POL618 Political Corruption

Faculty of Social Studies
Autumn 2018
Extent and Intensity
1/1/0. 4 credit(s). Type of Completion: zk (examination).
Teacher(s)
Mgr. Aneta Pinková, Ph.D. (lecturer)
Guaranteed by
doc. PhDr. Stanislav Balík, Ph.D.
Department of Political Science – Faculty of Social Studies
Contact Person: Mgr. Lucie Pospíšilová
Supplier department: Department of Political Science – Faculty of Social Studies
Timetable
Tue 25. 9. 8:00–11:40 PC26, Tue 16. 10. 8:00–11:40 PC26, Tue 30. 10. 8:00–11:40 PC26, Tue 13. 11. 8:00–11:40 PC26, Tue 27. 11. 8:00–11:40 PC26
Prerequisites (in Czech)
!NOW( BSS465 Politická korupce ) && ! BSS465 Politická korupce
Course Enrolment Limitations
The course is also offered to the students of the fields other than those the course is directly associated with.
fields of study / plans the course is directly associated with
Course objectives
The course offers the possibility of more profound understanding of political corruption, its causes and consequences. It will deal both with theoretical and methodological issues related to the study of corruption (such as definition, operationalization, measurement, etc.) and practical/empirical problems such as anti-corruption policies, corruption in legislation, etc.
Learning outcomes
Students will be able to:
– explain advantages and weaknesses of various definitions of corruption;
– describe and compare different forms of clientelism;
– describe and assess various anti-corruption strategies;
– describe possible impacts of corruption on the quality of democracy and the political system;
Syllabus
  • 1. Defining and measuring corruption;
  • 2. Clientelism, social organization of corrutpion;
  • 3. Corruption in legislation;
  • 4. Anti-corruption strategies;
  • 5. Corruption and democracy, discussion on literature;
Literature
    required literature
  • • Johnston, Michael. 2018. Democratic Norms, Political Money, and Corruption. In. Kubbe, Ina and Engelbert Annika (eds.) Corruption and Norms: Why Informal Rules Matter. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 13–30.
  • • Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina. 2013. “Controlling Corruption Through Collective Action.” Journal of Democracy vol. 24(1), s. 86–99.
  • • Chabová, Krisýna. 2017. Measuring corruption in Europe: public opinion surveys and composite indices. Quality & Quantity, 51(4), pp. 1877-1900. (https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11135-016-0372-8)
  • • Kpundeh. Sahr. 1997. Political Will in Fighting Corruption. UNDP-PACT and OECD Development Centre Workshop on Corruption and Integrity Improvement Initiatives in the Context of Developing Economies, Paris, 1997.
  • • OECD. 2012. Lobbying: influencing decision making with transparency and integrity (http://www.oecd.org/cleangovbiz/toolkit/50101671.pdf)
  • • Miller, Nicholas R. 1999. Logrolling. An entry in The Encyclopedia of Democratic Thought (Routledge) edited by Paul Barry Clarke and Joe Foweraker. (https://userpages.umbc.edu/~nmiller/RESEARCH/LOGROLLING.pdf)
  • • Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 1999. Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 113-126.
  • • Evans, Diana. 2004. Greasing The Wheels: Using Pork Barell Projects to Build Majority Coalitions in Congress, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-25.
  • • Pinková Aneta. 2015. Corruption and democracy in East Central Europe, in: Holzer, Jan – Mareš, Miroslav (eds.), Challenges to Democracies in East Central Europe, London, and New York: Routledge, pp. 91-111.
  • • Gardiner, John A. 2001. Defining Corruption, in: Heidenheimer, Arnold J. – Johnston, M. (eds.): Political Corruption, Concepts & Contexts. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, pp. 25-40.
  • • Muno, Wolfgang. 2013. Clientelist corruption networks: conceptual and empirical approaches, in: Debiel, T. – Gawrich, A. (eds.): (Dys-)Functionalities of Corruption: Comparative Perspectives and Methodological Pluralism. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, pp. 33-
  • • Kobis, Nils, C. – Iragorri-Carter, Daniel – Starke, Christopher. A Social Psychological View on the Social Norms of Corruption. In. Kubbe, Ina and Engelbert Annika (eds.) Corruption and Norms: Why Informal Rules Matter. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 31
  • • Kurer, Oskar. 2001. Why do Voters Support Corrupt Politicians? In Arvind K. Jain (ed). The Political Economy of Corruption. London: Routledge. pp. 63-86. (http://www.untag-smd.ac.id/files/Perpustakaan_Digital_1/CORRUPTION%20The%20political%20economy%20
Teaching methods
lectures, class discussion, reading, presentations of written assignments by students.
Assessment methods
100 points total 15 points maximum for each seminar assignment and participation. Points for final essay will be awarded only if the student demonstrates knowledge of the literature. Final written exam: 40 points: student chooses 4 questions out of 8 to answer. Minimum of 24 points from the test is required to complete the course.
Language of instruction
English
Further comments (probably available only in Czech)
Study Materials
The course is taught annually.
  • Enrolment Statistics (recent)
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