124 Probability and confidence Chap. 7 the problem. Any attempt to base the initial belief on guesswork or instinct must be unscientific and unreliable. The only strict way to justify an initial degree of belief is by the equally likely method introduced in section 7V^| As we saw, this does not work in a continuous case. * 7.1.6 Conclusions on Probability Thus probability can be considered as the limit of a frequency, as an objective number or as a subjective degree of belief. This has been a very quick look at a very deep subject, and you should be aware that there are serious differences even within these camps. Beware, too, of names: some people refer to the frequency definition of probability as 'objective', the Bayesians call the frequentists 'classical', and the frequentists call the equally likely school 'classical'. Why have we opened this can of worms? There is no point in arguing the claims of rival schools: you can adopt whatever definition you please, and use arguments about the merits of different definitions as an amusing conversation topic. What matters is that you should be aware of what you are doing, and do not mix up thoughts, ideas, and formulae from the different definitions. Most scientists, if challenged, would claim to belong to the frequency school. Propensities and Bayesian statistics are strictly unorthodox and heretical. However, although we claim to adopt the frequency definition, in our innermost hearts we probably think of probabilities as objective numben, and often talk in language appropriate to Bayesian probabilities. In particular^ any attempt to interpret the results of an experiment falls into the trap of: repeatability. Suppose you measure the mass of the electron as 520+ 10keV/c2. Thil is a clear statement; you have obtained a result of 520keV/c2 with an apparatus of known resolution 10keV/c2. You may then say, on the basis of your value, that 'the mass of the electron probably lies clow to 520keV/c2' or even make the more numerically detailed statement that 'the value lies between 510 and 530, with a 68% probability'. Either statement is, in von Mises' view, 'unscientific' and incompatible with your claimed adherence to the frequency definition. The electron has just one mall (it happens to be 511 keV/c2) and it either lies within your error bar or outside it. Such statements are really using subjective, Bayesian, arguments. Befon the experiment you know nothing about mf, so you considei all possibilitiei equally likely." tytfty x_) = P(x)dx = C (7.6) Bind whether they exceed it by a little or a lot is irrelevant. Careful! It must be emphasized that the upper limit of a 95% central ■ confidence interval, and the 95% upper limit, are not the same thing. The ■ former has 97.5% of the probability content below it and 2.5% above; the ■ latter has 95% below and 5% above. A 7.2.2 Confidence Intervals in Estimation Suppose we want to know the value of a parameter X, and have estimated I It from the data, giving a result x. We know about the resolution of our ■ measurements, and thus V(x) and its square root a. The problem is to turn I our knowledge of x and a into a statement, of the confidence level type, about I the true value X. The naive answer is to turn it round and say 'X lies within x — a and I x + a, with 68% confidence, and within x -2a and x + 2