+ Focus on leniency

Lecture 

1. Definition 
2. Stability of cartel
   • One-shot and finitely repeated game (payoff matrix for a Cournot duopoly)
   • Infinitely repeated game
   • Evidence from legal cartels:
     • Finnish manufacturing industries in 1951–1990 (Hyytinen et al., 2018, Fig. 3)
     • Norwegian cement industry (Roller and Steen, 2006)
3. Antitrust and leniency
   • Classroom experiment (slides) based on Hinloopen and Soetevant (2008)
   • Impact on cartel stability (slides)

Seminar

• Homework for all:  Carefully read the introduction of Miller (2009) and Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008). You should be able to answer questions about the main story of one of the papers (from your memory).
• Projects:
  • Task 1:  Summarize the main results of Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008) with a focus working of leniency.  Check whether they find protection from fines motive.  Explain the protection from fines motive (you can refer to Spagnolo (2005) as well).
    Presentation by Ladislav
  • Task 2:  Replicate the empirical analysis of Miller (2009) (see the attached data and code in Stata. It is forbidden to share the data, especially to upload it to ChatGPT). Using RStudio (or equivalent), Markdown, or a presentation, go through the code and explain step-by-step how you created the main results (not necessary to discuss all tables and figures) of the paper.