. However, the commitment of the core countries of the European Union was affirmed in the Maastricht Treaty and Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and France maintain a pro-union stance. The Scandinavian countries (with the exception of oil-rich Norway) joined the Union, as did Austria; the newly independent countries of middle Europe have announced their intentions of joining as soon as possible.

In Mediterranean Europe there has been a similar strength of commitment. In Spain, Portugal and Greece the European Union has been the institutional space within which post-military liberal-democratic regimes have developed. One of the original EEC members was Italy and here the end of the Cold War meant an end to the corrupt political system dominated by the CDP. A revolt on the part of pro-EU professionals led the attack on the established political-business classes.

In a speculative way we could pick out the key elements of Europeanness: (a) a political-economy in which state and market interact, with the state having a directive role; (b) a social-institutional structure which affirms an idea of the importance of community, and sees economy and polity acknowledging the important role of the community; and (c) a cultural tradition which acknowledges established institutions, a broad humanist social philosophy and a tradition of social-democratic or Christian-democratic welfare politics.

It is on the basis of these political-cultural traits, and the continuing legacies of the European colonial empires, that the countries of Europe engage with the Third World. The experience of the colonial period offers the Europeans both a geographical focus for linkages with the Third World and a body of shared experience (much of which, of course, is deeply ambiguous). The Lomé Convention of 1975 governs the relationships of the countries of the European Union with those territories which were parts of the various colonial empires. The historical linkages are of diminishing relevance but the European political-cultural forms do shape continuing exchanges in areas of Africa, South Asia and the Caribbean.

The reconstruction of global industrial-capitalism: Pacific Asia

The countries of Pacific Asia attained the outline of their present configuration over the period of the expansion of the Japanese empire, the chaos of the Pacific War and the collapse of the Western empires. The Pacific region over the post-Second World War period has been divided by Cold War institutions and rhetoric into a Western-focused group and a socialist bloc. The Western-focused group has been subject to the political-economic and cultural hegemony of the USA. However, the Western-focused group is undergoing considerable change. This may be summarized as the beginnings of a political-economic, social-institutional and cultural emancipation

from the hegemony of the USA. At the same time the countries of the socialist bloc which had spent decades following autarkic state-socialist development trajectories are now opening up to the Western-focused group.

The key relationship in the post-Second World War period has been that of the Japanese and the Americans. Thereafter the countries of the inner periphery of East Asia have dealt with a long period of economic development in the political and military shadow of the USA and the economic shadow of Japan. The countries of the outer periphery of Southeast Asia have more recently reoriented themselves towards the economic mode of Japan. Relatedly we can note the more recent turn of the countries of Australasia towards the Pacific Asian economies, a turn that is routinely expressed in terms of a commitment to open regionalism, thereby arguably implicitly granting a continued political commitment to the West in general and to the USA in particular. Finally we have the ongoing process of the reorientation of China and Indo-China.

The region has been undergoing considerable structural change since the late 1970s and the 1985 Plaza Accords (which generated a flood of yen based investment in the region). One key contemporary public issue concerns the arguments to the effect that the pattern of change in Pacific Asia is such that we can talk about a Pacific Asian model of development where this is taken to be a particular variety of industrial-capitalism distinct from the American or European models.

A speculative illustration of the character of the Pacific-Asian mode would include these factors: (a) the economy is state-directed; (b) state direction is oriented to the pragmatic pursuit of economic growth (that is it is not informed by explicit or debated political-ideological positions); (c) state direction is top-down in style and pervasive in its reach throughout the political-economy and culture; (d) society is familial and thereafter communitarian (thus society is non-individualistic); (e) social order is secured by pervasive control machineries (sets of social rules and an extensive bureaucratization of everyday life) and a related hegemonic common culture (which enjoins submission to the demands of community and authority); (f) political debate and power are typically reserved to an elite sphere (and political life centres on the pragmatic pursuit of overarching economic goals); (g) political debate and action amongst the masses is diffuse and demobilized (thus there is no 'public sphere'); (h) culture comprises a mix of officially sanctioned tradition and market sanctioned consumption; and (i) culture stresses consensus, acquiescence and harmony and eschews open conflict.

In respect of the sets of relationships within the region it can be argued that the economic core is Japan and that around this core is a series of concentric spheres. In northeast Asia the countries of South Korea and Taiwan have close links with Japan. In southeast Asia the countries of ASEAN have become increasingly integrated within the Japanese sphere. In the sometime socialist block, China and Indo-China, there is extensive Japanese activity. Finally, in Australia and New Zealand, there is extensive

integration with the Pacific Asian countries. In those countries which would until quite recently have been labelled Third World the issues of development are increasingly addressed with reference to the economic influence of Japan within the region, and their key concern with an ordered and cooperative pattern of development.

The reconstruction of global industrial-capitalism: the USA

The episode of the Second World War saw the emergence of the USA as the premier economic, political, diplomatic and military power in the world. The power of the USA was used to establish and underpin the Bretton Woods system within the sphere of the West and the military/diplomatic confrontation with the Second World. The position of the USA was unchallenged until the mid-1970s when the financial burdens of the Vietnam War occasioned the first changes within the Bretton Woods system. The period of the late 1970s saw inflation and economic dislocation within the Western sphere and in the Third World. In the 1980s the military build-up inaugurated by President Reagan led to the USA becoming a debtor nation. In addition the USA was the major sponsor of the doctrines of economic liberalization which have further undermined the order of the global system.

The end of the short twentieth century has seen the USA continuing to press for an open global trading system but arguments are now made within the context of a tripolar system and without the convenience of the existence of the Second World which provided an excuse for US hegemony within the sphere of the West.

The key elements of the American polity might be taken to include a public commitment to an open market economy, a public commitment to republican democracy, a strong preference for individualism, a tradition which celebrates the achievements of ordinary people, and a cultural tradition of liberal individualism. It is on the basis of this commitment to an open business environment that the US engages with the Third World. The influence of the Washington-based IMF and World Bank is extensive in promoting liberalization and free trade, and recent expressions of these concerns have been the establishment of NAFTA and APEC.

The reconstruction of global industrial-capitalism: the Third World

The experience of the countries of the Third World in the post-colonial period has evidenced a diverse mix of advance, drift and stagnation. If we consider the very broad sweep of the countries of Pacific Asia, Latin America and the oil-rich Middle East it is clear that there has been a sharp process of differentiation within what has in the post-war period been called the Third World.

In the case of Pacific Asia it is clear that

relatively rapid development. In the case of Pacific Asia the basis for economic success is elusive. In the 1980s the New Right claimed that the success of the area proved the correctness of market-oriented development policies. However the countries of the area have all pursued state-directed development. The core regional economy has been Japan which industrialized in the late nineteenth century and which has subsequently played a key role in the development of Pacific Asia. In China in the late 1970s the reforms of Deng Xiaoping inaugurated a period of marketization which has seen rapid economic growth in the coastal regions and relative stagnation in the vast rural hinterlands. The country now has pronounced regional inequalities but is increasingly integrated within the Pacific Asian region. The pace of development in the region as a whole over the 1980s has been so rapid that Pacific Asia is now spoken of as one of the three major economic blocs within the global economy.

It is similarly the case for other areas of what would have been called the Third World a few years ago that they have experienced a further round of dependent capitalist development. It is possible to point to the oil-rich states of the Middle East. In the case of the Middle East it is clear that the basis for the economic success of the Middle East is that of primary-product exporting, in particular oil, but these countries have also invested heavily in industrial development. It is also clear that the countries of the Middle East have experienced considerable political dislocation in the shape of war and revolution. At the same time the progress of what has been called westernization, the introduction of modern social patterns, has been deeply problematical.

In the case of Latin America the extent of success is more problematical as social inequalities, environmental problems and political instability work against economic successes. However, Latin America and the Caribbean fall within the ambit of the USA-centred sphere of the global capitalist system. In 1993 the NAFTA agreement was inaugurated which looks to a free trade zone within the Americas.

In contrast to the countries of Pacific Asia, the Middle East and Latin America, the countries of Africa experienced little progress in the 1980s. In Africa the initial legacies of the colonial period included state and administrative machineries, legal systems, educated and mobilized populations, and so on. All these slowly ran down. As the economic changes of the post-colonial period progressed the residual pre-contact and colonial patterns of life began to be reworked. This could include the decay of traditional patterns of family and kin, and problems of tribalism. In Africa there were problems of political corruption, incompetence and instability. The role of the military increased. A series of internal conflicts occurred. These problems were internal to the new countries of the Third World but were particularly acutely felt in Africa.¹⁴ At the same time these countries experienced

interference from the two great powers as they pursued a series of overt and covert proxy wars. In the case of Africa, development specialists tend to speak of a lost decade. In terms of the African countries' share of world production and world trade it is shrinking and is now very slight. In the case of Africa it seems to be possible to speak of a slow detachment from the mainstream of the global industrial-capitalist system.

If we try to summarize the post-Second World War period as a whole then we can say that by the mid-1970s the orthodox optimism of the immediate post-war period had dissipated and was beginning to be replaced by those fears about debt, instability and failure which were to come to the fore in the 1980s. At the same time the counter-optimism of the critics of the orthodoxy was similarly beginning to decline as unease grew about the further unequal development of the global system. It is also true to say that the unease about the post-Second World War settlement which underpinned the discussion about development also became acute as First World economies suffered economic slow-downs and the societies saw rising problems. In the First World the intellectual and political confusion of the period saw the emergence of the Anglo-Saxon New Right. In the Third World the New Right sponsored a counter-revolution which aimed to sweep away the developmental role of the state in favour of the marketplace. The period of the 1980s was thus one of reduced expectations for both the orthodox and their radical critics. However, the position of the radical democrats was further undermined by the ferocious political reaction of the 1980s. The overall impact upon the Third World has been to reinforce the diversity of the area's patterns of integration within the global system, a mixture of dependent development and semi-detachment.

Chapter Summary

The post-Second World War global system with its two great powers, a divided Europe and a marginalized Third World was superseded in the period 1989-91. The 1980s saw the emergence of a tripolar global system. The ways in which a series of agent-groups understand themselves and their place in the global system are presently undergoing significant change. The changes can be grasped in terms of the dynamics of structural change and agent response within the three main areas of the global system. Overall, the substantive tasks of development theorists have shifted *from* the technical social scientific attempt to characterize authoritatively the shift to the modern world of the Western countries in order to order rationally the recapitulation of this experience by the countries of the Third World *towards* the dialogic elucidation of the dynamics of complex change within the integrated tripolar global industrial-capitalist system.



Abrams
 Afshar,
 Aglietta
 Alatas,
 Allen, J
 Anders
 Anders
 Anders
 Anders
 don,
 Anders
Scien
 Antoni,
 Appelb:
Pacifi
 Apthorj
Deve
 Apthorj
 Alder
 Arendt,
 Aron, F
 Weid
 Baran,
 Baran,
 Barber,
 Barrack
 Pengi
 Barret-I
 Bartley,
ives,
 Baumar
 Baumar

makes sense to prioritize the intellectual contribution of the social scientists of the West. A concern with elucidating the dynamics of complex change within the interdependent tripolar global industrial-capitalist system in dialogic exchange with scholars, policy analysts and activists from many parts of the world implies an equality of contribution. The task of elucidating the dynamics of complex change presents itself as a common problem for social scientists located in different parts of the world and drawing upon particular cultural resources.

In this context, it is clear that the asymmetry in respect of claims to knowledge of social processes which is built into the orthodox position is denied in favour of an equality of contributions to scholarship.

6 The development theory orthodoxy tended to affirm a narrow idea of the nature of social scientific enquiry. It was supposed that the procedures of the natural sciences could be replicated within the sphere of the social sciences. The type of knowledge produced and the use to which it could be put were taken to mirror in essentials the knowledge available within the natural sciences. It is characteristic of the simpler explanations of the nature of natural science that the objective to which research is oriented is taken to be the production of a general model of the natural system in question. On the basis of the general model, predictions about future states of affairs, and the necessary conditions of securing those states, can be made. The knowledge produced by the natural sciences is technical, precise and underpins the familiar role of the expert. This argument has definite consequences for the self-understanding and aspirations of the social sciences which were encouraged to aspire to a similarly technical expertise in respect of those spheres of the social world with which they concerned themselves. However, recent work within the philosophy of social science has made it clear that the simple argument by analogy from the nature of the natural sciences to an appropriate strategy for the social sciences is very misleading. The social sciences have their own logics and their own practical application in the broad concern with elucidation the dynamics of complex change. There is no general theory of the social system available. It is also the case that there is no general theory of development available to those who would aspire to an authoritative planning strategy of securing development.

In respect of the cherished core assumptions of the orthodox, the pursuit of a scientific-general model of development for use in the Third World, it is clear that such an authoritative-interventionist scheme is not available.

7 A particularly egregious specimen of positivist mis-analysis has been offered by the proponents of neo-classical economics whose work has been the basis of recently influential theories of spontaneous market order. On the basis of a claim to a scientificity unique within the spread of the social sciences of the West these theorists have looked to a central place within

underpinned their claims to be offering a positive analysis of the mechanisms of the naturally given system of the marketplace. However, the claim to scientificity can be rejected, and along with it any claim to centrality of orthodox economics within the spread of social sciences. The familiar claims in respect of the marketplace can thereafter be analysed as a particular delimited-formal political ideology. The use of these ideas to inform development policy within the countries of the Third World cannot be seen as the presentation of neutral technical scientific advice; rather they are one way in which the pursuit of metropolitan interests are advanced.

In respect of the market-centred expectation of a spontaneous order which would ensure success it is clear that this is also rejected as it is a social scientific nonsense in the service of the interests of those holding power in the metropolitan capitalist countries.

8 The influential work of the development orthodoxy, and the recently fashionable work of the theorists of spontaneous market order, can now be contextualized – in terms of the political and intellectual occasions of the production of formal theories over the post-war period – and superseded. A sceptical restatement of the modernist project can be affirmed. A new approach to development will draw on the classical tradition of social theory in order to elucidate the dynamics of complex change within the global industrial-capitalist system. These analyses will concern themselves with a series of analyses: (a) the political-economic analysis of global power structures; (b) the related social-institutional analyses of the ways in which particular regions or countries are embedded within global structures; and (c) the culture-critical elucidation of the ways in which groups of agents understand their position within these structures and thereby organize their actions.

In this context, a new general development theory will move from both authoritatively characterized recapitulation and market-focused recipes towards the interpretive-critical elucidation of complex patterns of accommodation to the expansion of the industrial-capitalist global system.

9 The sceptical reaffirmation of the modernist project as a basis for dialogic theorizing in respect of the dynamics of complex change within peripheral industrial-capitalist areas offers a distinctive role for scholarship. The positivist aspiration to a general model of the dynamics of the system is rejected in favour of a sceptical use of the resources of the classical tradition deployed within the public sphere. The concern to elucidate the dynamics of complex change will be associated with a commitment to the ethics of formal and substantive democracy. The work of scholarship will be prospective, wide-ranging and engaged.

The role of scholarship is characterizing the variety of First/Third World exchanges. The work of scholars, policy analysts and activists in the Third

and then gain/loss balances drawn up and thereafter arguments for specific patterns of change could be advanced.

10 The theories of development produced within the First World have had it in common that they assumed that they could specify the goals of Third World development projects. In the case of the interventionist orthodoxy the theories imputed to the replacement elites of the new nations of Third World the goal of the pursuit of effective nationstatehood. In the case of the free market orthodoxy the theories imputed to the elites of the Third World a desire to assimilate their economies rapidly within the global economy so as to maximize the levels of material consumer satisfactions amongst their populations. It is clear that First World theorists presented general analyses which affirmed sets of ideas particular to the metropolitan countries and neglected the detail of processes of change within the Third World. The intellectual, ethical and practical political resources of the countries of the Third World were read-out of the analyses. However, it is clear that the resources of the peripheral countries must be acknowledged as they are likely to be the basis upon which action at the local level is determined.

In this context, it is clear that what is to count as development will be locally determined.

End-note

In substantive practical terms a new general approach to development will be concerned with the structural analysis of the dynamics of the global industrial-capitalist system and with the elucidation of the ways in which particular local groups read and react to the system's constraints and opportunities. Just as the theorists of the nineteenth century were concerned with the ways people responded to the rise of industrial-capitalism in the Europe, so presently we are concerned with the ways in which people are dealing with the establishment of an interdependent tripolar global industrial-capitalist system.

Gellner has argued that the issue of development as it was presented in the immediate post-Second World War period of decolonization constituted a learning experience for First World theorists in regard to the business of the transition to the modern world.²³ It is clear that the issue of development lies close to the core of the classical tradition which we presently inherit. The central concern of the classical tradition of social theory is the attempt to make practical sense of complex patterns of political-economic, social-institutional and cultural change. It is upon this basis that a new interpretive-critical dialogue of development within the industrial-capitalist global system could be constituted. It is also clear that the attempt to constitute such a general development theory would be a further learning experience for the social theorists of complex change.

23 E. Gellner 1964 *Thought and Change* London, Weidenfeld

Chapter Summary

The present situation can be summarized in the following terms: (a) social theorizing is shifting its self-conception of procedure and role from naturalistic modelling to interpretive-critical dialogue, and its attention and object from industrialism and modernization to the expansionary dynamics of global capitalism; and (b) development theorizing is shifting its self-conception of procedure and role from offering technical expertise to facilitating elucidatory dialogue, and its attention and object away from the underdeveloped Third World to the dynamics of complex change in the developing global system.

- Bauman, Z. 1988 *Freedom*, Milton Keynes, Open University Press
- Bauman, Z. 1989 *Modernity and the Holocaust*, Cambridge, Polity
- Bauman, Z. 1992 *Intimations of Modernity*, London, Routledge
- Beattie, J. 1966 *Other Cultures*, London, Routledge
- Beetham, D. 1985 *Max Weber and the Theory of Modern Politics*, Cambridge, Polity
- Bell, D. 1973 *The Coming of Post Industrial Society*, Harmondsworth, Penguin
- Bello, W., Rosenfeld, S. 1990 *Dragons in Distress: Asia's Miracle Economies in Crisis*, San Francisco, IFDP
- Bennington, G. 1989 *Lyotard Writing the Event*, Manchester University Press
- Benton, T. 1977 *The Philosophical Foundations of the Three Sociologies*, London, Routledge
- Berlin, I. 1989 *Four Essays on Liberty*, Oxford University Press
- Bernstein, H. 1971 'Modernization Theory and the Sociological Study of Development', *Journal of Development Studies*, 7
- Bernstein, H. 1979 'Sociology of Underdevelopment Versus Sociology of Development' in Lehman, D. ed. *Development Theory*, London, Frank Cass
- Bernstein, R. 1976 *The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory*, London, Methuen
- Bienefeld, M. 1980 'Dependency in the Eighties', *Institute for Development Studies Bulletin*, 12
- Bienefeld, M., Godfrey, M. eds. 1982 *The Struggle for Development: National Strategies in an International Context*, London, Wiley
- Birnbaum, N. 1969 'The Staggering Colossus' in Nagel, G. ed. *Student Power*, London, Merlin
- Black, C. E. ed. 1976 *Comparative Modernization*, London, Collier
- Block, F. 1990 *Post Industrial Possibilities: A Critique of Economic Discourse*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press
- Bloch, M. 1983 *Marxism and Anthropology*, Oxford University Press
- Bloomstrom, M., Hettne, B. 1984 *Development Theory in Transition*, London, Zed
- Bloor, D. 1983 *Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge*, London, Macmillan
- Brenner, R. 1977 'The Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism', *New Left Review*, 104
- Brett, E. A. 1985 *The World Economy Since the War: The Politics of Uneven Development*, London, Macmillan
- Brewer, A. 1980 *Marxist Theories of Imperialism*, London, Routledge
- Britten, V. 1988 *Hidden Lives Hidden Deaths*, London, Faber
- Brookfield, H. 1975 *Interdependent Development*, London, Methuen
- Brown, V. 1994 *Adam Smith's Economic Discourse: Canonicity, Commerce and Conscience*, London, Routledge
- Burrow, J. W. 1966 *Evolution and Society*, Cambridge University Press
- Callinicos, A. 1989a *Against Postmodernism*, Cambridge, Polity
- Callinicos, A. 1989b *The Revenge of History*, Cambridge, Polity
- Cardoso, F. H., Faletto, E. H. 1979 *Dependency and Development in Latin America*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press
- Carver, T. 1975 *Karl Marx: Texts on Method*, Oxford, Blackwell
- Carver, T. 1981 *Engels*, Oxford University Press
- Cate, D. 1978 *The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purges under Truman and Eisenhower*, London, Secker and Warburg
- Challand, G. 1977 *Revolution in the Third World*, Harmondsworth, Penguin
- Chalmers, A. F. 1980 *What Is This Thing Called Science?*, Milton Keynes, Open University Press
- Chan, H. C. 1993 'Democracy: Evolution and Implementation - An Asian Perspective' in Bartley, R. L. ed. *Democracy and Capitalism: Asian and American Perspectives*, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
- Chisholm, A. 1972 *Philosophers of the Earth*, London, Sidgwick and Jackson
- Chitnis, A. C. 1976 *The Scottish Enlightenment: A Social History*, London, Croom Helm
- Chomsky, N. 1991 *Deterring Democracy*, London, Verso
- Clammer, J. 1985 *Anthropology and Political Economy*, London, Macmillan
- Clammer, J. ed. 1978 *The New Economic Anthropology*, London, Macmillan
- Clements, K. P. 1980 *From Right to Left in Development Theory*, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
- Cole, K. et al. 1991 *Why Economists Disagree*, London, Longman
- Colley, L. 1992 *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837*, Yale University Press
- Collini, S. 1979 *Liberalism and Sociology*, Cambridge University Press
- Culler, J. 1976 *Saussure*, London, Fontana
- Daiches, D. ed. 1986 *A Hotbed of Genius: The Scottish Enlightenment 1730-1790*, Edinburgh University Press
- Dasgupta, A. K. 1985 *Epochs of Economic Thought*, Oxford, Blackwell
- Davidson, B. 1968 *Africa in History*, London, Weidenfeld
- Davidson, B. 1978 *Africa in Modern History*, London, Allen Lane
- Davidson, B. 1994 *The Search for Africa*, London, James Currey
- Denitch, B. 1990 *The End of the Cold War*, London, Verso
- Diggins, J. P. 1978 *The Bard of Savagery: Thorstein Veblen and Modern Social Theory*, Hassocks, Harvester
- Dilley, R. ed. 1992 *Contesting Markets: Analyses of Ideology, Discourse and Practice*, Edinburgh University Press
- DiMarco, L. E. ed. 1972 *International Economics and Development: Essays in Honour of Raul Prebisch*, London, Academic Press
- Dobb, M. 1973 *Theories of Value and Distribution Since Adam Smith*, Cambridge University Press
- Donaldson, P. 1973 *Economics of the Real World*, Harmondsworth, Penguin
- Dore, R. 1986 *Flexible Rigidities*, Stanford University Press
- Eagly, R. V. ed. 1968 *Events, Ideology and Economic Theory*, Detroit, Wayne State University Press
- Eckersley, R. 1992 *Environmentalism and Political Theory: Towards an Ecocentric Approach*, London, UCL Press
- Ehrlich, P. 1968 *The Population Bomb*, London, Pan
- Ehrlich, P., Ehrlich, A. 1970 *Population, Resources, and Environment*, San Francisco, Freeman
- Eldridge, J. E. T. 1971 *Max Weber: The Interpretation of Social Reality*, London, Michael Joseph
- Elliot, J. A. 1994 *An Introduction to Sustainable Development*, London, Routledge
- Escobar, A. 1992 'Planning' in Sachs, W. ed. *The Development Dictionary*, London, Zed
- Etzioni-Halevy, E. 1981 *Social Change: The Advent and Maturation of Modern Society*, London, Routledge
- Fanon, F. 1967 *The Wretched of the Earth*, Harmondsworth, Penguin
- Fanon, F. 1975 *Social Theory and Political Practice*, London, Allen and Unwin

- Featherstone, M. 1991 *Consumer Culture and Postmodernism*, London, Sage
- Flemming, D. F. 1961 *The Cold War and Its Origins*, New York, Doubleday
- Foster-Carter, A. 1978 'The Modes of Production Controversy', *New Left Review*, 107
- Frank, A. G. 1967 *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America*, New York, Monthly Review Press
- Frank, A. G. 1969 *Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution?*, New York, Monthly Review Press
- Frank, A. G. 1975 *On Capitalist Underdevelopment*, Oxford University Press
- Frank, A. G. 1976 *Economic Genocide in Chile*, Nottingham, Spokesman
- Frank, A. G. 1972 *Lumpenbourgeoisie-Lumpendevlopment*, New York, Monthly Review Press
- Frazer, J. 1922 *The Golden Bough*, London, Macmillan
- Friedman, M. 1953 *Essays in Positive Economics*, University of Chicago Press
- Friedman, M. 1962 *Capitalism and Freedom*, University of Chicago Press
- Friedman, M., Friedman, R. 1980 *Free to Choose*, London, Secker
- Frobel, F., Heinrichs, J. 1980 *The New International Division of Labour*, Cambridge University Press
- Fukuyama, F. 1992 *The End of History and the Last Man*, London, Hamish Hamilton
- Furtado, C. 1964 *Development and Underdevelopment*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press
- Furtado, C. 1965 *Diagnosis of the Brazilian Crisis*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press
- Furtado, C. 1976 *Economic Development in Latin America*, 2nd edn, Cambridge University Press
- Furtado, C. 1978 *Accumulation and Development*, Oxford, Martin Robertson
- Galbraith, J. K. 1958 *The Affluent Society*, Harmondsworth, Penguin
- Galbraith, J. K. 1967 *The New Industrial State*, Harmondsworth, Penguin
- Garton-Ash, T. 1989 *We The People*, London, Granta
- Gellner, E. 1964 *Thought and Change*, London, Weidenfeld
- Gellner, E. 1983 *Nations and Nationalism*, Cambridge University Press
- Gellner, E. 1988 *Plough, Sword and Book*, London, Paladin
- Gellner, E. 1992 *Reason and Culture*, Oxford, Blackwell
- George, S. 1984 *Ill Fares the Land*, Washington, Institute for Policy Science
- George, S. 1988 *A Fate Worse than Debt*, Harmondsworth, Penguin
- Gerth, H. H., Mills, C. W. eds. 1948 *From Max Weber*, London, Routledge
- Giddens, A. 1971 *Capitalism and Modern Social Theory*, Cambridge University Press
- Giddens, A. 1972a *Emile Durkheim: Selected Writings*, Cambridge University Press
- Giddens, A. 1972b *Politics and Sociology in the Thought of Max Weber*, London, Macmillan
- Giddens, A. 1976 *New Rules of Sociological Method*, London, Hutchinson
- Giddens, A. 1979 *Central Problems in Social Theory*, London, Macmillan
- Giddens, A. 1982 *Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory*, London, Macmillan
- Girvan, N. 1973 'The Development of Dependency Economics in the Caribbean and Latin America: Review and Comparison', *Social and Economic Studies*, 22
- Glenny, M. 1990 *The Rebirth of History*, Harmondsworth, Penguin
- Goodman, D. Segal, G. eds. 1994 *China Development and Policy*, London, Collins

- Gordon, R. A. 1963 'Institutional Elements in Contemporary Economics' in Dorfman, J. ed. *Institutional Economics: Veblen, Commons and Mitchell Reconsidered*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press
- Grillo, R. ed. 1985 *Social Anthropology and Development Policy*, London, Tavistock
- Grimal, H. 1965 *Decolonization: The British, French, Dutch and Belgian Empires 1919-1963*, London, Routledge
- Habermas, J. 1989 *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, Cambridge, Polity
- Hagen, E. 1962 *On the Theory of Social Change*, Homewood, Dorsey
- Hall, S., Jaques, M. eds. 1983 *The Politics of Thatcherism*, London, Lawrence and Wishart
- Halliday, F. 1979a *Arabia without Sultans*, Harmondsworth, Penguin
- Halliday, F. 1979b *Iran: Dictatorship and Development*, Harmondsworth, Penguin
- Halliday, F. 1989 *Cold War, Third World*, London, Radius
- Hamilton, C. 1983 'Capitalist Industrialization in East Asia's Four Little Tigers', *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 13
- Hancock, G. 1989 *Lords of Poverty*, London, Macmillan
- Hankins, T. L. 1985 *Science and the Enlightenment*, Cambridge University Press
- Harris, S. 1948 *The European Recovery Programme*, London, Harper and Row
- Harrison, A. 1967 *The Framework of Economic Activity*, London, Macmillan
- Harrod, R. 1939 'An Essay on Dynamic Theory', *Economic Journal*, 49
- Harvey, D. 1989 *The Condition of Postmodernity*, Oxford, Blackwell
- Hawthorn, G. 1976 *Enlightenment and Despair*, Cambridge University Press
- Hekman, S. 1990 *Gender and Knowledge: Elements of Postmodern Feminism*, Cambridge University Press
- Held, D. 1980 *Introduction to Critical Theory*, London, Hutchinson
- Herrera, A. O. et al. eds. 1975 *Catastrophe or a New Society*, Ottawa, Barliocho Foundation
- Hettne, B. 1990 *Development Theory and the Three Worlds*, London, Longman
- Heyzer, N. 1986 *Working Women in Southeast Asia*, Milton Keynes, Open University Press
- Higgins, B. 1968 *Economic Development*, London, Constable
- Hindess, B. 1977 *Philosophy and Methodology in the Social Sciences*, Hassocks, Harvester
- Hobart, M. ed. 1993 *An Anthropological Critique of Development*, London, Routledge
- Hobsbawm, E. 1994 *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991*, London, Michael Joseph
- Hodgson, G. M. 1988 *Economics and Institutions: A Manifesto for a Modern Institutional Economics*, Cambridge, Polity
- Holub, R. C. 1991 *Jürgen Habermas: Critic in the Public Sphere*, London, Routledge
- Hoogvelt, A. 1982 *The Third World in Global Development*, London, Macmillan
- Horne, D. ed. 1992 *The Trouble with Economic Rationalism*, Newham, Scribe
- Howell, J. 1993 *China Opens its Doors: The Politics of Economic Transition*, Hemel Hempstead, Harvester
- Hughes, R. 1988 *The Fatal Shore*, London, Pan
- Hughes, S. 1959 *Consciousness and Society*, London, McGibbon
- Huntington, S. P. 1976 'The Change to Change: Modernisation, Development and ...', London, Collins

- Jackson, C. 1994 'Gender Analysis and Environments' in Redclift, M., Benton, T., eds. *Social Theory and the Global Environment*, London, Routledge
- Jackson, R. H. 1990 *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*, Cambridge University Press
- Jameson, F. *Postmodernism, Or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*, London, Verso
- Jay, M. 1973 *The Dialectical Imagination*, Boston, Mass., Little, Brown
- Jessop, B. et al. 1988 *Thatcherism: A Tale of Two Nations*, Cambridge, Polity
- Johnson, C. 1982 *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*, Stanford University Press
- Jones, G. 1980 *Social Darwinism and English Thought*, Brighton, Harvester
- Jones, H. 1975 *An Introduction to Modern Theories of Economic Growth*, London, Nelson
- Kabbani, R. 1986 *Imperial Fictions: Europe's Myths of Orient*, London, Pandora
- Kahl, J. A. 1976 *Modernisation, Exploitation and Dependency in Latin America*, New Brunswick, Transaction
- Kay, G. 1975 *Development and Underdevelopment: A Marxist Analysis*, London, Macmillan
- Kaye, H. 1984 *The British Marxist Historians*, Cambridge, Polity
- Kennedy, P. 1988 *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, London, Fontana
- Kerr, C. et al. 1960 *Industrialism and Industrial Man*, Harmondsworth, Penguin
- Kiernan, V. G. 1982 *European Empires from Conquest to Collapse*, London, Fontana
- King, A. D. 1990 *Urbanism, Colonialism and the World Economy*, London, Routledge
- Kitching, G. 1982 *Development and Underdevelopment in Historical Perspective*, London, Methuen
- Knakal, J. 1972 'The Centre-Periphery System Twenty Years Later' in DiMarco, L. E. ed. *International Economics and Development: Essays in Honour of Raul Prebisch*, London, Academic Press
- Kolko, G. 1968 *The Politics of War: US Foreign Policy 1943-45*, New York, Vintage
- Korner, P. et al. 1986 *The IMF and the Debt Crisis*, London, Zed
- Krieger, J. 1986 *Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics of Decline*, Cambridge, Polity
- Krugman, P. 1994 *Peddling Prosperity: Economic Sense and Nonsense in an Age of Diminished Expectations*, New York, Norton
- Laslett, P., Runciman, W. G. eds. 1967 *Philosophy, Politics and Society Third Series*, Oxford, Blackwell
- Lehman, D. ed. 1979 *Development Theory*, London, Cass
- Lerner, D. 1958 *The Passing of Traditional Society*, New York, Free Press
- Leys, C. 1977 'Underdevelopment and Dependency: Critical Notes', *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 7
- Lichtheim, G. 1961 *Marxism: An Historical and Critical Study*, London, Routledge
- Linklater, A. 1990 *Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations*, London, Macmillan
- Linz, J., Stepan, A. eds. 1978 *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*, Johns Hopkins University Press
- Long, N. et al. eds. 1992 *Battlefields of Knowledge*, London, Routledge
- Lukes, S. 1973 *Emile Durkheim*, London, Macmillan
- Lyotard, F. 1979 *The Postmodern Condition*, Manchester University Press
- MacIntyre, A. 1967 *A Short History of Ethics*, London, Routledge
- MacIntyre, A. 1971 *Against the Self-Images of the Age*, London, Duckworth
- MacIntyre, A. 1981 *After Virtue*, London, Duckworth
- MacIntyre, A. 1988 *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*, London, Duckworth
- Macpherson, C. B. 1966 *The Real World of Democracy*, Oxford University Press
- Macpherson, C. B. 1973 *Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval*, Oxford University Press
- Marcuse, H. 1969 *An Essay on Liberation*, Harmondsworth, Penguin
- Marquand, D. 1988 *The Unprincipled Society*, London, Fontana
- Marshall, B. L. 1994 *Engendering Modernity: Feminism, Social Theory and Social Change*, Cambridge, Polity
- Martin, K., Knapp, J. eds. 1967 *The Teaching of Development Economics*, London, Frank Cass
- Marx, K. 1957 *The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, London, Lawrence and Wishart
- Marx, K. 1973 *Grundrisse*, Harmondsworth, Penguin
- Marx, K. Engels, F. 1968 *Selected Works*, London, Lawrence and Wishart
- McClellan, D. 1973 *Karl Marx His Life and Thought*, London, Macmillan
- McClelland, D. C. 1961 *The Achieving Society*, New York, Van Nostrand
- McRae, D. G. 1974 *Weber*, London, Fontana
- Mead, M. 1928 *Coming of Age in Samoa*, New York, Morrow
- Meadows, D. H. 1992 *Beyond the Limits*, London, Earthscan
- Meadows, D. H. et al. 1972 *The Limits to Growth*, New York, Basic Books
- Meek, R. L. 1956 *Studies in the Labour Theory of Value*, London, Lawrence and Wishart
- Meier, G., Seers, D. eds. 1984 *Pioneers in Development*, Oxford University Press
- Mikesell, R. F. 1968 *The Economics of Foreign Aid*, London, Weidenfeld
- Milliband, R. 1977 *Marxism and Politics*, Oxford University Press
- Milliband, R., Saville, J. eds. 1965 *The Socialist Register*, London, Merlin
- Mills, C. W. 1963 *The Marxists*, Harmondsworth, Penguin
- Milton, K. ed. 1993 *Environmentalism: The View from Anthropology*, London, Routledge
- Minh-ha, T. T. 1989 *Women, Native, Other: Writing Postcoloniality and Feminism*, Indiana University Press
- Mirowski, P. 1988 *Against Mechanism: Protecting Economics From Science*, New Jersey, Rowman and Littlefield
- Mitchie J. ed. 1992 *The Economic Legacy 1979-1992*, London, Academic Press
- Mommsen, W. J., Osterhammel, J. eds. 1987 *Max Weber and His Contemporaries*, London, Unwin
- Mommsen, J. H. 1990 *Women and Development in the Third World*, London, Routledge
- Moore, B. 1966 *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Boston, Mass., Beacon
- Morgan, L. 1877 *Ancient Society*, London
- Myrdal, G. 1958 *Value in Social Theory*, London, Routledge
- Myrdal, G. 1970 *The Challenge of World Poverty*, London, Allen Lane
- Nairn, T. 1988 *The Enchanted Glass*, London, Radius
- Napoleoni, C. 1972 *Economic Thought of the Twentieth Century*, London, Martin Robertson
- Nisbet, R. 1966 *The Sociological Tradition*, New York, Basic Books
- O'Brien, P. J. 1975 'A Critique of Latin American Theories of Dependency' in Oxaal, I. et al. *Beyond the Sociology of Development*, London, Routledge

- Ohmae, K. 1990 *A Borderless World*, Tokyo, Kodansha
- Ormerod, P. 1994 *The Death of Economics*, London, Faber
- Oxaal, I. et al. 1975 *Beyond the Sociology of Development*, London, Routledge
- Palma, G. 1978 'Dependency: A Formal Theory of Underdevelopment or a Methodology for the Analysis of Concrete Situations of Underdevelopment', *World Development*, 6
- Pandy, B. N. 1980 *South and Southeast Asia 1945-1979: Problems and Policies*, London, Macmillan
- Passmore, J. 1968 *A Hundred Years of Philosophy*, Harmondsworth, Penguin
- Passmore, J. 1971 *The Perfectibility of Man*, London, Duckworth
- Peet, R. 1991 *Global Capitalism: Theories of Societal Development*, London, Routledge
- Petras, J., Zeitlin, M. eds. 1968 *Latin America: Reform or Revolution*, Greenwich, Fawcett
- Pheby, J. 1988 *Methodology and Economics: A Critical Introduction*, London, Macmillan
- Piore, M., Sabel, C. 1984 *The Second Industrial Divide*, New York, Basic Books
- Plant, R. 1991 *Modern Political Thought*, Oxford, Blackwell
- Pollard, S. 1971 *The Idea of Progress*, Harmondsworth, Penguin
- Postan, M. M. 1967 *An Economic History of Western Europe 1945-1964*, London, Methuen
- Prebisch, R. 1950 *The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems*, New York, United Nations Publications
- Preston, P. W. 1982 *Theories of Development*, London, Routledge
- Preston, P. W. 1983 'A Critique of Some Elements of the Residual Common Sense of Development Studies', *Cultures et Developpement*, 15
- Preston, P. W. 1985 *New Trends in Development Theory*, London, Routledge
- Preston, P. 1986 *Making Sense of Development*, London, Routledge
- Preston, P. W. 1987 *Rethinking Development*, London, Routledge
- Preston, P. W. 1994a *Discourses of Development: State, Market and Polity in the Analysis of Complex Change*, Aldershot, Avebury
- Preston, P. W. 1994b *Europe, Democracy and the Dissolution of Britain*, Aldershot, Dartmouth
- Preston, P. W. 1995 'The Debate on the Pacific Asian Miracle Considered' in idem ed. *Aspects of Complex Change in Asia*, Occasional Paper 7, Department of Anthropology and Sociology, Universiti Kebangsaan, Malaysia
- Pusey, M. 1991 *Economic Rationalism in Canberra: A Nation-Building State Changes its Mind*, Cambridge University Press
- Redclift, M., Benton, T. eds. 1994 *Social Theory and the Global Environment*, London, Routledge
- Rendall, J. 1978 *The Origins of the Scottish Enlightenment*, London, Macmillan
- Reuschmeyer, D. 1986 *Power and the Division of Labour*, Cambridge, Polity
- Reuschmeyer, D. et al. 1992 *Capitalist Development and Democracy*, Cambridge, Polity
- Reynolds, H. 1982 *The Other Side of the Frontier*, Penguin Australia, Ringwood
- Rhodes, R. I. 1968 'The Disguised Conservatism of Evolutionary Development Theory', *Science and Society*, 32
- Robertson, F. 1980 *An Anthropology of Planned Development*, Cambridge University Press

- Robinson, J. 1962 *Economic Philosophy*, Harmondsworth, Penguin
- Rocher, G. 1974 *Talcott Parsons and American Sociology*, London, Nelson
- Root, M. 1993 *Philosophy of Social Science*, Oxford, Blackwell
- Rosenberg, A. 1938 *Democracy and Socialism*, London
- Rostow, W. W. 1956 'The Take-Off into Self-Sustained Growth', *Economic Journal*, 66
- Rostow, W. W. 1960 *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*, Cambridge University Press
- Rostow, W. W. 1990 *Theorists of Economic Growth from David Hume to the Present*, Oxford University Press
- Roxborough, I. 1970 *Theories of Underdevelopment*, London, Macmillan
- Runciman, G. 1972 *Critique of Weber's Philosophy of Social Science*, Cambridge University Press
- Ryle, G. 1949 *The Concept of Mind*, London, Hutchinson
- Sachs, I. 1976 *The Discovery of the Third World*, London, MIT Press
- Sachs, W. ed. 1992 *The Development Dictionary*, London, Zed
- Sahay, A. ed. 1971 *Max Weber and Modern Sociology*, London, Routledge
- Sahlins, M. 1972 *Stoneage Economics*, London, Tavistock
- Said, E. 1993 *Culture and Imperialism*, London, Chatto
- Scammel, W. M. 1980 *The International Economy Since 1945*, London, Macmillan
- Schiell, T. 1987 'Wallerstein's Concept of a Modern World System: Another Marxist Critique', *University of Bielefeld Sociology of Development Research Centre Working Papers*, 89
- Scholte, A. 1993 *International Relations of Social Change*, Milton Keynes, Open University Press
- Scott, J. C. 1976 *The Moral Economy of the Peasant*, Yale University Press
- Scott, J. C. 1985 *Weapons of the Weak*, Yale University Press
- Seers, D. 1963 'The Limitations of the Special Case', *Oxford Bulletin of Statistics*, 25
- Seers, D. 1979 'Patterns of Dependency' in Villamil, J. J. ed. *Transnational Capitalism and National Development: New Perspectives on Dependence*, Harvester
- Seers, D. ed. 1981 *Dependency Theory: A Critical Reassessment*, London, Pinter
- Skinner, Q. ed. 1985 *The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences*, Cambridge University Press
- Sklair, L. 1991 *Sociology of the Global System*, Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf
- Smart, B. 1993 *Postmodernity*, London, Routledge
- Smelser, N. 1968 *Essays in Sociological Explanation*, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall
- Smith, A. D. 1973 *The Concept of Social Change*, London, Routledge
- Smith, A. D. 1976 *Social Change: Social Theory and Historical Process*, London, Routledge
- Smith, D. 1987 *The Rise and Fall of Monetarism*, Harmondsworth, Penguin
- Smith, D. 1991 *The Rise of Historical Sociology*, Cambridge, Polity
- Solow, R. 1956 'A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth', *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 70
- Spybey, T. 1992 *Social Change, Development and Dependency*, Cambridge, Polity

- Stavehagen, R. 1968 'Seven Erroneous Theses on Latin America' in Petras, J., Zeitlin, M. eds. *Latin America: Reform or Revolution*, Greenwich, Fawcett
- Strange, S. 1988 *States and Markets*, London, Pinter
- Streeten, P. 1970 'An Institutional Critique of Development Concepts', *Journal of European Sociology*, 11
- Streeten, P. 1972 *The Frontiers of Development Studies*, London, Macmillan
- Streeten, P. 1981 *Development Perspectives*, London, Macmillan
- Streeten, P. ed. 1970 *Unfashionable Economics: Essays in Honour of Lord Balogh*, London, Weidenfeld
- Sturrock, J. 1986 *Structuralism*, London, Paladin
- Sunkel, O. 1969 'National Development Policy and External Dependency in Latin America', *Journal of Development Studies*, 6
- Sunkel, O., Fuenzalida, E. 1979 'Transnationalization and Its National Consequences', in Villamil, J. J. ed. *Transnational Capitalism and National Development: New Perspectives on Dependence*, Hassocks, Harvester
- Swedberg, R. 1987 'Economic Sociology Past and Present', *Current Sociology*, 35
- Sweezy, P. 1942 *The Theory of Capitalist Development*, Oxford University Press
- Sztompka, P. 1993 *The Sociology of Social Change*, Oxford, Blackwell
- Taylor, J. G. 1979 *From Modernization to Modes of Production*, London, Macmillan
- Thorne, C. 1986 *The Far Eastern War: States and Societies 1941-45*, London, Unwin
- Thurrow, L. 1992 *Head to Head: The Coming Economic Battle Amongst Japan, Europe and America*, New York, Morrow
- Tippis, D. C. 1976 'Modernisation Theory and the Comparative Study of Societies: A Critical Perspective' in Black, C. E. ed. *Comparative Modernization*, London, Collier
- Todaro, M. P. 1982 *Economics for a Developing World*, London, Longman
- Toye, J. 1987 *Dilemmas of Development*, Oxford, Blackwell
- Tribe, K. 1978 *Land, Labour and Economic Discourse*, London, Routledge
- Turner, B. S. 1992 *Max Weber: From History to Modernity*, London, Routledge
- United Nations 1951 *Measures for the Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries*, New York, United Nations Publications
- United Nations 1995 *Yearbook of the United Nations: Special Edition UN Fiftieth Anniversary*, The Hague, Kluwer Law International
- United Nations Development Programme 1990 *Human Development Report 1990*, Oxford University Press
- van der Pijl, K. 1984 *The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class*, London, Verso
- van Wolferen, K. 1993 *The Enigma of Japanese Power*, Tokyo, Tuttle
- Villamil, J. J. ed. 1979 *Transnational Capitalism and National Development: New Perspectives on Dependence*, Hassocks, Harvester
- Wogel, E. 1980 *Japan as Number One*, Tokyo, Tuttle
- Walker, M. 1993 *The Cold War and the Making of the Modern World*, London, Fourth Estate
- Zallerstein, I. 1974 *The Modern World System*, New York, Academic
- Zard, H. 1995 'Rational Choice Theory' in Marsh, D., Stoker, G. eds. *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, London, Macmillan
- Zhite, G. ed. 1988 *Developmental States in East Asia*, London, Macmillan
- Zhite, J. 1973 *The Politics of Foreign Aid*, London, Bodley Head
- Zilkinson, E. 1990 *Japan versus the West: Image and Reality*, Harmondsworth,

- Willems, P. 1978 *The Non-Aligned Movement*, London, Pinter
- Williams, R. 1973 'Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory', *New Left Review*, 82
- Woodcock, G. 1969 *The British in the Far East*, London, Weidenfeld
- Woodiwiss, A. 1993 *Postmodernity USA: The Crisis of Social Modernism in Post-war America*, London, Sage
- World Bank 1993 *The East Asian Miracle*, Oxford University Press
- Worsley, P. 1964 *The Third World*, London, Weidenfeld
- Worsley, P. 1982 *Marx and Marxism*, Milton Keynes, Open University Press
- Worsley, P. 1984 *The Three Worlds: Culture and World Development*, London, Weidenfeld
- Yearley, S. 1994 'Social Movements and Environmental Change' in Redclift, M., Benton, T., eds. *Social Theory and the Global Environment*, London, Routledge
- Zeitlin, I. 1968 *Ideology and the Development of Sociological Theory*, New York, Prentice-Hall
- Zeylstra, G. 1977 *Aid or Development*, Leiden, A. W. Sijthoff