POLb1123 Game Theory and Political Decision Making

Faculty of Social Studies
Spring 2020
Extent and Intensity
1/1/0. 4 credit(s). Type of Completion: zk (examination).
Teacher(s)
Mgr. Lenka Hrbková, Ph.D. (lecturer)
doc. PhDr. Roman Chytilek, Ph.D. (lecturer)
Mgr. Bronislav Jaroš (seminar tutor)
Mgr. Tomáš Zwiefelhofer (seminar tutor)
Guaranteed by
doc. PhDr. Roman Chytilek, Ph.D.
Department of Political Science – Faculty of Social Studies
Contact Person: Mgr. Lucie Pospíšilová
Supplier department: Division of Politology – Department of Political Science – Faculty of Social Studies
Timetable
Thu 20. 2. 14:00–15:40 exP24, Thu 27. 2. 14:00–15:40 exP24, Thu 5. 3. 14:00–15:40 exP24, Thu 12. 3. 14:00–15:40 exP24, Thu 19. 3. 14:00–15:40 exP24, Thu 26. 3. 14:00–15:40 exP24, Thu 2. 4. 14:00–15:40 exP24, Thu 9. 4. 14:00–15:40 exP24, Thu 23. 4. 14:00–15:40 exP24, Thu 30. 4. 14:00–15:40 exP24, Thu 7. 5. 14:00–15:40 exP24, Thu 14. 5. 14:00–15:40 exP24
Prerequisites (in Czech)
! POL203 Game Theory and Decisions && !NOW( POL203 Game Theory and Decisions ) && (TYP_STUDIA(B))
Course Enrolment Limitations
The course is also offered to the students of the fields other than those the course is directly associated with.
The capacity limit for the course is 52 student(s).
Current registration and enrolment status: enrolled: 0/52, only registered: 0/52, only registered with preference (fields directly associated with the programme): 0/52
fields of study / plans the course is directly associated with
there are 42 fields of study the course is directly associated with, display
Course objectives
Objective of the course: To introduce students to the way in which the view of decision making in politics is influenced by economics and psychology. Both traditions are complementary: economic theory brings concepts such as benefit, preference, rationality, strategy, equilibrium, risk and others into the analysis of decision making. Psychology deconstructs and complements their assumptions of concepts such as errors in judgment or heuristics. During the course, "micro-foundations" of policy-mechanisms representing decision-making of political actors will be presented.
Learning outcomes
At the end the students should be able: - use the basics in the political science game theory ;
- distinguish between cooperative and non-cooperative game theory ;
- understand its applications in the study of politics ;
- develop their own game theory models ;
Syllabus
  • 1. Introductory lesson: What is the theory of games: do economists, habits, or oxytocin shape our decisions?;
  • 2. Basic concepts of game theory: rationality and utility, games in strategic and extensive form.;
  • 3. Classical Game Theory I. Games of two players, equilibrium. The dilemma of the prisoner's dilemma;
  • 4. Classical Game Theory II.;
  • 5. Sequential and repeated games.;
  • 6. Cooperation: cooperative games or cooperative solutions?;
  • 7. Nested games. Politics as a nested game. Game theory, political manipulation, and heresthetics;
  • 8. Behavioral theory of games, behavioral decision theory, limited rationality;
  • 9. ´Game week: Laboratory work;
  • 10. Prosocial preferences;
  • 11. Reciprocity;
  • 12. Guilt, disappointment and the effect of the others eyes;
  • 13. Cultural Variations of BGT Knowledge;
Literature
  • Fehr, Ernst, Schneider, Frédéric. (2010) Eyes are on Us, But Nobody Cares: Are Eye Cues Relevant for Strong Reciprocity? Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, Vol. 277(1686), p. 1315-1323.8s.
  • Herrmann Benedikt., Thöni Christian., Gächter Simon. (2008) Antisocial punishment across societies, Science, 319(5868), p.1362-7.
  • Charness G., Rabin M. (2002) Understanding social preferences with simple tests.
  • Falk A. et al. (2008) Testing theories of fairness. Intentions matter. Games and Economic Behavior, 62, p. 287-303
  • Ellingsen, Tore, Johannesson, Magnus, Tjotta, Sigve a Torsvik, Gaute. Testing Guilt Aversion. 2010. Games and Economic Behavior.
  • Eitan Tzelgov. 2014. "Damned if you do and damned if you don't: Rhetorical heresthetic in the Israeli Knesset," Party Politics, 20, 964-982
  • KAHNEMAN, Daniel. Myšlení - rychlé a pomalé. Translated by Eva Nevrlá. Vydání první. V Brně: Jan Melvil, 2012, 542 stran. ISBN 9788087270424. URL info
  • MCCAIN, Roger A. Game theory : non-technical introduction to the analysis of strategy. Mason, Ohio: Thomson South-Western, 2004, xxiv, 391. ISBN 0324206445. info
  • TSEBELIS, George. Veto players :how political institutions work. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002, xvii, 317. ISBN 0-691-09989-8. info
  • MORROW, James D. Game theory for political scientists. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, xx, 376 s. ISBN 0-691-03430-3. info
  • TSEBELIS, George. Nested games : rational choice in comparative politics. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990, xiv, 274. ISBN 0520076516. info
  • RIKER, William H. The art of political manipulation. New Haven: Yale university press, 1986, xiii, 152. ISBN 0300035926. info
Teaching methods
Lectures in combination with seminars
Assessment methods
Written test (65 pts. max.) and laboratory protocol (35 pts. max.). In order to complete the course, it is neccessary to score 60 pts. or more: A:100-91, B:90-81, C:80-74, D:73-66, E:65-60, F: 59 or less
Language of instruction
Czech
Further comments (probably available only in Czech)
Study Materials
The course is taught annually.
The course is also listed under the following terms Spring 2021, Spring 2023, Spring 2024.
  • Enrolment Statistics (Spring 2020, recent)
  • Permalink: https://is.muni.cz/course/fss/spring2020/POLb1123